This essay defends a reading of Hegel as a metametaphysical antirealist. Metametaphysical antirealism is a denial that metaphysics has as its subject matter answers to theoretical questions about the mind-independent world. Hence, on this view, metaphysical questions are not, in principle, knowledge transcendent. I hold that Hegel presents a version of metametaphysical antirealism in the Science of Logic because he pursues his project by suspending reference to all supposed objects of metaphysical theory as practiced before him. Hegel introduces reference in (...) his theory only by the self-reference of thought to itself in the Doctrine of the Concept. I motivate the relevance of Hegel’s approach to metaphysics by comparing it to Kit Fine’s (2017) concept of “naïve metaphysics.” I argue that Hegel’s theory results from a comprehensively naïve metaphysics. (shrink)

Hegel often says that his "logic" is meant to replace metaphysics. Since Hegel's Science of Logic is so different from a standard logic, most commentators have not treated the portion of that work devoted to logical forms as relevant to this claim. This paper argues that Hegel's discussion of logical forms of judgment and syllogism is meant to be the foundation of his reformation of metaphysics. Implicit in Hegel's discussion of the logical forms is the view that the metaphysical concepts (...) discussed in Books I and II of the Science of Logic supervene on the role of subject and predicate terms in the logical forms discussed in Book III. Hegel thus has an explanation for the nature and significance of metaphysical concepts that resembles Kant's "metaphysical deduction," according to which the categories can be derived from the table of judgments. Though Hegel's metaphysics is often supposed to be influenced by Kant, prevailing interpretations do not show how Hegel's fine-grained treatment of logical forms is relevant to his critical view of metaphysics. The present interpretation provides a model for Hegel's explanation of metaphysical concepts, as well as a new picture of the structure of his Science of Logic that emphasizes the priority of its Doctrine of the Concept. (shrink)

While the idea of philosophy as conceptual analysis has attracted many adherents and undergone a number of variations, in general it suffers from an authority problem with two dimensions. First, it is unclear why the analysis of a concept should have objective authority: why explicating what we mean should express how things are. Second, conceptual analysis seems to lack intersubjective authority: why philosophical analysis should apply to more than a parochial group of individuals. I argue that Hegel’s conception of social (...) ontology, focused on his concept of “ethical life” (Sittlichkeit), helps to explain how concepts (and their explication) have both objective and intersubjective authority in the social domain. Hegel claims that modern institutions are the product of self-conscious purposes, so that they are conceptually constituted. Concepts do not just represent these objects and so depend on a contingent relation to them. As many contemporary social ontologists agree, this means that our concepts of these institutions are uniquely epistemically “transparent.” They have objective authority. Concepts have intersubjective authority in the modern world as well, according to Hegel. However, I show that this feature of Hegel’s account does not rely on the solution to a philosophical problem. Rather, since the concepts of modern ethical life are “essentially contested,” their content depends on the practical and political agreement of modern subjects. This means that concepts can only have objective authority if some prior intersubjective agreement has been reached. The role of philosophy as conceptual analysis is thus importantly dependent on political developments. (shrink)

When the "human sciences" in the West followed the physical sciences in the 18th and 19th centuries with new measurements, methods, and language, the "metaphysics of infinity" lost its credibility. The response of Western religions was to retrench in a stronger authoritarianism, especially by the last half of the 19th century. While the new human sciences were being extended even to study the history and philosophy of religions, those religions themselves placed more emphasis on their understanding of the Absolute or (...) Unquestionable. That split became a burden both to those who were religious and to those who were not. Here, W. Royce Clark argues that humanity's survival may depend on the development of a universal or inclusive ethic in which religions move beyond their Absolutes. Clark poses the sharp challenge: Are religious communities ready to abandon the foundations that until now they have insisted were the only adequate foundation for ethics? (shrink)

In den drei Büchern der Schrift Über die Seele begründet Aristoteles erst-mals eine philosophische Psychologie als eigene Disziplin, welche empirisch von den Lebensfunktionen auf allen Stufen des Lebendigen ausgehend zu definitorischen Bestimmungen der verschiedenen seelischen Prinzipien kommt, besonders auch zum Vernunftprinzip des Menschen. Diese Ausgabe stützt sich auf die bekannten großen kommentierten Ausgaben des letzten und dieses Jahrhunderts. Der griechische Text ist der Teubner-Ausgabe entnommen; einige Varianten der Oxforder Ausgabe von Ross sind verzeichnet worden. Die Übersetzung orientiert sich an W. (...) Theiler, sucht jedoch eigene Wege des geeigneten Ausdrucks und gliedert zum besseren Verständnis häufiger Sinneinheiten ab, denen der Kommentar folgt. Mit Einleitung, Literaturhinweisen und Registern zum griechischen und deutschen Text. (shrink)

To give concrete meaning to the phrase "Art for Life's Sake," Jenkins assumes that "the general purpose that animates all of man's activities and artifacts is adaptation to the environment and satisfaction of the conditions of life." A phenomenological survey of human experience reveals three basic modes of viewing or adapting to the world--the affective, the cognitive, and the aesthetic. Each is intertwined with the others, and all three are necessary if man is to adapt to his environment; but as (...) one or another mode dominates experience, attention is focused on the self, the relatedness of entities, and the particular entities themselves. The view of art that emerges is a reformulation of the imitation theory; skillfully and systematically applied to the persistent facts of aesthetic life, it offers solid, common-sense illumination of traditionally obscure problems.--D. W. S. (shrink)

In this study of aesthetics during the eight decades from 1755 to 1833, Will argues that those thinkers who steered away from the dualistic, neo-classical concern with ideal beauty and turned to a monistic, organic approach to the intelligibility of beauty were pushing the Platonic-Plotinian tradition toward clearer thought concerning beauty, and were also laying the groundwork for Hegel's idealism. He concludes that Hegel's systematization of this strand of thought constitutes "an oblique argument in favor of the major tradition of (...) philosophical idealism."--D. W. S. (shrink)

Whitehead's remarks on man, social problems, education, religion, and history have been extracted from his technical works and placed side by side to form an account in familiar terminology of Whitehead's theory of civilization. In context, occurring almost as afterthoughts illustrating abstract metaphysical principles, these remarks constitute brilliant flashes of humanistic insight; abstracted from context, they become platitudinous. Only when, in the final chapter, Johnson adumbrates their metaphysical setting, does one feel any of the excitement of seeing the values of (...) Western democracy emerge from a speculative account of the nature of things. --D. W. S. (shrink)

This Norwegian philosopher feels that the search for a unified theory of man rationally imposes itself, in spite of the radically diverse and contradictory views of man inherent in Western thought. Rambling observations on the implications regarding man of religion, science, and philosophy, phenomenological method, and the role of contemporary culture upon philosophizing, lead to the conclusion that reason should never be equated with one of its successful methodologies, but rather is constructive structural thinking upon our background experience.--E. W.

A critique of Dewey's ethics. Arguing from a Thomistic point of view, Bausola claims that Dewey's ethics lacks adequate speculative grounding, but provides an occasionally useful anti-formalist attitude.--E. W.

A popular introduction to Hinduism. Religion is fundamentally experience, and since all men start from the cultural formation they actually have, Hinduism tolerates all forms of religion, while encouraging the evolution to higher forms. The second half of the book deals with a few basic Hindu concepts. The lack of critical, self-reforming energies in the Hindu fold of the last few centuries is criticized unflinchingly.--E. W.

In fascicles 9 through 12 of this volume, Weiss continues his analyses of art and begins to develop themes for his discussion of history and religion. There are also significant and lengthy sections devoted to metaphilosophy with critiques of Kant, Hegel, and Wittgenstein. The discussion of the arts reaches a degree of insight and breadth of synthesis not matched in the earlier fascicles, nor in The World of Art and The Nine Basic Arts. For here Weiss achieves a systematic relation (...) between fundamental concepts of Modes of Being and those of his aesthetic theory that is both less strained and schematic and more fruitful than any found elsewhere. The discussions of history are less happy, too quickly generalized and formalized in cosmic terms. The sections on religion are, however, excellent. Predominantly Christian themes are discussed at length. Weiss's metaphysics seems naturally sympathetic in their analysis. The metaphilosophy provides a valuable insight into Weiss's working habits and reveals what is, paradoxically, both a major strength and weakness-his appreciation of the formal and schematic demands of systematic thought. This appreciation can lead to productive analysis and insight, but also beyond experience and understanding. It is to Weiss's credit that these working journals show the dangerous side of his philosophic technique far more often than his regular, published work does. Now that we have the entire first volume of these journals, a few words must be said about their value as published works. They are, first, a useful, two-way bridge joining Weiss's formal, metaphysical works and his more descriptive, phenomenological works, such as The World of Art, Nine Basic Arts, History: Written and Lived, The God We Seek, etc.). Such a bridge is not absolutely necessary for one reasonably familiar with the whole of Weiss's published work, but it is helpful, especially to one beginning a study of Weiss with the more speculative formal writings. As independent works, the journals frequently provide valuable insights, suggest previously unsuspected avenues of analysis and inquiry, and demonstrate a level of argument and mode of explanation all too often ignored by contemporary philosophers. They should be read as what they are, journals, much as one would read Pepys' Diary. The Index is a thorough, accurate, and necessary tool for reference.—W. G. E. (shrink)

"The intent of this book," according to the author, "is to document the existence in man of two major modes of consciousness: one is analytic, the other holistic." They are sometimes called, he observes, "the ‘rational’ and ‘intuitive’ sides of man." In this connection, he adduces Roger Bacon’s apposite dictum: "There are two modes of knowing, those of argument and experience." A notable recent finding on the brain correlates of reason and intuition is summarized in the present book as follows: (...) "The left hemisphere of the cortex, which subtends language and mathematics, seems to process information in a linear, sequential manner... The right side of the cortex processes its input more as a ‘patterned whole'." That is, science, for example, uses the left side of the brain, while nonrational meditation exercises, procedures for expansion and concentration of consciousness, and the mystic experience, for example, involve the right side. The author sympathetically describes and analyzes a large variety of meditation methods as illustrating the intuitive path to knowledge, reports pertinent findings on biofeedback phenomena and other scientific grapplings with awareness disciplines and nonattachment systems, and concludes with a plea to scientific psychologists to train themselves rigorously in esoteric techniques. He also suggests, à propos of the "unitive" character of the mystic experience: "A shift toward a consciousness of the interconnectedness of life... might enable us to take those ’selfless’ steps that could begin to solve our collective problems." For philosophers who are open-minded on other ways of studying or making contact with reality than controlled observation, analysis, induction, theory-making, verification, and revision, this book should prove useful, both because it provides a rich collection of data and because it suggests directions for achieving a synoptic view.—W. G. (shrink)

This short, suggestive essay was the 1972 Aquinas Lecture at Marquette. It contains an outline of Findlay’s critique of "mechanistic neuralism," i.e., belief in "invariant, isolable factors and rigorous laws governing their interaction." In a manner reminiscent of Bergson, he sees this view as the product of specifically intellectual activity which naturally produces a "world of remote objects, all fully interpreted, which stand over against our subjectivity...." Speculative and experimental neurology thus present a view of mind in which the self (...) is identified with the cerebrum. "The cerebrum... becomes the true man... to whom we attribute all our highest preceptive, cogitative, emotional and practical feats". Findlay attacks no particular version of this view. His main concern is to argue against the tendency in thought. He holds that the difficulties faced by a through-going cerebralism are purely logical, and he sketches a number of arguments designed to expose some of the problems involved in reductionist accounts of perception, thought, and action. What makes the essay particularly interesting is the way in which it incorporates scattered but important insights of Wittgenstein, Husserl, and Hegel which bear significantly on any treatment of the mind-brain problem. What is frustrating is the pervasive generality of Findlay’s characterization of "cerebralism." No cerebralist is identified, and no recent defense of the position is discussed or referred to in detail. Perhaps this is both unavoidable and appropriate in a public lecture. But it may leave the reader wondering how Findlay’s critical points apply to recent important discussions of the problem.—J. W. (shrink)

A book whose primary concern is to show the possibility of making objective value judgments within a context that acknowledges the inescapable historicity of the human situation. Mr. Stern discusses problems such as the nature of historical reality, the difference between past and present history, the questionable presuppositions of a teleological philosophy of history, and the confrontation in modernity between a doctrine of natural right and that of historicism. While accepting a kind of relativism consequent upon an historicist position, the (...) author finds a locus for objective moral evaluation in the universality of the human project. That men of all times are born, live, suffer, die, and welcome that which conduces to human well-being, enables us to condemn civilizations that have thwarted the human endeavor to conserve life. Although the means at the disposal of men to carry out the human project differ in different historical periods, what remains unalterable, according to Mr. Stern, is that at all times men praise what conduces to health and relieves suffering. While the author gives many cogent arguments in favor of his position, the "ontological status" of the universal human project remains, in the last analysis, problematic. To overcome historicism in the way that Mr. Stern sets out to do requires a more rigorous theory of knowledge and being than he offers us.—L. W. W. (shrink)

This is a one paragraph review of a book by Julius Simon, in German, which book detailed the German editions and reviews of Emerson. According to the review, the book, emphasizes themes in Emerson including "Verinnerlichung" and "Vergeistigung" "stimulated largely in reaction against Nietzsche.".

In the ninth century, Arabic philosophy was in ferment, and an inquisition of heretics was in process. Al-Kindi, a court scholar, physician, and philosopher functioning at Baghdad, courageously produced, in that context, a treatise, Fi al-Falsafah al-Ula, in which he attempted to unify the philosophical tradition, starting from Aristotle, with basic Islamic concepts. Part One of the treatise is here published for the first time in a non-Arabic language. Al-Kindi, in this treatise, tries to show, by philosophical reasoning, that the (...) world could not have come spontaneously into being ex nihilo, that there must be a unique, eternal being, and that the ad hoc unity and plurality of individual things rest on a prior, creative, self-subsisting, and eternal unity, which is the Ultimate Cause. This volume contains a résumé of al-Kindi studies, a description and analysis of the text, On First Philosophy, a "reevaluation" of al-Kindi’s relation to the Mu'Tazilah sect of Moslem theologians, a translation of On First Philosophy, and a learned passage-by-passage commentary on it, with perspicuous discussions of nuances in Arabic terminology. This is primarily a book for medieval specialists, but students of ontology and theology will find some of al-Kindi’s argumentation relevant to their concerns.—W.G. (shrink)

Reilly approaches his topic by presenting the spirit of science and the phases of scientific inquiry as Peirce saw it, keeping before the reader, at all times, Peirce’s overarching view of man and the universe. The two prevailing themes guiding Peirce’s thought are 1) that there is a special conformity of the human mind to nature and of nature to God, and 2) that there is an architectonic qualifying all the various types and levels of treatment which occupy the philosopher’s (...) interest. The first question examined is the nature of the scientific concern. For Peirce, the scientist’s spirit is marked by the pure love of knowledge. It is important to note the theoretical aspect because it explains the possibility of holding belief in abeyance while examining nature: the purity of motive allows that proper questions will be asked and errors will be readily corrected. The scientist’s purpose is the real truth of things; he begins with questions about the world. There are four stages of scientific method: 1) The scientist observes nature as a thinking, analytic inquirer. Observation presupposes that nature is intelligibly structured. 2) He formulates an explanatory hypothesis which is a process of bringing a manifold of characters to a unified whole. 3) By deduction, the inquirer gathers experiential consequents of the hypothesis. 4) By induction the question is put to nature and observed phenomena are matched to the predicted phenomena, resulting in either truth or a modified hypothesis. Peirce’s principle of the kinship of man’s mind to nature supports his dictum to follow instinct over reasoned likelihood in choosing hypotheses. Also important is the doctrine of moderate fallibilism which holds that there is a convergence upon the truth founded upon the regularity of nature, but that chance is a real factor due to nature’s evolution. Reilly’s book gives an adequate account of the aspects of Peirce’s scientific method sacrificing specific and detailed analysis to a more general approach wherein he shows the unity operative throughout Peirce’s thinking. A good index and copious notes are provided.—W. A. F. (shrink)

Hoping to overcome the deficiencies of Bailey and Dewitt, and taking into account the insights of Diano, Kleve, and Merlan, Rist presents this book as an accurate and complete doxology of Epicurus’ philosophy. The book is written in a condensed style where doctrines treated early in the book are not fully explained until the completion of later parts. In trying to pin down Epicurus, distinct from the Epicureans, he depends heavily upon Lucretius and the few extant writings of Epicurus himself, (...) but he does range over the works of all the later students and commentators. Even so, much is left either vaguely outlined or problematic, and what is accepted from the more distant or biased sources is judiciously measured against the more accepted teachings. There are seven major chapters dealing with the canonic, physics, man and the cosmos, soul and mind and body, pleasure, friendship, and gods and religion. Certain of the teachings presented have a bearing, one upon the other, throughout the book and do much toward showing some consistency and richness to Epicurus’ philosophy: In the canonic, three types of criteria for judging as to the existence of a thing or the truth of a proposition are explained, viz., sensation, general concepts, and feeling. In the physics, a crucial topic is the role of the swerve with its logical priority. In the cosmos, there is the developmental, evolutionary character of the universe. In the soul and body of man, the animus/anima distinction is worked out. The interrelation of all these is brought to bear on the central theme of pleasure and the gods. Pleasure, as the stable condition of the flesh and confident expectation of the future on this score, with complete absence of pain and anxiety, involves the physics, friendship, the soul of man, and the canonic. Also important to his teaching on pleasure is the interplay of those pleasures based upon want and that pleasure which is a state of untroubledness. Rist makes good use of the teachings of the canonic to establish the existence of the gods. In describing their structure, he shows how the gods, as detached exemplars, fit in with the physics and canonic, and with the teaching on pleasure and friendship. He assiduously refrains from interpreting the role of the gods in Epicurus’ philosophy, but with their existence so presented future interpretations should be much enriched. This book is a superb piece of scholarship and an invaluable aid to the study of Greek philosophy.—W. A. F. (shrink)

Günther Bornkamm, a chief disciple of Rudolph Bultmann, has gathered together a number of his expository articles in this volume. The chapters deal generally with themes familiar to Bultmann's aficionados, concentrating heavily on Paul's Epistle to the Romans and other letters of Paul. The chapters are headed "God's Word and Man's Word in the New Testament," "Christ and the World in the Early Christian Message," "Faith and Reason in Paul," "The Revelation of God's Wrath," "Baptism and New Life in Paul," (...) "Sin, Law and Death," "The Praise of God," "On Understanding the Christ-hymn," "Lord's Supper and Church in Paul," "On the Understanding of Worship," "The More Excellent Way." The translations of the articles are admirable, and were completed by Paul L. Hammer.--W. A. J. (shrink)

Following an analytical introduction by Weiss, this work presents writings by Maimonides on the dispositions of the soul, especially its virtues and vices; on equanimity and the achievement of mental health; on secular and religious authority; on the knowledge of good and evil; on reasoning in respect to right and wrong; on awaiting the Messiah; on repentance; and on war and peace. Aside from a few extracts from the Guide of the Perplexed, for which an existing translation by Shlomo Pines (...) is reprinted here, all the materials included were translated by one or both of the editors, including the letter to Joseph ben Judah on secular and religious authority, which was translated into English for the first time. The materials from which selections were made include Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah, his Commentary on the Mishneh, his Introduction to the Mishneh tractate "Chapters of the Fathers," and his Logic. Most of these works are articulations and defenses of traditional Jewish ethical mandates, developed by Maimonides in the light of his knowledge of philosophy.—W.G. (shrink)

In this lecture to the British Academy, Strawson points to inter-personal, "reactive attitudes" such as those of resentment, gratitude and forgiveness, as the key to getting around the usual arguments between "optimists" and "pessimists" concerning the alleged moral consequences of the thesis of determinism. These calculative arguments, he thinks, over-intellectualize the facts; the moral sentiments are given along with human society, and are not to be externally justified.--W. L. M.

Burkill sees Kant's critical philosophy as the source of a vicious dualism in modern philosophy, a dualism between the phenomenally contented and the phenomenally discontented. After two chapters spent making this point, sketching both Kant's basic position and his criticisms of it, the author briefly considers a multitude of post-Kantian philosophers of all varieties. He ends with a constructive solution of the dualism, offering a doctrine of God as the élan vital, a positive principle inherent in the nature of things, (...) open to a descriptive philosophy based on an empiricism which sees the world of experience as made up, not of discrete events, but of entities in dynamic interconnection.--W. G. E. (shrink)

A detailed study of Heidegger's views on the dialogue between poet and thinker. Allemann's discussion of Heidegger's neologistic experiments in philology point up the immense problem of translating the German's writing. Fédier's translation is an example of precision and self-effacement, though the resulting text suffers from an understandable heaviness.--W. L. M.

Seemingly, every mental act has a content or subject-matter. When I think, imagine, or hear, there appears to be a content or subject-matter of my thinking, imagining, or hearing. Now, what the difference is between this kind of content and the content of nonmental containers or containings, is a question which has beguiled even those thinkers, such as Ryle in England and physicalists in America, who are disinclined to recognize the mental as a separate ontic domain. When the problem of (...) isolating the nature of mental content or subject-matter was revived in the 19th century, Franz Brentano followed the Scholastics in calling these contents "intentions." The editor of the present volume, while noting that the concept of "intentionality has played a very central role in such philosophical movements as phenomenology, existentialism, and neo-Scholasticism," brings out the fact that this concept also, in recent years, was taken up by "philosophers in the analytical tradition as a powerful conceptual tool...." Seminal writings on the nature of intentionality by Frege, Russell, Carnap, Hempel, Ryle, Quine, Chisholm, Wilfrid Sellars, Thomas Nagel, Aune, Linsky, Hintikka, and others are brought together in this well-organized anthology, along with an introduction, a supplement containing unpublished Sellars correspondence with David M. Rosenthal, a bibliographical essay, and an index.—W. G. (shrink)

Shestov's name appears from time to time in existentialist literature. Camus, for example, refers approvingly to Shestov in The Myth of Sisyphus: "Shestov... tracks down, illuminates, and magnifies the human revolt against the irremediable." Kierkegaard and the Existential Philosophy was translated earlier into French and into Danish in 1947, and German in 1949. The Danes received Shestov's book with great appreciation, and were particularly happy about his attempt to relate Kierkegaard to such diverse thinkers as Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Nietzsche, Hegel, Spinoza, (...) Luther, and others. And that is what Shestov's work on Kierkegaard is fundamentally all about, an attempt to place Kierkegaard in the history of philosophical and theological thought. Shestov is appreciative of Kierkegaard as the great champion of the revelational character of the Christian faith. Revelation stands over against reason, and the truths of one cannot be reconciled with the truths of the other. Shestov attempts to set in opposition the proponents of a rationalistic philosophy, Socrates, Spinoza, Hegel, and Kant, and the advocates of Biblical faith, Job, Abraham, Paul, Luther, and Kierkegaard, arguing that a reconciliation is impossible. One must choose to live the life of "the knight of faith," rather than attempt to find answers to, or reasons for, life's ambiguities. The author employs a methodological device much in vogue among Kierkegaard scholars in the 30s and 40s, i.e., he employs Kierkegaard's own life and experiences as a model to analyze and clarify theological conundrums. Kierkegaard's unhappiness is related to the human problem of suffering, just as Kierkegaard attempts at knowledge fail because he had forgotten the Biblical truth that "all that is not faith is sin." Finally, man must reject Spinoza's injunction "Do not laugh, do not weep, do not condemn, but understand." Not understanding, but faith. Kierkegaard's own life reveals an alternation between those polar opposites.--W. A. J. (shrink)

May discovered Diderot's copiously annotated copy of this anti-materialist tract by Hemsterhuis, known to many contemporaries as "the Dutch Plato"; this edition contains May's interesting introduction, a facsimile of the original text, and a transcription of all of Diderot's comments. The comments bear on infelicities of style as well as of thought, though the latter preponderate: the Lettre is not, alas, the product of a first-rate philosophical intellect. Diderot's strong objections to Hemsterhuis' crude theory of a moral organ can be (...) taken as complementing his Refutation of Helvetius, which dates from the same period.—W. L. M. (shrink)

A piece of metaphilosophy which seeks to assimilate metaphysical assumptions to religious faith conceived as an ungrounded, yet necessary, attitude of "trust of orientation" toward "what is taken to be ultimate." Dilley claims that "philosophical fragmentation is the rule; hence attention has turned to the reasons for philosophical pluralism, and one of the reasons which has become increasingly obvious is the confessional character of metaphysical theories." We find this supported by the usual convenient, if uncomfortable, alliance between positivism and Tillichian (...) theology, buttressed by snatches or arguments from dozens of metaphilosophers, philosophers, metatheologians and theologians, such as Carnap, Whitehead, Lazerowitz, Barth, Buber, and Hick. The irrational clutter of authorities doesn't quite conceal the argument's lack of foundations, philosophical or theological. But there is a consistency between the thesis and the mode of argument. Attitudes are notoriously chaotic, unreflective, and possibly inconsistent mental states which we try to clarify, straighten out, order, and ground through thought. Perhaps we would be asking for a self-refutation to require this task of Dilley.—W. G. E. (shrink)

This volume contains a new, literal translation of Xenophon's Hiero, Strauss's textual analysis of that dialogue, a translation of Alexandre Kojève's comment on Strauss's analysis, and Strauss's restatement. In his Introduction, Strauss clearly draws his usual battle lines between "all specifically modern political thought," which began with Machiavelli, and classical political science, which included value-judgments. Kojève, posing as a "modern" influenced by Hegel, argues against the notion of a politically inactive philosophical elite presumed to possess "wisdom." Strauss concludes with a (...) frightening vision of the end of philosophy in a homogeneous "modern" state under a "Universal Tyrant."--W. L. M. (shrink)

This is a rather helpful volume, containing a collection of introductory materials in the field of the philosophy of religion. The authors group the contents of the volume about six topics: reason, faith, and philosophy; arguments for the divine reality; religious experience and revelation; religion and ethics; the meaning of religious statements; and God, man, and the world. To provide a helpful alternative to this division, the authors locate four different philosophical traditions in the above material : rationalism-idealism; empiricism; Existentialism; (...) and analysis. The volume is extremely well edited, up to date, and the material attractively presented. The book could well become a standard text in introductory philosophy of religion courses.--W. A. J. (shrink)

This is an introductory reader containing a generous, carefully edited selection from most of the philosophically important works of Marx, Engels, and, to a lesser extent, Lenin. There are seven somewhat arbitrarily divided sections, each preceded by a brief introduction, and two appendices. Selections from the 1844 Manuscripts and other early writings have been relegated to the first appendix, while the second contains excerpts from Lenin's Philosophical Notebooks. The philosophy is emphasized at the expense of the economic theory.--W. L. M.

This is a collection of early essays. It ought to be read with The Future of Man before any of his other works, particularly before trying to stumble through such terms as the 'Noosphere,' 'forced coalescence,' 'Migh-Synthesis'. Teilhard does not argue in syllogistic form, which may be scandalous to Scholastics. But then he does not argue at all. He seems to assume that he is writing to a select group of cognoscenti, who know as much about science and philosophy as (...) he. He does not take issue with his contemporaries --nor with the great thinkers of the past. One senses something of his intellectual isolation, and one is awed all the more by Teilhard's accomplishments. There are some problems with Teilhard's use of familiar scientific terms, especially as they are presented to a non-scientific reader. Teilhard supports the mentality of the modern believing Christian. He argues that "at extreme degrees of physico-chemical complexity, attaining the order of a million atoms, particles become 'animate'. At the level of the viruses we meet an ill-defined function which separates living from non-living beings." It is that kind of world-view that is consonant with both modern theology and modern science, at least in a Christian context.--W. A. J. (shrink)

This book continues the Muirhead Library of Philosophy series. It is a sequel to Trethowan’s own Absolute Value, to which frequent reference is made by the author. Together with that work, it comprises the lectures the author delivered in the Department of Religion of Brown University in 1969. It is chiefly a work of theological reflection: Trethowan is seeking new conceptual models for the Christian experience of God. In this vein, he devotes the bulk of the book to explorations of (...) the nature of faith and of the At-onement effected in the experience of God by the Christian mystics. An interesting treatment of the mystical experience of the Absolute concludes the book. This is not to suggest that Trethowan’s work will not be of interest to a general philosophical audience as well. The author begins his investigations with a discussion of contemporary positions which are opposed to metaphysical and theistic claims; within this context, Trethowan’s suggests some useful criticisms of Flew’s position. Searching for an experience of the Absolute that can serve to ground theistic claims, Trethowan examines the formulations of Coreth and Marcel; in the author’s estimate each yields an important emphasis, although some criticism must be directed to their respective accounts. The author’s own solution surfaces in the course of his treatment of faith. Its inspiration is largely Blondel’s "logic of action" : man’s experience of his own range of action leads him to an "option" in favor of the Absolute, an option which includes assent to the Christian experience of the Absolute. Trethowan also indicates a theory of signs, in which signs mediate but also are dynamically directed toward an experienced Absolute. The author’s treatment of Blondel has the advantage of providing the reader with lengthy citations from Blondel in translation.—W. L. P. (shrink)

In its original form this was Bonhoeffer's first work, presented as a theological dissertation when the author was only twenty-one. It has been very influential on proponents of "religionless Christianity" among the Continental theologians. The argument is compressed and often elliptical, exceedingly difficult to grasp. Bonhoeffer follows Tonnies' distinction between society and community, holding that the religious community is a community of will which admits no end outside itself, but whose telos, God, is its boundary. It is a structure of (...) meaning rather than a structure of purpose, uniting persons in an I-Thou relationship in which they assume the relative independence of a Leibnitzian monad. The book is magnificent; the translation unobtrusive and long overdue.—W. G. E. (shrink)

Weiss offers here what might be called a normative phenomenology of religion. The book clearly presupposes a body of descriptive detail and properly avoids metaphysical considerations of the existence and nature of God. The latter can be found in Modes of Being, the former have been the province of several disciplines. Weiss begins with an exploration of human experience to find those elements which give rise to religion and the common features which we should expect to qualify religious as well (...) as other human experience. The religious experience is described as a distinctive, episodic, qualitative immediacy involving the individual with God and detaching him from the world. Since the individual is public as well as private, the religious experience is both anticipatorily public and needs to be sustained within a religious community. We must be able to achieve a non-religious perspective in order to know what is involved in a religious experience. But the idea of God receives most of its content within a community which is distinctively religious though related in various ways to secular communities, and more or less antagonistic to competing religious communities. The most powerful chapters discuss these conflicts between religious communities and the phenomenon of "becoming religious." Combined with the section on the dedicated community, these provide one of the finest analyses of the religious life available in philosophic literature. The book is written with enviable style and grace, especially in the latter half.—W. G. E. (shrink)

A symposium presented in 1959 which includes essays by P. W. Bridgman, A. Grunbaum, A. Landé, H. Margenau, and others. It shows how difficult it is for philosophers and scientists to find a common ground for discussion. --W. M. W.

The first of Bachelard's highly original and influential treatises on the four elements has finally been made available to us in a highly satisfactory translation. Bachelard launches into his admittedly somewhat disorganized analyses with a masterful command of the history of science and of much literature, and with a Comtean conviction that his role is to exorcise primitive error; nevertheless, the errors prove to be most fascinating. There is a brief preface by Northrop Frye.--W. L. M.

A well-defined, methodically executed, minutely documented piece of scholarship. The genre is a sociological-historical analysis of the "status" of the Florentine humanists, carried out at a rather low level of empirical generalization issuing in a theory that common sense and everyday experience would have supplied unaided. "Social position" is seen to depend on the presence of one or more frequently interdependent factors: wealth, family background, political achievements, good marriage. The careers of a vast number of representative humanists are detailed as (...) evidence. The sheer opulence of the detailed information testifies to Martines' persistent hard work and undoubtedly makes the book an important contribution to the field. It becomes evident that many of the humanists were substantial citizens, not foot-loose bohemians, and that they observed the Florentine tradition of responsible citizenship to a high degree.—W. G. E. (shrink)

West takes his title from Camus, and quotes Camus' definition of absurdity: "the division between the mind that desires and the world that disappoints." The essays, which originally appeared in periodicals, discuss Yeats, Lawrence, Sartre, Camus, Simon Weil, Graham Greene, Santayana, and other modern writers. There is no analysis, either philosophical or literary; West attempts overall estimates of each writer's contribution to the problem of absurdity, but succeeds in providing neither insights for those already familiar with the problem nor useful (...) introductions for the uninitiated. Nor, despite the expectations aroused by the preface, do we get a very strong impression of an individual's encounter with the thinkers from whom he has learned most. In vino vacuitas.—W. B. K. (shrink)

Das »Richtige und das Gute« (1930), das ethische Hauptwerk W. D. Ross’, enthält eine Vielzahl wichtiger moralphilosophischer Thesen und Argumente, die bis in die Gegenwart kontrovers diskutiert werden. Im Mittelpunkt steht seine pluralistische Deontologie, der zufolge sich die richtige Handlung aus einer Abwägung der in der jeweiligen Situation relevanten und unableitbaren Prima-facie-Pflichten ergibt, von denen nur ein Teil auf die Optimierung der Handlungsfolgen bezogen ist. Diese Deontologie wurde zu einem modernen Klassiker unter den normativen ethischen Theorien. Darüber hinaus stellt Ross’ (...) These, dass moralische Intuitionen eine Quelle selbstevidenten Wissens sein können, einen wichtigen Referenzpunkt in Debatten um den erkenntnistheoretischen Fundamentalismus dar. Auch für die Handlungstheorie liefert Ross einflussreiche Argumente, wenn er die Ansicht vertritt, dass Pflichten nie ein bestimmtes Motiv des Handelnden zum Gegenstand haben können. Eine zentrale Stellung nimmt für Ross die Güterlehre ein, in welcher er von vier Grundgütern, Tugend, Wissen, Lust und Gerechtigkeit, ausgeht. Wurde Ross in den ersten Jahrzehnten des 20. Jahrhunderts im damaligen Großbritannien als ein herausragender Ethiker – einer der bedeutendsten des Jahrhunderts, auf Augenhöhe mit G.E. Moore – angesehen, wandelte sich das Meinungsbild in den folgenden Jahrzehnten unter dem Einfluss besonders des Logischen Positivismus und der Philosophie Wittgensteins. In den letzten Jahrzehnten ist jedoch wieder ein wachsendes Interesse an Ross’ Ethik festzustellen. Dabei wird »Das Richtige und das Gute« bisweilen sogar mit der »Nikomachischen Ethik«, Kants »Grundlegung« und Humes »Untersuchung über die Prinzipien der Moral« verglichen. (shrink)

In einem Brief nennt Adorno die "Negative Dialektik" kurz nach ihrem Erscheinen unter seinen Schriften "das philosophische Hauptwerk, wenn ich so sagen darf“. Dieser herausgehobenen Bedeutung, die das Werk für Adorno hatte, entspricht nicht nur die lange Zeit, die er mit der Abfassung des Buchs beschäftigt war, sondern auch die lange Geschichte, die ihre zentralen Motive in seinem Denken haben. Philosophische Begriffsklärung, die Arbeit an "Begriff und Kategorien“ einer negativen Dialektik, versteht Adorno dabei als dialektischen Übergang in inhaltliches Denken – (...) und so betreibt er sie auch hier. Das hat Konsequenzen für die Form des kooperativen Kommentars, der in diesem Band versucht wird. Adornos "Negative Dialektik" zu kommentieren, kann nur in dem Bewußtsein der unüberbrückbaren Kluft gelingen, die den Kommentar von diesem Text trennt. (shrink)

The paper „F. W. Bessel and Russian science by K. K. Lavrinovich published in NTM-Schriftenreihe contains several errors coming mainly from re-translations of German names and texts from Russian into German. The correct spelling of names and original texts are given here. Beside this, some additional information from sources not mentioned by the author is presented, and the kind of relationship between Bessel and W. Struve is discussed on the basis of their correspondence.

The following is the transcript of a lecture taken in shorthand by Hans-Georg Backhaus. The transcript was originally published as an appendix in Hans-Georg Backhaus, Dialektik der Wertform. Untersuchungen zur marxschen Ökonomiekritik, a complete translation of which is forthcoming in the Historical Materialism book series.