Short description: Wie kann der Boden für eine kulturmenschliche Potenzialentfaltung politisch und gesellschaftlich fruchtbar gemacht werden?; Promotional text: Immanuel Hermann Fichtes ›System der Ethik‹ ist vor dem Hintergrund einer innenpolitischen Erstarrung als Folge der Revolution von 1848 und des in Deutschland sich nahezu gleichzeitig ereignenden wirtschaftlichen ›Take-off‹ des beginnenden Industriezeitalters verfasst. In direktem Bezug auf diese Umbruchssituation bietet Fichtes Konzeption, die Wolfram Schmitz in seiner Studie erstmals umfassend untersucht, Leitlinien für eine weitgreifende Reform von Staat und Gesellschaft.; Biographical (...) note: Dr. Wolfram Schmitz hat Philosophie, Geschichte und Soziologie studiert. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungAm 1. Februar 2010 ist das Gendiagnostikgesetz in Kraft getreten. Die Debatte um einige Regelungsbereiche, wie beispielsweise das Neugeborenenscreening, reißt nicht ab. Ein Aspekt des Gesetzes ist im Rahmen der Debatte um die Präimplantationsdiagnostik in Deutschland unter neuen Vorzeichen zu diskutieren: Das – international bislang einzigartige – Verbot der pränatalen Diagnostik so genannter spätmanifestierender Erkrankungen, die erst nach der Vollendung des 18. Lebensjahres ausbrechen. In diesem Beitrag möchten wir Hinweise zur differenzierten Diskussion dieser in § 15 GenDG bestimmten Verbotsnorm liefern. (...) Obgleich Argumente, insbesondere das Recht auf Nichtwissen des geborenen Kindes, für ein solches Verbot sprechen, kommen wir aufgrund der medizinischen Sachlage und nach einer Analyse der Pro- und Kontraargumente aus ethischer und rechtlicher Sicht zu dem Schluss, dass ein generelles Verbot der pränatalen Diagnostik spätmanifestierender Erkrankungen im Sinne der Zielsetzung womöglich insuffizient ist sowie in der Begründung Inkonsistenzen zum bereits bestehenden Regelwerk aufweist, und lenken daher den Blick auf unter Umständen bessere Alternativen. (shrink)

Am 1. Februar 2010 ist das Gendiagnostikgesetz (GenDG) in Kraft getreten. Die Debatte um einige Regelungsbereiche, wie beispielsweise das Neugeborenenscreening, reißt nicht ab. Ein Aspekt des Gesetzes ist im Rahmen der Debatte um die Präimplantationsdiagnostik (PID) in Deutschland unter neuen Vorzeichen zu diskutieren: Das – international bislang einzigartige – Verbot der pränatalen Diagnostik so genannter spätmanifestierender Erkrankungen, die erst nach der Vollendung des 18. Lebensjahres ausbrechen. In diesem Beitrag möchten wir Hinweise zur differenzierten Diskussion dieser in § 15(2) GenDG bestimmten (...) Verbotsnorm liefern. Obgleich Argumente, insbesondere das Recht auf Nichtwissen des geborenen Kindes, für ein solches Verbot sprechen, kommen wir aufgrund der medizinischen Sachlage und nach einer Analyse der Pro- und Kontraargumente aus ethischer und rechtlicher Sicht zu dem Schluss, dass ein generelles Verbot der pränatalen Diagnostik spätmanifestierender Erkrankungen im Sinne der Zielsetzung womöglich insuffizient ist sowie in der Begründung Inkonsistenzen zum bereits bestehenden Regelwerk aufweist, und lenken daher den Blick auf unter Umständen bessere Alternativen. (shrink)

This pioneering book lays new foundations for the study of reference and truth.

Apologies. The purpose of the following talk is to give an overview of the present state of aims, methods and results in Pure Proof Theory. Shortage of time forces me to concentrate on my very personal views. This entails that I will emphasize the work which I know best, i.e., work that has been done in the triangle Stanford, Munich and Münster. I am of course well aware that there are as important results coming from outside this triangle and I (...) apologize for not displaying these results as well.Moreover the audience should be aware that in some points I have to oversimplify matters. Those who complain about that are invited to consult the original papers.1.1. General. Proof theory startedwithHilbert's Programme which aimed at a finitistic consistency proof for mathematics.By Gödel's Theorems, however, we know that we can neither formalize all mathematics nor even prove the consistency of formalized fragments by finitistic means. Inspite of this fact I want to give some reasons why I consider proof theory in the style of Gentzen's work still as an important and exciting field of Mathematical Logic. I will not go into applications of Gentzen's cut-elimination technique to computer science problems—this may be considered as applied proof theory—but want to concentrate on metamathematical problems and results. In this sense I am talking about Pure Proof Theory.Mathematicians are interested in structures. There is only one way to find the theorems of a structure. Start with an axiom system for the structure and deduce the theorems logically. These axiom systems are the objects of proof-theoretical research. Studying axiom systems there is a series of more or less obvious questions. (shrink)

This essay focuses on the genetic text of Nietzsche’s unpublished poem An Hafis. Frage eines Wassertrinkers in order to establish the development of this poem from preliminary versions to an authoritative version. Through such a detailed philological analysis of the text in Nietzsche’s notebooks, it becomes increasingly clear that the final version of An Hafis constitutes an intertextual answer to Goethe’s West-östlicher Divan (1819/1827), which itself was inspired by the late-medieval Persian poet Hafez. Developing from different, and open-ended, semantic configurations (...) to a final version, Nietzsche’s An Hafis also allows us to reassess the editorial practices necessary to shed light on Nietzsche’s unpublished lyrical drafts. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Kit Fine offers a reconstruction of Cantor's theory of ordinals. It avoids certain mentalistic overtones in it through both a non-standard ontology and a non-standard notion of abstraction. I argue that this reconstruction misses an essential constructive and computational content of Cantor's theory, which I in turn reconstruct using Martin-Löf's theory of types. Throughout, I emphasize Kantian themes in Cantor's epistemology, and I also argue, as against Michael Hallett's interpretation, for the need for a constructive understanding (...) of Cantorian ?existence principles? (shrink)

This chapter explores some fundamental consequences of the correspondence between physical process and computations. Most physical questions may be answerable only through irreducible amounts of computation. Those that concern idealized limits of infinite time, volume, or numerical precision can require arbitrarily long computations, and so be considered formally undecidable. The behavior of a physical system may always be calculated by simulating explicitly each step in its evolution. Much of theoretical physics has, however, been concerned with devising shorter methods of calculation (...) that reproduce the outcome without tracing each step. Computational irreducibility is common among the systems investigated in mathematics and computation theory, but it may well be the exception rather than the rule, since most physical questions may be answerable only through irreducible amounts of computation. (shrink)

Proposing a theory of the origins of human language ability and presenting an account of the early evolution of language, this text explains why humans are the only language-using animals and challenges the assumption that language is due to intelligence-- jacket cover.

A traditional view maintains that thought, while expressed in language, is non-linguistic in nature and occurs in non-linguistic beings as well. I assess this view against current theories of the evolutionary design of human grammar. I argue that even if some forms of human thought are shared with non-human animals, a residue remains that characterizes a unique way in which human thought is organized as a system. I explore the hypothesis that the cause of this difference is a grammatical way (...) of structuring semantic information, and I present evidence that the organization of grammar precisely reflects the organization of a specific mode of thought apparently distinctive of humans. Since there appears to be no known non-grammatical structuring principle for the relevant mode of thought, I suggest that grammar is that principle, with no independent ?Language of Thought? needed. (shrink)

In this paper I outline the PAIR account of joint attention as a perceptual-practical, affectively charged intentional relation. I argue that to explain joint attention we need to leave the received understanding of propositions and propositional attitudes and the picture of content connected to it behind and embrace the notions of subject mode and position mode content. I also explore the relation between joint attention and communication.

Frege argued for the force-content distinction not only by appealing to the logical and fictional contexts which are most closely associated with the “Frege point", but also based on the fact that an affirmative answer to a yes-no question constitutes an assertion. Supposedly this is only intelligible if the question contains a forceless thought or proposition which an affirmative answer then asserts. Against this I argue that this fact more readily supports the view that questions operate on assertions and other (...) forceful acts themselves. Force is neither added to propositions as on the traditional view, nor is it cancelled as has recently been proposed. Rather higher-level acts such as questioning, but also e.g. conditionalizing, embed and present assertoric or directive acts that are forceful and committal, while suspending commitment to them. The Frege point confounds different varieties of force and the question whether something is merely presented for consideration with the question what is so presented. Force is representational: through assertoric and directive force indicators subjects non-conceptually present positions of theoretical or practical knowledge, while interrogative acts indicate positions of wondering which strive for such knowledge. (shrink)

This book introduces generative grammar as an area of study and asks what it tells us about the human mind. Wolfram Hinzen lays the foundation for the unification of modern generative linguistics with the philosophies of mind and language. He introduces Chomsky's program of a 'minimalist' syntax as a novel explanatory vision of the human mind. He explains how the Minimalist Program originated in work in cognitive science, biology, linguistics, and philosophy, and examines its implications for work in these (...) fields. He considers the way the human mind is designed when seen as an arrangement of structural patterns in nature, and argues that its design is the product not so much of adaptive evolutionary history as of principles and processes that are ahistorical and internalist in character. Linguistic meaning, he suggests, arises in the mind as a consequence of structures emerging on formal rather than functional grounds. From this he substantiates an unexpected and deeply unfashionable notion of human nature. Clearly written in nontechnical language and assuming a limited knowledge of the fields it examines and links, Minimal Mind Design will appeal to a wide range of scholars in linguistics, philosophy, and cognitive science. It also provides an exceptionally clear insight into the nature and aims of Chomsky's Minimalist Program. (shrink)

Raimo Tuomela’s most important contribution to the philosophy of collective intentionality was his development of the notion of the we-mode. In my chapter I extend the notion of we-mode to that of role-mode, the mode in which individual and collective subjects feel, think and act as occupants of roles within groups and institutional structures. I focus on how being in role-mode is manifest in the minds of subjects and on the following points. First, I argue that both we-mode and role-mode (...) are best thought of as further modifications of I-consciousness, respectively we-consciousness. Second, role-mode is further characterized by the fact that subjects will take positions as role occupants that they won’t take as mere individuals, or we-mode group members, or in other roles. Third, such divergences are only possible against a background of agreements between positions taken in different modes. Fourth, such divergences are also grounded in decision making procedures and the accessibility and admissibility of sources of evidence. Fifth, role-mode goes all the way down, that is, it is also manifest in how subjects feel, move and comport themselves when they occupy their roles. To put it into fashionable jargon, it is embodied and enacted. (shrink)

Schmitz zieht in diesem Buch die Bilanz eines mehr als fünfzigjährigen Fortschreitens im Dienst der Aufgabe, den Menschen ihr wirkliches Leben begreiflich zu machen. Er stellt zu diesem Zweck vier Säulen seines Werkes vor - unter den Titeln: Subjektivität, Mannigfaltigkeit, Leib und Gefühl, Welt - und bringt grundlegende Fragestellungen der Neuen Phänomenologie zur Sprache: Der Leib war seit der...

Die klassischen Gegenuberstellungen in der Philosophie gleichen oft dem Verschieben von Figuren im Theater oder auf dem Schachbrett. Das liegt daran, dass man alles fur einzeln und Identitat mit etwas fur selbstverstandlich halt. Es versteht sich aber nicht von selbst, dass alles, was ist, selbst ist. Selbstsein, Einzelheit, Identitat mit etwas haben tiefliegende und kontingente Voraussetzungen in der Dynamik des spurbaren Leibes. Von dieser hangt durch die subjektiven (nicht neutralen) Tatsachen des affektiven Betroffenseins auch das Selbstbewusstsein der Person ab. Um (...) sich mit etwas zu identifizieren, muss sie sich schon kennen, und dafur bedarf sie der leiblichen Dynamik, wie fur alles Konkrete der aus dieser sich ergebenden leiblichen Kommunikation. Durch die Ambivalenz von Eintauchen in den Leib und Auftauchen aus ihm wird die Person labil und zwiespaltig. Als Wege zu ihrer Stabilisierung und Integration werden hier die Fassung, die Komik und der Humor erortert. Alle Erfahrung wird auf leibliches Verstehen zuruckgefuhrt. Aber was ist der spurbare Leib im Gegensatz zum sichtbaren und tastbaren Korper? Er muss erst begrifflich freigelegt werden, denn seine eigentumliche Ausdehnung und Dynamik waren der europaischen Intellektualkultur unbekannt. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary book considers the relationship between language and thought from a philosophical perspective, drawing both on the philosophical study of language and the purely formal study of grammar, and arguing that the two should align. The claim is that grammar provides homo sapiens with the ability to think in certain grammatical ways and that this in turn explains the vast cognitive powers of human beings. Evidence is considered from biology, the evolution of language, language disorders, and linguistic phenomena.

In this paper I propose three steps to overcome the force-content dichotomy and dispel the Frege point. First, we should ascribe content to force indicators. Through basic assertoric and directive force indicators such as intonation, word order and mood, a subject presents its position of theoretical or practical knowledge of a state of affairs as a fact, as something that is the case, or as a goal, as something to do. Force indicators do not operate on truth- or satisfaction evaluable (...) entities as on the traditional view, but complete and unify them. Second, higher-level acts such as interrogative, logical and fictional acts create higher-level unities that may suspend commitment to the assertions and directions they operate on. But they do not cancel their force, but transfer the meaning of force indicators into the new unities they create. For example, in the context of asking a theoretical or practical question, the assertoric or directive force indicator now presents the kind of knowledge the subject is seeking. Third, the Frege point conflates different varieties of force. We neither need Frege’s assertion sign, nor Hare’s neustic, nor Hanks’s cancellation sign, but only ordinary force indicators and interrogative, logical and fictional markers. Propositions are not forceless contents to which a subject commits by forceful acts, but forceful acts put forward by higher-level acts which may suspend commitment to them. (shrink)

The following text is the first ever translation into English of a writing by German phenomenologist Hermann Schmitz (*1928). In it, Schmitz outlines and defends a non-mentalistic view of emotions as phenomena in interpersonal space in conjunction with a theory of the felt body’s constitutive involvement in human experience. In the first part of the text, Schmitz gives an overview covering some central pieces of his theory as developed, for the most part, in his massive System of (...) Philosophy, published in German in a series of volumes between 1964 and 1980. Schmitz’s System is centred on the claim that the contemporary view of the human subject is the result of a consequential historical process: A reductionist and ‘introjectionist’ objectification of lived experience culminating in the ‘invention’ of the mind (or ‘soul’) as a private, inner realm of subjective experience and in a corresponding ‘grinding down’ of the world of lived experienced to a meagre, value-neutral ‘objective reality’. To counter this intellectualist trend, Schmitz puts to use his approach to phenomenology with the aim of regaining a sensibility for the nuanced realities of lived experience—hoping to make up for what was lost during the development of Western intellectual culture. Since both this text and the overall style of Schmitz’s philosophising are in several ways unusual for a contemporary readership, a brief introduction is provided by philosophers Jan Slaby and Rudolf Owen Müllan, the latter of whom translated Schmitz’s text into English. The introduction emphasises aspects of Schmitz’s philosophy that are likely to be of relevance to contemporary scholars of phenomenological philosophy and to its potential applications in science and society. (shrink)

Dieser Band dokumentiert die Hauptvorträge des XIX. Deutschen Kongresses für Philosophie, der vom 23.-27. September 2002 in Bonn stattfand. Das Thema des Kongresses Grenzen und Grenzüberschreitungen wurde dabei hinsichtlich des gesamten Spektrums philosophischer Fragestellungen beleuchtet. So wird die aktuelle Problematik hinsichtlich der Grenzen technischer Machbarkeit und moralischer Verantwortbarkeit ebenso aufgegriffen wie klassische erkenntnis- und wissenschaftstheoretische Fragestellungen nach den Grenzen unserer kognitiven Möglichkeiten. Weitere Beiträge befassen sich mit Grenzen und Grenzüberschreitungen in der Ästhetik, Geschichtsphilosophie, Kulturphilosophie, Metaphysik, Philosophie des Geistes, Philosophie der (...) Logik und Mathematik, der politischen Philosophie sowie der Religionsphilosophie. Der historischen Dimension des Themas wird ebenfalls Rechnung getragen und zugleich die Diskussion von Grenzen und Grenzüberschreitungen durch die Geschichte der Philosophie zurückverfolgt. (shrink)

First of all, this paper aims at a clarification of Wittgenstein's conception of grammatical propositions. Their essential characteristics will be developed and some of the central questions concerning their status will be discussed: Should grammatical propositions be seen as arbitrary conventions? How do they work in practices? And how do they relate to natural facts? Later on, the two propositions "Every rod has a length" and "Sensations are private" will be discussed in more detail, for both fulfil three important features (...) of grammatical propositions: They are not empirical descriptions, they are rules of a practice, and they are not knowledge-claims but express insights. Focussing on the grammar of pain language, it will be shown what kind of interdependency exists between grammar and natural facts. It will also turn out that some grammatical propositions are closely connected to our understanding of living a human form of life. (shrink)

In this paper I want to introduce and defend what I call the "subject mode account" of collective intentionality. I propose to understand collectives from joint attention dyads over small informal groups of various types to organizations, institutions and political entities such as nation states, in terms of their self-awareness. On the subject mode account, the self-consciousness of such collectives is constitutive for their being. More precisely, their self-representation as subjects of joint theoretical and practical positions towards the world – (...) rather than as objects of such positions – makes them what they are. Members of such collectives represent each other as co-subjects of such positions and thus represent the world from the point of view of the collective. (shrink)

This paper discusses Raimo Tuomela's we-mode account in his recent book "Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents" and develops the idea that mode should be thought of as representational. I argue that in any posture – intentional state or speech act – we do not merely represent a state of affairs as what we believe, or intend etc. – as the received view of 'propositional attitudes' has it –, but our position relative to that state of affairs and thus (...) ourselves. That is, we represent the subject through what I call "subject mode" and its position through what I call "position mode". I argue that the key to understanding collective intentionality is to understand how we represent others as co-subjects of positions rather than as their objects. This is shown on various levels of collective intentionality. On the non-conceptual level of joint attention we experience others as co-subjects who we attend with rather than to and who we are at least also disposed to act jointly with. On the conceptual level of the we-mode we represent others as co-subjects of positions of knowledge, intention, belief and shared values. Organizations and thus group agents in Tuomela's sense I propose to understand in terms of what I call "role mode", that is, in terms of the positions individuals and groups take as occupants of certain roles, for example, as committee members, or as chancellor of Germany. I try to show how this account, while very much in the spirit of Tuomela's, can avoid his fictionalism about group agents and some other problems of his account, while steering between the Scylla of excessive individualism and the Charybdis of extreme collectivism. (shrink)

Internalism is an explanatory strategy that makes the internal structure and constitution of the organism a basis for the investigation of its external function and the ways in which it is embedded in an environment. It is opposed to an externalist explanatory strategy, which takes its departure from observations about external function and mind-environment interactions, and infers and rationalizes internal organismic structure from that. This paper addresses the origins of truth, a basic ingredient in the human conceptual scheme. I suggest (...) the necessity of pursuing an internalist line of explanation for it, as adopted in the biolinguistic program and generative grammar at large. According to this view, the concept of truth is a presupposition for the way language is used in relation to the world, rather than a function of that use or a consequence of language-world relations. (shrink)