The functions and expression pattern of urea cycle enzymes have undergone considerable changes during the course of evolution. Sequence analyses shows that urea cycle enzymes from mammals are homologous to microbial enzymes of the arginine‐metabolic pathway. Recently, an unexpected relationship was found between argininosuccinate lyase (EC 4.3.2.1), the fourth enzyme of the cycle, and δ‐crystallin, a lens structural protein of birds and reptiles.

This paper argues for a coherentist theory of the justification of evidentiary judgments in law, according to which a hypothesis about the events being litigated is justified if and only if it is such that an epistemically responsible fact-finder might have accepted it as justified by virtue of its coherence in like circumstances. It claims that this version of coherentism has the resources to address a main problem facing coherence theories of evidence and legal proof, namely, the problem of the (...) coherence bias. The paper then develops an aretaic approach to the standards of epistemic responsibility which govern legal fact-finding. It concludes by exploring some implications of the proposed account of the justification of evidentiary judgments in law for the epistemology of legal proof. (shrink)

We define a new theory of concatenation WTC which is much weaker than Grzegorczyk's well-known theory TC. We prove that WTC is mutually interpretable with the weak theory of arithmetic R. The latter is, in a technical sense, much weaker than Robinson's arithmetic Q, but still essentially undecidable. Hence, as a corollary, WTC is also essentially undecidable.

It is proved that $\Pi^1_1$ -indescribability in $P_{\kappa}\lambda$ can be characterized by combinatorial properties without taking care of cofinality of $\lambda$ . We extend Carr's theorem proving that the hypothesis $\kappa$ is $2^{\lambda^{<\kappa}}$ -Shelah is rather stronger than $\kappa$ is $\lambda$ -supercompact.

The aim of this paper is to examine the role of imagination in environmental ethics and introduce an imaginative dimension as an essential part of environmental ethics. Imagination constitutes a basic condition for ethical thinking and action. Matters of environmental ethics have revealed the indispensable role of imagination in ethics. I’ll advance an imagination-based environmental ethics by developing Hans Jonas’ ethical thought. From his viewpoint, various effects of our action on nature and future generations, generally out of our sight, have (...) become an ethical concern. This necessitates the exercise of imagination because we must “imagine” those distant effects to act in an environmentally responsible way. Jonas’ “heuristics of fear” is an imaginative approach necessary for responsible action. Further, I reinterpret the role of imagination as motivating our “will to know.” In conclusion, I suggest the importance of environmental education as cultivating ecological imagination from the standpoint of environmental ethics. (shrink)

Lawvere hyperdoctrines give categorical algebraic semantics for intuitionistic predicate logic. Here we extend the hyperdoctrinal semantics to a broad variety of substructural predicate logics over the Typed Full Lambek Calculus, verifying their completeness with respect to the extended hyperdoctrinal semantics. This yields uniform hyperdoctrinal completeness results for numerous logics such as different types of relevant predicate logics and beyond, which are new results on their own; i.e., we give uniform categorical semantics for a broad variety of non-classical predicate logics. And (...) we introduce an analogue of Lawvere–Tierney topology and cotopology in the hyperdoctrinal setting, which gives a unifying perspective on different logical translations, in particular allowing for a uniform treatment of Girard’s exponential translation between linear and intuitionistic logics and of Kolmogorov’s double negation translation between intuitionistic and classical logics. In the hyerdoctrinal conception, type theories are categories, logics over type theories are functors, and logical translations between them, then, are natural transformations, in particular Lawvere–Tierney topologies and cotopologies on hyperdoctrines. The view of logical translations as hyperdoctrinal Lawvere–Tierney topologies and cotopologies has not been elucidated before, and may be seen as a novel contribution of the present work. From a broader perspective, this work may be regarded as taking first steps towards interplay between algebraic and categorical logics; it is, technically, a combination of substructural algebraic logic and hyperdoctrinal categorical logic, as the hyperdoctrinal completeness theorem is shown via the integration of the Lindenbaum–Tarski algebra construction with the syntactic category construction. As such this work lays a foundation for further interactions between algebraic and categorical logics. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics is often devalued due to its peculiar features, especially its radical departure from any of standard positions in foundations of mathematics, such as logicism, intuitionism, and formalism. We first contrast Wittgenstein’s finitism with Hilbert’s finitism, arguing that Wittgenstein’s is perspicuous or surveyable finitism whereas Hilbert’s is transcendental finitism. We then further elucidate Wittgenstein’s philosophy by explicating his natural history view of logic and mathematics, which is tightly linked with the so-called rule-following problem and Kripkenstein’s paradox, yielding (...) vital implications to the nature of mathematical understanding, and to the nature of the certainty and objectivity of mathematical truth. Since the incompleteness theorems, foundations of mathematics have mostly lost their philosophical driving force, and anti-foundationalism has become prevalent and pervasive. Yet new foundations have nevertheless emerged and come into the scene, namely categorical foundations. We articulate the foundational significance of category theory by explicating three forms of foundations, i.e., global foundations, local foundations, and conceptual foundations. And we explore the possibility of categorical unified science qua pluralistic unified science, arguing for the categorical unity of science on both mathematical and philosophical grounds. We then turn to an issue in conceptual foundations of mathematics, namely the nature of the concept of space. We elucidate Wittgenstein’s intensional conception of space in relation to Brouwer’s theory of space continua and to the modern conception of space as point-free structure in category theory and algebraic geometry. We finally give a bird’s-eye view of mathematical philosophy from a Wittgensteinian perspective, and further sheds new light on Wittgenstein’s constructive structuralism and his view of incompleteness and contradictions in mathematics. (shrink)

There are still on-going debates on what exactly is wrong with Prior’s pathological “tonk.” In this article I argue, on the basis of categorical inferentialism, that two notions of inconsistency ought to be distinguished in an appropriate account of tonk; logic with tonk is inconsistent as the theory of propositions, and it is due to the fallacy of equivocation; in contrast to this diagnosis of the Prior’s tonk problem, nothing is actually wrong with tonk if logic is viewed as the (...) theory of proofs rather than propositions, and tonk perfectly makes sense in terms of the identity of proofs. Indeed, there is fully complete semantics of proofs for tonk, which allows us to link the Prior’s old philosophical idea with contemporary issues at the interface of categorical logic, computer science, and quantum physics, and thereby to expose commonalities between the laws of Reason and the laws of Nature, which are what logic and physics are respectively about. I conclude the article by articulating the ideas of categorical logical positivism and pluralistic unified science as its goal, including the unification of realist and antirealist conceptions of meaning by virtue of the categorical logical basis of metaphysics. (shrink)

独自の視点から思想の可能性をつかみ出し、現代の倫理として編み直す。鶴見哲学の中心へ、気鋭の哲学者による決定的論考。.

In this paper, we introduce systems of nonstandard second-order arithmetic which are conservative extensions of systems of second-order arithmetic. Within these systems, we do reverse mathematics for nonstandard analysis, and we can import techniques of nonstandard analysis into analysis in weak systems of second-order arithmetic. Then, we apply nonstandard techniques to a version of Riemannʼs mapping theorem, and show several different versions of Riemannʼs mapping theorem.

In recent years coherence theories of law and adjudication have been extremely influential in legal scholarship. These theories significantly advance the case for coherentism in law. Nonetheless, there remain a number of problems in the coherence theory in law. This ambitious new work makes the first concerted attempt to develop a coherence-based theory of legal reasoning, and in so doing addresses, or at least mitigates these problems. The book is organized in three parts. The first part provides a critical analysis (...) of the main coherentist approaches to both normative and factual reasoning in law. The second part investigates the coherence theory in a number of fields that are relevant to law: coherence theories of epistemic justification, coherentist approaches to belief revision and theory-choice in science, coherence theories of practical and moral reasoning and coherence-based approaches to discourse interpretation. Taking this interdisciplinary analysis as a starting point, the third part develops a coherence-based model of legal reasoning. While this model builds upon the standard theory of legal reasoning, it also leads to rethinking some of the basic assumptions that characterize this theory, and suggests some lines along which it may be further developed. Thus, ultimately, the book not only improves upon the current state of coherence theory in law, but also contributes to the larger debate about how to articulate a theory of legal reasoning that results in better decision-making. (shrink)

Philosophical accounts of moral responsibility are standardly framed by two platitudes. According to them, blame requires the presence of a moral defect in the agent and the absence of excuses. In this chapter, this kind of approach is challenged. It is argued that (a) people sometimes violate moral norms due to performance mistakes, (b) it often appears reasonable to hold them responsible for it, and (c) their mistakes cannot be traced to their moral qualities or to the presence of excuses. (...) In the end, the implications for discussions of moral responsibility are discussed. (shrink)

“La parte de los crímenes” plantea un reto inédito en cuanto al ejercicio de la narración de los feminicidios cometidos en México durante los años noventa del siglo pasado. Sobre ese fondo problemático, el presente artículo se despliega en dos partes. En la primera, siguiendo a Kant y a Lyotard, se propone mostrar la singularidad de la experiencia de lo sublime ocasionada por (el relato de) los crímenes. En la segunda, se abre la posibilidad de que una comprensión del hecho (...) en su conjunto pueda apelar a figuras de la razón, pero, en lugar de volver a Kant, lo resuelve apelando a algunos conceptos-idea de Giorgio Agamben que han venido a enriquecer el paisaje de la filosofía política contemporánea. (shrink)

This paper explores relationships between many-valued logic and fuzzy topology from the viewpoint of duality theory. We first show a fuzzy topological duality for the algebras of Łukasiewicz n -valued logic with truth constants, which generalizes Stone duality for Boolean algebras to the n -valued case via fuzzy topology. Then, based on this duality, we show a fuzzy topological duality for the algebras of modal Łukasiewicz n -valued logic with truth constants, which generalizes Jónsson-Tarski duality for modal algebras to the (...) n -valued case via fuzzy topology. We emphasize that fuzzy topological spaces naturally arise as spectrums of algebras of many-valued logics. (shrink)

We study the distributivity of the bounded ideal on Pkλ and answer negatively to a question of Johnson in [13]. The size of non-normal ideals with the partition property is also studied.

Considerar el Derecho como" objeto de estudio" no parece comportar ninguna novedad, sobre todo si nos ubicamos en un ambiente académico. De hecho, se da por sentado que, en efecto, el Derecho puede ser ese "objeto" por todos aquellos que escogen como área de formación profesional lo jurídico. El ejercicio que se lleva a cabo sobre él se torna casi siempre repetitivo y memorístico, pero pronto se aprende que, en la práctica, el resultado de erudición que ello produce rendirá buenos (...) frutos mañana. El estudiante "aprende derecho" apropiándose una terminología y adquiriendo la habilidad de ponerla en acto cuando sea el momento oportuno, haciendo así uso de una técnica que, sin embargo, no siempre producirá los resultados esperados. Una "técnica" cargada de albur. Las más de las veces, el ya profesional del derecho se consuela de sus tropiezos y fracasos "reconociendo" que "no siempre se tiene la razón" -en el mejor de los casos-, o acusando a propios y extraños de hacer un uso manipulativo o injusto de la herramienta. Se sabe que, además de lo competido que es el campo, se encuentra plagado de incertidumbres por la enorme carga de "subjetividad" que supone no solo su aplicación, sino la creación misma de sus componentes. (shrink)

Modern technology has radically altered the conditions for human action, endowing us with tremendous power to affect the future. Patterns of action that appear positive in their short-term effects must sometimes be judged unsustainable. Hans Jonas and Thomas Berry are among those who emphasize the necessity of transforming ethics in light of these considerations. In a Whiteheadian framework, this needed transformation is rooted in the nature of things.

Although Wittgenstein’s influence on logic and foundations of mathematics is well recognized, nonetheless, his legacy concerning other sciences is much less elucidated, and in this article we aim at shedding new light on physics, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science from a Wittgensteinian perspective. We focus upon three issues amongst other things: the Chosmky versus Norvig debate on the nature of language; a Neo-Kantian parallelism between Bohr’s philosophy of physics and Hilbert’s philosophy of mathematics; the relationships between cognitive contextuality and physical (...) contextuality as shown by recent Bell-type results. The Chosmky versus Norvig debate may be seen as a battle between Wittgenstein’s earlier and later conceptions of meaning, i.e., picture theory and use theory. From a Wittgensteinian point of view, quantum physics may be seen as a physical version of the Linguistic Turn. The parallelism between Bohr’s philosophy of classical concepts and Hilbert’s philosophy of finitism builds upon transcendental philosophy in the Kantian tradition, both Bohr and Hilbert having been influenced by Neo-Kantian thinkers, such as Hertz, whose sign theory is actually a common root of Wittgenstein’s picture theory and Hilbert’s axiomatics. Wittgenstein is considered a root of contextualism in contemporary philosophy. Contextuality has different manifestations in physics and cognitive science, and contextuality studies across the sciences are rapidly developing in cutting-edge research. We elucidate both analogies and disanalogies between contextuality of reality and contextuality of reason in terms of the nature of probabilities involved. In passing, we also give a reformulation of Penrose’s quantum mind thesis. (shrink)

This paper defends a version of the Simple View, the claim that someone intentionally φs only if the person intends to φ. To do this, I raise a problem for Bratman’s classic argument (1984, 1987) against it. The problem brings into focus an evaluative dimension behind the View, whose recognition allows for an improved version of it. With this improved version, I then go on to answer other criticisms that have been raised to it.

This paper argues that “free will” is vague. The argument has two steps. First, I argue that free will is a matter of degrees and, second, that there are no sharp boundaries separating free decisions and actions and non‐free ones. After presenting the argument, I focus on one significant consequence of the thesis, although others are mentioned along the way. In short, considerations of vagueness help understand the logic behind so‐called manipulation arguments, but also show why these arguments are ultimately (...) flawed. (shrink)

This paper articulates an egalitarian conception of judicial humility and justifies its value on the grounds that it importantly advances the legal and political ideal of fraternity. This account of the content and value of the virtue of humility stands in sharp contrast with the dominant view of judicial humility as deference or judicial restraint. The paper concludes by discussing some ways in which the account of humility and of its value provided in the paper furthers our understanding of the (...) judicial virtues and of the political implications of giving virtue a role in adjudication. (shrink)

Abstract.A type of subtlety for Pκλ called “strongly subtle” is introduced to show almost ineffability is consistencywise stronger than Shelah property. The following are also shown: is strongly subtle” has rather strong consequences. (ii) The ideal is not strongly subtle} is not λ-saturated, and completely ineffable ideal is not precipitous. (iii) In case that λ<κ=2λ, almost λ-ineffability coincides with λ-ineffability. (iv) It is not provable that κ is λ<κ-ineffable whenever κ is λ-ineffable.

La presente contribución recoge el diálogo mantenido entre distintos filósofos del Derecho a propósito de la última obra del Profesor Massimo La Torre “Il diritto contro se stesso. Saggio sul positivismo giuridico e la sua crisi”. Al hilo del trabajo del citado autor, los participantes reflexionan sobre preguntas centrales para la teoría y filosofía del Derecho contemporánea: ¿cuál es la naturaleza del Derecho? ¿es el razonamiento jurídico eminentemente moral? ¿qué lugar debe ocupar la práctica jurídica en su conceptualización? ¿qué lugar (...) ocupa la fuerza en el Derecho? (shrink)