This article explores the justification for the defendant’s restitutionary obligation to the plaintiff consequent on an unjust enrichment. It focuses on the dominant corrective justice explanation, according to which the duty of restitution instantiates this virtue. It identifies two types of corrective justice explanation: a thin and thick version, attributed to John Gardner and Ernest Weinrib, respectively. According to the thin version, corrective justice is confined to the remedial relation between the plaintiff and the defendant; it is solely concerned with (...) the norm of justice that provides reasons to transfer back. The thick account in contrast does not restrict corrective justice to this remedial stage. Rather, it understands it as encompassing the relationship between the parties from the outset. Both accounts fail to provide a satisfactory explanation for the duty of restitution for unjust enrichment. Their failures, however, are instructive, illuminating a possible route to a more nuanced understanding of private law’s remedial obligations and their justifications. (shrink)

Zoé Chatzidakis , David Marker , Amador Martin-Pizarro , Rahim Moosa , Sergei Starchenko Source: Notre Dame J. Formal Logic, Volume 54, Number 3-4, 277--277.

A novel problem or task may seem difficult at first, but with enough practice, it can become easy and routine. Practice and the process of learning is often accompanied by some mild cognitive uneas...

The use of genetically modified organisms in agriculture makes great promises of better seeds, but also raises many controversies about ownership of seeds and about potential hazards. I suggest that owners of these seeds bear the responsibility to do no harm in using these seeds. After defining the nature of this responsibility, this paper asks, if ownership entails moral responsibility, and ownership can be transferred, then how is moral responsibility transferred? Building on the literature on use plans, I suggest five (...) conditions for a good transfer of moral responsibility for genetically modified seeds. I also look at the Monsanto Technology Use Guide and Technology/Stewardship Agreement, as an examplar of a use plan, to explore the extent to which these conditions are present. I conclude that use plans can play a role in the distribution and transfer of moral responsibility for technologies with high benefits and potential harmful uncertainties. (shrink)

was to test the role of both early and higher visual areas in the integration of local features into global shapes. To this end, we conducted functional magnetic resonance imaging studies. Although fMRI lacks the high spatial resolution of intracortical recordings, it allows simultaneous collection of responses to the same stimulus set from multiple visual areas that is not possible with standard recording techniques. We performed these studies in monkeys, where much is known about the properties of neurons in different (...) visual areas, and in humans, where recent fMRI.. (shrink)

In this paper, I claim that the personal/subpersonal distinction is first and foremost a distinction between two kinds of psychological theory or explanation: it is only in this form that we can understand why the distinction was first introduced, and how it continues to earn its keep. I go on to examine the different ontological commitments that might lead us from the primary distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations to a derivative distinction between personal and subpersonal states. I argue that (...) on one of the most common metaphysical interpretations of the explanatory distinction, talk of a distinction between personal and subpersonal states simply makes no sense. When people insist on applying the personal/subpersonal terminology to psychological states, I allow that they are often making a genuine distinction, but one that it is best understood in terms of Stich's (1978) distinction between doxastic and subdoxastic states. I end the paper by considering some other common misinterpretations of the personal/subpersonal distinction, such as those involving consciousness, normativity, or autonomy. (shrink)

Perceptual experiences are not immediately responsive to reasons. You see a stick submerged in a glass of water as bent no matter how much you know about light refraction. Due to this isolation from reasons, perception is traditionally considered outside the scope of epistemic evaluability as justified or unjustified. Is perception really as independent from reasons as visual illusions make it out to be? I argue no, drawing on psychological evidence from perceptual learning. The flexibility of perceptual learning is a (...) way of responding to new epistemic reasons. The resulting perceptual experiences are epistemically evaluable as justified or unjustified. (shrink)

We have all become used to the rapid change around us, and with it, the shifting landscape of medical ethics. It appears, however, that the acceleration phase of change in biomedical sciences is only just beginning, and we need to be prepared for new challenges ahead. This issue of the journal considers several of them: in epigenome editing, 1 in bioprinting 2 and in cryonics. 3 With all of these developments, we need to be doing our ethical thinking proactively rather (...) than reactively; and we need to consider not only what we think the ethical problems might be but what frameworks we have for arguing how we should address them. There are several approaches that could be taken 4 each with their own advantages and limitations. The most fun—and the one we are perhaps best at—is to consider hypothetical scenarios, the ethical controversies associated with... (shrink)

The role of audiences in mathematical proof has largely been neglected, in part due to misconceptions like those in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca which bar mathematical proofs from bearing reflections of audience consideration. In this paper, I argue that mathematical proof is typically argumentation and that a mathematician develops a proof with his universal audience in mind. In so doing, he creates a proof which reflects the standards of reasonableness embodied in his universal audience. Given this framework, we can better understand (...) the introduction of proof methods based on the mathematician’s likely universal audience. I examine a case study from Alexander and Briggs’s work on knot invariants to show that we can fruitfully reconstruct mathematical methods in terms of audiences. (shrink)

This paper presents a case for the decriminalisation of abortion in Britain in light of the increasing investigations into people experiencing pregnancy loss and prosecutions of those suspected of illegal abortion. This growing enforcement of the criminal abortion offences has coincided with the legal change to allow the home use of abortion pills through telemedicine, and comes in the context of global backlash against abortion rights. Framing abortion as a necessary healthcare service and human right, this paper demonstrates the harms (...) caused by criminalisation and highlights how the law exacerbates socio-economic and other vulnerabilities. It is later illegal abortions that tend to be prosecuted, and while there are complex reasons as to why someone might require an abortion, the law prohibits abortion beyond 24 weeks except for narrow medical reasons, creating crisis situations for those that find themselves without legal access. Decriminalisation is necessary to move away from this culture of suspicion, hostility, and stigma that has been built around abortion. (shrink)

Expanded non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) has provoked ethical concerns about its justifiable scope. In this paper, we evaluate the role of the child’s right to an open future in setting the scope of NIPT. This ‘open future principle’ has been cited in arguments both limiting and expanding parental freedoms. This moral right holds that adult autonomy rights which children cannot yet exercise should nonetheless be protected until they can. Its purpose is to protect the future autonomy of the child as (...) a future adult. Several authors have extended this rationale from child to fetus. However, the right was not anticipated to apply to the fetus, a non-legal entity in many jurisdictions. The aim of this paper is to reconsider whether this principle is useful to help deliberate the scope of NIPT. We find that extending the open future principle to delineate the scope of NIPT is theoretically flawed. We contend that in the prenatal context its value primarily lies with counselling for prenatal screening where it can be used to encourage parents’ reflection on the implications of knowing for the sake of knowing on their future children and their relationship with them. (shrink)

In many social contexts, social influence seems to be inescapable: the behavior of others influences us to modify ours, and vice-versa. However, social psychology is full of examples of phenomena where individuals experience a discrepancy between their public behavior and their private opinion. This raises two central questions. First, how does an individual reason about the behavior of others and their private opinions in situations of social influence? And second, what are the laws of the resulting information dynamics? In this (...) paper, we address these questions by introducing a formal framework for representing reasoning about an individual’s private opinions and public behavior under the dynamics of social influence in social networks. Moreover, we dig deeper into the involved information dynamics by modeling how individuals can learn about each other based on this reasoning. This compels us to introduce a new formal notion of reflective social influence. Finally, we initialize the work on proof theory and automated reasoning for our framework by introducing a sound and complete tableaux system for a fragment of our logic. Furthermore, this constitutes the first tableau system for the “Facebook logic” of J. Seligman, F. Liu, and P. Girard. (shrink)

T. 1. Estestvennye i tochnye nauki obshchestvennye nauki -- t. 2. Tekhnicheskie i prikladnye nauki -- t. 3. Filialy.

It is this question which occupied Hannah Arendt throughout most of her life, and which will form the crux of this article. I wish to explore whether critical thought holds the potential to rescue us from the crisis of the ‘moral point of no return’, by allowing us to recognise it. Arendt, and later Zygmunt Bauman, call for critical thinking as a way out of evil. Critical thought being something that they conflate with morality. They both attempt to demonstrate the (...) decline of morality and its separation from legality/rationality under modernity. Bauman needs these assumptions to show how cold rationality eclipses morality and his subsequent appeal to persistent, but not socially grounded individual morality as remedy. For Arendt, the perceived lack of thought by the ‘perpetrators’ lays the foundation of her call to critical thinking as remedy; but similarly heralds a process of pure ethics. This article argues that although they both argue for more morality, morality cannot in fact disappear. (shrink)

What kinds of mental states can be based on epistemic reasons? The standard answer is only beliefs. I argue that perceptual states can also be based on reasons, as the result of crossmodal interactions. A perceptual state from one modality can provide a reason on which an experience in another modality is based. My argument identifies key markers of the basing relation and locates them in the crossmodal Marimba Illusion (Schutz & Kubovy 2009). The subject’s auditory experience of musical tone (...) duration is based on the reason provided by her visual representation of the length of the musician’s gesture and other stored perceptual principles. (shrink)

A unique concept: 40 extraordinary people give answers to 10 searching questions about their beliefs. In our current age of uncertainty and turmoil, this is a book to give insight for life's journey and to encourage readers to confront the same questions themselves. "My suggestion or advice is very simple; that is, to have a sincere heart." - The Dalai Lama What Has Life Taught You? features the answers given by 40 outstanding people to 10 profound questions about life, the (...) mind and the spirit. Author Zoë Sallis has a passion for stirring up debate on philosophical and ethical questions and journeyed all over the globe to ask well-known figures of widely varying beliefs the same 10 questions. Interviewees include: Nelson Mandela His Holiness the Dalai Lama Neale Donald Walsch Anjelica Huston Jack Nicholson Sophia Loren Teale Swan Richard Dawkins David Lynch Gore Vidal And more... The questions range from "What is your concept of God?" and "Do you think this life is all there is, or do you believe in an afterlife?" to "What has life taught you so far?" and "How do you find peace within yourself?" Socrates thought the unexamined life was not worth living, and perhaps that is why he roamed the streets of Athens accosting people and asking them their thoughts and beliefs. By sharing the wisdom of these truly inspiring people, the book hopes to provoke debate and encourage readers to examine what they have learned on their life journey so far and share their own insights with others. (shrink)

This paper studies unbounded pseudo-algebraically closed fields and shows an amalgamation result for types over algebraically closed sets. It discusses various applications, for instance that omega-free PAC fields have the property NSOP3. It also contains a description of imaginaries in PAC fields.

Daniel Dennett's distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations was fundamental in establishing the philosophical foundations of cognitive science. Since it was first introduced in 1969, the personal/subpersonal distinction has been adapted to fit different approaches to the mind. In one example of this, the ‘Pittsburgh school’ of philosophers attempted to map Dennett's distinction onto their own distinction between the ‘space of reasons’ and the ‘space of causes’. A second example can be found in much contemporary philosophy of psychology, where Dennett's (...) distinction has been presumed to be equivalent to Stephen Stich's distinction between doxastic and subdoxastic states. Both these interpretations of the personal/subpersonal distinction, and also Dennett's own philosophical views of the mind, go beyond the personal/subpersonal distinction itself. They each involve supplementing the distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations with metaphysical claims about the relationship between the two kinds of explanation and the entities they posit. (shrink)

Perception provides us with access to the external world, but that access is shaped by our own experiential histories. Through perceptual learning, we can enhance our capacities for perceptual discrimination, categorization, and attention to salient properties. We can also encode harmful biases and stereotypes. This article reviews interdisciplinary research on perceptual learning, with an emphasis on the implications for our rational and normative theorizing. Perceptual learning raises the possibility that our inquiries into topics such as epistemic justification, aesthetic criticism, and (...) moral knowledge should include not only an examination of cognition but also of perception. (shrink)

Language provides rich social information about its speakers. For instance, adults and children make inferences about a speaker's social identity, geographic origins, and group membership based on her language and accent. Although infants prefer speakers of familiar languages, little is known about the developmental origins of humans’ sensitivity to language as marker of social identity. We investigated whether 9-month-olds use the language a person speaks as an indicator of that person's likely social relationships. Infants were familiarized with videos of two (...) people who spoke the same or different languages, and then viewed test videos of those two individuals affiliating or disengaging. Results suggest that infants expected two people who spoke the same language to be more likely to affiliate than two people who spoke different languages. Thus, infants view language as a meaningful social marker and use language to make inferences about third-party social relationships. (shrink)

BackgroundInternationally, patient access to notes is increasing. This has been driven by respect for patient autonomy, often recognised as a primary tenet of medical ethics: patients should be able to access their records to be fully engaged with their care. While research has been conducted on the impact of patient access to outpatient and primary care records and to patient portals, there is no such review looking at access to hospital medical records in real time, nor an ethical analysis of (...) the issues involved in such a change in process.MethodsThis study employed a systematic review framework in two stems, to integrate literature identified from two searches: Medline, CINAHL and Scopus databases were conducted, (for (1) hospitalised patients, patient access to records and its effects on communication and trust within the doctor-patient relationship; and (2) patient access to medical records and the ethical implications identified). The qualitative and quantitative results of both searches were integrated and critically analysed.Results3954 empirical and 4929 ethical studies were identified; 18 papers representing 16 studies were identified for review (12 empirical and 6 ethical). The review reveals a consensus that our current approach to giving information to patients – almost exclusively verbally – is insufficient; that patient access to notes is a welcome next step for patient-centred care, but that simply allowing full access, without explanation or summary, is also insufficient. Several ethical implications need to be considered: increased information could improve patient trust and knowledge but might transfer an (unwelcome) sense of responsibility to patients; doctors and patients have conflicting views on how much information should be shared and when; sharing written information might increase the already significant disparity in access to health care, and have unforeseen opportunity costs. The impact on medical practice of sharing notes in real time will also need to be evaluated.ConclusionsThe review presents encouraging data to support patient access to medical notes. However, sharing information is a critical part of clinical practice; changing how it is done could have significant empirical and ethical impacts; any changes should be carefully evaluated. (shrink)

We propose a new dynamic hybrid logic to reason about social networks and their dynamics building on the work of “Logic in the Community” by Seligman, Liu and Girard. Our framework distinguishes between the purely private sphere of agents, namely their mental states, and the public sphere of their observable behavior, i.e., what they seem to believe. We then show how such a distinction allows our framework to model many social phenomena, by presenting the case of pluralistic ignorance as an (...) example and discussing some of its dynamic properties. (shrink)

Detecting conscious awareness in a patient emerging from a coma state is problematic, because our standard attributions of conscious awareness rely on interpreting bodily movement as intentional action. Where there is an absence of intentional bodily action, as in the vegetative state, can we reliably assume that there is an absence of conscious awareness? Recent neuroimaging work suggests that we can attribute conscious awareness to some patients in a vegetative state by interpreting their brain activity as intentional mental action. I (...) suggest that this change of focus, from the interpretation of motor behaviour as intentional bodily action to the interpretation of neural activity as intentional mental action, raises philosophical issues that affect the interpretation of the neuroimaging data. (shrink)

According to a traditional picture, perception and belief have starkly different epistemic roles. Beliefs have epistemic statuses as justified or unjustified, depending on how they are formed and maintained. In contrast, perceptions are “unjustified justifiers.” Core cognition is a set of mental systems that stand at the border of perception and belief, and has been extensively studied in developmental psychology. Core cognition's borderline states do not fit neatly into the traditional epistemic picture. What is the epistemic role of these states? (...) Focusing on the core object system, the author argues that core object representations have epistemic statuses like beliefs do, despite their many prototypically perceptual features. First, the author argues that it is a sufficient condition on a mental state's having an epistemic status as justified or unjustified that the state is based on reasons. Then the author argues that core object representations are based on reasons, through an examination of both experimental results and key markers of the basing relation. The scope of mental states that are subject to epistemic evaluation as justified or unjustified is not restricted to beliefs. (shrink)

A controversial claim in recent dual process accounts of reasoning is that intuitive processes not only lead to bias but are also sensitive to the logical status of an argument. The intuitive logic hypothesis draws upon evidence that reasoners take longer and are less confident on belief–logic conflict problems, irrespective of whether they give the correct logical response. In this paper, we examine conflict detection under conditions in which participants are asked to either judge the logical validity or believability of (...) a presented conclusion, accompanied by measures of eye movement and pupil dilation. The findings show an effect of conflict, under both types of instruction, on accuracy, latency, gaze shifts, and pupil dilation. Importantly, these effects extend to conflict trials in which participants give a belief‐based response (incorrectly under logic instructions or correctly under belief instructions) demonstrating both behavioral and physiological evidence in support of the logical intuition hypothesis. (shrink)

This paper introduces a general logical framework for reasoning about diffusion processes within social networks. The new “Logic for Diffusion in Social Networks” is a dynamic extension of standard hybrid logic, allowing to model complex phenomena involving several properties of agents. We provide a complete axiomatization and a terminating and complete tableau system for this logic and show how to apply the framework to diffusion phenomena documented in social networks analysis.

Safe-by-design aims at addressing safety issues already during the R&D and design phases of new technologies. SbD has increasingly become popular in the last few years for addressing the risks of emerging technologies like nanotechnology and synthetic biology. We ask to what extent SbD approaches can deal with uncertainty, in particular with indeterminacy, i.e., the fact that the actual safety of a technology depends on the behavior of actors in the value chain like users and operators. We argue that while (...) indeterminacy may be approached by designing out users as much as possible in attaining safety, this is often not a good strategy. It will not only make it more difficult to deal with unexpected risks; it also misses out on the resources that users can bring for achieving safety, and it is undemocratic. We argue that rather than directly designing for safety, it is better to design for the responsibility for safety, i.e., designers should think where the responsibility for safety is best situated and design technologies accordingly. We propose some heuristics that can be used in deciding how to share and distribute responsibility for safety through design. (shrink)

The past twenty years have seen an increase in the importance of the body in psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind. This 'embodied' trend challenges the orthodox view in cognitive science in several ways: it downplays the traditional 'mind-as-computer' approach and emphasizes the role of interactions between the brain, body, and environment. In this article, I review recent work in the area of embodied cognitive science and explore the approaches each takes to the ideas of consciousness, computation and representation. Finally, (...) I look at the current relationship between orthodox cognitive science and the study of mental disorder, and consider the implications that the embodied trend could have for issues in psychopathology. (shrink)

In Thinking and Perceiving, Stokes challenges “the pernicious cognitive effects assumption”: the assumption that it would be epistemically problematic if our thoughts were to directly influence our perceptual experience. In doing so, Stokes takes himself to be supplementing the epistemological claims of philosophers like Siegel and Lyons with descriptive claims about human psychology. I argue that his conclusions are more radical than they first appear, to the extent that Stokes’s project is at odds with the standard epistemological discussions of cognitive (...) penetration. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between several ideas about the mind and cognition. The hypothesis of extended cognition claims that cognitive processes can and do extend outside the head, that elements of the world around us can actually become parts of our cognitive systems. It has recently been suggested that the hypothesis of extended cognition is entailed by one of the foremost philosophical positions on the nature of the mind: functionalism, the thesis that mental states are defined by their functional (...) relations rather than by their physical constituents. Furthermore, it has been claimed that functionalism entails a version of extended cognition which is sufficiently radical as to be obviously false. I survey the debate and propose several ways of avoiding this conclusion, emphasizing the importance of distinguishing the hypothesis of extended cognition from the related notion of the extended mind. (shrink)

This paper goes beyond critiques of western philosophical notions of space as passive, feminine, and unintelligent by reconfiguring containment as an active process. The author draws on work in the history of technology, on a cybernetic epistemology that emphasizes the interdependence of organism and environment, and on intersubjectivist psychoanalytic theories of the maternal provision. A more unexpected ally is found in Heidegger, whose writings on holding and supply are read in ways that contribute to the development of an urgently required (...) philosophy of container technologies. (shrink)

Testimonial accounts of mathematical problem choice typically rely on intrinsic constraints. They focus on the worth of the problem and feelings of beauty. These are often developed as both descriptive and normative constraints on problem choice. In this paper, I aim to add an extrinsic constraint of no less importance: the assurance of contact of minds with a desired audience. A number of elements for the relationship between mathematician and his audience make up this contact. This constraint stems from the (...) mathematician’s role as an arguer, as one of the pre-requisites to argumentation is contact of minds. I examine two exceptional cases which fail to be explained by intrinsic constraints on motivation and posit how this contact could influence usual cases. While not the only constraint or drive in problem choice, establishing contact of minds plays an important role worth further examination. (shrink)

This study investigated whether some Japanese intransitive verbs, called agent-implying intransitive verbs, are processed differently from other ordinary intransitive verbs. These verbs are special in that they denote agentive events, but they are intransitive verbs, which only allow the patient/theme to be the only nominatively marked argument. The priming experiment was designed based on the situation model theory, assuming that verbs with an agentive semantic structure (e.g., ordinary transitive verbs) has a shorter causal inferential distance than those with a non-agentive (...) semantic structure (e.g., ordinary intransitive verb). In the experiment, participants were instructed to read two sentences that formed a story, of which the second sentence was either a transitive or intransitive sentence. The participants then answered a related question about general knowledge, and their response times were measured. The results show that, whereas the mean response time in the ordinary intransitive condition was significantly longer than that in the ordinary transitive condition, the mean response time in the agent-implying intransitive condition was not significantly different from that of the corresponding transitive condition, suggesting that agent-implying intransitive verbs are interpreted as agentive. The findings suggest that agent-implying intransitive verbs instantly evoke agentivity, whereas ordinary intransitive verbs do not. The theoretical implications of the findings are discussed. (shrink)

Church has contributed a lot to the safeguard of G. Frege's theory of meaning after the discovery of antinomies in it. To achieve this he has adapted it by keeping parts, discarding others and adding new ones, most of which are clearly exposed in an informal way in the introduction to his Introduction to Mathematical Logic. As for any modification of a theory by another person, it is interesting to understand how the thoughts of the former survive in the new (...) theory even though radical changes have occurred, or on the contrary how it retains only the appearance of the initial theory. We shall therefore go through the basic concepts of logic he introduces in this introduction and assess their relation to Frege's original theory. (shrink)