Feminist Auto/biography as a Means of Empowering Women: A Case Study of Sylvia Plath's The Bell Jar and Janet Frame's Faces in the Water Feminism, as a political, social and cultural movement, pays much attention to the importance of text. Text is the carrier of important thoughts, truths, ideas. It becomes a means of empowering women, a support in their fight for free expression, equality, intellectual emancipation. By "text" one should understand not only official documents, manifestos or articles. (...) The term also refers to a wide range of literary products—poetry, novels, diaries. The language of literature enables female authors to omit obstacles and constraints imposed by the phallogocentric world, a world dominated by masculine propaganda. Through writing, female authors have an opportunity to liberate their creative potential and regain the territory for unlimited expression. In order to produce a truly powerful text, they resort to a variety of writing styles and techniques. Here the notions of a situated knowledge and context sensitivity prove useful. There are three methodologies working within situated knowledge, namely, the politics of location, self-reflexivity and feminist auto/biography. All of them regard text as a fundamental tool to signify one's authority, yet feminist auto/biography, a concept widely discussed by the British theorist Liz Stanley, appears to be the most empowering mode of writing. It challenges the overused genre of auto/biography and reconstructs its role within feminist epistemologies, thus creating a favourable environment for text production. The works by Sylvia Plath and Janet Frame can be analyzed from the point of view of auto/biographical empowerment, even though their auto/biographical potential is mainly instinctive. Nevertheless, they help to comprehend the strength of the auto/biographical.The aim of this article is to "investigate" two novels by these authors, The Bell Jar by Sylvia Plath and Faces in the Water by Janet Frame, and their compatibility with Stanley's concept. The paper attempts to answer several questions. Are these novels actual feminist auto/biographies or rather fictional auto/biographies with feminist undertones? What kind of narrative strategy is used to achieve the effect of authority over the text? Last but not least, what is the function of auto/biographical narration in the case of these two novels? The article also explores the idea of writing as a means of regaining control over one's life. (shrink)

Greening Auto Jobs: A Critical Analysis of the Green Job Solution provides a major contribution to the growing and important field of environmental sociology and labor studies by providing a theoretical and practical understanding of how the broader political-economic relations of society affect the relationship between labor and the environment.

We propose a reading of Heidegger’s interpretation of the problem of Self-Affection in the first Kantian Critique. If the Time and the ‘I Think’ are unified is due to the notion of time as pure Self-Affection, that could capture the formation of Self without subordinating it to an extra-temporal connection. We attempt to show that Heidegger’s account considers time as a self-referential movement which however requires a delay and a retreat of itself to release what is coming. In order (...) to allow an encounter with another, the self-affective structure must give time to herself, which prevents the autarchic closure of herself. (shrink)

This paper has a twofold objective. First, it engages with the interrelation of time, space, and matter in Kant, Heidegger, and Derrida and questions whether and how this interrelation effects the possibility of self-relation. In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Heidegger suggests that the very structure of subjectivity is constituted by what he calls the ‘pure self-affection’ of time and thus the possibility of self-relation is intimately bound up with the temporalizing of time. In his 1964–65 seminar, Heidegger: the (...) Question of Being and History, Derrida translates this pure affection of time into the more generic term ‘auto-affection,’ which will remain a pivotal reference point for his deconstruction of the metaphysical privileging of time as presence. Derrida shows how the (im)possibility of auto-affection is bound up not only with time but also with space, or rather with the ‘spacing of time’ that he also refers to as ‘the trace.’ Second, the paper moves across the frontiers of philosophy and physics posing anew the question concerning the interrelations of temporality, spatiality, and materiality. With reference to what in general relativity is called ‘the curvature of spacetime,’ the efficacy of materiality in the movement of auto-affection is called into question. (shrink)

The contingent cultural, epistemological and ontological status of biology is highlighted by changes in attitudes towards reproductive politics in the history of feminist movements. Consider, for example, the American, British, and numerous European instances of feminist sympathy for eugenics at the turn of the century. This amounted to a specific formation of the role, in late nineteenth and early twentieth century feminisms, of concepts of biological risk and defence, which were transformed into the justificatory language of rights claims. In this (...) context, one can ask how reproductive politics are to be fitted into the paradoxical relationship between biopolitics and thanatopolitics discussed by Michel Foucault and more recently by Roberto Esposito. In this context, “reproductive life,” can be thought of arising at the intersection of thanapolitics and biopolitics as these relate to women’s bodies. Revisiting Foucault and Esposito in the light of reproductive politics also allows a reconsideration of the paradoxical feminist aims involved in defending individual rights by reference to overall biopolitical interest and futurity. (shrink)

This essay aims to bring to light a specific movement elaborated by Derrida in Of Grammatology, which goes from the experience of dispossession in speech and the economy of signs that replaces speech itself with writing, through the chains of supplements, to the merging of language and auto-erotism into the differentiated totality of auto-affection as the universal rule of experience or as life itself. I will point out that idealization, as the submission of the world to a (...) certain power of repetition in the living and, thus, as the only condition at which the world can affect the living, marks the becoming-spontaneous of the possibility of auto-affection and, at the same time, the very articulation of life, across its history, into a hierarchy of more and more complex symbolical operations. As I aim to demonstrate throughout my reading, the ultimate task of this movement is that a phenomenology cannot account for the structure of auto-affection insofar as, with a gesture parallel to phonocentrism, it would dissolve the irreducible trait of sexuality into the self-presence of self-touching. 1. (shrink)

은 일상적 질서에서 벗어난 존재로서, 자연의 위반, 오류, 무질서 등으로 나타난 다. 이러한 괴물의 이미지는 근․현대 생물학에서 여전히 보존되고 있다. 근․현대 생물학에 서 괴물은 무엇보다도 정상성과 안정성과 관련된다. 생명체의 정상 형태 또는 생명체에서 보존되는 질서의 안정성은 괴물을 어떤 부정의 대상으로 만든다. 한편, 들뢰즈는 차이의 철학을 저주의 상태에 묶인 차이를 해방하는 기획으로 규정한다. 이러한 기획은 괴물에 대 해서도 마찬가지로 적용된다. 차이의 존재론에서 괴물은 정상을 상정하는 비정상이나 질 서를 상정하는 무질서라기보다는 차라리 어떤 이상(anomalie)이다. 이것은 괴물이 유기 체와 동등하게 무한한 변이 가능성을 함축하는 (...) 생명의 변이임을 의미한다. 들뢰즈에게서 이러한 생명에 대한 개념은 다양체에서 찾아진다. 다양체는 고전적으로 생명의 규정이었 던 자기-운동에 대한 들뢰즈의 개념이다. 이에 비추어 보면, 유기체와 괴물은 동등하게 생명-다양체의 변이들이다. 하지만 이것이 유기체와 괴물 사이에 어떠한 구별도 없음을 의미하지는 않는다. 유기체와 괴물은 하나의 생명체에 대해 형상적으로 구별되는 측면들 이기 때문이다. 모든 생명체는 어떤 측면에서는 유기체적이지만, 다른 측면에서는 어떤 ‘괴물 같음’을 함축하고 있다. 이러한 ‘괴물 같음’은 생명체의 잠재적 이미지에 해당한다. 차이의 존재론이 괴물의 문제에 대해 주는 대답은 괴물이 생명체 안에서 형상적으로 구별 되는 잠재적 이미지라는 것이다. (shrink)

This chapter shows how Derrida's deconstruction in Voiceand Phenomenon exposes a double necessity that undergirds Husserl's phenomenological inquiry in the “First Logical Investigation,” especially with respect to expression and indication. It turns to Derrida's reflections on the aporia of blindness in Memoirs of the Blind in order to further develop the logic of double necessity and to examine Derrida's divergence from Merleau‐Ponty's thought. The chapter examines Derrida's critique of the auto‐affective movement of temporalization in Voice and Phenomenon that (...) reveals the impossibility of pure auto‐affection. It explores the limits of Merleau‐Ponty's phenomenology where he has moved beyond Derrida's deconstruction of Husserlian phenomenology. For Derrida, Merleau‐Ponty's emphasis on speech and perception reveals his entrenchment in the phenomenological prioritization of presence; “soaring up to the sun of presence, it is the path of Icarus”. (shrink)

In 1947, the U.S. Secretary of State, George C. Marshall announced that the USA would provide development aid to help the recovery and reconstruction of the economies of Europe, which was widely known as the ‘Marshall Plan’. In Italy, this plan generated a resurgence of modern industrialization and remodeled Italian Industry based on American models of production. As the result of these transnational transfers, the systemic approach known as Fordism largely succeeded and allowed some Italian firms such as Fiat to (...) flourish. During this period, Detroit and Turin, homes to the most powerful automobile corporations of the twentieth century, became intertwined in a web of common features such as industrial concentration, mass flows of immigrations, uneven urban sprawl, radical iconography and inner-city decay, which characterized Fordism in both cities. In the crucial decades of the postwar expansion of the automobile industries, both cities were hubs of labor battles and social movements. However, after the radical decline in their industries as previous auto cities, they experienced the radical shift toward post-Fordist urbanization and production of political urbanism. This research responds to the recent interest for a comparative (re)turn in urban studies by suggesting the conceptual theoretical baseline for the proposed comparative framework in post-Fordist cities. In better words, it develops a “theory” on the challenges of comparative urbanism in post-Fordist cities. (shrink)

Artificial Immune Systems (AIS) are intelligent algorithms derived on the principles inspired by human immune system. In this research work, electroencephalography (EEG) signals for four distinct motor movement of human limbs are detected and classified using Negative Selection Classification Algorithm (NSCA). For this study, a widely studied open source EEG signal database (BCI IV - Graz dataset 2a, comprising 9 subjects) has been used. Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCCs) are extracted as selected feature from recorded EEG signals. Dimensionality reduction (...) of data is carried out by applying two hidden layered stacked auto-encoder. Genetic Algorithm (GA) optimized detectors (Artificial Lymphocytes) are trained using Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA) for detection and classification of four motor movements. The trained detectors consist of four sets of detectors, each set is trained for detection and classification of one of the four movements from the other three movements. The optimized radius of detector is small enough not to mis-detect the sample. Euclidean distance of each detector with every training dataset sample is taken and compared with optimized radius of detector as a non-self detector. Our proposed approach achieved a mean classification accuracy of 86.39% for limb movements over 9 subjects with a maximum individual subject classification accuracy of 97.5 % for subject number eight. (shrink)

In the essay ‘To Speculate – On “Freud’”, which is published in The Postcards: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond (1980) and draws upon the last part of his unedited lecture course on La Vie la mort (taught in 1975), Jacques Derrida engages a close reading of Sigmund Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle. This article focuses on the deconstruction of the Freudian concept of drive (Trieb) that Derrida unfolds across his reading. It traces the analysis of the movement of (...) autotelicity (auto-télie) that, according to Derrida, underpins the drive's relation to itself, and argues that the French philosopher interprets a specific drive evoked (but not thematized) by Freud, the drive to power (Bemächtigungstrieb), as the figure of the deconstruction of that autotelicity. Furthermore, the article suggests that the implications of this argument extend beyond Derrida's early reading of Freud, since they cast a new light on the argument for replacing the concept of sovereignty with that of the drive to power, which Derrida elaborates in his late political analyses. (shrink)

This article explores the way sound, music, rhythm and movement reflect experiences of suffering, trauma and aliveness by reflecting on colonializing and decolonializing modes of understanding the role played by sounds and music in living through suffering, displacement, cultural devastation and illness. Music and sound practices offer people ways of connecting life narratives and coping mechanisms to deal with loss and suffering. A peculiar aliveness of the body is mediated by sound and rhythm. The experiences with personal and cultural (...) suffering of Richard Wilhelm, Simone Weil, Ludwig Wittgenstein and people in the author’s life are read against the background of the ethical and communicative dimensions of sound and music, in an ethnographic and auto-ethnographic as much a philosophical study. (shrink)

This book argues that we have moved into a new cultural period, automodernity, which represents a social, psychological, and technological reaction to postmodernity. In fact, by showing how individual autonomy is now being generated through technological and cultural automation, Samuels posits that we must rethink modernity and postmodernity. Part of this rethinking entails stressing how the progressive political aspects of postmodernism need to be separated from the aesthetic consumption of differences in automoderntiy. Choosing culturally relevant studies of The Matrix, Grand (...) Theft Auto, Eminem and Jurassic Park, he interprets these medias through the lens of eminent theorists like Slavoj Zizek, Frederic Jameson, and Henry Jenkins. Ultimately, he argues that what defines postmodernity is the stress on social construction, secular humanism, and progressive social movements that challenge the universality and neutrality of modern reason"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

The phenomenological reading of psychoanalysis undertook by Michel Henry is surprising in several ways. By inscribing Freud in the philosophical lineage and by affirming that his theses on the unconscious take over (resume), ignoring it, two opposite movements of western metaphysics, Henry intends to show that psychoanalysis has to overcome the primacy of representation in order to get rid of the contradictions that traverse it and that make it a prisoner of a philosophy of consciousness. Without fully rejecting the Freudian (...) theory, the author of the Genealogy of Psychoanalysis reformulates the meaning of the meta-psychological notions according to his theses on the cogito, subjectivity and the auto-affection of the living. In this article we retraced the stakes of this redefinition of drives, affect and the unconscious considering his reflexions on repression. (shrink)

Apart from these reservations, however, the child sacrifices certain immediate ends of satisfaction for ends which by their very transcendence elude him. The consequence of his new attitude on his interpretation of the actions of other individuals will he striking; for, inasmuch as their acts and gestures no longer signify as means to his immediate and tangible ends within his life-space, their behavior will be problematic, and the child will attempt to interrogate its meaning. Under the old dispensation he could (...) grasp the meaning of a bodily movement by following its direction towards an object in his proximate environment, and the end of the movement was simply the object viewed as terminus ad quem or as positively charged with respect to action. Under the new dispensation, based no longer on Pleasure and Pain but on Good and Bad, the signification of the gestures and speech of those around the child is transcendent in the sense that it does not aim at material objects or at combinations of the same in his proximate milieu, but at possible or ideal objects separated from the child not by an interval of space but by an interval of time. Thus the transcendent terminus of a gesture is not a materially given object but an object to be constructed and as yet existing only in the projects of the parents. Moral and intellectual formation is a process of self-alienation, of auto-suggestive submission to the Transcendent, interrupted periodically on the part of the child by acts of defiance, systematic contradiction and obstinacy, and regression to earlier modes of adjustment with considerable nuisance-value. If under the regime of indulgence the child becomes what he is by acquiring his immanent meaning in his activities of self-gratification, under the regime of discipline he becomes other than he is by a sacrifice of his determinate individuality. (shrink)

This paper attempts to briefly sketch the discursive development of critique in critical theories from modernity to postmodernity. Critique has evolved from negative criticism of the product or output of discourse to the production of or the possibility of discourse. Moreover, there has been a movement from a framework of critique to the critique of alterity. The paper demonstrates that this Levinasian critique has shifted from the auto-critique to alter-critique. The other not just returns the gaze of the (...) self but also contests that gaze in the name of justice. (shrink)

Is “philosophy after automation” a theme or a question? One might hesitate about this, because we may wonder whether or not it implies that philosophy could disappear after automation, or at least be subject to serious revision. Philosophy could be read as a historical movement towards self-determination [autodétermination] as well as the exposition of the limit of such a program of archi-autonomy. The Cartesian event is essentially ambivalent, and man alone in the world is undoubtedly also the one who (...) can but alter, in the long run, the sufficiency of the auto. This is what we can now begin to understand. (shrink)

This paper brings about a conversation between Schumpeterian and Polanyian perspectives on markets and their central role in the capitalist economy. For Schumpeter, markets were critical to the process of selftransformation of economic activity, but in his vision, markets as such were largely taken for granted. Markets enabled the introduction of new processes and products equally as well as rendering economic activities obsolete, with the entrepreneur and firm as agents of change, generating new combinations of activities and driven by the (...) creative power of knowledge. Innovation and markets are jointly the engines of endogenous growth. For Karl Polanyi, by contrast, although markets were the central feature of the capitalist economy from the beginning of the nineteenth century, his main interest is the constant impulse for markets as institutions to expand into every aspect of social life and the countermovement of regulation to restrain what he sees as their essentially destructive nature. His focus is therefore on markets as instituted economic processes, driven by the double movement of regulation and de-regulation. He scarcely considers innovation in production or consumption, concentrating on institutions of exchange and distribution. The paper explores the two perspectives in order to ask the question that their confrontation raises: What is the relation between intra-market endogenous change and marketframework institutional change? To test out each perspective, a schematic “long-duration” empirical account of the United Kingdom food distribution markets is subjected to a Schumpeterian and Polanyian reading, and each is exposed for complementary deficits. A broader explanatory framework is sketched that proposes analysis of innovation in market institutions--especially processes exchange and distribution-- in combination with innovation in production and consumption. It is suggested that to explore the constant change of capitalist economies, these four economic domains each involve different orders of innovation and transformation that have complex feedbacks and interactions with each other. Rather than according primacy to one or other order of change, we require a complex causal account embracing multiple instituted economic processes.Cet article discute de la vision des marchés et de leur rôle central dans l’économie capitaliste selon Schumpeter et Polanyi. Pour Schumpeter, les marchés sont essentiels au processus d’auto transformation de l’activité économique, mais dans son approche il présuppose l’existence des marchés. Les marchés permettent l’introduction de nouveaux processus et produits et rendent en même temps les activités économiques obsolètes. Les marchés, avec l’entrepreneur et la firme comme agents du changement, créent de nouvelles combinaisons d’activités et sont dynamisés par le pouvoir créatif de la connaissance. L’innovation et les marchés sont conjointement les moteurs de la croissance endogène. Chez Karl Polanyi, en revanche, bien que les marchés soient un élément central de l’économie capitaliste dès le début du 19ème siècle, l’attention se porte sur le mouvement permament des marchés-institutions à s’étendre à tous les domaines de la vie sociale ainsi que sur le contre-mouvement de la régulation à limiter ce que Polanyi considère comme la nature destructrice des marchés. Son interêt se porte ainsi aux marchés comme des processus économiques établis, conduits par un double mouvement de régulation et de dérégulation. Il ne considère que rarement l’innovation de production ou de consommation, et se concentre sur les institutions de l’échange et de la distribution.L’article explore les deux visions afin de sinterroger sur ce que la confrontation des approches soulève comme question: Quelle est la relation entre les changements endogènes intra marché et les changements institutionnels de la structure de marché? Pour tester chacune des visions, un compte-rendu empirique sur longue période de la distribution alimentaire au Royaume-Uni est soumis à une lecture Schumpeterienne et Polanyienne.Un cadre explicatif plus large est esquissé et suggère une analyse de l’innovation des institutions de marché - particulièrement des processus d’échange et de distribution - conjointement à l’innovation de production et de consommation. Il est suggéré que pour analyser le changement permanent des économies capitalistes, il faut considérer les ordres d’innovation et de transformation de ces quatres domaines économiques qui connaissent des “effets de retour” ainsi des interactions. Au lieu d’accorder la primauté à un des ordres de changement, il est nécessaire de rendre compte d’une causalité complexe qui prend en compte des processus économiques multiples. (shrink)

Taking regular walks when living with Parkinson’s disease has beneficial effects on movement and quality of life. Yet, patients usually show reduced physical activity compared to healthy older adults. Using auditory stimulation such as music can facilitate walking but patients vary significantly in their response. An individualized approach adapting musical tempo to patients’ gait cadence, and capitalizing on these individual differences, is likely to provide a rewarding experience, increasing motivation for walk-in PD. We aim to evaluate the observance, safety, (...) tolerance, usability, and enjoyment of a new smartphone application. It was coupled with wearable sensors and delivered individualized musical stimulation for gait auto-rehabilitation at home. Forty-five patients with PD underwent a 1-month, outdoor, uncontrolled gait rehabilitation program, using the BeatWalk application. The music tempo was being aligned in real-time to patients’ gait cadence in a way that could foster an increase up to +10% of their spontaneous cadence. Open-label evaluation was based on BeatWalk use measures, questionnaires, and a six-minute walk test. Patients used the application 78.8% of the prescribed duration and enjoyed it throughout the program. The application was considered “easy to use” by 75% of the patients. Pain, fatigue, and falls did not increase. Fear of falling decreased and quality of life improved. After the program, patients improved their gait parameters in the six-minute walk test without musical stimulation. BeatWalk is an easy to use, safe, and enjoyable musical application for individualized gait rehabilitation in PD. It increases “walk for exercise” duration thanks to high observance.Clinical Trial Registration: ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT02647242. (shrink)

E l auto r pa r t e de l reconocimient o d e qu e lo s parámetro s e n lo s qu e s e inscribía n las institucione s d e l a democraci a representat iva ha n cambiad o sustancialmente . E n es e nu evo cont e xt o sitú a e l debat e sobr e lo s posi b le s dé f icit s d e l a democraci (...) a representat iva y espe- cí f icament e e l crecient e desapoderamient o d e l a capacida d popula r d e influi r y condicionar la s decisiones , qu e hac e perde r l e gitimida d a un a democraci a qu e sól o mantien e abie r tas la s pue r ta s d e lo s rito s fo r male s e institucionales . E n s e gund o luga r , e l a r tícul o s e centra e n lo s efecto s qu e tien e l a generalizació n d e inte r ne t e n es e escenario . E l auto r constata cóm o la s estrat e gia s d e us o d e la s TI C hast a ahor a desa r rollada s e n e l espaci o polític o se ha n centrad o e n l a mejor a d e l a capacida d d e prestació n d e se r vicio s o e n l a ampliació n de l a capacida d d e elecció n d e lo s consumidores-ciudadanos , per o n o e xist e un a v olunta d d e ir má s all á d e un a concepció n d e l a democraci a qu e s e centr a e n la s r e gla s procedimentales y e n un a visió n mu y estrict a de l principi o d e representación . F rent e a esta s estrat e gias, e l a r tícul o aborda , po r u n lado , la s relacione s entr e Inte r net , m o vimiento s sociale s y las nu ev a s fo r ma s d e hace r polític a (centrándos e e n l a e xperienci a de l 15M ) y , po r otr o lado , la posibilida d d e repensa r d e nu evo e l viej o tem a d e l a democraci a direct a y l a pa r ticipación ciudadan a qu e l a e xtensió n y generalizació n d e Inte r ne t pe r miten . E n amba s estrat e gia s late l a preocupació n po r l a calida d d e l a pa r ticipació n y l a capacida d d e implicació n d e l a gente e n lo s asunto s colect iv o s tant o a n i v e l polític o com o ví a necesari a n o sól o par a defender su s intereses , sin o com o fo r m a d e entende r l a democracia , un a democraci a relaciona l y pa r ticipat iv a. (shrink)

The Genesis of the Social and the Carnal Donation of the Non-Presentable. The Range of the Notion of Institution in Merleau-PontyThis article examines the range of the notion of institution that Merleau-Ponty proposes in his course at the Collège de France (1954-55), by notably insisting on the importance of the question of the genesis of the social for the deepening of his thought. By broadening his investigative domains in two complementary directions (that is, lateral passivity and socio-historical institution), Merleau-Ponty aims (...) in this course to grasp in a better way the lateral relations of our Urstiftung (originary institution) and the instituting subject who obliquely goes beyond the institution towards its sense. That leads him to introduce the perceptual field as being essentially lacunary, because it marks a place where the consciousness is present at the divergence in relation to consciousness. It is certain that the Phenomenology of Perception addressed this question by considering the social as a place where “I am given to myself”. However, the psychological starting point of this work, as well as the originary temporal and unilateral character of radical reflection, prevented one from really grasping the institutional junction of the concrete event and the symbolic matrix. One was not able to thematize an auto-articulation which appears suddenly between radical reflection and the unreflective. This is why Lévi-Strauss’ structuralist thought, by considering the social as symbolism, allows for a better understanding of this institutional nexus. But this idea does not lead to the dogmatic positing of the reality and the autonomy of the social. Instead, it encourages us to practice “the perception of history,” which consists in guessing, in the very process of sociological idealization, the carnal and wild donation of the non-presentable. Far from returning to psychologism, this perception aims at actively achieving the movement internal to the symbolic, that is, its incarnation.La genesi del sociale e la donazione carnale del non-presentabile. La portata della nozione di istituzione in Merleau-PontyQuesto articolo esamina la portata della nozione d’istituzione che Merleau-Ponty propone nel suo corso al Collège de France del 1954-1955, insistendo in particolare sull’importanza della questione della genesi del sociale per l’approfondimento del suo pensiero.Estendendo i propri domini di ricerca in due direzioni complementari (la passività laterale e l’istituzione socio-storica), Merleau-Ponty si propone in questo corso di cogliere meglio i rapporti laterali della nostra Urstiftung (l’istituzione originaria) e del soggetto istituente che la supera obliquamente in direzione del suo senso. Ciò induce a presentare il campo percettivo come essenzialmente lacunoso, poiché manca di un luogo dove la coscienza possa assistere allo scarto rispetto a se stessa.È certo che la Fenomenologia della percezione affrontava questa questione considerando il sociale come un luogo dove “io sono donato a me stesso”. I presupposti psicologici di quest’opera, così come il carattere originariamente temporale e unilaterale della riflessione radicale, impedivano tuttavia di cogliere in maniera adeguata il legame istituzionale dell’evento concreto e della matrice simbolica, e di tematizzare un’autoarticolazione che sorgesse tra la riflessione radicale e l’irriflesso.È per questo motivo che il pensiero strutturalista di Lévi-Strauss, che considerava il sociale come simbolismo, permette di comprendere meglio questo nesso istituzionale. Quest’idea non conduce però a porre dogmaticamente la realtà e l’autonomia del sociale, essa incita piuttosto a praticare “la percezione della storia” che consiste nell’individuare, nel processo stesso dell’idealizzazione sociologica, la donazione carnale e selvaggia del non-presentabile. Lungi dal rappresentare un ritorno allo psicologismo, questa nozione di percezione mira a completare attivamente il movimento interno al simbolico, ovvero la sua incarnazione. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:diacritics 34.2 (2006) 3-13 [Access article in PDF] Biographical Illusion and Methodological Reality Leland De La Durantaye Pierre Bourdieu. Esquisse Pour Une Auto-Analyse. Paris: Raisons d'Agir, 2004. 1 Like his student and friend Nietzsche, Jacob Burckhardt often stressed the necessity for a scholar to work in solitude. Like Nietzsche, he also possessed a gift for acidic analogy and likened the world of academia to a group of dogs (...) sniffing one another.Few observers of the academic interactions of his time had such sharp senses as Pierre Bourdieu, and few have been as torn between solitary reflection and communal exchange. Trained by France's most elite academic institutions (such as the celebrated Parisian lycée Louis-le-Grand and the even more celebrated École Normale Supérieure), Bourdieu was grateful for the opportunities that this training afforded him. And he felt that this gratitude could best be repaid by submitting those elite academic institutions and their insular world to an unsparing critique, to unveiling the distance that separated their stated ideals from their real effects.Like Bergson and Jaurès, like Sartre and Aron, like Foucault and Derrida, Bourdieu studied that which was most difficult and most prestigious where it was most difficult and prestigious: philosophy at the École Normale Supérieure. Like those famous fellow alumni, he was a brilliant student, and like them, he longed to distinguish his personal vision from those around him. This led him to do something surprising, something that, despite their separate and significant dissatisfactions with the philosophy of their day, neither Bergson nor Sartre, neither Foucault nor Derrida ever did: he abandoned philosophy. He left what he saw as the intellectual royal road for the most pedestrian of paths—that of sociology.As he often reminded his readers, sociology was in a sorry state when he entered it. Both in academic appraisal and the popular imagination, it was considered dry and provincial. It was thought to have no true intellectual adventure in it—nothing of the ethnologist tramping through the rain forests of the Amazon, nothing of the lone philosopher working through the night on an opus to end metaphysics. It was laborious and abstract; it dealt in statistical generalities. Bourdieu repeatedly described sociology as "the pariah of disciplines."1 He had, however, a special mission for it in mind. [End Page 3]In Bourdieu's posthumous memoir Esquisse pour une auto-analyse, published in February 2004—two years after his death—by the small publishing house he helped found, Raisons d'Agir, he notes how, "a bit as a joke," he had often defined himself as "the leader of a liberation movement aiming to free the social sciences from philosophy's imperialism" [94].2 From early on in his career, he had wished to revolt against the "empire of the total philosopher"—an empire reigned over by, more than any other, Jean-Paul Sartre [cf. 25].3 Looking back upon this decisive period of his development, Bourdieu goes so far as to state that the shaping of his identity was done "against everything which the Sartrian enterprise represented for me" [37]. In historical accounts, Sartre is often given as counterfigure his friend and fellow normalien Raymond Aron. In his Esquisse, Bourdieu proposes a different, and less conventional, counterfigure for the imperial philosopher: the brilliant Austrian satirist and cultural critic Karl Kraus. Bourdieu notes the particular affection he had always felt for Kraus and attributes it to the latter's singular capacity for "critical reflectivenesss" [37]. Subtly, and appropriately, Bourdieu follows this remark with something that occurs nowhere else in his memoir: an epigram (the composing of which Kraus excelled in). Bourdieu writes: "there are a great many intellectuals who question the world, but there are very few intellectuals who question the intellectual world" [37]. The remark could not more compactly and precisely reflect what Bourdieu had aspired all his life to do: to excel in the art and science of questioning the intellectual world. 2 Leo Spitzer liked to cite Friedrich Gundolf's dictum "Methode ist Erlebnis" (method is lived experience). Nearing the end of his career... (shrink)

Actualmente, el feminismo, en su condición de movimiento, pero también de teoría viva, fluctuante y sometida a un proceso de revisión, (auto)crítica y disputa permanente, estaría experimentando importantes cambios en el marco de lo que algunas autoras han denominado como cuarta ola. En todo este proceso de emergencia de nuevos feminismos, pero también de pujanza por la categoría y por la significación de la misma, el papel de las políticas e iniciativas públicas —feministas y no feministas— sería de gran (...) relevancia. A lo largo de este trabajo, nos centraremos en analizar algunas propuestas feministas vinculadas a la promoción del empleo y el emprendimiento entre mujeres desarrolladas por el Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2015-2019). De esta manera, analizaremos la producción de sentido y de ideales subjetivos femeninos fomentada en el marco de estas políticas, atendiendo a posibles contradicciones y ambivalencias inherentes a los marcos referenciales movilizados y a su interacción.Currently, the feminist social movement and feminist theories are being subjected to a process of resignification, change and conceptual dispute in the frame of what some authors have called the Fourth Wave. This process involves the theoretical development of new feminist approaches and, thus, the struggle for signifying and owning the category feminism. In this complex process, the role of public initiatives and policies is crucial for setting and promoting the hegemonic meaning of this (and any) category. Throughout this paper, we aim to analyse two feminist initiatives developed by Madrid’s City Council in order to promote employment from an entrepreneurial approach. By doing so, we will be looking into the production of meaning linked to a feminine ideal subject as well as into a gender biased entrepreneurial discourse. (shrink)

O objectivo primário do presente artigo é estudar algumas das implicações, sobretudo epistemológicas, associadas com o auto-intitulado movimento da Física Ariana (Deutsche Physikj, movimento esse que aqui se considera como tendo sido iniciado pelos físicos, laureados com o Prémio Nobel, Philipp Lenard e Johannes Stark. Assim, em primeiro lugar, procura-se analisar questões como a da ligação entre ciência e raça, a da função do método experimental e do método dedutivo nas descobertas das ciências naturais, bem como a da relação (...) entre matemática e natureza, já para não mencionar a dimensão histórica da ciência. Em vez de recorrer a conceitos supostamente puros do que sejam ciência ou racionalidade em ordem a instaurar um tribunal da história, cujo veredicto seria a condenação da Física Ariana como irrisória anomalia epistemológica no corpo histórico da ciência, os autores do presente artigo procuram, antes de mais, traçar a origem do movimento a partir das biografias de Lenard e Stark, acreditando que o carácter profundamente conturbado de ambos, coadunado com a conflituosa situação política que antecedeu a ascensão de Hitler ao poder na Alemanha em 1933, seriam razões suficientes para a formação das doutrinas que atacavam a Física Teórica. Nesse sentido, depois de expor os princípios e as ideias defendidas pelos físicos arianos, os autores procuram evidenciar até que ponto uma análise restrita ao campo da física e dos seus documentos não é suficiente para uma compreensão cabal de tal movimento. Ao mesmo tempo, procuram mostrar também por que razão é necessário considerar que algumas objecções levantadas contra a física teórica se constituíam como problemas verdadeiramente relevantes, sendo que alguns deles foram também formulados por autores que não pactuavam com as convicções políticas de Lenard e Stark. Finalmente, o artigo comporta uma análise das posições defendidas por Werner Heisenberg em ordem a mostrar a seriedade com a qual as críticas dos físicos arianos foram recebidas por este autor, nelas reconhecendo algo digno de ser respondido, e isso não meramente por razões políticas, mas antes porque constituíam dilemas reais instalados na prática das ciências naturais. Ou seja, recorrendo aos argumentos esgrimidos por Werner Heisenberg, os autores do artigo pretendem demonstrar que a Física Ariana não merece atenção apenas na sua qualidade de aberração histórica, mas também pelo facto de ela ter levantado questões ainda hoje epistemologicamente relevantes. /// The primary aim of the present article is to study some of the implications, particularly the epistemological ones, associated with the movement of the so called German Physics (Deutsche PhysikJ, a movement that in this article is mainly associated with the work of the physicists, and Nobel laureates, Phillip Lenard and Johannes Stark. The article begins by analyzing questions related to the connection established between science and race, as well as to the function of the experimental and deductive methods in the discoveries of the natural sciences, not to mention the problems associated with the relation between mathematics and nature as well as the historical dimension of science. The goal, therefore, is not to take supposedly pure concepts about what science and rationality might be and establish them as judges in the tribunal of history, whose verdict would be the condemnation of the German Physics as an insignificant epistemological anomaly within the historical body of science. Rather, the authors of the article want to trace the origin of the movement of the German Physics by reading the biographies of Lenard and Stark, whereby it is assumed that the problematic character of these physicists together with the political situation that anteceded Hitlers ascension to power in Germany in 1933 would be reason enough for the formation of doctrines directed against theoretical physics. In this sense, after expounding the principles and the doctrines defended by the Arian physicists, the authors of the article show that an analysis circumscribed to the domain of physics would not be sufficient for a global understanding of this movement. At the same time, however, the authors also want to show the reason why it is necessary to consider some of the objections raised against theoretical physics as serious problems, even though some of them were also formulated by authors that did not share the political convictions of Lenard and Stark. Finally, the article contains an analysis of the positions defended by Werner Heisenberg in order to demonstrate the seriousness with which the criticisms of the Arian physicists were received by this most important author, so much so that he recognized in them something worth a response, and this not only for political reasons, but also because he recognized the problems raised as a dilemma situated at the very heart of the practice of the natural sciences. In other words, by a close reading of the arguments presented by Werner Heisenberg, the authors of the article want to demonstrate that the movement of German Physics is worth attention not only in its quality as an historical aberration, but also due to the fact that it raised questions that are still epistemologically relevant. (shrink)

Tute Bianche are not a movement but a device of subjectivation working inside vaster movements. Each is free to put or to remove Tute Bianca. It indicates that he respects the style of it: the refusal of the separation violence/nonviolence, reference to t zapatisme, the relationship of a particular type with the media. Tute Bianche are auto-sarcastic, ironic, rich in invention. In search of a hegemony of minority cultures, they put in crisis representations, destabilize media, etc. But if (...) since Seattle one can speak about a real movement it is mainly because hundred thousand persons put their body at the risk of the bats, of the eargas, and now, balls. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 33.1 (2003) 60-79 [Access article in PDF] The Secret Power of Suggestion Scipio Sighele and the Postliberal Subject Suzanne R. Stewart-Steinberg He experiments one by one with about thirty young men. [...] Almost all of them respond immediately to his power of fascination by turning stiff throughout their bodies; their faces become contracted, terrified, sometimes cadaverous; they are at the mercy of the fascinator and follow his movements (...) like a magnet. [...] There is something pitiful, spasmodic in their features, something macabre in their gestures. [...] Donato has them all in his power, he attracts them in threes, in sixes, ten at a time, simply by rapidly staring into their eyes, even against their firm will and their obstinate efforts to resist his suggestion. [...] Donato, in the process, never speaks: he thinks, he wants and points. [...] —an eyewitness account, L'Italia (1886) Young male bodies that turn stiff despite their efforts to do otherwise—such were the events to be seen on the stage of the Teatro Scribe in Turin in 1886, events performed under the direction of "Donato" (the Belgian-born Alfred d'Hont), the new theatrical magnetizer of crowds. Enrico Morselli, one of Italy's leading psychiatrists of the period,1 assisted and himself succumbed to the fascination of Donato. In his important 1886 study on animal magnetism and hypnotic states, Morelli provided a rather positive portrait of the man. Donato, in his opinion, was not a vulgar man. First soldier, then state employee, journalist, novelist, poet, and finally student and apostle of animal magnetism, Donato had revolutionized hypnotic practice through his discovery of a phenomenon called "fascination." Donato was blessed with uncommon physical strength, quick and insistent eyes, a great agility of movement and much spirit. He had exchanged the magician's cap for the more sober tuxedo—quite appropriately, for he [End Page 60]rejects fluids, rejects the power and transmission of will; nor does he trade in somnambulist lucidity, in sight without eyes, in divination. He does not claim to have special secrets or gifts. Instead he claims that it is his quick and insistent "gaze" that produces a rapid and sudden shock to the nervous system of sensitive individuals. Where there is no "orgasm," he told me—but more accurately he should have said "predisposition"—his method does not work. [Morselli, Il magnetismo animale 281] What was then so revolutionary about Donato's method? Why were the spectacles at the Teatro Scribe perceived to be so radically new? And above all, why, as Morselli claims, did these shows come close to producing a political crisis right at the center of Europe [Magnetismo 271]?James Braid's discovery in 1842 that hypnotic sleep could be induced by the simple fixation on a luminous object had revolutionized magnetic theory and practice. Braid's was to prove an important discovery, for it made possible the shift from the putative supernatural powers of the hypnotist—based on the theory of the transmission of magnetic fluids or electric currents—to an analysis of characteristics thought to inhere in the hypnotized subject him- or herself. The real cause of hypnosis, its very effectivity, was to be found, as Morselli remarks, not in the magnetizer but in his subject [Magnetismo 32]. A rethinking, within the late-nineteenth-century literature on hypnotism, of what drives the subject, of what makes him act appears predicated then on a very peculiar form of interiority, of self-causation within the subject himself. At the end of its historical trajectory this rethinking would first result in the idea of auto-hypnosis or auto-suggestion, and then, by the beginning of the new century, it would found the psychoanalytic subject, traversed as he is by conflicting desires and topographically split between ego and superego. In both instances, however, obedience is exacted as a result of an internalized command and—and here lies the peculiarity and utter novelty of this subject—for that reason the subject ceases to be master of his own house.In the remarks that follow, I will leave aside Freud's own contributions... (shrink)

The 'Conscious Pilot' is a new model of the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) consistent with the Orch OR model. The basic idea is that spatiotemporal envelopes of dendritic gamma synchrony move through the brain's neuronal networks. The movement is sideways to neurocomputational flow, occurring via dendritic dendritic gap junction electrical synapses. A conscious pilot moving around an airplane while it flies on auto pilot is used as a metaphor for dendritic synchrony moving through the brain's neurocomputational networks, (...) conveying conscious experience and choice to otherwise non conscious cognitive modes. (shrink)

After people learn to sort objects into categories they see them differently. Members of the same category look more alike and members of different categories look more different. This phenomenon of within-category compression and between-category separation in similarity space is called categorical perception (CP). It is exhibited by human subjects, animals and neural net models. In backpropagation nets trained first to auto-associate 12 stimuli varying along a onedimensional continuum and then to sort them into 3 categories, CP arises as (...) a natural side-effect because of four factors: (1) Maximal interstimulus separation in hidden-unit space during autoassociation learning, (2) movement toward linear separability during categorization learning, (3) inverse-distance repulsive force exerted by the between-category boundary, and (4) the modulating effects of input iconicity, especially in interpolating CP to untrained regions of the continuum. Once similarity space has been "warped" in this way, the compressed and separated "chunks" have symbolic labels which could then be combined into symbol strings that constitute propositions about objects. The meanings of such symbolic representations would be "grounded" in the system's capacity to pick out from their sensory projections the object categories that the propositions were about. (shrink)

A poem encrypts, though not predictably, the effects it may have when at some future moment, in another context, it happens to be read and inscribed in a new situation, in ‘an interpretation that transforms the very thing it interprets’, as Jacques Derrida puts it in Specters of Marx. In Wallace Stevens's ‘The Man on the Dump’ (1942), we are told: ‘The dump is full/Of images’. The poem's movement is itself a complex temporal to and fro that aims to (...) repudiate and even annihilate these images. This renunciation leaves the man on the dump ‘The Latest Freed Man’, as the title of another Stevens poem puts it. Like Walter Benjamin's Angel of History, he has his back toward history and has rejected its images in ‘disgust’ in order to face toward a future that will, he hopes, be purified of ideology. Yet Stevens knows that more such images will come and will need in their turn to be rejected and junked, in an endless task of purification. In a now impossibly outdated way, Stevens nevertheless wanted the poet – that is, himself, the man on the dump – to be the begetter of a new ideology, or a new fiction that would, in a powerful speech act, replace all those outworn images on the dump. In the context of potentially catastrophic climate change (as the result of something like a global auto-immune disorder), the second part of the essay complements this commentary on the poem with a free reading; a performative reading, reading as work or as oeuvre that does something with words, for which Jacques Derrida calls. This reading sees Stevens's text as somehow the proleptic foretelling of a present situation. Such future chiming is also, it is argued, a sign to sign relation, an anticipatory allegory or prophecy, or, perhaps, a miniature apocalypse in the etymological sense of an enigmatic unveiling of what has not yet happened. (shrink)

Simone de Beauvoir is one of the most well‐known chroniclers of the twentieth century and her formal volumes of autobiography are widely cited as a left‐wing intellectual's account of her era. Yet her life writing extended far beyond formal memoir to include diaries, letters, and biographical testimonies. In this chapter I analyze the broad movements of Beauvoir's engagement with the genre, from her early philosophical diaries to her formal memoirs and biographies, in the context of her own philosophical and literary (...) worldview. Her auto/biographical writings will emerge from this analysis as an individual case history in which Beauvoir tests out many of her philosophical notions concerning situated selfhood and bears witness to the major evolutions in twentieth century western society. (shrink)

continent. 1.1 : 3-13. / 0/ – Introduction I want to propose, as a trajectory into the philosophically weird, an absurd theoretical claim and pursue it, or perhaps more accurately, construct it as I point to it, collecting the ground work behind me like the Perpetual Train from China Mieville's Iron Council which puts down track as it moves reclaiming it along the way. The strange trajectory is the following: Kant's critical philosophy and much of continental philosophy which has followed, (...) has been a defense against horror and madness. Kant's prohibition on speculative metaphysics such as dogmatic metaphysics and transcendental realism, on thinking beyond the imposition of transcendental and moral constraints, has been challenged by numerous figures proceeding him. One of the more interesting critiques of Kant comes from the mad black Deleuzianism of Nick Land stating, “Kant’s critical philosophy is the most elaborate fit of panic in the history of the Earth.” And while Alain Badiou would certainly be opposed to the libidinal investments of Land's Deleuzo-Guattarian thought, he is likewise critical of Kant's normative thought-bureaucracies: Kant is the one author for whom I cannot feel any kinship. Everything in him exasperates me, above all his legalism—always asking Quid Juris? Or ‘Haven’t you crossed the limit?’—combined, as in today’s United States, with a religiosity that is all the more dismal in that it is both omnipresent and vague. The critical machinery he set up has enduringly poisoned philosophy, while giving great succour to the academy, which loves nothing more than to rap the knuckles of the overambitious [….] That is how I understand the truth of Monique David-Menard’s reflections on the properly psychotic origins of Kantianism. I am persuaded that the whole of the critical enterprise is set up to to shield against the tempting symptom represented by the seer Swedenborg, or against ‘diseases of the head’, as Kant puts it. An entire nexus of the limits of reason and philosophy are set up here, namely that the critical philosophy not only defends thought from madness, philosophy from madness, and philosophy from itself, but that philosophy following the advent of the critical enterprise philosophy becomes auto-vampiric; feeding on itself to support the academy. Following Francois Laruelle's non-philosophical indictment of philosophy, we could go one step further and say that philosophy operates on the material of what is philosophizable and not the material of the external world. [1] Beyond this, the Kantian scheme of nestling human thinking between our limited empirical powers and transcendental guarantees of categorical coherence, forms of thinking which stretch beyond either appear illegitimate, thereby liquefying both pre-critical metaphysics and the ravings of the mad in the same critical acid. In rejecting the Kantian apparatus we are left with two entities – an unsure relation of thought to reality where thought is susceptible to internal and external breakdown and a reality with an uncertain sense of stability. These two strands will be pursued, against the sane-seal of post-Kantian philosophy by engaging the work of weird fiction authors H.P. Lovecraft and Thomas Ligotti. The absolute inhumanism of the formers universe will be used to describe a Shoggothic Materialism while the dream worlds of the latter will articulate the mad speculation of a Ventriloquil Idealism. But first we must address the relation of philosophy to madness as well as philosophy to weird fiction. /1/ – Philosophy and Madness There is nothing that the madness of men invents which is not either nature made manifest or nature restored. Michel Foucault. Madness and Civilization. The moment I doubt whether an event that I recall actually took place, I bring the suspicion of madness upon myself: unless I am uncertain as to whether it was not a mere dream. Arthur Schopenhauer. The World as Will and Idea, Vol. 3. Madness is commonly thought of as moving through several well known cultural-historical shifts from madness as a demonic or otherwise theological force, to rationalization, to medicalization psychiatric and otherwise. Foucault's Madness and Civilization is well known for orientating madness as a form of exclusionary social control which operated by demarcating madness from reason. Yet Foucault points to the possibility of madness as the necessity of nature at least prior to the crushing weight of the church. Kant’s philosophy as a response to madness is grounded by his humanizing of madness itself. As Adrian Johnston points out in the early pages of Time Driven pre-Kantian madness meant humans were seized by demonic or angelic forces whereas Kantian madness became one of being too human. Madness becomes internalized, the external demonic forces become flaws of the individual mind. Foucault argues that, while madness is de-demonized it is also dehumanized during the Renaissance, as madmen become creatures neither diabolic nor totally human reduced to the zero degree of humanity. It is immediately clear why for Kant, speculative metaphysics must be curbed – with the problem of internal madness and without the external safeguards of transcendental conditions, there is nothing to formally separate the speculative capacities for metaphysical diagnosis from the mad ramblings of the insane mind – both equally fall outside the realm of practicality and quotidian experience. David-Menard's work is particularly useful in diagnosing the relation of thought and madness in Kant's texts. David-Menard argues that in Kant's relatively unknown “An Essay on the Maladies of the Mind” as well as his later discussion of the Seer of Swedenborg, that Kant formulates madness primarily in terms of sensory upheaval or other hallucinatory theaters. She writes: “madness is an organization of thought. It is made possible by the ambiguity of the normal relation between the imaginary and the perceived, whether this pertains to the order of sensation or to the relations between our ideas” Kant's fascination with the Seer forces Kant between the pincers of “aesthetic reconciliation” – namely melancholic withdrawal – and “a philosophical invention” – namely the critical project. Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis is a combination and reversal of Kant's split, where an aesthetic over engagement with the world entails prolific conceptual invention. Their embrace of madness, however, is of course itself conceptual despite all their rhizomatic maneuvers. Though they move with the energy of madness, Deleuze and Guattari save the capacity of thought from the fangs of insanity by imbuing materiality itself with the capacity for thought. Or, as Ray Brassier puts it, “Deleuze insists, it is necessary to absolutize the immanence of this world in such a way as to dissolve the transcendent disjunction between things as we know them and as they are in themselves”. That is, whereas Kant relied on the faculty of judgment to divide representation from objectivity Deleuze attempts to flatten the whole economy beneath the juggernaut of ontological univocity. Speculation, as a particularly useful form of madness, might fall close to Deleuze and Guattari’s shaping of philosophy into a concept producing machine but is different in that it is potentially self destructive – less reliant on the stability of its own concepts and more adherent to exposing a particular horrifying swath of reality. Speculative madness is always a potential disaster in that it acknowledges little more than its own speculative power with the hope that the gibbering of at least a handful of hysterical brains will be useful. Pre-critical metaphysics amounts to madness, though this may be because the world itself is mad while new attempts at speculative metaphysics, at post-Kantian pre-critical metaphysics, are well aware of our own madness. Without the sobriety of the principle of sufficient reason we have a world of neon madness: “we would have to conceive what our life would be if all the movements of the earth, all the noises of the earth, all the smells, the tastes, all the light – of the earth and elsewhere, came to us in a moment, in an instant – like an atrocious screaming tumult of things”. Speculative thought may be participatory in the screaming tumult of the world or, worse yet, may produce its spectral double. Against theology or reason or simply commonsense, the speculative becomes heretical. Speculation, as the cognitive extension of the horrorific sublime should be met with melancholic detachment. Whereas Kant's theoretical invention, or productivity of thought, is self -sabotaging, since the advent of the critical project is a productivity of thought which then delimits the engine of thought at large either in dogmatic gestures or non-systematizable empirical wondrousness. The former is celebrated by the fiction of Thomas Ligotti whereas the latter is espoused by the tales of H.P. Lovecraft. /2/ – Weird Fiction and Philosophy. Supernatural horror, in all its eerie constructions, enables a reader to taste treats inconsistent with his personal welfare. Thomas Ligotti Songs of a Dead Dreamer. I choose weird stories because they suit my inclination best—one of my strongest and most persistent wishes being to achieve,momentarily, the illusion of some strange suspension or violation of the galling limitations of time, space, and natural law which forever imprison us and frustrate our curiosity about the infinite cosmic spaces beyond the radius of our sight and analysis H.P. Lovecraft. “Notes on Writing Weird Fiction” Lovecraft states that his creation of a story is to suspend natural law yet, at the same time, he indexes the tenuousness of such laws, suggesting the vast possibilities of the cosmic. The tension that Lovecraft sets up between his own fictions and the universe or nature is reproduced within his fictions in the common theme of the unreliable narrator; unreliable precisely because they are either mad or what they have witnessed questions the bounds of material reality. In “The Call of Cthulhu” Lovecraft writes: The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability of the human mind to correlate all its contents. We live on a placid island of ignorance in the midst of black seas of infinity, and it was not meant that we should voyage far. The sciences, each straining in its own direction, have hitherto harmed us little; but some day the piecing together of dissociated knowledge will open up such terrifying vistas of reality, and of our frightful position therein, that we shall either go mad from the revelation or flee from the deadly light into the peace and safety of a new dark age. Despite Lovecraft's invocations of illusion, he is not claiming that his fantastic creations such as the Old Ones are supernatural but, following Joshi, are only ever supernormal. One can immediately see that instead of nullifying realism Lovecraft in fact opens up the real to an unbearable degree. In various letters and non-fictional statements Lovecraft espoused strictly materialist tenets, ones which he borrowed from Hugh Elliot namely the uniformity of law, the denial of teleology and the denial of non-material existence. Lovecraft seeks to explore the possibilities of such a universe by piling horror upon horror until the fragile brain which attempts to grasp it fractures. This may be why philosophy has largely ignored weird fiction – while Deleuze and Guattari mark the turn towards weird fiction and Lovecraft in particular, with the precursors to speculative realism as well as contemporary related thinkers have begun to view Lovecraft as making philosophical contributions. Lovecraft's own relation to philosophy is largely critical while celebrating Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. This relationship of Lovecraft to philosophy and philosophy to Lovecraft is coupled with Lovecraft's habit of mercilessly destroying the philosopher and the figure of the academic more generally in his work, a destruction which is both an epistemological destruction and an ontological destruction. Thomas Ligotti's weird fiction which he has designated as a kind of “confrontational escapism” might be best described in the following quote from one of his shortstories, “The human phenomenon is but the sum of densely coiled layers of illusion each of which winds itself on the supreme insanity. That there are persons of any kind when all there can be is mindless mirrors laughing and screaming as they parade about in an endless dream”. Whereas Lovecraft's weirdness draws predominantly from the abyssal depths of the uncharted universe, Ligotti's existential horror focuses on the awful proliferation of meaningless surfaces that is, the banal and every day function of representation. In an interview, Ligotti states: We don't even know what the world is like except through our sense organs, which are provably inadequate. It's no less the case with our brains. Our whole lives are motored along by forces we cannot know and perceptions that are faulty. We sometimes hear people say that they're not feeling themselves. Well, who or what do they feel like then? This is not to say that Ligotti sees nothing beneath the surface but that there is only darkness or blackness behind it, whether that surface is on the cosmological level or the personal. By addressing the implicit and explicit philosophical issues in Ligotti's work we will see that his nightmarish take on reality is a form of malevolent idealism, an idealism which is grounded in a real, albeit dark and obscure materiality. If Ligotti's horrors ultimately circle around mad perceptions which degrade the subject, it takes aim at the vast majority of the focus of continental philosophy. While Lovecraft's acidic materialism clearly assaults any romantic concept of being from the outside, Ligotti attacks consciousness from the inside: Just a little doubt slipped into the mind, a little trickle of suspicion in the bloodstream, and all those eyes of ours, one by one, open up to the world and see its horror [...] Not even the solar brilliance of a summer day will harbor you from horror. For horror eats the light and digests it into darkness. Clearly, the weird fiction of Lovecraft and Ligotti amount to a anti-anthrocentric onslaught against the ramparts of correlationist continental philosophy. /3/ – Shoggothic Materialism or the Formless Formless protoplasm able to mock and reflect all forms and organs and processes—viscous agglutinations of bubbling cells—rubbery fifteen-foot spheroids infinitely plastic and ductile—slaves of suggestion, builders of cities—more and more sullen, more and more intelligent, more and more amphibious, more and more imitative—Great God! What madness made even those blasphemous Old Ones willing to use and to carve such things? H.P. Lovecraft. “At the Mountains of Madness” On the other hand, affirming that the universe resembles nothing and is only formless amounts to saying that the universe is something like a spider or spit. Georges Bataille. “Formless”. The Shoggoths feature most prominently in H.P. Lovecraft's shortstory “At the Mountains of Madness” where they are described in the following manner: It was a terrible, indescribable thing vaster than any subway train – a shapeless congeries of protoplasmic bubbles, faintly self -luminous, and with myriads of temporary eyes forming and un-forming as pustules of greenish light all over the tunnel-filling front that bore down upon us, crushing the frantic penguins and slithering over the glistening floor that it and its kind had swept so evilly free of all litter. The term is a litmus test for materialism itself as the Shoggoth is an amorphous creature. The Shoggoths were living digging machines bio engineered by the Elder Things, and their protoplasmic bodies being formed into various tools by their hypnotic powers. The Shoggoths eventually became self aware and rose up against their masters in an ultimately failed rebellion. After the Elder Ones retreated into the oceans leaving the Shoggoths to roam the frozen wastes of the Antarctic. The onto-genesis of the Shoggoths and their gross materiality, index the horrifyingly deep time of the earth a concept near and dear to Lovecraft's formulation of horror as well as the fear of intelligences far beyond, and far before, the ascent of humankind on earth and elsewhere. The sickly amorphous nature of the Shoggoths invade materialism at large, where while materiality is unmistakably real ie not discursive, psychological, or otherwise overly subjectivist, it questions the relation of materialism to life. As Eugene Thacker writes: The Shoggoths or Elder Things do not even share the same reality with the human beings who encounter them—and yet this encounter takes place, though in a strange no-place that is neither quite that of the phenomenal world of the human subject or the noumenal world of an external reality. Amorphous yet definitively material beings are a constant in Lovecraft's tales. In his tale “The Dream-Quest of Unknown Kadatth” Lovecraft describes Azathoth as, “that shocking final peril which gibbers unmentionably outside the ordered universe,” that, “last amorphous blight of nethermost confusion which blashphemes and bubbles at the centre of all infinity,” who, “gnaws hungrily in inconceivable, unlighted chambers beyond time”. Azathoth's name may have multiple origins but the most striking is the alchemy term azoth which is both a cohesive agent and a acidic creation pointing back to the generative and the decayed. The indistinction of generation and degradation materially mirrors the blur between the natural and the unnatural as well as life and non-life. Lovecraft speaks of the tension between the natural and the unnatural is his short story “The Unnameable.” He writes, “if the psychic emanations of human creatures be grotesque distortions, what coherent representation could express or portray so gibbous and infamous a nebulousity as the spectre of a malign, chaotic perversion, itself a morbid blasphemy against Nature?”. Lovecraft explores exactly the tension outlined at the beginning of this chapter, between life and thought. At the end of his short tale Lovecraft compounds the problem as the unnameable is described as “a gelatin—a slime—yet it had shapes, a thousand shapes of horror beyond all memory”. Deleuze suggests that becoming-animal is operative throughout Lovecraft's work, where narrators feel themselves reeling at their becoming non-human or of being the anomalous or of becoming atomized. Following Eugene Thacker however, it may be far more accurate to say that Lovecraft's tales exhibit not a becoming-animal but a becoming-creature. Where the monstrous breaks the purportedly fixed laws of nature, the creature is far more ontologically ambiguous. The nameless thing is an altogether different horizon for thought. The creature is either less than animal or more than animal – its becoming is too strange for animal categories and indexes the slow march of thought towards the bizarre. This strangeness is, as aways, some indefinite swirling in the category of immanence and becoming. Bataille begins “The Labyrinth” with the assertion that being, to continue to be, is becoming. More becoming means more being hence the assertion that Bataille's barking dog is more than the sponge. This would mean that the Shoggotth is altogether too much being, too much material in the materialism. Bataille suggests that there is an immanence between the eater and the eaten, across the species and never within them. That is, despite the chaotic storm of immanence there must remain some capacity to distinguish the gradients of becoming without reliance upon, or at least total dependence upon, the powers of intellection to parse the universe into recognizable bits, properly digestible factoids. That is, if we undo Deleuze's aforementioned valorization of sense which, for his variation of materialism, performed the work of the transcendental, but refuse to reinstate Kant's transcendental disjunction between thing and appearance, then it must be a quality of becoming-as-being itself which can account for the discernible nature of things by sense. In an interview with Peter Gratton, Jane Bennett formulates the problem thusly: What is this strange systematicity proper to a world of Becoming? What, for example, initiates this congealing that will undo itself? Is it possible to identify phases within this formativity, plateaus of differentiation? If so, do the phases/plateaus follow a temporal sequence? Or, does the process of formation inside Becoming require us to theorize a non-chronological kind of time? I think that your student’s question: “How can we account for something like iterable structures in an assemblage theory?” is exactly the right question. Philosophy has erred too far on the side of the subject in the subject-object relation and has furthermore, lost the very weirdness of the non-human. Beyond this, the madness of thought need not override. /4/ - Ventriloquial Idealism or the Externality of Thought My aim is the opposite of Lovecraft's. He had an appreciation for natural scenery on earth and wanted to reach beyond the visible in the universe. I have no appreciation for natural scenery and want the objective universe to be a reflection of a character. Thomas Ligotti. “Devotees of Decay and Desolation.” Unless life is a dream, nothing makes sense. For as a reality, it is a rank failure [….] Horror is more real than we are. Thomas Ligotti. “Professor Nobody's Little Lectures on Supernatural Horror”. Thomas Ligotti's tales are rife with mannequins, puppets, and other brainless entities which of replace the valorized subject of philosophy – that of the free thinking human being. His tales such as “The Dream of the Manikin” aim to destroy the rootedness of consciousness. James Trafford has connected the anti-egoism of Ligotti to Thomas Metzinger – where the self is at best an illusion and we plead desperately for someone else to acknowledge that we are real. Trafford has stated it thus, “Life is played out as an inescapable puppet show, an endless dream in which the puppets are generally unaware that they are trapped within a mesmeric dance of whose mechanisms they know nothing and over which they have no control”. An absolute materialism, for Ligotti, implies an alienation of the idea which leads to a ventriloquil idealism. As Ligotti notes in an interview, “the fiasco and nightmare of existence, the particular fiasco and nightmare of human existence, the sense that people are puppets of powers they cannot comprehend, etc.” And then further elaborates that,“[a]ssuming that anything has to exist, my perfect world would be one in which everyone has experienced the annulment of his or her ego. That is, our consciousness of ourselves as unique individuals would entirely disappear”. The externality of the idea leads to the unfortunate consequence of consciousness eating at itself through horror which, for Ligotti, is more real than reality and goes beyond horror-as-affect. Beyond this, taking together with the unreality of life and the ventriloquizing of subjectivity, Ligotti's thought becomes an idealism in which thought itself is alien and ultimately horrifying. The role of human thought and the relation of non-relation of horror to thought is not completely clear in Ligotti's The Conspiracy Against the Human Race. Ligotti argues in his The Conspiracy Against the Human Race,that the advent of thought is a mistake of nature and that horror is being in the sense that horror results from knowing too much. Yet, at the same time, Ligotti seems to suggest that thought separates us from nature whereas, for Lovecraft, thought is far less privileged – mind is just another manifestation of the vital principal, it is just another materialization of energy. In his brilliant “Prospects for Post-Copernican Dogmatism” Iain Grant rallies against the negative definition of dogmatism and the transcendental, and suggests that negatively defining both over-focuses on conditions of access and subjectivism at the expense of the real or nature. With Schelling, who is Grant's champion against the subjectivist bastions of both Fichte and Kant, Ligotti's idealism could be taken as a transcendental realism following from an ontological realism. Yet the transcendental status of Ligotti's thought move towards a treatment of the transcendental which may threaten to leave beyond its realist ground. Ligotti states: Belief in the supernatural is only superstition. That said, a sense of the supernatural, as Conrad evidenced in Heart of Darkness, must be admitted if one's inclination is to go to the limits of horror. It is the sense of what should not be- the sense of being ravaged by the impossible. Phenomenally speaking, the super-natural may be regarded as the metaphysical counterpart of insanity, a transcendental correlative of a mind that has been driven mad. Again, Ligotti equates madness with thought, qualifying both as supernatural while remaining less emphatic about the metaphysical dimensions of horror. The question becomes one of how exactly the hallucinatory realm of the ideal relates to the black churning matter of Lovecraft's chaos of elementary particles. In his tale “I Have a Special Plan for This World” Ligotti formulates thus: A: There is no grand scheme of things. B: If there were a grand scheme of things, the fact – the fact – that we are not equipped to perceive it, either by natural or supernatural means, is a nightmarish obscenity. C: The very notion of a grand scheme of things is a nightmarish obscenity. Here Ligotti is not discounting metaphysics but implying that if it does exist the fact that we are phenomenologically ill-equipped to perceive that it is nightmarish. For Ligotti, nightmare and horror occur within the circuit of consciousness whereas for Lovecraft the relation between reality and mind is less productive on the side of mind. It is easier to ascertain how the Kantian philosophy is a defense against the diseases of the head as Kant armors his critical enterprise from too much of the world and too much of the mind. The weird fiction of both Lovecraft and Ligotti demonstrates that there is too much of both feeding into one another in a way that corrodes the Kantian schema throughly, breaking it down into a dead but still ontologically potentiated nigredo. The haunting, terrifying fact of Ligotti's idealism is that the transcendental motion which brought thought to matter, while throughly material and naturalized, brings with it the horror that thought cannot be undone without ending the material that bears it either locally or completely. Thought comes from an elsewhere and an elsewhen being-in-thought. The unthinkable outside thought is as maddening as the unthought engine of thought itself within thought which doesn't exist except for the mind, the rotting décor of the brain. /5/ - Hyperstitional Transcendental Paranoia or Self -Expelled Thought Weird fiction has been given some direct treatment in philosophy in the mad black Deleuzianism of Nick Land. Nick Land along with others in the 1990s created the Cyber Culture Research Unit as well as the research group Hyperstition. The now defunct hyperstitional website, an outgrowth of the Cyber Culture Research Unit, defined hyperstition in the following fourfold: 1-Element of effective culture that makes itself real. 2-Fictional quantity functional as a time-traveling device. 3-Coincidence intensifier. 4-Call to the Old Ones. The distinctively Lovecraftian character of hyperstition is hard to miss as is its Deleuzo-Guattarian roots. In the opening pages of A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari write, “We have been criticized for over-quoting literary authors. But when one writes, the only question is which other machine the literary machine can be plugged into”. The indisinction of literature and philosophy mirrors the mess of being and knowing as post-correlationist philosophy, where philosophy tries to make itself real where literature, especially the weird, aims itself at the brain-circuit of horror. The texts of both Lovecraft and Ligotti work through horror as epistemological plasticity meeting with proximity as well as the deep time of Lovecraft and the glacially slow time of paranoia in Ligotti. Against Deleuze, and following Brassier, we cannot allow the time of consciousness, the Bergsonian time of the duree, to override natural time, but instead acknowledge that it is an unfortunate fact of existence as a thinking being. Horror-time, the time of consciousness, with all its punctuated moments and drawn out terrors, cannot compare to the deep time of non-existence both in the unreachable past and the unknown future. The crystalline cogs of Kant's account of experience as the leading light for the possibility of metaphysics must be throughly obliterated. His gloss of experience in Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics could not be more sterile: Experience consists of intuitions, which belong to the sensibility, and of judgments, which are entirely a work of the understanding. But the judgments which the understanding makes entirely out of sensuous intuitions are far from being judgments of experience. For in the one case the judgment connects only the perceptions as they are given in sensuous intuition [....] Experience consists in the synthetic connection of appearances in consciousness, so far as this connection is necessary. Here it is difficult to dismiss the queasiness that Kant's legalism induces upon sight for both Badiou and David-Menard. Kant's thought becomes, as Foucault says when reflecting on Sade's text in relation to nature, “the savage abolition of itself”. For Badiou, Kant's philosophy simply closes off too much of the outside, freezing the world of thought in an all too limited formalism. Critical philosophy is simply the systematized quarantine on future thinking, on thinking which would threaten the formalism which artificially grants thought its own coherency in the face of madness. Even the becoming-mad of Deleuze, while escaping the rumbling ground, makes grounds for itself, mad grounds but grounds which are thinkable in their affect. The field of effects allows for Deleuze's aesthetic and radical empiricism, in which effects and/or occasions make up the material of the world to be thought as a chaosmosis of simulacra. Given a critique of an empiricism of aesthetics, of the image, it may be difficult to justify an attack on Kantian formalism with the madness of literature, which does not aim to make itself real but which we may attempt to make real. That is, how do Lovecraft's and Ligotti's materials, as materials for philosophy to work on, differ from either the operative formalisms of Kant or the implicitly formalized images of Deleuzian empiricism? It is simply that such texts do not aim to make themselves real, and make claims to the real which are more alien to us than familiar, which is why their horror is immediately more trustworthy. This is the madness which Blanchot discusses in The Infinite Conversation through Cervantes and his knight – the madness of book-life, of the perverse unity of literature and life a discussion which culminates in the discussion of one of the weird's masters, that of Kafka. The text is the knowing of madness, since madness, in its moment of becoming-more-mad, cannot be frozen in place but by the solidifications of externalizing production. This is why Foucault ends his famous study with works of art. Furthermore extilligence, the ability to export the products of our maligned brains, is the companion of the attempts to export, or discover the possibility of intelligences outside of our heads, in order for philosophy to survive the solar catastrophe. To borrow again from Deleuze, writing is inseparable from becoming. The mistake is to believe that madness is reabsorbed by extilligence, by great works, or that it could be exorcised by the expelling of thought into the inorganic or differently organic. Going out of our heads does not guarantee we will no longer mean we cannot still go out of our minds. This is simply because of the outside, of matter, or force, or energy, or thing-in-itself, or Schopenhauerian Will. In Lovecraft’s “The Music of Erich Zahn” an “impoverished student of metaphysics” becomes intrigued by strange viol music coming from above his room. After meeting the musician the student discovers that each night he plays frantic music at a window in order to keep some horridness at bay, some “impenetrable darkness with chaos and pandemonium”. The aesthetic defenses provided by the well trained brain can bear the hex of matter for so long, the specter of unalterability within it which too many minds obliterate, collapsing everything before the thought of thought as thinkable or at least noetically mutable on our own terms. Transcendental paranoia is the concurrent nightmare and promise of Paul Humphrey's work, of being literally out of our minds. It is the gothic counterpart of thinking non-conceptually but also of thinking never belonging to any instance of purportedly solid being. As Bataille stated, “At the boundary of that which escapes cohesion, he who reflects within cohesion realizes there is no longer any room for him” Thought is immaterial only to the degree that it is inhuman, it is a power that tries, always with failure, to ascertain its own genesis. Philosophy, if it can truly return to the great outdoors, if it can leave behind the dead loop of the human skull, must recognize not only the non-priority of human thought, but that thought never belongs to the brain that thinks it, thought comes from somewhere else. To return to the train image from the beginning “a locomotive rolling on the surface of the earth is the image of continuous metamorphosis” this is the problem of thought, and of thinking thought, of being no longer able to isolate thought, with only a thought-formed structure. [1] One of the central tenets of Francois Laruelle's non-philosophy is that philosophy has traditionally operated on material already presupposed as thinkable instead of trying to think the real in itself. Philosophy, according to Laruelle, remains fixated on transcendental synthesis which shatters immanence into an empirical datum and an a prori factum which are then fused by a third thing such as the ego. For a critical account of Laruelle's non-philosophy see Ray Brassier's Nihil Unbound. (shrink)

This wide-ranging introduction to the special issue on Automobilities examines various dimensions of the automobile system and car cultures. In its broadest sense we can think of many automobilities - modes of autonomous, self-directed movement. It can be argued that there are many different car cultures and autoscapes which operate around the world, which cannot be seen as making driving (including freeways, motorways and autobahns) a uniform experience of movement in a controlled 'no-place' space. Yet, there clearly is (...) an increasingly globalizing car system, conceptualized as a powerful socio-economic and technological complex which sustains the car as a key object of mass production (Fordism) and mass consumption, which has impacted on spatial organization through roads, city layout, suburban housing and shopping malls and demands new forms of social life, sociability and time-space flexibility. This automobile system currently accounts for some 1.2 million deaths through traffic accidents a year world-wide, with the reversal of the long normalization of this form of 'mass murder,' now seen as a key topic for public health authorities. At the same time while it is potentially possible to subject cars to greater surveillance and systemic control through information technology, this in itself may not automatically lead to a reduction of accidents. In recent years the car has become a complex communicative platform for multi-tasking, a command centre for telephone, television, Internet etc., a place of work and instrumental tasking; but also a place of dwelling and refuge, a comfort zone for emotional decontrol via the sound system. Something which requires a more flexible driving habitus in which the senses are reconfigured and extended through the technology, as driving increasingly depends on the software as we move to intelligent cars and roads. Yet this is also something which generates an expanding set of new risks. The logic is for the driver to become the auto pilot and the automobile to become a sort of datasuit wrap. Yet it is not surprising that this view of the controlled safe car should also summon up its opposite: the car as dangerous and powerful, as a vehicle for excitement and speed. Especially so given that car racing practically originated alongside the birth of the automobile and is now itself a massive global industry whose imagery is central to the marketing of many types of cars. (shrink)

Michel Henry radicalises phenomenology by putting forward the idea of a double manifestation: the “Truth of Life” and “truth of the world.” For Henry, the world turns out to be empty of Life. To find its essence, the self must dive completely inward, away from the exterior movements of intentionality. Hence, Life, or God, for Henry, lies in non-intentional, immanent self-experience, which is felt and yet remains invisible, in an absolutist sense, as an a priori condition of all conscious experience. (...) In Christian theology, the doctrine of the Trinity illuminates the distinction between the immanent Trinity (God’s self-relation) and the economic workings of the Trinity (God-world relation). However, the mystery of God’s inmost being and the economy of salvation are here understood as inseparable. In light of this, the paper aims to: 1) elucidate the significance of Henry’s engagement with the phenomenological tradition and his proposal of a phenomenology of Life which advocates an immanent auto-affection, radically separate from the ek-static nature of intentionality, and 2) confront the division between Life and world in Henry’s Christian phenomenology and its discordancy with the doctrine of the Trinity, as the latter attests to the harmonious unity that subsists between inner life and the world. (shrink)

This essay explores the original political significance of the posters of May ’68 as a critique of capitalism, as well as extending this approach to a critique of contemporary capitalism in 2020. The slogans of ’68 are deceptively simple and we look to the importance of the political ideas expressed aesthetically as having immediate impact in the late 1960s, but also the underlying Situationist philosophy which influenced them.We also explore the contemporary significance of Situationist theory, especially in the context of (...) the renewal of Marxist thought in the 21st century. This renewed Leftist critique of capitalism emerges as articulated through newer social and political movements of the current times, particularly through the political philosophy of Slavoj Žižek and his auto-critique of the former Yugoslavia. (shrink)

As a theologian coming from Europe, a ‘postcolonial import’ into South Africa, it is my white privilege in particular that continues to queer my understanding of a social revolution on which our future, as a people, may depend. In this article, I seek to turn my personal experience of grappling with my whiteness into the source of my reflection. Drawing inspiration from fallism – a recent student movement that inscribes itself into a larger decolonial ‘struggle against the globalised system (...) of racist capitalism’ – I ponder what it could mean, in the South African context, for whiteness to fall upward (Rohr). Here, the metaphor of ‘falling upward’ as a kenosis of whiteness is considered specifically with regard to a white theologian’s (my own) attempt to open spaces that could be filled with blackness. Contribution: This auto-ethnographic essay inscribes itself into a transdisciplinary study of theology and race from both socio-cultural and religiospiritual perspectives. The author’s personal reflections, inspired by his own engagement with the fallist narratives and his ever-evolving attitude towards the blackness–whiteness binary, as experienced in the South African social and academic contexts, are shared as a means to crack open the societal and theological (notably Christian) imagination, both of which appear to suffer from a serious crisis. (shrink)

Based on a close reading of Sartre’s essay, The Transcendence of the Ego, this paper shows the importance of Sartre’s arguments against the transcendental ego for the Deleuzian project of restructuring the transcendental field. Sartre formulates four propositions which he takes to be the implications of the rejection of the transcendental ego as found in Kant and Husserl. The paper attempts to show how these propositions are derived, and furthermore how they become reinterpreted by Deleuze into nascent forms of transcendental (...) empiricist notions such as the virtual, and auto-synthesis. I then conclude by showing why Deleuze believes that Sartre’s own work needs to be surpassed, and why this movement beyond Sartre in fact undercuts the very arguments which generate the four conditions Deleuze takes to be necessary for transcendental empiricism. (shrink)

The Visible Medium. Opaque Interface and Non-Mimetic Immersivity -/- The relation of reciprocal co-implication that Merleau-Ponty formulates—and on which he insists throughout his work—between sense and the sensible, perception and expression, and then visible and invisible, transforms the way in which one conceives of the medium. Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics reveals an idea of the medium as a support that erases itself in the act of conveying the signifi cation and also shakes the direct correlation between transparency and mimetic simulation. Understood as (...) the sensible thickness of the body opening onto the world, then as depth and écart that catalyzes vision, the medium, then, furnishes one of the defi nitions of fl esh, as the element of auto-mediation: connective tissue or fabric of communication that is at once écart and internal difference. Merleau-Ponty conceives of the medium as both that which renders and that which is rendered visible. It is therefore no longer an intermediary; it ceases to be an invisible mediator and becomes the opaque element that reveals in fi ligree the movement of gestaltic difference. It is from such a Merleau-Pontian conception of medium that one can begin to elaborate the complex issues posed by mediality in the post-medial age. The idea of a “visible medium” permits us to break with the confl ation of the simulation’s immersive effect and performance, which often informs the rhetoric concerning medias and new technologies, in order rather to think of an “opaque interface” or an “non-mimetic immersivity.” From such a conception of mediality we can equally understand the phenomenon of numerical convergence, not as the accomplishment of the suppression or dematerialization of the medium, as is the case with traditional theories, but as the point of departure for a return to the body as the condition of possibility for every aesthetic experience. (shrink)

In this article, I focus on the reading of Heidegger's Kant that Derrida offers in his recently published 1978-9 seminar Donner le temps II (§§12–3). Here Derrida tracks across Heidegger's text the auto-affective or auto-dative structure (namely, the originary synthesis of spontaneity and receptivity) in which the Kantian conceptions of the experience of time and of transcendental imagination converge, and which is seen as scandalously underpinning the conception of respect. In particular, I draw attention to the moment in (...) which Derrida originally accounts for the structure of the Kantian respect as the movement of abandonment or delivery over to the event which he also ascribes to other figures of freedom (or unconditionality without sovereignty) explored in his later writings. My hypothesis is that, in doing so, Derrida may be building a bridge between two thoughts of imagination: on the one hand, imagination as a figure of his early differance, and, on the other hand, imagination as the non-sovereign freedom that undergirds his late work on sovereignty. (shrink)

The concrete insertion of nurses into the context of an inquiry contributes to empirical evaluation research of health promotion programs. As interveners and concrete actors in social movements, nurses are in a privileged position to give realism to a local understanding of the political and cultural context of evaluative research. Drawing on the practice of empirical evaluation research, this paper seeks to generate new methodological approaches in a way that broadens nursing inquiries in community health nursing. It explores new ways (...) of thinking about epistemology and knowledge production in nursing practice. For 5 months an evaluative research project adopting a participatory‐action research approach was conducted with local community actors in an AIDS prevention project in Amazonas (Brazil) in a prostitution setting. An auto‐ethnographic journal was used as a reflective approach for the critical analysis of nursing research activities. This paper calls for a closer relationship between scientific research settings and the sociopolitical and the sociocultural aspects of nursing practice. It increases an incorporation of popular, social and professional experiential learning and skill acquisition in embedded knowledge production. (shrink)

Origins. environment. first influences. the Russian gentry -- Solitude. anguish. freedom. revolt. pity. doubts and wrestlings of the spirit. reflections on eros -- First conversion. search for the meaning of life -- The domain of philosophical knowledge. philosophical sources. existentialism and romanticism -- Conversion to socialism. the domain of revolution. Marxism and idealism -- The russian cultural renascence of the early twentieth century. encounters -- The movement towards christianity. the drama of religion -- The domain of creativity. the meaning (...) of the creative act. the creative act as ecstasy -- The russian revolution and the domain of communism -- Russian and the west -- My final philosophical outlook. confession of faith. the domain of eschatology. time and eternity -- Concerning self-knowledge. the limits of self-knowledge. auto-biographical conclusion. years of ordeal. (shrink)

It is one of Jacques Derrida’s later texts, Le Toucher—Jean-Luc Nancy , wherein one finds his most sustained commentary on the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. I argue that Derrida’s criticisms of Merleau-Ponty in this text conceal a significant proximity between his own elaboration of sensibility and that of Merleau-Ponty. Their respective accounts of sensibility are similar in two respects. Firstly, for them both, sensibility is born of a parsing of the self in a hiatus or interval that disrupts the (...) class='Hi'>movement of auto-affection. The self can only be known as such through this exposure to alterity. Secondly, this exposure and opening is in no way normative for either thinker, which is to say that their accounts of sensibility are similar not only in structure but also insofar as sensibility for them both is a non-normative opening to ethics; it is an elaboration of embodiment that provokes the question of response but no definitive or prescriptive answer. Hence the structure of sensibility begs the question of ethics, and the problem of response, but can provide little by way of a normative ethics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 42.2 (2004) 234-235 [Access article in PDF] Leonard Lawlor. Derrida and Husserl: The Basic Problem of Phenomenology. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002. Pp. xii + 286. Paper, $19.95. Ever since Derrida began producing his interpretive critical studies on the giant figures of Husserl and Heidegger, a book of the kind Lawlor offers has been needed. Framing his study by drawing directly from Derrida's (...) texts themselves, Lawlor takes up in detail Derrida's interpretation and critique of Husserl's phenomenology to show how he moves beyond the framework he identifies as Husserl's in developing his "deconstruction."In the course of a study thus primarily internal to Derrida's texts, Lawlor provides one of the greatest strengths of the book, his fine treatment of the way the work of French thinkers subsequent to Husserl helped Derrida develop the distinctive enterprise of "deconstruction": specifically, Jean Cavaillès, Tran-Duc-Thao (ch. 4, parts 1-2), Jean Hyppolyte (ch. 5, part 1), and Emmanuel Levinas (chs. 6-8). Determinative prior to that, however, is the influence Lawlor shows stemming from Eugen Fink's published writings (chapter 1). Impressive as well throughout (though his "internalist" restriction also shows serious faults—mentioned later) is the exegetical subtlety Lawlor exercises upon Derrida's writings, those concentrating on Husserl from 1953 to 1967, together with one on Lévinas ("Violence et métaphysique," 1964/1967) and three later ones no longer dealing with Husserl (principally "Les fins de l'homme," 1972, De l'esprit, 1987, on Heidegger, and "Spectres de Marx," 1993). It is a choice of texts that is eminently justifiable, even if the necessary inclusion of the latter introduces a dimension that needs to be contrasted more incisively with the way the Husserl-centered material is focused.Lawlor is excellent in showing a shift in interpretive focus and character taking place as Derrida moves from his treatment of Husserl in Le problème de la genèse dans la philosophie de Husserl (1953-54) through his "Introduction" to Husserl's Origine de la géométrie (1962) to La voix et le phénomène (1967) (chs. 4-6). Derrida's interpretive critique of Husserl thus begins with the primacy of the problem of "genesis," of "origin," then moves in transition through the second book (via the notable interlude on Lévinas, ch. 6) to the decisive break from Husserl in the third (ch. 7). With this last, La voix et le phénomène, Lawlor writes, "[t]he problem of the sign has come to replace, for Derrida, the problem of genesis" (166). Here instead of the transcendental power of origination being the intuition-effecting subjectivity of Husserl's Ideas I, a double replacement occurs by which a) "the voice" becomes for Derrida the "ultra-transcendental," and b) its constitutive dynamic, "temporality," is cast as a movement of pure "auto-affection" in a process called "archi-writing," unceasingly generating a supply of element upon element in a "supplement"-driven articulation of meaning (192-97)—in sum, différance as co-incident "differentiation" and "deferral" (196-205). This is the burden of the section (chs. 6 and 7) entitled "The End of Phenomenology and Ontology," closing a debate between Husserl—"phenomenology"—and Heidegger—"ontology." With this the new, post-phenomenological, post-ontological effort begins, the era in which Derrida's philosophic work, now after the definitive "deconstruction of metaphysics," gradually moves ethico-political issues into the foreground, though "[d]ifférance and supplementarity" continue as basic concepts (211-12). Here no foundational grounding underlies clarifications in the region of meaning and value, or rather a "non-foundation" subtends any gaining of insight, radically qualifying its claims. One's efforts deploy in ever-renewed consideration of issues guided by something "deeper than being," by a "non-foundational," "non-ontological" "aporia" "experienced" in deconstructive ultimacy as "the unheard-of question" (234).About all this, some reservations have to be raised. First of all, it is quite clear that in fact the question of "genesis" remains; the whole... (shrink)

The complex structure of the tragic aspects of globalization has been accounted for in extant literature. What remains unclear is how deglobalization, isolationism and all the radically disruptive movements and politics in-between will shape transnational corporations’ organizational practices. The purpose of this study is to interrogate and problematize the implications of anarchic ‘globalisolationism’ vis-à-vis the atlas of insurrection and the TNCs’ global responsibility towards human-centric management practices. We situate our analysis in the heavily politicized and contested discursive space of emergent (...) global geopolitical and environmental tensions and the global quest to reclaim dignity, freedoms, right to resources and decisions—stakeownership. ‘Globalisolationism’ is conceptualized as a radically non-compromising coexistence of globalization and isolationism by design, aided by new information technologies, reactivated mass consciousness and slack political resources. It is characterized by the radical pursuit of new deals within the global geopolitical and economic order; renegotiation of existing deals for resource appropriation and democratic space for the marginalized; the collapse of the old political order via auto-implosion as a beneficial constraint; and the defence of the status quo in global resource and environmental governance due to ‘translocal’ insurrection. Therefore, the paper suggests how TNCs’ current modus operandi could be transformed into responsible human/environment-centric organisational practices to accommodate emerging sociopolitical and environmental challenges. It further highlights the implications for novel game-changing policies and political action by ‘subaltern’ societies and their metamorphosis from victims of planetary vandalism to stakeowners with sovereignty over their resources. (shrink)

In his ‘deconstruction of Christianity’, Jean-Luc Nancy seeks to show how our modern, secular society and its so-called Christian ‘roots’ are co-original and mutually constitutive. As a result of this mutual constitution, the Christian religion is fundamentally characterised by its own deconstruction. This article focuses on one element of this auto-deconstructive movement of Christianity: that of prayer, or more generally, of addressing God. According to Nancy, prayer reveals how Christianity contains at its core, or rather as its core, (...) the principal absence of its God and therefore the kernel of its own secularisation. This article examines why, in Nancy’s work, prayer has to be understood both as a form of demythologisation, as well as a poetic movement, a movement correlating with, and proper to, poetic practices. In adopting such an approach, Christianity’s auto-deconstruction is explained as a question of language. (shrink)

Burnshaw treats virtually every aspect of poetry, but devotes a major theoretical effort to developing a biologically grounded explanation of both creation and the esthetic experience. He extends his theory of creation to every art form, including the fabrication of scientific theories; the rest of the study is devoted exclusively to poetry. Burnshaw claims to be following the lead of John Keble, who described poetry as that which "acts as a safety valve to a full mind." He supports his homeostatic (...) theory with numerous statements by creative persons about their psycho-physiological state at the time of inspiration. Burnshaw wisely limits his theory of creation to those works which seem to be truly inspired, which "demand" to be born; nevertheless, his method tends toward the pseudo-scientific. He too facilely converts the terms of the poet's auto-description into supposed physicalist counterparts. In like manner, the esthetic experience is reduced to the communication of an internal metaphor which constitutes the "true" poem, where this internal metaphor is the expression, through the affective structures of the poem, of the poet's inner bodily movements at the time of creation. The reader, because of changes in his muscular, circulatory, and respiratory systems, comes to "reverberate" with the internal metaphor. Fortunately, Burnshaw doesn't get too caught up in such theories. In the second section of the book, for example, he goes beyond reductionistic explanations and discusses the act of creation in teleological terms; poetry becomes a primal language, which, in symbolically restoring the true sensuality of all things, overcomes alienation and reunites both poet and reader in themselves, with each other, and with the rest of the universe. The book contains a wealth of biological, anthropological, zoological, and psychological information and ideas, plus some very penetrating analyses of different poems in an explicitly rhetorical and implicitly metaphysical framework.--C. M. R. (shrink)

A key phrase in working with horses, “bringing up life” is taken in its literal sense of moving expressively and energetically in order to animate the movements of the horses. The phrase also points to both what the radical phenomenologist Michel Henry referred to as the auto-affectivity of life and the vital powers of an essential hetero-affectivity. “Bringing up life” is the kinetic, kinaesthetic, affective expression of this fundamental impression that life is shared with other animate beings and that (...) it is all the more powerfully felt for being so. Working with horses – in spite of all the human conceits that groundwork, liberty training, and the riding disciplines hold – can thus reveal what it means to “bring up life” as more than a topic of very practical interest and specific phenomenological description. Through the impressional investigation of this expression we may well begin to feel our way toward more life-affirming, life-enhancing interactions with others of our own and many other animal kinds. (shrink)

This article analyses the phenomenology and ontology of videogames through the lens of semiotics. The difference between games and more traditional narrative models (such as those found in books and movies) lies on the structural level. The game narrative needs to be ‘written’ (played) before it can be ‘read’ (interpreted). Games provide fluidity of interactive immersion: the interface as the place of the merger between the player and the game. A connection, without delay, is established between the movement of (...) the player’s hands and the virtual movement across virtual space-times of the virtual characters/events on the screen. The connection is cybernetic, of course, and real. The actuality of the virtual is established as the action of the finger movements of the player. Games require at least a minimum degree of interaction. The player has a role as the master of the code, as the last string of code attached to complete the sequence. Such is the definition of the Cinematic under the formal demands of the Ludic: the defining-delimiting-restricting background which nonetheless, by its very (fixed) presence, provides the nurturing ground for the appearance and presence of (fluid) malleability as the ‘gap’ or ‘lack’ in the structure to be filled – in whatever manner – by the player in the act of his or her (world-constitutive) existential engagement. (shrink)

Razões e causas tipificam duas gramáticas ou jogos de linguagem que tendem para a incomensurabilidade. Estas gramáticas instituem uma discriminação qualitativa entre a auto-eficácia de se ser alguém e a eficácia simétrica, impessoal, de se ser algo. As razões podem comportar-se como causas, embora seja profundamente absurdo interpretar razões como causas e vice-versa. Contudo, para que as razões possam assumir tal eficiência causal, é necessário admitir vários postulados: primeiro, uma ontologia monista assegurando a comunicação de eficiência dinâmica entre duas (...) cadeias de fenómenos, ou seja, a série de representações intencionais e a série de movimentos corporais, que implicaría a coexistência entre uma homogeneidade ontológica profunda e uma aparente heterogeneidade superficial; segundo, uma fenomenologia auto-vigilante, capaz de reconhecer a peculiaridade do "Eu sinto" que deve poder acompanhar o "meu agir" e o "meu fazer acontecer", ainda que aceitando a validade de uma incerteza metafísica invencível. A exploração das relacões entre razões e causas ilustrará o modo como a subjectividade emerge sob o signo de um processo unificador - mas instável - de construção de sentido. Reasons and causes typify two language games or grammars tending to incommensurability. These grammars institute a qualitative discrimination between the self-efficacy of being someone and the symmetric, selfless, efficacy of being something. Reasons can behave as causes, although it is fully absurd to interpret reasons as causes and vice-versa. Yet, in order for reasons to possess causal efficacy, one must assume: first, a monist ontology warranting the communication of dynamic efficiency between two chains of phenomena, that is to say, the chain of intentional representations and that of body movements so that a deep ontological homogeneity may coexist with a surface heterogeneity; second, a self-alert phenomenology which recognizes the peculiar "I feel" that must be able to accompany "my acting" and "my making happen", while acknowledging, however, the validity of an invincible metaphysical uncertainty. On exploring the relationships between reasons and causes selfhood emerges here as an unstable but unifying process of meaning-construction. (shrink)