Koopman-von Neumann in the 30’s gave an operatorial formulation of Classical Mechanics. It was shown later on that this formulation could also be written in a path-integral form. We will label this functional approach as CPI (for classical path-integral) to distinguish it from the quantum mechanical one, which we will indicate with QPI. In the CPI two Grassmannian partners of time make their natural appearance and in this manner time becomes something like a three dimensional supermanifold. (...) Next we introduce a metric in this supermanifold and show that a particular choice of the supermetric reproduces the CPI while a different one gives the QPI. (shrink)

We use the system of p-adic numbers for the description of information processes. Basic objects of our models are so-called transformers of information, basic processes are information processes and statistics are information statistics (thus we present a model of information reality). The classical and quantum mechanical formalisms on information p-adic spaces are developed. It seems that classical and quantum mechanical models on p-adic information spaces can be applied for the investigation of flows of information in cognitive (...) and social systems, since a p-adic metric gives a quite natural description of the ability to form associations. (shrink)

We formulate from first principles a theory of stochastic processes in configuration space. The fundamental equations of the theory are an equation of motion which generalizes Newton's second law and an equation which expresses the condition of conservation of matter. Two types of stochastic motion are possible, both described by the same general equations, but leading in one case to classical Brownian motion behavior and in the other to quantum mechanical behavior. The Schrödinger equation, which is derived here (...) with no further assumption, is thus shown to describe a specific stochastic process. It is explicitly shown that only in the quantum mechanical process does the superposition of probability amplitudes give rise to interference phenomena; moreover, the presence of dissipative forces in the Brownian motion equations invalidates the superposition principle. At no point are any special assumptions made concerning the physical nature of the underlying stochastic medium, although some suggestions are discussed in the last section. (shrink)

At the onset of quantum mechanics, it was argued that the new theory would entail a rejection of classical logic. The main arguments to support this claim come from the non-commutativity of quantum observables, which allegedly would generate a non-distributive lattice of propositions, and from quantum superpositions, which would entail new rules for quantum disjunctions. While the quantum logic program is not as popular as it once was, a crucial question remains unsettled: what (...) is the relationship between the logical structures of classical and quantum mechanics? In this essay we answer this question by showing that the original arguments promoting quantum logic contain serious flaws, and that quantum theory does satisfy the classical distributivity law once the full meaning of quantum propositions is properly taken into account. Moreover, we show that quantum mechanics can generate a distributive lattice of propositions, which, unlike the one of quantum logic, includes statements about expectation values which are of undoubtable physical interest. Lastly, we show that the lattice of statistical propositions in classical mechanics follows the same structure, yielding an analogue non-commutative sublattice of classical propositions. This fact entails that the purported difference between classical and quantum logic stems from a misconstructed parallel between the two theories. (shrink)

This paper describes a long-standing, though little-known, debate between Paul Dirac and Werner Heisenberg over the nature of scientific methodology, theory change, and intertheoretic relations. Following Heisenberg’s terminology, their disagreements can be summarized as a debate over whether the classical and quantum theories are “open” or “closed.” A close examination of this debate sheds new light on the philosophical views of two of the great founders of quantum theory.

Within the traditional Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics, it is not possible to describe a particle as possessing, simultaneously, a sharp position value and a sharp momentum value. Is it possible, though, to describe a particle as possessing just a sharp position value (or just a sharp momentum value)? Some, such as Teller, have thought that the answer to this question is No - that the status of individual continuous quantities is very different in quantum (...) class='Hi'>mechanics than in classical mechanics. On the contrary, I shall show that the same subtle issues arise with respect to continuous quantities in classical and quantum mechanics; and that it is, after all, possible to describe a particle as possessing a sharp position value without altering the standard formalism of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Some of the problems associated with the construction of a manifestly covariant relativistic quantum theory are discussed. A resolution of this problem is given in terms of the off mass shell classical and quantum mechanics of Stueckelberg, Horwitz and Piron. This theory contains many questions of interpretation, reaching deeply into the notions of time, localizability and causality. A proper generalization of the Maxwell theory of electromagnetic interaction, required for the well-posed formulation of dynamical problems of systems (...) with electromagnetic interaction is discussed, and some of the significance of recently found (classical) relativistic chaotic behavior is pointed out. Many results of a technical nature have been achieved in this framework; in this paper, some of these are reviewed, but I shall concentrate on a discussion of the basic ideas and foundations of the theory. (shrink)

Classical mechanics is empirically successful because the probabilistic mean values of quantum mechanical observables follow the classical equations of motion to a good approximation (Messiah 1970, 215). We examine this claim for the one-dimensional motion of a particle in a box, and extend the idea by deriving a special case of the ideal gas law in terms of the mean value of a generalized force used to define "pressure." The examples illustrate the importance of probabilistic averaging (...) as a method of abstracting away from the messy details of microphenomena, not only in physics, but in other sciences as well. (shrink)

The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics assumes the existence of the classical deterministic Newtonian world. We argue that in fact the Newton determinism in classical world does not hold and in the classical mechanics there is fundamental and irreducible randomness. The classical Newtonian trajectory does not have a direct physical meaning since arbitrary real numbers are not observable. There are classical uncertainty relations: Δq>0 and Δp>0, i.e. the uncertainty (errors of observation) in (...) the determination of coordinate and momentum is always positive (non zero).A “functional” formulation of classical mechanics was suggested. The fundamental equation of the microscopic dynamics in the functional approach is not the Newton equation but the Liouville equation for the distribution function of the single particle. Solutions of the Liouville equation have the property of delocalization which accounts for irreversibility. The Newton equation in this approach appears as an approximate equation describing the dynamics of the average values of the position and momenta for not too long time intervals. Corrections to the Newton trajectories are computed. An interpretation of quantum mechanics is attempted in which both classical and quantum mechanics contain fundamental randomness. Instead of an ensemble of events one introduces an ensemble of observers. (shrink)

Following an article by John von Neumann on infinite tensor products, we develop the idea that the usual formalism of quantum mechanics, associated with unitary equivalence of representations, stops working when countable infinities of particles (or degrees of freedom) are encountered. This is because the dimension of the corresponding Hilbert space becomes uncountably infinite, leading to the loss of unitary equivalence, and to sectorisation. By interpreting physically this mathematical fact, we show that it provides a natural way to (...) describe the “Heisenberg cut”, as well as a unified mathematical model including both quantum and classical physics, appearing as required incommensurable facets in the description of nature. (shrink)

We propose a conceptual framework for understanding the relationship between observables and operators in mechanics. To do so, we introduce a postulate that establishes a correspondence between the objective properties permitting to identify physical states and the symmetry transformations that modify their gauge dependant properties. We show that the uncertainty principle results from a faithful—or equivariant—realization of this correspondence. It is a consequence of the proposed postulate that the quantum notion of objective physical states is not incomplete, but (...) rather that the classical notion is overdetermined. (shrink)

This work first explicates the philosophy of classical and quantum fields and particles. I am interested in determining how science can have a metaphysical dimension, and then with the claim that the quantum revolution has an important metaphysical component. I argue that the metaphysical implications of a theory are properties of its models, as classical mechanics determines properties of atomic diversity and temporal continuity with its representations of distinct, continuous trajectories. ;It is often suggested that (...) classical statistical physics requires that many particle states be represented so that permuting properties leads to distinct states; this implies that individuals can be reidentified across possible worlds in a non-qualitative way. I show there is no evidence for this conclusion, an important result, for it is claimed that quantum particles are not individuals. This claim is based on the misconception about classical statistics, but also on a conflation of notions of identity; I show that, while transworld identity is incompatible with quantum mechanics, other classical notions may be consistently ascribed. I also give a field-particle distinction that applies usefully in both quantum and classical domains. In the former the distinction helps defeat claims of underdetermined by data, in the latter it helps provide a minimal field metaphysics. ;Next I tackle renormalisation: I show how divergences occur in approximate, perturbative calculations, and demonstrate how finite, empirically verified, answers are obtained. These techniques seem to show that the predictions are not logical consequences of the exact theory. I use the techniques of the renormalisation group to establish that perturbative renormalised quantum field theory does indeed approximate the consequences of field theory. ;Finally, I discuss the idea that renormalisation proves that there can be no quantum theory of everything, only a patchwork of effective theories. The preceding chapter shows that renormalisation demonstrates only that the picture is consistent, and this is insufficient to show that physics must be phenomenological. (shrink)

We give a review of some works where it is shown that certain quantum-like features are exhibited by classical systems. Two kinds of problems are considered. The first one concerns the specific heat of crystals (the so called Fermi–Pasta–Ulam problem), where a glassy behavior is observed, and the energy distribution is found to be of Planck-like type. The second kind of problems concerns the self-interaction of a charged particle with the electromagnetic field, where an analog of the tunnel (...) effect is proven to exist, and moreover some nonlocal effects are exhibited, leading to a natural hidden variable theory which violates Bell's inequalities. (shrink)

In recent works, Časlav Brukner and Jacques Pienaar have raised interesting objections to the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics. We answer these objections in detail and show that, far from questioning the viability of the interpretation, they sharpen and clarify it.

We propose a model of physics that blends Rovelli’s relational quantum mechanics (RQM) interpretation with the language of finite information quantities (FIQs), defined by Gisin and Del Santo in the spirit of intuitionistic mathematics. We discuss deficiencies of using real numbers to model physical systems in general, and particularly under the RQM interpretation. With this motivation for an alternative mathematical language, we propose the use of FIQs to model the world under the RQM interpretation, wherein we view the (...) propensities that make up a FIQ as quantifications of potential interaction. Under this model, the stable facts, relative facts, and shifting perspectives that make up the relational interpretation correspond to shifting digits and propensities of the FIQs. The model’s predictions agree with those of both classical and quantum physics, and it is indeterministic. We also propose explanations, with examples, for how the propensities of a FIQ are distributed, and how its digits become actualized. This is equivalent to the notion of the measurement problem, and the question of what causes wave function collapse. In short, by stepping through the “new door” opened by the language of FIQs, we attempt to describe the world under the relational interpretation. (shrink)

The relationship between classical and quantum theory is of central importance to the philosophy of physics, and any interpretation of quantum mechanics has to clarify it. Our discussion of this relationship is partly historical and conceptual, but mostly technical and mathematically rigorous, including over 500 references. For example, we sketch how certain intuitive ideas of the founders of quantum theory have fared in the light of current mathematical knowledge. One such idea that has certainly stood (...) the test of time is Heisenberg's `quantum-theoretical Umdeutung (reinterpretation) of classical observables', which lies at the basis of quantization theory. Similarly, Bohr's correspondence principle (in somewhat revised form) and Schroedinger's wave packets (or coherent states) continue to be of great importance in understanding classical behaviour from quantum mechanics. On the other hand, no consensus has been reached on the Copenhagen Interpretation, but in view of the parodies of it one typically finds in the literature we describe it in detail. On the assumption that quantum mechanics is universal and complete, we discuss three ways in which classical physics has so far been believed to emerge from quantum physics, namely in the limit h -> 0 of small Planck's constant (in a finite system), in the limit N goes to infinity of a large system with $N$ degrees of freedom (at fixed h), and through decoherence and consistent histories. The first limit is closely related to modern quantization theory and microlocal analysis, whereas the second involves methods of C*-algebras and the concepts of superselection sectors and macroscopic observables. In these limits, the classical world does not emerge as a sharply defined objective reality, but rather as an approximate appearance relative to certain ``classical" states and observables. Decoherence subsequently clarifies the role of such states, in that they are ``einselected", i.e. robust against coupling to the environment. Furthermore, the nature of classical observables is elucidated by the fact that they typically define (approximately) consistent sets of histories. This combination of ideas and techniques does not quite resolve the measurement problem, but it does make the point that classicality results from the elimination of certain states and observables from quantum theory. Thus the classical world is not created by observation (as Heisenberg once claimed), but rather by the lack of it. (shrink)

This study analyzes the triple relation between cognitive biological psychology, philosophy and quantum mechanics. It discusses the findings of Treisman according to which there exists a pre-conscious cerebral mechanism that manipulates the sensory input and transfers it to our consciousness only after correcting it to suit our logic and expectations. This experimental finding was predicted two centuries ago by Kant. It is observed that during the primary pre-conscious level of perception the macroscopic physical world is not perceived as (...) behaving according to the laws of classical physics but rather according to the laws of quantum mechanics, like the microscopic world. (shrink)

We present a derivation of the third postulate of relational quantum mechanics from the properties of conditional probabilities. The first two RQM postulates are based on the information that can be extracted from interaction of different systems, and the third postulate defines the properties of the probability function. Here we demonstrate that from a rigorous definition of the conditional probability for the possible outcomes of different measurements, the third postulate is unnecessary and the Born’s rule naturally emerges from (...) the first two postulates by applying the Gleason’s theorem. We demonstrate in addition that the probability function is uniquely defined for classical and quantum phenomena. The presence or not of interference terms is demonstrated to be related to the precise formulation of the conditional probability where distributive property on its arguments cannot be taken for granted. In the particular case of Young’s slits experiment, the two possible argument formulations correspond to the possibility or not to determine the particle passage through a particular path. (shrink)

A draft of a possible comparison between the use made of mathematics in classical field theories and in quantum mechanics is presented. Hilbert’s space formalism, although not only elegant and powerful but intuitive as well, does not give us a spatio-temporal representation of physical events. The picture of the electromagnetic field as an entity which is real in itself– i.e., as a wave without support – fostered by the emergence of special relativity can be seen as the (...) first step, favored by many physicists and philosophers, of a gradual “escape” from intuition into a purely mathematical representation of the external world. After the introduction, in recent theoretical physics, of fiber bundle formalism the classical notion of field acquires a new spatio-temporal intuitiveness. This intuitiveness is clearly foreshadowed in the Kantian and Meinongian analysis of the notion of magnitude. At the end of the paper we show that, contrary to what happens in quantum mechanics, mathematics plays a truly explicative role in general relativity, without any loss of spatio-temporal intuitiveness. (shrink)

We revisit the nonrelativistic problem of a bound, charged particle subject to the random zero-point radiation field, with the purpose of revealing the mechanism that takes it from the initially classical description to the final quantum-mechanical one. The combined effect of the zpf and the radiation reaction force results, after a characteristic time lapse, in the loss of the initial conditions and the concomitant irreversible transition of the dynamics to a stationary regime controlled by the field. In this (...) regime, the canonical variables x, p become expressed in terms of the dipolar response functions to a set of field modes. A proper ordering of the response coefficients leads to the matrix representation of quantum mechanics, as was proposed in the early days of the theory, and to the basic commutator x^,p^=iħ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\left[ {\hat{x}},{\hat{p}}\right] =i\hbar $$\end{document}. Further, the connection with the corresponding Fokker–Planck equation valid in the Markov approximation, allows one to obtain the radiative corrections of qed. These results reaffirm the essentially electrodynamic and stochastic nature of the quantum phenomenon, as proposed by stochastic electrodynamics. (shrink)

A mapping of a finite directed graph onto a curve in space-time is considered. The mapping induces the dynamics of a free particle moving along the curve. The distinction between the Lagrangian and the Hamiltonian formulation of particle mechanics is expressed in terms of the distinction between referring to a particle in space and time and referring to the points in space which the particle occupies, respectively. These elements are combined to yield an interpretation of Feynman's path integral formulation (...) of quantum mechanics. Describing a bound state of a system as a particle is discussed. (shrink)

The quantum harmonic oscillator is described in terms of two basic sets of coordinates: linear coordinates x, px and angular coordinates eiφ, Pφ (action-angle variables). The angular “coordinate” eiφ is assumed unitary, the conjugate momentum pφ is assumed Hermitian, and eiφ and pφ are assumed to be a canonical pair. Two transformations are defined connecting the angular coordinates to the linear coordinates. It is found that x, px can be physical, i.e., Hermitian and canonical, only under constraints on the (...) pφ eigenvalue spectrum. The conclusion is that eiφ can be a unitary operator. A parallel analysis of the classical harmonic oscillator is done with equivalent results. (shrink)

The discussion of different principles of additivity for probability functions has been largely focused on the personalist interpretation of probability. Very little attention has been given to additivity principles for physical probabilities. The form of additivity for quantum probabilities is determined by the algebra of observables that characterize a physical system and the type of quantum state that is realizable and preparable for that system. We assess arguments designed to show that only normal quantum states are realizable (...) and preparable and, therefore, quantum probabilities satisfy the principle of complete additivity. We underscore the little remarked fact that unless the dimension of the Hilbert space is incredibly large, complete additivity in ordinary non-relativistic quantum mechanics reduces to countable additivity. We then turn to ways in which knowledge of quantum probabilities may constrain rational credence about quantum events and, thereby, constrain the additivity principle satisfied by rational credence functions. (shrink)

A Zenonian supertask involving an infinite number of colliding balls is considered, under the restriction that the total mass of all the balls is finite. Classical mechanics leads to the conclusion that momentum, but not necessarily energy, must be conserved. Relativistic mechanics, on the other hand, implies that energy and momentum conservation are always violated. Quantum mechanics, however, seems to rule out the Zeno configuration as an inconsistent system.

The concepts of joint probability as implied by the Copenhagen and realist interpretations of quantum mechanics are examined in relation to (a) the rules for manipulation of probabilistic quantities, and (b) the role of the Bell inequalities in assessing the completeness of standard quantum theory. Proponents of completeness of the Copenhagen interpretation are required to accept a modification of the classical laws of probability to provide a mechanism for complementarity. A new formulation of the locality postulate (...) is given, not involving factorizability or conditional probabilities, which clarifies the role of locality in the derivation of the Bell inequalities. (shrink)

The difference between the measurement bases of classical and quantum mechanics is often interpreted as a loss of reality arising in quantum mechanics. In this paper it is shown that this apparent loss occurs only if one believes that refined everyday experience determines the Euclidean space as the real space, instead of considering this space, both in classical and quantum mechanics, as a theoretical construction needed for measurement and representing one part of (...) a dualistic space conception. From this point of view, Einstein's program of a unified field theory can be interpreted as the attempt to find a physical theory that is less dualistic. However, if one rgards this dualism as resulting from the requirements of measurements, one can hope for a weakening of the dualism but not expect to remove it completely. (shrink)

In this paper we analyze and discuss the historical and philosophical development of the notion of logical possibility focusing on its specific meaning in classical and quantum mechanics. Taking into account the logical structure of quantum theory we continue our discussion regarding the Aristotelian Square of Opposition in orthomodular structures enriched with a monadic quantifier. Finally, we provide an interpretation of the Orthomodular Square of Opposition exposing the fact that classical possibility and quantum possibility (...) behave formally in radically different manners. (shrink)

In electrostatics, we can use either potential energy or field energy to ensure conservation of energy. In electrodynamics, the former option is unavailable. To ensure conservation of energy, we must attribute energy to the electromagnetic field and, in particular, to electromagnetic radiation. If we adopt the standard energy density for the electromagnetic field, then potential energy seems to disappear. However, a closer look at electrodynamics shows that this conclusion actually depends on the kind of matter being considered. Although we cannot (...) get by without attributing energy to the electromagnetic field, matter may still have electromagnetic potential energy. Indeed, if we take the matter to be represented by the Dirac field, then it will possess potential energy. Thus, potential energy reappears. Upon field quantization, the potential energy of the Dirac field becomes an interaction term in the Hamiltonian operator of quantum electrodynamics. (shrink)

Contrary to Bell’s theorem it is demonstrated that with the use of classical probability theory the quantum correlation can be approximated. Hence, one may not conclude from experiment that all local hidden variable theories are ruled out by a violation of inequality result.

An interesting connection between special relativity and quantum mechanics was put forward by Louis de Broglie, about 60 years ago, who focused on the link between synchronization in a rotating frame and the quantization of the angular momentum. Here we generalise his approach to curved spacetime, using the gravitoelectromagnetic analogy, which can be applied to describe the weak gravitational field around rotating sources, and give a new interpretation of the results.

When David Bohm published his alternative theory of quantum mechanics in 1952, it was not received well; a recurring criticism was that it formed a reactionary attempt to return to classical physics. In response, Bohm emphasized the progressiveness of his approach, and even turned the accusation of classicality around by arguing that he wanted to move beyond classical elements still inherent in orthodox quantum mechanics. In later years, he moved more and more towards speculative (...) and mystical directions. This paper aims to explain this discrepancy between the ways in which Bohm’s work on quantum mechanics has been received and the way in which Bohm himself presented it. I reject the idea that Bohm’s early work can be described as mechanist, determinist, and realist, in contrast to his later writings, and argue that there is in fact a strong continuity between his work on quantum mechanics from the early 1950s and his later, more speculative writings. In particular, I argue that Bohm was never strongly committed to determinism and was a realist in some ways but not in others. A closer look at Bohm’s philosophical commitments highlights the ways in which his theory of quantum mechanics is non-classical and does not offer a way to avoid all ‘quantum weirdness’. (shrink)

An explicit expression of the “Wigner operator” is derived, such that the Wigner function of a quantum state is equal to the expectation value of this operator with respect to the same state. This Wigner operator leads to a representation-independent procedure for establishing the correspondence between the inhomogeneous symplectic group applicable to linear canonical transformations in classical mechanics and the Weyl-metaplectic group governing the symmetry of unitary transformations in quantum mechanics.

Substantivalists claim that spacetime enjoys an existence analogous to that of material bodies, while relationalists seek to reduce spacetime to sets of possible spatiotemporal relations. The resulting debate has been central to the philosophy of space and time since the Scientific Revolution. Recently, many philosophers of physics have turned away from the debate, claiming that it is no longer of any relevance to physics. At the same time, there has been renewed interest in the debate among physicists working on (...) class='Hi'>quantum gravity, who claim that the conceptual problems which they face are intimately related to interpretative questions concerning general relativity . My goal is to show that the physicists are correct--there is a close relationship between the interpretative issues of classical and quantum gravity. ;In the first part of the dissertation I challenge the received view that substantivalism has a commanding advantage over relationalism on grounds internal to GR. I argue that this view is based on a misconception of the relationships between realism and substantivalism, and between empiricism and relationalism. This has led to a narrow conception of relationalism. Once this is relinquished it can be seen that none of the standard arguments in favor of substantivalism are cogent. ;In the second part of the dissertation, I consider the way in which considerations arising out of quantum gravity bear upon the substantival-relational debate. I develop a framework in which to discuss the interpretative problems of gauge theories and place GR in this context. From this perspective, I provide a taxonomy of interpretative options, and show how the hole argument arises naturally as a consequence of gauge freedom. This means that certain substantivalist interpretations of GR render the theory indeterministic. In the final chapter, I argue that, far from being a drawback, this presents an opportunity for substantivalists. Examples from quantum mechanics, quantum field theory, and quantum gravity, are used to demonstrate that the ambiguities inherent in quantization can lead to an interpretative interplay between theories. In the case of quantum gravity, this means that substantivalism and relationalism suggest, and are suggested by, distinct approaches to quantizing GR. (shrink)

This paper discusses the question of stable facts in relational quantum mechanics (RQM). I examine how the approach to quantum logic in the consistent histories formalism can be used to clarify what infomation about a system can be shared between different observers. I suggest that the mathematical framework for Consistent Histories can and should be incorporated into RQM, whilst being clear on the interpretational differences between the two approaches. Finally I briefly discuss two related issues: the similarities (...) and differences between special relativity and RQM and the recent Cross-Perspectival Links modification to RQM. (shrink)

A two boundary quantum mechanics without time ordered causal structure is advocated as consistent theory. The apparent causal structure of usual “near future” macroscopic phenomena is attributed to a cosmological asymmetry and to rules governing the transition between microscopic to macroscopic observations. Our interest is a heuristic understanding of the resulting macroscopic physics.

Classical relativistic physics assumes that spatially separated events cannot influence one another (“locality”) and that values may be assigned to quantities independently of whether or not they are actually measured (“realism”). These assumptions have consequences—the Bell inequalities—that are sometimes in disagreement with experiment and with the predictions of quantum mechanics. It has been argued that, even if realism is not assumed, the violation of the Bell inequalities implies nonlocality—and hence that radical changes are necessary in the foundations (...) of physics. We show that this conclusion does not follow unless the locality hypothesis is strengthened in an implausible manner. (shrink)

A canonical formalism for the relativistic classical mechanics of many particles is proposed. The evolution equations for a charged particle in an electromagnetic field are obtained and the relativistic two-body problem with an invariant interaction is treated. Along the same line a quantum formalism for the spinless relativistic particle is obtained by means of imprimitivity systems according to Mackey theory. A quantum formalism for the spin-1/2 particle is constructed and a new definition of spin1/2 in relativity (...) is proposed. An evolution equation for the spin-1/2 particle in an external electromagnetic field is given. The Bargmann Michel, and Telegdi equation follows from this formalism as a quasiclassical approximation. Finally, a new relativistic model for hydrogenlike atoms is proposed. The spectrum predicted is in agreement with Dirac's when radiative corrections have been added. (shrink)

It is shown that quantum mechanics cannot be formulated as a stochastic theory involving a probability distribution function of position and momentum. This is done by showing that the most general distribution function which yields the proper quantum mechanical marginal distributions cannot consistently be used to predict the expectations of observables if phase space integration is used. Implications relating to the possibility of establishing a "hidden" variable theory of quantum mechanics are discussed.

This paper investigates the kind of empiricism combined with an operationalist perspective that, in the first decades of our Century, gave rise to a turning point in theoretical physics and in probability theory. While quantum mechanics was taking shape, the classical (Laplacian) interpretation of probability gave way to two divergent perspectives: frequentism and subjectivism. Frequentism gained wide acceptance among theoretical physicists. Subjectivism, on the other hand, was never held to be a serious candidate for application to physical (...) theories, despite the fact that its philosophical back-ground strongly resembles that underlying quantum mechanics, at least according to the Copenhagen interpretation. The reasons for this are explored. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to introduce the notion of a four-dimensional time in classical mechanics and in quantum mechanics as a natural concept related with the angular momentum. The four-dimensional time is a consequence of the geometrical relation in the particle in a given plane defined by the angular momentum. A quaternion is the mathematical entity that gives the correct direction to the four-dimensional time.Taking into account the four-dimensional time as a vectorial quaternionic idea, (...) we develop a set of generalizations and conclusions over the mechanics.In quantum mechanics, the four-dimensional time appears as an observable. (shrink)

With the purpose of introducing a useful tool for researches concerning foundations of quantum mechanics and applications to quantum technologies, here we address three quantumness quantifiers for bipartite optical systems: one is based on sub-shot-noise correlations, one is related to antibunching and one springs from entanglement determination. The specific cases of parametric downconversion seeded by thermal, coherent and squeezed states are discussed in detail.

The logic of a physical theory reflects the structure of the propositions referring to the behaviour of a physical system in the domain of the relevant theory. It is argued in relation to classical mechanics that the propositional structure of the theory allows truth-value assignment in conformity with the traditional conception of a correspondence theory of truth. Every proposition in classical mechanics is assigned a definite truth value, either ‘true’ or ‘false’, describing what is actually the (...) case at a certain moment of time. Truth-value assignment in quantum mechanics, however, differs; it is known, by means of a variety of ‘no go’ theorems, that it is not possible to assign definite truth values to all propositions pertaining to a quantum system without generating a Kochen–Specker contradiction. In this respect, the Bub–Clifton ‘uniqueness theorem’ is utilized for arguing that truth-value definiteness is consistently restored with respect to a determinate sublattice of propositions defined by the state of the quantum system concerned and a particular observable to be measured. An account of truth of contextual correspondence is thereby provided that is appropriate to the quantum domain of discourse. The conceptual implications of the resulting account are traced down and analyzed at length. In this light, the traditional conception of correspondence truth may be viewed as a species or as a limit case of the more generic proposed scheme of contextual correspondence when the non-explicit specification of a context of discourse poses no further consequences. (shrink)

As has been noted by several authors, in a relativistic context, there is an interesting difference between classical and quantum state evolution. For a classical system, a state history of a quantum system given along one foliation uniquely determines, without any consideration of the system’s dynamics, a state history along any other foliation. This is not true for quantum state evolution; there are cases in which a state history along one foliation is compatible with multiple (...) distinct state histories along some other, a phenomenon that David Albert has dubbed “non-narratability.” In this article, we address the question of whether non-narratability is restricted to the sorts of special states that so far have been used to illustrate it. The results of the investigation suggest that there has been a misplaced emphasis on underdetermination of state histories; though this is generic for the special cases that have up until now been considered, involving bipartite systems in pure entangled states, it fails generically in cases in which more component systems are taken into account, and for bipartite systems that have some entanglement with their environment. For such cases, if we impose relativistic causality constraints on the evolution, then, except for very special states, a state history along one foliation uniquely determines a state history along any other. But this in itself is a marked difference between classical and quantum state evolution, because, in a classical setting, no considerations of dynamics at all are needed to go from a state history along one foliation to a state history along another. (shrink)

Classical science and in fact Post-Newtonian science up till the early twentieth century were mired in a deterministic interpretation of realities. The deterministic hypothesis in science holds that everything in nature has a cause and if one could know the antecedent causes, he could predict the future with certainty. But quantum mechanics holds that sub-atomic particles, though the ultimate materials from which all the complexity of existence in the universe emerges, do not obey deterministic laws, hence, their (...) activities are causally indeterminate and could only be understood with probability. This paper argues that quantum mechanics can not totally be free from determinism, for it has subtly conceded to determinism in holding that the sub-atomic particles are the building blocks of the macro world, and that there is interconnection between entities in the universe, even at the nonmanifest level. The probabilistic interpretation of quantum mechanics only betray our human limitation of the knowledge of nature, which, I believe still have lots of tricks in our sleeves over mankind. (shrink)