Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Volume 44, Issue 4, Page 433-460, December 2021.

L’historienne, l’une des fondatrices de la revue d’histoire des femmes Memoria, a publié des essais sur la Révolution française, l’histoire sociale de l’État pontifical et l’histoire du travail. Sa dernière recherche nous conduit à nouveau dans l’Etat pontifical pour observer une institution qui va jouer un grand rôle dans le destin de centaines de femmes, les « Conservatoires de la vertu », nés au XVIe siècle pour accueillir les petites filles orphelines ou abandonnées afin de protéger leur...

La doctrine de l’État rassemble les Leçons sur des contenus variés de philosophie appliquée données par Fichte à l’université de Berlin pendant le semestre d’éré 1813. Elle est le dernier grand cours donné par Fichte avant sa mort en janvier 1814, et témoigne de l’état ultime de la pensée du philosophe, qui la présente lui-même à ses auditeurs comme livrant les résultats des recherches de toute une vie. Par « philosophie appliquée » Fichte n’entendait pas un quelconque effort d’adaptation (...) de la philosophie théorique à une réalité étrangère au monde de la pensée, mais la mise en œuvre de la pensée philosophique elle-même en son essence pratique, c’est-à-dire en tant qu’elle est elle-même une force vitale de formation et de création sociale et politique. La Doctrine de l’État mobilise ainsi la totalité de l’œuvre philosophique de Fichte à seule fin de déterminer les conditions de la libération réeelle et collective des hommes. Elle constitue, à ce titre, un témoignage précieux de cette philosophie fichtéenne de l’action qui, dans les années 1842-1844, inspira fortement la philosophie sociale allemande alors en rupture avec l’idéalisme spéculatif hégélien. (shrink)

Excerpt from The Doctrine of the Freedom of the Will in Fichte's Philosophy This essay is a critical study of the doctrine of the freedom of the will, as found in Fichte's philosophy, and especially in his ethical treatises. In Part I. the attempt has been made to give a fair and just exposition of what Fichte really taught on the subject, and, in order that the exposition should be distorted as little as possible through misinterpretation, exact quotations (...) have been given wherever it seemed practicable to do so. Part II. is devoted to a critical examination of the validity of the doctrine as it is presented by Fichte. Fichte's own works are the basis of the essay, and the references are to Johann Gottlieb Fichte's Sammtliche Werke, herausgegeben von J. H. Fichte. The name of the treatise quoted from, or referred to, has been stated in each case, in order that the significance of the quotation may be the better understood. I am under special obligation to President J. G. Schurman for his encouragement, inspiration, and criticism given in the direction of the work; and to Professor J. E. Creighton, under whose efficient leadership my serious study of Fichte's philosophy was first undertaken. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.". (shrink)

The history of dynasties and the reigns of kings can be shown to conform to certain recurring astrological configurations or periods of years in the past and can be extrapolated into the future. The various recurring periods are provided, as they are described by Abu Ma‘shar in his Book on Religions and Dynasties (On the Great Conjunctions), and then the application of these doctrines to Bohemian history is illustrated.

In the philosophical perspective of the Roman Stoic philosopher Lucius Annaeus Seneca virtus was a central theme, and historically he is an important conveyor of the Platonic-Stoic doctrine of virtue---which posits four primary virtues, namely, prudentia, fortitudo, temperantia, and iustitia. ;Despite recent research in Senecan scholarship and contemporary interest in the doctrine of virtue, there has been no study which unites these two philosophically important areas of investigation. The purpose of the study is to investigate and analyze, from (...) the standpoint of current philosophical scholarship, Seneca's doctrine of virtue---with particular reference to the four "cardinal" virtues. The philosopher's position concerning each of the four is examined with regard to how he perceived: the nature of each, their relationship, and their unity. The inquiry is limited to a discussion of Seneca's philosophical writings, viz.: the 124 Epistulae Morales , the ten Dialogi, the De Beneficiis, the De Clementia, and the Naturales Quaestiones. Specifically, this dissertation argues that Seneca's philosophical works illuminate the traditional Stoic doctrine of the unity of the four major virtues in which wisdom is the underlying connection which bonds all primary virtues into the rare unity of perfect virtue . The dissertation explains that there exists in Seneca's thought a logical progression of the four primary virtues from wisdom, to courage, to moderation, and ultimately to justice, and it systematically presents the connection and reciprocal relationships which exist between each of the four mutually entailing virtues. An identification and analysis of Seneca's philosophic contributions to the subject of virtue is conducted by setting his views against the Platonic-Aristotelian and the Hellenistic, particularly Stoic, traditions which he inherited. Occasional reference is made to ways in which Seneca's doctrine of virtue compares with, and, in some cases, influences later philosophers. ;The first chapter examines the metaphysical foundations of Senecan virtue. The subsequent chapters consider Seneca's views concerning the virtues of wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice, respectively. The sixth chapter inquires into the teleological dimensions of Seneca's doctrine of virtue. The dissertation closes with recapitulations, conclusions, and implications for further research. (shrink)

(1988). The doctrine of nuclear deterrence: Impact on contemporary international relations. World Futures: Vol. 24, Strategic Doctrines and Their Alternatives, pp. 65-85.

Les Doctrines littéraires de l'Encyclopédie, ou le Romantisme des encyclopédistes / par J. Rocafort,... Date de l'édition originale: 1890 Le présent ouvrage s'inscrit dans une politique de conservation patrimoniale des ouvrages de la littérature Française mise en place avec la BNF. HACHETTE LIVRE et la BNF proposent ainsi un catalogue de titres indisponibles, la BNF ayant numérisé ces oeuvres et HACHETTE LIVRE les imprimant à la demande. Certains de ces ouvrages reflètent des courants de pensée caractéristiques de leur époque, mais (...) qui seraient aujourd'hui jugés condamnables. Ils n'en appartiennent pas moins à l'histoire des idées en France et sont susceptibles de présenter un intérêt scientifique ou historique. Le sens de notre démarche éditoriale consiste ainsi à permettre l'accès à ces oeuvres sans pour autant que nous en cautionnions en aucune façon le contenu. Pour plus d'informations, rendez-vous sur www.hachettebnf.fr. (shrink)

When the U.S. conducts warfare, elements of a force are drawn from different services and work together as a single team to accomplish an assigned mission. To achieve such unified action, it is necessary that the doctrines governing the actions of members of specific services be both consistent with and subservient to joint Doctrine. Because warfighting today increasingly involves not only live forces but also automated systems, unified action requires that information technology that is used in joint warfare must (...) be aligned with joint doctrine. It requires also that the separate information systems used by the different elements of a joint force must be interoperable, in the sense that data and information that is generated by each element must be usable (understandable, processable) by all the other elements that need them. Currently, such interoperability is impeded by multiple inconsistencies among the different data and software standards used by warfighters. We describe here the on-going project of creating a Joint Doctrine Ontology (JDO), which uses joint doctrine to provide shared computer-accessible content valid for any field of military endeavor, organization, and information system. JDO addresses the two previously mentioned requirements of unified action by providing a widely applicable benchmark for use by developers of information systems that will both guarantee alignment with joint doctrine and support interoperability. (shrink)

Judgment aggregation theory, or rather, as we conceive of it here, logical aggregation theory generalizes social choice theory by having the aggregation rule bear on judgments of all kinds instead of merely preference judgments. It derives from Kornhauser and Sager’s doctrinal paradox and List and Pettit’s discursive dilemma, two problems that we distinguish emphatically here. The current theory has developed from the discursive dilemma, rather than the doctrinal paradox, and the final objective of the paper is to give the latter (...) its own theoretical development along the line of recent work by Dietrich and Mongin. However, the paper also aims at reviewing logical aggregation theory as such, and it covers impossibility theorems by Dietrich, Dietrich and List, Dokow and Holzman, List and Pettit, Mongin, Nehring and Puppe, Pauly and van Hees, providing a uniform logical framework in which they can be compared with each other. The review goes through three historical stages: the initial paradox and dilemma, the scattered early results on the independence axiom, and the so-called canonical theorem, a collective achievement that provided the theory with its specific method of analysis. The paper goes some way towards philosophical logic, first by briefly connecting the aggregative framework of judgment with the modern philosophy of judgment, and second by thoroughly discussing and axiomatizing the ‘general logic’ built in this framework. (shrink)

ABSTRACT William Cooney has recently argued (The Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 6, pp. 201–204) that the social programme of affirmative action, though controversial, can be supported by the doctrine of double effect in that, according to the doctrine, responsibility falls on the side of intended consequences and not on that of unintended consequences. The point of affirmative action is to include certain disadvantaged groups; it is not to exclude other groups, though this is an inevitable and foreseeable (...) by‐product. In this article I contend that Cooney's argument ignores two important conditions of the doctrine of double effect; namely, that the good which results from the intended effect must be at least commensurate with the harm that results from the unintended effect; and, that the intended good effect is causally separate from the unintended harmful effect. Any use of the doctrine which neglects these conditions leads to morally problematic cases. Further, once we take the conditions into account, we have good reason to think that the doctrine of double effect has no relevance to the affirmative action debate. (shrink)

Synopsis: We are often told that the doctrine of creation has not been refuted by modern science, but we cannot judge whether that is true unless we know exactly what the doctrine is, and that is seldom explained. I first offer an interpretation of the doctrine, then defend this as an interpretation, and finally argue that we should use not scientific but forensic methods to decide whether the doctrine, so interpreted, is true.

L'ouvrage Quelles doctrines constitutionnelles pour quel(s) droit(s) constitutionel(s) réuni les contributions des plus éminents spécialistes du droit constitutionnel français, mais aussi étrangers, dans le but de dresser un état des lieux scientifiques de cette discipline : qu'est-ce le droit constitutionnel aujourd'hui? Quellle est son utilité? Et quelles sont ses méthodes, ses évolutuons? Les différentes contributions ici proposées se penchent sur la possible formalisation (ou pas) d'une discipline scientifique autour d'une ou différentes écoles, ainsi que les évolutions qui travaillent les objets, (...) ou encore les domaines politiques et juridiques, mais aussi économiques, sociaux et culturels qu'il se propose d'appréhender. Cet ouvrage se révèle donc un outil précieux pour tous les juristes, mais plus largement, pour tous les citoyens qui s'intéressent aux questions de l'organisation constitutionnelle du Pouvoir au sein des Etats modernes. (shrink)

Doctrinal legal scholarship faces persistent challenges from empirical approaches, but such criticism rarely seeks to encounter doctrine on its own terms. In this article, we seek to excavate the theoretical and methodological basis of doctrinal legal scholarship by situating the discipline in a hermeneutic continuum between theory and practice, or law’s engagement with the social world. We first unfold this dynamic as an exercise in methodological interpretivism and ontological hermeneutics and then turn to explicate our analysis with examples drawn (...) from tort law and international criminal law. We ultimately argue that law can never be strictly circumscribed as an empirical object because law cannot be disassociated from an agent’s reasons, which are continuously bound up in a hermeneutic circle, and which the scholar must enter into to achieve legal understanding. Unavoidably, therefore, doctrinal legal scholarship becomes part of the very object it is investigating. (shrink)

This article focuses on the work of Czech Jesuit Cardinal Tomáš Špidlík (1919-2010), continued in his pupils, both in Rome, where he taught for most of his life, and in the Czech Republic. It explores in particular how studies of hesychasm marked their understanding of deification. It asks in which sense their work can be seen as a Western attempt to rehabilitate the doctrine of deification in its experiential and theological complexity, where they contribute to the renewal of the (...) communication between the Christian East and the Christian West, and what are the complications present in their attempt expressed against the background of uniatism. (shrink)

Cet article résume le contenu des doctrines non écrites attribuées à Platon ainsi que la démarche méthodique selon laquelle elles procèdent. Il atteste la présence de ces doctrines non écrites, notamment dans le Sophiste. L'article cherche à concilier entre elles la théorie des premiers principes et la métaphysique platonicienne, laquelle admet la transcendance théologique. En effet, en raison de la différence qui existe entre la Dyade du grand et du petit dans la sphère cosmologique et la Dyade dans le domaine (...) des Idées, le rôle de l'intellect démiurgique devient essentiel. Dès lors, réduire la métaphysique platonicienne à un système fondé sur la déduction, l'immanence et l'émanation est une position intenable. This article summarizes the content and the methodological proceedings of the unwritten doctrines ascribed to Plato, and documents their presence, which is to be found particularly in the Sophist. The article tries then to reconcile the first principles' theory with Platonic metaphysics, which admits the theological transcendency. It attempts to show that, because of the difference between the Dyad of great and small in the cosmological sphere and the Dyad of the ideal sphere, the role of the demiurgic Intellect becomes essential. This entails that the reduction of the Platonic metaphysics to a system based on deduction, immanence and emanation is untenable. (shrink)

It is well known that in India, over the last two thousand five hundred years or more, there has been a pervasive belief in the doctrine of Karma. Various forms and variants in which this doctrine has found expression in the multifarious texts and metaphysical systems have drawn a good deal of attention. The present paper, however, is an attempt at analysing the function of this doctrine, in the sustenance of the traditional social system, and particularly the (...) scheme of social stratification. As we shall see, an unshakable faith in this doctrine by people belonging to all strata of society provided tremendous strength to the caste hierarchy based on birth, and ensured a secure place for the Brāhmanas and their progeny on the top of the social pyramid. (shrink)

El presente artículo pone en evidencia una de las dificultades que se encuentran en la recepción de la Humanae vitae y de la Familiaris consortio: la profundidad del sentido de todo acto conyugal, su belleza y su vínculo explicito con el Creador. Esta paradoja provoca en primer lugar la fe de los bautizados en el misterio de Dios, que es amor y vida, y en segundo término la conciencia moral. ¿No sería acaso demasiado hermoso para ser verdad? Sin embargo, la (...) unión de los cónyuges es primero un acto religioso. El principal enunciado doctrinal envuelve la unión de los esposos y su responsabilidad parental. La verdadera “cuna” antropológica de todo ser humano es un acto de amor interpersonal. Este acto particular, rico y complejo, tiene un doble significado: unitivo y procreativo. Estos significados se amalgaman entre ellos, y traducen la unidad de las personas que se donan una a la otra. Es el gran misterio que une a los esposos y a Dios; y es el lugar de una revelación. (shrink)

The Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) is an influential non-consequentialist principle positing a role for intention in affecting the moral permissibility of some actions. In particular, the DDE focuses on the intend/foresee distinction, the core claim being that it is sometimes permissible to bring about as a foreseen but unintended side-effect of one’s action some harm it would have been impermissible to aim at as a means or as an end, all else being equal. This article explores the meaning (...) and application of the DDE along with current debates over the nature of the intend/foresee distinction and its moral significance. How is the line between intended effects and merely foreseen but unintended side-effects to be drawn, and how are problem cases best handled? What is an appropriate methodology for debating the tenability of the DDE? How might the DDE interact with other non-consequentialist principles, and how might it be modified to capture other related factors (resulting perhaps in a Doctrine of Triple Effect) or to avoid certain problem cases? Does the DDE make permissibility turn on the actual intentions of particular agents, as critics such as Thomson and Scanlon assume, or is the role of intention more abstract? (shrink)

The doctrine (or principle) of double effect is often invoked to explain the permissibility of an action that causes a serious harm, such as the death of a human being, as a side effect of promoting some good end. According to the principle of double effect, sometimes it is permissible to cause a harm as a side effect (or “double effect”) of bringing about a good result even though it would not be permissible to cause such a harm as (...) a means to bringing about the same good end. Does the principle of double effect play the important explanatory role that has been claimed for it? To consider this question, one must be careful to clarify just what the principle is supposed to explain. Three misinterpretations of the principle’s force or range of application are common. 1. To ensure that Double Effect is not misunderstood as principle issuing a blanket permission on causing any unintended harm that yields a benefit, applications must require that the agent seek to minimize the harm involved. 2. Since it is widely accepted that it is wrong to aim to produce harm to someone as an end, to rule this out is not part of double effect’s distinctive content. 3. Harms that were produced regretfully and only for the sake of producing a good end may be prohibited by double effect because they were brought about as part of the agent’s means to realizing the good end. (shrink)

. How does the doctrine of double effect apply to business decisions to sell products which may be harmful to consumers? Lawrence Masek believes that some authors have misapplied the doctrine to this type of decision and, as a consequence, have committed themselves to placing unwarranted constraints on businesses. Seeking to correct this mistake, Masek presents his account of how the doctrine applies here, an account which is rather permissive but which, he claims, nevertheless preserves the virtues (...) of the doctrine. It will be seen, though, that his attempt to loosen these putatively unnecessary constraints by appealing to consumer autonomy and an intuition about the morality of producing harmful products leaves the doctrine of double effect irrelevant to this type of decision. His argument that the doctrine is less restrictive in this context than others suppose leads ultimately to the conclusion that the doctrine does not constrain this kind of business decision at all. (shrink)

Philon d'Alexandrie, un philosophe juif contemporain de Jésus et de saint Paul et le principal témoin de la théologie de la Diaspora, éclaire les multiples visages de sa foi religieuse à l'aide de la philosophie grecque, au cours de ses abondants commentaires sur la Loi de Moïse. Il est très proche du monde de pensée de saint Paul, de l'Épître aux Hébreux et de saint Jean, c'est-à-dire du milieu où s'est développé le christianisme. L'auteur, Jean Laporte, élève de l'Institut catholique (...) de Paris et professeur à l'université Notre-Dame d'Indiana (USA), s'est fixé pour but d'étudier la doctrine eucharistique de Philon sous ses différents aspects : les termes et images qui l'expriment, son lien intime avec le culte du temple, les problèmes cosmologiques, anthropologiques et spirituels liés à l'œuvre de la création et de la restauration de l'homme. Le travail révèle la richesse de l'Eucharistie philonienne et contribue indirectement à éclairer les bases de l'Eucharistie chrétienne. (shrink)

This article proposes an analysis of the doctrine of sufficiency. According to my reading, the doctrine's basic positive claim is ‘prioritarian’: benefiting x is of special moral importance where (and only where) x is badly off. Its negative claim is anti-egalitarian: most comparative facts expressed by statements of the type ‘x is worse off than y’ have no moral significance at all. This contradicts the ‘classical’ priority view according to which, although equality per se does not matter, whenever (...) x is worse off than y, at least some priority should be assigned to helping x. Section I elaborates and defends this reconstruction of the doctrine of sufficiency, and section II shows that the privileged utility level presumed within the sufficiency framework exists. (shrink)

This article discusses two doctrines of jus ex bello concerning whether and how to end wars. In Section I, I defend the claim that there is a distinct morality of ending wars. Section II rebuts a challenge that the account is too permissive of war. Section III rejects a forward-looking conception of proportionality for jus ex bello. In Section IV, I allow an exception in cases in which the just cause for the war has changed. In Section V, I defend (...) five principles governing how to end a war. (shrink)

In The Doctrine of God Dolf te Velde examines the interaction of method and content in three historically important accounts of the doctrine of God.

In the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant develops an elaborate virtue ethics grounded in two ends that are also duties: our own perfection and the happiness of others. Kant says apparently inconsistent things about the nature of these duties, however, leaving ambiguous precisely what the demands of Kantian virtue are. In the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant says that duties of virtue govern only our freedom to set ends, not our freedom of action; that such duties are not coercively enforceable; (...) and that there are only two of them. Yet in the Doctrine of Elements, Kant seems to contradict all these commitments by positing numerous additional duties of virtue, at least some of which (such as duties against suicide or excessive drinking) look to be coercively enforceable constraints on actions. In this paper I develop a cohesive account of Kant’s virtue ethics that reconciles these apparent contradictions. We should take Kant at his word, I argue, when he says that there are only two duties of virtue and that those duties exclusively constrain our internal freedom to set ends. Adopting the ends of virtue, however, involves cultivating a continuous and principled commitment to our own perfection and the happiness of others. The duties Kant describes in the Elements are intended to illustrate what subsidiary commitments would be entailed by a true commitment to the two required ends of virtue. They are not normatively independent duties, however, nor (contrary to appearances) are they coercively enforceable constraints on action. (shrink)

According to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the distinction between doing and allowing harm is morally significant. Doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. This paper is the first of a two paper critical overview of the literature on the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. In this paper, I consider the analysis of the distinction between doing and allowing harm. I explore some of the most prominent attempts to analyse this distinction:. Philippa Foot’s sequence (...) account, Warren Quinn’s action/ inaction account, and counterfactual test accounts put forward by Shelly Kagan and Jonathan Bennett. I also discuss Jeff McMahan’s account of the removal of barriers to harm. I argue that analysis of the distinction has often been made more difficult by two mistaken assumption: (1) the assumption that when an agent does or allows harm his behaviour makes the difference to whether or not the harm occurs (2) the assumption that the distinction between doing and allowing and the distinction between action and inaction are interchangeable. I suggest that Foot’s account is the most promising account of the doing/allowing distinction, but that it requires further development. (shrink)

:Justice can be approached from many angles in ethical and political debates, including those involving healthcare, biomedical research, and well-being. The main doctrines of justice are liberal egalitarianism, libertarianism, luck egalitarianism, socialism, utilitarianism, capability approach, communitarianism, and care ethics. These can be further elaborated in the light of traditional moral and social theories, values, ideals, and interests, and there are distinct dimensions of justice that are captured better by some tactics than by others. In this article, questions surrounding these matters (...) are approached with the hermeneutic idea of a distinction between “American” and “European” ways of thinking. (shrink)

There are two seemingly unrelated paradoxes of democracy. The older one is the doctrinal paradox or the discursive dilemma. or a comprehensive bibliography, see List 1995. The younger one is the mixed motivation problem introduced by Jonathan Wolff (1994) in this journal. In the mixed motivation problem, we have voters with mixed Benthamite and Rousseauian motivations who reach a majority on an issue that is neither in the self-interest of a majority of the voters, nor considered to be conducive to (...) the common good by a majority of the voters. What has gone unnoticed so far is that both of these paradoxes share a common structure. (shrink)

"It is the purpose of this article to attempt to re-examine the account of Thrasymachus' doctrine in Plato's Republic, and to show how it can form a self-consistent whole. [...] In this paper it is maintained that Thrasymachus is holding a form of [natural right]".

This research article uses the theoretical framework of doctrine as believer's security to critique the theological framework behind the controversial activities reported amongst some South African neo-Pentecostal prophets, which include feeding congregants with grass, spraying them with insecticides and sexual violation of women congregants. The framework of the article falls within the discipline of systematic theology by raising the importance for South African Christians to develop a critical doctrinal framework for protecting themselves from controversial NPPs. The following main question (...) is answered by the article: from a systematic theological perspective, how can we evaluate the theological framework, which leads to the recent controversial activities reported amongst some NPPs in South Africa? Consequently, the article, firstly, describes the critical theological framework of the protective role of Christian doctrine. Secondly, it describes the South African NPPs and their controversial practices. Thirdly, this article analyses some of the theological problems in the current operative framework of NPPs. Fourthly, it argues for the need for doctrinally informed critical thinking as a safety measure against controversial NPPs. Finally, some steps that must be taken by NPPs to develop critical theological thinking in order to overcome doctrinally vacuous experientialism that promotes controversial religious activities are provided.CONTRIBUTION: From a systematic theological approach, this article attempts to demonstrate the importance of critical doctrinal thinking as a defence mechanism for protecting Christians from falling prey to harmful religious practices, such as those recently reported amongst some NPPs in South Africa. (shrink)

Toujours, dans toute proposition affirmative veritable, necessaire ou contingente, universelle ou singuliere, la notion du predicat est comprise en quelque facon dans celle du sujet, praedicatum inest subjecto, ou bien je ne sais ce que c'est que la vetite. Parce qu'elles mettaient principalement l'accent sur les liaisons conceptuelles, les precisions de ce genre ont ete interpretees comme autant d'indices permettant de reconstituer le contenu du predicat de verite a partir de presupposes coherentistes. Dans le concensus qui s'est etabli sur ce (...) point, le role hermeneutique tres excessif accorde a la notion de systeme a eu une portee aussi considerable que le contenu des quelques textes generalement allegues. Si on admet, au contraire, qu'il y a bien une doctrine leibnizienne de la verite, alors on est amene a inscrire la position de Leibniz dans le contexte du debat relatif a l'adaequatio rei et a souligner davantage ce qui l'apparente a une theorie de la verite-correspondance. Cet argument principal est soutenu par des analyses de detail dans la logique. Un attention particuliere est apportee aux valeurs des variables du nouveau calcul, a la fonction du predicat de possibilite, au probleme relatif a la constantia subjecti et au statut des entites intensionnelles. L'image de l'ontologie leibnizienne s'en trouve modifiee et precisee: a la fois possibiliste et factualiste, elle est traversee de tensions importantes et occupe une place tout a fait singuliere dans cette partie de la philosophie qui connait aujourd'hui un si profond renouveau. (shrink)

Few moral theorists would disagree that the fundamental principle of morality – perhaps of practical rationality itself – is “ Do good and avoid evil. ” Yet along with such an uncontroversial principle comes a major question: Can you fulfi l both halves satisfactorily across your life as a moral agent? We all have opportunities to perform acts that do good with no accompanying evil, but these are not as common as we might think. We can avoid evil by doing (...) nothing, but doing nothing implies doing no good either. Clearly the fundamental principle does not require that you go about your life doing good on any and every possible occasion any more than that you sit on your hands and abstain from action out of fear of doing evil. The principle tells us to avoid evil, not to refrain from ever causing it. And the simple fact is that the complexities of life make it inevitable that, much of the time when we go about doing good, we will also be doing evil. Further, they are such that sometimes we can avoid evil only at the cost of not performing a good act which reasonable people would regard as at least permissible, if not sometimes obligatory. So how, as rational, morally responsible agents, are we to satisfy the fundamental principle in an adequate, harmonious fashion, given life ’ s exigencies? This is where the so - called ‘ doctrine of double effect ’ comes into play. Some call it a doctrine, infl uenced by the fact that Catholic ethicists and moral theologians have, since the Middle Ages, codifi ed and ratifi ed it as something akin to a doctrine of Catholic moral philosophy. Others call it the ‘ principle of double effect, ’ though it breaks down into a set of principles unifi ed by a common idea. Yet other writers see it simply as a kind of reasoning about certain types of hard case in ethics. Whatever the preferred nomenclature, the DDE, as I will call it here, is – for all its critics and the diffi culties it faces – a keystone of sound moral thinking, without which the fundamental principle would remain nothing but a high ideal with little consistent applicability. So consider a simple example.. (shrink)

Modern medicine is often said to have originated with nineteenth century germ theory, which attributed diseases to bacterial contagions. The success of this theory is often associated with an underlying principle referred to as the “doctrine of specific etiology”. This doctrine refers to specificity at the level of disease causation or etiology. While the importance of this doctrine is frequently emphasized in the philosophical, historical, and medical literature, these sources lack a clear account of the types of (...) specificity that it involves and why exactly they matter. This paper argues that nineteenth century germ theory involves two types of specificity at the level of etiology. One type receives significant attention in the literature, but its influence on modern medicine has been misunderstood. A second type is present in this model, but it has been completely overlooked in the extant literature. My analysis clarifies how these types of specificity led to a novel conception of etiology that continues to figure in medicine today. (shrink)

In recent years, the doctrine of God has once again become a central focus of theological discussion and debate. Internationally respected scholar Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen offers a global survey of understandings of God in Scripture, Christian history, and contemporary theology. This new edition incorporates developments in theological research over the past decade and has been substantially updated throughout.

There are many moral qualities which are valued in men. But the question of virtue, of the moral worth of the person as an agent, is quite a different question from that of whether or not he possesses these moral qualities. The problem with which Kant wrestled for many years was that of the nature of the relation between the ‘feeling’ and the ground or motivation of moral action. His Critical doctrine was that the moral feelings lie at the (...) basis of morality, as subjective conditions of our receptiveness to the concept of duty. The Critical doctrine was to allocate the moral feeling to the causality of reason in its practical use, and in that way deliver it from the subjectivism which Kant attributes to all feelings. In the Prize Essay Kant explicitly limits the task of philosophy, however provisionally, to the analytic one of exhibiting, in Newtonian fashion, the basic elements of experience. (shrink)

According to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the distinction between doing and allowing harm is morally significant. Doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. This paper is the second of a two paper critical overview of the literature on the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. In this paper, I consider the moral status of the distinction between doing and allowing harm. I look at objections to the doctrine such as James’ Rachels’ Wicked Uncle (...) Case and Jonathan Bennett’s argument that any acceptable analysis of the distinction leaves it implausible that the distinction is morally relevant. I consider putative defences of the Doctrine from Philippa Foot and Warren Quinn. I argue that neither Foot not Quinn provides a satisfactory justification of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, but that the idea of self-ownership discussed by Quinn can be developed to provide a justification of the doctrine. (shrink)

According to the Doctrine of Illicit Intentions, it is impermissible both to form and then to act on an illicit intention. An intention is illicit, roughly, if it causes the agent who has it to be, in a certain way, disposed to perform actions that are impermissible. If the range of actions an agent might be directed to perform by an intention includes impermissible actions, then it may be impermissible to form or act on that intention even if, in (...) the end, the agent performs no action that is impermissible (other than forming and acting on an illicit intention itself). (shrink)

The Doctrine of Temporal Parts (sometimes abbreviated herein as 'DTP') asserts that, for each portion (including infinitely small portions) of the smallest period of time during which a material object exists, there is an object-a temporal part of the material object in question-which exists at that and at no other time. In "Things Change," Mark Heller offers an argument for DTP, and responds to a objection, the "No-Change" objection, to that doctrine.2 My goal in this paper is to (...) undermine both Heller's argument in favor of DTP and his response to that criticism. (shrink)

Michelson traces contemporary debates on the doctrine of God back in time to the philosophical critiques of Hume and Kant. Charnock, Schleiermacher and Barth each offered accounts of the doctrine of God. This book offers a critical evaluation of these accounts and demonstrates how they were responding to early modern critiques of the possibility of knowing God. Indeed, this work also highlights how these critics built their arguments on faulty interpretations of classical theological tradition. In doing so, this (...) book carves out a provocative, construct path forward for contemporary theological reflection on the doctrine of God. (shrink)