A correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-021-00451-y.

A correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-021-10018-3.

Metaethical absolutism is the view that moral concepts have non-relative satisfaction conditions that are constant across judges and their particular beliefs, attitudes, and cultural embedding. If it is correct, there is an important sense in which parties of moral disputes are concerned to get the same things right, such that their disputes can be settled by the facts. If it is not correct, as various forms of relativism and non-cognitivism imply, such coordination of concerns will be limited. The most influential (...) support for absolutism comes from an argument with two related premises. According to the first premise, moral thinking and moral discourse display a number of features that are characteristically found in paradigmatically absolutist domains, and only partly in uncontroversially non-absolutist domains. According to the second, the best way of making sense of these features is to assume that absolutism is correct. This paper defends the prospect of a non-ad hoc, non-absolutist, explanation of these "absolutist" features, thus calling into question the second premise. But instead of attempting to directly explain why the moral domain displays these features, it attends to how they are partially displayed by paradigmatically non-absolutists judgments about taste and likelihood. Based on this, it proposes independently motivated general accounts of attributions of agreement, disagreement, correctness and incorrectness that can explain both why absolutist domains display all "absolutist" features and why these non-absolutist domains display some. Based on these accounts, it provides preliminary reasons to think that these features of moral discourse can be given a non-absolutist explanation. (shrink)

This is a correction to: Thomas Schindler, Steps Towards a Minimalist Account of Numbers, Mind, 2021.

In this paper, I assess critically the recent debate on corrective duties across moral and legal philosophy. Two prominent positions have emerged: the Kantian rights-based view (holding that what triggers corrections is a failure to respect others' right to freedom) and the so-called continuity view (correcting means attempting to do what one was supposed to do before). Neither position, I try to show, offers a satisfactory explanation of the ground (why correct?) and content (how to correct?) of corrective duties. In (...) the final section, I suggest that it is probably better to restrict the label “corrective duties” to duties generated by interpersonal wronging. (shrink)

A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-021-00616-2.

A correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03091-x.

A correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-021-04780-w.

ABSTRACT A belief is correct if and only if the believed proposition is true. Some philosophers argued that from this standard of correctness it is possible to derive the statement of a norm, a claim about what a subject ought to do. Many formulations of the standard in terms of an ‘ought’-claim have been suggested, but all resulted affected by some problem. My aim in this article is to suggest a new formulation of the standard in ‘ought’-terms based on an (...) analysis of the relations occurring between the notions of correctness and ‘ought’. My suggested formulation is that, for any subject S and proposition p, according to the standard of correctness, given that S believes that p, it ought to be that p. (shrink)

In the original publication, the article title has been published incorrectly. Now the same has been corrected in this correction.

A correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-021-00309-6.

In this paper we investigate total correctness in Nonstandard Dynamic Logic . Here we show that despite of the celebrated Kfoury-Park [5] result, termination is a rst order notion if approached properly.

A recent National Academy report on research integrity noted that policies are not evidence-based, with no formal entity responsible to attend to this deficit. Here we describe four areas of research misconduct regulations governing Public Health Service funded research that are empirically and/or ethically questionable. Policies for human subject protection, RM and conflict of interest are not harmonized, making it extremely difficult to deal with complex cases which often contain allegations in all of these areas. Second, detection of RM has (...) depended entirely on whistleblowers in spite of evidence of significant under-reporting. Third, the scientific record is far from cleansed of the effects of falsified/fabricated work through current mechanisms of retraction. Finally, lack of fairness in the regulations may reflect lack of a Belmont Report-like document to guide ethics of RM policy. These issues are likely common in other countries. RM regulations should be harmonized with related regulations and their effectiveness tracked, open access to data for independent replication and improved statistical tests are an essential supplement to whistleblowers, correction of the scientific record will require a major effort, and further ethical analysis and guidance are as important as is empirical study for the improvement of RM regulations. Further consideration should be given to assigning current regulations for human subjects protection, RM and conflict of interest to a single authority and to the further development of a Belmont-like report of essential principles, for RM. (shrink)

In sub-Sect. 3.3, the terms “one-person” and “-person” were incorrectly updated by mistake during the correction stage in the online published article.

Political Correctness or Virtue Terror?Discussing the different meanings of the concept of political correctness, the author argues that it is a part of a profound change in culture within Western democracies that has led to a differentiation and deepening of human and fundamental rights. At the same time, it is shown that political correct-ness was adopted by the political right and used as a fight against this differentiation of human and fundamental rights in the Western liberal democracies, in order to (...) defame them by linking the corre-sponding prohibitions of discrimination and equality measures with virtue terror. (shrink)

As an unnamed friend pieces together—literally, from thousands of slips of papers and one troubling manuscript—the puzzle of Rotheimer's breakdown, what emerges is the story of a genius ceaselessly compelled to correct and refine his ...

The name of the second author was incorrect in the initial online publication. The original article has been corrected.

The e-mail address of the second author was incorrectly published in the original article. The author’s correct e-mail address is given in this correction.

The original publication contained an incorrect copyright holder.

Agents sometimes innocently benefit from the wrongdoing perpetrated by others. It has been asserted that when this happens the beneficiary acquires a defeasible duty to disgorge these benefits until the beneficiary’s gain is extinguished or the victim’s loss has been reversed. At the same time, critics have denied the existence of duties of disgorgement. In this paper, we contribute to this debate by proposing a novel account of the underlying justification, or rationale, for disgorgement duties grounded in the value of (...) corrective justice. An agent benefiting from injustice has a duty to disgorge, on this account, because fulfilling this duty helps correct injustice by making it as though the transaction that wrongfully enriched them had never happened. We go on to address five objections to this account of disgorgement duties and argue that the corrective justice account can withstand these objections. (shrink)

In the original publication of the article under the Acknowledgements section, a contributor name was missed out. The corrected statement should read as follows.

The authors would like to make the following corrections to the published paper [...].

The name of the third author was incorrect in the initial online publication. The original article has been corrected.

English grammar error correction algorithm refers to the use of computer programming technology to automatically recognize and correct the grammar errors contained in English text written by nonnative language learners. Classification model is the core of machine learning and data mining, which can be applied to extracting information from English text data and constructing a reliable grammar correction method. On the basis of summarizing and analyzing previous research works, this paper expounded the research status and significance of English (...) grammar error correction algorithm, elaborated the development background, current status, and future challenges of the classification model, introduced the methods and principles of feature extraction method and dynamic residual structure, constructed a basic model for English grammar error correction based on the classification model, analyzed the classification model and translation model of English grammar error correction, proposed the English grammar error correction algorithm based on the classification model, performed the analyses of the model architecture and model optimizer of the grammar error correction algorithm, and finally conducted a simulation experiment and its result analysis. The study results show that, with the continuous increase of training samples and the continuous progress of learning process, the proposed English grammar error correction algorithm based on the classification model will continue to increase its classification accuracy, further refine its recognition rules, and gradually improve correction efficiency, thereby reducing processing time, saving storage space, and streamlining processing flow. The study results of this paper provide a certain reference for the further research on English grammar error correction algorithm based on the classification model. (shrink)

The article Thinking embodiment with genetics: epigenetics and postgenomic biology in embodied cognition and enactivism, written by Maurizio Meloni and Jack Reynolds, was originally published electronically on the publisher’s internet portal on 18 June 2020 without open access. With the author’ decision to opt for Open Choice the copyright of the article changed on 6 November 2020 to ©The Author 2020 and the article is forthwith distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution.

There was a spelling error in the second author’s last name in the original publication. The name is correct in this erratum.

Let be the class of odd involutive even the notion of partial lex products is not sufficiently general. One more tweak is needed, a slightly even more complex construction, called partial sublex product, introduced here.

The abstract of this chapter was initially published with error. The chapter has been updated with the corrected abstract as given below.

In the original article published, the Greek term “μυθολογίαa” for muthologia is incorrect. The correct term is “μυθολογία”.

Table 3 was incomplete in the initial online publication. The original article has been corrected.

Two prominent philosophers here engage in a forthright debate over some of the centrally disputed topics in the political correctness controversy now taking place on college campuses across the nation, including feminism, campus speech codes, the western canon, and the nature of truth. Friedman and Narveson conclude the volume with direct replies to each other's positions.

Table 4 in original article has been corrected.

The initial online publication contained a typesetting mistake in the author information. The original article has been corrected.

In the Original publication of the article the revised date was erroneously published as: 20 August 2017 the correct date is: 20 August 2020.

Political Correctness ist nicht nur Reizthema und Schlagwort medialer Debatten, sondern auch in Alltagskommunikation oft Ausloser hitziger Debatten um sprachliche Diskriminierung. Doch wie positionieren sich eigentlich Sprachprofis zu diesem Thema, was rat das Worterbuch? Der Einfluss von Diskursen auf Worterbucher ist zwar in der Forschung unstrittig; eine umfassende Untersuchung zur Wirkung eines bestimmten zeitgenossischen Phanomens auf einen abgeschlossenen Wortschatzbereich existierte jedoch bislang nicht. Dieser Lucke widmet sich die Autorin, die den uber eine Korpusanalyse gewonnenen Wortschatz der Political Correctness aus den (...) ersten zehn Jahren (1990-2000) des Diskurses in den ersten sechs Auflagen (1983-2006) des Duden - Universalworterbuchs untersucht. Erstmals wird hier die Diskurslexik der Political Correctness der 1990er Jahre greifbar gemacht. Daruber hinaus werden vorhandene lexikographische Strategien beschrieben sowie deren Defizite im Umgang mit problematischer Lexik aufgedeckt. Die Arbeit zeigt, dass das Ringen um einen angemessenen Sprachgebrauch, die Vermeidung von Pejorisierung feste Bestandteile des Sprachhandelns darstellen, dem sich Worterbucher mit deskriptivem oder normativem Anspruch zu stellen haben. (shrink)

With the author(s)’ decision to opt for Open Choice the copyright of the article changed on 26 May 2021 to ©The Author(s) 2021 and the article is forthwith distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution.

The mainstream view in contemporary analytic philosophy is that perception is primarily in the business of representing the mind-independent world as it is. My dissertation explores an alternative conception: that the goal of perception is to guide successful action and that perceptions do not need to track mind-independent properties to play this action-guiding role. I focus on two types of perception: color perception and pain perception. I start with the former and advocate a pragmatist, empirically-guided approach which begins by inquiring (...) into the function of color vision. After arguing that none of the extant philosophical views of color are satisfactory, I answer the function question by focusing on systematic color perceptual phenomena investigated by psychophysicists. I argue that the human color visual system is an enhancement system: that is, its job is to help us better discriminate, track, and recognize meaningful objects, properties, and relations. I then build on this idea using the notion of ‘competence-embeddedness.’ I propose that color vision is embedded in a network of competences: the aim of color vision is to help organisms manifest these competences, and color experiences are correct when they result from competence-enhancing processing. The framework is explanatorily robust. For example, it allows me to conceptualize many textbook color illusions as special cases of successful color perception where the demands of the relevant competences clash. Finally, I use the notion of ‘competence-embeddedness’ to develop a new account of pain. I argue that the pain system is not a bodily disturbance detector, but a sophisticated, context-responsive security system whose primary goal is to help organisms manifest important behavioral and cognitive competences. (shrink)

John MacFarlane defends a radical form of truth relativism that makes the truth of assertions relative not only to contexts of utterance but also to contexts of assessment, or perspectives. Making sense of assessment-sensitive truth is a matter of making sense of the normative commitments undertaken by speakers in using assessment sensitive sentences. This paper argues against the possibility of making sense of such a practice. Evans raised a challenge to the coherence of relative truth. A modification of the challenge (...) can be given against MacFarlane’s revised views on assertion. The main objection to the relativist is that rational and earnest speakers are not bound by assessment-relative standards of correctness. (shrink)

In this paper, I ask how – and whether – the rectification of injury at which corrective justice aims is possible, and by whom it must be performed. I split the injury up into components of harm and wrong, and consider their rectification separately. First, I show that pecuniary compensation for the harm is practically plausible, because money acts as a mediator between the damaged interest and other interests. I then argue that this is also a morally plausible approach, because (...) it does not claim too much for compensation: neither can all harms be compensated, nor can it be said when compensation is paid that the status quo ante has been restored. I argue that there is no conceptual reason for any particular agent paying this compensation. I then turn to the wrong, and reject three proposed methods of rectification. The first aims to rectify the wrong by rectifying the harm; the second deploys punitive damages; the third, punishment. After undermining each proposal, I argue that the wrong can only be rectified by a full apology, which I disaggregate into the admission of causal and moral responsibility, repudiation of the act, reform, and, in some cases, disgorgement and reparations, which I define as a good faith effort to share the burden of the victim’s harm. I argue, further, that only the injurer herself can make a full apology, and it is not something that can be coerced by other members of society. As such, whether rectification of the wrong can be a matter of corrective justice is left an open question. (shrink)