Bertrand Russell introduced several novel ideas in his 1903 Principles of Mathematics that he later gave up and never went back to in his subsequent work. Two of these are the related notions of denoting concepts and classes as many. In this paper we reconstruct each of these notions in the framework of conceptual realism and connect them through a logic of names that encompasses both proper and common names, and among the latter, complex as well as simple common (...) names. Names, proper or common, and simple or complex, occur as parts of quantifier phrases, which in conceptual realism stand for referential concepts, i.e., cognitive capacities that inform our speech and mental acts with a referential nature and account for the intentionality, or directedness, of those acts. In Russell’s theory, quantifier phrases express denoting concepts (which do not include proper names). In conceptual realism, names, as well as predicates, can be nominalized and allowed to occur as "singular terms", i.e., as arguments of predicates. Occurring as a singular term, a name denotes, if it denotes at all, a class as many, where, as in Russell’s theory, a class as many of one object is identical with that one object, and a class as many of more than one object is a plurality, i.e., a plural object that we call a group. Also, as in Russell’s theory, there is no empty class as many. When nominalized, proper names function as "singular terms" just the way they do in so-called free logic. Leśniewski’s ontology, which is also called a logic of names can be completely interpreted within this conceptualist framework, and the well-known oddities of Leśniewski’s system are shown not to be odd at all when his system is so interpreted. Finally, we show how the pluralities, or groups, of the logic of classes as many can be used as the semantic basis of plural reference and predication. We explain in this way Russell’s "fundamental doctrine upon which all rests", i.e., "the doctrine that the subject of a proposition may be plural, and that such plural subjects are what is meant by classes [as many] which have more than one term" (Russell 1938, p. 517). (shrink)

In a recent article, Michael Kremer revisits Russell's "Gray's Elegy" argument—the argument in "On Denoting" in which Russell rejects "the whole distinction of meaning and denotation". Kremer argues that the Gray's Elegy argument is directed not at Frege's distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung but rather at Russell's own theory of "denoting concepts" in his earlier Principles of Mathematics. Furthermore, and more originally, Kremer argues that Russell's views of acquaintance play a central role in the argument. For Kremer, it (...) is because Frege does not share Russell's views of acquaintance that the Gray's Elegy argument succeeds against Russell's own earlier theory but not against Frege's position. (shrink)

The question of the origin of polyadic expressivity is explored and the results are brought to bear on Bertrand Russell's 1903 theory of denoting concepts, which is the main object of criticism in his 1905 "On Denoting". It is shown that, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, the background ontology of the earlier theory of denoting enables the full-blown expressive power of first-order polyadic quantification theory without any syntactic accommodation of scopal differences among denoting phrases such as (...) 'all φ', 'every φ', and 'any φ' on the one hand, and 'some φ' and 'a φ' on the other. The case provides an especially vivid illustration of the general point that structural (or ideological) austerity can be paid for in the coin of ontological extravagance. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell’s _Principles of Mathematics_ (1903) gives rise to several interpretational challenges, especially concerning the theory of denoting concepts. Only relatively recently, for instance, has it been properly realised that Russell accepted denoting concepts that do not denote anything. Such empty denoting concepts are sometimes thought to enable Russell, whether he was aware of it or not, to avoid commitment to some of the problematic non-existent entities he seems to accept, such as the Homeric gods and chimeras. (...) In this paper, I argue first that the theory of denoting concepts in _Principles of __Mathematics_ has been generally misunderstood. According to the interpretation I defend, if a denoting concept shifts what a proposition is about, then the aggregate of the denoted terms will also be a constituent of the proposition. I then show that Russell therefore could not have avoided commitment to the Homeric gods and chimeras by appealing to empty denoting concepts. Finally, I develop what I think is the best understanding of the ontology of _Principles of __Mathematics_ by interpreting some difficult passages. (shrink)

Russell's new theory of denoting phrases introduced in "On Denoting" in Mind 1905 is now a paradigm of analytic philosophy. The main argument for Russell's new theory is the so-called 'Gray's Elegy' argument, which purports to show that the theory of denoting concepts promoted by Russell in the 1903 Principles of Mathematics is incoherent. The 'Gray's Elegy' argument rests on the premise that if a denoting concept occurs in a proposition, then the proposition is not (...) about the concept. I argue that the premise is false. The 'Gray's Elegy' argument does not exhaust Russell's ammunition against the theory of denoting concepts. Another reason Russell rejects the theory is, as he says, that it cannot provide an adequate account of non-uniquely denoting concepts. In the last section of the paper, I argue that even though Russell was right in thinking that the theory of denoting concepts cannot provide an adequate account of non-uniquely denoting concepts, Russell's new theory does not succeed in eliminating the occurrence of all denoting concepts, as it requires a commitment to the existence of variables that indirectly denote their values. However, the view that variables are denoting concepts is unproblematic once the 'Gray's Elegy' argument is blocked. (shrink)

There are many data suggesting that we should acknowledge fictional entities in our ontological inventory, in spite of the paraphrasing strategies that Russell’s theory of descriptions can offer. Thus the realist attitude toward fictional entities of Meinongian and artifactualist accounts may seem well-motivated. Yet, these approaches infringe the Russellian “robust sense of reality.” A different realist account is proposed here, one that is compatible with the Russellian “robust sense of reality” in that it identifies fictional entities with denoting concepts, (...) understood as properties of properties. (shrink)

While Russell’s concerns in developing the theory of descriptions were primarily with his foundation of logic, he was aware of the epistemological uses of both the theory of denoting concepts and the 1905 theory of deWnite descriptions. At the end of “On Denoting” he suggests that the principle of acquaintance is a “result” of the new theory of denoting. In this paper I examine the relation between the theory of descriptions and the principle of acquaintance, and I (...) reject two suggestions, one that Russell’s view commits him to the position that quantiWers range only over objects of acquaintance, the other that the principle of acquaintance plays a crucial role in the Gray’s Elegy argument. Russell’s earlier theory of denoting concepts went hand in hand with the principle of acquaintance, as Russell made clear in his “Points about Denoting”. So the principle of acquaintance was neither a motivator for the new account nor a special consequence of it. The new account of “On Denoting”, while dispensing with denoting concepts, preserved the connection that the older de-. (shrink)

The Transparent Intensional Logic explicates the meaning of a linguistic expression as a construction. The construction is a hyperintensional entity. It is characterised as instructions for a „calculation“ of a concrete value. In the terminology of Pavel Tichy a linguistic expression denotes its meaning , which construes the signification of the expression. If the signification is an intension, we can call it a reference of the expression. In several semantic conceptions the question of the denotation and of the reference are (...) not treated equally. The terminological chaos can be resolved in a specific way thanks to „fine-grained“ character of the logical analysis offered by TIL. (shrink)

There are logics where necessity is defined by means of a given identity connective: \ is a tautology). On the other hand, in many standard modal logics the concept of propositional identity \ can be defined by strict equivalence \}\). All these approaches to modality involve a principle that we call the Collapse Axiom : “There is only one necessary proposition.” In this paper, we consider a notion of PI which relies on the identity axioms of Suszko’s non-Fregean logic (...) SCI. Then S3 proves to be the smallest Lewis modal system where PI can be defined as SE. We extend S3 to a non-Fregean logic with propositional quantifiers such that necessity and PI are integrated as non-interdefinable concepts. CA is not valid and PI refines SE. Models are expansions of SCI-models. We show that SCI-models are Boolean prealgebras, and vice-versa. This associates non-Fregean logic with research on Hyperintensional Semantics. PI equals SE iff models are Boolean algebras and CA holds. A representation result establishes a connection to Fine’s approach to propositional quantifiers and shows that our theories are conservative extensions of S3–S5, respectively. If we exclude the Barcan formula and a related axiom, then the resulting systems are still complete w.r.t. a simpler denotational semantics. (shrink)

ABSTRACTFregeans hold that predicates denote things, albeit things different in kind from what singular terms denote. This leads to a familiar problem: it seems impossible to say what any given predicate denotes. One strategy for avoiding this problem reduces the Fregean position to form of nominalism. I develop an alternative strategy that lets the Fregean hold on to the view that predicate denote things by reconceiving the nature of singular denotation and of Fregean objects.

Originally published in 1958. A study in the logical foundations of modern theoretical semantics, this book is concerned with notions of designation and consistency as well as denotation and truth. It presents several semantical theories, each of which with what were new concepts or treatments from the author. Talking at a time when semantical theory was gained great ground, this book also looks at the methodology of the sciences and the semantics of scientific language alongside analysis of meaning and expression. (...) It is influenced by the writings of Carnap, Church, Frege, Goodman, Quine, Russell and Tarski. (shrink)

The two theories of verbal cognition, namely abhihitānvaya and anvitābhidhāna, first put forth by the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas respectively in the second half of the first millennium C.E., can be considered as being foundational as all subsequent thinkers of the Sanskritic intellectual tradition engaged with and elaborated upon these while debating the nature of language and meaning. In this paper, I focus on the first chapter of Śālikanātha’s Vākyārthamātṛkā and outline the process of anvitābhidhāna described therein. Śālikanātha explains this (...) as comprising three steps, and thereafter discusses each of these three to elaborate upon and philosophically defend this conception of how one cognizes sentential meaning. The aim of this paper is to present Śālikanātha’s three-step model, and thus demonstrate especially the distinct conception of abhidhāna for the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas as complex and chronologically extended as contrasted with the Bhāṭṭa conception of abhidhāna as non-complex and instantaneous. Such an understanding of the disparate semantic contents with which the Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras use the identical term abhidhāna is crucial for any correct study of their respective doctrines. (shrink)

Nelson Goodman argued convincingly that in order to understand the representation relation one should dissociate it from the relation of resemblance because of the logical differences between the two concepts. Resemblance is reflexive and symmetric whereas representation is not. Furthermore, Goodman suggested that what lies at the core of representation is denotation. According to Goodman, if X represents Y then X must denote Y, but he recognized that by opting for an analysis of representation only based on this idea of (...) denotation we run into problems. There are two reasons for this. The first reason is that X could be considered to be a representation of Y by mere stipulation. The second reason is that in many cases X represents Y but Y does not exist and thus there is nothing that X denotes. Both of these problems are important when addressing questions about scientific representation. First, we do not think that we do justice to scientific practices by thinking that scientific models represent by mere stipulation. Second, some of our scientific models represent what we often label ideal systems or ideal states of affairs, and if such systems do not exist in the actual world then it would also not make much sense to claim that our models denote such systems. I argue in this paper that there is a way to overcome these two problems and explicate “representation” by means of “denotation”. (shrink)

At first russell thought (p) that whatever a proposition is about must be a constituent of it. Then, Around 1900, He discovered denoting concepts and realized that a proposition could be about something and have only its denoting concept as constituent. However, A number of remarks that he made through the years can only be understood as inspired by (p). In particular, The arguments offered in "on denoting" against the doctrine of denotation of "principles" are grounded (...) on (p). (shrink)

In this paper, I critically approach the essence of Dewey’s philosophy: his method. In particular, it is what Dewey termed as denotative method is at the center of my attention. I approach Dewey’s denotative method via what I call the “genealogical deconstruction” that is followed by the “pragmatic reconstruction.” This meta-approach is not alien to Dewey’s philosophy, and in fact was employed by Dewey himself in Experience and Nature. The paper consists of two parts. In Part 1, I genealogically deconstruct (...) the philosophical foundation of the denotative method: the doctrine of immediate empiricism. The latter was originally stated in Dewey’s 1905 seminal “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism” article, and fully developed twenty years later in his Experience and Nature. I claim that Dewey’s immediate empiricism is essentially incompatible with his pragmatism (instrumentalism) and with pragmatism overall. In Part 2, I pragmatically reconstruct Dewey’s denotative method from the perspective of what I term as the “hermeneutic empiricism” which is grounded in Dewey’s 1896 “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology” article. As opposed to the immediate empiricism’s main thesis “things are what they are experienced as,” the motto of the hermeneutic empiricism would be “things are what they are interpreted as”/“things are experienced what they are interpreted as.” The above-mentioned pragmatic reconstruction also leads to the transformation of the notion of “common sense” which is vital to Dewey’s method, into the notion of sound reason. (shrink)

In his Logical Investigations Edmund Husserl criticizes John Stuart Mill’s account of meaning as connotation, especially Mill’s failure to separate the distinction between connotative and non-connotative names from the distinction between the meaningful and the meaningless. According to Husserl, both connotative and non-connotative names have meaning or “signification”, that is, what Gottlob Frege calls the sense (“Sinn”) of an expression. The distinction between connotative and non-connotative names is a distinction between two kinds of meaning (or sense), attributive and non-attributive meaning (...) (“attributive und nicht-attributive Bedeutung”). Attributive (connotative) names denote (refer to) objects through their attributes, whereas a non-attributive name means a thing directly (“direkt”). In this paper I examine the concepts of attributive and non-attributive meaning by means of the semiotic theory of Charles S. Peirce, and compare Peirce’s account with the views of Frege, Husserl, Alexius Meinong, and David Kaplan and Gareth Evans. (shrink)

This commentary focuses on Machery's eliminativist claim, that ought to be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology because it fails to denote a natural kind. I argue for the more traditional view that concepts are a functional kind, which provides the simplest account of the empirical evidence discussed by Machery.

Le point de départ de l'article est la théorie de la signification et de la référence des termes scientifiques présentée par Hilary Putnam dans son article « The Meaning of 'Meaning7 » et quelques autres essais de Mind, Language and Reality. Dans la partie critique du texte la thèse et les arguments de Putnam, ainsi que sa prétention d'éviter le problème de rincommensurabilité des théories rivales, sont évalués à la lumière de la distinction que nous introduisons entre référence et dénotation. (...) Dans sa partie constructive le texte propose les grandes lignes d'un traitement de la référence des termes scientifiques qui s'appuie sur notre conception de la structure de la théorie physique, le pragmatisme constructif.The paper's starting point is Hilary Putnam's theory of meaning and reference for scientific terms, as presented in " The Meaning of 'Meaning' " and several other essays from his Mind, Language and Reality. A critique of Putnam's thesis and arguments, as well as of his claim to avoid the problem of incommensurability of competing theories, is offered in the light of our own distinction between reference and denotation. In the process we develop an outline of a theory of reference for scientific terms that builds on our view of the structure of physical theory: constructive pragmatism. (shrink)

Associationism can be broadly defined as a school of thought in philosophy and psychology that holds that mental activity can be accounted for by processes that combine simple elements or ideas. More than a century ago, scientific psychology started taking measurements of word associations, and only a few years later, word associations became a major research tool in psychiatry. With the advent of neurobiology and the discovery of the neuron, the term association came to denote physical connections between cells or (...) parts of the brain. The resulting ambiguity made the concept highly fruitful and at the same time introduced the risk of committing categorical mistakes and of engaging in unfounded speculation, since little was known about the actual functioning of neurons. In modern cognitive neuroscience, computational models provide the critically needed link between the psychological and the biological approaches. The concept of association, with its biological, psychological, and computational connotations, provides the framework needed for further experimental research. Its potential for contributing to our understanding of psychopathology can hardly be overestimated. (shrink)

In this paper, I critically approach the essence of Dewey’s philosophy: his method. In particular, it is what Dewey termed as denotative method is at the center of my attention. I approach Dewey’s denotative method via what I call the “genealogical deconstruction” that is followed by the “pragmatic reconstruction.” This meta-approach is not alien to Dewey’s philosophy, and in fact was employed by Dewey himself in Experience and Nature. The paper consists of two parts. In Part 1, I genealogically deconstruct (...) the philosophical foundation of the denotative method: the doctrine of immediate empiricism. The latter was originally stated in Dewey’s 1905 seminal “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism” article, and fully developed twenty years later in his Experience and Nature. I claim that Dewey’s immediate empiricism is essentially incompatible with his pragmatism (instrumentalism) and with pragmatism overall. In Part 2, I pragmatically reconstruct Dewey’s denotative method from the perspective of what I term as the “hermeneutic empiricism” which is grounded in Dewey’s 1896 “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology” article. As opposed to the immediate empiricism’s main thesis “things are what they are experienced as,” the motto of the hermeneutic empiricism would be “things are what they are interpreted as”/“things are experienced what they are interpreted as.” The above-mentioned pragmatic reconstruction also leads to the transformation of the notion of “common sense” which is vital to Dewey’s method, into the notion of sound reason. (shrink)

Frege held various views about language and its relation to non-linguistic things. These views led him to the paradoxical-sounding conclusion that "the concept horse is NOT a concept." A key assumption that led him to say this is the assumption that phrases beginning with the definite article "the" denote objects, not concepts. In sections I-III this issue is explained. In sections IV-V Frege's theory is articulated, and it is shown that he was incorrect in thinking that this theory (...) led to the conclusion that "the concept horse is not a concept." Section VI goes on to show that his strict theory about the functioning of ordinary language is inconsistent. Sections VII-VIII investigate Frege's reasons for thinking that "the concept horse" must denote an object; these reasons are not adequate on Frege's own grounds. Section IX sketches a systematic way to allow such phrases to denote concepts (not objects) within the framework of Frege's main views about language. Section X comments briefly on the consequences of this idea for his logistic program. (shrink)

The term complementarity plays a central role in quantum physics, not least in various approaches to defining entanglement and the conditions for its occurrence. It has, however, been used in a variety of ways by different authors, denoting different concepts and relationships. Here we describe and clarify some of them and analyze the role they play with respect to the phenomenon of entanglement. Based on these considerations we discuss the recently proposed system-theoretical generalization of the concepts entanglement and complementarity (...) (Atmanspacher et al. in Found Phys 32(3):379–406, 2002; von Lucadou et al. in J Conscious Stud 14(4):50–74, 2007; Filk and Römer in Axiomathes 21(2):211–220, 2011; Walach and Von Stillfried in Axiomathes 21(2): 185–209, 2011). We hope that a clarification regarding the specific meaning of these terms can be useful to the growing engagement with this interesting hypothesis and its critical investigation. (shrink)

The creation of transgenic animals by means of modern techniques of genetic manipulation is evaluated in the light of different interpretations of the concept of intrinsic value. The zoocentric interpretation, emphasizing the suffering of individual, sentient animals, is described as an extension of the anthropocentric interpretation. In a biocentric or ecocentric approach the concept of intrinsic value first of all denotes independence of humans and a non-instrumental relation to animals. In the zoocentric approach of Bernard Rollin, genetic engineering (...) is seen as a morally neutral tool, as long as the animal does not suffer as a result of it. Robert Colwell who defends an ecocentric ethic, makes a sharp distinction between wild animals and domesticated animals. Genetic manipulation of wild species is a serious moral issue, in contrast to genetic manipulation of domesticated species which is no problem at all for Colwell. Both authors do not take the species-specific nature (or telos) of domesticated animals seriously. When domestication is seen as a process between the two poles of the wild animal and the human construct (which can be patented), the technique of genetic manipulation can only be seen as a further encroachment upon the intrinsic value of animals. At the level of molecular biology, the concept of an animal's telos loses its meaning. (shrink)

The term nonmarket is increasingly applied to environments, institutions, organizations, and exchanges that are also labeled as noneconomic and social. Why has this new term been coined and widely adopted, and what are its distinct denotations? The author traces the development of this concept through four perspectives on nonmarket, which are integrated into an overarching definition, after relating them to major theories and pointing to major research challenges. The constituting and correcting of markets, firms, and noneconomic institutions are the (...) central concerns of nonmarket studies that bear on all organizing projects. (shrink)

The concept of impetus denoted the transmission of a power from the mover to the object moved. Many authors resorted to this concept to explain why a projectile keeps on moving when no longer in contact with its initial mover. But its application went further, as impetus was also appealed to in attempts to explain the acceleration of falling bodies or the motion of the heavens. It was widely applied in Renaissance natural philosophy, but it also raised a (...) number of ontological questions concerning its precise nature. (shrink)

This paper identifies the key assumptions underpinning current arrangements in vocational education and training (VET) in the UK. These assumptions, and the idea of vocational capability they denote, are rejected in favour of a more coherent conception—a conception centred not on the traditional dichotomy of ‘knowing how-knowing that’ but on what I refer to as the ‘constitutive understandings’ from which both practical and theoretical capabilities can be seen to derive. It is argued that an account of vocational capability in these (...) terms suggests a far richer conception of vocational preparation than current arrangements are able to admit. (shrink)

Evil-scepticism comes in two varieties: one variety is descriptive, where it is claimed that the concept of evil doesn’t successfully denote anything in the world; the other variety is normative, where it is claimed that the concept of evil is not a helpful or useful concept to be employing in either our social or interpersonal lives. This paper argues that evil-scepticism can be responded to by understanding the concept of evil as a thin moral concept. (...) Understood in this thin way, the descriptive challenge fades, because the concept of evil doesn’t even purport to denote anything in the world (it is purely evaluative), and so does the normative argument, since the thinness of the concept means that, first, it is ineliminable anyway, and, second, its malleability allows for it to be used for progressive and constructive means. (shrink)

The concept of "dogma" comes from the Greek word dogmatus, which means "thought", "doctrine". Traditionally, these concepts denote such basic provisions of the doctrine of a denomination, which are recognized as eternal and immutable truths, which are established by the supposedly God Himself and are obligatory for faith in them to all followers of a particular religious course.

This study analyzes the metaphoric and metonymic nature ofbaş/kafa‘head’ in Turkish idiomatic expressions from a cognitive linguistic perspective. The database for the study is composed of idioms containing the two head-denoting wordsbaşandkafa. Idioms and their definitions are analyzed in terms of their figurative uses of abstract concepts, and the conceptual metaphors and metonymies are identified. Findings are examined under five categories: head as the representative of the person, the seat of mental faculties, the locus of emotions, the sign of (...) superiority/power, and the sign of value. The study proposes a cultural model in which the image schemaswhole-part,containmentandverticalityplay a key role, and reveals cross-cultural similarities and differences in the conceptualization ofhead. The study also provides further support for the embodiment thesis, and underscores the impact of cultural processes in shaping the way the body is conceptualized. (shrink)

ABSTRACT. Fodor characterizes concepts as consisting of two dimensions: one is content, which is purely denotational/broad, the other the Mentalese vehicle bearing that content, which Fodor calls the Mode of Presentation (MOP), understood "syntactically." I argue that, so understood, concepts are not interpersonally sharable; so Fodor's own account violates what he calls the Publicity Constraint in his (1998) book. Furthermore, I argue that Fodor's non-semantic, or "syntactic," solution to Frege cases succumbs to the problem of providing interpersonally applicable functional roles (...) for MOPs. This is a serious problem because Fodor himself has argued extensively that if Fregean senses or meanings are understood as functional/conceptual roles, then they can't be public, since, according to Fodor, there are no interpersonally applicable functional roles in the relevant senses. I elaborate on these relevant senses in the paper. (shrink)

The authors try to show that even Wittgensteinian definition of concept is not always sufficient to analyze what really happens in science. As a result, in addition to “concept” we propose “conception” as a new promising tool for philosophy of science. We provide a brief historical analysis of this term and reveal two main interpretations of “conception” in philosophy and scientific disciplines. In accordance with the first view, conception appears as either a “twin” of the concept, or (...) a pair entity to the concept. According to the second view, conception is a kind of “strange concept” that exists among “normal” concepts. Since conception is understood differently in sciences and philosophical systems, it is not possible to give a generalized definition of conception. That is, it is impossible to formulate this definition, so to speak, inductively. Moreover, even if it was possible, such a definition would not necessarily have to be automatically accepted by philosophy of science. That is why the introduction of a concept of conception was carried out through the analysis of a global process associated with the return of metaphysics to science. We define conception as a semantic construction denoting the unknown (and, possibly, fundamentally unknowable) and ensuring the possibility of working with this unknown (unknowable). By virtue of the way conception was introduced (conception is not a “generalization” of the interpretations available in specific sciences) many conceptions that are considered as conception in specific sciences turn out to not to be conceptions within this definition. Thus, the article interprets conception as a new possible tool of philosophy of science, which is aimed at understanding how specific sciences develop. (shrink)

The article examines the interpretation of the teaching of Wilhelm von Humboldt on language by Gustav Shpet together with Shpet’s perception of the influence of Kant’s philosophy on Humboldt. Special emphasis is laid on terminological analysis, the underlying thesis of this analysis being that words, terms and concepts are not the same thing: one and the same word or word combination can denote different terms, and the concept is a term in each particular doctrine. The object of critical analysis (...) is the function of Humboldt’s term “inner form of language” and the way this term was transformed, according to Shpet, into “the concept of inner form” over time by various thinkers — Plato, Plotinus, Goethe, Humboldt and others. The difference is analysed between the terms which Humboldt, Shpet and Kant denoted by the same word “concept”. Shpet’s position on the issue of Kant’s influence on Humboldt is analysed, notably in terms of the “schematism of the pure concepts of understanding”. Steinthal’s opinion on this issue allows us to raise the hermeneutic question of what kind of Kant a particular researcher is dealing with at a particular time — from the beginning of the nineteenth century until our days. The author notes the peremptory character of some of Shpet’s claims as well as his description of Kant’s influence on Humboldt as suggestion. The author also considers Shpet’s critique of subjectivism, which robs subjectivism of creativity and confines it to the capacity to convey what has been understood and to err. Finally, Shpet’s methodology (the question of identity and difference) and the role of terminology in his own works is considered. The positing of identity as the starting point of method accords with Shpet’s conviction that terms have meaning and explanatory power. Contrary to Shpet, it is difference that is the initial experience and the key term in phenomenological and post-phenomenological philosophy. (shrink)

The Affective grounding hypothesis suggests that affective experiences play a crucial role in abstract concepts’ processing (Kousta et al. 2011). Vigliocco and colleagues test the role of affective experiences as well as the role of language in learning words denoting abstract concepts, comparing children with typical and atypical development. They conclude that besides the affective experiences also language plays a critical role in the processing of words referring to abstract concepts.

The term complementarity plays a central role in quantum physics, not least in various approaches to defining entanglement and the conditions for its occurrence. It has, however, been used in a variety of ways by different authors, denoting different concepts and relationships. Here we describe and clarify some of them and analyze the role they play with respect to the phenomenon of entanglement. Based on these considerations we discuss the recently proposed system-theoretical generalization of the concepts entanglement and complementarity (...) (Atmanspacher et al. in Found Phys 32(3):379–406, 2002; von Lucadou et al. in J Conscious Stud 14(4):50–74, 2007; Filk and Römer in Axiomathes 21(2):211–220, 2011; Walach and Von Stillfried in Axiomathes 21(2): 185–209, 2011). We hope that a clarification regarding the specific meaning of these terms can be useful to the growing engagement with this interesting hypothesis and its critical investigation. (shrink)

My presentation deals with developments and transformations of the concept of the transcendental within Anglo-American analytical philosophy. According to Kant – the “founding father” of transcendental philosophy – the methodical domain of the transcendental is to denote and to expose the a priori epistemic structureof human mind and cognition (perception, experience, knowledge), as well as to provide a priori foundations for normative ethics. Analytical philosophy has adopted the term of the transcendental, mostly within sceptical argumentations or for sceptical refutations. (...) What is the methodological function of the transcendental in these debates, in the context of philosophical scepticism? My contribution tries to show that the notion of the transcendental becomes concave in analytical contexts. It might be appropriate to refute scepticism, but in these analytical contexts it’s not possible to deduct epistemic structures (e.g. categories,epistemic schemes) of experience and knowledge or to bridge the gap to foundations in ethics – one of the core goals in Kantian transcendental philosophy. What is the importance in transcendental analysis and reflection or is this term obsolete all together nowadays? My paper tries to discuss and mediate between various positions and ideas. (shrink)

The article critically analyzes one of the main lines of philosophy, which is designated as the philosophy of forms and concepts. The main stages in the formation of a philosophy of this type are identified, which culminates in two fundamental principles: in the Kantian idea of the formation of objects through internal forms from the primary material of sen­sations and in the Hegelian idea of the identity of being and thinking. The question of the natural and unnatural origin of concepts (...) and the concept of form is discussed. “Concept” and “form” are terms that claim to be a direct expression of formative and comprehending thinking, denote two interrelated procedures: firstly, the removal of forms from objectivity, the transfer of forms into the “cognitive ability” and endowing them with the status of internal principles that form objects; secondly, the identification of an object and its meaning, and their mutual transformation in dynamics. Form is both a function of the concept that synthesizes the object and its meaning in identification, and its condition. Bergson’s criticism of the philosophy of “Forms and Ideas” is analyzed in connection with his doctrine of duration. Deleuze and Guattari’s thesis (in the book “What is Philosophy?”) that philosophy is the invention of concepts and its justification is also the subject of analysis. In this regard, the issue of translating the term “concept” into Russian is being considered. The article raises the question of a terminological turn in historical and philosophical research as a necessary element in the analysis of philo­sophical doctrines and problems. The question is also raised about non-conceptual think­ing as differentiation and distinction of differences. (shrink)

Indonesia, an archipelagic country with 17 000 islands with 281 million inhabitants, is a democratic country with Islam as the major religion. Currently, Indonesia is the second country with the largest Muslim population in the world. The Islamic tradition in Indonesia has assimilated and intersected with the richness and diversity of Indonesian culture. This is reflected in the use and meaning of Islamic concepts in Indonesia, such as ikhtiar. Ikhtiar is important to Indonesian Muslims and may have profound ethical implications (...) in palliative care situations. This makes it a relevant term to understand for healthcare professionals and adds to our vocabulary in medical ethics. This column will demonstrate the meaning and origin of ikhtiar, how it may be used in a palliative care setting, and its relationship with other concepts. The word ikhtiar is etymologically derived from Arabic اِخْتِيَار ( iḵhtiyār ) and is included in the Official Dictionary of Bahasa Indonesia. It means ‘free choice’ in Arabic, emphasising the capacity of mankind to determine their own course of action rather than predestination. However, in Indonesia, ikhtiar has a more specific nuance as a verb, meaning ‘making an effort’. It denotes that, as a consequence of having free will, humans can choose the goal which they perceive to be the best, and subsequently, make an effort to reach that goal. Ikhtiar is commonly used among Indonesian …. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Conflatingion with Empirical Observation: The False Mind-Matter Dichotomy” by Bernardo Kastrup. Upshot: Kastrup’s attempt to undermine the dichotomy between mind and matter is interesting but it leaves much to be desired. In particular, it suffers from the following three difficulties. First, it is predicated on a misguided working definition of dichotomy. Second, it conflates the concept of matter with the putative denotation of that concept. Lastly, it effectively presupposes the refutation of materialism, (...) making it pointless to argue that materialism is epistemically more costly than idealism. (shrink)

The paper studies the vocabulary the Ukrainian intellectuals of the second half of the 16th–the early 17th century used to signify a number of moral, ethical, and legal concepts. The first part of the article examines legal documents, including the Statutes of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and several court documents. The author comes to the following conclusions: the lexeme “justice” is consistently used in legal documents written in Old Ukrainian to denote practices related to litigation and acquires clear features (...) of a legal concept which corresponds to the Latin iustitio; the study of the aforementioned texts shows that the semantic field of the lexeme “justice” does not include any reference to moral and ethical norms and principles which is customary in modern language. Instead, semantic fields of both old and modern concepts of “justice” intersect in the fact that now, like in the early modern times, it means impartial attitude towards someone and a set of actions that comply with legal norms; the lexemes “fairly/justly”, “truly”, and “true” have rather vague semantic fields that often overlap, while the adverbs “fairly/justly” and “truly” often function as synonyms; the use of lexemes “fairly/justly”, “truly”, and “true” is neither consistent nor structured. They belong to the sphere of everyday speech and cannot claim to belong to the conceptual apparatus; the lexemes “truth”, “righteousness”, and “verity” are almost never used in the legal domain of that time. Although the field of jurisprudence included the concepts that were very important for the communicational sphere in early modern Ukrainian society, it could not cover all its needs. (shrink)

The thesis of this paper is that even some of the most fundamental concepts of Marxism have been used and abused to fit their advocates' purposes. More specifically, the interpretation of the concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" has been subject to a dual development. First, the dictatorship of the proletariat has come to denote an increasingly violent regime. Second, the term has been used to refer to a rule exercised by an ever smaller segment of society. This (...) paper seeks to analyze and elucidate this much disputed and frequently misunderstood Marxist concept. In the first part Marx's use of the term is examined. The second section explores how the same concept was explicated in the writings of some of the most important first generation Marxist thinkers and "practitioners" like Engels, Lenin, Kautsky, Bukharin, and Stalin. Following the summary of my findings I attempt to formulate some meaningful generalizations about the usage of the concept by Marxist thinkers. (shrink)

With his theory of descriptions Russell wanted to solve two problems concerning denotation and reference, which are formulated here as Problem I and Problem II. After presenting each problem, we describe the main points of Russell’s solution. We deal with Russell’s concepts of existence and then elaborate his presuppositions concerning the relation of denoting and referring. Next we discuss the presuppositions or principles which underlie Russell’s understanding of the _objects_ of reference. These principles are such that if the objects (...) of reference are material objects, they are objects of classical mechanics, or very close to such an interpretation. Finally we show how these principles have to be relaxed if the objects of reference are objects of quantum mechanics or special or general relativity. (shrink)

This article is an attempt to present Gödel's discussion on concepts, from 1944 to the late 1970s, in particular relation to the thought of Frege and Russell. The discussion takes its point of departure from Gödel's claim in notes on Bernay's review of ?Russell's mathematical logic?. It then retraces the historical background of the notion of intension which both Russell and Gödel use, and offers some grounds for claiming that Gödel consistently considered logic as a free-type theory of concepts, called (...) intensions, considered as the denotations of predicate names. (shrink)

Chapter 1 First Person Access to Mental States. Mind Science and Subjective Qualities -/- Abstract. The philosophy of mind as we know it today starts with Ryle. What defines and at the same time differentiates it from the previous tradition of study on mind is the persuasion that any rigorous approach to mental phenomena must conform to the criteria of scientificity applied by the natural sciences, i.e. its investigations and results must be intersubjectively and publicly controllable. In Ryle’s view, philosophy (...) of mind needs to adopt an antimentalist stance to achieve this aim. Antimentalism not only definitively rejects the idea that mind is a substance separated from the body, it also denies that mental phenomena radically differ from physical phenomena by virtue of several unique features. Most problematically, mental phenomena have a conscious character (mental states are related to specific qualitative feelings) and are accessible only to the first-person (only the subject knows directly what s/he is experiencing inside his/her mind). Ryle takes a strong stance on antimentalism going so far as to maintain that an approach to mind which aims to meet the criteria of scientificity set by the natural sciences must avoid any reference to internal, unobservable mental states. In his view (which is considered a specifically philosophical version of psychological behaviorism and also addresses questions put forward in psychological research), mental states can be redescribed in terms of behavioral dispositions. In this chapter, we address the historical roots of the antimentalist view and analyze its relation to the later tradition of research on mind. We show that, compared to the antimentalist stance, functionalism and cognitivism take a step back when they maintain that direct reference to mental states is necessary since mental states cause and therefore explain human behavior. This step backwards is often interpreted as a return to mentalism. However, this is only partially true. Indeed, we suggest that these later traditions retain one important element of Ryle’s antimentalism, i.e. the idea that mental states must be uniquely identified using external and publicly observable criteria, while excluding any reference to introspection and those qualitative dimensions of a mental state, which are accessible only to the first-person. According to the perspective we put forward, this epistemological stance has continued to influence contemporary research on mind and current philosophical and psychological theories which both tend to exclude the subjective qualities of human experience from their accounts of how the mind works. The issue we raise here is whether this is legitimate or whether subjective qualities do play a role with respect to the way our mind works. The conclusion of this chapter anticipates the argument the book makes in in favor of this latter position, starting from a particular angle, i.e. the problem of how we categorize concepts related to our internal states. -/- Chapter 2 The Misleading Aspects of the Mind/Computer Analogy. The Grounding Problem and the Thorny Issue of Propriosensitive Information -/- Abstract. After the crisis of behaviorism, cognitivism and functionalism became the predominant models in the field of psychology and of philosophy, respectively. Their success is mainly due to the new key they use for interpreting mental processes: the mind/computer analogy. On the basis of this analogy, mental operations are seen as cognitive processes based on computations, i.e. on manipulations of abstract symbols which are in turn understood as informational unities (representations). This chapter identifies two main problems with this model. The first is how these symbols can relate to and communicate with perception and thus allow us to identify and classify what we perceive through the senses. Here we limit ourselves to presenting this issue in relation to the classical symbol grounding problem originally put forward by Harnad on the basis of Searle’s Chinese room argument. An attempt to address the problem raised here will be made in chap. 3. The second point we discuss in relation to the mind/computer analogy concerns the idea of information it fosters. Indeed, following this analogy, information is something available in the external world which can be captured by the senses and transmitted to the central system without being influenced or modified by the procedures of transmission. This perspective does not take into account that – unlike computers – in living beings information is acquired by means of the body. As Ulric Neisser has already pointed out, the body is itself an informational source that provides us with additional sensory experience that influences (modifies or complements) the information extracted from the external world by the senses. To develop this line of analysis and to determine exactly what information is provided by the body and how this might influence cognition, we examine Sherrington’s and Gibson’s positions. Moving on from their views, we qualify bodily information in terms of ‘proprioception’. We use ‘proprioception’ in a broad sense to describe any kind of experience we have of our internal states (including postural information as well as sensations related to the general state of the body and its parts). Following Damasio’s and Craig’s studies, we further elaborate this position, arguing that living beings are equipped with an internal propriosensitive monitoring system which maps all the changes that constantly occur in our body and that give us perceptual (‘proprioceptive’ or propriosensitive) information about what happens inside us. Moreover, relying on Goldie’s and Ratcliffe’s view, we show that emotional information can also be considered as a form of ‘proprioception’ which contributes to determining everything we perceive. This analysis leads us to the second main thesis of this book: ‘proprioception’ is a form of internal perception and it is an essential component of the sensory information we can access and use for all cognitive purposes. -/- Chapter 3 Semantic Competence from the Inside: Conceptual Architecture and Composition -/- Abstract. Concepts are essential constituents of thought: they are the instruments we use to categorize our experience, i.e. to classify things and group them together in homogeneous sets. Here we define concepts as the internal mental information (representations) that allows us, among other things, to master words in natural language. By analyzing the way in which individuals master word meanings we explore a number of hypotheses regarding the nature of concepts. Following Diego Marconi’s research, we differentiate between two kind of abilities that underpin lexical competence – so-called ‘referential’ and ‘inferential competence’ – and we suggest that, in order to support these abilities, concepts must also include two corresponding kinds of information, i.e. inferential and referential information. We point out that the most widely used and acknowledged theories of concepts do not make this distinction, instead broadly characterizing the information used for categorization in terms of propositionally described feature lists. However, we show that while feature lists can explain inferential competence, they do not account for referential competence. To address the issue of referential competence we examine Ray Jackendoff’s hypothesis that to account for the possibility of linking perceptual and conceptual information we need to assume the existence of a (visual) representation that encodes the geometric and topological properties of objects and bridges the gap between the percept and the concept. Furthermore, we analyze the extension of this work by Jesse Prinz who introduced the notion of a proxytype, a perceptual representation of a class of objects that incorporates structural and parametric information related to their appearance. However, as we point out, proxytypes can only explain the relationship between perception and concepts with respect to instances that can be perceived through the senses and that belong to the same class by virtue of their physical similarity. We suggest that this notion be extended to include larger conceptual classes. To accomplish this, we further develop Mark Johnson, George Lakoff and Jean Mandler’s idea of a schematic image and argue that conceptual representations include a perceptual schema. Perceptual schemata are non-linguistic, structured experiential gestalts (patterns or maps) that make use of information taken from all sensory modalities, including body perception. They accomplish a quasi-conceptual function: they allow us to recognize and to classify different instances. In this work, we hypothesize that perceptual schemata are an essential component of concepts, but not identical to them. Instead, we suggest that concepts include both perceptual and propositional information with perceptual schemata providing the ‘perceptual core concept’ that grounds related propositional information. -/- Chapter 4 In the Beginning There Were Categories. The Bodily Origin of Prelinguistic Categorical Organization: The Example of Folkbiological Taxonomies -/- Abstract. Studies of categorization in psychology and the cognitive sciences have made use of the notions of ‘category’ and ‘concept’ without precisely defining what is meant by either; in fact, often these terms have been used as synonyms, making it difficult to address specific issues related to conceptual development. This chapter begins by discussing the definitions of, as well as the distinctions between, ‘categories’ and ‘concepts’ in the classical philosophical tradition (Aristotle, Kant and Husserl). We introduce our view of categories with reference to Husserl. Categorization is defined as the way in which our experience is originally (pre-linguistically) organized in a passive and fully unconscious manner on the basis of universal structuring principles. Conceptualization is explained as a later process in which the earlier categorical macro-classes are further subdivided into more specific and detailed sets; this later process also relies on linguistic learning and exposure to culture. On the basis of Ray Jackendoff, Jean Mandler, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s work, we hypothesize that categorization is a two-step process that begins with the formation of homogeneous sets of entities partitioned into regions that describe the ontological boundaries of the objects that humans perceive (categories) and continues at a later stage with the development of more specific classifications (concepts). In this chapter, we mainly address three related issues: Why should we assume that there is categorical organization which precedes the development of a conceptual system? How do categories and concepts relate to each other? Shall we hypothesize that categories are innate or that they are formed before concepts on the basis of information and organizational structure available at a very early developmental stage? We show that categorical partitions are necessary for categorization and, following Mandler, that the general categories we form at an early age do not match our adult superordinate concepts. As for the third issue, we argue that there might be no need to assume that categories are innately present in the human mind, since their formation can be explained – at least in certain cases – by basic mechanisms that work on body (propriosensitive) information. This hypothesis will not be discussed in general, but in relation to a particularly relevant example of categorical partition, i.e. the folk-biological dichotomy between ANIMATE/INANIMATE. This is compared with other dichotomies that derive from it, but are not directly categorical such as LIVING/NON-LIVING and BIOLOGICAL/NON-BIOLOGICAL. -/- Chapter 5 Internal States: From Headache to Anger. Conceptualization and Semantic Mastery -/- Abstract. Here we ask if we can also apply the distinction between referential and inferential competence we introduced in Chapter 3 to words that do not refer to things that are perceived using the external senses, especially to words/concepts that denote bodily experiences (such as pain, thirst, hunger, etc.) or emotions. We introduce and discuss the hypothesis that – even though such words/concepts do not refer to intersubjectively identifiable entities in the external world – they do have a kind of referent that can be accessed via direct perception, more specifically ‘proprioception’, as we have defined it in terms of all propriosensitive information we can consciously access. In the first part of the chapter, we specifically consider terms denoting bodily experiences such as ‘pain’ or ‘hunger’ and argue that their referents are identified and classified from a first-personal point of view on the basis of four main characteristics: their specific intensity, their localization in the body, their co-occurrence with other signals and above all their specific qualitative sensations. Emotions are addressed in the second part of the chapter. We suggest that there is a continuity between bodily experiences and emotions. In particular, we argue for a perceptual theory of emotions in line with that proposed by James and Lange at the end of the 19th century and developed more recently by authors such as Damasio (see also chap. 2§5, §6). The hypothesis we put forward is that the referential information that supports the categorization of emotions and therefore also our mastery of terms referring to emotions consists in the perception (i.e. the ‘proprioception’) of those bodily states and changes in bodily states which constitute our emotional experience. In the context of this discussion we examine some objections to this line of reasoning that arise from a cognitivist perspective and following authors such as Oatley, Johnson-Laird and Frijda, we distinguish between basic emotions that can be identified and classified solely on the basis on how they feel and complex emotions whose identification and classification additionally depends on cognitive factors. To describe how emotions are identified and classified on the basis of how they feel, we rely on Marcel and Lambie’s distinction between an ‘emotion state’ and an ‘emotion experience’. Both notions indicate kinds of feelings that we consciously experience. However, they describe first-order and second order emotion awareness respectively. The emotion state is the feeling we have of the bodily states and changes that occur when we are experiencing an emotion, while the emotion experience is the fully developed and integrated emotion we both experience and are, with reflection, aware of experiencing. On the basis of this differentiation, we also show that the same characteristics that aid in the identification and classification of bodily experiences (specific qualitative sensations; somatic localization; specific intensity; presence/absence of specific concomitant sensations) can also be used for the identification and classification of emotions – at least basic emotions. In the last two sections of the chapter we present some clinical evidence on the semantic competence of people who suffer from Alexithymia and Autism Spectrum Disorder which supports the conclusions of our preceding analyses. -/- Chapter 6 The ‘Proprioceptive’ Component of Abstract Concepts -/- Abstract. In this chapter, we address the issue of whether the mastery of abstract words requires only inferential knowledge and thus, if the concepts that support the mastery of abstract words include only linguistic information. We start by differentiating the notions of ‘abstract’ and ‘general’ which are often erroneously confused. We then identify a strict definition of abstract, as contrasted with ‘concrete’, that applies to words or concepts whose referent cannot be experienced by the senses. We argue that abstract words/concepts would be better described as theoretical, because they are usually conceived as structured sets of inferential knowledge expressed linguistically; that is, as small theories. Pointing out parallels with Carnap’s analysis of this issue in philosophy of science, we hypothesize that words/concepts denoting non-observable entities are not all ‘equally theoretical’, because their link to sensory experience can be stronger or weaker. We revive the distinction, inspired by Quine, between theoretical and intertheoretical concepts/words. This distinction relies on the fact that the former – unlike the latter – retains a strong, although indirect, connection with perception. In Quine’s discussion, perception is understood uniquely in terms of observability, i.e. of external sensory experience. Here we argue, however, that bodily, ‘proprioceptive’ (i.e. propriosensitive) experience can also serve to referentially ground theoretical (i.e. abstract) concepts/words. We frame this issue using the example of the theoretical concept ‘freedom’ and Lakoff’s hypothesis that this concept is developed on the basis of bodily information. We contrast this with the example of ‘democracy’ which more closely resembles an intertheoretical concept/word. Furthermore, we show that one of the classical views put forward in psycholinguistic research to explain how abstract concepts are mentally represented – i.e. Paivio’s Dual Coding Theory – points in the same direction as our analysis. The same is true of Barsalou’s work suggesting that we use internal information to understand at least some abstract words. To sustain this position, we put forward two lines of evidence: the first comes from psycholinguistic studies while the second examines deficits of semantic competence exhibited by people with Autism Spectrum Disorder. On the basis of our analysis, we put forward a classification that distinguishes between different kinds of concreteness and different degrees of abstraction: concepts/words referring to body experiences and basic emotions are described as analogous to concrete concepts/words because they are grounded in perceptual (i.e. propriosensitive) experience, while abstract concepts/words are considered more or less abstract depending on whether they are intratheoretical (and rely entirely on inferential information) or theoretical (and are partially grounded in perceptual – or more often in propriosensitive perceptual – information). In the last section of the chapter we consider two scales that have been used in psycholinguistic research to measure the degree of concreteness vs. abstractness of words and we show that – used conjointly – they can provide a measure of the internal vs. external grounding of specific words. (shrink)

The article devoted to the analysis of theoretical and conceptual developments of the Russian Social Democrats in the emigrant period. The authors note that the concept of democratic socialism, which began to be formed in 1917, was considerably amended and deepened when the Mensheviks created a new party program developed in 1922-1924. The significance of this program of the RSDLP is practically not evaluated in the science literature. In the analysis of Soviet historiography, the authors of the article outlined (...) the lack of attention to the projects of the Mensheviks in emigration, as the researchers insisted on the collapse of the RSDLP in post-October period. Some of modern researchers are highly skeptical about the intellectual developments of the Russian Social Democrats after the events of October 1917. However, the authors identified a number of innovative elements in the projects of the Mensheviks in this time. The new party program is an original stage in the formation of the concept of post-revolutionary development of Russia. In the course of the inner-party discussion, the differences in assessing the degree of Russia’s readiness for socialist transformation, as well as the Bolshevik experiment with various internal political trends, were sharply denoted. The article analyzes the positions of representatives of the official Mensheviks and the right wing of the party. The authors acknowledge the significant transformation of the political attitudes of the Mensheviks, pointing to some delusional and utopian nature of a number of program theses. (shrink)

This paper argues that there are two importantly distinct normative relations that can be referred to using phrases like ‘X is obligated to Y,’ ‘Y has a right against X,’ or ‘X wronged Y.’ When we say that I am obligated to you not to read your diary, one thing we might mean is that I am subject to a deontological constraint against reading your diary that gives me a non-instrumental, agent-relative reason not to do so, and which you are (...) typically in a unique position to waive with consent. I call this first relation the constraint relation. A second thing we might mean is that you are in a position to fittingly hold me personally accountable for reading your diary by demanding that I not read your diary, resenting me if I do so without excuse, and deciding whether to forgive me for this afterwards. I call this second relation the accountability relation. Though these two kinds of directed obligation often coincide, I argue that they are extensionally dissociable and play different normative roles. We cannot provide an adequate theory of ‘obligation to’ until we recognize that this phrase denotes not one relation, but two. (shrink)

We introduce the notions of syntactic synonymy and referential syn- onymy due to Moschovakis. Those notions are capable of accounting for fine- grained aspects of the meaning of linguistic expressions, by formalizing the Fregean distinction between sense and denotation. We integrate Moschovakis’s theory with the theory of concepts developed in the foundational ontology DOLCE, in order to enable a formal treatment of equivalence between concepts.

The article offers an analysis of the concept of the Absolute in Fichte’s philosophy. Despite the difficulty of the definition, this concept receives a rich and creative rethinking in Fichte and will further influence the philosophical systems of thought. Gradually introducing this concept into his philosophical project of Wissenschaftslehre Fichte often changes its interpretation. So, starting with a somewhat vague understanding of the concept of the "absolute I" through Schelling's criticism of the Absolute, he develops the (...) theory of the manifestation of the Absolute, each time choosing new metaphors to denote it, and sometimes filling it with religious content, when the Absolute becomes a substitute for the concept of God. On the one hand, it’s important not to reduce the Absolute to a simple object of thought because this would indicate the limitation of the Absolute. On the other hand, it would be wrong to consider the Absolute as an empty or neutral concept or something completely enclosed in itself. Then, its existence will be doubtful. Fichte is careful about a clear definition of the Absolute. He solves this dilemma through the idea of the manifestation of the Absolute. Manifestation is the exit of the Absolute beyond itself while remaining unchanged. The ability to manifest itself is a prerequisite that the Absolute can be recognized and thought. This is how the Absolute manifests itself in the form of knowledge. Fichte emphasizes that the Absolute is not a projection of our mind, it may not depend on our thinking, however with such peculiarity that truth and knowledge have their basis in it. Thereby, with the theory of the Absolute, Fichte develops the idea of the foundation that is outside of ourselves, has transcendental character, and thus allows knowledge or truth not to be trapped in subjective tenets. Analyzing step by step the process of evolution of this concept, we will be able to see how in the last years of his life, Fichte states the importance of two realities: the “I” and the “Absolute” and how he explains the connection between them. (shrink)

In this chapter, Ricardo Silvestre and Alan Herbert offer a reconstruction of the Gītā’s concept of God with a focus on the relationship between God and the world. They try to explain the claim that the Gītā is panentheistic. This is done with the help of some key notions of contemporary metaphysics (such as ontological dependence and fundamentality) along with the Indic notion of prakṛti, considered as a metaphysical primitive denoting the intimate relationship that exists between matter and (...) conscious living beings on the one hand, and God on the other. (shrink)

The article builds on a recent literature that has sought to underscore the relevance of Bourdieu’s field theory for historical-sociological analysis. It draws attention to symbolic revolutions, a concept that has been given short shrift in this literature and even in Bourdieu’s own expositions of his field-theoretical apparatus. The article argues that symbolic revolutions denote a universal mechanism of field-internal change which extends and complements a conceptual battery of mostly structural universals of fields. In a synoptic reading of Bourdieu’s (...) field-theoretical work, the article fleshes out an ideal type of symbolic revolutions, with special regard to its dialectical features. It adds further analytical purchase to the concept by highlighting continuities and parallels with the work of Thomas Kuhn and Karl Mannheim. Finally, it argues that more recent studies by other authors on transformations in the psychiatric field, the field of social and human sciences, and the political field are in fact discussing instances of symbolic revolutions. It thus shows how the concept can help identify common properties among highly heterogeneous phenomena, opening up new avenues for historical-sociological investigations that can more systematically relate the general and the particular. (shrink)