In this text, Georges Didi-Huberman responds, in letter-form, to the critical reflections about his work formulated by Jacques Rancière in “Images Re-read: Georges Didi-Huberman’s Method.” Didi-Huberman disagrees with Rancière’s analysis that images are “passive” and that the words which accompany them are “active.” Instead, he agrees with Merleau-Ponty’s view, which postulates that any analysis of images that seeks to disentangle its elements will render the image unintelligible. In opposition to Rancière’s presentation of his work, Didi-Huberman argues that (...) his method is one of tracing the mutually entangled implications of images. Furthermore, Didi-Huberman challenges Rancière to articulate what exactly “the sensible” means when he uses the phrase “distribution of the sensible.” While Rancière distrusts the reliance on pathos and emotions when it comes to analysing images, Didi-Huberman argues that “the sensible” will always involve the body with all its pathos, emotions and gestures. (shrink)

This essay describes and illustrates the role that (verbal) pictures in general can play in the search for knowledge. Focusing on myth as a particular kind of verbal image, this essay examines the new form of myth that Plato creates and defines, and the role that this new form of myth can play in a philosophical logos.

Where Benjamin attempts an account of social and attention practices surrounding the artwork, Adorno accuses him of not being dialectical enough and of inadequately theorizing the artwork's autonomy.2 Adorno makes the same accusation in those places where Benjamin attempts to disrupt historicism with the "dialectical image." Although Adorno appears to offer the same criticism in both instances, I maintain that Adorno's blanket prescription for more dialectics covers over a chiastic relationship between his reactions in each case. That is, (...) the worries that inform Adorno's reaction to Benjamin's portrayal of the artwork are quite the opposite of the worries that inform his reaction to Benjamin's portrayal of the .. (shrink)

Using the form of cinematic montage, this essay explores the nature of historical consciousness in a mass-mediated culture where historical discourse takes the form of both showing and saying, moving images and written words. The title draws upon and argues with Roland Barthes's critique of the duplicity of the "insistent fringes" that supposedly reduce and naturalize "Roman-ness" to fringed hair in popular historical film. Barthes presumes a "certainty" in such a cinematic image, and hence deems it mythological-that is, "it (...) goes without saying." Countering Barthes with Walter Benjamin, one might argue that the "insistent fringe" is insistently historical and constitutes, in its insistence, a "dialectical image": a site and sight full of contradictions and open to excavation. That is, it concretizes historiographic saying by showing. Neither historiographic saying nor showing are privileged in medias res-in a culture saturated in images and textuality, in competing modes of expression each of which has its limits. Historical consciousness is sparked and constituted from both showing and saying. Indeed, the "insistent fringe" is precisely not clear-cut-and, if it insists on anything, it is its serrated nature, its articulation as a limit that differs from, but is constituted by, the elements of the two distinct domains which it both separates and connects. Similarly, there is a dynamic, functional, and hardly clear-cut relation that exists between the mythological histories wrought by Hollywood cinema and the academic histories written by scholars. They co-exist, compete, and cooperate in a contingent, heteroglossic, and always shifting ratio-thus constituting the "rationality" of contemporary historical consciousness. (shrink)

In this text, Jacques Rancière critically discusses the work of Georges Didi-Huberman on images. He disagrees with various claims seemingly made by Didi-Huberman about images, such as that they can “take position” or that they are “active.” Rancière argues that Didi-Huberman adds another form of dialectics to the simpler form of dialectics adopted by Bertolt Brecht and Harun Farocki in their works, namely one that also involves a layering of different temporalities. However, both in Brecht’s War Primer and (...) in Didi-Huberman’s analysis of it, all the potencies credited to images as such are actually potencies of the words that accompany the images. Rancière comes to the conclusion that to “put images in motion,” as Didi-Huberman wants to do, or to regard them as being “active,” he has to put words, his own poetic and extensive writings, in motion. (shrink)

The paper presents a contra-classical dialectic logic, inspired and motivated by Hegel s dialectics. Its axiom schemes are 0.1 Thus, in a sense, this dialectic logic is a kind of “mirror image“ of connexive logic. The informal interpretation of ‘ $$\rightarrow $$ ’ emerging from the above four axiom schemes is not of a conditional (or implication); rather, it is the relation of determination in the presence of truth-value gaps: $$\varphi \rightarrow \psi $$ is read as $$\varphi $$ determines $$\psi (...) $$, namely, necessarily, if $$\varphi $$ is true, then $$\psi $$ is either true or false, not gappy. As far as I know, such a connective has not been considered before in the literature. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Dialectic and Dialogue: Plato's Practice of Philosophical Inquiry (SPEP Studies in Historical Philosophy)Rosamond Kent SpragueFrancisco J. Gonzalez. Dialectic and Dialogue: Plato's Practice of Philosophical Inquiry (SPEP Studies in Historical Philosophy). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1998. Pp. 418. Paper, $29.95.What this rich and independent-minded book asks us to do is to give serious consideration to the question, "What, in Plato's view, are we doing when we philosophize?" (1) (...) If we employ our own conceptions of philosophy as the models for formulating and discussing specific Platonic questions, we may be imposing upon him ways of thinking that are foreign to his thought. To do this is particularly distorting in the case of dialectic.Gonzalez has chosen to confine himself to the early and middle dialogues, so that his book is a direct challenge to the work of Richard Robinson. Of the important views that have more recently arisen, Gonzalez allies himself most nearly with the non-doctrinal approach, but not to the extent of embracing scepticism. There is much philosophical knowledge in the dialogues, but such knowledge is primarily non-propositional. As for the esotericist and the developmentalist, both are misguided in proceeding on the assumption that Plato is attempting to formulate definitions and to arrive at a systematic philosophy; they regard the dialogues as treatises, which they are not. As Gonzalez quite justly inquires, "can there be any form of writing less suited to presenting a systematic philosophy than Plato's dramatic dialogues?" (4)In contrast to Robinson, who relies on the analysis of passages taken out of context, Gonzalez focusses mainly on whole dialogues, taking them to be dramatic portrayals of dialectic at work. He begins with detailed studies of the Laches and Charmides. In both cases, Socrates starts with ordinary knowledge (in the persons of the title characters), but "clearly intends to transcend it" (20). Neither will he accept "the 'sophistic' understanding that attempts to substitute definitions for this experience" (21) on the part of Nicias and Critias. The knowledge sought by Socrates by means of the dialectical method is shown to thave three characteristics: it is "knowledge how," it is "self-knowledge," and it is "non-propositional" (61).The next chapters consider three presuppositions of Plato's dialectic: words (in the Cratylus), arguments (in the Euthydemus), and images (in Republic X). All three are necessary to the dialectical enterprise, but, like ordinary knowledge in the aporetic dialogues, are transcended.Gonzalez' confrontation with Robinson naturally requires that he address the topic [End Page 113] of the method of hypothesis in the Meno, Phaedo, and Republic. This is a method that does yield propositional results, but it remains at the level of poion ti and fails to provide similar knowledge of the ti. Gonzalez' interpretation of the divided line is of particular interest here: as he sees it, dialectic is not intended as simply an extension continuous with the method of hypothesis. To take it this way is, with Robinson, to collapse dialectic into mathematics, making the former as deductive as the latter. The good (which "is not for Plato an exclusively moral term" 216) is "already there before the inquiry as the ground of its possibility" (236); this is what "unhypothesized" means. The movement of thought is circular, but not with a vicious circularity; "reflexivity" is the term preferred.To my mind the most rewarding and most convincing section of the book is the concluding chapter on the philosophical digression in the Seventh Letter. (The issue of authenticity is not significant, since, if the Letter is a forgery, "this forger had a better understanding of Plato than many other scholars, both ancient and contemporary" (246). Although "the subject of this wisdom simply cannot be expressed in words" (252) (and here Gonzalez emphasizes that Plato means spoken as much as written words), there is no contradiction in being able to talk or write about it. If "our only means of attaining true knowledge of a thing have the defect of being unable to express this nature" (263), Plato suggests an up and down movement which transcends this defect. The nature of this movement he describes as tribein, a process... (shrink)

Russell Berman has written a fascinating book about space and alterity in colonial discourse. The book has a Eurocentric focus: the time and world Berman discusses were Eurocentric. So, too, was the Enlightenment, and Berman explicates the encounter between European voyagers and non-European peoples in terms of the “dialectic of enlightenment.” As a device, this works well. It allows a unity of focus in an otherwise varied assortment of topics. As he writes, his book is “neither a history of German (...) colonialism nor an intellectual history of images of non-Europeans in German literature,” but a look at “some specific cases…. (shrink)

This article focuses on the interpretative complexities encountered in the work of Lidwien van de Ven. First, it aims to map out the always porous nature of the relationships between aesthetics, politics and religion that make up her palimpsest-like images. Second, it aims to tease out a three-part analytics of photography. Third, it attempts to flesh out a difficult notion of spectacle that is inherent to her wide-ranging practice, and which distinguishes her project from liberal photojournalism with its obeisance (...) to identity politics and its weak notion of ethics. Finally, it aims to isolate, within the dialectical machinery of spectacle that is so often put to work by western democracies, a pragmatic moment in our encounter with her photographs that has real political purchase. With a variable notion of close reading at the crux of the operation, the article probes the efficacy of this moment so akin to philosophical aesthetics. (shrink)

In this text, Jacques Rancière critically discusses the work of Georges Didi-Huberman on images. He disagrees with various claims seemingly made by Didi-Huberman about images, such as that they can “take position” or that they are “active.” Rancière argues that Didi-Huberman adds another form of dialectics to the simpler form of dialectics adopted by Bertolt Brecht and Harun Farocki in their works, namely one that also involves a layering of different temporalities. However, both in Brecht’s War Primer and (...) in Didi-Huberman’s analysis of it, all the potencies credited to images as such are actually potencies of the words that accompany the images. Rancière comes to the conclusion that to “put images in motion,” as Didi-Huberman wants to do, or to regard them as being “active,” he has to put words, his own poetic and extensive writings, in motion. (shrink)

The author attempts at questioning Habermas’ and Honneth’s claim that the linguistic turn within Critical Theory of society represents a way out of the “dead end” of the first generation of Frankfurt School theorists, who were unable to formulate an action-theoretic understanding of social conflicts. By presenting a view that Adorno, in his “Negative dialectic”, develops an insight into a crucial characteristic of the conflict nature of modern societies, which eludes the lingustic-pragmatist Critical Theory, the author tries to defend and (...) reactualize Adorno’s perspective. The paper analyzes some key aspects of the original idea of Critical Theory, and the “negativistic turn” that Adorno and Horkheimer made with the writing of “Dialectic of Enlightenment”. Having considered the central arguments of the “Negative Dialectic”, the author presents his understanding of Adorno’s concept of social conflict, which is then being contrasted with Habermas’ understanding of social conflict, formulated in terms of a systemic colonization of the lifeworld. Pointing out the weaknesses of Habermas’ concept, the author aims at sharpening the image of the conflict nature of modern societies that Adorno sketches, concluding that his perspective is able to question the framework of intersubjectivity that Habermas and Honneth take for granted. (shrink)

THE PURPOSE OF THE ARTICLE IS TO SHOW THAT AESTHETIC\nENJOYMENT IS THE FEELING OR EXPERIENCE OF THE FREE LIFE OF\nCONSCIOUSNESS. GENERALLY, CONSCIOUSNESS ACCOMPANIES OUR\nPSYCHIC ACTIVITIES ONLY AS A WITNESS, WHILE IN THE\nCONTEMPLATIVE ATTITUDE IT AFFIRMS ITSELF INDEPENDENTLY; BUT\nINSOFAR AS IT LIMITS ITSELF TO PERCEPTION, CONSCIOUSNESS\nONLY REFLECTS THE REAL. PSYCHIC DISTANCE IS THE FIRST STEP\nTOWARD ITS INDEPENDENT LIFE, BUT IT IS YET FREEDOM FROM,\nNOT NECESSARILY FREEDOM TO. IT IS ONLY WHEN THE ARTIST\nBEGINS TO MASTER IMAGES WITH THE AIM TO CREATE (...) THAT\nCONSCIOUSNESS DYNAMISES ITSELF INTO AUTONOMOUS ACTIVITY.\nTHE AUTHOR EMPLOYS THE DIALECTIC METHOD IN ORDER TO PROVE\nTHAT THE MULTIPLE OPPOSITIONS IN AESTHETICAL THEORIES FIND\nTHEIR SYNTHESIS IN HIS INTERPRETATION. (shrink)

In this book, David McNeill illuminates Plato’s distinctive approach to philosophy by examining how his literary portrayal of Socrates manifests an essential interdependence between philosophic and ethical inquiry. In particular, McNeill demonstrates how Socrates’s confrontation with profound ethical questions about his public philosophic activity is the key to understanding the distinctively mimetic, dialogic, and reflexive character of Socratic philosophy. Taking a cue from Nietzsche’s account of “the problem of Socrates,” McNeill shows how the questions Nietzsche raises are questions that, in (...) Plato's depiction, Socrates was aware of and responded to. McNeill also shows how the Republic provides a view of Socratic moral psychology that resembles Nietzsche’s account of human psychology: it deals with the internalized ethical narratives and justificatory schemes through which human beings orient themselves to their world. McNeill argues that this moral psychology not only determines Socrates’s explicit account of different character types and political regimes but also crucially informs his dialectical engagements with his various interlocutors in the dialogues. In addition to contributing a unique perspective to current debates about Socrates’s philosophic methods and the significance of the literary character of Plato’s dialogues, the book offers a far-reaching interpretation of Plato’s presentation of the theoretical and practical activities of the fifth-century Sophists. And in showing how Plato responds to “modern” theoretical challenges, McNeill provides new evidence to question standard views of the differences between ancient and modern conceptions of the self, society, and nature. (shrink)

This article examines Gilles Deleuze’s 1986 letter to French film critic Serge Daney about cinema, television, and images in control societies through a Benjaminian lens. While neither Deleuze nor Daney deeply engage with Walter Benjamin’s thought, I argue that the ideas or dialectical images constructed by the German thinker are crucial to better understand Deleuze’s and Daney’s thoughts regarding the threatened death of modern cinema in the 1980s because of the predominance of television as a control apparatus. (...) In the first part of the article, I analyze the aesthetical and political meaning of the concept of history as/of perception. I also show affinities between Benjamin’s and Deleuze’s works through their connection to art historian Aloïs Riegl. In the sec- ond part, I demonstrate how Deleuze’s and Daney’s reflections about mannerism as a weapon against the rise of clichés and the ideology of the visible in control societies must be supplemented by Benjamin’s concept of “construction”. In conclusion, I draw on Benjamin’s discussion of politics as a body space to advocate for desiring mannerisms to fight control apparatuses and the reign of clichés. (shrink)

‘The Image of Thought’ could be considered to be the most important piece of writing in the entire Deleuzian corpus. This is the chapter of Difference and Repetition that several decades later, Deleuze claims is the ‘most necessary and the most concrete’ (Deleuze 1994: xvii) section of the book, and the one that provides a basis for his later work with Guattari. Here, Deleuze engages with two basic issues. First, he separates out his conception of thinking, and with it, philosophy, (...) from prior philosophical approaches, explaining why the difference of his philosophy from prior systems itself differs from the traditional relationship between philosophical positions. Second, he raises the question of how one should begin to philosophise. As we will see, philosophy often operates by the recognition of implicit presuppositions in prior thinkers, and their refutation. Descartes, for instance, criticises Aristotle for presupposing the transparency of categories such as rational and animal. Kant, in turn, criticises Descartes for presupposing the determinability of his own foundational moment, the cogito. If we see the development of philosophy as the unmasking and critique of presuppositions of prior systems, then the endpoint of philosophy will be a system entirely without presuppositions. This is the goal Hegel aims at with his system of absolute idealism. Deleuze’s claim is that such a model of the progress of philosophy itself operates within one overarching assumption: the good will of thinking. In this essay, I want to relate these questions of thinking and beginnings to the work of one of Deleuze’s predecessors. Deleuze writes of Ludwig Feuerbach that ‘Feuerbach is among those who have pursued farthest the problem of where to begin.’ (Deleuze 1994: 319) As we shall see, prefiguring Deleuze, Feuerbach accuses Hegel of operating within ‘an image of Reason’. While Feuerbach is famous as a precursor of Marx, and for his critique of traditional accounts of religion, I want to here focus on an early piece by Feuerbach, his Critique of Hegelian Philosophy. Here Feuerbach sets out the limitations of traditional philosophical accounts, and provides the groundwork for his own later materialism. Deleuze discovered Feuerbach through his friend Althusser’s translation of his work, published in 1960. While many of the intuitions behind Deleuze’s critique of the image of thought can be found within a broader pantheon of thinkers, including Nietzsche, Bergson, and Foucault, the specific mechanics of Deleuze’s criticism bear a striking resemblance to the formulation of the critique of philosophy in Feuerbach’s earlier thought. I want to explore this connection, first by looking at the dialectical interrelation of two thinkers, Descartes and Hegel, to get a sense for how criticism in philosophy typically operates. I then want to move on to look at Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel and philosophy more generally, drawing out several aspects that will be taken up by Deleuze himself. I will then look at some of the ways in which Deleuze goes beyond Feuerbach by recognising some of the limitations that persist in Feuerbach’s own analysis. I will conclude by showing how Deleuze’s desire to think the two common acceptations of aesthetics together (the artistic and the sensible) bring Feuerbach into relation with an unexpected figure: the playwright and poet, Antonin Artaud. (shrink)

The theory of language that underlies Plotinus’ Enneads is considered in relation to his broader metaphysical vision. For Plotinus, language is neither univocal nor equivocal, but is something in-between, incapable of precisely describing reality, but nonetheless not completely useless. Propositional knowledge expressed discursively represents an imperfect shadow of reality which is defective in relation to the pure apprehension of Intellect. Passages in Plotinus which relate language to the sensible world are examined and it is argued that, although it plays a (...) useful role in relating the sensible world to Intellect, discursive reason is nonetheless intrinsically inferior to both as a mode of representation. Plotinus holds that the inadequacy of language is “global” in character; language cannot describe any aspect of reality precisely, from the mundane to the transcendent. Language as a whole is an inferior image or imitation of the world as a whole. Therefore, the flaws in our linguistic representations cannot all be untangled or conceptually unpacked by means of language. There are passages in the Enneads which hint at an underlying semantic holism. Plotinus’ theory implies that apparent verbal contradictions which occur in different contexts might nonetheless still represent the optimal linguistic description of a reality that strictly speaking is ineffable. Therefore, discursive logical deduction is not always reliable, and needs to be subordinated to a vision of Intellect. True philosophical reasoning (dialectic) represents ostension towards the transcendent. Those who are sufficiently liberated to attain to an apprehension of the Forms, thereby come to inhabit the same “higher world”, involving a shared mystical intersubjectivity, which can be expressed linguistically, but only in an approximate manner. Plotinus’ theory presents a potential way out of the nihilistic impasse into which contemporary philosophy has arguably become enmeshed. (shrink)

How, according to the folk-tradition, do the Walloons see the Flemish population? An analysis of a stereotype is attempted here, considering the importance of stock-phrases and tags with regard to relations between populations. For an historian, the study of the folk-tradition sets a lot of problems concerning the research and the critical use of a complex documentation : oral tradition, French and dialect al literature, newspapers, etc. With such a documentation, we are able to describe some «patterns» of Flemings : (...) the pedlar, the play-character, the militant Fleming, the farmer, the agricultural labourer and the worker. These portraits generally emphasize the dull-witted and rough appearance of the Fleming. The rise of these ideas, at a some time, among the Walloon population appears resulting from the social and cultural position of a great deal of the Flemish immigrants into the Walloon area. (shrink)

Channeling affinities with certain motifs of Daoism, Walter Benjamin renews a form of dialectical thought that diffuses ideological notions of progress and grants minimal weight to the ontological distinction of the Subject. In fleeting yet pivotal moments of contact with Chinese aesthetics, Benjamin moves attention toward the practice of ‘thinking by way of resemblance’ – a phenomenon he variously enacts. Calling forth resonances within late-capitalist modernity, he retrieves from Daoist literature a notion of dialectical reversal freed from progressive (...) synthesis, as well as image-repertoires of self-forgetting, which he understands to be irreducible to reification. The Daoist imaginary offers Benjamin resources for breaking open the anthropocentric closure of Hellenic accounts of mimesis. He theorizes similitude more capaciously as something that can flash up across temporally discontinuous phenomena – without deferring to predetermined categories of Being. Benjamin thus recasts resemblance – regarded by Enlightenment rationality as an impoverished mode of cognition – as a medium of historical apprehension that resists the occlusion of transience by the ontology of the victors. (shrink)

This essay analyses Hegel’s use of the metaphor of «the cross and the rose», not only in the Preface to the Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, which all major interpretations refer to, but also in two other texts: Wer denkt abstrakt? of 1807 and the 1829 review of Schubart's and Garganico’s Über Philosophie überhaupt... In Wer denkt abstrakt? Hegel criticizes a sentimental, as equivalent to a «non concrete», interpretation of the figure; in the Preface he claims that «reason is the (...) rose in the cross of the present», assimilating the image to a platonic idea of State; in the review of 1829 he criticizes a naïve interpretation of the figure. In the light of these observations, it is possible to conclude that Hegel sees the figure as the specific image of the relation of the platonic and the critical element, typical of dialectical rationality. The Hegelian use of the figure thus results, in this perspective, by far more subtle than the one envisaged by its “political” interpretations. (shrink)

This short study attempts to demonstrate the importance for Rabelais's thought and art of the "Platonic-Hermetic" current in antique and Renaissance intellectual history. The demonstration is weakened by the author's failure to sketch a history of this tradition, and one is left to gather from intermittent allusions and from footnotes whom he considers its principle spokesmen and what he considers its main tenets and spokesmen to be. According to Masters, Rabelais's writing is grounded in a Platonic dialectic which plays with (...) the tensions between reality and appearance, intellect and matter, soul and body, God and man. The presence of the divine in human affairs is manifested by such images as the androgyne and the pantagruelion. The recurrent Rabelaisian image of drinking can be understood on several levels. In its most literal sense, it points to the pleasure of festive conviviality. At a higher level, it involves the enlightened exchange of ideas, and at the highest, evoked in the episode of the Dive Bouteille, drinking suggests the acquisition of self-knowledge and, with self-knowledge, all other knowledge proper to the human mind. The Hermetic sciences can lead man in three directions: downward to the black arts; outward toward a salutary investigation of the world; or finally upward to an "intuitive dialectic" and a mystical union with the godhead. Although Masters' interpretations of specific images and episodes sometimes lack tact, his erudition should enhance the book's interest both for intellectual historians and Rabelaisian specialists.--T. M. G. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 42.2 (2004) 220-221 [Access article in PDF] Clyde Lee Miller. Reading Cusanus: Metaphor and Dialectic in a Conjectural Universe. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2003. Pp. viii + 276. Cloth, $64.95. In an age where the idea of postmodernity gains more and more ground, the period of postmodern thinking has turned into a major challenge to the human mind. Whereas the (...) project of modernity revokes itself through the contradictions it has generated, the need to find new perspectives makes us wonder what happened in the 15th century when the Renaissance paved the way to modernity and still contained seeds of alternative developments which for one reason or another did not get a chance to germinate. This is an invitation to concentrate on the work of Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) as one of the major Renaissance thinkers.Miller's book is an attempt to promote the understanding of Cusanus by a close reading of six of the major works of this author. In reading these works he focuses on Cusan thought both as this thought presents itself in these works, and as it appears against the background of traditional philosophy, especially when seen in the light of the Neoplatonic tradition.The works in question are the books On Learned Ignorance (De docta ignorantia) and On Conjectures (De coniecturis), aptly presented under the title: "Envisiong the Whole," and "Conjecturing Oneness and Otherness" respectively. The remaining four works concern the The Layman: About Mind (Idiota de mente) in which Cusanus develops his understanding of the mind and of intellectual authenticity; The Vision of God (De visione Dei), a treatise on mystical theology and an invitation to enter the divine mystery through a combination of prayer and reflection; On the Not Other (De non aliud), a highly speculative work on divine immanence and transcendence; and The Hunt for Wisdom (De venatione sapientiae) in which Cusanus gives an account of his philosophy by connecting it with the metaphor of a hunt in ten different fields. [End Page 220]Miller begins his book with an Introduction in which he outlines his approach to Cusanus, taking the cue from Plato's image of the divided line with its emphasis on the dialectical distinction between noesis (intellect) and dianoia (reason), and from the dialogue On the Hidden God (De Deo abscondito), a brief discussion between a Heathen and a Christian in which Cusanus connects the theme of learned ignorance with the act of adoration. The distinction between reason and intellect is important because the work of Cusanus is a continuous effort to cope with the meaning of distinctions and their impact on our ways of thinking. The reference to the dialogue is significant because this text clearly indicates that the quest for God is the central issue in the thought of Cusanus, and that the notion of ignorance is actually connected with the theoretical and practical meaning of God.In his discussion of the six works Miller follows the text of Cusanus which he presents in the form of argumentative summaries and complementary reflections. His presentation is lucid and to the point. In his reflections on the text and context of Cusan thought he gives valuable insights into the historical position of Cusanus and the manner in which Nicholas appropriated and transformed traditional ways of thinking. At the same time Miller keeps track of the reception of Cusanus by contemporary scholarship and the various interpretations it has to offer.The book ends with a "reprise" of the previous chapters which provides "an overall perspective on Nicholas' thought and its main themes and proposals" (241). The central elements of this perspective are "the metaphysics of the Infinite and the finite" (242) and the doctrine of perspectival relations as it has been developed in De coniecturis. What connects them with one another finds expression in the distinction (and transition) between explanatory and exploratory metaphors (252); that is, between metaphors such as "image-exemplar" and "unfolding-enfolding," which provide explanatory structures for the interpretation of reality, and metaphors such... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 42.2 (2004) 220-221 [Access article in PDF] Clyde Lee Miller. Reading Cusanus: Metaphor and Dialectic in a Conjectural Universe. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2003. Pp. viii + 276. Cloth, $64.95. In an age where the idea of postmodernity gains more and more ground, the period of postmodern thinking has turned into a major challenge to the human mind. Whereas the (...) project of modernity revokes itself through the contradictions it has generated, the need to find new perspectives makes us wonder what happened in the 15th century when the Renaissance paved the way to modernity and still contained seeds of alternative developments which for one reason or another did not get a chance to germinate. This is an invitation to concentrate on the work of Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) as one of the major Renaissance thinkers.Miller's book is an attempt to promote the understanding of Cusanus by a close reading of six of the major works of this author. In reading these works he focuses on Cusan thought both as this thought presents itself in these works, and as it appears against the background of traditional philosophy, especially when seen in the light of the Neoplatonic tradition.The works in question are the books On Learned Ignorance (De docta ignorantia) and On Conjectures (De coniecturis), aptly presented under the title: "Envisiong the Whole," and "Conjecturing Oneness and Otherness" respectively. The remaining four works concern the The Layman: About Mind (Idiota de mente) in which Cusanus develops his understanding of the mind and of intellectual authenticity; The Vision of God (De visione Dei), a treatise on mystical theology and an invitation to enter the divine mystery through a combination of prayer and reflection; On the Not Other (De non aliud), a highly speculative work on divine immanence and transcendence; and The Hunt for Wisdom (De venatione sapientiae) in which Cusanus gives an account of his philosophy by connecting it with the metaphor of a hunt in ten different fields. [End Page 220]Miller begins his book with an Introduction in which he outlines his approach to Cusanus, taking the cue from Plato's image of the divided line with its emphasis on the dialectical distinction between noesis (intellect) and dianoia (reason), and from the dialogue On the Hidden God (De Deo abscondito), a brief discussion between a Heathen and a Christian in which Cusanus connects the theme of learned ignorance with the act of adoration. The distinction between reason and intellect is important because the work of Cusanus is a continuous effort to cope with the meaning of distinctions and their impact on our ways of thinking. The reference to the dialogue is significant because this text clearly indicates that the quest for God is the central issue in the thought of Cusanus, and that the notion of ignorance is actually connected with the theoretical and practical meaning of God.In his discussion of the six works Miller follows the text of Cusanus which he presents in the form of argumentative summaries and complementary reflections. His presentation is lucid and to the point. In his reflections on the text and context of Cusan thought he gives valuable insights into the historical position of Cusanus and the manner in which Nicholas appropriated and transformed traditional ways of thinking. At the same time Miller keeps track of the reception of Cusanus by contemporary scholarship and the various interpretations it has to offer.The book ends with a "reprise" of the previous chapters which provides "an overall perspective on Nicholas' thought and its main themes and proposals" (241). The central elements of this perspective are "the metaphysics of the Infinite and the finite" (242) and the doctrine of perspectival relations as it has been developed in De coniecturis. What connects them with one another finds expression in the distinction (and transition) between explanatory and exploratory metaphors (252); that is, between metaphors such as "image-exemplar" and "unfolding-enfolding," which provide explanatory structures for the interpretation of reality, and metaphors such... (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 7, Page 1035-1053, September 2022. The article aspires to cast light on aspects of the radical character of Walter Benjamin’s work, that, sadly, have not, to date, provoked much discussion in the literature on him. The main issue it elaborates is his dialectic between fetishized, reified social form, and content-essence, which forms the core of the concept of critique in his philosophy. In Benjamin’s case, the concept of illusion, or, as the notion is (...) described in his texts, of phantasmagoria, or of the image, holds a special gravity that comes to the fore if it is connected not only to commodity fetishism but also to the fetishism of social forms as a process, and the concept of cracks in capitalism. (shrink)

오늘날과 같은 영상 시대에는 다양한 통신 매체를 통해 시각적 이미지를 쉽고 다양하게 생산하며 전달하고 있다. 이러한 실정은 앞으로 시각적 이미지를 사용한 의사소통, 나아가서 논증활동이 눈에 띄게 증가할 것이라는 점을 충분히 예상할 수 있게 한다. 그러나 대부분의 논증론에서는 언어적인 것과 시각적인 것을 다르게 취급하고, 이미지로 전달되는 것을 논증활동의 영역에서 배제한다. 본 논문에서는 화용-대화론을 통해서 언어의 의미를 해석하는 방식과 동일한 방식으로 이미지의 의미를 해석할 수 있다는 것을 보이고자 한다. 이를 통해 이미지를 통한 논증이 기존의 논증론 내에서 충분히 다뤄질 수 있다는 것을 증명할 (...) 수 있다.BR 기존의 논증론들 가운데서 화용-대화론은 특히 시각 논증을 분석하는 데에 적합한데, 그 이유는 화용-대화론이 제시하는 의사소통의 원리와 함축적 그리고 간접적 화행에 대한 설명이 시각적 이미지에 쉽게 적용되어 그 의미를 설명해 낼 수 있기 때문이다.BR 그러나 시각 논증이 언어적 의미보다는 시각적 의미에 의존하기 때문에, 언어적인 논증활동에 초점을 맞추는 화용-대화론에서 의미를 귀속시키는 대상을 이미지로까지 확장할 필요가 있다. 그러나 이것이 논증활동을 다루는 화용-대화론의 근본 입장이나 설명에 어떤 변화를 일으키는 것은 아니다. 화용-대화론은 논증활동에 대한 기존의 이론적 관점을 유지하면서도 시각 논증을 해석하고 나아가서 시각 논증과 언어 논증의 관계를 설명할 수 있다. (shrink)

The present paper offers a narrative of the post-World War II development of Hungarian philosophy, and argues that it is characterized by a double, historical and anthropological orientation under Marx’s influence. The resulting amalgam is an intellectual history that looks beyond the ideas themselves, searching for underlying images of man which are represented as ideological backgrounds to theories of nature, society, cognition, etc. The most important works of this approach interpret ideas and anthropologies within a Marxist framework, and see (...) them as closely linked to the social–historical circumstances in which they develop; yet, these approaches represent an alternative attitude quite different from the official ideology of dialectical materialism. (shrink)

This book offers an interpretation of the work of Theodor Adorno. In contrast to the conventional view that Adorno's is in essence a critical philosophy, Yvonne Sherratt traces systematically a utopian thesis that pervades all the major aspects of Adorno's thought. She places Adorno's work in the context of German Idealist and later Marxist and Freudian traditions, and then analyses his key works to show how the aesthetic, epistemological, psychological, historical and sociological thought interconnect to form a utopian image. The (...) book will be eagerly sought out by students and specialists in philosophy, social and political theory, intellectual history, literary theory and cultural studies. (shrink)

This paper theorizes two dialectic moments in which art is situated. The hypothetical dialectic is based on Hal Foster’s explication of the relationship between the neo-avant-garde and the historical avant-garde which forms the thesis of his text The Return of the Real. This dialect is comprised of an initial moment that delineates the terms of our enunciative and perceptive condition followed by a second that “comprehends,” not completes, the first. I forward Slavoj Žižek’s notion of the stain to characterize this (...) first moment. By looking at the stain, we see the make-up of the whole field of symbolic relations attempting—but ultimately failing—seamlessly to incorporate it. I give Diane Arbus’s use of the stain as a subject as an illustration of this first moment. Further, I posit Žižek’s notion of the act as a method to redialecticize art stuck in this initial moment and made stagnant through cynicism. Acts are moments of absolute freedom, that “[temporarily suspend] the field of ideological meaning” (Enjoy Your Symptom 35). However, I qualify the act in art as a “spectre” of the real: “The Real which returns [as]… an image, a semblance, an ‘effect,’ which, at the same time, [delivers] ‘the thing itself’” (Welcome to the Desert of the Real 18). I use recent collage paintings by Albert Oehlen as illustrations to stage the latter part of my argument. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 40.4 (2006) 1-20 MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]"This-with-That": A Dialectical Approach to Teaching for Musical ImaginationEstelle R. JorgensenAmong the various approaches to music education, my dialectical and epistemological view offers a way of thinking about music and education and deciding how to go forward in teaching and learning music. 1 In this article I show how this particular philosophical perspective can play (...) out in teaching for the development of musical imagination in a particular musical piece, in particular, Johannes Brahms's Intermezzo, op. 118, no. 2. Three questions lie at the center of this analysis: What is meant by my dialectical approach? 2 How is musical imagination implicated, for example, in a performer's reading of this Intermezzo? How ought one to teach for the development of musical imagination?My response to the first of this trio of questions is predicated on my previous writing, most recently in Transforming Music Education and an essay, "Four Philosophical Models of the Relationship of Theory and Practice." 3 My response to the second applies Mary Reichling's model of images of imagination to a reflection on my approach to this Brahms Intermezzo—a piece I have played over a musical lifetime—with reference to a few of its more obvious features. 4 And my response to the third builds on my extension of Vernon Howard's analysis of learning in Transforming Music Education by drawing on Alfred North Whitehead's elegant model of teaching and learning formulated almost a century ago in his The Aims of Education and Other Essays, again with reference to the self-same piece. 5 In addressing these questions, I show how my dialectical approach can work practically and how the various tensions between aspects of imagination can play out in opposite, even paradoxical, modes of teaching for musical imagination. [End Page 1]What Is Meant by My Dialectical Approach?In choosing a "this-with-that" approach rather than a both/and synthesis or either/or approach to the choices between alternatives in music education, I recognize that in the phenomenal world, educational decisions (as with decisions in other areas of life) are often difficult to arrive at and problematic in their outcomes. I see dialectics as seepages and tensions that arise between alternatives viewed comparatively. 6 These alternatives are not always logically compatible, equally feasible, or easily reconcilable. Rather, resolutions are made on the basis of incomplete information, consequences that flow from decisions are often unexpected, some things are easier to meld than others, and constituent value judgments are sometimes dissonant, even impossible, to reconcile logically and practically. My interest is in describing the epistemological quandaries in which musician-teachers and their students sometimes find themselves practically speaking. I do not seek a "one-size-fits-all" approach because it is impossible to realize practically even if it could be shown to be desirable. Music instruction takes place in the phenomenal world—a world of sometimes messy or fuzzy categories in which the teacher's and student's interests often lie at the margins, where one thing seems to become another 7 —and I seek to describe my own approach to tackling the sorts of practical dilemmas in which I find myself as teacher and student. As such, I am preoccupied with the question, How does one decide what to do as a music teacher or learner?For me, the best angle from which to address this question has been from a dialectical perspective. I came to this position as I reflected on my experience as a music teacher. 8 Things in the phenomenal world were never as simple as the theoretical models upon which I drew supposed. I was often faced with choices, and these choices were sometimes easily made and sometimes not. This practical experience resonated with that of others on a similar journey. For example, I. A. Richards remarks that Socrates enjoyed the friendship of those who were able to see both the "one-and-the-many... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:ImagesSean P. Murphy (bio)[End Page 142] Click for larger view View full resolutionIMAGE: DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM, 2022 Acrylic paint on wood 8 x 8 x 1 inches[End Page 143] Click for larger view View full resolutionFORMALISM, 2022 Acrylic paint on wood 8 x 8 x 1 inches[End Page 3] Click for larger view View full resolutionNEW HISTORICISM, 2022 Acrylic paint on wood 8 x 8 x 1 inches[End Page (...) 89] Click for larger view View full resolutionDECONSTRUCTION, 2022 Acrylic paint on wood 8 x 8 x 1 inches[End Page 141]Sean P. Murphy Sean P. Murphy, PhD, MSN, PMHNPBC, is a Clinical Assistant Professor teaching in the University of Illinois Chicago's Psychiatric-Mental Health Nurse Practitioner doctoral program. He practices at university health and counseling centers, specializing in sexual and gender minority mental health, emerging adult populations, and trauma. Murphy holds a PhD in Literature, Cultural Theory, and Social Practice and was a tenured professor of English and Humanities prior to entering nursing. He uses visual art as a space to digest and metabolize emotions associated with clinical practice as well as to explore connections between the humanities, literary and critical theories, and science. Email: [email protected] © 2023 Cornell University... (shrink)

The global ecological crisis is upon us. From global warming to the long-term implications of ocean acidification, air and water pollution, deforestation, and the omnipresent dangers of nuclear technology the future of our planetary home is threatened. Yet in the midst of the unfolding crisis, the conventional ideologies of the twentieth century and their representations of nature remain unchallenged by both the defenders of capitalism and capitalism's most radical critics. The Distortion of Nature's Image illustrates how the anti-naturalism of late (...) capitalist society, in which nature is reified into the emptiness of mere matter, simply a thing to be dominated, is subtly complemented by the failure of the Left to go both beyond the historic limitations of Marx's ninteenth-century viewpoint and beyond anarchism's blind faith in "natural law." However, an alternative for comprehending nature and the ecological crisis as historical and social phenomena remains open in the dialectical naturalism of Western Marxism and Murray Bookchin's social ecology. By examining in closer detail how Bookchin's social ecology politicizes the concept of nature, as well as how precursory models in Western Marxist thought provide a foundation for this, Damian Gerber illustrates how the notion of an ecological society remains a decisively political question. (shrink)

The paper analyses Aleksei F. Losev’s position in respect to the notion of time, which he considers in a dialectical perspective. The Russian philosopher proceeds from the Platonic interpretation of the relationship between the one and the many, according to which each plurality carries in itself a unifying principle, as its ontological grounding. This anti-modern perspective represents a rejection of the positivist “objectification” of the world, which introduced the “metaphysical” notions of absolute space and time. According to Losev, time (...) as an indefinite continued progress of events that occur in an apparently irreversible succession does not exist as such and cannot be considered other than within the framework of the overall unity of temporal fragments, so that they acquire a common background. By placing the interpretation of time on the ontological plan, in its dialectical connection with its opposite, Losev manages to overcome the problem of the measurability of time, raised in Aristotle’s definition of time as a “measure of motion.” Losev also rejects modern subjectivist ideas about time as an experience of the present or as pure duration, both conceptions inevitably leading to the problem of identifying in the continuous flow of time a stable ground that serves as the basis for any temporal change. Besides that, Losev’s approach to the interpretation of time leads to criticism of the modern idea of progress, understood as an endless striving for the future, which always remains unattainable. The main task then is to find “mobile rest,” a unifying principle that can give meaning to human existence through the combination of past, present and future. (shrink)

Richard Rorty, in his ‘Consequences of Pragmatism’ (1982), acknowledging the pragmatic direction taken by both modern and postmodern philosophy, declared that ‘James and Dewey were not only waiting at the end of the dialectical road which analytic philosophy traveled, but are waiting at the end of the road which, for example, Foucault and Deleuze are currently traveling’ (Rorty, 1982, p. xviii). This paper does not aim to establish who traveled the farthest along the road posited by Rorty. Instead, its (...) purpose is to trace a common direction as a sort of pragmatic trajectory that will map a territory constituting Gilles Deleuze’s new image of thought, or rather as he put it, a thought without image. By addressing some of Deleuze’s ideas on thinking and learning, especially with regard to the problematics of sources of knowledge, this paper posits the convergence between his philosophical position and Dewey’s philosophy of education despite the two being seemingly separated by time, place and culture. The paper further shifts the focus from the factual knowledge to an experimental and experiential process of knowing and asserts the latter’s far-reaching implications for education as a developing and generative practice. (shrink)

With the birth of the feminist movement classicists, philosophers, educational experts, and psychologists, all challenged by the question of whether or not Plato was a feminist, began to examine Plato's dialogues in search of his conception of woman. The possibility arose of a new focus affecting the view of texts written more than two thousand years in the past. And yet, in spite of the recent surge of interest on woman in Plato, no comprehensive work identifying his position on the (...) subject has yet appeared. This book considers not only the totality of Plato's texts on woman and the feminine, but also their place within both his philosophy and the historical context in which it developed. But this book is not merely a textual study situating the subject of woman philosophically and historically; it also uncovers the implications hidden in the texts and the relationships that follow from them. It draws an image of the Platonic woman as rich and full as the textual and historical information allows, offering new and sometimes unexpected results beyond the topic of woman, illuminating aspects of Plato's work that are of relevance to Platonic studies in general. (shrink)

I argue that Meister Eckhart's distinctive use of language in his German sermons deliberately reflects his theological view. Instead of being straightforward statements of doctrine, Eckhart's sermons use paradox, wordplay, and imagery to engage their interpreters dialectically and bring them to the perspective Eckhart hopes to instill. This perspective centers on God's simultaneous distinction and indistinction from creatures, including the soul. Knowing God requires becoming aware of one's own contingency as a creature in time, which exists only because it receives (...) its being from God with every moment. For Eckhart, Christian practice does not mean to achieve eternal salvation or mystical union with the divine. Rather, it confesses and proclaims the soul's recognition of its ontological dependence on God. Through close readings of four sermons, I show how Eckhart's language reveals his ontological and practical views, which in turn determine how he speaks. His sermons present complex verbal images of God, the soul, and their relationship. (shrink)

Cet article explore la production du savoir dans le cadre d'une « anthropologie nationale». Au Mexique s'est développée de façon précoce une des plus importantes anthropologies « nationales » du monde postcolonial; malgré son « succès », elle a toujours été hantée par l'absorption de ses principaux représentants dans l'appareil d'État et par un sentiment de discontinuité et d'isolement intellectuel. Quatre aspects de l' anthropologie mexicaine sont abordés dans le contexte historique où ils ont émergé: le rôle de l'anthropologie dans (...) la construction d'une image de la nation (1850-1900); les stratégies d'intervention dans la modernisation et l'incorporation des populations indigènes et «attardées» (1880-1930); son rôle dans la régulation de l'orthodoxie du développement (1940-1968), puis dans la reformulation de l'image de la nation face à l'urbanisation massive (depuis 1968). (shrink)

Two themes form the basis for this volume. First, the author argues that the relation between an outer transient nature and an inner eternal nature provides a thread which enables the interpreter to trace a coherent point of view and provide an immanent criticism of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous texts. Second, he argues that there is a dialectic of self and other running throughout the pseudonymous works which challenges the view that Kierkegaard’s image of the human being is that of a single (...) solitary one. He develops these themes by applying a structural analysis to these works. (shrink)

I compare Plato’s and Husserl’s accounts of the non-original appearance and the original with a focus on their methodologies for distinguishing between them and the phenomenological—i.e., the answer to the question of the what and how of their appearance—criteria that drive their respective methodologies. I argue that Plato’s dialectical method is phenomenologically superior to Husserl’s reflective method in the case of phantasmata that function as apparitions. Plato’s method has the capacity to discern the apparition on the basis of criteria (...) that appeal solely to its appearance, whereas Husserl’s method presupposes a non-apparent primitive distinction between the original qua primal impression and the phantasm as its reproductive modification. On the basis of Plato’s methodological superiority in this regard, I sketch a reformulation of the Husserlian approach to appearances guided by the original interrogative context of Plato’s dialectical account of the distinction between true and false appearances, eikones and phantasmata. (shrink)