This thesis examines a prima facie tension between the narrow scope of social justice proposed by many liberal, rights-based accounts, and the intuition that we have a strong obligation to help distant people who are in great need. 'Distant people' in this instance are people who do not share our nationality, or those who will come to exist as members of future generations. Ways in which liberal, right-based theories of political philosophy can resolve this tension are examined, and (...) the thesis concludes that a liberal, rights-based account of our obligations to distant people is possible, by understanding the extent of our connections to distant people. (shrink)

On a business-as-usual policy, it seems inevitable that people in the distant future will live in a world with a more harmful climate. But can we really harm distant future people? If so, to what extent can we harm them? Derek Parfit’s non-identity problem (1984) has been taken by other scholars, such as David Boonin (2014), to support the idea that, as long as distant future people’s lives are still worth living (though harsh), they cannot be harmed (...) generally since shutting down our business-as-usual would eliminate their very existence in the future. John Nolt (2018) counterargues that they can still be harmed if some of the consequences of our business-as-usual makes them worse off, although they benefit in general. In this paper I aim to show how these contemporary theories fail to fully account for the harm we may do to distant future people. Their mere focus on the concreteness of harm has missed something morally relevant. To address this, I argue that “endangering someone” also counts towards “harm”, since it causes the reasonable expectation of injury or death occurring, practically boosts the process of making people worse off, and negatively impacts the victim’s interest not to be endangered. Therefore, distant future people will start to be “invisibly” harmed once they are exposed to reasonably expectable worse-off situations, such as climate change, energy shortage, and environmental degradation in the future, before actual consequences occur. (shrink)

Debate about the responsibilities of affluent people to act to lessen global poverty has dominated ethics and political philosophy for forty years. But the controversy has reached an impasse, with the main approaches either demanding too much of ordinary mortals or else letting them off the hook. In Distant Strangers I show how a preoccupation with standard moral theories and with the concepts of duty and obligation have led philosophers astray. I argue that there are serious limits to what (...) can be demanded of ordinary human beings, but that this does not mean we must abandon the moral imperative to reduce poverty. Drawing on findings from behavioral economics and psychology, I show how we can motivate better-off people to lessen poverty without excessively taxing their moral virtue. And I argue that this approach is not just pragmatically but morally appropriate. (shrink)

This African moral framework discusses distant poverty as human vulnerability. Contextually, if vulnerability means human frailty, relative to some opposing facts of life, and that poverty makes the human person frail, relative to some largely unrealized/unrealizable desirables without assistance, then distant poverty as human vulnerability invariably connects, significantly, with poor dependency: poor people are vulnerable as dependent on the assisting other. Some fundamental questions arise: 1) What is the ontology of distant poverty as human vulnerability? 2) In (...) what ways does the idea of poverty as human vulnerability essentially and morally connect with the idea of dependency? 3) Is the issue of addressing the problem of distant poverty as human vulnerability a question of perfect or imperfect moral duty or both? 4) In what ways do the perfect or imperfect moral duty connect to positive and negative moral duties? 5) What moral framework best accommodates, all things considered, moral duties? Considering these questions, this work advances that African ethics as character ethics, fundamentally serves as a better moral framework, compared to the Western ethics that has dominated the debates on addressing the questions for years. (shrink)

For Amartya Sen, Adam Smith’s notion of the impartial spectator is a device that brings “distant voices” into our moral deliberations in order to prevent us from the parochialism that can limit our views on particular issues. Whilst recognising its importance, this article suggests that there are some problems with the way Sen uses this in his The Idea of Justice. Tensions arise around issues relating to his interpretation of Smith, a one-sided and undialectical understanding of the operation of (...) the impartial spectator, an ambivalence in Sen’s approach between essentialism and cultural relativism, the capacity for people to carry out the demands of the impartial spectator and its efficacy in relation to real moral problems such as Smith’s case of infanticide. The conclusion is that in the search for openness, Sen leaves his idea of justice with insufficient grounding to forge a dialogue that can act as a challenge to entrenched beliefs rather than simply accept them in a limbo of fragile co-existence. (shrink)

In recent years, mtDNA and Y chromosome studies involving human populations from South Asia and the rest of the world have revealed new insights about the peopling of the world by anatomically modern humans during the late Pleistocene, some 40,000–60,000 years ago, over the southern coastal route from Africa. Molecular studies and archaeological record are both largely consistent with autochthonous differentiation of the genetic structure of the caste and tribal populations in South Asia. High level of endogamy created by numerous (...) social boundaries within and between castes and tribes, along with the influence of several evolutionary forces such as genetic drift, fragmentation and long‐term isolation, has kept the Indian populations diverse and distant from each other as well as from other continental populations. This review attempts to summarize recent genetic studies on Indian caste and tribal populations with the focus on the information embedded in the socially defined structure of Indian populations. BioEssays 29: 91–100, 2007. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Advances in genetic technology in general and medical genetics in particular will enable us to intervene in the process of human biological development which extends from zygotes and embryos to people. This will allow us to control to a great extent the identities and the length and quality of the lives of people who already exist, as well as those we bring into existence in the near and distant future. Genes and Future People explores two general philosophical questions, one (...) metaphysical, the other moral: (1) How do genes, and different forms of genetic intervention (gene therapy, genetic enhancement, presymptomatic genetic testing of adults, genetic testing of preimplantation embryos), affect the identities of the people who already exist and those we bring into existence? and (2) How do these interventions benefit or harm the people we cause to exist in the near future and those who will exist in the distant future by satisfying or defeating their interest in having reasonably long and disease-free lives? Genes and Future People begins by explaining the connection between genes and disease, placing genetic within a framework of evolutionary biology. It then discusses such topics as how genes and genetic intervention influence personal identity, what genetic testing of individuals and the knowledge resulting from it entails about responsibility to others who may be at risk, as well as how gene therapy and genetic enhancement can affect the identities of people and benefit or harm them. Furthermore, it discusses various moral aspects of cloning human beings and body parts. Finally, it explores the metaphysical and moral implications of genetic manipulation of the mechanisms of aging to extend the human life span.The aim Genes and Future People is to move philosophers, bioethicists, and readers in general to reflect on the extent to which genes determine whether we are healthy or diseased, our identities as persons, the quality of our lives, and our moral obligations to future generations of people. (shrink)

A shocking number of people worldwide currently suffer from malnutrition, disease, violence, and poverty. Their difficult lives evidence the intractability and pervasiveness of global need. In this paper I draw on recent developments in metaethical and normative theory to reframe one aspect of the conversation regarding whether moral agents are required to respond to the needs of distant strangers. In contrast with recent treatments of the issue of global poverty, as found in the work of Peter Singer (1972 and (...) 2002), who employs a broadly consequentialist framework focusing on suffering, and Thomas Pogge (2002), who inventively reframes the issue in terms of a negative duty not to harm, I explore this issue through an alternative approach: a social view of deontic moral reasons that features the idea of relational normativity. I address whether moral agents must respond to needy others by considering how the needs of distant strangers make implicit claims on those able to help them. Ultimately, I demonstrate why indifference in the face of global need is morally unacceptable, hence supporting the idea of an obligation that requires response to others’ basic needs. (shrink)

People with mild to moderate intellectual or multiple disabilities may have serious difficulties in accessing leisure events, managing communication exchanges with distant partners, and performing functional daily activities. Recently, efforts were made to develop and assess technology-aided programs aimed at supporting people in all three areas. This study assessed a new technology-aided program aimed at helping four participants with intellectual and multiple disabilities in the aforementioned areas. The program, which was implemented following a non-concurrent multiple baseline across participants design, (...) relied on the use of a smartphone or tablet connected via Bluetooth to a two-switch device. This device served to select leisure and communication events and to control the smartphone or tablet’s delivery of step instructions for the activities scheduled. Data showed that during the baseline phase, three participants failed in each of the areas while one participant managed to access a few leisure events. During the intervention phase, all participants managed to independently access leisure events, make telephone calls, and carry out activities. These results suggest that the program might be a useful tool for helping people with intellectual and multiple disabilities improve their condition in basic areas of daily life. (shrink)

In the midst of globalization, English is regarded as an international language, or Lingua Franca, but learning it as a second language (L2) remains still difficult to speakers of other languages. This is true especially for the speakers of languages distantly related to English such as Japanese. In this sense, exploring neural basis for translation between the first language (L1) and L2 is of great interest. There have been relatively many previous researches revealing brain activation patterns during translations between L1 (...) and English as L2. These studies, which focused on language translation with close or moderate linguistic distance (LD), have suggested that the Broca area (BA 44/45) and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; BA 46) may play an important role on translation. However, the neural mechanism of language translation between Japanese and English, having large LD, has not been clarified. Thus, we used functional near infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) to investigate the brain activation patterns during word translation between Japanese and English. We also assessed the effects of translation directions and word familiarity. All participants’ first language was Japanese and they were learning English. Their English proficiency was advanced or elementary. We selected English and Japanese words as stimuli based on the familiarity for Japanese people. Our results showed that the brain activation patterns during word translation largely differed depending on their English proficiency. The advanced group elicited greater activation on the left prefrontal cortex around the Broca’s area while translating words with low familiarity, but no activation was observed while translating words with high familiarity. On the other hand, the elementary group evoked greater activation on the left temporal area including the superior temporal gyrus (STG) irrespective of the word familiarity. These results suggested that different cognitive process could be involved in word translation corresponding to English proficiency in Japanese learners of English. These difference on the brain activation patterns between the advanced and elementary group may reflect the difference on the cognitive loads depending on the levels of automatization in one’s language processing. (shrink)

Has human nature been essentially the same since the evolution of Homo sapiens? If we could observe tribal forest dwellers from the Paleolithic period, would we notice more similarities than differences compared with contemporary men and women? Or has human nature itself undergone such radical changes over the course of evolution that we would have trouble finding anything in common with our distant ancestors? Political scientist Jeremy J. Millett tackles these tough questions and more in this sweeping overview of (...) society and human nature past, present, and future. Combining philosophy, political theory, and the evidence of evolution, Millett argues that people today are very different from human beings of the distant past. He notes research suggesting that our genetic natures have been changing since the dawn of our species. Hence, the human nature of the 21st century is not the same as that of the 100th century BCE. Nor will humans of some distant future era be the same as us. Both the continuously developing genetic basis of human nature and the many differences of environment and culture have produced and will continue to produce people unlike us. Millett examines successive periods of human development—tribal, feudal, maritime, urban, and today's emerging global society, showing in each case how distinctive human nature was in each time period. He concludes by projecting into the future, forecasting an age of "autonomous people" who have largely escaped the need for government and for whom cooperation is the norm. A work of great erudition and fascinating speculation, People Unlike Us raises profound questions about human nature and the future of our species. (shrink)

This study utilizing correlation, regression, confirmatory factor analyses, ANOVA, moderation and mediation analysis investigated connections of stereotypes, emotions, and sociocultural variables in a single-sample/single-group design. Prior to data processing, Georgian versions of the Stereotype Content Model questionnaires were validated through CFA. The study looked at Georgian students' attitudes to: representatives of German-speaking countries and representatives of English-speaking countries. Emotions predicted to these groups by social–structural antecedents—vitality and fear of assimilation—and stereotypes were admiration, pride, and sympathy. In addition, envy was predicted (...) for the English-speaking group. The prediction of envy is explained by moderation analysis according to which it is elicited by the interplay of warmth and competence, as well as fear of assimilation and competence. The former interaction mediates the link between social–structural antecedents to emotions. Thus, distant out-groups elicit envy as a result of their perceived vitality, fear of assimilation, warmth, and competence. Social–structural antecedents come forward to elicit emotions of envy independently as well as in interaction with stereotypes when small country representatives evaluate representatives of the influential group of English-speaking people. (shrink)

In his classic article, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, pp. 229–243), Peter Singer claimed that affluent people in the developed world are morally obligated to transfer large amounts of resources to poor people in the developing world. For present purposes I will not call Singers argument into question. While people can reasonably disagree about exactly how demanding morality is with respect to duties to the desperate, there is little question in my mind that it is much more demanding than common sense (...) morality or our everyday behavior suggests. Even someone who disagrees with this might still find some interest in seeing what a demanding morality would imply for well-off residents of the rich countries of the world. I proceed in the following way. First, I survey humanitarian aid, development assistance, and intervention to protect human rights as ways of discharging duties to the desperate. I claim that we should be more cautious about such policies than is often thought. I go on to suggest two principles that should guide our actions, based on an appreciation of our roles, relationships, and the social and political context in which we find ourselves. (shrink)

"This is an exceedingly long short book, stretching at least fifty thousand years into the past and who knows how many into the future." So begins Visions of the Future, the prophetic new book by eminent economist Robert Heilbroner. Heilbroner's basic premise is stunning in its elegant simplicity. He contends that throughout all of human history, despite the huge gulf in social organization, technological development, and cultural achievement that divides us from the earliest known traces of homo sapiens, there have (...) really only been three distinct ways of looking at the future. During a period Heilbroner refers to simply as the Distant Past, stretching from prehistory to the appearance of modern nation-states in seventeenth century Europe, there was no notion of a future measurably and materially different from the present or the past. From the Stone Age to the Bronze, Mesopotamia and Egypt to Greece and Rome, and throughout the Middle Ages, a continuum of cultures and civilizations shared one defining expectation--the absence of any expectation of material progress for the great masses of people. Heilbroner maintains that it was not until the first stirrings of the period he refers to as Yesterday, spanning from roughly 1700 to 1950, that the future entered into human consciousness as a great beckoning force. Capitalism, continually reinvigorated by the seemingly endless forward march of science and an evolving sense of democracy, appeared to promise all levels of society some expectation of a future at least somewhat better than the past. It was this unwavering faith in the superiority of the future that separated Yesterday from the age we have now entered, that of Today. While we are still driven towards tomorrow by the same forces that determined the recent past, the lessons of Hiroshima and Chernobyl, the chaos in the former Soviet Union, the stagnation of the West, and the anarchic rage unleashed in our inner cities and in hot spots around the globe have brought on a palpable anxiety that is quite apart from both the resignation of the Distant Past or the bright optimism of Yesterday. In a brilliant conclusion drawing together the threat of nuclear blackmail, global warming and the growing commodification of life represented by video games, voice mail, and VCRs, Visions of the Future issues a call to face the challenges of the twenty-first century with a new resolve strengthened by the inspiration of our collective past. (shrink)

It appears to have been established that it is not possible for us to harm distant future generations by failing to adopt long-range welfare policies which would conserve resources or limit pollution. By exploring a number of possible worlds, the present article shows, first, that the argument appears to be at least as telling against Aristotelian, rights-based and Rawlsian approaches as it seems to be against utilitarianism, but second, and most importantly, that it only holds if we fail to (...) view moral agents as individuals. The article also concludes that the argument has profoundly counter-intuitive implications. (shrink)

Calls for compensation are heard in many countries all over the world. Spokespersons on behalf of formerly oppressed and dominated groups call for compensation for the deeply traumatic injustices their members have suffered in the past. Sometimes these injustices were suffered decades ago by members already deceased. How valid are such claims to compensation and should they be honoured as a matter of justice? The focus of this essay is on these issues of compensatory justice. I want to look at (...) the issue from the perspective of the eradication of systematic poverty affecting particular groups—where injustices of the distant past can reliably be identified as one of the major contributory factors to people’s current poverty. In the paper I will examine the following issues: (1) What kind of injustices qualify to be remedied by means of compensatory justice? (2) Should there be a limit to how far back in history one should go to compensate for injustice? (3) How can an injustice from the distant past be reliably identified as a cause of current problems? (4) Who should be compensated? (5) Who is responsible for compensation? (6) What form should compensation take? (7) Is the concept of compensatory justice backward looking or forward looking? I will argue for a moral obligation to the effect that serious injustices, perpetrated long ago against a group of people and caused them to be poor, ought to be compensated by society in a variety of ways to the original victims (if still alive) and their descendants. (shrink)

In the Roman time, Azania and its capital Rhapta had cultural and economic connections with diverse civilizations of the world, including those in the Mediterranean basin, the Middle East, India, the Far East, and the deep interior of Africa. Information about Azania was first provided by the Romans – Pliny the Elder, Claudius Ptolemy, and sources such as the Periplus of the Erythraean Sea. Apart from the Romans, other people of the Middle East, including the Homerites or Himyarites, were found (...) to have lived and traded in Azania. Pliny the Elder reported that Azanian received spices from the Far East and sent them to the Great Lakes’ region where they were ferried via the Nile to the Mediterranean basin. The Periplus also reported other exported and imported trade goods. Indian and Chinese records provided evidence of connections with Azania. The most recent evidence of these connections is archeological. Materials recovered include beads and ceramics from Rome, the Middle East, and India. Archeology of submerged Rhapta also uncovered architectural remains of Roman technology. Material remains from the deep interior of Africa have been found on the coast of Azania. Roman connections with the deep interior of Africa are believed to have created caravan routes that facilitated cultural and technological exchanges. (shrink)

The work of the French Lithuanian Jewish philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas, describes a perceptive rethinking of the possibility of concrete acts of goodness in the world, a rethinking never more necessary than now, in the wake of the cruel realities of the twentieth century—ten million dead in the First World War, forty million dead in the Second World War, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, the Soviet gulags, the grand slaughter of Mao’s “Great Leap Forward,” the pointless and gory Vietnam War, the Cambodian self-genocide and (...) many an attempted extermination from the face of the earth of entire nations of indigenous peoples. The list of horrors goes on and on—daily holocausts that do not distinguish between the civilian and the soldier, the guilty and the innocent, those deserving of life and those less deserving. (shrink)

Listening effort helps explain why people who are hard of hearing are prone to fatigue and social withdrawal. However, a one-factor model that cites only effort due to hardness of hearing is insufficient as there are many who lead happy lives despite their disability. This paper explores other contributory factors, in particular motivational arousal and pleasure. The theory of rational motivational arousal predicts that some people forego listening comprehension because they believe it to be impossible and hence worth no effort (...) at all. This is problematic. Why should the listening task be rated this way, given the availability of aids that reduce its difficulty? Two additional factors narrow the explanatory gap. First, we separate the listening task from the benefit derived as a consequence. The latter is temporally more distant, and is discounted as a result. The second factor is displeasure attributed to the listening task, which increases listening cost. Many who are hard of hearing enjoy social interaction. In such cases, the actual activity of listening is a benefit, not a cost. These people also reap the benefits of listening, but do not have to balance these against the displeasure of the task. It is suggested that if motivational harmony can be induced by training in somebody who is hard of hearing, then the obstacle to motivational arousal would be removed. This suggests a modified goal for health care professionals. Don’t just teach those who are hard of hearing how to use hearing assistance devices. Teach them how to do so with pleasure and enjoyment . (shrink)

As an affluent person in a world of needy poor, I should probably do more to aid badly off persons around the globe. Many people subscribe to this thought, which prompts guilt and chagrin. However, the thought readily becomes an extremely demanding vise. If I am contemplating using a few dollars of mine to go to a restaurant and a movie, I might reflect that the money would do more good, yield more moral value, if I refrained from the personal (...) expense and gave the money to a relief agency serving the global poor. Transferred to the relief agency, the money would save a life or prevent a severe deterioration in the quality of someone’s life. The vise tightens when I reflect further that if I give the few dollars to a relief agency, essentially the same decision problem recurs. I could contribute another similar increment of resources to a worthy cause and further reduce my expenditures to enhance my own quality of life. And another, and another, and so on. Peter Singer has observed that virtually all of us would agree that if we chance upon a child drowning in a pond we ought to save the child’s life even if the life-saving activity imposes a considerable sacrifice on us. We live in a world in which, in effect, children drowning in ponds or the moral equivalent are ubiquitous, and thanks to the existence of networks of. (shrink)

In this manuscript, we introduce a theoretical model of climate radicalization that integrates social psychological theories of perceived unfairness with historical insights on radicalization to contribute to the knowledge of individuals’ processes of radicalization and non-radicalization in relation to climate change. We define climate radicalization as a process of growing willingness to pursue and/or support radical changes in society that are in conflict with or could pose a threat to the status quo or democratic legal order to reach climate goals. (...) We describe how perceptions of unfairness can play a pivotal role in processes of climate change related radicalization. Without taking any position or judgment regarding climate concerns and associated actions, we suggest that although these behaviors drive many people to participate in peaceful climate protest, they may also lead others to radicalize into breaking the law to achieve their climate goals, possibly in violent ways. This process of climate radicalization, we argue, can be driven by people perceiving certain situations to be blatantly unfair. Specifically, we discuss how radical attitudes and behaviors can be products of perceived unfairness stemming from the past, the future, the immediate social environments of perceivers, as well as those that are spatially distant from them. We further argue that because radicalization processes are shaped by an interaction between individuals and movements, on the one hand, and societal actors and developments, on the other, they tend to develop in non-linear and dynamic ways. We therefore propose that climate radicalization is a dynamic, contingent, and non-linear process, often of an escalating kind, that develops over time, through various interactions between individuals and their contexts, and in which people and groups move back and forth from peaceful protest, through disobedient and unlawful methods, to violent actions. Implications, strengths, and limitations of our model are discussed. (shrink)

There is a hidden history of Europe, which is far earlier than the Indo-European history of public konwledge and education. Archaeological, mythological and linguistic evidence point to a matrilineal society, which honoured the place of women, was based on a partnership between women and men, and lived in accord with its natural environment. I find in this early history a cause of hope for Europe’s present and future. If Europeans can learn from this diverse and non-militaristic distant past, which (...) has been repressed but not destroyed, there is hope that we can develop models of society based on partnership rather than dominance. (shrink)

The theory of evolution unites the past, present, and future of living things. It puts humanity's place in the universe into necessary perspective. Despite a history of controversy, the evidence for evolution continues to accumulate as a result of many separate strands of incredible scientific sleuthing. In The Story of Evolution in 25 Discoveries, Donald R. Prothero explores the most fascinating breakthroughs in piecing together the evidence for evolution. In twenty-five vignettes, he recounts the dramatic stories of the people who (...) made crucial discoveries, placing each moment in the context of what it represented for the progress of science. He tackles topics like what it means to see evolution in action and the distance between species in space and time, following figures from Darwin to lesser-known researchers as they unlock the mysteries of the fossil record, the earth, and the universe. The book also features the stories of animal species strange and familiar, including humans-and our ties to some of our closest relatives and more distant cousins. Prothero's wide-ranging tales showcase awe-inspiring and bizarre aspects of nature and the powerful insights they give us into the way that life works. (shrink)

SummaryTheoderic’s diplomacy with distant peoples has often been considered as a kind of ‘Realpolitik’ chiefly aimed at military or strategical purposes, but the symbolic importance of two embassies from the Warni and Hesti should be taken into consideration more carefully. The king aimed to convince his subjects and neighbours that he was the rightful heir of the Roman emperors by following a subtle policy of imitatio Imperii. He also used diplomacy to achieve this goal and took advantage of (...) two embassies from remote peoples of Northern Europe in order to imitate both Augustus and contemporary emperors, who prided themselves upon receiving envoys from far-away lands. (shrink)

The Kantian categorical imperative process of rational reflection and reasoned social discourse is theoretically capable of forming the moral environmental maxims applicable to business. This article argues that rational environmental discourse demands that business has an imperfect duty to develop relevant unbiased information, and perhaps to disseminate this information through participation in business-public coalitions. For the environmental problem, this “rationality” particularly concerns our obligations toward future generations and distant people while recognizing that they cannot participate in current discourse, and (...) the rules for gathering and assessing the evidence that should govern our environmental preservations and enhancements. Both these concerns demand certain scientific information requirements, as well as logical decision criteria that are perceived as stable across both overlapping generations, and affected peoples. The criteria for Rawls’ “considered moral judgments” are shown to apply to resolutions of these business-related ethical conundrums. In a way similar to Kant’s anthropological examinations of humanity’s antisocial behaviors, this article also examines various biases that inhibit this social reasoning. (shrink)

Most cosmopolitans who are concerned about world poverty assume that for citizens of affluent societies, justice beyond national borders is a matter of their positive duty to provide aid to distant people suffering from severe poverty. This assumption is challenged by some authors, notably Tomas Pogge, who maintains that these citizens are actively involved in the incidence of poverty abroad and therefore neglect their negative duty of refraining from harming others. This paper examines the extent to which it is (...) pertinent to contend that citizens in economically advanced countries are morally liable for the impoverishment of a sizable population of the developing world. The contention in question can be interpreted in two nonexclusive ways. First, it might imply that historical injustices, including colonialism and slavery, contributed to both contemporary affluence in some parts of the world and poverty in others. Second, it could imply that the present global economic system, instituted and implemented by the governments of rich and powerful countries acting in the name of their citizens, is benefiting the citizens while harming the world’s disadvantaged. The author argues that the idea of reparation for historical injustices suffers from serious philosophical difficulties, including the non-identity problem presented by Derek Parfit, and thus fails to provide a satisfactory approach to the existing problem of poverty. This paper then examines the alleged liability of citizens in affluent countries, with a special reference to empirical observations on the policy process. The paper concludes by suggesting a twofold theory of global justice, which combines material, managerial, and moral assistances for a society lacking a competent government and proposes institutional reforms in the global order in order to achieve poverty reduction. (shrink)

I begin with an account of what is deserved in human ethics, an ethics that assumes without argument that only humans, or rational agents, count morally. I then take up the question of whether nonhuman living beings are also deserving and answer it in the affirmative. Having established that all individual living beings, as well as ecosystems, are deserving, I go on to establish what it is that they deserve and then compare the requirements of global justice when only humans (...) are taken into account with the requirements of global justice when all living beings are taken into account. (shrink)

I show how Jan Narveson’s critique fails to unseat my central argument that harm cuts both ways in our assumed idealized conflict situations, such that sometimes the poor harm the rich and sometimes the rich harm the poor. I further show how this supports my overall argument that libertarianism has gone over the brink into the waiting arms of welfare liberals and socialists. I also reject the; other reasons that Narveson provides for not recognizing the welfare rights of distant (...) peoples and future generations which are independent of my argument about harm. (shrink)

Abstract Of the many ways in which identity is constructed and performed online, few are as strongly ‘anchored’ to existing offline relationships as in online social networks like Facebook and Myspace. These networks utilise profiles that extend our practical, psychological and even corporeal identity in ways that give them considerable phenomenal presence in the lives of spatially distant people. This raises interesting questions about the persistence of identity when these online profiles survive the deaths of the users behind them, (...) via the practice of ‘memorialising’ social network profile pages. I situate these practices within a phenomenology of grief that accounts for the ways in which the dead can persist as moral patients, and show how online survival in this case illuminates an important difference between persons and selves within contemporary philosophy of personal identity. Ultimately, the online persistence of the dead helps bring into view a deep ontological contradiction implicit in our dealings with death: the dead both live on as objects of duty and yet completely cease to exist. Content Type Journal Article Category Special Issue Pages 1-17 DOI 10.1007/s13347-011-0050-7 Authors Patrick Stokes, Philosophy Group, School of Humanities, University of Hertfordshire de Havilland Campus, Hatfield, Hertfordshire AL10 9AB, UK Journal Philosophy & Technology Online ISSN 2210-5441 Print ISSN 2210-5433. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that even a libertarian ideal of liberty, which initially seems opposed to welfare rights, can be seen to require a right to a basic needs minimum that extends to distant peoples and future generations and is conditional upon the poor doing whatever they reasonably can to meet their own basic needs, including bringing their population growth under control. Given that, as I have argued elsewhere, welfare liberal, socialist, communitarian and feminist political ideals can (...) be easily seen to support this same right to a basic needs minimum, showing how a libertarian ideal of liberty supports the right should go a long way toward solving the problem of what all people, whether near or distant, present or future, deserve, which is the basic problem of global justice. (shrink)

Composite beings (“monsters”) are those mythical creatures composed of a mix of different anatomical forms. There are several scholarly claims for why these appear in the imagery and lore of many societies, including claims that they are found near-universally as well as those arguments that they co-occur with particular sociocultural arrangements. In order to evaluate these claims, we identify the presence of composite monsters cross-culturally in a global sample of societies, the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample. We find that composite beings are (...) not universal, and that their presence or absence co-varies most significantly with social stratification and transportation technology. This supports hypotheses that the cultural evolution of composite monsters is driven by human concerns with social distinctions within societies as well as increased contact with distant peoples. (shrink)

This paper considers Kazakh traditional culture in terms of its etiquette rules. Four main blocks are explored: the etiquette of greeting and farewell, hospitality, family etiquette, and blessings, all of which are mandatory in everyday situations. This study acquires importance in relation to the complicated processes of interethnic relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of Kazakhstan. Familiarity with the traditions and norms of behavior in Kazakh society as well a basic knowledge of ethnic etiquette serves (...) to strengthen intercultural relations and to understand the ways of life of neighboring and distant peoples. This topic is of special importance in relation to the study of communication culture among interethnic groups after the collapse of the USSR. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:53 HUME ON ARTIFICIAL LIVES with a Rejoinder to A.C. Maclntyre The variety of human cultures fascinated Enlightenment thinkers and evoked certain problems for philosophical discussion. Wide experience of other societies, as well as the study of history, disclosed moral systems interestingly different from modern European mores. Also a student of other cultures, historical and contemporary, David Hume is a moderate pluralist on the matter of alternative moral systems. (...) He acknowledges that there are systems of values other than that shared by his readers which qualify as moralities; but more interestingly, he also holds that there are some such systems which, despite the claims of their adherents, fail to qualify as moralities. Thus Hume opposes forms of relativism that allow any system which a community deems to be a moral code has to be acknowledged as constituting a genuine morality. In this paper I address the question of how Hume can discriminate among value systems and declare some to be moralities, some not. Given the design of his philosophical approach to morals, addressing this question is a matter of some importance for Hume, since he maintains that moral reflection takes its departure from everyday moral beliefs and sentiments. This being the case, we might expect that what should count as 'everyday moral beliefs and sentiments' would be whatsoever any individual or group puts forward as a morality, and that Hume's pluralism impedes him from raising a critical challenge to any system advanced, no matter how strange it might be. But Hume holds that certain systems advanced for the guidance of life which are sharply opposed to 54 everyday beliefs and sentiments do not constitute a morality, even if they number many as adherents. It is instructive to observe that A.C. Maclntyre believes that Hume's position is deeply flawed. He asserts that the treatment of rival tables of the virtues constitutes a most serious weakness in Hume's 2 theory of morals. Maclntyre contends that Hume's spurning of the monkish virtues, for instance, or his preference of Cicero's Offices over the Christian Whole Duty of Man, is devoid of theoretical justification and amounts to a matter of personal idiosyncrasy and eighteenth-century class elitism. Thus this seems a problem worthy of discussion. In what follows I shall: (a) lay out the problem of artificial lives as it arises in A Dialogue; (b) describe five points of differentiation between artificial lives and nonartificial lives; (c) review some less than fully satisfactory solutions to the problem; (d) introduce what I take to be the chief considerations supporting Hume's rejection of artificial lives; and finally (e) discuss whether Maclntyre 's objections to Hume's treatment of artificial lives are sustainable. 1. The Context of the Problem Hume deals with diversity of morals most expressly in A Dialogue, the short work appended to the second Enquiry. The essay records an exchange between one Palamedes, a lover of the novel and the striking, and his interlocutor, referred to merely as "I". Palamedes confounds the interlocutor by narrating a story about a distant people (the inhabitants of 'Fourli") whose mores include practices, apparently deemed moral by them, which sharply offend his, and presumably our, moral A sensibilities. Having elicited the interlocutor's 55 felt disapproval of those practices, Palamedes delights in revealing that the people of whom he has been speaking in cloaked terms are none other than the interlocutor's beloved Greeks of classical antiquity. Not satisfied with astonishing the interlocutor, he goes on to draw a strongly relativist conclusion about morals in general. The interlocutor confronts the choice of either abandoning his moral admiration of the civilization of the Greeks or of accepting some measure of the relativism in morals that Palamedes is advocating. The interlocutor does neither. He distinguishes between the principles of moral approbation or disapprobation and specific examples of approval or disapproval (E 333). He grants that there are examples of practices of which the ancients apparently approved and contrariwise we disapprove, but he denies that the existence of some such instances warrants the serious sort of relativism that Palamedes would foist on him. Obviously the number of such discrepancies cannot be overwhelming, otherwise the... (shrink)

When do you have to sacrifice life and limb, time and money, to prevent harm to others? When must you save more people rather than fewer? These questions might arise in emergencies involving strangers drowning or trapped in burning buildings, but they also arise in our everyday lives, in which we confront opportunities to donate time or money to help distant strangers in need of food, shelter, or medical care. With the resources available, we can provide more help--or less. (...) -/- In The Rules of Rescue, Theron Pummer argues that we are often morally required to engage in effective altruism, directing altruistic efforts in ways that help the most. Even when the personal sacrifice involved makes it morally permissible not to help at all, he contends, it often remains wrong to provide less help rather than more. Using carefully crafted examples, he defends the view that helping distant strangers is more morally akin to rescuing nearby strangers than most of us realize. The ubiquity of opportunities to help distant strangers threatens to make morality extremely demanding, and Pummer argues that it is only thanks to adequate permissions grounded in considerations of cost and autonomy that we may pursue our own plans and projects. He ultimately concludes that many of us are required to provide no less help over our lives than we would have done if we were effective altruists. (shrink)

James P. Sterba offers something that philosophers have long sought: an argument showing that morality is rationally required. Furthermore he argues that morality requires substantial equality. Even libertarian perspectives, which would seem to require minimal enforcement of morality, are shown to lead to a requirement of equality.

Many people believe that we have responsibility towards the distant future, but exactly how far this responsibility reaches and how we can find a reasonable ethical foundation for it has not been answered in any definitive manner. Future people have no power over us, they form no part of our moral community and it is unclear how we can represent them in a possible original position. All these problems can be circumvented when you take an impersonal decision criterion like (...) maximizing total or average utility. Such a sum-ranking criterion is neutral with respect to distance in time or space: my utility, my neighbour's and that of our descendants all carry the same weight. This makes future people an integral part of present decisions. Time-neutrality was defended by, among others, Sidgwick, Pigou and Ramsey. (shrink)

People are often inaccurate in their predictions of performance on a variety of cognitive tasks. We tested whether receptivity to bullshit – the tendency to perceive meaningless statements as profound – would relate to the accuracy of metacognitive judgments on several problem-solving tasks. Individuals who were highly receptive to bullshit were less accurate in their predictions of performance on creative problem-solving tasks, but not on verbal analogy or recall tasks. Further, individuals with high BS receptivity were less able to discriminate (...) between solvable and unsolvable problems when making metacognitive judgments. These findings support the possibility that the tendency to perceive semantic connections where none exist, as indicated by high bullshit receptivity, may lead to inaccurate predictions of performance on tasks that require noticing and utilizing distant semantic connections. (shrink)

Most people have a story to tell about a remarkable coincidence that in some instances changed the course of their lives. These uncanny occurrences have been variously interpreted as evidence of divine influence, fate, or the collective unconscious. Less common are explanations that explore the social situations and personal preoccupations of the individuals who place the most weight on coincidences. Drawing on a variety of coincidence stories, renowned anthropologist Michael Jackson builds a case for seeing them as allegories of separation (...) and loss—revealing the hope of repairing sundered lives, reconnecting estranged friends, reuniting distant kin, closing the gap between people and their gods, and achieving a sense of emotional and social connectedness with others in a fragmented world. (shrink)

Many people believe in what can be described as a 'concentric circles model of responsibilities to others' in which responsibilities are generally stronger to those physically or affectively closer to us - those who, on this model, occupy circles nearer to us. In particular, it is believed that we have special ties to compatriots and, moreover, that these ties entail stronger obligations than the obligations we have to non-compatriots. While I concede that our strongest obligations may generally be to those (...) family and friends with whom we have close personal relationships, those often thought to occupy the inner core, what I want to challenge is the idea that our obligations diminish in strength when we move beyond the boundary of the circles occupied by compatriots and proceed to those more geographically or culturally distant from us. The weight that is typically placed on the boundary between compatriots and non-compatriots in determining the strength of our obligations to others cannot withstand critical scrutiny. In this paper I show that arguments that are supposed to work to justify stronger obligations to compatriots than non-compatriots do not succeed in the ways imagined. I also present the framework of a contractarian-style model which aims to give us a more systematic way to think about our obligations to 'non-core' others, both distant and near. While we can certainly have different kinds of obligations, my analysis shows that our basic obligations to others do not diminish with distance. In addition, my account aims to flesh out what our basic obligations to others are. (shrink)

Over 30 million people worldwide have taken a commercial at-home DNA test, because they were interested in their genetic ancestry, disease predisposition or inherited traits. Yet, these consumer DNA data are also increasingly used for a very different purpose: to identify suspects in criminal investigations. By matching a suspect’s DNA with DNA from a suspect’s distant relatives who have taken a commercial at-home DNA test, law enforcement can zero in on a perpetrator. Such forensic use of consumer DNA data (...) has been performed in over 200 criminal investigations. However, this practice of so-called investigative genetic genealogy raises ethical concerns. In this paper, we aim to broaden the bioethical analysis on IGG by showing the limitations of an individual-based model. We discuss two concerns central in the debate: privacy and informed consent. However, we argue that IGG raises pressing ethical concerns that extend beyond these individual-focused issues. The very nature of the genetic information entails that relatives may also be affected by the individual customer’s choices. In this respect, we explore to what extent the ethical approach in the biomedical genetic context on consent and consequences for relatives can be helpful for the debate on IGG. We argue that an individual-based model has significant limitations in an IGG context. The ethical debate is further complicated by the international, transgenerational and commercial nature of IGG. We conclude that IGG should not only be approached as an individual but also—and perhaps primarily—as a collective issue. There are no data in this work. (shrink)

> Future people count. There could be a lot of them. We can make their lives better. > > -- William MacAskill, What We Owe The Future > > [Longtermism is] quite possibly the most dangerous secular belief system in the world today. > > -- Émile P. Torres, Against Longtermism Philosophers,1 2 psychologists,3 4 politicians5 and even some tech billionaires6 have sounded the alarm about artificial intelligence (AI) and the dangers it may pose to the long-term future of humanity. (...) Some believe it poses an existential risk (X-Risk)7 to our species, potentially causing our extinction or bringing about the collapse of human civilisation as we know it. The above quote from philosopher Will MacAskill captures the key tenets of ‘longtermism’, an ethical standpoint that places the onus on current generations to prevent AI-related—and other—X-Risks for the sake of people living in the future.1 2 Developing from an adjacent social movement commonly associated with utilitarian philosophy, ‘effective altruism’, longtermism has amassed following of its own. Its supporters argue that preventing X-Risks is at least as morally significant as addressing current challenges like global poverty. However, critics are concerned that such a distant-future focus will sideline efforts to tackle the many pressing moral issues facing humanity now.8 9 Indeed, according to ‘strong’ longtermism,10 future needs arguably should take precedence over present ones. In essence, the claim is that there is greater expected utility to allocating available resources to prevent human extinction in the future than there is to focusing on present lives, since doing so stands to benefit the incalculably large number of people in later generations who will far outweigh existing populations.1 Taken to the extreme, this view suggests it would be morally permissible, or even required, to actively neglect, harm or destroy large swathes of humanity as …. (shrink)

Should people make demands for justice relating to events occurring in the past, even the distant past? What does and what should happen when they do? These questions frame the problems of historical justice that became especially palpable during the twentieth and early twenty‐first centuries and contributed to innovations in the design and use of tribunals, truth commissions and reparations initiatives. These responses to calls for historical justice deal with objections and difficulties in their own ways. Objections to such (...) innovations include charges that they depart too radically from established legal forms, that they reopen old wounds, that they inevitably rely on stale and partial evidence, that their costs are excessive or divert resources from more pressing needs, and that they do little to prevent future atrocities or to heal social rifts. (shrink)

Prominent theories in moral psychology maintain that a core aspect of moral competence is the ability to distinguish moral norms, which derive from universal principles of justice and fairness, from conventional norms, which are contingent on a specific group consensus. The present study investigated the psychological bases of the moral-conventional distinction by manipulating the framing of the test question, the authority’s license, and the historical context. Participants evaluated moral and conventional transgressions by answering an ‘okay for you’ test question (i.e., (...) judging according to their opinion) or an ‘okay in context’ test question (i.e., judging by imagining being a contemporary of the story protagonist). In evaluating moral transgressions that happened in a distant context or with the authority’s license, most of the participants condemned the violations when responding to the ‘okay for you’ test question, but did not do so when responding to the ‘okay in context’ test question. A similar effect of the question framing was found also on scenarios presenting conventional violations suggesting that subtle changes in the framing of the test question can influence people’s evaluations of both moral and conventional prototypical transgressions. We propose that these effects indicate the presence of moral and conventional construals of social actions that are highly flexible and context-sensitive. (shrink)

"At places distant from where you are, but also uncomfortably close," writes David Takacs, "a holocaust is under way. People are slashing, hacking, bulldozing, burning, poisoning, and otherwise destroying huge swaths of life on Earth at a furious pace." And a cadre of ecologists and conservation biologists has responded, vigorously promoting a new definition of nature: biodiversity --advocating it in Congress and on the Tonight Show; whispering it into the ears of foreign leaders redefining the boundaries of science and (...) politics, ethics and religion, nature and our ideas of nature. These scientists have infused the environmental movement with new focus and direction, but by engaging in such activities, they jeopardize the societal trust that allows them to be public spokespersons for nature in the first place. The Idea of Biodiversity analyzes what biodiversity represents to the biologists who operate in broader society on its behalf, drawing on in-depth interviews with the scientists most active today in the mission to preserve biodiversity, including Peter Raven, Thomas Lovejoy, Jane Lubchenco, and Paul Ehrlich. Takacs explores how and why these biologists shaped the concept of biodiversity and promoted it to society at large--examining their definitions of biodiversity their opinions about spirituality and its role in scientific work the notion of biodiversity as something of intrinsic value and their views on biophilia, E. O. Wilson's idea that humans are genetically predisposed to love nature. Takacs also looks at the work of twentieth-century forerunners of today's conservation biologists--Aldo Leopold, Charles S. Elton, Rachel Carson, David Ehrenfeld--and points out their contributions to the current debates. He takes readers to Costa Rica, where a group of scientists is using biodiversity to remake nature and society. And in an extended section, he profiles the thoughts and work of E. O. Wilson. "When I'm asked, 'should we save this species orthat species, or this place or that place?' the answer is always 'Yes!' with an exclamation point. Because it's obvious. And if you ask me to justify it, then I switch into a more cognitive consciousness and can start giving you reasons, economic reasons, aesthetic reasons. They're all dualistic, in a sense. But the feeling that underlies it is that 'yes!' And that 'yes!' comes out of the affirmation of being part of it all, being part of this whole evolutionary process. And agreeing with Arne Naess that each species, each entity, should be allowed to continue its evolution and to live out its destiny... just do its thing, as we say. Why not? And the 'why not?' is there's too many people."--Michael E. Soule, from an interview in The Idea of Biodiversity "An important contribution, a first distanced examination of a critical, modern topic by a scholarly, honest broker."--E. O. Wilson, Harvard University. (shrink)

Seen as contributing to human enhancement, implanted technologies have recently been receiving a lot of attention. However, reflections on these technologies have taken the shape of rather speculative ethical judgments on “hyped” technological devices. On the other hand, while science and technology studies and philosophy of technology have a long tradition of analyzing how technological artifacts and tools transform and configure our lives, they tend to focus on use configurations rather than the intimate relations brought about by implanted technologies. Even (...) the cyborg has lost some of its hermeneutic power as it has been detached from its material grounds, becoming a discursive entity. In this article, I reclaim the importance of materiality and explore how people live with spinal cord stimulation, which is a type of neuromodulation technology. Implanted in bodies and seemingly out of sight, this technology does not cease to matter. Embodiment and incorporation are crucial for people to live well with SCS. Embodying the neuromodulation technology entails groping processes in which gestures are central and an increased intimacy with one’s bodily materiality. Incorporating it is highly relational and entangled with the bodies of loved and distant ones, humans and nonhumans. (shrink)

Utilitarians must think collectively about the future because many contemporary moral issues require collective responses to avoid possible future harms. But current rule utilitarianism does not accommodate the distant future. Drawing on my recent books Future People and Ethics for a Broken World, I defend a new utilitarianism whose central ethical question is: What moral code should we teach the next generation? This new theory honours utilitarianism’s past and provides the flexibility to adapt to the full range of credible (...) futures – from futures broken by climate change to the digital, virtual and predictable futures produced by various possible technologies. (shrink)