The phenomenon of distributed knowledge is well-known in epistemic logic. In this paper, a similar phenomenon in ethics, somewhat neglected so far, is investigated, namely distributed morality. The article explains the nature of distributed morality, as a feature of moral agency, and explores the implications of its occurrence in advanced information societies. In the course of the analysis, the concept of infraethics is introduced, in order to refer to the ensemble of moral enablers, which, although (...) morally neutral per se, can significantly facilitate or hinder both positive and negative moral behaviours. (shrink)

There are various philosophical approaches and theories describing the intimate relation people have to artifacts. In this paper, I explore the relation between two such theories, namely distributed cognition and distributed morality theory. I point out a number of similarities and differences in these views regarding the ontological status they attribute to artifacts and the larger systems they are part of. Having evaluated and compared these views, I continue by focussing on the way cognitive artifacts are used (...) in moral practice. I specifically conceptualise how such artifacts (a) scaffold and extend moral reasoning and decision-making processes, (b) have a certain moral status which is contingent on their cognitive status, and (c) whether responsibility can be attributed to distributed systems. This paper is primarily written for those interested in the intersection of cognitive and moral theory as it relates to artifacts, but also for those independently interested in philosophical debates in extended and distributed cognition and ethics of (cognitive) technology. (shrink)

The concept of distributed moral responsibility (DMR) has a long history. When it is understood as being entirely reducible to the sum of (some) human, individual and already morally loaded actions, then the allocation of DMR, and hence of praise and reward or blame and punishment, may be pragmatically difficult, but not conceptually problematic. However, in distributed environments, it is increasingly possible that a network of agents, some human, some artificial (e.g. a program) and some hybrid (e.g. a (...) group of people working as a team thanks to a software platform), may cause distributed moral actions (DMAs). These are morally good or evil (i.e. morally loaded) actions caused by local interactions that are in themselves neither good nor evil (morally neutral). In this article, I analyse DMRs that are due to DMAs, and argue in favour of the allocation, by default and overridably, of full moral responsibility (faultless responsibility) to all the nodes/agents in the network causally relevant for bringing about the DMA in question, independently of intentionality. The mechanism proposed is inspired by, and adapts, three concepts: back propagation from network theory, strict liability from jurisprudence and common knowledge from epistemic logic. (shrink)

Technology moves us to a better world. We contend that through technology people can simplify and solve moral tasks when they are in presence of incomplete information and possess a diminished capacity to act morally. Many external things, usually inert from the moral point of view, can be transformed into the so-called moral mediators. Hence, not all of the moral tools are inside the head, many of them are shared and distributed in “external” objects and structures which function as (...) ethical devices. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of delegation of morality to a machine, through a consideration of whether or not non-humans can be considered to be moral. The aspect of morality under consideration here is protection of privacy. The topic is introduced through two cases where there was a failure in sharing and retaining personal data protected by UK data protection law, with tragic consequences. In some sense this can be regarded as a failure in the process of delegating (...) morality to a computer database. In the UK, the issues that these cases raise have resulted in legislation designed to protect children which allows for the creation of a huge database for children. Paradoxically, we have the situation where we failed to use digital data in enforcing the law to protect children, yet we may now rely heavily on digital technologies to care for children. I draw on the work of Floridi, Sanders, Collins, Kusch, Latour and Akrich, a spectrum of work stretching from philosophy to sociology of technology and the “seamless web” or “actor–network” approach to studies of technology. Intentionality is considered, but not deemed necessary for meaningful moral behaviour. Floridi’s and Sanders’ concept of “distributed morality” accords with the network of agency characterized by actor–network approaches. The paper concludes that enfranchizing non-humans, in the shape of computer databases of personal data, as moral agents is not necessarily problematic but a balance of delegation of morality must be made between human and non-human actors. (shrink)

Linguistic justice is about institutions distributing material and symbolic resources fairly when they are faced with linguistic diversity. However, no theory of linguistic justice has developed a systematic and comprehensive account of the moral dilemmas that take place in interpersonal linguistic relationships, in particular the power dynamics leading to (linguistic) domination. The aim of this article is to start building a general theory of linguistic domination, one that offers new conceptual tools for both empirical and normative analyses of linguistically diverse (...) societies. Using the republican tradition of thought, I argue that there is linguistic domination whenever someone is subject to the uncontrolled capacity for interference over their linguistic uses, ideology and acquisition by another agent. This article tests under what conditions this phenomenon takes place and the parties involved in it (both in terms of individuals and political institutions). (shrink)

In this paper we address the problem of short-term electric energy prediction using a time series forecasting approach applied to data generated by a Paraguayan electricity distribution provider. The dataset used in this work contains data collected over a three-year period. This is the first time that these data have been used; therefore, a preprocessing phase of the data was also performed. In particular, we propose a comparative study of various machine learning and statistical strategies with the objective of predicting (...) the electric energy consumption for a given prediction horizon, in our case seven days, using historical data. In this paper we have tested the effectiveness of the techniques with different historical window sizes. Specifically, we considered two ensemble strategies, a neural network, a deep learning technique and linear regression. Moreover, in this study, we tested whether the inclusion of meteorological data can help achieve better predictions. In particular, we considered data regarding temperature, humidity, wind speed and atmospheric pressure registered during the three-year period of data collection. The results show that, in general, the deep learning approach obtains the best results and that such results are obtained when meteorological data are also considered. Moreover, when meteorological data is used, a smaller historical window size is required to obtain precise predictions. (shrink)

The judiciary is a key policy actor that is involved in deciding health rights and policy by intervening in the policy process through a variety of judicial mechanisms, yet the appropriate extent of its involvement remains contentious. Taking the competence objection seriously requires understanding it as an epistemic problem about how courts assess empirical and scientific evidence in order to competently adjudicate controversial health claims. This paper examines recent advances in social epistemology to develop insights for the epistemic competence of (...) the judiciary from a system‐oriented approach. I outline three epistemic features that set the judiciary and the judicial decision‐making process apart from other types of decision‐makers in health policy: the distribution of epistemic power, the epistemic authority of a justified believer, and the principle of disinterestedness. Finally, I relate these insights back to the judicial decision‐making process with a specific focus on recent court decisions in health rights and health policy in Chile. (shrink)

This article provides a philosophical response to the need for truth-telling about colonial history, focussing on the Australian context. The response consists in inviting philosophers and the public to engage in social-justice practices specified by a model called Distributed Truth-Telling (DTT), which integrates the historiography of injustices affecting Indigenous peoples with insights from social philosophy and cultural evolution theory. By contrast to official and large-scale truth commissions, distributed truth-telling is a set of non-elitist practices that weave three components: (...) first, multisite, multiformat, and multiscale inquiries into injustices; second, remedial imaginings and reasoning about moral repair and reconciliated futures; and finally, emotions suitable for motivating agents to cooperatively plan and implement moral revolutions. Distributed truth-telling can entrench virtuous feedback loops that contribute to moral revolutions. However, vicious feedback loops associated with collective denial and biases can impair distributed truth- telling and thwart moral revolutions. (shrink)

Bargaining games typically involve two players distributing a specific payoff (usually money), and will be our focus here, as they are especially helpful for examining the moral psychology of justice. Examples include the ultimatum game and dictator game. We will also look at a novel twist on the dictator game by the psychologist Daniel Batson, which has fostered a large experimental literature on what he calls ‘moral hypocrisy.’ Finally we will connect this discussion of economic games to the virtue of (...) justice and to other personality traits such as agreeableness, honesty-humility, and justice sensitivity. (shrink)

This paper discusses conventional and Islamic concepts of distributivejustice, and develops propositions for the establishment of firms deemed to bemoral firms from Islamic perspective. Generally, distributive justice impliesthat goods should be distributed among members of the community accordingto their standing in society. In the Islamic scenario, however, the positive andthe normative aspects work simultaneously. The management of a firm seeksnot only to earn profit in this world but also to get reward in the life-hereafter.Thus, it is duty of a (...) firm to serve the community and look after its shareholders,employees and consumers. This paper also postulates that in a cooperativecum-competitive environment, firms have the same responsibilities as othermembers of the society. Hence, it is the duty of the firm to maintain distributivejustice among its stakeholders. It is also suggested that in the framework of theShariʽah, if there are any imperfections in the market, it is the responsibilityof the state to remove them. This paper also discusses the social and moralresponsibilities of the firms which claim that their products are Shariʽahcompliant. (shrink)

The concept of a “chemical speciation”, as defined by in the year 2000, is grounded in an empiricist semantics. It is a static concept, as it is associated with the ontological category of the chemical state of the distribution of chemical species in a system and is further restricted to chemical species of a single element as it excludes chemical species with more complex chemical systemic subunits, such as molecular species, crystals, or nanoparticles. In this work, we propose a new (...) definition of “chemical speciation” based on a semantics of meaning, applying Mario Bunge’s philosophical system. Chemical speciation is the distribution of chemical systemic subunits amongst defined chemical species in a system. Additionally, we propose two dynamic concepts associated with chemical speciation: chemical species transformation and chemical species evolution. These concepts aim to account for the chemical changes that explain both the diversity of chemical species sharing common systemic subunits and the historical emergence of new modes of chemical speciation. These modes, in turn, explain the appearance of new systemic chemical subunits and novel substantial properties. Our definitions have the advantage of being consistent with general theories of the evolution of matter, such Assembly Theory. Additionally, at the chemical level, this approach encompasses broader systemic chemical subunits beyond elemental particles, allowing for the chemical speciation of families of molecules, crystals, nanoparticles, etc. Finally, our proposal offers the advantage of overcoming the issue of arbitrariness in choosing the reference systemic chemical subunit by linking this choice to the concepts of substantial property, and function. (shrink)

According to the sufficiency principle, distributive justice requires that everyone have some sufficient level of resources or well-being, but inequalities above this threshold have no moral significance. This paper defends a version of the sufficiency principle as the appropriate response to moral uncertainty about distributive justice. Assuming that the appropriate response to moral uncertainty is to maximize expected choiceworthiness, and given a reasonable distribution of credence in some familiar views about distributive justice, a version of the sufficiency principle strikes the (...) optimal balance between the competing moral risks posed by implementing these views. In particular, it avoids the moral risk posed by views like Nozick’s libertarianism, which forbid redistributive taxation even for the sake of helping to provide for people’s basic needs: failing to do the latter, if it turns out that justice does require it, would be very morally wrong. This “uncertainty argument” has the advantage of minimizing reliance on controversial intuitions about distributive justice, helps to specifying a non-arbitrary threshold for sufficiency, and shows that the substantive moral implications of moral uncertainty are not limited to high-stakes applied ethics issues such as abortion and vegetarianism but instead extend to an issue at the heart of political philosophy. (shrink)

Nowadays, around half of the global population lives in urban areas. This rate is expected to increase up to two-thirds by the year 2050. Most studies analyze urban dynamics in wide geographic ranges, focusing mainly on cities. According to them, the global population is spatially distributed in two extremes: large urban agglomerations and rural deserts. However, this remark is excessively general and imprecise. For this reason, it remains essential to analyze these dynamics at other spatial scales. A close-up look (...) in thinly populated regions shows how urban dynamics are also noticeable. In this paper, we analyze spatiotemporal patterns of population distribution in a predominantly rural area by applying a local-scale approach. These patterns are represented by using spatial networks with nodes representing the human settlements and links showing hierarchies between nodes. This case study is conducted in a small municipality located in northwestern Spain. It is a predominantly rural area with a very particular spatial pattern of population distribution. (shrink)

There has been considerable recent interest in the “collective moral autonomy” thesis (CMA), that is, the notion that we can predicate moral successes, failures, and duties of collectives even if there are no comparable successes, failures, and duties among members. One reason why this position looks appealing is because the opposing individualist position seems to have what we might call an accounting problem. Individualists maintain that only individuals can be subjects of moral success, failure, or duty; however, many reasonable judgments (...) about collective actions include moral information on a scale and of a stringency that it does not seem possible to predicate even of the duties of members who have steering power in the actions of the collective. Here I offer a paradigm for thinking about responsibility judgments in organized collective cases to help individualism solve its accounting problem, and allow us to account within a strict individualist perspective for moral information that ostensibly favors CMA. (shrink)

Michael Blake claims that liberal principles ground egalitarian distribution domestically but not globally. This paper raises some worries about these claims. It challenges the argument for domestic distributive equality based on a concern for autonomy, noting that a broader concern for wellbeing is required. And it suggests that a concern for everyone’s autonomy and wellbeing supports the progressive pursuit of global distributive equality rather than only the pursuit of global sufficiency.

Hart’s criticism of Devlin’s stance on the legal enforcement of morality has been highly influential in shaping a new liberal sensibility and in paving the way to many important legal reforms in the UK. After 50 years it is perhaps time to go back to Law, Liberty and Morality to see it in the perspective of the general evolution of Hart’s thought since the early 50s. This is a period of extraordinary creativity for the Oxford philosopher, in which (...) he writes many important contributions to legal, moral and political philosophy. Prominent among these is ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’, an article that sets the agenda for Hart’s subsequent work on liberty, fairness and rights, and provides the philosophical background for the liberal understanding of the relations between law and morality defended in Law, Liberty and Morality. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that established responses to the demandingness objection fail to acknowledge an alternative explanation of the intuitive pull of this objection for a significant subset of norms being subject to it. This is the class of imperfect collective duties, which give rise to conceptually distinct objections from fairness that nonetheless permeate many clear examples of intuitively problematic moral demands. Such duties obtain where it is morally required to attain a certain outcome O, yet obtaining O does (...) not require each moral agent to do as much as they individually can but instead requires a finite amount of effort that can be variously allocated to different agents – think of classic collective action problems such as protesting against an unjust policy, lobbying a government, donating to disaster relief, or hosting refugees. -/- In such cases, our collective ability to attain O grounds a collective duty C to attain O, but this collective duty can be translated into various schemes of individual duties P to contribute towards O. Accordingly, this decomposition of C raises a problem of distributive justice. In fact, many intuitive objections to unfair distributions in such cases can be readily accounted for with the conceptual apparatus of prominent theories of distributive justice, but not by standard theories of interpersonal morality. For instance, the moral relevance of the fact that performing a composite duty P is more burdensome for agent A than for agent B can readily be explained in luck-egalitarian terms. Yet both utilitarians and contractualists could not account for this fact independently of an appeal to the demandingness objection, provided that the moral importance of the outcome attainable through P still trumps reasons against it that are due to the burden borne by the agent. -/- Put briefly, then, we need to clearly distinguish objections that morality demands _too much_ of me from objections that morality demands too much _of me_. Doing so is likely to make accepting the demandingness of morality properly construed more intuitively plausible, perhaps as mitigated by certain existing responses. (shrink)

This article argues for a social proviso concerning capital endowments that is analogous to Locke's original proviso on access to productive natural capital.

Lorenzo Sacconi and his coauthors have put forward the hypothesis that impartial agreements on distributive rules may generate a conditional preference for conformity. The observable effect of this preference would be compliance with fair distributive rules chosen behind a veil of ignorance, even in the absence of external coercion. This paper uses a Dictator Game with production and taking option to compare two ways in which the device of the veil of ignorance may be thought to generate a motivation for, (...) and compliance with a fair distributive rule: individually-as a thought experiment that should work as a moral cue- and collectively-as an actual process of agreement among subjects. The main result is that actual agreement proves to be necessary for agents to be led towards a fair distributive principle and to generate a significant amount of compliance in absence of external authority. This conclusion vindicates the role of actual agreements in generating motivational power in correspondence with fair distributive rules. (shrink)

Artificial agents have become increasingly prevalent in human social life. In light of the diversity of new human–machine interactions, we face renewed questions about the distribution of moral responsibility. Besides positions denying the mere possibility of attributing moral responsibility to artificial systems, recent approaches discuss the circumstances under which artificial agents may qualify as moral agents. This paper revisits the discussion of how responsibility might be distributed between artificial agents and human interaction partners (including producers of artificial agents) and (...) raises the question of whether attributions of responsibility should remain entirely on the human side. While acknowledging a crucial difference between living human beings and artificial systems culminating in an asymmetric feature of human–machine interactions, this paper investigates the extent to which artificial agents may reasonably be attributed a share of moral responsibility. To elaborate on criteria that can justify a distribution of responsibility in certain human–machine interactions, the role of types of criteria (interaction-related criteria and criteria that can be deferred from socially constructed responsibility relationships) is examined. Thereby, the focus will lay on the evaluation of potential criteria referring to the fact that artificial agents surpass in some aspects the capacities of humans. This is contrasted with socially constructed responsibility relationships that do not take these criteria into account. In summary, situations are examined in which it seems plausible that moral responsibility can be distributed between artificial and human agents. (shrink)

Distributive Justice Theories of distributive justice seek to specify what is meant by a just distribution of goods among members of society. All liberal theories (in the sense specified below) may be seen as expressions of laissez-faire with compensations for factors that they consider to be morally arbitrary. More specifically, such theories may be interpreted […].

_ Source: _Page Count 19 Collectivities can have obligations beyond the aggregate of pre-existing obligations of their members. Certain such collective obligations _distribute_, i.e., become members’ obligations to do their fair share. In _incremental good_ cases, i.e., those in which a member’s fair share would go part way toward fulfilling the collectivity’s obligation, each member has an unconditional obligation to contribute.States are involuntary collectivities that bear moral obligations. Certain states, _democratic legal states_, are collectivities whose obligations can distribute. Many existing (...) states are democratic legal states, but none satisfies more rigorous requirements of distributive justice. There, citizens who hold assets, in excess of what is just, bear a distributed duty to dedicate that excess toward correcting the injustice. It is an incremental good case not conditioned on the conformity of others who are also wealthier than justice allows, nor on the diligence of the state in meeting its obligations. (shrink)

If states are permitted to create and maintain a military force, by what means are they permitted to do so? This paper argues that a theory of just recruitment should incorporate a concern for moral risk. Since the military is a morally risky profession for its members, recruitment policies should be evaluated in terms of how they distribute moral risk within a community. We show how common military recruitment practices exacerbate and concentrate moral risk exposure, using the UK as a (...) case study. We argue that the British state wrongs its citizens by subjecting them to excessively morally risky recruitment practices. Since, we argue, this risk exposure cannot be justified by appealing to the benefits of a military career for recruits, our argument calls for reform of existing practices. Our method of evaluation is generalizable and thus can be used to assess other states’ practices. (shrink)

Sufficientarian theories of distributive justice are often considered to be vulnerable to the ‘blindness to inequality and other values objection’. This objection targets their commitment to holding the moral irrelevance of requirements of justice above absolute thresholds of advantage, making them insufficiently sensitive to egalitarian moral concerns that do have relevance for justice. This paper explores how sufficientarians could reply to this objection. Particularly, I claim that, if we accept that the force of the aforementioned objection comes from relational, and (...) not distributive, inequalities, different strategies are open for sufficientarians in order to be sensitive to these concerns. Drawing on recent literature about the relation between distributive and relational egalitarianism, and the possibility of reducing one to the other, strategies of ‘internalizing’ and ‘externalizing’ relational egalitarian concerns to a distributive sufficientarian framework are explored. In turn, I suggest that both strategies fail in their standard versions, but argue that a particular ‘hybrid view’ about justice is an attractive candidate for the sufficientarian theorist. (shrink)

Morality, Mortality as a whole deals with certain aspects of ethical theory and with moral problems that arise primarily in contexts involving life‐and‐death decisions. The importance of the theoretical issues is not limited to their relevance to these decisions; however, they are, rather, issues at the heart of basic moral and political theory. This first volume comprises three parts. Part I, Death: From Bad to Worse, has with four chapters, and an appendix, discussing death and why it is bad (...) for the person who dies. Part II, Saving Lives: General Issues, has six chapters, and explores a cluster of moral problems that arise in saving lives. The general question raised is whether we should always, in aiding life, act so as to save the greater number of lives or to produce the greatest amount of good. Part III, Scarce Resources: Theoretical Issues, Specific Recommendations, and Organ Transplants, has five chapters, and deals with the problem of the acquisition and distribution of organs for transplantation. It allows us to apply the theoretical discussion of saving lives and relevant/irrelevant utilities presented in the previous parts. However, the discussion can be understood independently of the first two parts, and the conceptual issues and procedures on which it focuses are relevant to dealing with any scarce resource, including money and time, which are needed to use other plentiful resources. Although the book contains much theoretical and methodological argument, it is firmly grounded in practical ethical issues, and is illustrated throughout by examples. (shrink)

Nearly a decade ago, Ingrid Robeyns formulated a distributive justice doctrine known as economic limitarianism. This article posits that Robeyns’ limitarianism is a politically plausible, practically feasible and morally justifiable doctrine. The doctrine effectively addresses concerns regarding incentives, efficacy and unequal opportunities. The article identifies a problem of scope or extensity, which it refers to as an asymmetric argument. The article proposes that this issue can be resolved by fully extending limitarianism to non-democratic states. This extension is justified by the (...) relationship between surplus money and political inequality, which can be explained through various avenues, including causal and constitutive explanations, structural injustice and systemic causation. While this list of avenues is not exhaustive, it is representative of the possible avenues that can be explored. Fully extending the doctrine to non-democratic states would enhance its robustness. (shrink)

A widespread view in moral, legal, and political philosophy, as well as in public discourse, is that responsibility makes a difference to the fair allocation or distribution of things that are valuable or disvaluable independently of responsibility. For example, the fairness of punishing a person for wrongdoing varies with her responsibility for wrongdoing; the fairness of requiring a person to pay compensation varies with her responsibility for the harm that she caused; the fairness of one person being worse off than (...) another varies with her responsibility for being worse off; the fairness of inflicting defensive harm on a person to avert a threat varies with her responsibility for causing or posing the threat; and so on. (shrink)

Various arguments have been provided for drawing non-humans such as animals and artificial agents into the sphere of moral consideration. In this paper, I argue for a shift from an ontological to a social-philosophical approach: instead of asking what an entity is, we should try to conceptually grasp the quasi-social dimension of relations between non-humans and humans. This allows me to reconsider the problem of justice, in particular distributive justice . Engaging with the work of Rawls, I show that an (...) expansion of the contractarian framework to non-humans causes an important problem for liberalism, but can be justified by a contractarian argument. Responding to Bell’s and Nussbaum’s comments on Rawls, I argue that we can justify drawing non-humans into the sphere of distributive justice by relying on the notion of a co-operative scheme. I discuss what co-operation between humans and non-humans can mean and the extent to which it depends on properties. I conclude that we need to imagine principles of ecological and technological distributive justice. (shrink)

How important is it, morally speaking, that banning the sale of organs removes the best option available to would-be organ sellers? According to a widespread argument called the best option argument, this is very important. In a recent article I criticised such reasoning, drawing on considerations of distributive justice. Luke Semrau has argued that I have misunderstood the best option argument. In this article, I respond to Semrau’s criticism and elaborate on my original argument.

Les crises économiques, financières, politiques, sociales, morales et écologiques se succèdent et s'entremêlent à l'échelle globale, au travers d'une mondialisation qui, dans la concrétisation de l'universel, traduit un jeu dual (global-local) dans lequel l'universalisation des conditions d'accès à l'universel fait défaut. L'extrême pauvreté dans les " sociétés non libérales " et le recul des libertés en termes de " capabilités " des plus vulnérables nous interpellent tous sur la glocalisation des grands maux sociétaux qui affligent en l'occurrence les plus mal (...) lotis et requièrent ainsi de nouvelles interrogations sur la pensée de John Rawls à propos de la solidarité et de la justice dans les relations internationales. Le glocaliste Thomas Pogge, qui mesure fort bien les enjeux de la conception de la justice comme équité à l'horizon cosmopolitique, se positionne en s'opposant à Rawls sur ce sujet. Le " principe de différence global " qui manque dans les politiques publiques et les institutions de redistribution de richesses est le point nodal de la discussion dans ce livre. Avec le souci d'établir les jalons d'un " développement glocaliste " juste et équitable, Daniel Noumbissié Tchamo ouvre un débat en philosophie pratique sur la distribution des richesses et les nouvelles considérations sur le développement dans une société mondiale glocalisée. (shrink)

If it is accepted that the real marketplace does not necessarily distribute wealth in the manner that the ideal market would have done, and that societal institutions have an obligation to bring the real and ideal market distributions into accord, then it can be argued that economic actors have a responsibility to consider the effects of their activities on the distribution of wealth in society. This paper asserts that businesses have a responsibility to consider the wealth distribution effects of their (...) wealth-creating decisions. We use arguments from moral economics and Catholic social teaching to support this assertion, deriving decision principles that we apply to the Starbucks fair trade coffee case. (shrink)

The paper discusses the problem of global distributive justice. It proposes to distinguish between principles for the domestic and for the global or intersocietal distribution of wealth. It is argued that there may be a plurality of partly diverging domestic conceptions of distributive justice, not all of which need to be liberal egalitarian conceptions. It is maintained, however, that principles regulating the intersocietal distribution of wealth have to be egalitarian principles. This claim is defended against Rawls's argument in The Law (...) of Peoples that egalitarian principles of distributive justice should not be applied globally. Moreover, it is explained in detail, why Rawls's “duty of assistance to burdened societies” cannot be an appropriate substitute for a global principle of distributive justice. (shrink)

In order for states to fulfil their moral duties, costs must be passed to individual citizens. This paper asks how these costs should be distributed. I advocate the common-sense answer: the distribution of costs should, insofar as possible, track the reasons behind the state’s duty. This answer faces a number of problems, which I attempt to solve.

For much of its modern history, the notion of talent has been associated with the idea of ‘careers open to talent’. Its emancipatory promise of upward social mobility has radically transformed the distribution of advantaged social positions and has had a lasting influence on the very idea of social status itself. Nevertheless, unlike concepts traditionally associated with distributive justice, e.g. fairness, (in)equality, desert, equality of opportunity as well as justice itself, the notion of talent has received only limited examination. This (...) article discusses some of the most pressing problems and challenges arising out of a reductionist understanding of talents’ anatomy and a distorted characterization of their overall distributive value. In particular, it aims to address those issues revolving around talents’ anatomy existing conceptions of distributive justice leave either neglected or outrightly ignored. The introductory part outlines the basic egalitarian conception of equal opportunities and then proceed with the examination of fairness embedded in it. The central part of the paper identifies the key elements of talents’ anatomy. We then discuss some of the implications egalitarianism either leaves out of the discussion or neglects. In particular, we challenge the idea of moral arbitrariness as the key mechanism to discard talents as a form of unfair advantage in the process of competition for advantaged social positions. In the final part, we outline two fundamental problems that call into question the cogency of egalitarian conceptions of talent(s) as a form of unfair disadvantage. (shrink)

In Against Moral Responsibility, Bruce Waller launches a spirited attack on a system that is profoundly entrenched in our society and its institutions, deeply rooted in our emotions, and vigorously defended by philosophers from ancient times to the present. Waller argues that, despite the creative defenses of it by contemporary thinkers, moral responsibility cannot survive in our naturalistic-scientific system. The scientific understanding of human behavior and the causes that shape human character, he contends, leaves no room for moral responsibility. Waller (...) argues that moral responsibility in all its forms--including criminal justice, distributive justice, and all claims of just deserts--is fundamentally unfair and harmful and that its abolition will be liberating and beneficial. What we really want--natural human free will, moral judgments, meaningful human relationships, creative abilities--would survive and flourish without moral responsibility. In the course of his argument, Waller examines the origins of the basic belief in moral responsibility, proposes a naturalistic understanding of free will, offers a detailed argument against moral responsibility and critiques arguments in favor of it, gives a general account of what a world without moral responsibility would look like, and examines the social and psychological aspects of abolishing moral responsibility. Waller not only mounts a vigorous, and philosophically rigorous, attack on the moral responsibility system, but also celebrates the benefits that would result from its total abolition. (shrink)

Everyone agrees that justice is a profoundly important value. People march and protest to demand it; more than a few have died in its pursuit. Yet when we stop to reflect on what makes for justice, or try to state in a clear way what we mean when we speak of justice, we may be perplexed. But if you are going to die in defense of some value, it is important for you to have a fairly clear conception of what (...) that value is. This book is an attempt to explain and defend, in clear and precise terms, a novel and controversial view about what makes for distributive justice in a country. The theory is a form of desertism, according to which justice reigns in a country when the government ensures that citizens receive the benefits and burdens they deserve. (shrink)

A growing number of lay Buddhist practitioners have sought out alternative ways to incorporate Buddhist teachings in their daily practices and make positive changes in society by “doing good” for others. Sometimes recognized as part of “humanistic Buddhism,” this approach emphasizes general morality and focuses on people who need help as a way to fulfill Buddhist teachings in this world. Some Chinese Buddhist practitioners who follow the Tibetan Buddhist tradition also carry out similar humanistic engagements but use more subtle (...) space-making processes and often “brand” these as Buddhist practices. Drawing on the ethnographic observations of lay Buddhist practitioners in urban China, this article examines how urban practitioners promote (middle-class) morality and well-being lifestyles through what I call “atmospheric Buddhism.” Ultimately, the article argues that an alternative mode of Buddhist practice is emerging in Chinese urban environments in order to cope with politically constrained environments. (shrink)

This paper considers the view that the basis of equality is the range property of being a moral person. This view, suggested by John Rawls in his A Theory of Justice (1971), is commonly dismissed in the literature. By defending the view against the criticism levelled against it, I aim to show that this dismissal has been too quick. The critics have generally failed to fully appreciate the fact that Rawls's account is restricted to the domain of distributive justice. On (...) Rawls's view distributive justice is a matter of the fair terms of cooperation among the participants of a system of social cooperation. I argue that this understanding of distributive justice can provide a compelling rationale for considering moral personality as the basis of equality for this domain of morality. That moral persons are indeed equal is further supported by an intuitive argument concerning the irrelevance of morally arbitrary factors, giving us reasons to believe that varying capacities among moral persons does not result in an unequal moral status. The dismissal of Rawls's account of equality has thus been premature, and it remains an important view to consider. (shrink)

Disagreements about the morality of markets, and about self-interested behavior within markets, run deep. They arise from perspectives within economics and political philosophy that appear to have nothing in common. In this book, Daniel Finn provides a framework for understanding these conflicting points of view. Recounting the arguments for and against markets and self-interest, he argues that every economy must address four fundamental problems: allocation, distribution, scale, and the quality of relations. In addition, every perspective on the morality (...) of markets addresses explicitly or implicitly the economic, political, and cultural contexts of markets, or what Finn terms 'the moral ecology of markets'. His book enables a dialogue among the various participants in the debate over justice in markets. In this process, Finn engages with major figures in political philosophy, including John Rawls, Robert Nozick, and Michael Walzer, as well as in economics, notably Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek, and James Buchannan. (shrink)

This book addresses a range of relevant theoretical issues, including the possibility of an interpersonally comparable measure of well-being, or “utility” metric; the moral value of equality, and how that bears on the form of the social welfare function; social choice under uncertainty; and the possibility of integrating considerations of individual choice and responsibility into the social-welfare-function framework. This book also deals with issues of implementation, and explores how survey data and other sources of evidence might be used to calibrate (...) both a utility metric and a social welfare function, and whether distributive goals are ever best pursued through regulation rather than the tax system. In working through this range of theoretical and practical issues, the book draws from a wide variety of literatures, including philosophical scholarship on equality, responsibility, the nature of well-being, and personal identity over time; the social choice literature within economics; applied economic literatures concerning the measurement of inequality and poverty; legal and policy-analysis scholarship on cost-benefit analysis, environmental justice, and the choice between regulation and taxation; and the burgeoning field of “happiness studies”. (shrink)

Society's distribution of goods is not always just: there is a significant lack of jobs and resources accessible to even the hardest of workers, and even the most motivated can have trouble discovering that fulfilling calling. Furthermore, the most needed jobs may, for many, not be the most fulfilling ones, while the most fulfilling jobs may not always better society. Amidst such observations, I find myself reflecting on my own life choices. Working at The Hastings Center is an exceedingly rare (...) opportunity for which I am extremely grateful: it allows me to combine my life passion and my hopes for a moral society with allocating my time in ways that are both fulfilling momentarily and hopefully contribute to a future career in the field. (shrink)