Is it possible to justify territorial rights? Provided a justification for territorial rights can be found, does it ground claims toparticularterritories? And provided a claim to particular territories can be justified, what kind of claim is it? Is it a claim to jurisdiction? A claim to control resources? A claim to control the movement of people across borders? In this paper I review some prominent accounts seeking to answer these questions. After outlining their main features, I focus on some (...) difficulties they encounter, in particular with regard to the justification of exclusion. (shrink)

El trabajo utiliza las herramientas conceptuales de la discusión sobre injusticia epistémica para analizar tres contextos de cuidado emocional y la atención a la salud mental, tales como: las redes sociales de apoyo informal, la atención terapéutica y la atención psiquiátrica. El propósito es mostrar el tipo de dinámicas sociales que, en dichos contextos, derivan en una exclusión del testimonio de las personas que recurren a ellas. La tesis central sostiene que entender las diversas dinámicas sociales que propician los distintos (...) tipos de exclusiones, implica desglosar circunstancias sociales de diferente calado, algunas de las cuales se encuentran interrelacionadas, como lo representan la producción de sesgos derivados de diferentes tipos de prejuicios (de identidad o participación), mientras que, otras, responden a la constitución de un exceso de credibilidad otorgado a determinados campos expertos. De esta forma la invitación es a pensar que la restitución de la justicia epistémica en este tipo de atención y cuidado no depende ni de la corrección de una sola instancia social, ni de la mejora de un solo sistema experto. (shrink)

Les communautés humaines se sont organisées à l’origine autour de règles morales envisageant leur propre survie. Les règles morales existent parce que les êtres humains sont violents, en tant qu’êtres naturels, et raisonnables, en tant qu’êtres capables de choisir la raison. Le choix de la raison, au moment de créer un domaine d’exclusion et de reconnaissance, est ce qui constitue le monde humain comme monde sensé. La violence, concrétisée sous les plus différentes formes d’exclusion, est la négation du sens. Ainsi, (...) l’élimination progressive de la violence est, en même temps, le secret des morales et le critère de toute action politique qui se veut morale. (shrink)

This chapter delineates several distinct (and often problematically conflated) kinds of sexual exclusion: (1) lack of access to sexual gratification or pleasure, (2) lack of access to partnered sex, and (3) lack of social/psychological validation that comes from being seen as a sexual being. Liberman offers proposals about what our collective responses to these harms should be while weighing in on debates about whether there are rights to various kinds of sexual goods. She concludes that we ought to provide mechanical (...) assistance to those who are incapable of self-stimulation, enhance access to sexual education for everyone, and engage in a systematic effort to change the harmful social norms, stereotypes, and cultural ideals that drive exclusion from partnered sex and can lead to social invalidation. (shrink)

Recently some philosophers suggested an exclusion problem for moral non-naturalism, which is similar to the exclusion problem in philosophy of mind. In this article, the author aims to advance the discussion of exclusion in morality by investigating two influential solutions to the exclusion problem: the autonomy solution and the overdetermination solution. The author attempts to show that the moral non-naturalist can solve the exclusion problem in a way that is different from the approach to solving mental-physical exclusion. First, the author (...) argues that while the autonomy solution to mental exclusion may work, a similar autonomy approach to moral exclusion is implausible. Second, the author argues that whereas the overdetermination solution to mental exclusion fails, a similar overdetermination solution to moral exclusion is promising. (shrink)

Hardly known twenty years ago, exclusion from public space has today become a standard tool of state intervention. Every year, tens of thousands of homeless individuals, drug addicts, teenagers, protesters and others are banned from parts of public space. The rise of exclusion measures is characteristic of two broader developments that have profoundly transformed public space in recent years: the privatisation of public space, and its increased control in the 'security society'. Despite the fundamental problems it raises, exclusion from public (...) space has received hardly any attention from legal scholars. This book addresses this gap and comprehensively explores the implications that this new form of intervention has for the constitutional essentials of liberal democracy: the rule of law, fundamental rights, and democracy. To do so, it analyses legal developments in three liberal democracies that have been at the forefront of promoting exclusion measures: the United Kingdom, the United States, and Switzerland. (shrink)

Deliberative democratic theorists typically use accounts of public reason— that is, constraints on the types of reasons one can invoke in public, political discourse—as a tool to resist political exclusion; at its most basic level, the aim of a theory of public reason is to prevent situations in which powerful majority groups are able to justify policy choices based on reasons that are not even assessable by minority groups. However, I demonstrate here that a type of exclusion I call "conceptual (...) exclusion" complicates this picture. I argue that the possibility of conceptual exclusion creates the potential for public reason constraints to further exclude already marginalized groups— contrary to the standard view—and thus that taking conceptual exclusion seriously requires both a revision of traditional accounts of public reason and a reconceptualization of our civic obligations. (shrink)

Jaegwon Kim’s (2005) most recent formulation of the so-called Supervenience Argument against Non-Reductive Physicalism is discussed. The two stages of Kim’s argument can be seen as instances of, what I will call, the Generalized Exclusion Argument.

Erman's reaction shows that she misses the main point at issue. She insists that democracy means "rule by the people"; I define it as a commitment to freedom and equality for everyone. This is a disagreement about the concept of democracy itself, not just about differing conceptions, and it illustrates how deeply engrained Westphalian thinking remains.

In this brief note I claim that, contrary to what Esfeld argues in his paper in this same volume, Kim's position with respect to the problem of causal exclusion does indeed commit him to the causal heterogeneity of realized properties.

Is it possible for the state simultaneously to respect deep cultural differences and to protect the hard-won citizenship rights of vulnerable group members, particularly women? This 2001 book argues that it is not only theoretically needed, but also institutionally feasible. Rejecting prevalent normative and legal solutions to this 'paradox of multicultural vulnerability', Multicultural Jurisdictions develops a powerful argument for enhancement of the jurisdictional autonomy of religious and cultural minorities while at the same time providing viable legal-institutional solutions to the problem (...) of sanctioned intra-group rights violation. This new 'joint governance' approach is guided by an innovative principle that strives for the reduction of injustice between minority groups and the wider society, together with the enhancement of justice within them. This book will interest students of political and social theory, law, religion, institutional design, as well as cultural and gender studies. (shrink)

Recent debates in psychopathy studies have articulated concerns about false-positives in assessment and research sampling. These are pressing concerns for research progress, since scientific quality depends on sample quality, that is, if we wish to study psychopathy we must be certain that the individuals we study are, in fact, psychopaths. Thus, if conventional assessment tools yield substantial false-positives, this would explain why central research is laden with discrepancies and nonreplicable findings. This paper draws on moral psychology in order to develop (...) tentative theory-driven exclusion criteria applicable in research sampling. Implementing standardized procedures to discriminate between research participants has the potential to yield more homogenous and discrete samples, a vital prerequisite for research progress in etiology, epidemiology, and treatment strategies. (shrink)

A-theoretic presentness is commonly regarded as non-solipsist and non-relative. The non-solipsism of a non-relative, A-theoretic presentness requires at least two space-like separated things to be present simpliciter together – this co-presentness further implies the global, non-relative, non-conventional simultaneity of them. Yet, this implication clashes with the general view that there is no global, non-relative, non-conventional simultaneity in Minkowski space-time. In order to resolve this conflict, this paper explores the possibility that the non-solipsism of a non-relative, A-theoretic presentness does not require (...) at least two space-like separated things to be present simpliciter together. This can be done by holding exclusive disjunctivism –that mutually space-like separated things are present simpliciter exclusively disjunctively, and each one of them gets to be present simpliciter in a non-successive way (just like mutually time-like related things are present simpliciter exclusively disjunctively, and each one of them gets to be present simpliciter, but in a successive way). (shrink)

In Sharing Freedom, Geneviève Rousselière explores the French revolutionary tradition’s singular contributions to republicanism by focusing on its internal tensions and its exclusions. French revol...

Some non-reductionists claim that so-called ‘exclusion arguments’ against their position rely on a notion of causal sufficiency that is particularly problematic. I argue that such concerns about the role of causal sufficiency in exclusion arguments are relatively superficial since exclusionists can address them by reformulating exclusion arguments in terms of physical sufficiency. The resulting exclusion arguments still face familiar problems, but these are not related to the choice between causal sufficiency and physical sufficiency. The upshot is that objections to the (...) notion of causal sufficiency can be answered in a straightforward fashion and that such objections therefore do not pose a serious threat to exclusion arguments. (shrink)

I agree with a great deal in Helen Steward's paper. I am especially sympathetic to her suggestion that we gain metaphysical illumination by considering various ways in which we arrive at ideas of certain kinds of individuals by abstraction from those of more basic kinds. My aim is to pursue that suggestion by exploring the proposal that a grounding node in this form of abstraction may be characterized by Exclusivity in spatial location. Steward claims that we arrive at our ideas (...) of specific events and processes by different modes of abstraction in cases where a more basic persisting individual undergoes some kind of change. I argue that the most basic individuals in this hierarchy of abstraction are enduring substances that occupy their spatial location exclusively at all times: no two such substances are ever precisely collocated. (shrink)

Jaegwon Kim argues that if mental properties are irreducible with respect to physical properties then mental properties are epiphenomenal. I believe this conditional is false and argue that mental properties, along with their physical counterparts, may overdetermine their effects. Kim contends, however, that embracing overdetermination in the mental case, due to supervenience, renders the attribution of overdetermination vacuous. This way of blocking the overdetermination option, however, makes the attribution of mental epiphenomenalism equally vacuous. Furthermore, according to Kim’s own logic, physical (...) properties, and not mental properties, may be in danger of losing their causal relevance. (shrink)

Although sovereign jurisdictional authority is not itself a kind of property right for Hobbes, it is the object of the sovereign’s proprietary rights. Jurisdictional authority for Hobbes is foundationally over persons rather than territory, so that the sovereign’s territorial jurisdiction is parasitic on jurisdiction over persons. Territory nevertheless plays a significant role in determining subjects’ political obligations because the sovereign’s ability to protect subjects is necessary for such obligations, and control over space is necessary to protect subjects. Yet (...) Hobbes shows why the modern ideology of the state does not univocally posit the state as an intrinsically territorial entity. There are two traditions here: The Lockean one that, in grounding jurisdictional authority in private dominion over things, portrays the state as intrinsically territorial, and the Hobbesian one that, in deriving property rights from jurisdictional authority, does not. (shrink)

Although sovereign jurisdictional authority is not itself a kind of property right for Hobbes, it is the object of the sovereign’s (not the state’s) proprietary rights. Jurisdictional authority for Hobbes is foundationally over persons rather than territory, so that the sovereign’s territorial jurisdiction is parasitic on jurisdiction over persons. Territory nevertheless plays a significant role in determining subjects’ political obligations because the sovereign’s ability to protect subjects is necessary for such obligations, and control over space is necessary to (...) protect subjects. Yet Hobbes shows why the modern ideology of the state does not univocally posit the state as an intrinsically territorial entity. There are two traditions here: The Lockean one that, in grounding jurisdictional authority in private dominion over things, portrays the state as intrinsically territorial, and the Hobbesian one that, in deriving property rights from jurisdictional authority, does not. (shrink)

In this contribution, I critically discuss the thesis, advanced by some recent writers, that nonreductive physicalists can solve the problem of causal exclusion by resorting to the metaphysical notion of grounding. After discussing the many problems confronted by very recent versions of this proposal, I conclude that a version of Nonreductive Physicalism framed in terms of a notion of realization of properties is in a better position than Grounding Physicalism in order to successfully deal with a notoriously complex metaphysical issue (...) such as the causal exclusion problem. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es someter a crítica el discurso de la exclusión social. Comenzaremos exponiendo algunos rasgos centrales de nuestro mundo en globalización para, a continuación, exponer las razones que hacen a este discurso profundamente inadecuado. Distrae la atención de características fundamentales de este mundo, de modo que puede ser instrumentalizado para ocultar relaciones que se encuentran a la base de la explotación, la dominación o la subordinación. Frente a este discurso se propondrá otro que podría evitar estos (...) peligros, el de la incorporación adversa. The aim of this article is to criticize the discourse of social exclusion. We will begin by exposing some central features of our globalizing world and then we will present some reasons that make this discourse profoundly inadequate. It distracts attention from fundamental characteristics of our contemporary world, so that it can be used to obscure relationships at the root of exploitation, domination or subordination. Against this discourse, I will propose the concept of adverse incorporation to avoid these dangers. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Jc Beall has employed what he calls ‘shriek rules’ in a putative solution to the long-standing ‘just false’ problem for glut theory. The purpose of this paper is twofold: firstly, I distinguish the ‘just false’ problem from another problem, with which it is often conflated, which I will call the ‘exclusion problem’. Secondly, I argue that shriek rules do not help glut theorists with either problem.

The roles of linguistic, cognitive, and social-pragmatic processes in word learning are well established. If statistical mechanisms also contribute to word learning, they must interact with these processes; however, there exists little evidence for such mechanistic synergy. Adults use co-occurrence statistics to encode speech–object pairings with detailed sensitivity in stochastic learning environments (Vouloumanos, 2008). Here, we replicate this statistical work with nonspeech sounds and compare the results with the previous speech studies to examine whether exclusion constraints contribute equally to the (...) statistical learning of speech–object and nonspeech–object associations. In environments in which performance could benefit from exclusion, we find a learning advantage for speech over nonspeech, revealing an interaction between statistical and exclusion processes in associative word learning. (shrink)

This paper presents experimental data relevant to understanding the modal free choice effect (Kamp, 1973) when there are more than two disjuncts under the relevant modal operator. The results suggest that speakers' willingness to draw free choice inferences is correlated with whether the embedded disjuncts are *modally separable*, in a sense brought into focus by considering cases within which the relevant propositions fail to be pairwise redundant but are redundant as a set.

Many philosophers argue that exclusion arguments cannot exclude non-reductionist physicalist mental properties from being causes without excluding properties that are patently causal as well. List and Stoljar (2017) recently argued that a similar response to exclusion arguments is also available to dualists, thereby challenging the predominant view that exclusion arguments undermine dualist theories of mind. In particular, List and Stoljar maintain that exclusion arguments against dualism require a premise that states that, if a property is metaphysically distinct from the sufficient (...) cause of an effect, this property cannot be a cause of that effect. I argue that this premise is indeed likely to exclude patently causal properties, but that exclusion arguments against dualism do not require this premise. The relation that enables metaphysically distinct properties to cause the same effect in the relevant way turns out to be tighter than the relation typically posited between dualist conscious properties and their underlying physical properties. It is therefore still plausible that the latter causally exclude the former and that compelling exclusion arguments against dualism can be formulated by using a weaker exclusion premise. I conclude by proposing such a formulation. (shrink)

A critical analysis of recent interventionist responses to the causal exclusion problem is presented. It is argued that the response can indeed offer a solution to the problem, but one that is based on renouncing the multiple realizability thesis. The account amounts to the rejection of nonreductive physicalism and would thus be unacceptable to many. It is further shown that if the multiple realizability thesis is brought back in and conjoined with the interventionist notion of causation, inter-level causation is ruled (...) out altogether. (shrink)

In “Ethics and the Underpinnings of Policy in Biodefense and Emergency Preparedness,” Lisa Eckenwiler advances discussion about emergency preparedness by exploring ethical commitments that shape healthcare and defense policy in an age of terrorism. Eckenwiler rightly discerns that policymakers' assumptions about controlling and containing hostile malefactors and the need for public consent regarding security measures are part of an epistemic framework that orders the current response to terrorism. Again rightly, she suggests that citizens ought to have a say in shaping (...) and interpreting such fundamental assumptions, a reductive medical model that focuses on mitigation and the management of casualties is insufficient for understanding and responding to the complex social, political, and economic factors that precipitate terrorist attacks, and there is in emergency preparedness an ethically problematic disproportion between the demands society places on public health/medical professionals and the resources society provides for them to meet these demands. She is also probably correct in claiming that, properly understood, the ethical underpinnings of public health policy are teleological in nature. (shrink)

This study shows how three Chilean media construct in their discourse the social actor ‘secondary students’, in a multimodal way. It focuses on the representation of Televisión Nacional de Chile (also known as TVN), El Dínamo and El Ciudadano of this social group which is often suppressed suppressed from the media sphere. It is a qualitative study with a social semiotic approach, following the guidelines of Visual Grammar and the typology of representation of social actors by van Leeuwen (2003). The (...) corpus comprised 15 multimodal texts of 2018 compiled from internet sites, which constitute a semiotic chain of a news event about education. The results suggest that TVN creates the meaning of an ‘aggressor student’, El Dínamo as a ‘student to be reformed’; whereas El Ciudadano, represents him as a social actor who is an ‘active participant’. (shrink)

The non-reductive physicalist would like to believe that mental properties are not identical to physical properties; that there are complete causal explanations of all events in terms of physical properties; and that there are sometimes explanations of events in terms of mental properties. However, some have argued that these claims cannot all be true, since they are collectively inconsistent with a principle of causal exclusion. In this paper I argue that the best formulation of the interventionist theory of causation entails (...) the falsity of the exclusion principle. However, I argue that it does so at the cost of revealing a weakness in the interventionist theory itself. (shrink)

Does democracy or popular sovereignty imply exclusion and drawing borders? And if so, what type of exclusion and borders, and what kind of justification can we give for them? Moreover, if democracy really requires some kind of exclusion, is global democracy then a paradoxical union of two contradictory ideals? Can we create a demos on the global level? The focus of this collection of essays is on this potential conflict and its underlying values.

In seventeenth-century France, Colbert built a more effective state administration not by rationalizing state offices but by using public documents to increase the government’s intellectual capacity to exercise logistical power and engage in territorial governance. This pattern calls into question Weber’s model of the genesis of “modern officialdom,” suggesting that its source was not social rationalization, but rather the identification and management of expertise. Colbert recruited into government nascent technocrats with knowledge useful to territorial politics, using contracts and other documents (...) to limit their independence and subordinate them to patrimonial authorities. They exercised specific duties and impersonal powers in jurisdictional areas—much like modern technocrats. Their expertise enhanced the intellectual capacity of the administration to exercise territorial power and made the state less dependent on patrimonial clienteles without challenging the patrimonial culture of power/knowledge. (shrink)