The ways in which people conceptualize the human–nature relationship have significant implications for proenvironmental values and attitudes, sustainable behavior, and environmental policy measures. Human exceptionalism (HE) is one such conceptual framework, involving the belief that humans and human societies exist independently of the ecosystems in which they are embedded, promoting a sharp ontological boundary between humans and the rest of the natural world. In this paper, we introduce HE in more depth, exploring the impact of HE (...) on perceptions of the human–nature relationship, the role of culture in HE, and speculating on the origins of HE. We consider potential implications for environmental decision-making, conservation and environmental science, and promoting proenvironmental behavior. We present empirical evidence on the pervasiveness and consequences of HE in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic) populations, and potential interventions. Finally, we close with implications of human-exceptionalist thinking on other sustainability-related fields, including conservation practices, nature management, climate change adaptation, and environmental science. Understanding the cognitive and social drivers of this disconnect is vital on a planet now dominated by environmental change, as not only are humans increasingly impacted by natural disasters, but the choices they make can have ever more dire consequences for the sustainability of ecosystems. (shrink)

The "new materialisms' offer an important critique of 'human exceptionalism, however they tend to overstate their case by ignoring those qualities of freedom that remain distinctive to human life. The paper turns to Simone de Beauvoir to make an argument for a more modest human exceptionalism.

Animals are at work everywhere in education, yet existing nowhere: Education doesn’t know them beyond their instrumental use value; as animals-for-us (Pedersen, 2019a, p. 7; Wallin, 2014, p. 149; c...

In recent years, several cases about the legal personhood of nonhuman animals garnered global attention, e.g. the recognition of ‘basic rights’ for the Argentinian great apes Sandra and Cecilia. Legal scholars have embraced the animal turn, blurring the once sovereign boundaries between persons and objects, recognising nonhuman beings as legal subjects. The zoonotic origins of the Covid-19 pandemic stress the urgency of establishing ‘global animal law’ and deconstructing anthropocentrism. To this end, it is vital to also consider the extensive premodern (...) legal history that humans share with other animals. Over 200 so-called animal trials have been documented in premodern Europe. In these proceedings, certain nonhuman animals—particularly domestic pigs—were prosecuted, often resulting in their capital punishment or anathema. This paper takes a history of ideas approach to these historical instances where Western philosophy of law and philosophical anthropology intersect, problematising the notion that such trials constitute wholesome precedents of the kind of legal personhood presently debated in jurisprudence. My counter-hegemonic analysis of the legal prosecution and execution of several pigs in fifteenth-century France demonstrates that late mediaeval notions of criminality transcended the alleged human-nonhuman divide whilst reaffirming and reifying human distinctiveness. I propose that pig trials were local laboratories where Christian communities reflected upon the natural hierarchy of God’s creation. Ensuing the apparent breach of the prescribed boundaries of nature, these communities renegotiated and re-naturalised everyday interspecies sociability by utilising the offending animals to exemplify particular norms about what it means to be human, generally to the animals’ detriment. (shrink)

This paper addresses a fundamental question in folk metaphysics: how do we ordinarily view human agency? According to the transcendence account, we view human agency as standing outside of the causal order and imbued with exceptional powers. According to a naturalistic account, we view human agency as subject to the same physical laws as other objects and completely open to scientific investigation. According to exceptionalist naturalism, the truth lies somewhere in between: we view human agency as (...) fitting broadly within the causal order while still being exceptional in important respects. In this paper, I report seven experiments designed to decide between these three competing theories. Across a variety of contexts and types of action, participants agreed that human agents can resist outcomes described as inevitable, guaranteed, and causally determined. Participants viewed non-human animal agents similarly, whereas they viewed computers, robots, and simple inanimate objects differently. At the same time, participants judged that human actions are caused by many things, including psychological, neurological, and social events. Overall, in folk metaphysics, human and non-human animals are viewed as exceptional parts of the natural world. (shrink)

With the 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq, the most controversial question in world politics fast became whether the United States stands within the order of international law or outside it. Does America still play by the rules it helped create? American Exceptionalism and Human Rights addresses this question as it applies to U.S. behavior in relation to international human rights. With essays by eleven leading experts in such fields as international relations and international law, it (...) seeks to show and explain how America's approach to human rights differs from that of most other Western nations. In his introduction, Michael Ignatieff identifies three main types of exceptionalism: exemptionalism ; double standards ; and legal isolationism. The contributors use Ignatieff's essay as a jumping-off point to discuss specific types of exceptionalism--America's approach to capital punishment and to free speech, for example--or to explore the social, cultural, and institutional roots of exceptionalism.These essays--most of which appear in print here for the first time, and all of which have been revised or updated since being presented in a year-long lecture series on American exceptionalism at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government--are by Stanley Hoffmann, Paul Kahn, Harold Koh, Frank Michelman, Andrew Moravcsik, John Ruggie, Frederick Schauer, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Carol Steiker, and Cass Sunstein. (shrink)

100 years ago, the editors of the Journal of Educational Psychology conducted one of the most famous studies of experts' conceptions of human intelligence. Reason enough to prompt the question where we stand today with conceptualizing 'intelligence'. In this paper, I provide a synopsis of the latest research on human intelligence(s). I embrace the notion of intelligence as a non-unitary faculty with pluralistic forms. Even though I do not provide a definition of 'intelligence' of my own, I provide (...) good reasons for this reluctance. Nonetheless, I specify the term as complex, gradual, embedded, multidirectional, and dynamic. Furthermore, I argue for the special status of musical, not linguistic, intelligence. (shrink)

In 2016, the European Parliament approved the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) whose core aim is the safeguarding of information privacy, and, by corollary, human dignity. Drawing on the field of philosophical anthropology, this paper analyses various interpretations of human dignity and human exceptionalism. It concludes that privacy is essential for humans to flourish and enable individuals to build a sense of self and the world.

Architecture and human-built structures are embedded with speciesist practices of domination over the environment, where humans are considered special and superior to other species. This (hu)man exceptionalism has driven architecture and the built environment to be conceived in opposition to ‘nature’, dominating natural terrains and consequently displacing or instrumentalizing the many other species that are given little to no ethical consideration. This way of intervening in the world is leading to the existential questions that must be posed given (...) our global climate crisis. A reframing of human intervention as ‘built environment’ placed in opposition to the ‘natural environment’ of supposedly passive nature, is urgently needed. The motivation for this paper is rooted in a deep concern for the role of humans in the climate crisis and a realization that architecture as a discipline is complicit in elevating the human category above all other beings in nature. There are biases embedded in the practices and teaching of architecture that need to be interrogated and reflected upon, starting with the role models and ideals that we unwittingly operate within. To contextualize the idea of human exceptionalism in architecture, we will explore deep-seeded ideals in architecture linked to the concept of Rectitude as a form of ‘rightness’ -or correct- mode of intervening in the world, conceptualized by Western men as a human-centric practice distinct from nature-made. Supported by Ecofeminist thought, the aim is to open alternative models for world-building and housing humans on earth living in its sixth extinction. (shrink)

The term “exceptionalism” was introduced into health care in 1991 when Bayer described “HIV exceptionalism” as the policy of treating the human immunodeficiency virus different from other infectious diseases, particularly other sexually transmitted diseases. It was reflected in the following practices: pre- and post-HIV test counseling, the development of specific separate consent forms for HIV testing, and stringent requirements for confidentiality of HIV test results. The justification for these practices was the belief that testing was essential for (...) prevention and that patients might not seek HIV testing if confidentiality were not guaranteed. Confidentiality was believed to be particularly important given the degree of discrimination and stigmatization associated with the illness. Anonymous testing was a further step in ensuring strict confidentiality, even though such a practice prevented public officials from contacting partners and others who were at risk. (shrink)

One of the most important and contentious policy issues surrounding genetics is whether genetic information should be treated separately from other medical information. The view that genetics raises distinct issues is what Thomas Murray labeled “genetic exceptionalism,” borrowing from the earlier term “HIV exceptional-ism.” The issue of whether the use of genetic information should be addressed separately from other health information is not merely an academic concern, however. Since the Human Genome Project began in 1990, nearly every state (...) has enacted legislation prohibiting genetic discrimination in health insurance; two-thirds of the states have enacted laws prohibiting genetic discrimination in employment, and other state laws have been enacted dealing with genetic discrimination in life insurance, genetic privacy, and genetic testing. Bills in Congress also would prohibit genetic discrimination in health insurance and employment. (shrink)

Discussions about brain data and privacy, particularly those advocating for human rights frameworks, at times, have embodied problematic undercurrents of, if not overt appeals to, neuro-exceptional...

Research involving human subjects is much more stringently regulated than many other nonresearch activities that appear to be at least as risky. A number of prominent figures now argue that research is overregulated. We argue that the reasons typically offered to justify the present system of research regulation fail to show that research should be subject to more stringent regulation than other equally risky activities. However, there are three often overlooked reasons for thinking that research should be treated as (...) a special case. First, research typically involves the imposition of risk on people who do not benefit from this risk imposition. Second, research depends on public trust. Third, the complexity of the moral decision making required favors ethics committees as a regulative solution for research. (shrink)

I would like to begin by thanking all of the commentators for their insightful analyses of ‘Genetic information, insurance and a pluralistic approach to justice’; I learnt a great deal from them all. Naturally, I cannot do justice to all of their criticisms in this brief response; instead, I shall use their remarks to prompt some clarificatory points about my arguments in the hope that this will help readers to draw their own conclusions about the various points of disagreement. My (...) aim in the paper was modest; I aimed to argue that considerations of justice do not speak unequivocally against the use of Genetic Test Results (GTRs) in insurance, and that a pluralist approach may lend support to some limited uses. This represents a compromise position between outright prohibition, and using GTRs in an insurance market in accordance with purely commercial principles. Notably, this conclusion is compatible with the thought that there may be other very strong moral reasons in favour of prohibition. These include concerns about privacy, as well as the consequentialist and human rights considerations that Tiller and Delatycki rightly highlight.1 Of course, considerations of justice are not orthogonal to questions regarding the right against genetic discrimination, since such a right might plausibly be supported by appeal to broadly egalitarian considerations. Indeed, one important challenge for the rights-based argument for prohibition is to defend the strong degree of genetic exceptionalism it connotes. As I briefly suggested in the paper, broadly egalitarian arguments might be invoked in an attempt to justify at least some degree of genetic exceptionalism here. Notably though, in her commentary, Feiring expresses scepticism about the view of genetic exceptionalism that is implicit in my acceptance of the idea that the use of GTRs in insurance warrants its own specific guidance.2 Given the different …. (shrink)

Germany is an interesting case with respect to the governance of reprogenetics. It has a strong profile in the technosciences and high aims regarding the global bioeconomy, yet her regulation of human genetics, reproductive medicine and embryo research has for a long time been rather restrictive. German biopolitical exceptionalism has often been explained by reference to Catholicism and the legacy of the Nazi past. The Germans, so goes the common story, have learnt the lessons of history and translated (...) them into unconditional respect for human dignity, which in turn translates into unconditional protection of human life, including the human embryo, and the firm repudiation of any eugenic distinction between ‘life worth to live’ and ‘life not worth to live’. This, however, is not the whole story. Alongside deontological strictness we find another strand of governing body politics and reprogenetics in Germany, the rule-and-exception model, running from the mid-1970s abortion law via the 2002 Stem Cell Act to the 2011 regulation of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis. In contrast to the former, that strongly draws on Kant and his concept of human dignity, the latter bears resemblances to Carl Schmitt's concept of state of exception. The article will show that the rule-and-exception model builds the exception into the rule and transforms the meaning and mandate of ethics, namely from safeguarding ethical standards to deciding about the exception. Given that the exception has now tended to become the rule, the question is whether the lessons of history will govern German reprogenetics for much longer. (shrink)

In this paper we put forward and defend a view of the nature of logic that we call moderate anti-exceptionalism. In the first part of the paper we focus on the problem of genuine logical validity and consequence. We make use of examples from current debates to show that attempts to pinpoint the one and only authentic logic inevitably either yield irrefutable theories or lead to dead ends. We then outline a thoroughly naturalist account of logical consequence as grounded (...) in rules implicit in human linguistic practices. We insist that there are only two existing kinds of language: natural languages, and artificial languages that have been forged by us. There is thus no room for a "genuine" language and hence for "genuine" logic. We conclude that though logical theories are established—and are liable to criticism—in a similar fashion as those of the sciences, and in this sense logic is not exceptional, to fulfill its mission logic must lay a claim to normative authority over our argumentation and reasoning, which makes its methodology somewhat special. Logical theory is not meant to provide just an explanation, the standards it establishes serve also as a tool, providing for a reinforcement of our rational communication. (shrink)

This article explores attitudes underscoring arguments I believe are located in Professor Armour’s address in the present special issue. I first show how Armour’s arguments are intertwined with a resolute belief in the existence of a unique form of knowledge, one particularly attuned to the work of humanities scholars, and then go on to argue this certainty is linked to an antecedent attitude, one of exceptionalism. Spelling out what I find to be troubling about this species of argument leads (...) into thoughts around how a world-humanities might unfold. Such a field must develop as a conscious attempt on the part of scholars to bring about dialogue around how humans can find an appropriate place in the natural world. (shrink)

Gesundheit and colleagues offer dramatic examples of the medical treatment of terrorists but then pose the suggestion that those who engage in terrorism forfeit their right to medical care, and, consequently, that physicians have no obligation to treat them. Their argument presupposes that a physician’s obligation to provide medical care depends on the patients’ right to health care. Therefore, someone who commits heinous and abhorrent acts thereby waives the right to health care and the physicians’ duty to provide health care (...) might consequently be absolved. This view may appeal to physicians who have experienced the complexity and discomfort of treating someone whose morality or even humanity they question, such as a rapist, a serial killer, or a perpetrator of genocide. However we have grounds to believe that the duty of physicians to treat is not based on the moral worth of patients, but rather on the duties that physicians have, and this notion renders any concern about the unacceptability of any person’s behavior irrelevant in determining whether to provide treatment. We will first argue that not all duties are directly derived from rights, and then illustrate how deontological views, along with common views on the role morality of physicians, provide a basis for offering indiscriminate medical care. Second, we will discuss the physician’s role in the context of war, and offer one compelling moral reason on the basis of which warfare norms do indeed obligate physicians to extend their duty to care toward enemies, terrorists included, independently of whatever right they maintain. (shrink)

In _Biocultural Creatures_, Samantha Frost brings feminist and political theory together with findings in the life sciences to recuperate the category of the human for politics. Challenging the idea of human exceptionalism as well as other theories of subjectivity that rest on a distinction between biology and culture, Frost proposes that humans are biocultural creatures who quite literally are cultured within the material, social, and symbolic worlds they inhabit. Through discussions about carbon, the functions of cell membranes, (...) the activity of genes and proteins, the work of oxygen, and the passage of time, Frost recasts questions about the nature of matter, identity, and embodiment. In doing so, she elucidates the imbrication of the biological and cultural within the corporeal self. In remapping the relation of humans to their habitats and arriving at the idea that humans are biocultural creatures, Frost provides new theoretical resources for responding to political and environmental crises and for thinking about how to transform the ways we live. (shrink)

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the validity of the contention that, over the past decades, we have been witnessing the rise of the ‘posthuman condition’. To this end, the analysis draws on the work of the contemporary philosopher Rosi Braidotti. The paper is divided into four parts. The first part centres on the concept of posthumanism, suggesting that it reflects a systematic attempt to challenge humanist assumptions underlying the construction of ‘the human’. The second part (...) focuses on the concept of post-anthropocentrism, demonstrating that it articulates a desire to reject the twin ideas of ‘species supremacism’ and ‘human exceptionalism’, which it seeks to replace with ‘species egalitarianism’ and ‘monistic vitalism’. The third part is concerned with the concept of critical posthumanities, positing that its advocacy is based on the cross-fertilization of posthumanism and post-anthropocentrism. The fourth part offers an assessment of the ‘posthuman condition’ thesis, evaluating the extent to which it sheds new light on the ways in which our engagements with the world are shaped by the confluence of zoe-, geo-, and techno-based dimensions. The paper concludes with a brief summary of the key insights gained from the preceding inquiry. (shrink)

On September 8, 2015, the Department of Health and Human Services issued a Notice of Proposed Rule Making to revise the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, widely known as the “Common Rule.” The NPRM proposes several changes to the current system, including a dramatic shift in the approach to secondary research using biospecimens and data. Under the current rules, it is relatively easy to use biospecimens and data for secondary research. This approach systematically facilitates secondary (...) research with biospecimens and data, maximizing the capacity for substantial public benefit. However, it has been criticized as insufficiently protective of the privacy and autonomy interests of biospecimen and data sources. Thus, the NPRM proposes a more restrictive regime, although more so for biospecimens than data. Both the status quo and the NPRM's proposal are critically flawed. (shrink)

In her analyses of human ecological alienation, Val Plumwood implies that the recalcitrant problem of human exceptionalism is sustained in part by a kind of imaginative failure, by a certain blind spot to the ecological edibility of the human body. Among the many assumptions responsible for the blind spot, Plumwood suggests, is the liberal conception of the body as something proprietary, as something one owns. Plumwood’s work therefore establishes a new, if counterintuitive, task for environmental philosophy: (...) to find or create models of human embodiment that do not preempt but rather enable access to edibility. One such model can be found in Emmanuel Levinas’s late concept of the pre-egoic ethical body. This otherwise elusive and frequently neglected concept ought to be understood as a boldly materialist appropriation of Plotinian emanationism. So understood, it provides a path beyond the blind spot that Plumwood identifies. Taking up Levinas in this way opens a new path for environmental philosophy into his idiosyncratic thought—a path distinct, that is, from the standard extensionist maneuver of seeking nonhuman applications for his ultra-humanist notion of the face. (shrink)

After the Human explores how the strategies and methods of scientific as well as humanistic inquiry are converging to construct a relational view of the world. It evaluates Einstein's theory of relativity, quantum theory, information theory, cognitive neuropsychology, and evolution alongside the history of modern western philosophy, arguing that presumptions such as human exceptionalism and individualism are not only out of sync with scientific knowledge but also root causes of the critical issues facing the world--climate change, machine (...) intelligence, ideological political oppositions. How to think beyond anthropocentrism and binary oppositions--human/animal, sacred/profane--and acknowledge ourselves as entangled parts of larger ecologies is the aim of the book. The distinctive character of the book is its wealth of scientific insight; the opening chapter reveals the complex worlds of dirt, water, air, and fire and how humans have deformed them beyond recognition. Extraordinary advances in technology, with their promise of furthering a global village, have been derailed by economic individualism and hierarchy, prefigured in the atomism of Descartes and Newton. Not until Einstein, Bohr, and Heisenberg introduced relativity and quantum mechanics--less than a century after Hegel first proposed his dialogical worldview--did a relational account of reality begin to develop. The study of the natural world revealed a micro-universe of relations in which organisms and environments constantly adapt to one another; as Lynn Margulis puts it, "life is a verb," webs and networks of intelligences and emotions communicating within and across species and nonbiological life forms including AI. We have only to change not the world but how we see ourselves in it. (shrink)

The discursive explosion that was provoked by the new genetics could support the impression that the ethical and social problems posed by the new genetics are somehow exceptional in their very nature. According to this view we are faced with special ethical and social problems that create a challenge so fundamental that the special label of genethics is needless to justify. The historical account regarding the evolution of the gene concepts could serve us to highlight the limits of what we (...) know about genes and what we can do with genes. The widespread notion about the exceptionality of genetic knowledge and its applicative possibilities is hardly justifiable and leads to misunderstandings regarding the conceptualization of the ethical and social problems we might face. Following a more realistic interpretation of the role of genes in human life we might avoid a whole set of fictive dilemmas and counterproductive regulatory efforts in bioethics. Bioethical discourse should move from the gene-centered scientific discourse toward the more sophisticated and complex discourses where human development represented as a matter of complex interactions between genomes and environments, between genes, educational factors, nutritional regimes, and other different developmental resources. If a gene is seen as one among the different developmental resources that are shaping a given human trait then both genethics and genetic exceptionalism could hardly be represented as a justified approach in discussing the ethical and social problems of genetics. (shrink)

A legacy of Enlightenment thought was to see the human as separate from nature. Human history was neatly distinguished from natural history. The age of Anthropocene has now put all that into question. This human exceptionalism is seen by some as responsible for the devastating impact humans have had on the planet. But if we give up on the nature / culture distinction and see human activity as just another type of natural process, we risk (...) losing our ability to attribute moral agency and responsibility to humanity for the environmental crisis, argues Giuseppina D’Oro. (shrink)

With respect to aggressiveness it is not enough to say that humans are We resemble only those species where males have higher maximum reproductive rates than females. In such species males evolve a set of hormonally mediated competitive traits via sexual selection. Because humans match the predictions of this general evolutionary model, attempts to (re)explain men's aggressiveness in sociological terms are superfluous and misleading.

Philosophers of science often assume that logically equivalent theories are theoretically equivalent. I argue that two theses, anti-exceptionalism about logic (which says, roughly, that logic is not a priori, that it is revisable, and that it is not special or set apart from other human inquiry) and logical realism (which says, roughly, that differences in logic reflect genuine metaphysical differences in the world), make trouble for both this commitment and the closely related commitment to theories being closed under (...) logical consequence. I provide three arguments. The first two show that anti-exceptionalism about logic provides an epistemic challenge to both the closure and the equivalence claims; the third shows that logical realism provides a metaphysical challenge to both the closure and the equivalence claims. Along the way, I show that there are important methodological upshots for metaphysicians and philosophers of logic. In particular, there are lessons to be drawn about certain conceptions of naturalism as constraining the possibilities for metaphysics and the philosophy of logic. (shrink)

How might Strathernian comparison extend anthropology beyond human exceptionalism? This essay explores how a fungal spore might guide attention to more-than-human nature. The exercise allows us to reflect on knowledge tools we use for understanding human as well as nonhuman social relations.

Being born into a family structure—being born of a mother—is key to being human. It is, for Jacques Lacan, essential to the formation of human desire. It is also part of the structure of analogy in the Thomistic thought of Erich Przywara. AI may well increase exponentially in sophistication, and even achieve human-like qualities; but it will only ever form an imaginary mirroring of genuine human persons—an imitation that is in fact morbid and dehumanising. Taking Lacan (...) and Przywara at a point of convergence on this topic offers important insight into human exceptionalism. (shrink)

The upsurge in cultural nationalism in New Zealand has failed to produce a good case that New Zealand is an exceptional society. The reason for this is that New Zealand has not had a chance to develop a culture that is autochthonous in significant respects. New Zealand's domination by the cultures of Britain, Australia and America in the 19th and 20th centuries prevented its history from taking a significantly different path. The lack of autochthony is attributed to the structural effects (...) of physical isolation. Remoteness made its human history unusually short, led it to be exceptionally exposed to the global revolution in transport and communication from the mid-19th century, and severely constrained its population size. (shrink)

The Western history discipline has recently experienced a growing appreciation of animals as subjects of historical concern, part of what has been described as the “animal turn” in the humanities. While briefly examining some historiographical points related to this burgeoning trend, this article looks to the question of whether animals have history itself as a device to reframe the relationship humans have with both animals and history. Through this process, this article highlights how respecting the unknown possibility and the possibility (...) of the unknown history from the animal perspective recasts the inquiry into “history” as a parochial human endeavor, entangled in the limits of human knowledge, perception, and frailty. It is this same human frailty that explains why humans must understand animal history if only from a human perspective—because humans have fundamentally depended on animals for their survival and development in their own history. Taking these points together, this article asserts that appreciating the existence (and weakness) of the human lens gives new meaning and a sense of humility to the inquiry into animal history, such as how animal history may be better understood in the plural (“histories”), how humans might be freed from universal history and human exceptionalism, and how this humility encourages more ethical treatment of animals. (shrink)

Even as paleoanthropology becomes increasingly sophisticated in revealing both the broad contours and the details of the deep evolutionary history of Homo sapiens, it continues to be informed by lingering pre-evolutionary residues. Specifically, the goal of prior research was to demonstrate that the influence of the ancient Scala Naturae as an organizing principle significantly contributed to the scientific community’s delayed acceptance of Australopithecus as a plesiomorphic member of the Hominidae. The present study extends this research through a selective examination of (...) non-primary source material reporting on significant early hominid discoveries over the last century, beginning with Australopithecus africanus and ending with Ardipithecus ramidus. It is argued that these accessible sources reify to varying degrees the perception among the non-expert public that human beings are an inevitable culmination of the evolutionary process. This culturally transmitted schema of human exceptionalism continues to impact other life on Earth in profound ways, in some cases with calamitous results. (shrink)

In this article, building on our multidisciplinary expertise on philosophy, anthropology, and social study of microbes, we discuss and analyze new approaches to justice that have emerged in thinking with more-than-human contexts: microbes, animals, environments and ecosystems. We situate our analysis in theory of and practical engagements with antimicrobial resistance and climate emergency that both can be considered super-wicked problems. In offering solutions to such problems, we discuss a more-than-human justice orientation, seeking to displace human exceptionalism (...) while still engaging with human social justice issues. We offer anthropological narratives to highlight how more-than-human actors already play an important role in environmental and climate politics. These narratives further justify the need for new ethical frameworks, out of which we, for further development outside the scope of this article, suggest a queer feminist posthumanist one. (shrink)

Deborah Britzman’s remarkable question, ‘What holds education back?’, appears more urgent than ever in a world of accelerating environmental crises, climate change, and what has been described as omnicide – the annihilation of everything. What, then, holds education back from initiating radical change under these urgent conditions? This paper introduces the notion of ‘institutional anxiety’ as a consolidating force and explores how it may condition possibilities for resistance. Bringing examples from ethnographic fieldwork and experiences of course development in conversation with (...) psychoanalytic and schizoanalytic thought, a key catalyst of institutional anxiety is discussed: Anxiety related to ‘the question of the animal’ as a threat to human exceptionalism in educational practice and research. Confronting these anxieties could open new modes of being and acting in academic space and give interspecies ethics, justice and sustainability a chance to develop in omnicidal times. (shrink)

Research involving human subjects is much more stringently regulated than many other nonresearch activities that appear to be at least as risky. A number of prominent figures now argue that research is overregulated. We argue that the reasons typically offered to justify the present system of research regulation fail to show that research should be subject to more stringent regulation than other equally risky activities. However, there are three often overlooked reasons for thinking that research should be treated as (...) a special case. First, research typically involves the imposition of risk on people who do not benefit from this risk imposition. Second, research depends on public trust. Third, the complexity of the moral decision making required favors ethics committees as a regulative solution for research. (shrink)

The production of genetic knowledge -- Scientific and economic strength of genetic reductionism -- Policy implications : discourses of genetic enlightenment as new disciplinary devices -- Genetic conceptualizations of normality and the idea of genetic justice -- Beyond genetic universality and authenticity, the lure of the genetic underclass -- Previews of the future as background -- Economic and actuarial perspective on genetics and insurance -- Practical and normative arguments against genetic exceptionalist legislation -- The changing social role of private insurance (...) : risk as a new representational regime. (shrink)

In the Anthropocene, the fact that human activity is enmeshed with the existence and actions of every kind of other being is inescapable. As a result, the planetary ecological crisis has brought forth an urgent need to rethink understandings of human action. One response holds that the transformations necessary to tackle today’s crises will emerge from the distinctive capacity of human beings to transcend their environment. Another school of thought calls for seeing action as composite, produced by (...) distributed networks of human and nonhuman agents. Yet the first of these is open to charges of human exceptionalism, while the second, according to its critics, lacks effective political traction. Martin Crowley argues that a new conception of political agency is necessary to break this impasse. Engaging with thinkers such as Bruno Latour, Bernard Stiegler, and Catherine Malabou, Crowley proposes an original account of agency as both distributed and decisive. Challenging the prevailing view of agency as exclusively human, he explores how a politics that incorporates nonhuman agency can intervene in the real world, examining timely issues such as climate-related migration and digital-algorithmic politics. A major intervention into ongoing debates in posthumanism, political ecology, and political theory, Accidental Agents reshapes our understanding of political agency in and for a more-than-human world. (shrink)

Can humanity survive climate change and mass extinction? Concepts of humanity assumed or implicit in the field at the founding of this journal are under critical pressure from multiple directions. Reading across schools of thought confronting relations sometimes called Anthropocene, this essay explains five tasks for religious ethics “after humanity:” (i) incorporate species-level relations of power and vulnerability; (ii) denaturalize planetary myth-making; (iii) undo colonial humanisms; (iv) recompose ways of life after the end of the world; and (v) reanimate ethical (...) inquiry in attentiveness to multispecies worldmaking. (shrink)

The article begins with reflections on the nature, and basis, of human rights considered as moral standards. It recommends an orthodox view of their nature, as moral rights possessed by all human beings simply in virtue of their humanity and discoverable through the workings of natural reason, that makes them strongly continuous with natural rights. It then offers some criticisms of recent attempts to depart from orthodoxy by explicating human rights by reference to the supposedly constitutive connection (...) they bear to the matter of political legitimacy. The second half of the article turns to the legitimacy of international law, with a special focus on international human rights law. An account is sketched of the legitimacy of international law based on the service conception of legitimate authority. The article concludes by discussing three sources of potential limitations on international law’s legitimacy: pluralism, freedom (sovereignty) and exceptionalism. (shrink)

_In a recent article, William Rees defends the proposition that ecological overshoot will propel human population decline in coming decades. He rightly highlights that decreasing energy availability will contribute to this demographic shift, although he understates the significance of this phenomenon. He is also correct to expect ecological overshoot to be inadequately addressed. Yet Rees’s reasoning betrays stark __neglect of the colonial roots of ecological overshoot and why it goes unaddressed. This leads him to reinforce the discursive dynamics driving (...) ecological overshoot despite avowing to criticize them. Ultimately, he makes several specious colonialist assumptions about the primary drivers of ecological overshoot. He also fails to recognize that human population decline will occur even if a suitable energy and infrastructure transition takes place. Is such a decline inevitable, as Rees claims? Yes, but this is not for the reasons he suggests. A careful analysis of his argument shows why._. (shrink)

The focus of this study is an examination of what it means to be a legal person and the role that the law plays in bestowing the legal status of being a person. This study highlights the underpinning rationalities and human interest that establish a hierarchy between person, defined as “human”, at a superior level to everything else, defined as “nonhuman”. In this respect, there is a core notion concerning human exceptionalism based on the rational sovereignty (...) that justifies and consolidates the mastery of nature. To understand the fundamental premises of legal personhood, it begins from the first usage of person in history and philosophy, since the concept of legal personhood has been established through historical and philosophical developments. Analysing the meaning of person through different conceptualisations can allow a deeper insight into the legal interpretation of personhood. As a result of such investigation, two main dualistic structures of legal personhood reveal: the person-property dualism and the human being-person dualism. Thus, legal personhood simultaneously includes personalisation and depersonalisation, and always operates in a hierarchical array. Although the division between persons and things in the concept of personhood is rigid, being a “person” or a “thing” is open to interpretation in different circumstances through legal practices of exclusion and inclusion. Recently, there have been an increasing number of court rulings and a tendency of legislation to recognise the legal personhood of natural entities as a legal way of conserving the environment. This leads to an interpretation that legal recognition is a matter of institutional interest and attempts. Nevertheless, legal practitioners mostly prefer to confer certain rights or the status of a legal person on nature without the consideration of legal personhood’s background as seen in the case discussed in this study - the Tierra Digna case in Colombia. While this study endeavours to demonstrate the anthropocentric standard view of legal personhood, its principal purpose is to indicate the malleable nature of legal personhood as a product of legal fiction. In this context, this study aims to conclude that law’s imaginary nature should be used for producing a new legal reasoning and for offering a real paradigm shift that is congruent with the plasticity of and the fluidity of nature. (shrink)

This article approaches the recent Wonder Woman film as a presentation of the tensions traditionally associated with the paradox of democratic foundations. Steeped in classical mythology, Wonder Woman adapts two origin myths from the Athenian polis: the myth of Pandora and the myth of the heroic colonizing demigod. Through its adaptation of these myths I argue that Wonder Woman offers two competing responses to the democratic paradox of founding. One is exceptionalist, where sovereign interventions by extraordinary ‘super-agents’ like Wonder Woman (...) are justified by their unique origins and identities. The second response subverts this narrative, however, offering a tragic depiction of democratic agency. Through the relationships formed with Diana’s human companions, I argue that Wonder Woman shows the insufficiency of a politics of heroic origins, suggesting agents must continually struggle to establish communities which do not ignore their historical failures or their powers to address these. Wonder Woman therefore provides important imaginative resources for resisting the kinds of seductive, exceptionalist political narrative it also presents. (shrink)

Environmental ethics deals with discussing the ethical framework of environmental values, their organization and regulation, and their ethical premises. One of the main cul-de-sacs that environmental ethics has is its anthropocentrism that can be observed through its diverse ethical approaches—even ecocentric ones, developed as non-anthropocentric egalitarian alternatives. This article aims to question the exclusiveness of Anthropos, the practices, values, and discourses that determine the scope and course of environmental ethics, and the exclusion of nonhuman animals or more-than human beings (...) from its focus. It first examines the main approaches in environmental ethics (land ethic, deep ecology, social ecology, and postmodern environmental ethics)—biocentric, ecocentric, anthropocentric, socialist, postmodern—and reveals that they are but limited to the human perspective, deeply rooted in human exceptionalism. All of these approaches provide us with a critical frame that still needs to be deconstructed so that they will not project an anthropocentric orientation. This article posits that the compass of environmental ethics, recently aligning itself to embrace the more-than-human world in its ecocentric attitude, still needs to be revisited for its discourses of exclusion. At this point, new materialism functions as a prolific theoretical site as it diminishes the classical boundaries between human and animal or subject and object that anthropocentric environmental ethics relies on. With such concepts as “agential realism” (Barad), “transcorporeal ethics” (Alaimo), “vibrant matter” (Bennett), or “storied matter” (Oppermann and Iovino) the new materialist view of the human and the nonhuman evolves to end set dualities in the discourses of environmental ethics. This article concludes that the new materialist theory destabilizes any anthropocentric position in environmental ethics and includes more-than-human beings in its ethical focus, discarding any dualities that serve anthropocentrism or human exceptionalism. (shrink)