Communication, when defined as an act intended to affect the psychological state of another individual, demands the use of inference. Either the signaler, the recipient, or both must make leaps of understanding which surpass the semantic information available and draw from pragmatic clues to fully imbue and interpret meaning. While research into human communication and the evolution of language has long been comfortable with mentalistic interpretations of communicative exchanges, including rich attributions of mental state, research into animal communication has balked (...) at theoretical models which describe mentalized cognitive mechanisms. We submit a new theoretical perspective on animal communication: the model of inferential communication. For use when existing proximate models of animal communication are not sufficient to fully explain the complex, flexible, and intentional communication documented in certain species, specifically non-human primates, we present our model as a bridge between shallower, less cognitive descriptions of communicative behavior and the perhaps otherwise inaccessible mentalistic interpretations of communication found in theoretical considerations of human language. Inferential communication is a framework that builds on existing evidence of referentiality, intentionality, and social inference in primates. It allows that they might be capable of applying social inferences to a communicative setting, which could explain some of the cognitive processes that enable the complexity and flexibility of primate communication systems. While historical models of animal communication focus on the means-ends process of behavior and apparent cognitive outcomes, inferential communication invites consideration of the mentalistic processes that must underlie those outcomes. We propose a mentalized approach to questions, investigations, and interpretations of non-human primate communication. We include an overview of both ultimate and proximate models of animal communication, which contextualize the role and utility of our inferential communication model, and provide a detailed breakdown of the possible levels of cognitive complexity which could be investigated using this framework. Finally, we present some possible applications of inferential communication in the field of non-human primate communication and highlight the role it could play in advancing progress toward an increasingly precise understanding of the cognitive capabilities of our closest living relatives. (shrink)

Background Care is the basis of the nursing profession and nurse’s caring behavior is one of the important factors in patient satisfaction. On the other hand, psychological empowerment can improve the provision of care services, and leaders have a significant impact on the behavior of followers. This study determined the correlation between ethical leadership, psychological empowerment, and caring behavior from nurses’ perspective. Methods This cross-sectional descriptive study was conducted in 2019. A total of 200 nurses were selected (...) by stratified random sampling. Data were collected with ethical leadership, caring behavior and psychological empowerment questionnaires and analyzed with descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation, frequency distribution) and inferential statistics (Pearson correlation coefficient, regression, and t-test) using SPSS20. Results The findings showed a significant correlation between ethical leadership, psychological empowerment (P < 0.001, r = 0.24) and caring behavior of nurses (P < 0.001, r = 0.25). Also, there was a significant correlation between psychological empowerment and nurses’ caring behavior (P = 0.002, r = 0.21). The regression analysis showed that ethical leadership and psychological empowerment are a predictor of caring behavior of nurses. Conclusion Applying an ethical leadership style by nursing managers can lead to nurses’ improved psychological empowerment and caring behaviors and ultimately, patient care quality. Thus, considering guidelines at the team and organizational levels and programs such as providing workshops and periodic counseling to cultivate ethical nurse leadership can lead to better caring behavior. (shrink)

The recent coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic pushed almost all institutions to adopt online and virtual education. The uncertainty of this situation produced various questions that perplexed educationists regarding what implications the pandemic would have on educational institutions, especially regarding how the switch to online education would impact the behavior and performance of students. The vast importance of this matter attracted the attention of researchers and served as the motivation for this research, which aims to resolve this confusion by studying (...) the use of mobile learning among students for educational purposes during the COVID-19 period. This study also examines how this situation has affected student learning behavior and performance in the higher education setting. This research is based on collaborative learning theory, sociocultural learning theory, and ML theory. This quantitative research employed the convenient sampling technique to collect data through structured questionnaires distributed to 396 students of higher education institutions who carry a mobile device. This study used descriptive and inferential statistics to make the data more meaningful. Structural equation modeling with AMOS software was used for hypothesis testing. The results showed that ML was a significant and positive predictor of SP and LB. Moreover, student LB partially mediated the relationship between ML and SP. The findings suggest that the academic performance of students can be enhanced by building a ML environment that aligns with the LB of students. Nevertheless, content suitable for ML must be developed, and future research should be conducted on this topic. (shrink)

The aim of this research was to establish linear relations (association and prediction) and inferential relations between three constructs at different levels of psychological research –executive dysfunction(microanalysis),self-regulation(molecular level), andself-vs.external regulation(molar level), in the prediction of emotion regulation difficulties. We hypothesized that personal and contextual regulatory factors would be negatively related to levels of executive dysfunction and emotion regulation difficulties; by way of complement, non-regulatory and dysregulatory personal, and contextual factors would be positively related to these same difficulties. To establish (...) relationships, we used a retrospective,ex postfacto design, where 298 university students voluntarily participated by completing standardized self-reports. Linear and structural correlational, predictive analyses were performed, as well as inferential analyses. Results were consistent and validated the proposed hypotheses, for both association and prediction. The most important result refers to the discriminant value of the five-level combination heuristic for predicting Executive Function and External (contextual) Dys-Regulation. In conclusion: (1) both personal and contextual regulation factors must be analyzed in order to better understand the variation in executive functions and emotion regulation difficulties; (2) it is important to continue connecting the different levels of the constructs referring to self-regulation, given their complementary role in the behavioral analysis of regulation difficulties. (shrink)

What do the rules of logic say about the meanings of the symbols they govern? In this book, James W. Garson examines the inferential behaviour of logical connectives, whose behaviour is defined by strict rules, and proves definitive results concerning exactly what those rules express about connective truth conditions. He explores the ways in which, depending on circumstances, a system of rules may provide no interpretation of a connective at all, or the interpretation we ordinarily expect for it, or (...) an unfamiliar or novel interpretation. He also shows how the novel interpretations thus generated may be used to help analyse philosophical problems such as vagueness and the open future. His book will be valuable for graduates and specialists in logic, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of language. (shrink)

I present and defend here a thesis named vehicleless externalism for conceptual mental episodes. According to it, the constitutive relations there are between the production of conceptual mental episodes by an individual and the inclusion of this individual in social discursive practices make it non-necessary to equate, even partially, conceptual mental episodes with the occurrence of physical events inside of that individual. Conceptual mental episodes do not have subpersonal vehicles; they have owners: persons in interpretational practices. That thesis is grounded (...) on inferentialism and on the endorsement of the idea that "meaning is normative". After having recapitulated this heritage and after having presented that thesis, the paper especially attempts to articulate how, in that framework, we may then positively conceive the relations there are between conceptual mental episodes, intracranial events and inferential behaviour. (shrink)

Whether people possess free will has been a long-lasting philosophical debate. Recent attention in social psychology has been given to the behavioral consequences of believing in free will. Research has demonstrated that manipulating free will beliefs has implications for many social behaviors. For example, free will belief manipulations have been associated with cheating, aggressiveness, and prejudice. Despite this work, some of these findings have failed to replicate. Testing theoretical predictions, such as whether believing in free will influences behavior, depends (...) on theoretical, auxiliary, statistical, and inferential assumptions (TASI). In this paper we apply the TASI category of assumptions to the free will belief debate. In doing so we demonstrate why these assumptions should be considered when appraising the influence of free will belief manipulations on free will beliefs and behavior. To provide a nuanced view of free will beliefs, we believe researchers should pay careful attention to these critical assumptions. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose a computational interpretation of the generalized Kreisel–Putnam rule, also known as the generalized Harrop rule or simply the Split rule, in the style of BHK semantics. We will achieve this by exploiting the Curry–Howard correspondence between formulas and types. First, we inspect the inferential behavior of the Split rule in the setting of a natural deduction system for intuitionistic propositional logic. This will guide our process of formulating an appropriate program that would capture (...) the corresponding computational content of the typed Split rule. Our investigation can also be reframed as an effort to answer the following question: is the Split rule constructively valid in the sense of BHK semantics? Our answer is positive for the Split rule as well as for its newly proposed general version called the S rule. (shrink)

The seventeenth-century Spanish Dominican Cosme de Lerma authored numerous philosophical works, some ofwhich were posthumously reorganised into a Cursus philosophicus, intended as an arts course for the Dominican studia in Italy. Lerma’s philosophical project consisted in developing the doctrines proposed a century earlier by his fellow Dominican friar Domingo de Soto. Through analysing Lerma’s Compendium and Disputationes based on Soto’s Summulae and Lerma’s Commentaries on Aristotle’s Logic, this paper explores three issues: first, Lerma’s axiomatic theory of inference, including the development (...) of Soto’s project of relevance logic (relating to the analysis of the paradoxes of implication); second, the question whether there are different degrees of validity (answered negatively by Lerma); third, Lerma’s psychology of inference, which offers an interpretation of human inferential behaviour and its limitations in terms of the scholastic theories of causation and natural agency. (shrink)

Causation is generally conceived of as a relation that holds between events. Apart from a few cursory remarks, the case of stative causation has been widely neglected. The paper aims at contributing to a more balanced perspective by arguing for a stative variant of causation, on a par with eventive causation. The stative variant is analyzed in terms of Moltmann’s ontological notion of tropes. German causal von-modifiers are taken as a linguistic window into our understanding of causation. The study of (...) von is particularly suited to this endeavor, because von-modifiers are confined to expressing the core notion of “direct causation” :1–48, 2003). The paper develops a compositional semantics of causal von-modifiers that derives their eventive and stative readings from a single lexical entry and allows for coercive adaptions to account for the observed range of interpretive adjustments. Characteristic features of the interpretation such as the inferential behavior of causal von-modifiers and the holistic effect of the stative reading are traced back to independently motivated conceptual assumptions concerning the spatiotemporal grounding of direct causation. The formal analysis is couched in terms of Asher’s type composition logic. (shrink)

Classical logic of formal provability includes Löb’s theorem, but not reflection. In contrast, intuitions about the inferential behavior of informal provability (in informal mathematics) seem to invalidate Löb’s theorem and validate reflection (after all, the intuition is, whatever mathematicians prove holds!). We employ a non-deterministic many-valued semantics and develop a modal logic T-BAT of an informal provability operator, which indeed does validate reflection and invalidates Löb’s theorem. We study its properties and its relation to known provability-related paradoxical arguments. (...) We also argue that T-BAT is a fairly sensible candidate for a formal logic of informal provability. (shrink)

BAT is a logic built to capture the inferential behavior of informal provability. Ultimately, the logic is meant to be used in an arithmetical setting. To reach this stage it has to be extended to a first-order version. In this paper we provide such an extension. We do so by constructing non-deterministic three-valued models that interpret quantifiers as some sorts of infinite disjunctions and conjunctions. We also elaborate on the semantical properties of the first-order system and consider a (...) couple of its strengthenings. It turns out that obtaining a sensible strengthening is not straightforward. We prove that most strategies commonly used for strengthening non-deterministic logics fail in our case. Nevertheless, we identify one method of extending the system which does not. (shrink)

In Talking about, Unnsteinsson defends an intentionalist theory of reference by arguing that confused referential intentions degrade reference. Central to this project is a “belief model” of both identity confusion and unconfused thought. By appealing to a well‐known argument from Campbell, I argue that this belief model falls short, because it fails to explain the inferential behavior it promises to explain. Campbell's argument has been central in the contemporary literature on Frege's puzzle, but Unnsteinsson's account of confusion provides (...) an opportunity for more clarity about how the argument is best interpreted, and what it shows. (shrink)

Truth-value gaps have received little attention from a foundational perspective, a fact which has rightfully opened up gap theories to charges of vacuousness. This paper develops an account of the foundations of gap-like behavior which has some hope of avoiding such charges. I begin by reviewing and sharpening a powerful argument of Dummett’s to constrain the options that gap theorists have to make sense of their views. I then show that within these strictures, we can give an account of (...) gaps by drawing on elements of a broadly Stalnakerian framework for assertion and using gaps to track an amalgamation of assertoric effects. The discussion reveals that we may need special resources in our theories of assertion to posit gaps, that gaps may be unusable in characterizing the structure of mental states, and that gaps may have heterogeneous linguistic sources that result in equally heterogeneous projective and inferential behavior. (shrink)

Drawing on various resources and requirements (as expressed by Dewey, Wittgenstein, Sellars, and Brandom), this paper proposes an externalist view of conceptual mental episodes that does not equate them, even partially, with vehicles of any sort, whether the vehicles be located in the environment or in the head. The social and pragmatic nature of the use of concepts and conceptual content makes it unnecessary and indeed impossible to locate the entities that realize conceptual mental episodes in non-personal or subpersonal contentful (...) entities (vehicles). Persons, who engage in social practices of deontic scorekeeping (Brandom), and who are thus able to produce appropriate inferential behaviour, enact conceptual mental episodes and the basis of their supervenience. (shrink)

The addition of "actually" operators to modal languages allows us to capture important inferential behaviours which cannot be adequately captured in logics formulated in simpler languages. Previous work on modal logics containing "actually" operators has concentrated entirely upon extensions of KT5 and has employed a particular modeltheoretic treatment of them. This paper proves completeness and decidability results for a range of normal and nonnormal but quasi-normal propositional modal logics containing "actually" operators, the weakest of which are conservative extensions of (...) K, using a novel generalisation of the standard semantics. (shrink)

We may wonder about the status of logical accounts of the meaning of language. When does a particular proposal count as a theory? How do we judge a theory to be correct? What criteria can we use to decide whether one theory is “better” than another? Implicitly, many accounts attribute a foundational status to set theory, and set-theoretic characterisations of possible worlds in particular. The goal of a semantic theory is then to find a translation of the phenomena of interest (...) into a set-theoretic model. Such theories may be deemed to have “explanatory” or “predictive” power if a mapping can found into expressions of set-theory that have the appropriate behaviour by virtue of the rules of set-theory (for example Montague 1973; Montague1974). This can be contrasted with an approach in which we can help ourselves to “new” primitives and ontological categories, and devise logical rules and axioms that capture the appropriate inferential behaviour (as in Turner 1992). In general, this alternative approach can be criticised as being mere “descriptivism”, lacking predictive or explanatory power. Here we will seek to defend the axiomatic approach. Any formal account must assume some normative interpretation, but there is a sense in which such theories can provide a more honest characterisation (cf. Dummett 199). In contrast, the set-theoretic approach tends to conflate distinct ontological notions. Mapping a pattern of semantic behaviour into some pre-existing set-theoretic behaviour may lead to certain aspects of that behaviour being overlooked, or ignored (Chierchia & Turner 1988; Bealer 1982). Arguments about the explanatory and predictive power of set-theoretic interpretations can also be questioned (see Benacerraf 1965, for example). We aim to provide alternative notions for evaluating the quality of a formalisation, and the role of formal theory. Ultimately, claims about the methodological and conceptual inadequacies of axiomatic accounts compared to set-theoretic reductions must rely on criteria and assumptions that lie outside the domain of formal semantics as such. (shrink)

Our aim is to model the behaviour of a cognitive agent trying to solve a complex problem by dividing it into sub-problems, but failing to solve some of these sub-problems. We use the powerful framework of erotetic search scenarios combined with Kleene’s strong three-valued logic. ESS, defined on the grounds of Inferential Erotetic Logic, has appeared to be a useful logical tool for modelling cognitive goal-directed processes. Using the logical tools of ESS and the three-valued logic, we will show (...) how an agent could solve the initial problem despite the fact that the sub-problems remain unsolved. Thus our model not only indicates missing information but also specifies the contexts in which the problem-solving process may end in success despite the lack of information. We will also show that this model of problem solving may find use in an analysis of natural language dialogues. (shrink)

In spite of alleged differences in purpose, descriptive and computational linguistics share many problems, due to the fact that any precise study on language needs some form of knowledge representation. This constraint is mostly apparent when interpretation of sentences takes into account elements of the so-called “context”. The parametrization of context, i.e. the explicit listing of features relevant to some intepretation task, is difficult because it requires flexible formal structures for understanding or simulating inferential behaviour, as well as a (...) large amount of information about conventional structures in the given language. This paper aims at illustrating major difficulties in these two fields, in relation with the necessity of a contextual approach. It offers a (clearly partial) enumeration of open problems inthe reperesentation of commonsense knowledge and languages-dependent structures, with some attempt to delineate future solutions. (shrink)

The argument of this paper rests on the distinction between two types of what are, loosely speaking, logical claims: A general (speaker-independent) claim that some favoured principle of inference is both truth-preserving, and consistent with certain others. A claim by a particular speaker that he/she has reasonable deductive grounds for concluding that some particular statement is true. The first is a matter of pure logic—a question of what (allegedly) follows from what. The second is a matter of epistemic logic—a question (...) of whether someone has, or more generally, whether there are, reasonable deductive grounds for concluding that something is the case. I shall argue that this distinction has a crucial bearing on the disagreement between classical logicians and non-classical logicians, which is essentially a disagreement about inferential behaviour. The argument is laid out in a manner designed to maximise the chances of any errors being detected. The paper concludes with some considerations of the relevance of relevant logic to the psychologist investigating inference behaviour. (shrink)

The central claim of this book is that I is a deictic term, like the other singular personal pronouns You and He/She. This is true of the logical character, inferential role, referential function, expressive use, and communicative role of all and only expressions used to formulate first-personal reference in any language. The first part of the book shows why the standard account of I as a ‘pure indexical’ (‘purism’) should be rejected. Purism requires three mutually supportive doctrines which turn (...) out to be myths: a) that a simple rule is sufficient to give the meaning of I (‘rule theory’); b) that one can use I to express thoughts without having to identify what is being referred to (‘independence’); and c) that as a matter of the meaning of I, any use of the term is logically guaranteed against failure to refer (‘the guarantee’). The second part of the book shows why the radically new account of I should be endorsed as a deictic term. Substitution instances and the behaviour of I in inference reveal that it has an obligatorily deictic logical character and inferential role. I fulfils its referential function in the deictic way, providing determinacy of reference by making an individual referentially salient in the extra-sentential context. The discriminability of the referent of an I-use depends on recognizing the referentially salient individual. This is true of its discriminability both to the reference-maker and to the audience. So I has the expressive use and communicative role of a deictic term. The conclusion of the book directs research towards the next step, showing how the meaning of I may be used to elucidate the thoughts expressed by the term, and from there questions relating to self-knowledge, practical reasoning, belief-acquisition, and belief-ascription. (shrink)

In philosophy of language, a distinction has been proposed between two aspects of lexical competence, i.e. referential and inferential competence (Marconi 1997). The former accounts for the relationship of words to the world, the latter for the relationship of words among themselves. The distinction may simply be a classification of patterns of behaviour involved in ordinary use of the lexicon. Recent research in neuropsychology and neuroscience, however, suggests that the distinction might be neurally implemented, i.e., that different cognitive architectures (...) with partly distinct neural realizations might be responsible for cognitive performances involving inferential and referential aspects of semantics. This hypothesis is strongly consistent with patient data supporting the notion of a functional double dissociation between inferential and referential abilities, and with a set of direct cortical mapping studies and neuroimaging experiments suggesting that inferential and referential abilities are underpinned by at least partly different regions of the human brain (e.g., Marconi et al. 2013; review in Calzavarini 2017). The initial hypotheses formulated in the setting of the philosophy of language, along with the neuropsychological experimental evidence (about how referential and inferential competences may be neurally instantiated) can be the input to computational modelling activities involving the inferential and the referential aspects of lexical competence. The aim of the talk is to offer a critical discussion of the kind of formalisms that can be used to model the two aspects of lexical competence, and of the main difficulties related to the use of these computational techniques. -/- Inferential (=symbolic) vs referential (=connectionist) formalisms. (shrink)

As proposed for the emergence of modern languages, we argue that modern uses of languages (pragmatics) also evolved gradually in our species under the effects of human self‐domestication, with three key aspects involved in a complex feedback loop: (a) a reduction in reactive aggression, (b) the sophistication of language structure (with emerging grammars initially facilitating the transition from physical aggression to verbal aggression); and (c) the potentiation of pragmatic principles governing conversation, including, but not limited to, turn‐taking and inferential (...) abilities. Our core hypothesis is that the reduction in reactive aggression, one of the key factors in self‐domestication processes, enabled us to fully exploit our cognitive and interactional potential as applied to linguistic exchanges, and ultimately to evolve a specific form of communication governed by persuasive reciprocity—a trait of human conversation characterized by both competition and cooperation. In turn, both early crude forms of language, well suited for verbal aggression/insult, and later more sophisticated forms of language, well suited for persuasive reciprocity, significantly contributed to the resolution and reduction of (physical) aggression, thus having a return effect on the self‐domestication processes. Supporting evidence for our proposal, as well as grounds for further testing, comes mainly from the consideration of cognitive disorders, which typically simultaneously present abnormal features of self‐domestication (including aggressive behavior) and problems with pragmatics and social functioning. While various approaches to language evolution typically reduce it to a single factor, our approach considers language evolution as a multifactorial process, with each player acting upon the other, engaging in an intense mutually reinforcing feedback loop. Moreover, we see language evolution as a gradual process, continuous with the pre‐linguistic cognitive abilities, which were engaged in a positive feedback loop with linguistic innovations, and where gene‐culture co‐evolution and cultural niche construction were the main driving forces. (shrink)

Current theories of social cognition are mainly based on a representationalist view. Moreover, they focus on a rather sophisticated and limited aspect of understanding others, i.e. on how we predict and explain others’ behaviours through representing their mental states. Research into the ‘social brain’ has also favoured a third-person paradigm of social cognition as a passive observation of others’ behaviour, attributing it to an inferential, simulative or projective process in the individual brain. In this paper, we present a concept (...) of social understanding as an ongoing, dynamical process of participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation. This process may be described (1) from a dynamical agentive systems point of view as an interaction and coordination of two embodied agents; (2) from a phenomenological approach as a mutual incorporation, i.e. a process in which the lived bodies of both participants extend and form a common intercorporality. Intersubjectivity, it is argued, is not a solitary task of deciphering or simulating the movements of others but means entering a process of embodied interaction and generating common meaning through it. This approach will be further illustrated by an analysis of primary dyadic interaction in early childhood. (shrink)

Background: Moral philosophical positions and professional values have been shown to influence nurses’ practice behaviours. Understanding nursing students’ professional values and ethical ideologies, therefore, is important as they may help inform evidence-informed curriculum decisions and education strategies to develop students’ professional reflective competencies. However, there is a dearth in current empirical data on Canadian nursing students’ perceptions of professional values and ethical positions. Objectives: This study’s purpose was to examine undergraduate nursing student’s perceptions of professional values and ethical ideology and (...) explore relationships in data and selected participant demographic variables. Research design, participants and context: A descriptive cross-sectional research design was conducted with a convenience sample of undergraduate nursing students recruited from a university in Canada. An online encrypted survey consisting of two validated instruments was administered to participants who met study eligibility criteria. Descriptive and inferential statistics were employed to analyse the data and classify nursing students’ ethical ideologies into four categories based on mean scores for idealism and relativism. Ethical considerations: This study received ethical approval from the institutional Behavioural Research Ethics Board and was executed in-line with ethical principles for research involving humans. Findings: Nursing students scored high on professional values and ethical idealism and differed significantly on a measure of ethical relativism in terms of age and year of study. Professional values were significantly associated with ethical idealism. Based on mean scores for idealism and relativism, most nursing students in the study were classified as situationists. Discussion and conclusion: Findings suggest that faculty pay attention to influences of moral philosophical positions in facilitating nursing students’ professional values development. Implications for future research and curriculum are highlighted to strengthen nursing students’ professional values. (shrink)

The immanent approach adopted by most contemporary representatives of the Critical Theory tradition has generally the purpose of offering a foundation for social criticism that, without relying exclusively on explicit or factually accepted principles, avoids both the potential arbitrariness of subjective judgment and the appeal to transcendent criteria. However, this project has not yet paid much attention to the socio-epistemic elements related to the intersubjective praxis of criticism. Based on this concern, I intend to explore the possibility of immanent criticism (...) by using the epistemic category of dissonance. I will begin by showing how Davidson’s notion of irrationality can overcome the problematic separation between healthy and pathological behavior found in Festinger’s classical theory of cognitive dissonance and serve as an indicator of epistemic contradictions that can lead to social change. Thereafter, I will explain the link between these approaches and both Brandom’s inferential semantics and Honneth’s normative reconstruction. At the end of the first part, I expect to show an articulated picture of how dissonance can serve as a key for the analysis of inconsistencies present both in the belief systems and in the institutions and practices that constitute forms of life. In the second part, I will reconstruct three possible objections to this comprehensive approach in relation to the role of the individual in processes of social criticism and to the notions of progress and rationality that the approach adopts. I will analyze here what kind of meta-criterion is necessary to overcome the discomfort generated by the experience of dissonance so that it leads to social change. Taking up the Hegelian-Pragmatist idea of accumulation of experiences, I will argue that such a meta-criterion refers to the possibility of gathering and using available and non-endogenous socio-epistemic resources that allow reconfiguring the foundations of the questioned form of life. (shrink)

Information about the structure of a causal system can come in the form of observational data—random samples of the system's autonomous behavior—or interventional data—samples conditioned on the particular values of one or more variables that have been experimentally manipulated. Here we study people's ability to infer causal structure from both observation and intervention, and to choose informative interventions on the basis of observational data. In three causal inference tasks, participants were to some degree capable of distinguishing between competing causal (...) hypotheses on the basis of purely observational data. Performance improved substantially when participants were allowed to observe the effects of interventions that they performed on the systems. We develop computational models of how people infer causal structure from data and how they plan intervention experiments, based on the representational framework of causal graphical models and the inferential principles of optimal Bayesian decision‐making and maximizing expected information gain. These analyses suggest that people can make rational causal inferences, subject to psychologically reasonable representational assumptions and computationally reasonable processing constraints. (shrink)

This thesis investigates two main issues concerning the behavior of rational agents, preference dynamics and agent diversity. -/- We take up two questions left aside by von Wright, and later also the multitude of his successors, in his seminal book Logic of Preference in 1963: reasons for preference, and changes in preference. Various notions of preference are discussed, compared and further correlated in the thesis. In particular, we concentrate on extrinsic preference. Contrary to intrinsic preference, extrinsic preference is reason-based, (...) i.e. one's preference for one option over another has a reason. A logical model is proposed and its properties are determined. Dynamics come in naturally, since reasons for the preferences can change. Logical systems and formal results regarding dynamical preference change are then presented. -/- Preference arises from comparisons between alternatives. A first option is to compare situations. Abstractly speaking, preferences are in this case between propositions, viewed as sets of possible worlds. The reasons can then be based on a `betterness' relation over possible worlds. Propositional preference arises as a lift from this primitive relation. A standard modal logical approach is taken and we use a modality for the betterness relation in the language. We then model preference change by techniques from dynamic epistemic logic (DEL), where a typical action, e.g. a suggestion or a command can change the betterness ordering of the worlds, and thereby the propositional preference. Dynamic reduction axioms are obtained to encode exactly how such a change takes place. We obtain a complete dynamic preference logic. -/- A second option is to compare objects as such. Concretely, properties of the objects often determine the preference over the objects. Properties are now the reasons. Inspired by Optimality Theory (OT), we propose a priority sequence, an ordering of properties. Various ways of getting a preference from the priority sequence are investigated, though we mostly follow the OT approach. We use a fragment of first-order logic to describe the situation. Here, on the dynamic side, it is priority change that leads to preference change. Using the DEL methodology again we propose a complete set of reduction axioms concerning the possible dynamic operations on priority sequences. -/- Not surprisingly, the above two views are closely related. After all, possible worlds can be thought of as objects! On the basis of a systematic comparison of the two views, we develop a two level perspective, in which the models themselves are structured in layers. In particular, correspondence results between the changes at the level of the possible worlds and the changes at the level of the priority sequences are proved. We end up by sketching a two-level preferential predicate logic to describe more complex circumstances in which situations and objects are compared simultaneously. -/- But we do not see this as the whole story. Preference does not live by itself, it is often intermingled with epistemic notions of knowledge and belief. One can have different intuitions about how this entanglement operates. A few options are discussed, and proposals for logical models are presented. When moving to dynamics, we now see a picture of knowledge update, belief revision and preference change taking place symbiotically, often unconsciously as in real life. -/- The resulting picture in the thesis is one of agents that process information and adjust beliefs and preferences in many different ways. There is no logically prescribed unique norm for doing this. The second part of the thesis takes this general phenomenon of diversity of agents as its focus, since it raises many issues for logical systems and the idealized agents which they normally presuppose. In reality, agents can differ across a wide spectrum of cognitive abilities and habits: in their memory capacity, observation power, inferential power, introspective ability, and revision policies when facing new information. -/- Two kinds of agents, perfect recall agents, and memory-free agents are studied thoroughly, in the setting of playing games. We show how current dynamic logics can be `parametrized' to allow for this memory diversity, with new characterizations of agent types resulting in complete dynamic-epistemic logics. The other dimension of the reality of diverse agents is that, however different they are, they often do manage to coordinate with each other successfully. While this theme has been prominent in game theory and multi-agent systems, it has received hardly any attention in logic. We analyze this interaction between different agents by looking at concrete scenarios which model their types explicitly. -/- Finally, we analyze the issue of agent diversity in its generality, discussing what dynamic logics would have to look like to become a full-fledged account of agents of different capacities and tendencies that pursue and sometimes achieve their goals in irreducibly social settings. -/- . (shrink)

Psychology of communication must do everything is possible to promote an adequate perception of risk. This is particularly true when it comes to transmitting statistical and probabilistic data to an audience of non-experts, inevitably conditioning their perception of risk. Data are all available, but subjects are able to understand them in the specific meanings proper to a specialized language, only if they are adequately transmitted. And we find these phenomena in the difficulty in representing the trend of, for instance, Covid-19 (...) contagion, based on probability of contagion and mortality. In general, then, when we communicate scientific terms or data we should re-introduce the psychological aspects which characterize communication. The nudging strategies can be considered as a prototype of approach to overcome risky behaviours, which takes into account the cognitive characteristics of the human system. This strategy acts on different levels, using implicit factors, bypassing defensive attitudes and exploiting adaptive inferential processes, without overloading the cognitive system. But from a communicative point of view, nudge, as well as any other type of intervention, is not a general ‘recipe. The acceptance of the suggestion, the effectiveness of the nudging implies the congruity with the system that receives it: the “way of reasoning”, and its implicit layer has to be taken into account. The right combination of the source, the adopted message and the decisional setting could improve the efficacy of the public policies. (shrink)

This book offers a comprehensive philosophical investigation of ignorance. Using a set of cognitive tools and models, it discusses features that can describe a state of ignorance if linked to a particular type of cognition affecting the agent’s social behavior, belief system, and inferential capacity. The author defines ignorance as a cognitive condition that can be either passively borne by an agent or actively nurtured by him or her, and a condition that entails epistemic limitations that affect the (...) agent’s behavior, belief system, and inferential capacity. The author subsequently describes the ephemeral nature of ignorance, its tenacity in the development of human inferential and cognitive performance, and the possibility of sharing ignorance among human agents within the social dimension. By combining previous frameworks such as the naturalization of logic, the eco-cognitive perspective in philosophy and concepts from Peircean epistemology, and adding original ideas derived from the author’s own research and reflections, the book develops a new cognitive framework to help understand the nature of ignorance and its influence on the human condition. (shrink)

People sometimes argue for questions, as can be verified by a Web search using as search terms phrases consisting of a conclusion indicator and an interrogative particle. These arguments provide a reason for asking the question and thus try to establish that it needs to be answered. Typically, they do so either in order to motivate interest in discovering the answer or in order to challenge addressees or a third party to explain their behaviour. The “inferential erotetic logic” of (...) the Polish logician Andrzej Wiśniewski provides a basis for evaluating the inferences in such arguments. For an inference from one or more statements to a question to be valid, the statements and the context must entail that the question has a true answer without entailing that any particular answer is true. Further, there must be a point to asking the question, such as the addressees’ ignorance of the correct answer to it; this requirement may be a pragmatic rather than a semantic constraint. Wiśniewski’s logic also covers inferences from questions to questions, but humans rarely articulate such inferences; this part of his logic is applicable to problem solving and proof theory rather than to arguments for questions. (shrink)

Obsessive compulsive disorder is a debilitating psychiatric condition where people become obsessed by remotely possible harm, error, bad luck, and compulsively repeat mental or behavioural rituals to neutralize these possibilities. This tendency to draw inferences on the basis of remote rather than more likely possibilities is termed 'inferential confusion' and can lead to immersion in possible worlds accompanied by feelings of dissociation between: knowing and doing, imagination and reality, and authentic and inauthentic self. These dissociation experiences in OCD may (...) inform us on the relational 'possibilistic' nature of consciousness. In a relational model of consciousness, the boundaries of consciousness are located between the person and the world, and shift according to the 'aboutness' of self-world interaction. A key element of 'aboutness' is projecting into the future to what is 'about to be', so sense of reality is constructed through a consensus about what could be, operationalized as a personal possibility distribution. Experiences such as derealization and depersonalization occur in OCD when there is a clash between personally possible worlds and the person ends up living in simultaneously a possible and an impossible world. Recognizing this confusion may be a key to alleviating dissociative symptoms. (shrink)

A taxonomy of part‐whole or meronymic relations is developed to explain the ordinary English‐speaker's use of the term “part of” and its cognates. The resulting classification yields six types of meronymic relations: 1. component‐integral object (pedal‐bike), 2. member‐collection (ship‐fleet), 3. portion‐mass (slice‐pie), 4. stuff‐object (steel‐car), 5. feature‐activity (paying‐shopping), and 6. place‐area (Everglades‐Florida). Meronymic relations ore further distinguished from other inclusion relations, such as spatial inclusion, and class inclusion, and from several other semantic relations: attribution, attachment, and ownership. This taxonomy is (...) then used to explain cases of apparent intransitivity in merological syllogisms, and standard form syllogisms whose premises express different inclusion relations. The data suggest that intransitivities arise due to equivocations between different types of semantic relations. These results are then explained by means of the relation element theory which accounts for the character and behavior of semantic relations in terms of more primitive relational elements. The inferential phenomena observed are then explained by means of a single principle of element matching. (shrink)

Behavioral scientists routinely publish broad claims about human psychology and behavior in the world's top journals based on samples drawn entirely from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. Researchers – often implicitly – assume that either there is little variation across human populations, or that these “standard subjects” are as representative of the species as any other population. Are these assumptions justified? Here, our review of the comparative database from across the behavioral sciences suggests both that there (...) is substantial variability in experimental results across populations and that WEIRD subjects are particularly unusual compared with the rest of the species – frequent outliers. The domains reviewed include visual perception, fairness, cooperation, spatial reasoning, categorization and inferential induction, moral reasoning, reasoning styles, self-concepts and related motivations, and the heritability of IQ. The findings suggest that members of WEIRD societies, including young children, are among the least representative populations one could find for generalizing about humans. Many of these findings involve domains that are associated with fundamental aspects of psychology, motivation, and behavior – hence, there are no obviousa priorigrounds for claiming that a particular behavioral phenomenon is universal based on sampling from a single subpopulation. Overall, these empirical patterns suggests that we need to be less cavalier in addressing questions ofhumannature on the basis of data drawn from this particularly thin, and rather unusual, slice of humanity. We close by proposing ways to structurally re-organize the behavioral sciences to best tackle these challenges. (shrink)

Precursors of inferential capacities concerning self- and other- understanding may be found in the basic experience of social contingency and emotional sharing. The emergence of a sense of self- and other-agency receives special attention here, as a foundation for self-understanding. We propose that synchrony, an amodal parameter of contingent self-other relationships, should be especially involved in the development of a sense of agency. To explore this framework, we have manipulated synchrony in various ways, either by delaying mother’s response to (...) infant’s behaviour, disorganizing mother’s internal synchrony between face and voice, freezing the partner in a still attitude, or on the contrary maximizing synchrony through imitation. We report results obtained with healthy and clinical populations that are supposed to be at the beginning of basic experiences concerning the ownership of their actions: infants of 2 months and 6 months, low-functioning children with autism and MA matched young children with Down Syndrome. Our results support the idea of a two-step process linking understanding of self to understanding of other and leading on to form the concept of human beings as universally contingent entities. (shrink)

Language has a rich typology of inferential types. It was recently shown that subjects are able to divide the informational content of new visual stimuli among the various slots of the inferential typology: when gestures or visual animations are used in lieu of specific words in a sentence, they can trigger the very same inferential types as language alone (Tieu et al., 2019 ). How general are the relevant triggering algorithms? We show that they extend to the (...) auditory modality and to music cognition. We tested whether pro-speech musical gestures, i.e. musical excerpts that replace words in sentences, can give rise to the same inferences. We show that it is possible to replicate the same typology of inferences using pro-speech music. Minimal and complex musical excerpts can behave just like language, gestures, and visual animations with respect to the logical behavior of their content when embedded in sentences. Specifically, we found that pro-speech music can generate scalar implicatures, presuppositions, supplements, and homogeneity inferences. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;There is a traditional conception of perception as the passive reception of information about the external world. This thesis pursues one line of development of an alternative view. The suggestion will be that fleeting subjective perceptual experience attains its status as genuinely representational of how things independently are in an objective world partly in virtue of its role as input into a system of practical thought and intentional interaction. (...) Thus objective perceivers are agents in the world of their perception. ;Part I opens with an account of what the capacity for objective perception might amount to. And I continue by exploring various lines of argument from here to the necessity of some kind of interplay between objective perception and practical thought. ;The focus of Part II shifts onto the notion of agency itself. After a brief outline of the metaphysical place of actions in the world of events, I go on to consider the question of our awareness of our intentional behavior. The resultant conception of our peculiarly immediate, non-observational, non-inferential knowledge of what we are doing, and of the bodily sensational origin of our practical know-how, tentatively suggests two further constraints upon the possibility of objective perception. Firstly, in the normal case, an objective perceiver must actually be an agent in the perceived world. And secondly, simple bodily feeling is an essential component in the psychological make-up of any subject of objective perception. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:How to Reason Beyond Reason? Toward a Philosophical Understanding of MadnessWouter Kusters, PhD (bio)To analyze the situation of madness on the ground, we need a grounded perspective, close to the situation at hand. The closer we come to the subject under scrutiny, the clearer its outlines, fine-grained details, and its dynamics, and the better we reach an explanation and understanding. The closer the approach, however, the higher the chances (...) are of becoming myopic and losing the connections with broader—or higher—perspectives: the view from above. It has been due to philosophical and historical approaches from above to the practices of philosophically inspired psychiatry that we may gain new insights into what is going on on the ground—and underground. This article by Garson provides such a view that may lead to a change in perspective, a new way to draw boundaries on the ground, to discover similarities and dissimilarities through space and time, without thereby losing the lived connection to the problematic ground.Garson proposes to replace a binary opposition of madness (in the sense of sick or insane) versus sanity (in the sense of healthy), with a triad of concepts, sanity, madness, and idiocy, taken from the work of philosophers of psychiatry avant la lettre in the early modern times, Locke, Kant, Wigan, and Heinroth. This triad is to be understood in terms of reason, where idiocy consists of the diminishment of some aspects of reason, while madness would be characterized by a perversion of reason. By examining how this perversion—or more neutrally said, this change—of reason was conceived by the four thinkers, Garson sheds a new light on research and theory within the philosophy of madness and the philosophy of psychiatry today. He examines the question of “how is it that the mad person “has” reason, but is still not reasonable?” with the help of the four authors mentioned above (of which I discuss three).In answering this question, Garson refers specifically to my work as an example of “exactly the kind of ontology we need for rethinking madness in a positive manner—not necessarily ‘positive’ in the sense of good, helpful, or ennobling, but in the sense of going beyond a mere lack, absence, or failure.” I wholeheartedly agree with this assessment, [End Page 317] and Garson’s proposal of this tripartite schema is helpful and valuable for thinking through how we can further nourish a positive view of madness, especially with reference to Mad Pride.Locke and HeinrothGarson discusses some fragments from Locke and concludes that according to Locke “the mad person, in contrast to the idiot, possesses reason by virtue of possessing an intact inferential capacity. What ultimately makes them mad, and not reasonable, is that their premises are flawed by the unhinged power of association.” So, with Locke the capacity for inferential logic is not disturbed, and in that sense reason is intact. The unreasonable behavior would be due, according to Locke, to an unbridled increase in imagination and associations, which are taken for reality. Instead of reason the capacity to align imagination and reality is afflicted. When we translate this Lockean view into contemporary terms, we could say that it is not their cognition, their way of processing stimuli that is problematic, but their being overwhelmed by impressions or stimuli. This is akin to “bottom-up” theories: Something is wrong with perception or experience, and ‘higher’ capacities of cognition and reasoning remain intact. Reason may seem ‘perverted,’ but at a closer look, this is a result of their being victim to anomalous experience, too many stimuli or too strong imaginations.Heinroth also explicitly distinguishes madness from idiocy, that is, from a diminishment of mental capacities. Instead, he considers madness as a reaction to what Garson calls “a reality that is too awful to bear.” Madness is then “a wholesome desire of nature to cure a perversion through another perversion.” Again, madness is then not in itself a diminishment of reason, but an attempt to cure something that went wrong, in a way that is also only seemingly wrong (perverted reason). Madness then is again within reason, but this core of intact reason is... (shrink)

The current study strives to examine the determinants of employee innovative work behavior and job performance. Therefore, an integrated research model is developed with the help of paternalistic leadership style and job embeddedness theory to investigate employee behavior toward innovative work behavior. The research model is extended with the moderating effect of environmental dynamism between the relationship of innovative work behavior and employee job performance. Data were collected from 411 employees working in small medium enterprises. For (...) inferential analysis, the structural equation modeling technique is used. Results of the structural equation modeling revealed that altogether paternalistic leadership style and factors underpinning job embeddedness theory have explained 52.1% of the variance in employee innovate work behavior. The findings of this research suggest that managers and policy makers should focus on benevolent leadership, moral leadership, and on-the-job embeddedness to boost employee job performance and innovative work behavior. (shrink)

This paper combines perspectives from different disciplines to open up an interdisciplinary view on basic processes of human interaction. Part I addresses problematic assumptions of dominating theories of mind and limits of phenomenological description. Part II presents findings from social psychological and neuroscientific experiments on sensomotor synchronization. These experiments were carried out at levels of experiencing, behavior/kinematics, organic functions, and neurophysiology. Novel approaches that study intercerebral processes in musicians who interact face-to-face are particularly relevant: parts of non-identical brains function (...) like temporarily coupled units. Part III discusses methodological issues and presuppositions of these experimental approaches as well as of current theories of mind. The findings from social psychology and neuroscience can serve to explicate phenomenological concepts and to complement descriptions, in particular of prereflective intentionality. Vice versa, the phenomenological view helps to critically examine limits and assumptions of empirical approaches and philosophical theories of mind. The presented findings on sensomotor and intercerebral synchronization corroborate phenomenological views of direct intercorporeal intersubjectivity, which provide an alternative to accounts that rely on simulation, representation, and inferential processes. (shrink)

The reduction of grounding to causation, or each to a more general relation of which they are species, has sometimes been justified by the impressive inferential capacity of structural equation modelling, causal Bayes nets, and interventionist causal modelling. Many criticisms of this assimilation focus on how causation is inadequate for grounding. Here, I examine the other direction: how treating grounding in the image of causation makes the resulting view worse for causation. The distinctive features of causal modelling that make (...) this connection appealing are distorted beyond use by forcing them to fit onto grounding. The very inferential strength that makes causation attractive is only possible because of a narrow construal of what counts as a causal relation; as soon as that broadens, the inferential capacity markedly diminishes. Making causation suitable for application to grounding spoils what was appealing about causation for this task in the first place. However, grounding need not appeal to causation: causal modelling does not have exclusive claim to structural equation modeling or other formal techniques of modelling structure. I offer a case in favour of a different kind of metaphysical frugality, which tend towards narrow, more restrictive construals of relations like causation or grounding, because then each relation behaves more homogenously. This more homogenous behavior delivers stronger inferential power per relation even though there may be more relations to which one is committed. (shrink)

A high level of professional integrity is expected from healthcare professionals, and literature suggests a relationship between unethical behavior of healthcare professionals and poor academic integrity behavior at medical school. While academic integrity is well researched in western countries, it is not so in the Middle East, which is characterized by different cultural values that may influence students’ academic integrity conduct. We conducted a cross-sectional study among health-professions students at a university in the Middle East to assess perceptual (...) differences on various cheating behaviors, as well as to explore the reasons underlying the cheating behavior. A validated survey instrument disseminated among first and second-year undergraduate students resulted in 211 complete responses and this data was analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics. Pearson’s Chi-square/ Fischer’s exact test was applied to test the association of various factors with academic misconduct. The major determinants of academic misconduct were investigated using Binary Logistic regression model. The conducted analysis and the results showed that preceding cheating behavior was the only factor significantly associated with cheating in the university (p. (shrink)

On a pragmatist view of quantum theory, a quantum state has the role of advising physically situated agents rather than representing the condition of physical systems. The advice concerns the cognitive significance of a magnitude claim S: σ has, locating the value of magnitude Q on system σ in set Δ of real numbers. The quantum state offers advice both on the content of a magnitude claim S and on its credibility, provided it has enough content. The advice is authoritative—anyone (...) who both accepts quantum theory and agrees on the correct quantum state is bound to heed it. On this view, the content of a magnitude claim is a function of its place in a web of material inferences connecting it to other claims, and hence to perception and action. A quantum state offers advice on the content of a magnitude claim by controlling its place in this inferential web. It thereby adds a contextual element to the content even of claims about the properties of familiar objects like gross experimental apparatus and the moon. But by modeling the behavior of quantum states, quantum theory itself reassures us that only for claims about currently unfamiliar objects does the consequent modification of content amount to anything. (shrink)

The purpose of a logical framework such as LF is to provide a language for defining logical systems suitable for use in a logic-independent proof development environment. All inferential activity in an object logic is to be conducted in the logical framework via the representation of that logic in the framework. An important tool for controlling search in an object logic, the need for which is motivated by the difficulty of reasoning about large and complex systems, is the use (...) of structured theory presentations. In this paper a rudimentary language of structured theory presentations is presented, and the use of this structure in proof search for an arbitrary object logic is explored. The behaviour of structured theory presentations under representation in a logical framework is studied, focusing on the problem of “lifting” presentations from the object logic to the metalogic of the framework. The topic of imposing structure on logic presentations, so that logical systems may themselves be defined in a modular fashion, is also briefly considered. (shrink)