Little Aristotle - Ethical Virtues Workshop. Inspired by Nicomachean Ethics, the project aims to seed virtuous consistent attitudes in children, as part of their moral enculturation process, understood as a coherent set of knowledge, criteria, and capacities of moral judgment. Character’s dispositions like courage, generosity, friendship, correctness or gentleness were aimed to be cultivated by activating non-formal educational methods, anchored in real life and adapted to children’s stage of development. The activities and conclusions of this workshop are presented (...) in this article, which the main purpose is to find a place for Aristotelian ethics in nowadays moral education for children, to highlight the need for an appropriate moral pedagogy, that takes into account children’s capacities of understanding and to inspire ethicists and moral trainers in their work. (shrink)

The present essay discusses the relationship between moral philosophy, psychology and education based on virtue ethics, contemporary neuroscience, and how neuroscientific methods can contribute to studies of moral virtue and character. First, the present essay considers whether the mechanism of moral motivation and developmental model of virtue and character are well supported by neuroscientific evidence. Particularly, it examines whether the evidence provided by neuroscientific studies can support the core argument of virtue ethics, that is, motivational externalism. Second, (...) it discusses how experimental methods of neuroscience can be applied to studies in human morality. Particularly, the present essay examines how functional and structural neuroimaging methods can contribute to the development of the fields by reviewing the findings of recent social and developmental neuroimaging experiments. Meanwhile, the present essay also considers some limitations embedded in such discussions regarding the relationship between the fields and suggests directions for future studies to address these limitations. (shrink)

This research describes and empirically evaluates the application of a business ethics pedagogy informed by neuroscience and evolutionary biology that suggest ethical decisions are made unconsciously and emotionally. Moral Foundation Theory (MFT) provides a framework that considers a range of values individuals rely on for decision-making. This relates to Virtue ethics (VE) that develops intellectual and character virtues, requires emotional development and is thus suitable for guiding business ethics pedagogy. This study focuses on a business ethics course integrating intellectual (...) virtue and character virtue pedagogies, including contemplative and emotional intelligence skills practices. The aim of the course is to develop character, providing future managers the means to enact ethical decision-making through self-awareness of emotions, intrinsic values and translate these into ethical behavior. Pre-Post Emotional Intelligence (EI) and Moral Foundation Questionnaires (MFQ) are used to evaluate the development of students’ character virtues, i.e., increased emotional awareness, emotional regulation and intrinsic values. This paper mainly seeks to understand how to develop ethical behavior, beyond learning didactic definitions of what is ethically right and what is wrong, i.e. focusing on the learning process that can lead to personal ethical judgment and conduct. The related pedagogy integrates transdisciplinary theories and practices, and as such suggests a holistic approach to ethical behavior transformation. The results indicate limited, significant changes in all measures except emotional awareness. This developing field requires more research to identify the contributions of MFT and related pedagogy to students’ ethical development. (shrink)

Paul Hirst’s idea of moral education is distinctive in the central role it attributes to social practices. For him, ethical principles and virtues should not be seen as abstract entities theoretically derived and then applied in education so that students learn to reason from those principles or live by those virtues. Instead, Hirst’s moral education incorporates an initiation into social practices and comes back to them by means of situated critical reflection from within those practices themselves. Embracing (...) Hirst’s proposed central role of social practices, this paper spells out the key role that emotions play in moral education so understood and their relations with social practices. As emotions materialize our deeply held values, incorporated into lived experience, their cultivation will not simply be a matter of deliberation, but rather of the practical exploration of social practices that can nurture and sustain them. (shrink)

Cosmopolitanism has become an influential theory in both political and, increasingly, educational discourse. In simple terms cosmopolitanism can be understood as a response to the globalised and diverse world in which we live. Diverse in nature, cosmopolitan ideas come in many forms. The focus here is on what have been termed 'strong' ethical forms of cosmopolitanism; that is, positions which conceptualise moral bonds and obligations as resulting from a shared, common humanity. The view that pupils should be taught that (...) all human beings are equal and, crucially, that this entails a responsibility to take action when human equity is challenged or transgressed, is finding increasing expression within educational literature. The suggestion explored here is that strong forms of ethical cosmopolitanism are limited in ways which seriously restrict their educational worth. In the final section, it is argued that forms of cultural and political cosmopolitanism (which are part of the lived experiences of intra- and supra-national citizenship) are best responded to by developing the requisite virtues in pupils to engage with diverse and dialogic communities. (shrink)

"Ethics and Experience" presents a wide-ranging and thought-provoking introduction to the question famously posed by Socrates: How is life to be lived? 'An excellent primer for any student taking a course on moral philosophy, the book introduces ethics as a single and broadly unified field of inquiry in which we apply reason to try and solve Socrates' question. "Ethics and Experience "examines the major forms of ethical subjectivism and objectivism - including expressivism, error theory', naturalism, and intuitionism. (...) The book lays out the detail of the most significant contemporary moral theories - including utilitarianism, virtue ethics, Kantianism, and contractarianism - and reconsiders these theories in the light of two questions that should perhaps be asked more often: Is moral theory, with its tendency to regiment ethical thought and experience, really the best way for us to apply reason to deciding how to live? And, might it not be more truly reasonable to look for less system and more insight? (shrink)

In parts I and II, this article briefly sketches two approaches to virtue ethics – those taken by Aristotle and the contemporary exemplarist moral theory of Linda Zagzebski – with an eye to providing resources for miliary educators. Each section concludes with remarks about the pros and cons of the author’s experiences of teaching these theories to undergraduates. Part III deals with the social articulation of morality and its implications for war crimes. The social articulation of morality is the (...) idea that moral principles cannot be applied in the abstract, but must be interpreted in terms of social backgrounds and norms. This draws on War Crimes: Causes, Excuses, and Blame (2019) by Talbert and Wolfendale, who consider how social articulations of morality led the military in various countries to commit war crimes in the mistaken belief that they were acting in accordance with moral principles. Democratic countries have commitments to free speech that enable us to resist such abuses. The implications for military education are that virtues such as intellectual discernment should be joined with discussions of ethical issues to ensure that future military leaders do not fall prey to false moral narratives. (shrink)

This dissertation offers an interpretation of moral knowledge and moral education in Plato's Protagoras. The dialogue develops the deeply antagonistic views of Protagoras and Socrates about these and related topics. I examine their competing views about several important questions, including: What is moral wisdom, and how is it related to the other parts of virtue? Can arete be taught, and if not, how else might it be acquired? Is the good reducible to natural human desires, or does (...) it in some way transcend the natural world? The dissertation includes a detailed analysis of all sections of the dialogue, as well as of relevant sections of the Theaetetus. In the Introduction and Conclusion I also compare Protagoras' and Socrates' views to those of other moral philosophers. ;I argue that for Protagoras, arete is the ability to plan well and to exert control over external circumstances in order to promote one's own survival and pleasure. Moral reasoning is a techne, a tool for maximizing human desires. An analysis of the Great Speech shows that Protagoras is an ethical naturalist: the good is survival. Justice and shame are valuable in that they promote this end. Socratic dialectic reveals that, for Protagoras, wisdom has priority over any virtues with which it conflicts. Socrates' analysis of hedonism elicits Protagoras' assumption that pleasure is the good, an assumption inconsistent with Protagoras' view that courage is a virtue. ;Socrates, by contrast, is not an ethical naturalist; the good is not an object of the natural world. Moral knowledge is not technical, for it requires self-knowledge. While arete depends upon moral knowledge, our knowledge is always incomplete: we may progress towards excellence, but can never fully attain it. The human soul has an openness to the good, but we must articulate and test our intuitions through conversation with others. Moral teaching, understood as the simple transmission of knowledge, is impossible, but moral learning through philosophical exploration of moral intuitions and their limits is possible. Philosophy, so understood, better preserves ordinary moral experience than does Sophistry. (shrink)

The teaching of ethics in school is considered important and necessary. But can ethics be taught? And should its teaching consist in conveying knowledge about ethical concepts, possibly a discussion around them, or rather in shaping students’ moral attitudes and appropriate behaviour? The article engages in reflection on these problems with reference to various traditions of ethical thought and moral theory. It proposes to take the contemporary renewed Aristotelian virtue ethics as the main point of reference and basis (...) for educational practice. The concept of phronesis as practical rationality, allowing the formation of moral judgements that are both context-sensitive and take into account the complexity of interests and goods that are difficult to agree upon, seems to be a still valid model for moral education. Teaching and discussion oriented towards the consideration of concrete cases and stories, i.e. training the skills of this type of judgement, avoids the dangers of learning focused on theoretical issues: becoming entangled in definitional ambiguities in defining moral values, or thinking detached from emotion and experience. Learning that consists of analysing a philosophical tradition runs the risk that the knowledge imparted will prove inadequate to the age and level of personal development of the student, generating moral subjectivism and relativistic scepticism. However, this argument is not directed against theorising and the introduction of abstract considerations in the educational process, even at the earliest stages: theorising and the construction of rational justifications are necessary but should result from the inspiration and development of intellectual predispositions, not from the transmission of ready-made knowledge. (shrink)

The author examines fundamental problems involved in teaching applied ethics in the educational environment of contemporary university culture. American universities are increasingly turning away from liberal arts education and focusing their efforts on constructing more professionalized degrees and programs. As a result, the education process has become increasingly commodified and ethics courses in universities have been further removed from the liberal arts project of moral development in the classroom. The author argues that ethicists should work to reframe the (...) project of moral education if they hope to retain a central role in the process of teaching ethics. The author suggests a growth model to be installed in the undergraduate curriculum that would reacquaint students with the aims and benefits of learning ethical and moral philosophy. (shrink)

In recent decades, many philosophers have considered the strengths and weaknesses of a virtue-centered approach to moral theory. Much less attention has been given to how such an approach bears on issues in applied ethics. The essays in this volume apply a virtue-centered perspective to a variety of contemporary moral issues, and in so doing offer a fresh and illuminating perspective. Some of the essays focus on a particular virtue and its application to one or more realms (...) of applied ethics, such as temperance and sex or humility and environmental ethics. Other chapters focus on an issue in applied ethics and bring several virtues into a discussion of that issue or realm of life, such as sport, education, and business. Finally, several of the chapters engage relevant psychological research as well as current neuroscience, which enhances the strength of the philosophical arguments. (shrink)

This paper argues that the contemporary practice of moral philosophy (particularly in the examples it relies on) and the contemporary practice of legal education both tend to ignore, dismiss or exclude that which is here called 'moral experience.' Moral experience is here defined (non-exhaustively) to be: 1) that which helps us face up to, instead of hide away from, our mortality and fallibility; 2) that which helps us experience radical uncertainty about who we are, (...) where we have been, and where we will be, and about what has happened, is happening and will happen; 3) that which helps us experience the insight that we are not in control of all that which influences us; 4) that which helps us experience the infinite (for us) complexity of others and the world; 5) that which helps us to notice hitherto-invisible (to us) forms of suffering and vulnerability; and 6) that which helps us to widen the scope of, or sometimes change, that which we find valuable and care about. Moral experience is not designed to replace traditions of moral inquiry (such as virtue ethics or utilitarianism), and it is not designed to help us meet the demands of moral life. Rather, it is designed to help us avoid underestimating the demands of moral life. Following a discussion of moral experience in the first part of the paper, the second part turns to offer some activities and resources thanks to which law schools can enable moral experience for both their students and their staff. In doing so, the second part of the paper draws on research undertaken as part of the AHRC Beyond Text in Legal Education project at the School of Law, University of Edinburgh. It also draws on the author's own research as part of a pedagogical project entitled Unnatural Exercises. (shrink)

Environmental-embodied Education: Virtues for Social Hygiene and Self-enjoyment. The contemporary debates concerning environmental education and ethics are continuously growing, developing new ways of perceiving the self in relation to the biotic community and to nature as a whole. Sustainability virtue ethics is a field that can provide a theoretical and practical structure for what it means to live a good and pleasant life, building attitudes characterized by caring, awareness, awe and responsibility. The aim of this paper is to draw a (...) map of how to generate a context that facilitates a real transformation in the way individuals relate to nature, an education for empathy, with a sense of belonging and a maximum of adaptability. Based on my experience as an educator in a green school (Green School Romania) and as a researcher in the field of moral eco-pedagogy, I intent to talk about how environmental experiential education is an Archimedean point for what it means to develop a sensuous enjoyment and self-enjoyment in the biotic community, moving away from defensiveness and unjustified fears. In the context of risk management and long-term strategies for protecting and preserving the delicate equilibrium of life on Earth, environmental virtue ethics represents a necessary and helpful tool, based on interaction and on a focus on the process, discovering the miracle of being aligned with the rhythms of nature. This paper is designed to stand up against the instrumentalism and the dominant egoistic attitude of being above nature, trying to replace them with the attitude of fitting into nature with curiosity, simplicity and serenity. Using the model of moral eco-pedagogy (experiential learning about, for and from the environment) and non-violent communication, I will show that the individual begins to become that self that one truly is, a process of self- realization and engagement with an impact on how he relates to the moral patients and the natural world. (shrink)

This essay develops a new conceptual framework of science and engineering ethics education based on virtue ethics and positive psychology. Virtue ethicists and positive psychologists have argued that current rule-based moral philosophy, psychology, and education cannot effectively promote students’ moral motivation for actual moral behavior and may even lead to negative outcomes, such as moral schizophrenia. They have suggested that their own theoretical framework of virtue ethics and positive psychology can contribute to the effective promotion of (...) motivation for self-improvement by connecting the notion of morality and eudaimonic happiness. Thus this essay attempts to apply virtue ethics and positive psychology to science and engineering ethics education and to develop a new conceptual framework for more effective education. In addition to the conceptual-level work, this essay suggests two possible educational methods: moral modeling and involvement in actual moral activity in science and engineering ethics classes, based on the conceptual framework. (shrink)

This volume provides a clear and accessible overview of central concepts, positions, and arguments in virtue ethics. While it focuses primarily on Aristotelian virtue ethics, it also includes discussion of alternative forms of virtue ethics and competing normative theories. The first six chapters are organized around central questions in normative ethics that are of particular concern to virtue ethicists and their critics: -/-  What is virtue ethics?  What makes a trait a virtue?  Is there a link between (...) virtue and happiness?  What is involved in being well-motivated?  What is practical wisdom?  What makes an action right? -/- The last four chapters focus on important challenges or objections to virtue ethics: -/-  Can virtue ethics be applied to particular moral problems?  Does virtue ethics ultimately rely on moral principles?  Can it withstand the situationist critique?  What are the prospects for an environmental virtue ethics? -/- With useful Summaries and Further Reading sections at the end of each chapter, the book is written for advanced undergraduates, but should also be useful to graduate students, professional philosophers, and anyone interested in normative ethics, applied ethics, moral psychology, or moral education. (shrink)

The misunderstanding of philosopher Immanuel Kant's principle of morality - the categorical imperative - by journalism professionals, professors, and students comes in many forms. To better understand Kant's ethical theory, however, one must go beyond Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals and study his Doctrine of Virtue: Part 2 of The Metaphysics of Morals; to apply the categorical imperative, one must also understand the importance Kant placed on moral education.

In recent years there has been an increased interest in the application of Aristotelian virtue to business ethics. The objective of this paper is to describe the moral and intellectual virtues defined by Aristotle and the types of pedagogy that might be used to integrate virtue ethics into the business curriculum. Virtues are acquired human qualities, the excellences of character, which enable a person to achieve the good life. In business, the virtues facilitate successful cooperation and enable the community (...) to achieve its collective goals. The cultivation of virtue in students requires imparting knowledge about virtue and training students to be virtuous. A variety of instructional techniques are discussed including using case studies, collaborative and cooperative learning, role-playing, and video presentations. Business educators should emphasize to students that virtue considerations apply both to possible actions they may take and to themselves as moral agents. Since faculty may be viewed as role models, it is especially important that they set proper standards of behavior for students to emulate. (shrink)

In this essay I sketch some vices of virtue ethics, draw on inference about the philosophical source of the vices, and conclude with a recommendation concerning future efforts in moral theory construction. The source of the vices, I argue, lies in a mononomic or single-principle strategy within normative theory construction, a reductionist conceptual scheme which distorts certain integral aspects of our moral experience. My recommendation is that this strategy be abandoned, for the moral field is not (...) unitary -- mononomic methods are not the best tools for moral theorists. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to address the possibility of explaining the nature of moral cognition as being rooted in an agent’s involvement in a social practice. Seen along such lines, not only does the recognition of the extent of moral standards show up as based in the agent’s experience that has been gathered in the process of education and developing their capacities for acting autonomously, but it is also thanks to the engagement in the set (...) of such social practices that the agent is able to define the moral aspect, which exceeds the practical aims of a certain area of life. Hence, I argue that in order to redefine the borders of shared morality, a practical experience is necessary to link the various practices that enable ethical reflection based on the moral resources that are obtained in this way. (shrink)

In this article, the author makes attempts to demonstrate that, from the educational standpoint, the relationship between philosophy and literature cannot be overlooked. Even the most remote cultures testify their transmission of moral teaching through literary accounts. In this sense, the author promotes this methodology hence argues that the axial concept structured by ethics is the concept of acknowledgment. Secondly, the author explains how the concept of acknowledgment has been present in contemporary ethical discourses and proposes which he considers (...) fundamental on the basis of a theory of knowledge which closely relates understanding and will together. He sustains that fundamental acknowledgment is that which is established by the recognition that the other is a person, a thesis which precedes the acknowledgment of the other as a legitimate interlocutor or a responsible subject. Next, the author aims his effort to explain two ways (among many other possible ones) in which literature applies to education as empathy and as paradigm. With respect to empathy, he argues that the self-recognition the reader can establish with a literary character is essential. In this sense, he considers that the empathy attainable can be only analogical, as it can only be partial. Empathy requires a point in common, which the author places in ?humanity?; thus, a certain form of equality between the empathic subject at the subject he attempts to be relate to, becomes possible. As for paradigms, the author sustains that literature is abundant in models and icons of virtue and vice and that such paradigms turn out to be essential for the ethical-moral upbringing of an individual. He takes up the concept of paradigm as analogical representation, that is, as a model-sign of man, and on these grounds, he reassumes some theses which have become recurrent in contemporary moral philosophy, as is the case with Max Scheler, Karol Wojtyla, Luis Pareyson, and Fernando Salmerón, among others. The author argues that the reader can recognize himself in the character; the later can then exert an aspirational force, which allows a connection to be established, by which the reader tries to approach the paradigm. (shrink)

Teaching experiments are valuable when it comes to sensitizing students for business ethics that addresses the behavior of agents in modern societies. Many students are coined by the often predominantly individualistic ethical reasoning that they are accustomed to from their living environments. In our classes, we confront them with the volatility of their own ethical behavior by the use of experiments that ideally work with real incentives. We believe experiments to be a powerful tool not only to illustrate theoretical concepts, (...) but also to make students experience the compulsion of economic incentives first-hand. This may lead to the insight that one is more prone to the contingencies of the situation than expected. Experiments may make students question their own behavior and re-evaluate the implementability of their moral ideals - as consumers, citizens and managers. (shrink)

In normative ethical theory, computer ethics belongs to the area of applied ethics dealing with practical and everyday moral problems arising from the use of computers and computer networks in the information society. Modern scholarship usually approves deontological and utilitarian ethics as appropriate to computer ethics, while classical theories of ethics, such as virtue ethics, are usually neglected as anachronistic and unsuitable to the information era and ICT industry. During past decades, an Aristotelian form of virtue ethics has (...) been revived in modern philosophical enquiries with serious attempts for application to computer ethics and cyberethics. In this paper, the author argues that current trends and behaviours in online communication require an ethics of self-care found in Plotinus’ self-centred virtue ethics theory. The paper supports the position that Plotinus’ virtue ethics of intellectual autonomy and self-determination is relevant to cyberethics discussions involved in computer education and online communication. (shrink)

The VIA Inventory of Strengths and the VIA model were originally developed to assess and study 24 character strengths. In this paper, I discuss how the VIA Inventory and its character strength model can be applied to the field of moral education with moral philosophical considerations. First, I review previous factor analysis studies that have consistently reported factors containing candidates for moral virtues, and discuss the systematic structure and organization of VIA character strengths. Second, I discuss (...) several issues related to the VIA model, including a lack of previous studies that directly support the moral justifiability of the model and the presence of a fundamental virtue component required for optimal moral functioning in virtue ethics, phronesis, practical wisdom, in the model. Finally, I propose future directions for research on the VIA model in order to address the aforementioned issues and facilitate the application of the model in moral education. (shrink)

An earlier version of this essay was presented at the Annual Retreat (February 2005) of the Ethics Committee of the South Carolina Medical Association. The subject was moral education in medical schools. A brief selection, “Creating An Effective Pedagogy for Moral Education” was published in the Journal of the S.C. Medical Association. The present paper examines the state of 'moral education' in contemporary education and other public institutions.

Scientific progress in recent neurofeedback research may bring about a new type of moral neuroenhancement, namely, neurofeedback-based moral enhancement; however, this has yet to be examined thoroughly. This paper presents an ethical analysis of the possibility of neurofeedback-based moral enhancement and demonstrates that this type of moral enhancement sheds new light on the moral enhancement debate. First, I survey this debate and extract the typical structural flow of its arguments. Second, by applying structure to the (...) case of neurofeedback-based moral enhancement, I examine the ethical, legal, and social issues to show that this technique is unique and traditionalist, which makes it compatible with almost all our conservative notions, so that it, accordingly, can be seen as an ethically acceptable option. Third, by rejecting the premise in the moral enhancement debate that bio/neuro-enhancement has its unique ELSI that traditional methods would never create, I demonstrate that, by virtue of its traditional or conservative features, neurofeedback-based moral enhancement can be incorporated into the traditional moral education network. Finally, I conclude that, being a part of the traditional moral education network, neurofeedback-based moral enhancement can be a unique and ethically acceptable option of moral neuroenhancement. (shrink)

In many universities and related knowledge transmission organisations, professional focus on empirical data shows as in vocational education that preparation for real life technical work is important, as one would expect from “career education”. University is as the name shows on the contrary focusing on the universality of some sort of education, which is neither a technical one, nor much concerned by preparing oneself for a career. The scope of this chapter is to propose an analysis of inclusion as the (...) very essence of an ethics of reformation of education, which in our opinion cannot come from the institution of education as much as from a common basis between everyday learning capacities and curriculum based learning methods. Inclusive vision and values should be theoretically explained by philosophers in order to be refined and adapted into our current experience of values, pointing out issues about method and knowledge parameters. In particular a focus on epistemic values should bring good indications on how to empower others, and leave a more inclusive life, assuming the somehow paradoxical and surprising idea that knowledge is as important in real life outside the university as it is in the classroom, being the real universal value and currency across disciplines, times and contexts. University learns from being inclusive, i. e. by bringing not only a higher point of view on technical education but also a wider view on the human being. (shrink)

In addition to the traditional reliance on rules and codes in regulating the conduct of military personnel, most of today’s militaries put their money on character building in trying to make their soldiers virtuous. Especially in recent years it has time and again been argued that virtue ethics, with its emphasis on character building, provides a better basis for military ethics than deontological ethics or utilitarian ethics. Although virtue ethics comes in many varieties these days, in many texts on military (...) ethics dealing with the subject of military virtues the Aristotelian view on virtues is still pivotal. Developing virtues is by some authors seen as the best way to prevent misconduct by military personnel, it being considered superior to rules or codes of conduct imposed from above. The main argument these authors offer is that these solutions are impotent when no one is around, and lack the flexibility often thought necessary in today’s world. Finally, rules and codes try to condition behavior, leaving less room for personal integrity. At first sight, then, there is a great deal to say in favor of virtue ethics as being the best way of enhancing the chances of soldiers behaving morally. However, this preference for steering conduct by means of promoting certain desirable dispositions is not without any problems that, as it stands, are hardly ever addressed. To begin with, there are a few practical concerns. For instance, even if we assume that military virtues can assist military personnel to do their work in a morally sound manner, it is still not clear to what extent virtues can, in fact, be taught to them. It is an assumption of virtue ethics that they can, but is this really the case? And if so, how should they be taught? – virtues are supposedly developed by practicing them, yet how much room is there for practicing virtues in for instance the ethics education as followed in military academies and school battalions? Secondly, it appears that the traditional military virtues, such as honor, loyalty, courage, and obedience, are, especially in their common interpretation, mainly beneficial to colleagues and the organization, not so much to the local population of the countries military personnel are deployed to. Changes in the military’s wider environment have led to a shift from traditional of self-defense tasks to new, more complex tasks, and especially in today’s missions one could expect that the proper virtues are not necessarily solely the more martial ones. (shrink)

This book is an anthology with the following themes. Non-European Tradition: Bussanich interprets main themes of Hindu ethics, including its roots in ritual sacrifice, its relationship to religious duty, society, individual human well-being, and psychic liberation. To best assess the truth of Hindu ethics, he argues for dialogue with premodern Western thought. Pfister takes up the question of human nature as a case study in Chinese ethics. Is our nature inherently good (as Mengzi argued) or bad (Xunzi’s view)? Pfister ob- (...) serves their underlying agreement, that human beings are capable of becoming good, and makes precise the disagreement: whether we achieve goodness by cultivating autonomous feelings or by accepting external precepts. There are political consequences: whether government should aim to respect and em- power individual choices or to be a controlling authority. Early Greek Thinking: Collobert examines the bases of Homeric ethics in fame, prudence, and shame, and how these guide the deliberations of heroes. She observes how, by depending upon the poet’s words, the hero gains a quasi- immortality, although in truth there is no consolation for each person’s inevi- table death. Plato: Santas examines Socratic Method and ethics in Republic 1. There Socrates examines definitions of justice and tests them by comparison to the arts and sciences. Santas shows the similarities of Socrates’ method to John Rawls’ method of considered judgments in reflective equilibrium. McPherran interprets Plato’s religious dimension as like that of his teacher Socrates. McPherran shows how Plato appropriates, reshapes, and extends the religious conventions of his own time in the service of establishing the new enterprise of philosophy. Ac- cording to Taylor, Socrates believes that humans in general have the task of helping the gods by making their own souls as good as possible, and Socrates’ unique ability to cross-examine imposes on him the special task of helping others to become as good as possible. This conception of Socrates’ mission is Plato’s own, consisting in an extension of the traditional conception of piety as helping the gods. Brickhouse and Smith propose a new understanding of Socratic moral psychology—one that retains the standard view of Socrates as an intellectualist, but also recognizes roles in human agency for appetites and passions. They compare and contrast the Socratic view to the picture of moral psychology we get in other dialogues of Plato. Hardy also proposes a new, non-reductive understanding of Socratic eudaimonism—he argues that Socrates invokes a very rich and complex notion of the “Knowledge of the Good and Bad”, which is associated with the motivating forces of the virtues. Rudebusch defends Socrates’ argument that knowledge can never be impotent in the face of psychic passions. He considers the standard objections: that knowledge cannot weigh incom- mensurable human values, and that brute desire, all by itself, is capable of moving the soul to action. Aristotle: Anagnostopoulos interprets Aristotle on the nature and acquisition of virtue. Though virtue of character, aiming at human happiness, requires a complex awareness of multiple dimensions of one’s experience, it is not properly a cognitive capacity. Thus it requires habituation, not education, according to Aristotle, in order to align the unruly elements of the soul with reason’s knowledge of what promotes happiness. Shields explains Aristotle’s doctrine that goodness is meant in many ways as the doctrine that there are different analyses of goodness for different types of circumstance, just as for being. He finds Aristotle to argue for this conclusion, against Plato’s doctrine of the unity of the Good, by applying the tests for homonymy and as an immediate cons- equence of the doctrine of categories. Shields evaluates the issue as unresolved at present. Russell discusses Aristotle’s account of practical deliberation and its virtue, intelligence (phronesis). He relates the account to contemporary philo- sophical controversies surrounding Aristotle’s view that intelligence is neces- sary for moral virtue, including the objections that in some cases it is unnecessary or even impedes human goodness. Frede examines the advantages and disadvantages of Aristotle’s virtue ethics. She explains the general Greek con- ceptions of happiness and virtue, Aristotle’s conception of phronesis and compares the Aristotle’s ethics with modern accounts. Liske discusses the question of whether the Aristotelian account of virtue entails an ethical-psy- chological determinism. He argues that Aristotle’s understanding of hexis allows for free action and ethical responsibility : By making decisions for good actions we are able to stabilize our character (hexis). Hellenistic and Roman: Annas defends an account of stoic ethics, according to which the three parts of Stoicism—logic, physics, and ethics—are integrated as the parts of an egg, not as the parts of a building. Since by this analogy no one part is a foundation for the rest, pedagogical decisions may govern the choice of numerous, equally valid, presentations of Stoic ethics. Piering interprets the Cynic way of life as a distinctive philosophy. In their ethics, Cynics value neither pleasure nor tradition but personal liberty, which they achieve by self-suffi- ciency and display in speech that is frank to the point of insult. Plotinus and Neoplatonism: Gerson outlines the place of ordinary civic virtue as well as philosophically contemplative excellence in Neoplatonism. In doing so he attempts to show how one and the same good can be both action-guiding in human life and be the absolute simple One that grounds the explanation of everything in the universe. Delcomminette follows Plotinus’s path to the Good as the foundation of free will, first in the freedom of Intellect and then in the “more than freedom” of the One. Plotinus postulates these divinities as not outside but within each self, saving him from the contradiction of an external foundation for a truly free will. General Topics: Halbig discusses the thesis on the unity of virtues. He dis- tinguishes the thesis of the identity of virtues and the thesis of a reciprocity of virtues and argues that the various virtues form a unity (in terms of reciprocity) since virtues cannot bring about any bad action. Detel examines Plato’s and Aristotle’s conceptions of normativity : Plato and Aristotle (i) entertained hybrid theories of normativity by distinguishing functional, semantic and ethical normativity, (ii) located the ultimate source of normativity in standards of a good life, and thus (iii) took semantic normativity to be a derived form of normativity. Detel argues that hybrid theories of normativity are—from a mo- dern point of view—still promising. Ho ̈ffe defends the Ancient conception of an art of living against Modern objections. Whereas many Modern philosophers think that we have to replace Ancient eudaimonism by the idea of moral obligation (Pflicht), Ho ̈ffe argues that Eudaimonism and autonomy-based ethics can be reconciled and integrated into a comprehensive and promising theory of a good life, if we enrich the idea of autonomy by the central elements of Ancient eudaimonism. Some common themes: The topics in Chinese and Hindu ethics are perhaps more familiar to modern western sensibilities than Homeric and even Socratic. Anagnostopoulos, Brickhouse and Smith, Frede, Liske, Rudebusch, and Russell all consider in contrasting ways the role of moral character, apart from intellect, in ethics. Brickhouse / Smith, Hardy, and Rudebusch discuss the Socratic con- ception of moral knowledge. Brickhouse / Smith and Hardy retain the standard view of the so called Socratic Intellectualism. Shields and Gerson both consider the question whether there is a single genus of goodness, or if the term is a homonym. Bussanich, McPherran, Taylor, and Delcomminette all consider the relation between religion and ethics. Pfister, Piering, Delcomminette, and Liske all consider what sort of freedom is appropriate to human well-being. Halbig, Detel, and Ho ̈ffe propose interpretations of main themes of Ancient ethics. (shrink)

This book takes a major step in the philosophy of education by moving back past the Enlightenment and reinstating Aristotelian Virtue at the heart of moral education.

1Preface: Malthus the Utilitarian vs. Malthus the Christian moral thinker. The chapter aims at reconstructing the deadlocks of Malthus scholarship concerning his relationship to utilitarianism. It argues that Bonar created out of nothing the myth of Malthus’s ‘Utilitarianism’, which carried, in turn, a pseudo-problem concerning Malthus’s lack of consistency with his own alleged Utilitarianism; besides it argues that such misinterpretation was hard to die and still persists in Hollander’s reading of Malthus’s work. ● -/- 2 Eighteenth-century Anglican ethics. The (...) chapter gives an overview of eighteenth-century Anglican ethics, noticing how the Cambridge tradition gave special weight to natural theology as opposed to positive or revealed theology and how two Cambridge fellows, John Gay and Thomas Brown worked out a kind of a rational-choice account of the origins of natural laws, where a law-giver God chooses among a number of possible sets of laws on the basis of a maximizing criterion, happiness for his creatures. ● -/- 3 Malthus’s meta-ethics. The chapter reconstructs the two ethical chapters of the second Essay. It argues that Malthus’s ethics is not dependent on Paley’s, but is derived from Cumberland, Butler, Gay, Brown. Besides, it argues that theodicy takes a new place in the 1803 Essays and ethics becomes a key to theodicy. The new solution is that, once it has been proved that passions can be mastered and that a world where passions are under control would be a comparatively happy place, a society where moral restraint prevailed would make the middling ranks more numerous, reduce dependence, and preserve liberty. ● -/- 4 Malthus’s early normative ethics: a morality of freedom. The chapter reconstructs young Malthus’s views on the foundations of ethics, proving his adhesion to voluntarist consequentialism. Then it reconstructs his treatment of political issues, whence a clear stance emerges in favour of traditional Whig concerns, such as political freedom, personal independence and dignity. Finally, it gives a fresh look at the theological argument in the two well-known final chapters, locating it in the context of consequentialism, voluntarism, and quasi-Leibnizian theodicy. ● -/- 5 Malthus’s intermediate normative ethics: a morality of prudence. Malthus’s normative ethics focuses on two main ‘natural’ virtues, benevolence and chastity, and three artificial virtues. These include love for equality and love for liberty. A special place is granted to another virtue, prudence, which is the link between natural and artificial virtues. This special virtue also provides an invisible link between the private and the public domains, in that it contributes to combine self-love with general happiness. This is granted by the unintended results mechanism, or “the happiness of the whole is to be the result of the happiness of individuals, and to begin first with them. No cooperation is required”. ● -/- 6 Malthus’s mature normative ethics: a morality of humanity. The chapter describes reactions by Evangelicals, such as Gisborne, Sumner, and Chalmers, to Malthus’s theory and Malthus’s transformation of his own system in order to pave objections. This amounts to incorporating The Evangelicals’ ideas into his own system. The friendly controversy with his Evangelical fellow-travellers yielded several important changes in 1806, 1817, and 1826 editions of the second Essay in the formulation of Malthusian ethics, in the adoption of moral improvement instead of happiness as the variable to be maximised, in the adoption of generalized education as the main weapon in the war on poverty. ● -/- 7 Malthus’s applied ethics. The chapter reconstructs Malthus’s treatment of a few issues in ‘applied ethics’, sexual morality, public morality, poverty, and besides, war and slavery. On the first issue, he argues the duty to marry only at a time when one is ready to carry the burden of six children as a moral duty imposed by prudence and rejects birth control because of its alleged effect of encouraging ‘indolence’. On the second issue, he defends a peculiar kind of Whiggism as anti-Machiavellian politics centred on rights, equality, and dignity. On the third issue, his final approach is a kind of Institutional approach to poverty, making room for generalized basic education, free markets for labour and allowing for a subsidiary role for private beneficence. The goal to be aimed at is bringing about circumstances which tend to elevate the character of the lower classes of society and offer them a chance of being respectable, virtuous and happy. ● -/- 8 Conclusions: strengthening the theological foundation. Malthus’s criteria for policy appraisal were not utilitarian ones. His normative ethics and his politics were sharply different from Bentham’s. Utility is just one element in Malthus’s ethics, going with laws of nature and rights, and ironically, far from being a Benthamite insertion, is the most markedly theological element in Malthus’s system of ideas. ● -/- . (shrink)

Structural evil impacts persons’ experiences differently, a reality that feminist philosophers Claudia Card and Lisa Tessman have termed “moral luck.” As Christian ethicists grapple with privilege and oppression, we lack a satisfactory framework to describe how particular life circumstances impact moral lives. This essay develops a Christian virtue account of moral luck, drawing on Thomas Aquinas and womanist theologians including Melanie L. Harris and Rosita deAnn Mathews. Moral luck helps Christian ethicists attend to the impact of (...) difference on the moral life as well as to the common experience of contingency harming virtue, requiring dependence on God’s grace. (shrink)

Background: Nurses encounter complex ethical dilemmas in everyday nursing care. It is important for nurses to have moral courage to act in these situations which threaten patients’ safety or their good care. However, there is lack of research of moral courage. Purpose: This study describes nurses’ experiences of care situations demanding moral courage and their actions in these situations. Method: A qualitative descriptive research design was applied. The data were collected with an open-ended question in the (...) questionnaire used in validation of the Nurses’ Moral Courage Scale. The sample consisted of 286 nurses from four different clinical fields in a major university hospital in Finland, providing a total of 611 answers. Data were analyzed using inductive content analysis. Ethical considerations: The study followed the commonly recognized principles of good scientific practice. The use of data was authorized by the developer of the instrument, the data collector, and the participating hospital. Ethical approval was obtained from the university ethics committee. Findings: Nurses acted morally courageously in most situations but sometimes they failed to do so. Although situations demanding moral courage varied, they could be categorized into seven main domains relating to colleagues, physicians, patients, relatives, nurses themselves, managers, and organizations. Nurses acted in the situations in different ways. The main acts in solving the situations were verbal communication or immediate action, such as interrupting of action. Conclusion: Care situations demanding moral courage focus on good and safe patient care and the patient’s good is at the center of attention. The situations are mostly related to the activities of other healthcare professionals. Findings may be applied in developing ethical nursing care through basic and continuing nursing education. Research is needed on the moral courage of physicians and managers, as well as on patients’ and their relatives’ experiences of care situations demanding moral courage. (shrink)

ABSTRACTI argue that Spinoza attributes to society the role of moral educator, a role that is to be carried out via Religion and Politics and hence also via an educational system. In his account, the social body is given the task of applying and transmitting a notion of virtue whose criterion is enhanced freedom, yet that freedom paradoxically must be acquired initially via authoritative coercive rules of praxis. The aim is to achieve an infinite broadening of perspective upon oneself (...) and upon the world and a consequent transformation of one’s motivations and desires from narrowly self-serving to infinitely inclusive. Intellectual virtue is exposed as the necessary and only true fulfillment of the virtue of moral models for it has achieved ‘the knowledge of the union that the mind has with the whole of Nature.’ Yet that intellectual virtue is not ready to hand but must be taught, and teaching necessarily entails an initial measure of authoritative transmission and even coercion, and hence moral models to be internalized. (shrink)

Situationist research highlights the fact that situational features often influence our behavior in unexpected ways. Virtue ethicists tend to think they can explain away such results, and prescribe cultivating virtue to ward against such moral failings. Situationists argue that studies like these uncover deep flaws within the moral psychology presumed by virtue ethicists, and hold that virtues may be an inadequate grounding for moral behavior and moral education. Using the concept of cognitive scripts from psychology, I (...) describe a new approach to moral education. The course focuses activities on written and performed scripts to encourage students to imagine hypothetical scenarios in real time, adopt the perspectives of others, evoke and alter their emotions, and ultimately, to revise their implicit, cognitive scripts. Attending to and altering cognitive scripts not only captures many theoretical and empirical insights from virtue ethics and situationism, but also offers a more sophisticated model of moral psychology and a better approach to moral education. (shrink)

This essay is an attempt to understand how technological metaphors, particularly computer metaphors, are relevant to moral education. After discussing various types of technological metaphors, it is argued that technological metaphors enter moral thought through their functional descriptions. The computer metaphor is then explored by turning to the hacker ethic. Analysis of this ethic reveals parallels between the experience of computer programming and the moral standards of those who are enmeshed in computer technology. This parallel suggests (...) that the hacker ethic is being pushed by a computer metaphor and its functional descriptions in a direction of individualism and systems thinking. After examining some possible implications of the computer metaphor, this essay offers suggestions concerning how technological metaphors may be critiqued. (shrink)

Over the past two decades, virtue ethicists have begun to devote increasing attention to applied ethics. In particular, the application of virtue ethical frameworks to the environmental ethics debate has flourished. This chapter reviews recent contributions to the literature in this field and highlights some strengths and weaknesses of thinking about climate change through a virtue ethical lens. Section “Two Benefits of Virtue Ethical Approaches to Climate Change” explores two benefits of applying virtue ethics to climate change: (a) we (...) can better capture the phenomenology of our moral experience, and (b) we avoid the problem of inconsequentialism. Section “A Catalogue of Environmental Virtues” analyzes various practical proposals that have been put forward in the form of specific environmental virtues. Section “An Objection to Virtue-Oriented Approaches to Climate Change” reconstructs a fundamental objection to the idea of using a virtue ethical normative approach to tackling the urgent and imminent dangers of climate change. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to offer a review of gratitude researches in youth. Gratitude is a positive emotion occurred in exchange-based relationships when one person acknowledges receiving a valuable benefit from others. Gratitude is essential to well-being and mental health throughout the life span. Although the adult literature on gratitude has grown substantially in the past few decades, the empirical research on gratitude in children and adolescent is in its infancy. Gratitude interventions in children and adolescents have a (...) short history, but initial findings are very promising. In this article, I review theoretical and empirical work on gratitude as a moral emotion, discuss the unique benefits of gratitude for youth, and analyze interventions for promoting gratitude in children and adolescents. Finally, I conclude by suggesting implications of gratitude interventions that can be applied in moral education. (shrink)

Background: The 21-item Nurses’ Moral Courage Scale was developed and validated in 2018 in Finland with the purpose of measuring moral courage among nurses. Objectives: The objective of this study was to make a Dutch translation of the Nurses’ Moral Courage Scale to describe the level of nurses’ self-assessed moral courage and associated socio-demographic factors in Flanders, Belgium. Research design: A forward–backward translation method was applied to translate the English Nurses’ Moral Courage Scale to (...) Dutch, and a pilot study was conducted to improve readability and understandability. A non-experimental, descriptive cross-sectional exploratory design was used to conduct a survey. Descriptive analysis was used. Participants: The data were collected from a convenience sample of 559 nurses from two hospitals in Flanders. Ethical considerations: Ethical approval was obtained from the university ethics committee, permission to conduct the study was obtained from the participating hospitals. Participants received a guide letter and gave their informed consent. Findings: The readability and understandability of the Dutch Nurses’ Moral Courage Scale were positively evaluated, and the scale revealed a good level of internal consistency for the total scale (α =.914) and all subscales. Nurses’ mean score of the 21-item Nurses’ Moral Courage Scale was 3.77 (standard deviation = 0.537). The total Nurses’ Moral Courage Scale score was associated with age (p <.001), experience (p <.001), professional function (p =.002), level of education (p =.002) and personal interest (p <.001). Discussion and Conclusion: The Nurses’ Moral Courage Scale was successfully translated to Dutch. The Flemish nurses perceived themselves as morally courageous, especially when they were in a direct interpersonal relationship with their patients. Acting courageously in ethical dilemmas that involved other actors or organizations appeared to be more challenging. The results strongly suggest the important role of education and ethical leadership in developing and supporting this essential virtue in nursing practice. (shrink)

Virtue ethics has now well and truly established itself as one of the main normative theories. It is now quite common, and indeed, expected, for virtue ethics to be included, alongside deontology and consequentialism, in any Moral Philosophy syllabus worth its salt. Students are typically introduced to virtue ethics only after studying the other two normative theories, and this often sets the scene for various sorts of misunderstandings, with students expecting virtue ethics to be based on the same set (...) of rules and assumptions as its rivals. Or at least, that is my experience. In this paper I want to focus on one such misunderstanding, which arises when trying to apply virtue ethics to our judgments of other people’s actions and behaviour. Although there are countless ways in which a theory can be misunderstood, it is worth guarding against this one in particular, given that it can lead someone who takes virtue ethics seriously to act in ways that are not virtuous, or even vicious. I begin by making a few remarks about the role of normative theory, and then go on to give four examples of how applying virtue ethics can lead to poor behaviour. In the final section I identify the mistake in question and conclude by noting how it can be avoided. (shrink)

This paper argues Confucianism is a compelling managerial ethic for several reasons: 1) Confucianism is compatible with accepted managerial practices. 2) It requires individuals and organizations to make a positive contribution to society. 3) Recognizes hierarchy as an important organizational principle and demands managerial moral leadership. 4) The Confucian "golden Rule" and virtues provide a moral basis for the hierarchical and cooperative relationships critical to organizational success. The paper applies Confucianism to the H. B. Fuller in Honduras: Street (...) Children and Substance Abuse case. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to answer the question of the importance of legal education in ensuring legal ethics and the moral compass of a person by understanding the most important aspects of it. Methods applied include theoretical-scientific analysis, systematic and critical review of scientific literature and other relevant sources, normative and critical analysis of ethical principles in the context of legal education, empirical-quantitative and qualitative analysis of scholarly articles. According to the main thesis of this article, (...) the integration of ethics into legal education can enhance moral development of future lawyers and improve their ability to serve justice. This paper traces the historical neglect of ethics in legal education and argues for its central place in modern studies. For lawyers to serve justice, a well-defined moral compass is essential. Several conclusions are drawn in this article, and first of all it is believed that universities will have to realise that a good lawyer is not only a professionally competent lawyer, because that is not enough in today’s world. Even if it is a personal journey, universities cannot stand aside, the future lawyer must be helped to grow. What is much more important is not so much the codes of ethics but how our moral compass works and what path it can point us down. To avoid getting lost, law schools could teach future lawyers how to empower their moral compass and find their way around. Each law teacher should have to find ways to teach the key virtues of a lawyer’s moral compass (e.g., wisdom, fortitude, temperance, and justice), how to help law students grow and not burn out in difficult situations. As our empirical research shows, the best scholarly articles on legal education discuss the elements of legal ethics. It is recognised that the ethics of lawyers is increasingly becoming an issue that goes beyond the professional aspects, and it is the university that must contribute to the development of the moral compass. (shrink)

This paper argues that attempts to apply Alasdair MacIntyre’s positive moral theory to business ethics are problematic, due to the cognitive closure of MacIntyre’s concept of a practice. I begin by outlining the notion of a practice, before turning to Moore’s attempt to provide a MacIntyrean account of corporate governance. I argue that Moore’s attempt is mismatched with MacIntyre’s account of moral education. Because the notion of practices resists general application I go on to argue that a negative (...) application, which focuses on regulation, is more plausible. Large-scale regulation, usually thought antithetical to MacIntyre’s advocacy of small-scale politics, has the potential to facilitate practice-based work and reveals that MacIntyre’s own work can be used against his pessimism about the modern order. Furthermore, the conception of regulation I defend can show us how management is more amenable to ethical understanding than MacIntyre’s work is often taken to imply. (shrink)

Compared to other approaches, it is virtue ethics that puts greatest emphasis on moral education. This results from its focus on moral agent and his or her moral condition as the main object of ethical enquiry. The aim of this paper is to outline the moral education within the framework of virtue ethics. I intend to explain how such education embraces the cognitive, affective, and behavioral elements. In the first part of the article, I present the (...) concept of ethical virtue to contrast it with certain misunderstandings which might lead to unnecessary fear of introducing the category of virtue into moral education. In the second part, I respond to various objections raised against virtue ethics, the most important being the objection of indoctrination and undermining autonomy of the educated. Another objection to which I pay special attention is the objection that there is no one catalogue of virtues but many different catalogues praised by different cultures, which especially poses a problem in multicultural societies. I am also trying to show the advantages of virtue education over other, nondirective approaches to moral education. (shrink)

In the Summer of 2020, a couple of months after the start of the Covid-19 crisis, the Franciscan Study Center at Tilburg University and the Franciscan Institute at St. Bonaventure University started a new partnership called Franciscan Connections. The aim of this new international Franciscan blog was to connect, communicate, and convey the best of Franciscan learning in the twenty-first century. We decided that we wanted to make contemporary and applied Franciscan scholarship available to a wider world of scholars, (...) educated professionals, and communities of practice and to make a new generation of readers aware of the contribution that Franciscan scholarship can make on contemporary issues in politics, society, ethics, and church. Now, almost two years and 200 blog posts later, we notice an increasing involvement from people around the world that seem to really appreciate this new platform as a means for establishing all kinds of Franciscan-inspired connections. Grafted on a way of life inspired by a vision of equality and justice, the Franciscan ethos displays a wealth of values and virtues that are conducive to moral goodness and concern for the common good. As a gift of the Highest Good, Franciscan goodness becomes both a social good and a personal virtue. It is inextricably bound to other social goods like charity, poverty, and peace, which, unsurprisingly, are personal virtues as well. They are also evangelical goods and virtues. Their evangelical rootedness and interconnectedness should therefore be borne in mind, when the Franciscan way of life is to be presented as a primary example of "the good life.". (shrink)

Modern mainstream ethical theories with its overemphasis on autonomy and non-interference have failed to adequately respond to contemporary social problems. A new ethical perspective is very much needed. Thanks to Carol Gilligan's 1982 groundbreaking work, 'In a Different Voice' , we now not only have virtue and communitarian ethicists, but also a group of feminist philosophers, charting a new direction for ethics that tempers modern ethics' obsession with autonomy, contractual rights, and abstract rules. Nel Noddings, in her 'Caring: A Feminine (...) Approach to Ethics and Moral Education', further contributed to this important discussion. In this work, Noddings proposes a new kind of moral ideal. She calls it "caring." Noddings defines "caring," as a direct, felt concern and action from the one-caring toward the well-being of the cared-for. In other words, care is a state of mental engrossment and motivational displacement that impels caring actions for the happiness of the cared-for and it transcends any rule-bound moral judgment. A caring attitude is best manifest in the spontaneous emotive bond of love between a mother and a child. This human relation of unscrutinized maternal love and care should be the model of ethics. Noddings's theory evokes a vigorous debate concerning whether or not the model can withstand rigorous philosophical scrutiny as a stand-alone ethical theory. This paper first discusses the strengths and weaknesses of a pure care ethics. Secondly, it demonstrates why both the Kantian and the Aristotelian attempts are unsatisfactory, and it offers a Confucian solution to the problems of care ethics. It argues that notwithstanding gender-oppressive practices that are at times associated with Confucianism, Confucian ethics of 'ren' (humaneness) is both more compatible with care ethics and is better equipped with conceptual resources than Kantian liberalism or Aristotelian virtue ethics to handle the moral predicament of the postmodern world. The paper demonstrates that care is an inherent element of Confucian 'ren' but that 'ren' is more than Noddings's care. It examines three essential principles that can be extracted from philosophical classical Confucianism: (1) an affectionate and particularistic approach to persons, (2) the mutual conditioning of the two prominent Confucian virtues -- humaneness (ren) and ritual propriety (li), and (3) the inseparability of the familial and the political self. The last section of the paper applies Confucian care ethics to concrete cases such as the geriatric care crisis and the problem of poverty. (shrink)

Every year in this country, some 10,000 college and university courses are taught in applied ethics. And many professional organizations now have their own codes of ethics. Yet social science has had little impact upon applied ethics. This book promises to change that trend by illustrating how social science can make a contribution to applied ethics. The text reports psychological studies relevant to applied ethics for many professionals, including accountants, college students and teachers, counselors, dentists, doctors, (...) journalists, nurses, school teachers, athletes, and veterinarians. Each chapter begins with the research base of the cognitive-developmental approach--especially linked to Kohlberg and Rest's Defining Issues Test. Finally, the book summarizes recent research on the following issues: * moral judgment scores within and between professions, * pre- and post-test evaluations of ethics education programs, * moral judgment and moral behavior, * models of professional ethicseducation, and * models for developing new assessment tools. Researchers in different professional fields investigate different questions, develop different research strategies, and report different findings. Typically researchers of one professional field are not aware of research in other fields. An important aim of the present book is to bring this diverse research together so that cross-fertilization can occur and ideas from one field can transfer to another. (shrink)

This book argues that moral philosophy should be based on seven scientific principles of theory selection. It then argues that a new moral theory—Rightness as Fairness—satisfies those principles more successfully than existing theories. Chapter 1 explicates the seven principles of theory-selection, arguing that moral philosophy must conform to them to be truth-apt. Chapter 2 argues those principles jointly support founding moral philosophy in known facts of empirical moral psychology: specifically, our capacities for mental time-travel and (...) modal imagination. Chapter 2 then shows that these capacities present human decisionmakers with a problem of diachronic rationality that includes but generalizes beyond, L.A. Paul’s problem of transformative experience: a problem that I call “the problem of possible future selves.” Chapter 3 then argues that a new principle of rationality—the Categorical-Instrumental Imperative—is the only rational solution to this problem, as it requires our present and future selves to forge and uphold a recursive, bi-directional contract with each another given mutual recognition of the problem. Chapter 4 then shows that the Categorical-Instrumental Imperative has three identical formulations analogous but superior to Immanuel Kant’s various formulations of his ‘categorical imperative.’ Chapter 5 shows that these unified formulas jointly entail a particular test of moral principles: a Moral Original Position similar to John Rawls’ famous ‘original position’, but which avoids a variety of problems with Rawls' model. Chapter 6 then shows that the Moral Original Position generates Four Principles of Fairness, which can then be combined into a single principle of moral rightness: Rightness as Fairness. This new conception of rightness is shown to reconcile four dominant moral frameworks (deontology, consequentialism, virtue ethics, and contractualism), as well as entail a new method of moral decisionmaking for applied ethics: a method of “principled fair negotiation” according to which applied ethical issues cannot be wholly resolved through principled debate, but must instead be resolved by actual negotiation and compromise. This method is then argued to generate novel, nuanced analyses of a variety of applied moral issues, including trolley cases, torture, and the ethical treatment of nonhuman animals. Chapter 7 then shows that Rightness as Fairness reconciles three leading political frameworks—libertarianism, egalitarianism, and communitarianism—showing how all three embody legitimate moral ideals that can, and should, be fairly negotiated against each other to settle the scope, and nature, of domestic, international, and global justice on an ongoing, iterated basis. Finally, Chapter 8 argues that Rightness as Fairness satisfies all seven of the principles of theory-selected defended in Chapter 1 more successfully than rival theories. (shrink)

This paper argues that applied ethics can itself be morally problematic. As illustrated by the case of Peter Singer’s criticism of social practice, morally loaded communication by applied ethicists can lead to protests, backlashes, and aggression. By reviewing the psychological literature on self-image, collective identity, and motivated reasoning three categories of morally problematic consequences of ethical criticism by applied ethicists are identified: serious psychological discomfort, moral backfiring, and hostile conflict. The most worrisome is moral backfiring: (...) psychological research suggests that ethical criticism of people’s central moral convictions can reinforce exactly those attitudes. Therefore, applied ethicists unintentionally can contribute to a consolidation of precisely those social circumstances that they condemn to be unethical. Furthermore, I argue that the normative concerns raised in this paper are not dependent on the commitment to one specific paradigm in moral philosophy. Utilitarianism, Aristotelian virtue ethics, and Rawlsian contractarianism all provide sound reasons to take morally problematic consequences of ethical criticism seriously. Only the case of deontological ethics is less clear-cut. Finally, I point out that the issues raised in this paper provide an excellent opportunity for further interdisciplinary collaboration between applied ethics and social sciences. I also propose strategies for communicating ethics effectively. (shrink)