We are well aware that there are not enough transplantable organs available for those who need them to stay alive. According to the Health Resources & Services Administration, seventeen persons die...

It is natural to say that when we acquire a new concept or concepts, or grasp a new theory, or master a new practice, we come to see things in a new way: we perceive phenomena that we were not previously aware of; we come to see patterns or connections that we did not previously see. That natural idea has been applied in many areas, including the philosophy of science, the philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of language. And, in (...) reflecting on the character of philosophy itself, Wittgenstein himself associates the introduction of a new concept in philosophy with the discovery of a new way of looking at things (PI §401), and says that the point of presenting us with an imagined example may be to change our way of looking at things (PI §144). The paper considers four interrelated questions about this association between seeing-as and change, novelty, or innovation. 1. Is there an important difference between the case where the change in someone’s way of seeing things involves the invention or discovery of a completely new concept, a completely new theory etc., and the case where it involves the person’s coming to understand an existing concept or theory? 2. Is there a special connection between seeing-as and conceptual or theoretical change or creativity: a connection that does not obtain between seeing-as and using or applying a familiar theory or system of concepts? 3. In cases where seeing-as is associated with novelty or creativity, is there any sense in which the fact that someone sees things in a new way can help to explain their conceptual or theoretical creativity? 4. To the extent that there is some association between seeing-as and novelty or creativity, why if at all does it matter that one experiences things in a certain way? Would someone who was aspect-blind be any worse off with respect to creativity or innovation than the rest of us? And if so, why? (shrink)

Over time, according to popular and academic accounts, alternative trade initiatives [such as fair trade, organics, forest certification, and socially responsible investing ] almost invariably lose their oppositional stance and go mainstream. That is, they lose their alternative, usually peripheral, and often contrarian character. In this paper, I argue that this is not always the case and that the path to going mainstream is not always an unproblematic one. I observe that while scholars have documented various aspects of specific alternative (...) trade initiatives, little comparative work has been done to theorize their different trajectories. To advance the scholarship, I compare two alternative trade movements, fair trade and SRI, and develop three hypotheses—the relation motivations hypothesis, the material interests hypothesis, and the organization of credibility hypothesis—that explain why going mainstream has been so hotly contested in the fair trade movement but not the SRI movement. I articulate these hypotheses and evaluate their merits. (shrink)

Life and works -- The Tractatus, language and logic -- The Tractatus, reality and the limits of language -- From the Tractatus to philosophical investigations -- Intentionality and rule-following -- Mind and psychology -- Knowledge and certainty -- Religion and anthropology -- Legacy and influence.

Strategic alliances are increasingly common, as many organizations look towards various partnering arrangements. This second edition of Strategies of Cooperation extends the first edition's clear and comprehensive survey of strategic alliances. Presenting different disciplinary perspectives and numerous examples from the corporate world. The text has been thoroughly revised and updated, taking account of new theoretical models, and its coverage of case studies has been extended. It will be ideal for business students and managers alike wishing to understand the challenges of (...) managing alliances. (shrink)

If mental causal explanations are grounded in facts about physical causes and effects, and if there are no psychophysical laws, how can we avoid the conclusion that the mental is causally, and causally explanatorily, irrelevant? The chapter analyses the ways in which this objection has been raised against non‐reductive monism in general, and Davidson's anomalous monism in particular. Then a conception of explanatory relevance for non‐basic physical properties is set out: properties are candidates for explanatory relevance if they play a (...) role in a simple model of causal action; it is intelligible how a property can be causally explanatorily relevant only if it supervenes on low‐level physical properties; but such supervenience does not provide a self‐standing condition of explanatory relevance. A parallel model is developed for the mental case, exploiting the intuitive model of rational action and appealing to supervenience. Anomalous monism is thereby defended against one objection; but, it is argued, this defence challenges the original motivation for thinking that mental events must be physical events. (shrink)

I have argued that Wittgenstein's treatment of dreaming involves a kind of anti-realism about the past: what makes "I dreamed p " true is, roughly, that I wake with the feeling or impression of having dreamed p . Richard Scheer raises three objections. First, that the texts do not support my interpretation. Second, that the anti-realist view of dreaming does not make sense, so cannot be Wittgenstein's view. Third, that the anti-realist view leaves it a mystery why someone who reports (...) having dreamed such-and-such is inclined to report what she does. The Reply defends my reading of Wittgenstein against these objections. (shrink)

Objective: Symptom improvement is often examined as an indicator of a good outcome of accessing mental health services. However, there is little evidence of whether symptom improvement is associated with other indicators of a good outcome, such as a mutual agreement to end treatment. The aim of this study was to examine whether young people accessing mental health services who meaningfully improved were more likely to mutually agree to end treatment.Methods: Multilevel multinomial regression analysis controlling for age, gender, ethnicity, and (...) referral source was conducted on N = 8,995 episodes of care [Female = 5,469, 61%; meanAge = 13.66 years] using anonymised administrative data from young people's mental health services.Results: Compared to young people with no change in mental health difficulties, those showing positive meaningful changes in mental health difficulties were less likely to have case closure due to non-mutual agreement. Similarly, they were less likely to transfer or end treatment for other reasons than by case closure due to mutual agreement.Conclusion: The findings suggest that young people accessing mental health services whose symptoms meaningfully improve are more likely to mutually agree to end treatment, adding to the evidence that symptom improvement may be appropriate to examine as an indicator of a good outcome of accessing mental health services. (shrink)

What is the relation between meaning and use? This chapter first defends a non-reductionist understanding of Wittgenstein’s suggestion that ‘the meaning of a word is its use in the language’; facts about meaning cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, facts about use, characterized non-semantically. Nonetheless, it is contended, facts about meaning do supervene on non-semantic facts about use. That supervenience thesis is suggested by comments of Wittgenstein’s and is consistent with his view of meaning and rule-following. Semantic (...) supervenience is then defended against two criticisms: first, John McDowell’s suggestion that the supervenience thesis falsifies the epistemology of meaning and fails to accommodate common-sense truths about meaning; second, a series of counter-examples proposed by Stephen Kearns and Ofra Magidor, who argue that worlds may differ semantically without differing non-semantically. It is argued that neither criticism is convincing: we should accept the thesis that semantic facts supervene on non-semantic facts. (shrink)

Some words enter the language with an uncommon aptitude both for uniting things already observed but formerly severed by separate terms and for fostering the recognition of things unnoticed before. Indeed, they often unite things that ought still to be left discrete; and even among those properly united, clarity may require the acknowledgment of many distinctions. I shall here consider such a term and the various kinds of things to which it can and cannot refer: projection.

Introduces and explains the basic argument for a causal theory of action‐explanation, and defends it against various non‐causal views of action: explaining an action is explaining why something happened, and an explanation of why something happened is always a causal explanation. But what is involved in the claim that reason‐explanation is a form of causal explanation? The chapter begins to answer that question. First, it considers the relation between causal explanation, on the one hand, and the singular relation of causation, (...) on the other. Second, it considers the relation between mental causation and physical causation, defending the idea that we cannot take a purely mentalist view of mental causation. (shrink)

William Child; Discussions: Crane on Mental Causation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 97, Issue 1, 1 June 1997, Pages 97–102, https://doi.org/1.

Is there a plausible middle position in the debate between realists and constructivists about categories or kinds? Such a position may seem to be contained in the account of triangulation that Donald Davidson develops in recent writings. On this account, the kinds we pick out are determined by an interaction between our shared similarity responses and causal relations between us and things in our environment. So kinds and categories are neither imposed on us by the nature of the world, nor (...) imposed by us on an intrinsically unstructured reality. But the picture derivable from Davidson's account of triangulation can be interpreted in either of two ways. On one interpretation, it collapses into constructivism. On the other, it turns out to be very close to the most plausible versions of realism. It is argued that Davidson's attempts to distinguish his view from Putnam's realism about natural kinds are unsuccessful. So Davidson's account of triangulation does indeed suggest a plausible view of kinds. But that view is a version of traditional realist views, not an alternative to them. (shrink)

The idea of creation in the divine image has a long and complex history. While its roots apparently lie in the royal myths of Mesopotamia and Egypt, this book argues that it was the biblical account of creation presented in the first chapters of Genesis and its interpretation in early rabbinic literature that created the basis for the perennial inquiry of the concept in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Yair Lorberbaum reconstructs the idea of the creation of man in the image of (...) God attributed in the Midrash and the Talmud. He analyzes meanings attributed to tselem Elohim in early rabbinic thought, as expressed in Aggadah, and explores its application in the normative, legal, and ritual realms. (shrink)

Examines the arguments for the anomalism of the mental. It is argued that the basis for the anomalism of the mental is the principle that rationality is uncodifiable, and that principle is defended. It is shown that the anomalism of the mental, and the uncodifiability of rationality that underlies it, is compatible with the supervenience of the mental on the physical, but that it rules out most varieties of functionalism. It is argued that the uncodifiability of rationality rules out token (...) identity or token correlation between particular mental states or events and particular physical states or events. (shrink)

Doing of some sort, undeniably, may have a connection of some kind with knowing in some sense. Take the slogan, "learning by doing." It points to the fact that one can acquire knowledge of how to do something--in the sense, at any rate, of acquiring the ability to do it--in the course of the doing. But, if undeniable, this fact seems also trifling. Nor would it mean much more to say that one can acquire such knowledge or ability only by (...) the doing, though this is probably true if we grant that actions can be performed in the imagination. (shrink)

IN MANY CHURCH-BODY DISPUTES OVER THE MORAL STATUS OF SAME-gender unions, the last line of defense against the affirmation of such unions is often an appeal to homosexual orientation as inherently "disordered," rendering same-gender unions unacceptable regardless of the loving and just qualities they may embody. On the basis of a biblical anthropology shaped by the eschatological orientation of the scriptures and further enhanced by contemporary Trinitarian discourse, this essay engages and challenges this traditional view as it has been developed (...) in the theological ethics of Helmut Thielicke. In so doing, the essay raises a key metaethical question of the theological foundations that inform Christian sexual ethics in general. (shrink)

Interpretation is the process of ascribing propositional attitudes to an individual on the basis of what she says and does. Interpretationism is the view that we can gain an understanding of the nature of the mental by reflecting on the nature of interpretation. The chapter examines the arguments for and against holding that the interpretation of propositional attitudes is inseparable from the interpretation of language, that being interpretable as possessing a given attitude is a necessary condition for possessing it, and (...) that being interpretable as possessing an attitude is sufficient for possessing it. And it discusses whether interpretationists should claim that being interpretable as having thoughts is actually constitutive of having thoughts. (shrink)

This article provides a conversation analytic description of a two-part structure, ‘I don’t want X, I want/just want Y’. Drawing on a corpus of recordings of family mealtimes and television documentary data, I show how speakers use the structure in two recurrent environments. First, speakers may use the structure to reject a proposal regarding their actions made by an interlocutor. Second, speakers may deliver the structure following a co-interactant’s formulation of their actions or motivations. Both uses decrease the likelihood of (...) challenge in third-turn position. When responding to multi-unit turns speakers routinely deal with the last item first. The value of ‘I want Y’ is to formulate an alternative sense of agency which undermines the preceding turn and shifts the trajectory of the ongoing sequence. The article contributes to work in discursive psychology as I show how speakers may formulate their ‘wants’ in the service of sequentially unfolding social interaction. (shrink)

What is the relation between interpreting a person's speech and actions, on the one hand, and interpreting a written text, on the other? That question is considered in connection with the theories of interpretation offered by Donald Davidson and Paul Ricoeur. There are some important similarities between those theories. However, it is argued that Davidson and Ricoeur are divided on fundamental questions about the relation between meaning and intention, about the reference of texts, about the relation between the meanings of (...) texts and the meanings of spoken words, and about the notion of correctness that applies to interpretation. On each of these points, it is contended, Davidson has the better of the dispute. (shrink)

In his book Criminally Ignorant: Why the law pretends we know what we don’t,1 Sarch provides a compelling re-conceptualisation and defence of the doctrine of wilful ignorance. Wilful ignorance is a...

Interpretation strives, for one thing, toward unification. One means of unifying is the category I call "repetition"; and reflection is one of its types. In order to identify the concept of reflection, I shall outline the various types of repetition and add some comments on this type in particular. I shall then consider several of the philosophical problems raised by the supposition that the reflective relationships do exist in the materials interpreted.

« No pasaran » (ils ne passeront pas). Devant les micros del Ministerio de Gobernacion, la députée communiste Dolorès Ibarruri officialise le mot d’ordre destiné à unir les forces de gauche contre les rebelles fascistes. En ce 19 juillet 1936, au lendemain du coup d’Etat nationaliste, les défenseurs de la démocratie viennent de trouver leur cri de ralliement ; une femme, qui devient un mythe, incarne la lutte. Les facettes de cette construction imaginaire se dévoilent aisément : voix du peup..

(2011). Beyond Myths, Fetishes, and Checklists: Discovering Diversity's Place in Education, Evaluation, and Accountability. Educational Studies: Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 3-25.

Rudolf Steiner is perhaps most widely known as the founder of the Waldorf schools and for his challenging and innovative ideas on children's mental development and education. What these ideas are and how they are put into practice are not so well known. Steiner (Waldorf) Education is a clear exposition of Steiner's view of the child as a developing personality based on body, soul, and spirit. It describes the stages of the child's development and gives a detailed account (...) of the Steiner/Waldorf school curriculum and teaching methods. It will be useful both to those already involved with Steiner/Waldorf schools and also to anyone who wants to learn more about this well-established alternative to the state educational system. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Some Basic Definitions Historiography and Myth in Ancient Greece Mythical Historiography in Antiquity Myth vs. Historiography References.