In this article, the aim is to explore Lebanese folklore through proverbs and to demonstrate how the dynamic field of imagination behind concise oral statements influences contemporary society and anchors, in the collective thinking of several generations, the values of a community, whether they are well-founded or not. Although Lebanese society is patriarchal, men are often depicted as beasts, frequently domestic and specifically as draft animals. The parody, satire, and humor that generally characterize proverbs feed into the images that circulate (...) in the collective unconscious. Durand's theriomorphic symbolism and its resulting ramifications, while referring to Bourdieu's “male domination,” highlight customs and traditions that devalue women and represent them as inferior beings or even as the embodiment of evil on earth. As one facet of folklore, these popular expressions sometimes originate from mythical, biblical, or traditional stories that are the result of beliefs and rituals passed down through centuries. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Feminist Studies 41, no. 3. © 2015 by Feminist Studies, Inc. 509 Mytheli Sreenivas Birth Control in the Shadow of Empire: The Trials of Annie Besant, 1877–1878 In March 1877, two London activists provoked a debate about poverty and overpopulation that reverberated across metropole and colony. These activists, Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh, republished a book by the American physician Charles Knowlton that outlined methods to prevent conception. TheFruitsofPhilosophy,which (...) Bradlaugh and Besant provocatively subtitled An Essay on the Population Question, had been in limited circulation in Britain since 1833, but the book’s legality was called into question when its previous publisher was charged with obscenity in early 1877.1 Determined to establish the legal right to publish information about contraception, on March 23rd, 1877, Bradlaugh and Besant delivered copies of The Fruits of Philosophy to the police department, the city solicitor, and local magistrates, and they announced their intent to sell the book from their premises at the Freethought Publishing Company on Stonecutter Street in East London. The following day, a crowd filled the narrow space outside the publishing house, and the two activists sold hundreds of copies of Knowlton’s book. When no arrests were made, Besant and Bradlaugh renotified the authorities that they were selling a supposedly obscene book and were informed in turn that papers were 1. S. Chandrasekhar, “A Dirty, Filthy Book”: The Writings of Charles Knowlton and Annie Besant on Reproductive Physiology and Birth Control and an Account of the Bradlaugh-Besant Trial (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 26. 510 Mytheli Sreenivas being prepared for their arrest and prosecution. On the 7th of April, 1877, Besant and Bradlaugh were arrested and taken into custody.2 In their subsequent trial, the two activists linked birth control advocacy to a Malthusian worldview. They argued that the urban working classes and the rural poor in Britain labored under the burden of overpopulation. Humanitarian concern for impoverished people, and not intent to promote obscenity, drove them to disseminate information about birth control. Besant and Bradlaugh were eventually acquitted on a legal technicality, and Bradlaugh moved on to other issues. Besant, however, was dissatisfied with The Fruits of Philosophy because its methods were outdated by the science of the day. She was determined to write a more up-to-date guide explaining contraceptive methods and went on to found a Malthusian League to disseminate birth control information. These events—the trial and Besant’s further campaigns promoting contraception —mark a watershed moment in the history of birth control activism.3 They would shape how reproduction came to be understood not as a private matter, but as a particular sort of social problem, whose implications reverberated from London to the empire in India and back again. To outside observers, Bradlaugh and Besant may have seemed an unlikely pair to set these events into motion. Bradlaugh, at age forty-four, had a long history of association with radical causes. A celebrated atheist and antimonarchical republican, he helped to shape a tradition of mid-nineteenth-century English radicalism that developed in the wake of Chartist decline. As a member of the National Reform League in the 1860s, he had participated in public demonstrations to extend the franchise. His leadership of the National Secular Society made him a popular lecturer among Freethinkers on issues of political democracy, anticlericalism, and occasionally on neo-Malthusianism.4 2. Anne Taylor, Annie Besant: A Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 110–12. 3. The term “birth control” was coined in a meeting of Margaret Sanger and her associates in 1914, and thus would not have been in use in the late nineteenth century. The term contraception was not unknown, but had only limited circulation in scientific discourses. Nevertheless, I use both “birth control” and “contraception” interchangeably to mean methods to prevent conception. See Peter C. Engelman, A History of the Birth Control Movement in America (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2011), xviii. 4. Taylor, Annie Besant, 80–81. Mytheli Sreenivas 511 In comparison to Bradlaugh’s prominence, Besant was relatively unknown. Her public career began after a separation from her husband, the Anglican vicar Frank Besant. Perhaps the couple were ill-suited to each other from... (shrink)

Studies point out that populism, a concept still in dire need of clarifications, resembles more of a rhetorical strategy than a fully-fledged ideology. Actually, populism has become a concept so frequently used that its orginial meaning seems to have been lost, leaving it as an empty shell, at least from an ideological point of view. I argue that in spite of this – or rather as a means of compensation – populism uses a very robust mythological apparatus, creating narratives that (...) allow voters to easily understand its messages. The current article underlines that in an attempt to over-simplify its discourse, populism makes use of all four political myths identified by Raoul Girardet. The conspiracy myth represents the main element revolving around the populist discourse. Politicians who embrace this rhetoric denounce a secret society that is rigorously organized, the actions of which defy morality, using all means to attain political power. The other three political myths, i.e. the myth of unity, the myth of the savior and the myth of the golden age, act together only as a counterweight for the first. The paper also points out that the success of Euroscepticism lies in the fact that it represents the perfect embedding for such myths, and that the EU needs to generate its own narratives if it hopes to confront the so-called “populist temptation”. (shrink)

L'absurde, le suicide, etc. Premier essai philosophique (1942) de l'auteur. Indispensable (ou presque) à tout apprenti philosophe.

This book explores the dynamic relationship between myth and philosophy in the Presocratics, the Sophists, and in Plato - a relationship which is found to be more extensive and programmatic than has been recognized. The story of philosophy's relationship with myth is that of its relationship with literary and social convention. The intellectuals studied here wanted to reformulate popular ideas about cultural authority and they achieved this goal by manipulating myth. Their self-conscious use of myth creates a self-reflective philosophic sensibility (...) and draws attention to problems inherent in different modes of linguistic representation. Much of the reception of Greek philosophy stigmatizes myth as 'irrational'. Such an approach ignores the important role played by myth in Greek philosophy, not just as a foil but as a mode of philosophical thought. The case studies in this book reveal myth deployed as a result of methodological reflection, and as a manifestation of philosophical concerns. (shrink)

Dr. Zaslavsky’s Platonic Myth and Platonic Writing: A Philosophico-Literary Exploration addresses the thorny issue of precisely what is meant by mythos (myth) in the Platonic corpus of dialogues. Dr. Zaslavsky rejects the common notion that what makes a myth in Plato a myth (as opposed to a speech or logos) is its truth value. Therefore, after an analysis of why Plato wrote as he did and a cataloguing and examination of every occurence of mythos and its derivatives in the Platonic (...) corpus, he articulates the new linguistic and philosophical principle that a myth is a genetic or causal synagogic/synoptic account, in contradistinction to logos as a descriptive or calssificatory diairetic account. He tests this definition successfully through an examination of all those accounts in Plato that are explicitly designated as myths. (shrink)

« Les pensées sans intuition sont vides; les intuitions sans concepts sont aveugles. » Tout le « kantisme analytique » tourne autour de cette formule kantienne et de l’interprétation qu’il essaie d’en donner. Sellars soutient que l’intuition ne peut être une connaissance à elle toute seule. McDowell pense même que l’intuition en tant que telle ne joue aucun rôle dans la pensée – c’est-à-dire qu’il croit que le contenu de l’intuition est encore conceptuel. Nous examinerons ces théories dans leur rapport (...) à Kant, qu’elles discutent et critiquent, et nous essaierons de comprendre pourquoi il y a une « tentation kantienne » en philosophie analytique, en la faisant remonter à l’œuvre fondatrice de Frege. (shrink)

Cette édition numérique a été réalisée à partir d'un support physique, parfois ancien, conservé au sein du dépôt légal de la Bibliothèque nationale de France, conformément à la loi n° 2012-287 du 1er mars 2012 relative à l'exploitation des Livres indisponibles du XXe siècle. Pages de début Avant-propos Préface : le mythe du précurseur 1. Qui fut Lamarck? 2. La nature 3. La « série » et les « circonstances » 4. « La transmission des acquisitions » 5. Les (...) avatars de la notion d'adaptation 6. Quand l'histoire se lit à rebours Conclusion : Lamarck au passé, au présent, au futur Bibliographie Pages defin. (shrink)

In The Myth of Morality, Richard Joyce argues that moral discourse is hopelessly flawed. At the heart of ordinary moral judgements is a notion of moral inescapability, or practical authority, which, upon investigation, cannot be reasonably defended. Joyce argues that natural selection is to blame, in that it has provided us with a tendency to invest the world with values that it does not contain, and demands that it does not make. Should we therefore do away with morality, as we (...) did away with other faulty notions such as witches? Possibly not. We may be able to carry on with morality as a 'useful fiction' - allowing it to have a regulative influence on our lives and decisions, perhaps even playing a central role - while not committing ourselves to believing or asserting falsehoods, and thus not being subject to accusations of 'error'. (shrink)

The essays collected in 'The Hegel Myths and Legends' serve the function of disabusing students and nonspecialists of these misconceptions by exposing these myths for what they are.

Mary Midgley argues in her powerful new book that far from being the opposite of science, myth is a central part of it. In brilliant prose, she claims that myths are neither lies nor mere stories but a network of powerful symbols that suggest particular ways of interpreting the world.

La Preisfrage de 1763 était, à l’époque, incroyablement actuelle. En effet, autour de 1761, à l’Académie de Berlin et en dehors d’elle, une somme de facteurs vint menacer la supériorité incontestée de la méthode démonstrative. Même si l’optimisme suscité par les mathématiques était encore victorieux, le paradigme de la certitude absolue était imperceptiblement en train de se transformer. On se distanciait d’un certain cartésianisme et, pour utiliser le mot de Voltaire, au « compas de la mathématique » on ajoutait « (...) le flambeau de l’expérience ». On jugeait le réquisit pur de la déduction logique trop élevé pour l’entendement humain, et l’on avait tendance à souligner les traits sensibles du plan syntaxique des figures géométriques ou des preuves des faits. Cette circonspection concernant la rhétorique de la démonstrationest bien visible dans les pages anonymes des réponses à cette Preisfrage : la plupart sont favorables à l’évidence géométrique en métaphysique, mais le scepticisme vis à vis des démonstrations mathématiques inflexibles est palpable. Le pruritus demonstrandi contenait-il déjà en lui-même, par son outrance, le germe du futur dédain pour les démonstrations en philosophie ? (shrink)

Ob was Mythos im ursprünglichen oder anfänglichen Sinn heissen soll aus den zahlreichen späteren und sich oft widersprechenden Deutungen überhaupt noch ans Licht zu ziehen ist lässt sich fragen. Desgleichen, ob es das Sein selbst ist, das sich im Mythos (als auslegende Seinserzählung) dem archaischen Menschen kund tut oder ob es vom Menschen als dem „interpretations- und orientierungsbedürftigen Wesen” angesprochen wird. Im ersten Falle lässt Mythos sich am besten als Manifestation, im zweiten als Interpretation auffassen. Aber auch wenn es das (...) Sein selbst sein sollte, das den Menschen im Mythos anspricht so ist es auf ihn als das Wesen, das ausspricht dass es angesprochen wird oder sich angesprochen weiss immer noch angewiesen. Die immer von aktuellen Fragen inspirierte wissenschaftliche und philosophische Forschung wird mit der Schwierigkeit konfrontiert, dass die Suche des Mythos „an sich” immer davon auszugehen hat was der Mythos „für uns” bedeutet und dem unmöglich los wird. Wenn Myhos mit einem gewissen Recht als „vorgängiges Seinsverständnis” qualifiziert wird kann mit gleichem Recht gelten, dass jede theoretische Interpretation des Mythos als Artikulierung von etwas das „vorgängiges Mythosverständnis” genannt werden kann aufzufassen ist. Der Grund, der im Mythos gelegt wird, lässt sich nicht mehr „interpretationsfrei” zurückholen. Zugleich zieht er uns immer wieder zu sich zurück. Auch das ist ein Grund – der Grund, der uns zwingt immer wieder vom Mythos zu reden und über ihn nachzudenken, sei es im Modus des Verfalls. (shrink)

À première vue, on peut trouver des similarités frappantes entre les vues de Heidegger et Wittgenstein sur la signification. Les deux auteurs soulignent la connexion entre signification et contexte d’usage. Pourtant, il n’est pas si clair qu’ils partagent le même concept d’usage. Wittgenstein s’intéresse primairement à l’usage des signes. Il lui arrive de considérer des usages non linguistiques, mais il n’y voit jamais un principe de « signification ». En général il semble plutôt réservé quant à tout usage générique du (...) mot « signification » qui rendrait toute relation que nous avons avec les choses dépendante d’une telle « signification ». De ce point de vue, la différence entre la conception herméneutique de la perception heideggérienne et l’analyse grammaticale du percevoir wittgensteinienne, qui donne toute sa portée à la simple facticité de l’être-perçu, est cruciale. Au-delà d’une simple divergence de doctrine, cela signifie que le concept d’« usage », dans sa centralité, joue un rôle tout à fait différent de part et d’autre. Chez Heidegger, celui-ci semble encore constituer quelque chose comme un principe « transcendantal » d’explication : l’ultime fondation possible du sens. Wittgenstein, de son côté, abandonne toute perspective fondationaliste : son insistance sur le concept d’« usage » vise seulement à nous faire accepter le simple fait que nous signifions de quelque façon définie et il y a quelque chose par rapport à quoi nous signifions de cette façon.Prima facie, striking similarities can be found between Heidegger’s and Wittgenstein’s take on meaning. Both authors emphasize the connection between meaning and the context of use. However, it is not so clear whether they share the same concept of use. Wittgenstein is concerned primarily with the use of signs. He might be occasionally considering non linguistic uses, but then never sees them as principle of « meaning ». In general, he seems rather reluctant to endorse any generic use of the word « meaning » that would make every kind of relation we might have with the things dependent on such « meaning ». From that point of view, the difference between Heidegger’s hermeneutical conception of perception and Wittgenstein’s grammatical analysis of perceiving that makes full sense of the simple facticity of the being-perceived, is really critical. Beyond a mere divergence of doctrine, that indicates that the concept of « use », in its centrality, plays a quite different role on both sides. In Heidegger, it seems to constitute still something like a « transcendental » principle of explanation: the ultimate possible foundation of meaning. Wittgenstein, for his part, gives up any kind of foundationalist perspective: his emphasis on « use » just aims to have us accept the mere fact that we are meaning in some definite way and there is something we are meaning about this way. (shrink)

Lang, lang geleden werd de planeet getiranniseerd door een gigantische draak. De draak was groter dan de grootste kerk en was bedekt met dikke, zwarte schubben. Zijn rode ogen gloeiden van haat en uit zijn verschrikkelijke bek stroomde onophoudelijk stinkend, geelgroen slijm. Hij eiste van de mens een ijzingwekkend eerbetoon: om zijn enorme honger te stillen, moesten er iedere avond bij het vallen van het duister tienduizend mannen en vrouwen aan de voet van de berg, waar de draak-tiran woonde, afgeleverd (...) worden. Soms slokte de draak deze arme zielen gelijk op; soms sloot hij ze echter op in de berg waar zij maanden of jaren wegkwijnden totdat zij uiteindelijk opgegeten werden. (shrink)