Eastern Orthodox Christianity carries forward a moral tradition from the earliest Christian period, in the belief that scriptural and patristic teaching remains applicable to the contemporary economic sphere of life. The Church Fathers focused on the ownership of property and the ethical acquisition of wealth and its use; they stressed special concern for the poor and disadvantaged. Carried forward through the Byzantine and modern eras, these early Christian understandings now can be applied through a basic and elementary natural law (...) morality to business activities. The Orthodox approach embodies traditional virtue and character ethics as well. The essay concludes by applying these Orthodox approaches to two current issues: the charging of interest and internet ethics. (shrink)

Human enhancement is the term used for applications of biomedical knowledge that aim to improve human form or functioning beyond what is necessary to restore or sustain good health. Genomics is one of the research-areas that promises to offer such possibilities in the near future, and body weight - especially over-weight and obesity - is one of the human characteristics at which these will be directed. This paper offers an overview of some of the moral issues that the subject (...) of enhancement raises when related to obesity and genomics. After a brief discussion of the different perspectives on obesity and on the meaning of the term enhancement, a framework is presented in which the moral issues at stake are organised according to perspective on obesity (health or aesthetics) and moral outlook (distributive justice vs private morality). An inventory is made of the different ethical discussions that possible future genomics-based options for the prevention or treatment of obesity and overweight may evoke. These include justice, obligations with regard to life-style, the limits of medical practice and the value of food and food-cultures. Finally, some speculations are made with regard to future possibilities for genetic modification and "self-evolution". (shrink)

To "look good" and to "be good" have traditionally been considered two very different notions. Indeed, philosophers have seen aesthetic and ethical values as fundamentally separate. Now, at the crossroads of a new wave of aesthetic theory, Marcia Muelder Eaton introduces this groundbreaking work, in which a bold new concept of merit where being good and looking good are integrated into one.

In this chapter, I explore the importance of ethics education for senior military officers with responsibilities at the strategic level of government. One problem, as I see it, is that senior commanders might demand “ethics” from their soldiers but then they are themselves primarily informed by a “morally skeptical viewpoint” (in the form of political realism). I argue that ethics are more than a matter of personal behavior alone: the ethical position of an armed service is a matter of the (...) collective responsibility of the people who constitute it, and senior military officers, having authority to give the orders, have a particularly important role. First, I discuss the continued prominence of a neorealist mindset in strategic thinking. Neorealist theory assumes that ethics is a largely irrelevant concern for strategic decision-makers. In contrast, I argue that consideration of moral values should be at the center of strategic theory and practice. Then, in the second section, I explore the “professional ethics” of senior military officers in order to develop an appreciation of the shared values and expectations regarding required conduct within any professional military service. I argue that senior military leaders should be concerned with what it means to be “good” and that this concept of the good can, and should, be applied across cultures and national boundaries. In the final section, I examine armed conflict and briefly discuss the moral reasoning involved to justify deliberate killing and destruction. I conclude that senior military officers require an understanding of sound moral reasoning to implement effective strategy. (shrink)

The teaching of ethics in school is considered important and necessary. But can ethics be taught? And should its teaching consist in conveying knowledge about ethical concepts, possibly a discussion around them, or rather in shaping students’ moral attitudes and appropriate behaviour? The article engages in reflection on these problems with reference to various traditions of ethical thought and moral theory. It proposes to take the contemporary renewed Aristotelian virtue ethics as the main point of reference and basis for educational (...) practice. The concept of phronesis as practical rationality, allowing the formation of moral judgements that are both context-sensitive and take into account the complexity of interests and goods that are difficult to agree upon, seems to be a still valid model for moral education. Teaching and discussion oriented towards the consideration of concrete cases and stories, i.e. training the skills of this type of judgement, avoids the dangers of learning focused on theoretical issues: becoming entangled in definitional ambiguities in defining moral values, or thinking detached from emotion and experience. Learning that consists of analysing a philosophical tradition runs the risk that the knowledge imparted will prove inadequate to the age and level of personal development of the student, generating moral subjectivism and relativistic scepticism. However, this argument is not directed against theorising and the introduction of abstract considerations in the educational process, even at the earliest stages: theorising and the construction of rational justifications are necessary but should result from the inspiration and development of intellectual predispositions, not from the transmission of ready-made knowledge. (shrink)

This essay examines the particular contributions of three communities of women religious for the ways in which they incorporated concerns for the moral formation of their students together with a focus on beauty. These communities not only provided a basic “Catholic moral education” but also aimed to develop persons who saw their responsibility as building a better world that was not only good but also beautiful. Given recent attention to the relationship between ethics and aesthetics, this essay shows how (...) the work of women religious makes a significant contribution to this field. (shrink)

It may be that Kant’s inherently communal concept of taste is a morally laden notion that blurs the line between the good and the beautiful, on the one hand, and moral evaluation and aesthetic appreciation, on the other. In particular, it can be shown how, on Kant’s view, moralistic factors, such as considerations of social appropriateness, enter into estimations of aesthetic value. Moreover, Kant’s tendency to overlap taste and morals suggests an underlying assumption operative in Kant’s aesthetics. According to (...) this ‘decency assumption’, as I have termed it, taste is first and foremost a trait of people with certain supposedly refined socio-moral characteristics. Kant also seems to think that having good taste and a morally good character go hand in hand. Even though we do find separate sets of ultimate principles in Kant’s ethics and aesthetics, the aforesaid assumption nevertheless implies a shared ground between these two branches of philosophy and thereby links them tightly together, contrary to the common view that ethics and aesthetics are distinct enterprises. In addition, Kant’s morally laden conception of taste will be shortly examined in relation to the Enlightenment project as Kant saw it and our contemporary world. (shrink)

Aesthetics is a normative domain. We evaluate artworks as better or worse, good or bad, great or grim. I will refer to a positive appraisal of an artwork as an aesthetic appreciation of that work, and I refer to a negative appraisal as aesthetic depreciation. (I will often drop the word “aesthetic.”) There has been considerable amount of work on what makes an artwork worthy of appreciation, and less, it seems, on the nature of appreciation itself. These two topics (...) are related, of course, because they nature of appreciation may bear on what things are worthy of that response, or at least on what things are likely to elicit it. So I will have some things to say about the latter. But I want to focus in this discussion on appreciation itself. When we praise a work of art, when we say it has aesthetic value, what does our praise consist in? This is a question about aesthetic psychology. I am interested in what kind of mental state appreciation is. What kind of state are we expressing when we say a work of art is “good”? This question has parallels in other areas of value theory. In ethics, most notably, there has been much attention lavished on the question of what people express when they refer to an action as “morally good.” One popular class of theories, associated with the British moralists and their followers, posits a link between moral valuation and emotion. To call an act morally good is to express an emotion toward that act. I think this approach to morality is right on target (Prinz, 2007). Here I want to argue that an emotional account of aesthetic valuation is equally promising. There are important differences between the two domains, but both have an affective foundation. I suspect that valuing of all kinds involves the emotions. Here I will inquire into the role of emotions in aesthetic valuing. I will not claim that artworks express emotions or even that they necessarily evoke emotions.. (shrink)

This paper argues for several claims about the moral relevance of the aesthetic: that attention to aesthetic values may promote moral motivation; that aesthetic values should be regarded as constraining moral demands; and that the pursuit of aesthetic satisfactions may itself have positive moral value. These arguments suggest that moral thinking should be aesthetically informed to a much greater degree than has been typical. The aesthetic is a central dimension of a good life, and a life’s being good (...) for the person living it has considerable moral weight, both in itself and because of the positive consequences for others that stem from it. Moral thinking that neglects aesthetic considerations, then, is likely to result in theories that are deficient not only from an aesthetic but from a moral point of view. (shrink)

In the Summer of 2020, a couple of months after the start of the Covid-19 crisis, the Franciscan Study Center at Tilburg University and the Franciscan Institute at St. Bonaventure University started a new partnership called Franciscan Connections. The aim of this new international Franciscan blog was to connect, communicate, and convey the best of Franciscan learning in the twenty-first century. We decided that we wanted to make contemporary and applied Franciscan scholarship available to a wider world of scholars, educated (...) professionals, and communities of practice and to make a new generation of readers aware of the contribution that Franciscan scholarship can make on contemporary issues in politics, society, ethics, and church. Now, almost two years and 200 blog posts later, we notice an increasing involvement from people around the world that seem to really appreciate this new platform as a means for establishing all kinds of Franciscan-inspired connections. Grafted on a way of life inspired by a vision of equality and justice, the Franciscan ethos displays a wealth of values and virtues that are conducive to moral goodness and concern for the common good. As a gift of the Highest Good, Franciscan goodness becomes both a social good and a personal virtue. It is inextricably bound to other social goods like charity, poverty, and peace, which, unsurprisingly, are personal virtues as well. They are also evangelical goods and virtues. Their evangelical rootedness and interconnectedness should therefore be borne in mind, when the Franciscan way of life is to be presented as a primary example of "the good life.". (shrink)

Bioethics and Global Bioethics are currently among the most visible programs in ethics in the global academic community. It was my good fortune to have met Dr. Van Rensselaer Potter in 1963, long before he coined the term “Bioethics” and emerged as America's first Bioethicist, maintaining “The Wisconsin Tradition” established by John Muir and Aldo Leopold. Van believed that all ethics are properly based on a pan-cultural scientific knowledge base. How it is that ethics are related to knowledge, and (...) to values and morals, is the subject of this discussion. (shrink)

A pathbreaking new study of women and morality How do people decide what is "good" and what is "bad"? How does a society set moral guidelines -- and what happens when the behavior of various groups differs from these guidelines? Martha Saxton tackles these and other fascinating issues in Being Good , her history of the moral values prescribed for women in early America. Saxton begins by examining seventeenth-century Boston, then moves on to eighteenth-century Virginia and nineteenth-century St. (...) Louis. Studying women throughout the life cycle -- girls, young unmarried women, young wives and mothers, older widows -- through their diaries and personal papers, she also studies the variations due to different ethnicities and backgrounds. In all three cases, she is able to show how the values of one group conflicted with or developed in opposition to those of another. And, as the women's testimonies make clear, the emotional styles associated with different value systems varied. A history of American women's moral life thus gives us a history of women's emotional life as well. In lively and penetrating prose, Saxton argues that women's morals changed from the days of early colonization to the days of westward expansion, as women became at once less confined and less revered by their men -- and explores how these changes both reflected and affected trends in the nation at large. (shrink)

This study points out the importance and meaning of apologizing as a moral value in compensating the imperfections committed by individuals in social relations and correcting the deteriorating relationships. Accepting that every person can make mistakes is the most essential element that paves the way for the emergence of apology as a virtue. It teaches one to accept that he/she may be wrong, not to consider himself superior to anyone, and arouses the will and will not to make such mistakes. (...) Apology tells the necessity to be respectful and to value other people as well as to be honest. Apologizing is like forcing a person to be honest, and it tells you about the need to care about other people and to be respectful. It is seen that different kinds of apologies are made according to the culpable, guilty person, the environment, the victim, and the situation of the defect. This study discusses the meaning of the words used in apologizing whether they mean full apology or not, the meaning of the apology, its moral dimension, and its relationship with repentance. It also discusses the reasons for the apology, apologizing strategies, accountability, assuming responsibility, proposing repairs, and making promises on not doing something wrong again. The similarity of repentance in religious traditions with apologizing was emphasized, and the relationship between forgiveness and apology was evaluated in terms of the attitudes that the parties should adopt. Finally, as a rule of value and courtesy, suggestions were made on how to provide apologies education in the family.Summary: This study draw attention to the meaning and importance of apologizing as a moral value in compensating for the imperfections that individuals have committed against each other in social relations and in correcting broken relationships. Acknowledging that every person can make mistakes is the most important element that paves the way for the emergence of an apology as a virtue. Accepting that one can be wrong teaches that one should not think of himself as superior to anyone and arouses the will and desire not to make such mistakes. Apologizing leads people to be honest and tells them about the need to care about other people and be respectful.Apologizing is admitting that the rhetoric, actions, and practices that lead to apologies are not fair, accurate, and legitimate. First, apologizing means that the person to whom we made a mistake is a human being. It means that accepting anyone can make a mistake, and we can be wrong. It gives this person the understanding that s/he should not be superior to anyone else. It also arouses a desire and will not make such mistakes anymore. Apologizing tells you the necessity of caring and respecting other people as well as forcing people to be honest. The person who apologizes to him is undoubtedly respectable. The respected person will surely appreciate to others. The basis of social order and life is mutual respect. Being able to apologize draws the individual's point of view to the end where he or she should be and provides the basis for the healthy functioning of the social order by gaining the understanding of respect for other people. Also, being able to apologize is an expression of confession, honesty, and sincerity. Apologizing in this respect is a virtue and merit. The society that values are lost and surrounded by selfishness and nihilism must be turned into virtues, and people who know the value of human beings.The good and virtuous person is not without fault, s/he is the one who apologizes for the mistakes, s/he has committed or seeks ways to redeem that mistake, s/he is the one who returns from his/her mistake. Apologizing should be not only a responsibility but also an indicator of self-confidence. It should not be forgotten that conscientious accounting is a self-judgment. S/he can quickly apologize for stepping on someone else's feet, soiling his clothes, but s/he does not think of a full apology consisting of remorse, compensation, and repair for the person who has taken away a person's right, poisoned his life and tarnished his future.When the parent says that the child should apologize, a process will be initiated for the child to consider. If the child apologizes in front of his or her parent, who points to the necessity of this, it is an important step in the child's moral education, and this indicates that the child internalizes these norms and engages in independent moral accounting. Because s/he now realizes that a value s/he defends without dictating from the outside has been violated, and therefore, has the motivation to make an apology.Arrogance is the biggest obstacle to apologizing. In men-women relations, it can be seen that women are more easily able to apologize, they do not consider apologizing as an indicator of as powerlessness and insulted as men. A manager, a boss, a leader, or a president can delay or fail to realize that his/her authority and dignity will diminish when s/he apologizes to his/her subordinate and those under his/her command. Men in the family, teachers at school, managers in the institution, boss and so on leader and authority persons refrain from apologizing by going to show and bless what they say and do to legitimize the past, to forget or reject mistakes, to prevent them from being questioned morally. This tells us the importance of internalizing the understanding of apologetics as a social culture starting with the family.Individual mistakes should be apologized for in daily life, institutional errors, as well as for some unfortunate incidents. Apologies have the potential for establishing a suitable basis for the establishment of a culture of dialogue in inter-communal relations and sharing some common values and interests. Apologies can contribute significantly to the development of a culture of tolerance, cooperation, and peaceful coexistence among communities.When a defect requiring a committed apology, the event must be evaluated not only from a unilateral perspective, but from a whole context and sides so that the perpetrator can adopt the feelings and understanding of the victim.In the apology, there should be a strategy such as an expression of regret, accountability, taking responsibility, offering repairs, and making promises on not happening again. Repentance in religious traditions is similar to an apology. In the face of apology, the victim reduces negative feelings towards the offender by forgiving and repairs the relationship. Apologies are a reputation-protecting action for the victim, while a discreditable step is taking place for the wrong person. It is also important to forgive and protect the reputation of the person who made a mistake. Like the cultural past, gender causes men and women to choose different apology strategies. Various forms of apology are also influenced by factors such as age, income status, occupation, and ethnicity. The time to apologize, the environment, the mood of the interlocutor must be well calculated. If enough care is not given to them, the apology may not reach its purpose, and thus, there is no possibility of correcting the broken relationship. Since childhood, it is important to teach individuals that a person may have been guilty by making mistakes towards others, society and the environment. Also, individuals should be educated on apologizing from others when needed. The child should apologize when he/she makes a mistake by taking the model in his / her family and the people around him and should be forgiving in cases made against him/her. (shrink)

This chapter explores the interaction between the moral value and aesthetic value of food, in part by connecting it to existing discussions of the interaction between moral and aesthetic values of art. Along the way, this chapter considers food as art, the aesthetic value of food, and the role of expertise in uncovering aesthetic value. Ultimately this chapter argues against both food autonomism (the view that food's moral value is unconnected to its aesthetic value) and Carolyn Korsmeyer's food moralism (the (...) view that moral flaws can only make food aesthetically worse). Instead, it argues for the position of food immoralism: sometimes a moral flaw can make an item of food aesthetically better. This chapter concludes by drawing out broader implications of this position for discussions on the ethics of food and discussions on the interaction between the moral and aesthetic values of art. (shrink)

This article addresses the following meta-ethical question: do moral values have a special position among other values? According to Robert Adams, moral values do have a special position and are of overriding importance. I argue that the "overridingness" thesis is inconsistent with Adams’s value theory that only God has value in himself and all other things are valuable to the extent that they resemble God. I consider some possible ways of integrating the overridingness thesis that are latent in Adams’s work (...) and argue that none succeeds. My main contribution is to propose a solution to the inconsistency in Adams’s theory. I argue that a theological account of beauty gives us reason to reject the overridingness thesis. Morality overrides some other concerns, but not all other concerns. (shrink)

Kant says that moral values are ‘good without qualification.’ This assertion and similar remarks of Plato can be understood in terms of a return to moral data themselves in the following ways: 1. Moral values are objectively good and not relative to our judgments; 2. Moral goodness is intrinsic goodness grounded in the nature of acts and independent of our subjective satisfaction; 3. Moral goodness expresses in an essentially new and higher sense of the idea of value as (...) such; 4. Moral Goodness cannot be abused like intellectual, aesthetic, temperamental and other values; 5. Moral values are good in that they never must be sacrificed for any other value, because they are incomparably higher and should absolutely and ‘first’ be sought for; 6. Moral goodness makes the person as such good; 7. All three different modes of participation in moral values are linked to the absolute, most ‘necessary’ and highest good for the person; 8. Moral Values are goods "in the unrestricted sense" by being pure perfections in the sense that "neither in this world nor outside it" can we find anything that could be called good unqualifiedly except moral goodness which is absolutely better to possess than not to possess. 9. Moral Values are unconditionally good because they are never just ‘means’ towards ends. 10. Moral values imply a new type of ought which elucidates the ‘absolute sense’ in which they are good. Conclusion: These distinctions allow a better grasp of Kant and Plato as well as of a central ethical truth decisive for the moral education of humankind. (shrink)

BackgroundIn the Netherlands, patients have the legal right to make a request for euthanasia to their physician. However, it is not clear what it means in a moral sense for a physician to receive a request for euthanasia. The aim of this study is to explore the moral values of physicians regarding requests for euthanasia. MethodsSemi-structured interviews were conducted with nine primary healthcare physicians involved in decision-making about euthanasia. The data were inductively analyzed which lead to the emergence of themes, (...) one of which was about values regarding end-of-life decisions.ResultsFour clusters of values related to euthanasia requests are described: values related to 1) the patient; 2) the family; 3) the physician; and 4) life and death. The data show that the participants value patient autonomy as a necessary but not sufficient condition for meeting a euthanasia request. A good relationship with the patient and the family are important. For the physician, the values physician autonomy, responsibility, understanding the patient and relief of suffering play a role. Life as an intrinsic good and a peaceful death are also important values.ConclusionThis study shows that next to patient autonomy and the relationship with the patient and the family, it is important for the participants to act in accordance with their professional values and to do justice to values related to life and death. The awareness of going against the intrinsic value of life is crucial, even if performing euthanasia may result in a feeling of relief or gratitude afterwards. (shrink)

The paper discusses some of the criticisms of contingent valuation (CV) and allied techniques for estimating the intensity of peoples' preferences for the environment. The weakness of orthodox utilitarian assumptions in economics concerning the commensurability of all items entering into peoples' choices is discussed. The concept of commensurability is explored as is the problem of rational choice between incommensurate alternatives. While the frequent claim that the environment has some unique moral intrinsic value is unsustainable, its preservation often raises ethical and (...) other motivations that are not commensurate with the values that people place on ordinary marketable goods. Nevertheless, CV is also claimed to have some advantages and it is concluded that little progress will be made in this area until both sides in the debate recognise what is valid in their opponents' arguments. (shrink)

My goal in this article is to provide support for the claim that moral flaws can be detrimental to an artwork's aesthetic value. I argue that moral flaws can become aesthetic flaws when they defeat the operation of good-making aesthetic properties. I do not defend a new theory of aesthetic properties or aesthetic value; instead, I attempt to show that on both the response-dependence and the supervenience account of aesthetic properties, moral flaws with an artwork are relevant to what (...) aesthetic properties obtain. I provide a description of the main features of both theories of aesthetic properties, and then explain how moral flaws can become aesthetic flaws on either account. I address several objections to moralism about art including the "moralistic fallacy.". (shrink)

McGinn's latest brings together moral philosophy and literary analysis in a way that illuminates both. Setting out to enrich the domain of moral reflection by showing the value of literary texts as sources of moral illumination, McGinn starts by setting out an uncompromisingly realist ethical theory, arguing that morality is an area of objective truth and genuine knowledge. He goes on to address such subjects as the nature of goodness, evil character, and the meaning of monstrosity in the context of (...) an aesthetic theory of virtue, which maintains that goodness of character is the same thing as beauty of soul. Looking at such literary works as Billy Budd, Lolita, The Picture of Dorian Gray, and Frankenstein, as well as examples from film and painting, Ethics, Evil, and Fiction is an original and compelling book by a leading philosopher who is also a critic and novelist. (shrink)

Philosophical discussions of climate change have mainly conceived of it as a moral or ethical problem, but climate change also raises new challenges for aesthetics. In this paper I show that, in particular, climate change (1) raises difficult questions about the status of aesthetic judgments about the future, or ‘future aesthetics’; and (2) puts into relief some challenging issues at the intersection of aesthetics and ethics. I maintain that we can rely on aesthetic predictions to enable us to grasp, in (...) some sense, aesthetic value in environments affected by climate change and, through a discussion of three hypothetical cases, I argue that, although moral considerations will press on aesthetic judgments, aesthetic value will not necessarily be trumped by them. (shrink)

In the article, we analyse ethical and moral issues of public administration in region of Eastern Slovakia through some cases of the last years. We focused on self-governing regions, namely the Košice and Prešov self-governing regions. We identified two fundamental situations where failures on the side of public administrators occur: selection processes for vacant positions, be it directly in public administration or institutions that fall under its domain, and public procurement with regard to the acquisition of goods and services. (...) The year 2009 was the year of elections to self-governing regions which is why a great number of negative cases dealt with the election campaign. Further, we stated that negative cases dealt with failures of bodies of self-governing regions from both the legal (breaking the law) and moral viewpoint. By claiming that public administrators failed morally, we meant breaking moral norms and rules. Contradictions, which were identified (from the ethical viewpoint), predominantly result from the conflict between public and private interests. In many cases, private interests of public administrators are preferred at the expense of public interests. And it is exactly this preference (a conflict of interests) that is sensitively perceived by the public. (shrink)

By reflecting upon ordinary morality, Aurel Kolnai observed that the constituents of human life are already valued pre-morally. Asking himself how morality could be understood against this background, Kolnai implicitly reflected about the question what makes us moral. By developing a neo-Kolnaian conception of ordinary morality and by making use of the phenomenological method, I argue that man’s moral consciousness is built on the foundation of primordial positive values but that it takes on its proper negative and emphatic character only (...) in the face of aggressive threat to those values. Ethical phenomenology, then, reveals that morality concerns the preservation, protection and improvement of this valuable mode of life. We emphatically experience the valuable when it is in need of protection. This also explains the primarily imperative or negative character of morality. Likewise, moral rules and principles primarily express the concern not to break or transgress them and this precisely because they say to uphold and thereby protect the existing good. Additionally, vice and virtue suitably fall within this view. As morality is about what we do and refrain from doing, thus about our actions and conduct, it is also about our moral character. Repeated compliance with the existing good results in the ascription of virtue, repeated noncompliance in vice. Thus, I argue, in the spirit of Kolnai, that ordinary morality should be, and earns to be, taken much more seriously and less sceptically. In particular, a phenomenology that tries to describe and learn from morality as it is, has much more to offer than is claimed by contemporary moral philosophy, all too often disregarding phenomenology and the search for relevant descriptions of ethical phenomena. (shrink)

Truth-telling for terminally ill patients is a challenging ethical and social issue for Chinese health care professionals. However, despite the existence of ethical and moral standards for nurses, they frequently encounter moral dilemmas when making decisions about truth-telling to patients with end-stage diseases in China. This article aims to provide ethical strategies for clinical nurses in China regarding truth-telling decisions for terminally ill patients on the basis of their individual autonomy. This article first presents a common case scenario in China (...) and then critically discusses ethical issues related to ethical principles and philosophical theories. The aim is to provide the much needed strategy for truth-telling for nurses who are terminally ill rather than to focus on attitudes toward disclosure. This article focuses on nursing morality, ethics, norms, and philosophy in health care and discusses countermeasures taken by nurses in truth-telling decision-making in combination with Chinese Confucian culture. The analysis identifies key ethical strategies tailored to Chinese nurses’ practices, emphasizing individual autonomy, cultural sensitivity, and family dynamics in truth-telling decisions. The complexity of end-of-life illness requires Chinese nurses to strengthen the communication training needed to deliver bad news, as well as critical and autonomous thinking and good communication skills when implementing patient- and family-centered care, to achieve true delivery of bad news, thereby increasing patient autonomy and promoting more successful collaboration among patients, families, and providers. To improve the quality of care. Chinese nurses should integrate ethical principles with Confucian values to enhance patient-centered communication, respecting autonomy while adapting to cultural nuances in end-of-life care. (shrink)

One universal anonymous sage : the Rta/Tao/Logos -- Four sages from the East. The Hindu tradition : the four wants of man -- Buddha : Nirvana -- Confucius : social harmony -- Lao Tzu : nature's way -- Three sages from the West. Moses : divine law -- Jesus : agape love -- Muhammad : "Islam" -- Three classic Greek founders of philosophy. Socrates : the primacy of wisdom ("Virtue is knowledge") -- Plato: No double standard : ethics and politics (...) ; Platonic Ideas : the objective reality of goodness ; Justice as health of soul and therefore always profitable -- Aristotle: Happiness as the end, the greatest good ; Virtue as the road to happiness ; The good as teleological ; The golden mean as the key to virtue ; Ethics as dependent on metaphysics ; The (later) idea of "natural law" -- Three lesser but more popular ancient philosophers. Protagoras -- Epicurus: Hedonism -- Epicurus: Stoicism -- Three medieval Christian saints. St. Augustine: Love as gravity ; Only two kinds of people ; The restless heart -- St. Anselm : the good greater than which nothing can be thought -- Thomas Aquinas: The role of faith and reason ; Four kinds of law ; The four cardinal virtues and the three theological virtues ; Eight candidates for happiness -- Three modern political philosophers. Machiavelli : the good as the practical -- Hobbes : the good as power -- Rousseau : the good as feeling -- Three classic modern ethical alternatives. Hume : the good as subjective -- Kant: The good as goodwill ; Goodwill as duty ; Duty as the "categorical imperative" -- Mill : utilitarianism : the good as maximally happy consequences -- Three Existentialists. Kierkegaard : aesthetics, ethics, and religion -- Nietzsche: The genealogy of morals as resentment ; The Superman : "beyond good and evil" ; "The will to power" -- Sartre: God vs. freedom ; Love vs. freedom -- Two Personalists. Marcel: Being as value ; Mysteries vs. problems ; "Creative fidelity" -- Von Hildebrand: Three kinds of value ; The ethics of the heart -- Three analytic philosophers. Ayer : the good as meaningless -- Moore : the good as indefinable -- Wittgenstein : the good as "mystical" -- Is ethics dead? MacIntyre "After Virtue" vs. Aquinas. (shrink)

Ethical questions normally arise in sport because its participants are human moral agents and because its practice community entails the observance of rules and responsibilities that humans generally owe one another in a social practice of voluntary competition. Since nature sports are not defined by this kind of inter-agential activity, it would appear that there are no comparable ethical constraints on their pursuit. This paper considers conflicts of preference versus right between humans, how these are resolved, and whether these rights (...) are relevant in assessment of nature sport activity vis-à-vis nonhuman creatures. Relying on a goods perspective instead of a rights framework, via Korsgaard, I argue against an assumption that human preference is sufficient to override consideration of nonhuman animals’ functional goods. (shrink)

Ethical questions normally arise in sport because its participants are human moral agents and because its practice community entails the observance of rules and responsibilities that humans generally owe one another in a social practice of voluntary competition. Since nature sports are not defined by this kind of inter-agential activity, it would appear that there are no comparable ethical constraints on their pursuit. This paper considers conflicts of preference versus right between humans, how these are resolved, and whether these rights (...) are relevant in assessment of nature sport activity vis-à-vis nonhuman creatures. Relying on a goods perspective instead of a rights framework, via Korsgaard, I argue against an assumption that human preference is sufficient to override consideration of nonhuman animals’ functional goods. (shrink)

This entry surveys issues at the intersection of art and morality. Particular emphasis is placed on whether, and in what way, the moral character of a work of art influences its artistic value. Other topics include the educational function of art and artistic censorship.

The term “value theory” is used in at least three different ways in philosophy. In its broadest sense, “value theory” is a catch-all label used to encompass all branches of moral philosophy, social and political philosophy, aesthetics, and sometimes feminist philosophy and the philosophy of religion — whatever areas of philosophy are deemed to encompass some “evaluative” aspect. In its narrowest sense, “value theory” is used for a relatively narrow area of normative ethical theory of particular concern to consequentialists. In (...) this narrow sense, “value theory” is roughly synonymous with “axiology”. Axiology can be thought of as primarily concerned with classifying what things are good, and how good they are. For instance, a traditional question of axiology concerns whether the objects of value are subjective psychological states, or objective states of the world. (shrink)

There appear to be various respects in which the outdoor environment has been regarded as significant for education in general and moral education in particular. Whereas some educationalists have considered the environment to be an important site of character development, others have regarded attention to conservation and sustainable development as pressing moral educational concerns in a world of widespread human environmental abuse. The following paper argues that approaches to environmental education that proceed by way of character education or environmental ethics (...) may yet fall short of the central goal of promoting intrinsic appreciation of nature and the outdoors, and explores an alternative strategy focused on exposure to the arts. (shrink)

Aggregative consequentialism and several other popular moral theories are threatened with paralysis: when coupled with some plausible assumptions, they seem to imply that it is always ethically indifferent what you do. Modern cosmology teaches that the world might well contain an infinite number of happy and sad people and other candidate value-bearing locations. Aggregative ethics implies that such a world contains an infinite amount of positive value and an infinite amount of negative value. You can affect only a finite amount (...) of good or bad. In standard cardinal arithmetic, an infinite quantity is unchanged by the addition or subtraction of any finite quantity. So it appears you cannot change the value of the world. Modifications of aggregationism aimed at resolving the paralysis are only partially effective and cause severe side effects, including problems of “fanaticism”, “distortion”, and erosion of the intuitions that originally motivated the theory. Is the infinitarian challenge fatal? (shrink)

"Every professor knows his own area, but who is able to see the whole picture?" Based on the author's background and the wide-ranging areas she has studied in the university, Gila Gat-Tilman presents articles on science, psuedo-science and moral values from an all-encompassing perspective. The first article in this book represents an overview of science and academic knowledge. Articles that follow discuss moral values, the Sabbath, experiments on animals, and the philosophical questions of certainty. Additionally, she includes the biography of (...) two people whose influence has helped hone her viewpoint. Science has improved our lives, and pseudo-science has followed suit. But pseudo-science, built upon baseless, faulty and tendentious theories and assumptions, has won unjustified credibility, as if it was real science, and has only caused harm. In ancient times there were philosophers like Socrates who investigated the question of what is justice and what is the good. They said that one should know what is the good in order to be good. They clarified what are the values that one should hold dear. In the generations that followed, those values were sanctified by religions, were kept in a sanctified way, and improved the life of the society. In our days, the values in the Ten Commandments are not enough, because technology has markedly changed our life, increased our performance abilities, and created new layers of relationships between strangers. Inventions such as the engine, telephone, television, and the computer enable mass communication, with all the implications. For example, today, from birth to death, every person is registered and the authorities have records about them that areused to influence their educational and employment chances. The Ten Commandments are a start for establishing the basis of moral values in our day, but they are not enough. We therefore need additional basic values, which when observed in a sacrosanct way, will provide people with the ability to properly integrate their social life into our society for the good of everyone. The author has a broad, varied academic knowledge in many fields. Her keen ability to focus on what is happening to others and put herself in their position has enabled her to see the bigger picture in society and to understand which values are lacking and must be widely adopted. This book offers these moral values. (shrink)

I am addressing you this evening in a somewhat unfamiliar theme: that of “logical values” or “values in speaking.” I do so since the points I want to raise come up very constantly in contemporary discussion, and yet are seldom made the object of explicit reflection. There are, it is plain, a large number of qualities which appeal to us in our utterances, whether in the setting forth of our notions in words, or in the weaving of such words into (...) sentences. And they may be said to appeal to us in a peculiar manner, and to satisfy a special set of interests in us, which we may group together as the “logical side” of our nature. Thus most people would say that clarity, relevance, coherence, solid significance and simplicity were merits in speaking, and that so also was truthful conformity to the facts of experience, whether in their general outline or their concrete detail. And everyone would admit readily that such excellences “belonged together,” that they were somehow akin, and that they differed profoundly from such virtues in speaking as poetic felicity, practical helpfulness, or moral and religious inspiration. And most people would also be willing to say, with a great deal of obscurity and most puzzling conviction, that the appeal of such qualities wasn't “merely momentary and personal,” but had something “solid” and “universal” about it, that a man would be foolish not to value such qualities, and that he couldn't help valuing them if he only thought of them sufficiently. And we should recommend such qualities to the approval of others with an air of earnestness and authority, setting them on a level, in this respect, with those other excellences that are called “ethical” and “aesthetic.” But while we could back our recommendation in the last two types of case with a great deal of systematic doctrine, built up in centuries of reflection, we should have little to bring forward in the former case, since the excellences that I want to call “logical,” though often acknowledged, have seldom been made the objects of systematic reflection. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the “true” has generally been ranged alongside of the “good” and the “beautiful” as a species of “ultimate value.”. (shrink)

It is often suggested that aesthetic and ethical value judgements are similar in such a way that they should be analysed in analogous manners. In this paper, I argue that the two types of judgements share four important features concerning disagreement, motivation, categoricity, and argumentation. This, I maintain, helps to explain why many philosophers have thought that aesthetic and ethical value judgements can be analysed in accordance with the same dispositional scheme which corresponds to the analogy between secondary qualities and (...) values. However, I argue that aesthetic and ethical value judgements differ as regards their fundamental structures. This scheme is mistaken as regards ethical value judgements, but it is able to account for aesthetic value judgements. This implies that aesthetic value judgements are autonomous in relation to ethical value judements and that aestheticians, not moral philosophers, are the true heirs of this renowned analogy. (shrink)

Morality, besides being a form of regulation of human behavior, is also a form of spiritual cognition, having its specific features in each spiritual tradition, either philosophical or religious. Nowadays the humankind tends to forget about the Plato spiritual archetype of Goodness, Truth, and Beauty, united by the eidos of “χάρις” or “αγαθόν,” which in Russian orthodox culture long ago has been turned into the triad Truth, Virtue and Beauty united by Love. Recently, the person tends to lose his humaneness; (...) the current spiritual crisis is of menacing scale and depth. It is necessary to reveal mutual universal values in order to stop any kind of violence. To realize this task, the author tries to investigate common features of spiritual cognition in different cultures and to suggest a universal dimension of the spiritual phenomenon of faith, founding the ethics of “openness to Being.”. (shrink)

The study of engineering ethics tends to emphasize professional codes of ethics and, to lesser degrees, business ethics and technology studies. These are all important vantage points, but they neglect personal moral commitments, as well as personal aesthetic, religious, and other values that are not mandatory for all members of engineering. This paper illustrates how personal moral commitments motivate, guide, and give meaning to the work of engineers, contributing to both self-fulfillment and public goods. It also explores some general frameworks (...) for thinking about these commitments and calls for further exploration of them. (shrink)

Might aesthetic imperfections play an edifying role in the lives of moral agents? Drawing on the work of Aurel Kolnai, R. F. Holland, Yuriko Saito, and Soetsu Yanagi, this paper argues that aesthetic imperfections, especially of the everyday variety, can sustain our sense that life is worth living, thereby ethically edifying our lives. Cultivating the ability to find beauty in everyday aesthetic imperfections helps to preserve us in dark times. The beauty of the chipped, gnarled, and otherwise blemished can reveal (...) the goodness of a flawed world, indeed in a more powerful way than can the beauty of less flawed objects. -/- . (shrink)

Recent philosophical discussion about the relation between fiction and reality pays little attention to our moral involvement with literature. Frank Palmer's purpose is to investigate how our appreciation of literary works calls upon and develops our capacity for moral understanding. He explores a wide range of philosophical questions about the relation of art to morality, and challenges theories that he regards as incompatible with a humane view of literary art. Palmer considers, in particular, the extent to which the values and (...) moral concepts involved in our understanding of human beings can be said to enter into our understanding of, and response to, fictional characters. The scope of his discussion encompasses literary aesthetics, ethics, and epistemology, and he makes extensive reference to literary examples. (shrink)

Among the many virtues of Facts, Values and Norms, is the articulation of an especially subtle and detailed form of naturalistic value realism. The theory aspires to vindicate the objective purport of value discourse while granting, indeed insisting, that value is subjective in important respects. Evaluative thought and inquiry are understood to be continuous with empirical inquiry in the human sciences, so that ethical and evaluative conclusions can ultimately be defended on a posteriori grounds. Railton argues that talk of what (...) is good for a person, of what is morally right and morally valuable, and perhaps even of what is beautiful, may be shown to concern evaluative facts that are part of the natural world—a mind-independent world that is causally responsible for our experience. Yet each of these forms of value, he thinks, depends in essential ways on subjects who value them. They depend, that is, upon the existence of beings from whose subjective points of view things can matter; because a world without a locus of valuing or concern would be a world in which nothing mattered. One task Railton sets himself is to develop an understanding of the distinct respects in which value can be at once objective and subjective that could unseat the sort of skepticism about objective value that has seemed to many the inevitable upshot of a sober, naturalistic view of human life and thought: “a dark unease over what sort of thing value is and how it might find a place in the world” (86). While I find much to agree with and still more to admire in these excellent essays, I confine my attention here to an area where I have some misgivings. I want to explore the puzzling category that Railton calls “moral value,” and try to understand how the balance between subjectivity and objectivity is supposed to be achieved in that particular case. For this reason, and because they have not yet received the widespread attention.. (shrink)

Though acknowledged by scholars, Plato’s identification of the Beautiful and the Good has generated little interest, even in aesthetics where the moral concepts are a current topic. The view is suspect because, e.g., it is easy to find examples of ugly saints and beautiful sinners. In this paper the thesis is defended using ideas from Plato’s ancient commentators, the Neoplatonists. Most interesting is Proclus, who applied to value theory a battery of linguistic tools with fixed semantic properties—comparative adjectives, associated (...) gradable adjectives, mass nouns, and predicate negations—all with a semantics that demand a privative scale of value. It is shown how it is perfectly possible to interpret value terms Platonically over privative Boolean algebras so that beautifuland good diverge while at higher levels other value terms are coextensional. Considerations are offered that this structure conforms to actual usage. (shrink)

In this paper I explore and reject the claim that an anthropocentric ethic necessarily excludes recognition of the intrinsic value of nature. Part One reviews thereasons for attributing intrinsic value to nature and considers how a teleological view of nature can transform the role of the moral subject and the nature of moral judgment. Following Tim Hayward, I argue that anthropocentrism does not entail “speciesism” and can accommodate the extension of moral consideration to non-human nature, thus reconstituting an anthropocentric ethic. (...) In Part Two, I apply these principles to Kant’s notion of natural purposiveness. I argue that Kantian ethics, a paradigm of anthropocentric ethics, cannot be considered speciesist because nature must be evaluated from the perspective of the highest good. I conclude that the highest good requires the promotion of a form of sustainable development that includes strong ecological values. (shrink)

Philosophers have predominantly regarded morality and aesthetics judgments as fundamentally different. However, whether this claim is empirically founded has remained unclear. In a novel task, we measured brain activity of participants judging the aesthetic beauty of artwork or the moral goodness of actions depicted. To control for the content of judgments, participants assessed the age of the artworks and the speed of depicted actions. Univariate analyses revealed whole-brain corrected, content-controlled common activation for aesthetics and morality judgments in frontopolar, dorsomedial and (...) ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. Temporoparietal cortex showed activation specific for morality judgments, occipital cortex for aesthetics judgments. Multivariate analyses revealed both common and distinct whole-brain corrected representations for morality and aesthetics judgments in temporoparietal and prefrontal regions. Overall, neural commonalities are more pronounced than predominant philosophical views would predict. They are compatible with minority accounts that stress commonalities between aesthetics and morality judgments, such as sentimentalism and a valuation framework. (shrink)

This article examines the role wisdom and dignity play in developing ethical business leaders, or what we call shamanic leaders, for the twenty‐first century. We define wisdom as the integration of moral imagination (the good), systems understanding (the true), and aesthetic sensibility (the beautiful) into decisions, actions, and practices in the service of a better world. Dignity is our inherent value, worth, and vulnerability, a core aspect of humanity that each of us is born with. The challenges of developing (...) shamanic leaders, i.e., individuals who evidence the shamanic attributes of healing, connecting, and sensemaking, are discussed, including how to think about and embody wisdom, and the learning that is required to understand and lead with dignity. We argue that dignity and wisdom can be learned and provide the reader with insights into what is required to promote an inclusive and integrated culture where human flourishing and well‐being are at the core of ethical leadership. (shrink)

I articulate an African view of personhood that combines beauty and goodness–aesthetic and moral features. I discuss the idea of communalism, which provides the social and moral values and belief system that give meaning to this view of personhood. I use ideas from some African ethnic traditions, or some people’s account of these traditions, as examples to illustrate this view. The similarities in these examples from different ethnic traditions indicate that it is reasonable to characterize this view as a common (...) theme that may plausibly represent many African cultures. This essay does not seek to provide an anthropological descriptive view, but a plausible philosophical stance on how we ought to understand the idea of personhood in African cultures. I do not suggest that all African cultures or traditions have exactly the same view or that they hold this view in the same way, extent or degree. Obviously, there may be minor differences that do not alter the essence of the view. Many of the authors quoted in this paper who have written on African philosophy use the phrase, ‘African culture’, ‘African tradition’, ‘African view’ or ‘African society’. Thus, it has become commonplace in African philosophical circles that when the prefix ‘African’ is used in the literature on African philosophy, it does not imply that Africa is a monolith or that its traditions are static. There is a recognition that some traditions have changed or are changing. The use of ‘African tradition’ usually indicates a generalizing theoretical abstraction about some enduring and dominant similar themes or ideas in many African traditions. It is also meant to contrast ‘African’ with ‘Western’ traditions, and to also respond to Western critiques of Africa as a group. It is used in a similar way in which the prefix ‘Western’ is used in the literature. This notion of ‘Western’, which is replete in the literature, does not suggest the West is a monolith, but rather, a reference to some similar dominant themes in Western thought. (shrink)

In this paper, the future of bullfighting in France not long to break the moral value and aesthetic experience in disputes arising from conduct analysis to facilitate thinking about aesthetic experience and the relationship between animal existence. This paper is seeking to explore, and not in the evaluation of an article or opinion on a work conflict, but conflict involved to judge the value of multiple values. Guardian of moral values ​​and oppose bullfighting events, the main slogan is to respect (...) life, refused pain; and aesthetic value of the defenders, usually held in the name of safeguarding cultural heritage and maintain the aesthetic quality of performance. Evaluation criteria of the dispute and defend the value caused by the conflict is not the same evaluation criteria dispute is business volume, but as long as both parties agree, you can also stop the dispute; but to defend the value caused by the conflict is poured out not In order, because the two sides都that the other side The defense held the right of speech is not. This will work for contemporary art in the use of animals in vivo action conducted research to explore the contemporary art of the new research topics implied by the reach of the arts domain and the domain of U.S. academic issues. Contemporary art in the works use living animals move, going beyond In order to both logic system recognized by the precinct, including the U.S. academic field naturalist館exhibition science precinct, ethics and moral of the bounded domain, the legal precinct, and so on. The definition of contemporary art across borders is an important factor in the definition. This paper will examine the Huang Yong Ping's "World Theatre" Case, this was originally a huge cultural center complete degree 1994's "beyond boundaries" arranged by one of the works on display, but In several animal protection requirements under the Joint Association was eventually canceled. Case in other article, is the author of contemporary art in the study of the U.S. boycott of the case made ​​by the observation results. These different Case studies - is currently on-going research work - at least lead to two problems: artists at work using live or dead animals, whether in what form cross In order moral bounded domain and / or the U.S. academic Domain? Also, from one precinct to another precinct of the transition, the leap of variables that? Description of the future, after all, this issue of intense controversy, is originated from the West, so that this issue regardless of whether the problem is the West competition, but more is not Chinese or Asian issues of concern? Based on various conflicts of evaluation , this study of the relationship between aesthetic experience and animality evidences the existence of value registers, above the very values ​​such as beauty or sensitiveness. Aesthetic register is used by the supporters of a work in the name of cultural traditions or artistic quality, while ethical register is used by its opponents in the name of respect for living beings or of refusal to inflict sufferings. Whereas value conflicts allow discussions that may end up with an agreement, value registers conflicts can generate but endless fights, since the arguments of one party are without any relevance for the other party. Out of various case studies, mostly in France and in the USA, two questions arise. First, what kinds of moral and / or aesthetic boundaries are transgressed by the use of animals "living or even dead" in artistic proposals? Second, how do these transgressions change according to different cultures? Do they raise more difficulties in western culture than in Chinese or Asian culture, since the latter provides the propositions which have been most violently attacked in the Western world? (shrink)

The purpose of the research study is to determine a comparative analysis between evil and suffering. Comparative studies of these Western and Eastern religious philosophies demonstrate different results. In Western philosophies, the cause of evil is related to human free will and the law of the universe, focusing on justice driven by God and moral values chosen by humans. On the other hand, the Eastern philosophical theories of various religions focus on the series of experiences that humans face (...) depending upon the cycle of karma, rebirth, and cosmological context. They tend to move toward practical approaches taken by humans to eliminate suffering in their lives by utilizing ethical values and practices. Despite these differences, both philosophies tend to impact human conditions and paths, with the only difference being that Western religions have firm faith in God's plan of justice, whereas Eastern religions focus on the cosmetology and self-motivation of humans. On the other hand, the study of Western religion provides the availability of grooming laws for individuals to attain spiritual goodness personally. Another important factor of Western religions is the involvement of different religion-related institutes like mosques, churches, and schools that help shape the communities living in different areas and increase their social ethics for playing a role in communal enhancement. For education gaining ideas, the Eastern religion is more focused on expanding intellect and gaining wisdom through education. The education is delivered to incorporate such healthy meditations to increase intellect, memory, and spiritual knowledge. In Western religious philosophies, education is taken to illuminate and clarify different purposes and aspects of life. This aspect has also helped develop technology and enhance science background regions also play a proper role in religious teachings for character building, along with the academic type of education. (shrink)

The question of racial identity in the process and outcome of aesthetic surgery is gaining increasing attention in bioethical discourse. This paper attempts an ethical examination of the racial identity issues involved in aesthetic surgery. Dominant moral values in Western culture are explored in the evaluation of aesthetic surgery. The paper argues that African values are yet to receive the universal attention they arguably deserve especially in the rethinking of values underlying aesthetic surgery as racial transformation. Through a consideration of (...) some moral-aesthetic values in the Yorùbá-African culture, this paper further re-evaluates the ethics of aesthetic surgery. The paper contends against the propagation of aesthetic surgery as a new form of bolstering racial divides and identity in the evolving cosmopolitan age. The position defended in the paper is that some values from Yorùbá-African culture are useful in the consideration of the ethics of aesthetic surgery and more importantly, in avoiding the racial identity bias embedded in aesthetic surgery. The paper concludes that if due consideration is perhaps given to some African moral-aesthetic values in the global aesthetic surgery industry, some of the evolving moral and racial complexities would be better mediated. (shrink)

How can one establish if a corporate code of ethics is ethical in terms of its content? One important first step might be the establishment of core universal moral values by which corporate codes of ethics can be ethically constructed and evaluated. Following a review of normative research on corporate codes of ethics, a set of universal moral values is generated by considering three sources: (1) corporate codes of ethics; (2) global codes of ethics; and (3) the business ethics literature. (...) Based on the convergence of the three sources of standards, six universal moral values for corporate codes of ethics are proposed including: (1) trustworthiness; (2) respect; (3) responsibility; (4) fairness; (5) caring; and (6) citizenship. Relying on the proposed set of universal moral values, implications are discussed as to what the content of corporate codes of ethics should consist of. The paper concludes with its limitations. (shrink)

This paper addresses some important questions related to ethical and human values that stem from the transition of Eastern European businesses to a market economy. While such a change has the potential for a tremendous redistribution of power and benefits in the societies involved, it also has its detrimental effects in terms of loss of wages, decline in security of life and a reduced standard of living for a significant number of people. The paper explores the problems and issues (...) relating to former state-owned firms and newly created companies under three broad headings: the manufacture and distribution of products; management and corporate governance; and rights, responsibilities and problems of workers. The author concludes by saying that while the transition to a market economy has broad support throughout Eastern Europe, it does not represent a painless solution. Moreover, it allows for the emergence of a range of moral problems. This complexity involved in addressing ethical issues lends itself to either of the two extreme tendencies-paralysis or creativity. The stance which Eastern Europeans take towards these problems will largely depend upon the 'moral resources' which they are able to muster up in addressing these issues. (shrink)