The issue of the ordering of the ten trichotomies is one among the many questions still open regarding Peirce’s extended theory of signs. A proper decision regarding the order of the ten trichotomies demands a discussion of the entire semiotic process. The aim of this paper is to discuss the order of the trichotomies related to the mode of being of the immediate and dynamical objects. Therefore, it addresses only one part of this process, which concerns the relationship between the (...) sign and its objects. When subdividing the object, Peirce begins to consider the immediate and the dynamic objects as trichotomies, that is, aspects to be considered in the definition of the classes of signs. The introduction of these two trichotomies brings in a problem: how to order them in the system of ten trichotomies. Diverging opinions regarding this ordering are found in Peirce’s texts, and in his commentators. We will investigate this problem by seeking a sort of pragmatic clarification of the matter, presenting a reflection about the philosophical and semiotic consequences of the different proposals for the ordering of these trichotomies. Placing the dynamic object after the sign may even help to explain the functioning of fictional signs, but is this coherent with Peirce’s philosophy? On the other hand, would it be possible to talk about lying signs if every object was determined by its own sign? (shrink)

This paper argues that pragmatic considerations similar to the ones that Grice has shown pertain to assertability pertain to acceptability. It further shows how this should affect some widely held epistemic principles. The idea of a pragmatics of belief is defended against some seemingly obvious objections.

The paper proposes an outline of a reconciliatory approach to the perennial controversy between epistemological realism and anti-realism (constructionism). My main conceptual source in explaining this view is the philosophy of pragmatism, more specifically, the epistemological theories of George H. Mead, John Dewey, and also William James’ radical empiricism. First, the paper analyzes the pragmatic treatment of the goal-directedness of action, especially with regard to Mead’s notion of attitudes, and relates it to certain contemporary epistemological theories provided by the cognitive (...) sciences (Maturana, Rizzolatti, Clark). Against this background, the paper presents a philosophical as well as empirical justification of why we should interpret the environment and its objects in terms of possibilities for action. In Mead’s view, the objects and events of our world emerge within stable patterns of organism-environment interactions, which he called “perspectives”. According to pragmatism as well as the aforementioned cognitive scientists, perception and other cognitive processes include not only neural processes in our heads but also the world itself. Elaborating on Mead’s concept of perspectives, the paper argues in favor of the epistemological position called “constructive realism.”. (shrink)

This paper is divided in two parts. In part I, I argue against two attempts to naturalise the notion of scientific representation, by reducing it to isomorphism and similarity. I distinguish between the means and the constituents of representation, and I argue that isomorphism and similarity are common (although not universal) means of representation; but that they are not constituents of scientific representation. I look at the prospects for weakened versions of these theories, and I argue that only those that (...) abandon the aim to naturalise scientific representation are likely to be successful. In part II of the paper, I present a deflationary conception of scientific representation, which minimally characterises it by means of two necessary conditions: representation is essentially intentional and it has the capacity to allow surrogate reasoning and inference. I then defend this conception by showing that it successfully meets the objections and difficulties that make its competitors, such as isomorphism and similarity, untenable. In addition the inferential conception explains the success of various means of representation in their appropriate domains, and it sheds light on the truth and accuracy of scientific representations. (shrink)

Measurement theory in (Hand in The world through quantification. Oxford University Press, 2004; Suppes and Zinnes in Basic measurement theory. Psychology Series, 1962) is concerned with the assignment of number to objects of phenomena. Representational aspect of measurement is the extent to which the assigned numbers and arithmetics truthfully represent the underlying objects and their relations, and is characteristic to natural sciences; pragmatic aspect is the extent to which the assigned numbers serve purposes other than representing the underlying phenomena, and (...) is characteristic to social sciences (Hand in The world through quantification. Oxford University Press, 2004). Here I criticise this distinction of representational and pragmatic measurements on the basis of the earlier history of the periodic system of chemical elements, viewed in terms of a practice based philosophy of science by Rein Vihalemm. I argue that the periodic system, although a natural scientific system interpretable as a measurement system, has considerable, in Hand’s terms pragmatic, aspects in it. Those aspects include: tampering with the material measurement results for the theoretical ideal of systematicity; adopting metaphysical assumptions that cannot be experimentally proven, like individuality of elements and atomicity; theoretical construction of the abstract entity—element—as the reference of the measurement system amenable to mathematically elegant ordering. Contrary to Suppes and Zinnes (Basic measurement theory. Psychology Series, 1962) I also argue for the dependence of the assigned numerical system on the material-procedural base of the measurement. (shrink)

This paper is divided in two parts. In part I, I argue against two attempts to naturalise the notion of scientific representation, by reducing it to isomorphism and similarity. I distinguish between the means and the constituents of representation, and I argue that isomorphism and similarity are common means of representation; but that they are not constituents of scientific representation. I look at the prospects for weakened versions of these theories, and I argue that only those that abandon the aim (...) to naturalise scientific representation are likely to be successful. In part II of the paper, I present a deflationary conception of scientific representation, which minimally characterises it by means of two necessary conditions: representation is essentially intentional and it has the capacity to allow surrogate reasoning and inference. I then defend this conception by showing that it successfully meets the objections and difficulties that make its competitors, such as isomorphism and similarity, untenable. In addition the inferential conception explains the success of various means of representation in their appropriate domains, and it sheds light on the truth and accuracy of scientific representations. (shrink)

It is shown how the discussion of the semantics of sentences attributing belief, central to the philosophy of language since Frege, may benefit from consideration of pragmatic features of the context of utterance. ;The dissertation begins with a historical introduction to the problem of substitutivity in belief contexts. Traditional solutions advanced by Frege, Russell, and Carnap are reviewed, along with traditional objections to such solutions. It is then suggested that the traditional Quinian approach of declaring belief ascriptions semantically ambiguous might (...) be avoided by appeal to pragmatic considerations. ;Radically divergent appeals to pragmatics are discussed. It is suggested, on one hand, how theories of reference associated with philosophers such as Kripke and Kaplan can benefit from pragmatic analysis, as it is demonstrated that substitution failure in belief ascriptions may be due to pragmatic rather than semantical factors. This is argued for in three ways: it is shown how the result of unacceptable substitution may be pragmatically ambiguous, insufficiently informative, or simply misleading. ;It is also suggested, on the other hand, how some followers of Frege may similarly argue that substitution success may be due to pragmatic rather than semantical factors. That is, it is shown how those who maintain that substitution in belief contexts is not truth-preserving and, roughly, that a sentence attributing a belief to someone is true only if the person would assent to it, can argue that our occasional inclination to accept a belief report to which the believer would not assent may be due to features of the sentence's utterance, rather than its truth conditions. ;After brief speculation on the ramifications of these pragmatic analyses for the semantics of belief, there is a discussion of the principle methodological issues raised by pragmatic analyses, with special attention to the distinction between pragmatic import and semantical meaning. Further discussion of pragmatics comes in the appendix, containing a critical review of various conceptions of pragmatics and of Grice's theory of conversation. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to defend Simple Modest Invariantism (SMI) about knowledge from the threat presented by pragmatic encroachment. Pragmatic encroachment is the view that practical circumstances are relevant in some way to the truth of knowledge ascriptions—and if this is true, it would entail the falsity of SMI. Drawing on Ross and Schroeder’s recent Reasoning Disposition account of belief, I argue that the Reasoning Disposition account, together with Grice’s Maxims, gives us an attractive pragmatic account of the (...) connection between knowledge ascriptions and practical circumstances. This gives us the ability to explain away the data that is supposed to support pragmatic encroachment. Finally, I address three important objections to the view offered by giving a pragmatic account of when it is conversationally appropriate to cancel a conversational implicature, and discussing when sentences with true content can end up sounding false as well as cases where sentences with false content can end up sounding true. (shrink)

Unveiling the Other - the Pragmatics of Infosuasion The present paper, starting from the assumption that television news is "the main source" and a key player in the democratic process explores the media-politics interface, along with the ideological conditioning and cultural embedding of the news discourse, understood both as a process and as a product. The objective behind it is threefold. Firstly, it is to examine the media mechanisms accounting for the process of ‘infosuasion’, i.e. persuading the viewers under (...) the guise of delivering information in the form of neutral and balanced reporting, thereby shaping their perceptions of the self and the "Other". Secondly, it is to demonstrate the dialectics between the news media and political elites, visible in the CNN representation of Iranians and its contingency on the anti-nuclear discourse of the Bush Administration. Finally, it is to maximize the validity of an eclectic approach, combining pragmatic and semiotic perspectives, in the domain of news media discourse along with the processes within this discourse and the practices behind it. (shrink)

The poor performances of typically developing children younger than 4 in the first-order false-belief task “Maxi and the chocolate” is analyzed from the perspective of conversational pragmatics. An ambiguous question asked by an adult experimenter (perceived as a teacher) can receive different interpretations based on a search for relevance, by which children according to their age attribute different intentions to the questioner, within the limits of their own meta-cognitive knowledge. The adult experimenter tells the child the following story of (...) object-transfer: “Maxi puts his chocolate into the green cupboard before going out to play. In his absence, his mother moves the chocolate from the green cupboard to the blue one.” The child must then predict where Maxi will pick up the chocolate when he returns. To the child, the question from an adult (a knowledgeable person) may seem surprising and can be understood as a question of his own knowledge of the world, rather than on Maxi's mental representations. In our study, without any modification of the initial task, we disambiguate the context of the question by (1) replacing the adult experimenter with a humanoid robot presented as “ignorant” and “slow” but trying to learn and (2) placing the child in the role of a “mentor” (the knowledgeable person). Sixty-two typical children of 3 years-old completed the first-order false belief task “Maxi and the chocolate,” either with a human or with a robot. Results revealed a significantly higher success rate in the robot condition than in the human condition. Thus, young children seem to fail because of the pragmatic difficulty of the first-order task, which causes a difference of interpretation between the young child and the experimenter. (shrink)

Habermas asserts that the ‘presupposition’ of the common objective world is thrust upon us by the pragmatics of language use. However, this is a dubious claim. A pre-linguistic relation to the world as common and objective is required for language acquisition. What’s more, Husserl’s analyses indicate that aspects of our experience of the common world are grounded in experiences of spatio-temporal horizonality and of the co-presence of others within that world-horizon. This is not to negate the importance of communicatively (...) achieved intersubjectivity, nor to diminish the rational significance of our linguistically articulated ‘world concepts’. But it is to suggest that the ‘presupposition’ of the common objective world has phenomenological, not linguistic-pragmatic, roots. (shrink)

Relations between perceiving and knowing are well-worn problems that become visceral encounters with doubt and ambiguity in ‘mixed-reality’ environments. Locative narrative situates participants within stories where existent places function as the setting. Experiential confusion, between what is talked of as real and as imagined, is an often-reported phenomenon. Classical pragmatisms, and more broadly the writings of William James, understand the functioning of the body to be for the production of action, from which flows a naturalistic epistemology. for James, a thought’s (...) reference to an object occurs in the medium of an ‘experienceable environment’ and is a condition of it being known; what something is known-as is how it functions in a particular context and the consequences that follow. Contemporary pragmatists express varying positions on the function of representation in perception at different levels of cognitive awareness, and the extent to which intentionality is derivative of linguistic norms. In the locative narrative iOS application The Lost Index No.1 – Landscape with Figures strategies of directing participant attention, movement, cognitive tasks and propositional content are used to guide the interpretation of events. The complex environment that is created plays with the multi-stability of perception and the ‘multi-stability meaning’ between terms, resulting in ambiguity and an enhanced flexibility of interpretation. (shrink)

There is a long-standing debate whether propositions, sentences, statements or utterances provide an answer to the question of what objects logical formulas stand for. Based on the traditional understanding of logic as a science of valid arguments, this question is firstly framed more exactly, making explicit that it calls not only for identifying some class of objects, but also for explaining their relationship to ordinary language utterances. It is then argued that there are strong arguments against the proposals commonly put (...) forward in the debate. The core of the problem is that an informative account of the objects formulas stand for presupposes a theory of formalization; that is, a theory that explains what formulas may adequately substitute for an inference in proofs of validity. Although such theories are still subject to research, some consequences can be drawn from an analysis of the reasons why the common accounts featuring sentences, propositions or utterances fail. Theories of formalization cannot refer to utterances qua expressions of propositions; instead they may refer to sentences and rely on additional information about linguistic structure and pragmatic context. (shrink)

Moore’s paradox in belief is the fact that beliefs of the form ‘ p and I do not believe that p ’ are ‘absurd’ yet possibly true. Writers on the paradox have nearly all taken the absurdity to be a form of irrationality. These include those who give what Timothy Chan calls the ‘pragmatic solution’ to the paradox. This solution turns on the fact that having the Moorean belief falsifies its content. Chan, who also takes the absurdity to be a (...) form of irrationality, objects to this solution by arguing that it is circular and thus incomplete. This is because it must explain why Moorean beliefs are irrational yet, according to Chan, their grammatical third-person transpositions are not, even though the same proposition is believed. But the solution can only explain this asymmetry by relying on a formulation of the ground of the irrationality of Moorean beliefs that presupposes precisely such asymmetry. I reply that it is neither necessary nor sufficient for the irrationality that the contents of Moorean beliefs be restricted to the grammatical first-person. What has to be explained is rather that such grammatical non-first-person transpositions sometimes, but not always, result in the disappearance of irrationality. Describing this phenomenon requires the grammatical first-person/non-first person distinction. The pragmatic solution explains the phenomenon once it is formulated in de se terms. But the grammatical first-person/non-first-person distinction is independent of, and a fortiori, different from, the de se /non- de se distinction presupposed by pragmatic solution, although both involve the first person broadly construed. Therefore the pragmatic solution is not circular. Building on the work of Green and Williams I also distinguish between the irrationality of Moorean beliefs and their absurdity. I argue that while all irrational Moorean beliefs are absurd, some Moorean beliefs are absurd but not irrational. I explain this absurdity in a way that is not circular either. (shrink)

Advocates of linguistic pragmatics often appeal to a principle which Paul Grice called Modified Occam's Razor: 'Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity'. Superficially, Grice's principle seems a routine application of the principle of parsimony ('Entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity'). But parsimony arguments, though common in science, are notoriously problematic, and their use by Griceans faces numerous objections. This paper argues that Modified Occam's Razor makes considerably more sense in light of certain assumptions about the (...) processes involved in language acquisition, and it describes recent empirical findings that bear these assumptions out. The resulting account solves several difficulties that otherwise confront Grice's principle, and it draws attention to problematic assumptions involved in using parsimony to argue for pragmatic accounts of linguistic phenomena. (shrink)

As is well known, according to the "new" theory of reference, the reference relation can be carried out by means of rigid designators whose relationship with the object they designate cannot be analyzed away. Moreover, the new theorists claim, the category of proper names in a natural language marks almost invariably rigid designators. In this paper, both claims are rejected. Using distinctions between the referential system and the identification system, and between two types of object identification, it is (...) argued that the use of a noun phrase as a rigid designator is predicated on the assumption that a language user knows who the noun phrase refers to in the actual world. The conclusion is that rigid designation is not a conceptually irreducible reference relation, nor are proper names always used as rigid designators. (shrink)

I defend a pragmatist reinterpretation of Sellars’s famous manifest-scientific distinction. I claim that in order to do justice to this important distinction we must first recognize, despite what philosophers—including, arguably, Sellars—often make of it, that the distinction does not draw an epistemological or metaphysical boundary between different kinds of objects and events, but a pragmatic boundary between different ways in which we interact with objects and events. Put differently, I argue that the manifest-scientific distinction, in my view, can be best (...) understood, not as a metaphysical distinction between apparent and real objects and events, or an epistemological distinction between perceptible and imperceptible objects and events, but rather as a distinction, which is not necessarily rigid over time, between distinct ways in which we collectively deal, in practice, with objects and events. (shrink)

The article discusses the methodology for studying reflective systems, which are very specific objects of study. However, such objects include almost all phenomena of the socio-humanitarian sciences, including scientific knowledge. It is noted that in the era of the “sixties” original concepts of reflexive analysis arose in Russian philosophy, among which the three most striking ones, associated with the names of V.A. Lefebvre (1936-2020), G.P. Shchedrovitsky (1929-1994), M.A. Rozova (1930-2011). The main attention is paid to the methodology that was built (...) within the framework of the theory of social relay races by M.A. Rosova. It is shown how systems with reflection function and why they are able to rebuild, changing the order of sociality. (shrink)

One challenge that the proponent of the Fregean theory of definite descriptions has to meet is to account for those truth-value intuitions that do not match the predictions of her theory. What needs an explanation is why sentences such as ‘The king of France is sitting in that chair’ [pointing at an empty chair] are intuitively false, while semantically truth-valueless. The existence of such cases was pointed out by Strawson :216–231, 1954) and Russell :385–389, 1957), and much discussed in the (...) subsequent literature. The standard pragmatic explanation that Fregeans have proposed :113–122, 1993; von Fintel, Descriptions and beyond, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004; Elbourne, Definite descriptions, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) invokes an epistemic strategy of verification of the utterance of the sentence. I raise three objections to this strategy, two concerning its descriptive adequacy, and one concerning the motivation offered for the approach. Finally, I propose an alternative account that relies on an inferential pattern that leads to the relevant truth-value judgements in certain contextually specified conditions. (shrink)

The correspondence of a sensory object to the category of a descriptive statement requires a reflexive-identity of the object, and such a reflexive-identity is primarily based on the cognition of spatiality. Spatiality is, however, constituted through visual perception. There are only two occasions on which definitive reflexive-identity is exemplified: the infinitesimal point and the infinite “One,” and others are just human stipulations that meet pragmatic needs of rough identification of things at hand. However, if a spatial point is (...) not different from any so-called “other” spatial point, to validate the reflexive identity of any spatial point implies a validation of the reflexive identity of all spatial points. Thus, as “one” and “many” here become absolutely unitary, the infinitely small and the infinitely immense are identical. (shrink)

This article combines the idea of the active interview with insights from science studies and suggests that some concepts from science studies, like boundary objects and trading zones, should be utilized to understand and facilitate the production and analysis of data in a transcultural interview. This is illustrated by examples from interviews that the author conducted with women computer science students and faculty in a university in Malaysia. The article argues that the understanding of, as well as the performance of (...) the transcultural interview might benefit from the highly pragmatic character of scientific investigations, focusing on using locally available resources to produce knowledge; and that this in turn may enhance our capacity to do feminist research. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.1 (2003) 63-66 [Access article in PDF] The Pragmatics of Psychiatry and the Psychiatry of Cross-Cultural Suffering Jennifer Radden I AM IN SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT with many of the conclusions David Brendel draws in his thoughtful discussion. Misleading language aside, I particularly applaud his use of my plea for ontological descriptivism to support clinical practice, which respects, as he puts it, the subjectively "melancholic" person (...) living behind the objectively "depressed" clinical presentation.Brendel offers two main critiques of my discussion about the relationship between today's depression and melancholia of past eras. First, he asserts that I neglect the relevance of causal reasoning in my preference for a descriptivist over a causal ontology. Second, arguing that pragmatic considerations ought to be, as he says, front and center when philosophers and psychiatrists "grapple with the complexities of psychiatric explanation," (Brendel 2003, 54) he questions what he sees as my too ready dismissal of pragmatism in this discussion. Allegiance to pragmatism seems to me to sit strangely with support for a causal ontology, as I shall try to demonstrate. But first let me comment on these two sides of Brendel's commentary.The case of Van Gogh's alleged melancholia is particularly well chosen because there has been continuing debate about Van Gogh's condition, including scholarly work attributing it to an inherited metabolic disorder (Arnold 1992). Brendel's suggestion that a causal ontology might allow us to use historical evidence to throw light on the relation between depression and melancholia is an interesting and fruitful one that I had overlooked. Brendel also holds hope for drug cartography as a means of determining the causes of mental disorders. I admit to the initial plausibility of the approach to classification employed by drug cartography, of course. Diagnostic maps must be evaluated according to their effectiveness for the purposes they serve, and cannot—or should not—be seen as mere descriptions of natural phenomena. And maps based on psychopharmacological effects will serve one of the most important purposes we can have in relation to mental disorders: their successful treatment. Nonetheless, as I indicated in my essay, there are conceptual limitations to drug cartography. That several different syndromes respond to the same drug is suggestive, but it does not tell us anything definitive about structural similarities or differences between those different disorders. Nor, from the fact that a condition is alleviated by drugs, does it follow that a particular brain state was the initiating cause of that condition.My dismissal of a pragmatic approach in the foregoing discussion may have been overly hasty. [End Page 63] But in trying to make good this omission, I find myself struck by the complexity of the task. There appear to be at least five different places where a pragmatic response might be called for: (1) in deciding what to say about the relationship between depression and melancholia; (2) in determining the structure of any given psychiatric classification; (3) in choosing between what I have called descriptivist and causal ontologies; (4) in electing a course or method of treatment in the clinical context; and (5) in evaluating psychiatric explanations.With regard to (1), I have sketched in a note one pragmatic consideration in favor of equating melancholia and depression: by so doing, we might reinvest depressive states with some of the glamorous associations from the past and so diminish the stigma and provide some compensation and consolation for the suffering attaching to depression. Pragmatic reasoning may be perfectly appropriate here. I beg to point out that pragmatic considerations let me neglect it.With regard to (2), I recognize that psychiatric classifications are not so much identifications of natural kinds as responses to our various purposes; indeed, this point is offered as one drawback of adopting a causal analysis, because there is little reason to expect our purposes, which are a product of culture, to correspond to natural arrangements, which are not.With regard to (3), if there were overriding pragmatic considerations that favored accepting one or the other of these ontologies, then perhaps this would be... (shrink)

Films frequently employ nicknames not only for villains but also for non-criminal characters. In this paper, I present a classification of nicknames used in films, along with various examples, mostly from crime-related films. I argue that the use of nicknames in films is important not for the sake of reference, but for the sake of an additional narrative told by the nickname as a shorthand description of a character's background (cf. Tony “Two-Toes”, “Dirty” Harry, “Doc” Erwin or “Hatchet” Harry Lonsdale). (...) The first role of nicknames is their use as a case of Russell's definite descriptions, which require context to be meaningful, in this case, the film story itself. Such descriptions do not need their object to necessarily exist, but they are still meaningful. This role will be tied to the pragmatic context employed. The second role of film nicknames is to concisely present the audience with a background story, by enriching the identity of a character with additional background information, without unnecessary storytelling. Such a device is connected to the philosophical theory of narrativism, providing an additional layer of the character’s identity. (shrink)

The correspondence of a sensory object to the category of a descriptive statement requires a reflexive-identity of the object, and such a reflexive-identity is primarily based on the cognition of spatiality. Spatiality is, however, constituted through visual perception. There are only two occasions on which definitive reflexive-identity is exemplified: the infinitesimal point and the infinite "One," and others are just human stipulations that meet pragmatic needs of rough identification of things at hand. However, if a spatial point is (...) not different from any so-called "other" spatial point, to validate the reflexive identity of any spatial point implies a validation of the reflexive identity of all spatial points. Thus, as "one" and "many" here become absolutely unitary, the infinitely small and the infinitely immense are identical. /// 感觉对象如果要与描述的范畴结构对应，必须以对象的自返同一性为基点，这 种自返同一性原始地建基于对空间性的认知。然而，空间性是通过视觉感知才得到建 构的。确切的自返同一性只有在以下两种情形中才可以被简单为民义地建构:即，无 穷小的点与无穷大的 "太一"。对于在元穷大与无穷小之间的各种客体对象而言，其 自返同一性只是思想强加的，是按照实用目的进行概念化加工的结果。由于任一空间 点和任何所谓"其他"的空间点是无差别的，对任一空间点的同一性的确立也就是对 所有空间点的同一性的确立。结果是，既然 "一" 与 "多" 是绝对同一，无穷小与无 穷大也必然是绝对同一。. (shrink)

What we generally regard as ‘the face’ should be semiotically understood not as something given and monolithic, but rather stratified – it is at least threefold: biological (face), physiognomic (expression), perceivable (visage) – and relational as it has to be put within a narrative in order to make sense. The face lies at the centre of a whole semiotic system, the form of life, revolving around the issue of identity (which the face – the visage, to be precise – embodies (...) and still does not resolve). What we may call ‘the natural face’ is not, as common sense would suggest, the precondition of the ‘culturalized’ one (featured with modifications ranging from make-up and proper masks to surgery), but rather just one of the possible semiotic masks a person may choose to wear. At the same time, the mask does not have to be reduced to a deceptive device only (nor to be meant merely as a material object), being in fact at the centre of a more complex axiology. The classic veridictory square articulating the opposition between Being and Seeming may provide a suitable model for the semiotic square of ‘visageness’, so that we would have: Face, Disguise (the place of the mask proper), Fake, Anonymity. Based on these theoretical premises, the paper finally addresses popular music and outlines a provisional map of the pragmatics of the mask (subtractive vs. additive, ritualistic vs. continuous, material vs. virtual, mask as face vs. face as mask), as a suggestion for further studies. (shrink)

According to Millianism, the semantic content of a proper name is its semantic referent. Many names, however, lack semantic referent; hence, so-called ‘empty’ names. Empty names raise various problems for Millianism. T.C. Ryckman, Fred Adams, Garry Fuller, Robert Stecker, Kenneth Taylor, and Nicole Wyatt, among others, have defended Millianism against these problems by appeal to pragmatics . I introduce Millianism and the problems raised by empty names for the view, then examine Pragmatic Millianism , its strength, its varieties, and (...) why the previous arguments against PM do not succeed. I then provide my argument against PM: the view oversimplifies the complex phenomenon of association between names and descriptions. I discuss an objection to my argument and rebut that. Finally, I try to draw an outline of a positive view. (shrink)

This position is not confined to the philosophical pragmatists of yore. More recent methodologists of science have reacted to Rudolf Carnap’s thesis that science can dispense with accepting hypotheses as true by maintaining that scientists do accept hypotheses, albeit on practical rather than theoretical grounds. On the position adopted by this school of thought, "accepting a hypothesis as true" is to be reinterpreted to amount to "acting or being disposed to act in the manner which would be best relative to (...) a given objective." Accordingly, such theorists propose in effect to reconstrue acceptability-as-true in terms of successful action. (shrink)

The dissociation between the domains of knowledge continues to perpetuate the fragmentation of people’s health and healing experiences. Of particular significance are the polarities that have been created between the objective, subjective and spiritual dimensions of knowledge and human experience. This paper offers a consideration of how faith might serve as a pragmatic avenue towards assuaging the polarities between knowledges and enhancing nurses’ ability to attend to the complex and mulitdimensional nature of health and healing processes.

Theories of economic justice are characteristically based on abstract ethical concerns often unrelated to practical distributive results. Two decades ago, Rawls's theory of justice began as a reaction against the alleged ‘sacrifices’ condoned by utilitarian theory. One variant of this objection is that utilitarianism permits gross inequalities, severe deprivations of individual liberty, or even the enslavement of society's least well-off individuals. There are, however, more subtle forms of the objection. In Rawls, it is often waged without any claim that utilitarianismdoesin (...) fact imply such gross deprivations in actual realworld circumstances. A second variant hinges, rather, on the milder claim that utilitarianismcouldcondone such deprivations or sacrifices in somepossibleworld—the objection being that utilitarianism improperly makes justice contingent, or uncertain, in this way. A third, still more abstract, variant would be that utilitarianism is flawed—not because of any practical distributive result, actual or hypothetical, but intheory—due to the way it treats individuals' interests, or the ‘concept of persons’ it presupposes. (shrink)

The dissociation between the domains of knowledge continues to perpetuate the fragmentation of people’s health and healing experiences. Of particular significance are the polarities that have been created between the objective, subjective and spiritual dimensions of knowledge and human experience. This paper offers a consideration of how faith might serve as a pragmatic avenue towards assuaging the polarities between knowledges and enhancing nurses’ ability to attend to the complex and mulitdimensional nature of health and healing processes.

The question of political judgement is usually addressed within a normative or epistemological framework. In contrast in this paper the approach is that of a pragmatics of judgement. The leading questions are what does political judgement do and how does it operate? This enquiry, carried out through an examination of political judgement in Thomas Hobbes and Baruch Spinoza, is shown to ineluctably lead to an ontology of action. These philosophers’ contrasting ontologies give rise to two different frameworks for political (...) judgement whose avatars are still with us today: Hobbesian functionalism and Spinozist affirmationism. Finally these competing frameworks of judgement are put to the test of resolving—or at least treating—the very problem that gave rise to them in the first place in Hobbes and Spinoza’s philosophies, the problem of political conflict. The singularity of Spinoza’s affirmationist framework for judgement is identified as its capacity to pose the reflexive question of who the subject of judgement is for the object of judgement in the actual action of judgement. The hypothesis is that this question opens a way for both subject and object of judgement to increase their power to act and think. (shrink)

After a brief presentation of what I believe to be the main features of the modelling démarche in science, I will focus on the basic following question: how can an abstract entity - a model - possibly represent an existing observable entity, which is phenomenally accessible to us, but which is not abstract? This is what Bas van Fraassen calls the loss of reality objection. Instead of proposing a pragmatic dissolution of this objection as van Fraassen does, I will argue (...) that scientific representing necessarily involves a homomorphism between structures and thus that, in a strict technical sense of representation, phenomena are not represented by our models but only as having some specific properties belonging to the domains of our representing structures. Yet, our contact with phenomenal entities is secured by propositions that are true in a correspondence sense. The truth of these - ontic - propositions which state that phenomenal entities possess some precise properties is the soil on which the informative content of our successful representations rest. (shrink)

I argue in the essay that the fourteenth-century logicians William Heytesbury and Albert of Saxony developed an argument I call the Socrates-Minus Argument. Their analysis and rejection of it indicates a direction towards a pragmatic resolution to the contemporary Descartes-Minus Argument. Their resolution is similar to the view adopted today by Peter van Inwagen, namely, that “arbitrary undetached parts of physical objects,” like 'all of Socrates except his finger' simply do not exist. I conclude the fourteenth-century approach does not run (...) afoul of Leibniz's law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals, but utilizes a form of Leibniz's Identity of Indiscernibles that, when combined with a weak “anthropic principle,” yield a pragmatic resolution to the Descartes-Minus Argument. (shrink)

In the beginning, as they say, was the ‘pragmatic maxim’ of Peirce and James. Peirce’s early formulation of the maxim in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” ran as follows: Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object. (Peirce 1878: 132; cf. Bernstein 2010: 2-3; and O’Shea 2008: 208-13) At its core, pragmatism thus (...) originated as a method for... (shrink)

The purpose of the presented paper is to showcase the links between Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s libertarian argumentation ethics and Karl-Otto Apel’s transcendental pragmatics with a special reference to the consensus theory of truth proposed by the latter thinker. More specifically, the author contends that Hoppe’s theory is logically contingent on Apel’s views on truth in that some crucial gaps in Hoppe’s grounding of the so-called “a priori of communication and argumentation” are filled by Apel’s original arguments. Additionally, the paper provides (...) a case for interpreting Hoppe's ethics as a theory of rational conflict-freedom, which seems to cohere best with the transcendental-pragmatist approach. Finally, the author offers a few remarks on how the most common objections against Hoppe's theory can be overcome on the basis of the transcendental pragmatics and the conflict-freedom principle. (shrink)

Many philosophers and medical scientists assume thatdisease categories or entities used to classify concrete cases ofdisease, are often defined by disease mechanisms or causalprocesses. Others suggest that diseases should always be definedin this manner. This paper discusses these standpoints criticallyand concludes that they are untenable, not only when `diseasemechanism' refers to an objective mechanism, but also when`mechanism' refers to a pragmatically demarcated part of thetotal ``objective'' causal structure of diseases. As an alternativeto principles that use the concept of disease mechanism (...) oranalogous concepts, a pragmatic approach is suggested anddescribed. This approach has been suggested before, but inproblematic or inadequate versions. This paper proposes a versioncompiled of two ``pragmatic principles'' and shows that they aremuch more adequate than the principle of disease mechanism. Withreference to a case study of a still ongoing internationaldiscussion of various candidates for a classification system formalignant lymphomas, including REAL (Revised European–AmericanClassification of Lymphoid Neoplasms) in which the concept ofdisease mechanism or analogous concepts plays a very small part,it is shown just how pivotal these two pragmatic principles canbe in actual discussions of definitions of diseases. Finally, itis pointed out that with regard to modern philosophy of languageit may, at least in some cases, be problematic to distinguishbetween the two pragmatic principles as they stand. (shrink)

This essay takes a critical look at Jonathan Berg’s theory of direct belief. Berg’s analysis of the concept of direct belief is considered insightful, but doubts are raised concerning his generalization of the purely extensional truth conditional semantics of direct belief ascription sentences to the truth conditional semantics of all belief ascription sentences. Difficulties are posed that Berg does not discuss, but that are implied by the proposal that the truth conditional semantics of belief ascription sentences generally are those of (...) direct belief ascription sentences, and that once mentioned must enter into an evaluation of the proposition that by implication all beliefs are direct. Another line of objection concerns Berg’s second main thesis that the pragmatics as distinct from the semantics of belief ascription sentences can explain away apparent substitution failure validity breakdowns in belief ascription sentences as inappropriate utterances according to rules of roughly Gricean conversational implicature, rather than correspondence or non-correspondence with the facts about such things as what it is that people actually believe. These two parts of Berg’s argument, that the truth conditional semantics of all belief ascription sentences are those exclusively of direct belief ascription sentences, and that apparent substitution failure is effectively salva propria rather than salva veritate, are explored within the general framework of Berg’s thought experiment, eventually arriving at diametrically opposed conclusions, reflecting on what we believe comic book character Lois Lane believes and does not believe about Superman, and what she believes and does not believe about Clark Kent. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Deleuze, Bergson, Merleau-Ponty: The Logics and Pragmatics of Creation, Affective Life, and Perception by Dorothea E. OlkowskiElodie BoublilOLKOWSKI, Dorothea E. Deleuze, Bergson, Merleau-Ponty: The Logics and Pragmatics of Creation, Affective Life, and Perception. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2021. 180 pp. Cloth, $63.00; paper, $28.00[End Page 152]Dorothea E. Olkowski's latest book carefully examines "the relationship between the creation of ideas and their actualization in relation to semiology, (...) logic and the cosmos in the philosophies of Deleuze, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty." However, this work is neither an extensive or historical account of Deleuze's, Bergson's, and Merleau-Ponty's philosophies, nor an attempt to homogenize their views on space, time, or perception. Instead, it subtly compares their differences and similarities to move beyond metaphysical dualism, and fruitfully rethinks the relations between formal logic and ontology. Indeed, the author aims to draw a "theory of form," based on the logic of sensation, ultimately designed "to take the place of a theory of the real, of material physical forces."Chapter 1 retraces the history of postmodernist claims and their philosophical legacy. Olkowski explains that postmodernism is not first and foremost a political worldview or a debunking of objectivity in natural sciences. Instead, "it begins as a formal system or series of formal systems." Olkowski explores how Deleuze draws on the knowledge of modern science and logic (Bolzano, Cavaillès) and on Bergson's critical analysis of it to elaborate his logic of sensation. Bergson's conception of affectivity impacted Deleuze's and Merleau-Ponty's theories of corporeality and sensation, and their understanding of perception. Bergson's concept of "body image" specifically influenced Deleuze's elaboration of the concept of "movement-image," through which he tried to overcome the dichotomy set up by mind–body dualism.Chapter 2 focuses on Deleuze and Guattari's critique of logic as an attempt to find a third way between idealism and materialism and to overcome the disconnection between formal logic and lived experience. It reviews their critique of Euclidean geometry, their objections to formal logic as set out by Frege and Russell, and their assessment of phenomenology in order to eventually show Deleuze's affinity with Peirce's pragmatist approach. Then, the author aims to determine if Deleuze's attempt could be compatible with the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and Bergson's understanding of quality and multiplicity.Chapter 3 focuses on Bergson. Recalling the controversy with Russell, Einstein, and Langevin, Olkowski refers to Merleau-Ponty's defense of Bergson's concept of intuition to prove the accuracy of his reflection on creative forces and pure duration. As she explains, "[T]he intent here is to clarify the relations between these different aspects of Bergson's thought and draw out how Deleuze makes use of these structures derived from Bergson's philosophy." This leads her to explore, more specifically, how Deleuze reworks the concept of "multiplicity" along the lines of Bergson's analysis of the élan vital.In chapter 4 the author focuses on Deleuze's work on cinema to deepen the philosophical correlation between Bergson's concepts, Deleuze's analysis, and the influences of Merleau-Ponty and Pierce. It aims to rethink the relation between movement and time, notably through the notions of time-image and movement-image. Olkowski notably showcases Deleuze's concept of destiny, "which is the pure power of time that [End Page 153] overflows all possible reaction. It defeats, immobilizes, and petrifies figures in their own affectivity; it sends them to their fate, destroying conventions along the way. For Merleau-Ponty, as for Bergson, acts are still possible in a network of temporal relations so that motion and time are destiny but differently than for Deleuze."Chapter 5 addresses the Phenomenology of Perception and how Merleau-Ponty provides an opportunity to rethink perception. In this book and his Courses on Nature, Merleau-Ponty "does not dismiss either position—that of objective science or that of the natural attitude—but argues that although each contains an element of truth, it is perception and only perception that allows us to bridge the gap between physical reality and behavior/comportment." Deleuze will depart from... (shrink)

This essay argues that to understand Dewey's vision of democracy as “epistemic” requires consideration of how experiential and communal aspects of inquiry together produce what is named here “pragmatic objectivity.” Such pragmatic objectivity provides an alternative to absolutism and self-interested relativism by appealing to certain norms of empirical experimentation. Pragmatic objectivity, it is then argued, can be justified by appeal to Dewey's conception of primary experience. This justification, however, is not without its own complications, which are highlighted with objections regarding (...) “radical pluralism” in political life, and some logical problems that arise due to the supposedly “ineffable” nature of primary experience. The essay concludes by admitting that while Dewey's theory of democracy based on experience cannot answer all of the objections argumentatively, it nevertheless provides potent suggestions for how consensus building can proceed without such philosophical arguments. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's views on mathematics are radically original. He criticizes most of the traditional philosophies of mathematics. His views have been subject to harsh criticisms. In this dissertation, I attempt to defend Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics from two objections: the objectivity objection and the consistency objection. The first claims that Wittgenstein's account of mathematics is not sufficient for the objectivity of mathematics; the second claims that it is only a partial account of mathematics because it cannot explain the semantic properties of (...) mathematical systems. ;The first chapter outlines Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics by stressing the differences and similarities with more traditional accounts. The second chapter discusses the objectivity objection. I distinguish epistemic from non-epistemic objectivity and discuss their relation with the issue of realism and anti-realism. I conclude first that either notion of objectivity is insufficient for disparaging anti-realist accounts of mathematics and, second, that Wittgenstein's account is sufficient for both. The third chapter is a detailed discussion of the consistency objection. Some unsuccessful replies are discussed. In the fourth chapter, I reformulate the objection by means of a rather simple axiomatic system that I call theory T. This allows us to see more clearly why the replies considered before are not successful and, furthermore, which view Wittgenstein is actually required to hold in order to reject the objection. In the fifth chapter, I offer a brief outline of Wittgenstein's account of logic and, finally, show how it provides the required answer to the consistency objection. (shrink)

This study briefly describes the prosodic and pragmatic characteristics of the discourse marker ni zhidao in spoken Chinese. It mainly explores the interaction between its prosody and pragmatics using instrumental methods. It is the first attempt to use acoustic and statistical analysis to examine the prosodic parameters and prosody-pragmatics interaction of a Chinese discourse marker. The corpus includes 71 interview conversations totaling more than 30 h, in which 490 discourse marker tokens of ni zhidao were found. Ni zhidao (...) mainly fulfilled four broad pragmatic functions of initiating a topic when occurring sentence-initially, of holding the floor when appearing within clauses, of marking coherence when making its presence between clauses, and of projecting attitudes and feelings when showing up sentence-finally. Drawing on the algorithm of random forest in R, the acoustic and statistical analysis of the performance of ni zhidao in these four functions showed that its prosodic features, including duration, tempo, pre-pause, post-pause, F0, and intensity, significantly relate to and thus imply its pragmatic functions, that the interaction between its prosody and pragmatics can be modeled statistically, and that the established pragmatics classification model based on prosody can be utilized to predict the pragmatics of ni zhidao. These findings seem to strengthen the hypothesis that prosodic variables play a role in deciphering the different pragmatic functions of ni zhidao. This study uses prosodic evidence to more objectively reveal not only the part of ni zhidao in dynamically constructing and embodying specific contexts but also its communicative functions and the underlying meta-pragmatic awareness behind it. This study breaks through the limitations of traditional discourse marker research, which mainly relies on context and discourse characteristics for subjective reasoning. (shrink)

‘Methods’ and their devices have been conventionally viewed as the means through which the move from world to representation might be reliably performed. An alternative view, perhaps most clearly exemplified by the post-ANT empirical programme of ‘material semiotics’, sees methods and devices as integral to the ways particular ‘realities’ are enacted in practices of inscription and intervention. Drawing upon this latter work, the present paper examines the role of satellite images, GIS and GPS data and devices in the methods utilized (...) in the location, identification and classification of ‘illegal deforestation’ in Brazilian Amazonia. Here we witness how efforts to render ‘deforestation’ into a stable object of knowledge, singular and coordinated, are countered by attempts to render it multiple and irreconcilable as methods and devices become entangled in the conflicts and antagonisms of social life. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAssuming there are fictional objects, what sorts of properties do they have? Intuitively, most of their properties involve being represented—appearing in works of fiction, being depicted as clever, being portrayed by actors, being admired or feared, and so on. But several philosophers, including Saul Kripke, Peter van Inwagen, Kendall Walton, and Amie Thomasson, argue that even if there are fictional objects, they are not really represented in some or all of these cases. I reconstruct four kinds of arguments for this (...) unexpected conclusion; they concern the semantics of names, pragmatic force, creation, and representations’ qualitative content. But I find all the arguments flawed. I then argue for the contrary, employing a new perspective: representation of fictional objects begins with the works of fiction that originate them. A work of fiction represents its “native” objects because our culture bestows that property on it. I sketch conditions for such property bestowal and argue that they are satisfied in this case. (shrink)

Despite the difficulties of establishing the meaning of "idealistic pragmatism," it is certainly a more descriptively accurate characterization of Josiah Royce’s philosophy than the more usual appellation of "absolute idealist." It suggests the American roots of his thought, and his relationships with Peirce and James, which are handled most sensitively in this book, though more briefly than the title might lead one to expect. The main object of the book is to establish the validity of the title, and in (...) this it largely succeeds. Certainly it is a useful endeavor, for Royce’s reputation as an Absolute Idealist has prevented his thought from becoming as widely known as it deserves to be, both for the clarity of his arguments for an idealist metaphysics and for his insights into the meaning of social life. Mahowald follows Oppenheim’s division of Royce’s thought into three periods, which he very carefully established. She then draws out the "pragmatic" aspects of the thought of each period, supplementing the main works with other published and unpublished material. The characteristic attitude of pragmatists is identified as "future orientation" and then Royce is included among them. (shrink)

SummaryThe paper is a critical survey of the semantics and pragmatics of Indexicals. Both the coordinate‐approach due to Lewis and the semantization of pragmatics attempted by Lakoff are shown to be inadequate. Cresswell's more dynamic approach is shown to withstand the objections raised against it. Sophisticated accounts such as a two dimensional tense logic, or a semantics involving pragmatic models and multiple reference models are shown to be necessary to cope with the intricacies of the use of tense (...) in natural language. Benveniste's division of time into physical, chronic and linguistic time is assessed and criticised for missing the phenomenon of tense anaphora. Finally, the problem of the interaction between the utterance's time and the indexicals is analysed. (shrink)

특수주의, 상대주의, 회의주의 그리고 허무주의와 같은 이 시대적 징후들이 우리가 처한 철학적 문제 상황을 극복할 수 있는 유일한 대안을 제공할 수 있다는 주장들이 도처에 만연해 있다. 그 결과 권력과 살인은 의미 있는 것이 되고, 최후 수단으로 주장될 수도 있다. 하지만 기근, 빈곤, 착취, 질병, 기아 등에 대한 대안이 무관심, 이기주의 그리고 냉소주의가 될 수 없는 것처럼, 폭력적이고, 잔혹하며, 파괴적인 행위에 대한 유일한 대안이 폭력, 파괴, 투쟁 그리고 전쟁이 아님을 우리가 원하고 희망해야 한다면 우리는 이런 행동과 행위 그리고 기준과 가치를 비판하고 (...) 그 ‘무근거성’을 증명할 수 있는 절대적인 하나의 해결점을 ‘합리적 · 도덕적’ 근거로부터 찾아야 할 것이다.BR 합리적인 것은 논증하는 것, 즉 논증하는 것의 논리, 인식개념과 진리개념, 인간 사유의 인식능력, 현실적인 것의 인식, 이성 일반을 밝히는 것과 연관해서 필수적이며, 근본적으로 ‘이론적’ 규정이다. 이론적 규정에서 중요한 것은 인식론적이고, 근거지음론적이며 그리고 존재론적인 ‘근거규정’들이다. 이를 철학적으로 해명하는 작업이 곧 ‘철학적 최종근거지음’ 이다.BR 이러한 맥락에서 필자는 철학적 최종근거지음의 증명 문제를 논증하기 위하여 먼저 최종근거지음 증명의 수행 방법을 고찰하고(2), 이어서 최종근거지음 증명을 위해 전제된 범주들과 원리들은 어떤 것이 있는지를 논의한 후에(3) 선험적 객관적 최종근거지음 증명의 가능성을 타진하면서(4) 이 글을 마무리하고자 한다(5). (shrink)

Background Pragmatic randomized controlled trials are designed to evaluate the effectiveness of interventions in real-world clinical conditions. However, these studies raise ethical issues for researchers and regulators. Our objective is to identify a list of key ethical issues in pragmatic RCTs and highlight gaps in the ethics literature. Methods We conducted a scoping review of articles addressing ethical aspects of pragmatic RCTs. After applying the search strategy and eligibility criteria, 36 articles were included and reviewed using content analysis. Results Our (...) review identified four major themes: 1) the research-practice distinction; 2) the need for consent; 3) elements that must be disclosed in the consent process; and 4) appropriate oversight by research ethics committees. 1) Most authors reject the need for a research-practice distinction in pragmatic RCTs. They argue that the distinction rests on the presumptions that research participation offers patients less benefit and greater risk than clinical practice, but neither is true in the case of pragmatic RCTs. 2) Most authors further conclude that pragmatic RCTs may proceed without informed consent or with simplified consent procedures when risks are low and consent is infeasible. 3) Authors who endorse the need for consent assert that information need only be disclosed when research participation poses incremental risks compared to clinical practice. Authors disagree as to whether randomization must be disclosed. 4) Finally, all authors view regulatory oversight as burdensome and a practical impediment to the conduct of pragmatic RCTs, and argue that oversight procedures ought to be streamlined when risks to participants are low. Conclusion The current ethical discussion is framed by the assumption that the function of research oversight is to protect participants from risk. As pragmatic RCTs commonly involve usual care interventions, the risks may be minimal. This leads many to reject the research-practice distinction and question the need for informed consent. But the function of oversight should be understood broadly as protecting the liberty and welfare interest of participants and promoting public trust in research. This understanding, we suggest, will focus discussion on questions about appropriate ethical review for pragmatic RCTs. (shrink)