Mūllā Sadrā sees knowledge as a real relational attribute and, based on the principle of congruity, by recognizing the meaning of human knowledge and purifying it from its shortcomings, he ascribes the very meaning of human knowledge to God. It means that Divine Knowledge as well as human one is a relational attribute and thus, it calls for an object of knowledge; but the difference is that Divine knowledge rejects any kind of imperfection. Given (...) this assertion and a couple of rules such as "the simple in nature is all things", and “The union between the intellect and the intelligible”, he presented his view on divine knowledge by the theory of “concise knowledge along with detailed discovery”. This theory has encountered many drawbacks, including: relationality of the knowledge; lack of explanation for Divine knowledge of non-beings and impossible states of affairs and His Knowledge of details before creating creatures in detailed fashion; acceptance of the union of the knower and the known based on the presential knowledge; believing God to being all things; division of God’s essence into two stages of brief and detailed. In contrast, in “Islamic Hadiths”, the theory of “knowledge without object of knowing” has been proposed. The priority of this theory pertains to rejecting the idea that knowledge is always relational. An important consequence of this view is that knowledge will not necessarily have an object of knowing. This idea could have a vast influence on the debate on Divine knowledge. (shrink)

This paper delves into a pivotal issue of scholastic angelology, the problem of angelic self-knowledge. It compares positions ranging from Thomas Aquinas’s to João Poinsot’s. I stress in particular what I dub ‘the problem of immanent knowledge in presence’, i.e. the problem of the actual, immanent and presential interplay between the angelic intellect and the angelic substance, which Aquinas sees as the rationale for angelic self-knowledge. I then discuss the perspectives of Cajetan and Vázquez, which revolve (...) around the identity between the angelic intellect and the angelic substance, and how they should interact so to enable self-knowledge in the angelic intellect. I finally deal with Poinsot’s account of the problem and its strong rebuttal to Vázquez. Poinsot’s view champions Aquinas’s original doctrine and is grounded upon the notions of “radical intellect” and “intelligible identity”. (shrink)

Tianyi Zhang offers in this study an innovative philosophical reconstruction of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī's (d. 1191) Illuminationism. Commonly portrayed as either a theosophist or an Avicennian in disguise, Suhrawardīappears here as an original and hardheaded philosopher who adopts mysticism only as a tool of philosophical inquiry. Zhang makes use of Plato's cave allegory to explain Suhrawardī's Illuminationist project. Focusing on three areas-the theory of presential knowledge, the ontological discussion of mental considerations, and Light Metaphysics-Zhang convincingly reveals the Nominalist (...) and Existential nature of Illuminationism, and thereby proposes a new way of understanding how Suhrawardī's central philosophical ideas cohere. (shrink)

Past and Present brings together almost two dozen newly collected essays by the distinguished American historian and cultural critic, Gertrude Himmelfarb. Their common theme is the intriguing, often unexpected ways in which the past illuminates the present. The novelist William Faulkner wrote that "The past is never dead. It's not even past." In these essays, Himmelfarb shows the truth of this statement. She helps us find a new perspective on contemporary issues by bringing to bear a trenchant analysis of debates (...) and thinkers of the past. She allows the past to inform the present without distorting either past or present. The essays, unified by the common theme of present and past, are varied. The topics range from the disorders of modern democracy to the challenges of postmodernism, from the Victorian ethos to the Jewish question. The thinkers range from Edmund Burke to Leo Strauss, from Cardinal Newman to Lionel Trilling. The political figures range from Benjamin Disraeli to Winston Churchill, from the American founders to Queen Elizabeth II. The underlying premise and principle of the essays is the conviction that the pursuit of knowledge and truth, however difficult or discomforting, eminently matters, in the "practical life,"as Trilling put it,as in the "moral life."Past and Presentis a notable contribution to this endeavor-to understanding where we have been, where we are now, and where we may be-or should be-going. (shrink)

In the contemporary period of history, so deeply contradictory and in many respects conflict ridden, eschatological themes, predictions of universal catastrophe and the ecological or nuclear destruction of mankind, and other motifs of the end of human history have become unprecedentedly widespread and greatly attractive. Despite the huge stores of scientific knowledge accumulated in the past few decades, many people are being drawn more and more into the stream of mystical monstrous visions and are beginning to connect the end (...) of the second millennium with implausible, obsessive apocalyptic presentiments with regard to the world as a whole as well as to our own Russian history. Soothsayers have appeared who have begun to link the phenomena of disintegration and decline and the destruction of political, ethical, and aesthetic criteria being manifested in our country in one way or another directly with the end of Russian history, with the final act of the Russian historical drama. In the sphere of concrete theoretical and philosophical-sociological knowledge, notions of the limit of historical progress, that history has fundamentally, in its essentials, run its course and that from now on the future will bring nothing essentially new, are being put forward and defended. (shrink)

Riassunto: Neuroeconomia e neuroetica sono settori delle neuroscienze cognitive che studiano i correlati neurali di aspetti distinti, sebbene strettamente interconnessi, del processo decisionale. Mentre la neuroeconomia studia i meccanismi cerebrali che guidano verso la massimizzazione dell’utilità economica personale, la neuroetica integra tali conoscenze con quelle fornite dalle neuroscienze sociali per affrontare domande tipiche dell'etica e della filosofia morale. Gli studi oggi disponibili in questo ambito vengono qui discussi al fine di mettere a confronto l’ipotesi secondo cui le scelte economiche individuali (...) e socio-morali sono supportate da un unico circuito cerebrale con differenti input specifici per dominio rispetto a quella che prevede basi cerebrali specifiche per la scelta in ambito socio-morale. In linea con il primo dei due modelli, i dati presenti in letteratura sembrano confermare l’esistenza di un singolo sistema cerebrale associato ai diversi tipi di scelta, indipendentemente dal contesto decisionale individuale vs. socio-morale. Parole chiave: Decision-making; Neuroeconomia; Neuroetica; Extended Common Currency Schema; Social Valutation Specific Schema From Neuroeconomy to Neuroethics: Towards a Neuroscience of Individual and Socio-Moral Decisions: Neuroeconomics and neuroethics are subfields of cognitive neuroscience that address the neural correlates of distinct, although strongly intertwined, facets of decision-making. While neuroeconomics investigates the neural mechanisms underlying the maximization of personal economic utility, neuroethics integrates such knowledge with that provided by social neurosciences, in order to address typical questions in ethics and moral philosophy. We review the available research to contrast the hypothesis that both individual economic and socio-moral choices rely on a common brain network receiving domain-specific inputs and the claim that a specific brain network underpins choices in a socio-moral context. In line with the former model, currently available evidence supports the existence of a single brain network associated with both choice types, regardless of the economic individual vs. socio-moral decisional context. Keywords : Decision-making; Neuroeconomics; Neuroethics; Extended Common Currency Schema; Social Valutation Specific Schema. (shrink)

The paper depicts the philosophical views of F. Bochwic (1799-1856) which are as follows: ontology, anthropology, epistemology, ethics, and education. The world, according to Bochwic, was created by God (creationism) and is divided into two spheres: spiritual and carnal (ontological dualism). The factor that unites them is man. His purpose, as a free creature, is his tendency to perfection. The sources of human knowledge are the following: unreliable senses and reliable conscience (intuitionism). Conscience is the source of our presentiments (...) with regard to: the existence of God, immortality of the soul, God\'s justice, and moral orders obligatory for all people (axiological absolutism): the order to make good and avoid evil, the order to love oneself and the neighbour, and the order to obey one\'s parents and superiors. The philosophical views of Bochwic lay at the grounds of his educational doctrine. According to it, education should instil civil virtues in adolescents and be versatile, balanced, varied, imitative, kind, and permanent. (shrink)

Avicenna (d. 1037) bequeathed the Arabic philosophical tradition with an aporia : self-knowledge is conceived, at times, in terms of intellection, at other times, in terms of apperception. In his Book of Discussions and Book of Notes, Avicenna has lengthy discussions on apperception, defined as a direct ontological mode of knowledge. Heir to this tradition, Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 1191) moved away from the first conception of self-knowledge as intellection to adopt the second conception of an apperception (...) of the self as a direct, intuitive and "presential (hcombining dot belowudcombining dot belowūrī)" perception, and which he defended with four types of arguments. (shrink)

This brief essay honor the recently deceased American author Cormac McCarthy by interpreting a short scene from one of his screenplays as a modern instance of genuinely tragic understanding. This interpretation is compared on the one hand with a related yet comedic version of tragic knowledge, and on the other hand with the play "Oedipus the King" by Sophocles. The essay argues that fostering the presentiment of such tragic understanding might be a an effective way of motivating people to (...) act to avert climate change. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that there is a notion of 'counterfactual success' which stands to knowledge how as true belief stands to propositional knowledge. (I attempt to avoid the question of whether knowledge how is a type of propositional knowledge.).

Antirealists who hold the knowability thesis, namely that all truths are knowable, have been put on the defensive by the Church-Fitch paradox of knowability. Rejecting the non-factivity of the concept of knowability used in that paradox, Edgington has adopted a factive notion of knowability, according to which only actual truths are knowable. She has used this new notion to reformulate the knowability thesis. The result has been argued to be immune against the Church-Fitch paradox, but it has encountered several other (...) triviality objections. Schlöder in a forthcoming paper defends the general approach taken by Edgington, but amends it to save it in turn from the triviality objections. In this paper I will argue, first, that Schlöder's justification for the factivity of his version of the concept of knowability is vulnerable to criticism, but I will also offer an improved justification that is in the same spirit as his. To the extent that some philosophers are right about our intuitive concept of knowability being a factive one, it is important to explore factive concepts of knowability that are made formally precise. I will subsequently argue that Schlöder's version of the knowability thesis overgenerates knowledge or, in other words, it leads to attributions of knowledge where there is ignorance. This fits a general pattern for the research programme initiated by Edgington. This paper also contains preliminary investigations into the internal and logical structure of lines of inquiries, which raise interesting research questions. (shrink)

A history of colonization inflicts psychological, physical, and structural disadvantages that endure across generations. For an increasing number of Indigenous Australians, environmental epigenetics offers an important explanatory framework that links the social past with the biological present, providing a culturally relevant way of understanding the various intergenerational effects of historical trauma. In this paper, we critically examine the strategic uptake of environmental epigenetics by Indigenous researchers and policy advocates. We focus on the relationship between epigenetic processes and Indigenous views of (...) Country and health—views that locate health not in individual bodies but within relational contexts of Indigenous ontologies that embody interconnected environments of kin/animals/matter/bodies across time and space. This drawing together of Indigenous experience and epigenetic knowledge has strengthened calls for action including state-supported calls for financial reparations. We examine the consequences of this reimagining of disease responsibility in the context of “strategic biological essentialism,” a distinct form of biopolitics that, in this case, incorporates environmental determinism. We conclude that the shaping of the right to protection from biosocial injury is potentially empowering but also has the capacity to conceal forms of governance through claimants’ identification as “damaged,” thus furthering State justification of biopolitical intervention in Indigenous lives. (shrink)

Safety accounts of knowledge claim, roughly, that knowledge that p requires that one's belief that p could not have easily been false. Such accounts have been very popular in recent epistemology. However, one serious problem safety accounts have to confront is to explain why certain lottery‐related beliefs are not knowledge, without excluding obvious instances of inductive knowledge. We argue that the significance of this objection has hitherto been underappreciated by proponents of safety. We discuss Duncan Pritchard's (...) recent solution to the problem and argue that it fails. More importantly, the problem reaches deeper and poses a threat to any current safety accounts that require a belief's modal stability in close possibilities (as well as safety accounts that appeal to ‘normality’). We end by arguing that ways out of the problem require substantial reconstruction for a safety‐based account of knowledge. (shrink)

How do historians, comparative linguists, biblical and textual critics and evolutionary biologists establish beliefs about the past? How do they know the past? This book presents a philosophical analysis of the disciplines that offer scientific knowledge of the past. Using the analytic tools of contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science the book covers such topics as evidence, theory, methodology, explanation, determination and underdetermination, coincidence, contingency and counterfactuals in historiography. Aviezer Tucker's central claim is that historiography as a scientific discipline (...) should be thought of as an effort to explain the evidence of past events. He also emphasizes the similarity between historiographic methodology to Darwinian evolutionary biology. This is an important, fresh approach to historiography and will be read by philosophers, historians and social scientists interested in the methodological foundations of their disciplines. (shrink)

The lottery paradox plays an important role in arguments for various norms of assertion. Why is it that, prior to information on the results of a draw, assertions such as, “My ticket lost,” seem inappropriate? This paper is composed of two projects. First, I articulate a number of problems arising from Timothy Williamson’s analysis of the lottery paradox. Second, I propose a relevant alternatives theory, which I call the Non-Destabilizing Alternatives Theory , that better explains the pathology of asserting lottery (...) propositions, while permitting assertions of what I call fallible propositions such as, “My car is in the driveway.” Le paradoxe de la loterie joue un rôle important dans l’argumentation visant à défendre diverses normes de l’assertion. Comment se fait-il que, avant que les résultats d’un tirage soient connus, des assertions comme «Mon billet a perdu» semblent inappropriées? Cet article se compose de deux projets. Premièrement, je relève certains problèmes issus de l’analyse du paradoxe de la loterie par Timothy Williamson. Deuxièmement, je propose une théorie des alternatives pertinentes que j’appelle la «théorie des alternatives non-déstabilisantes» , et qui explique d’une meilleure façon la pathologie de l’assertion de propositions concernant la loterie, tout en permettant des assertions faillibles, telles que «Ma voiture est dans l’entrée». (shrink)

One of the most provocative projects in recent analytic philosophy has been the development of the doctrine of externalism, or, as it is often called, anti-individualism. While there is no agreement as to whether externalism is true or not, a number of recent investigations have begun to explore the question of what follows if it is true. One of the most interesting of these investigations thus far has been the question of whether externalism has consequences for the doctrine that we (...) have authoritative, a priori self-knowledge of our mental states. The selected works presented in this volume, some previously published, some new, are representative of this debate and open up new questions and issues for philosophical investigation, including the connection between externalism, self-knowledge, epistemic warrant, and memory. (shrink)

We begin by asking what fallibilism about knowledge is, distinguishing several conceptions of fallibilism and giving reason to accept what we call strong epistemic fallibilism, the view that one can know that something is the case even if there remains an epistemic chance, for one, that it is not the case. The task of the paper, then, concerns how best to defend this sort of fallibilism from the objection that it is “mad,” that it licenses absurd claims such as (...) “I know that p but there’s a chance that not p ” and “ p but it there’s a chance that not p .” We argue that the best defense of fallibilism against this objection—a “pragmatist” defense—makes the following claims. First, while knowledge that p is compatible with an epistemic chance that not- p , it is compatible only with an insignificant such chance. Second, the insignificance of the chance that not- p is plausibly understood in terms of the irrelevance of that chance to p ’s serving as a ‘justifier’, for action as well as belief. In other words, if you know that p , then any chance for you that not p doesn’t stand in the way of p ’s being properly put to work as a basis for action and belief. (shrink)

This paper has five theses, which are intended to address the claims in Jerry Fodor's paper. (1) The question arises of the relation between the philosophical theory of concepts and epistemology. Neither is explanatorily prior to the other. Rather, each relies implicitly on distinctions drawn from the other. To explain what makes something knowledge, we need distinctions drawn from the theory of concepts. To explain the attitudes mentioned in a theory of concepts, we need to use the notion of (...) knowledge. (2) Concepts can have a normative dimension without their nature being interpretation‐dependent, and without their nature being mind‐dependent. The normative dimension traces back instead to the role of truth as a constitutive aim of judgement. (3) Conceptual combination is to be explained at the level of reference and semantic value. When we respect this fact, there is no difficulty in explaining compositionality for epistemically‐constrained concepts. (4) Epistemically‐constrained theories of concepts are committed to the applicability of the notion of the a priori. They are not committed to the applicability of the notion of analyticity, where this is construed as truth purely in virtue of meaning or the identity of concepts. (5) Possession of a concept has causal‐explanatory powers, whether given by a possession condition in the form presented in A Study of Concepts, or by possession of an implicit conception. A possession‐condition theory of concepts need not be a form of dispositionalism. (shrink)

In this clear and reasoned discussion of self- knowledge and the self, the author asks whether it is really possible to know ourselves as we really are. He illuminates issues about the nature of self-identity which are of fundamental importance in moral psychology, epistemology and literary criticism. Jopling focuses on the accounts of Stuart Hampshire, Jean-Paul Sartre and Richard Rorty, and dialogical philosophical psychology and illustrates his argument with examples from literature, drama and psychology.

Descartes published his Meditations in First Philosophy in 1641. A French translation from the original Latin, which he saw and approved, followed six years later. The words ‘in First Philosophy’ indicate that the Meditations attack fundamental questions, the chief of them being the nature of knowledge and the nature of man. I shall deal almost entirely with his treatment of the first, the nature of knowledge; even when the two questions become mixed up, as they notoriously do, I (...) shall not encroach on to the second, the nature of man. The Meditations were intended to confirm Descartes' reputation as a philosopher (he was already pre-eminent as a mathematician and a scientist) and, to increase their impact, they were accompanied in their first publication by a series of comments solicited from notable theologians and philosophers together with Descartes' replies. These comments are called the Objections and numbered from one to six, but it is only an accident that there are six Meditations and six Objections. There are six Objections because there are six objectors (that is not quite true, the sixth Objection being a collection of comments from several people) and each Objection ranges over the whole work, although, of course, the different commentators focused upon the parts they found important or questionable. Many of the Objections, particularly those of Arnauld and Gassendi, contain acute and valuable criticisms. Descartes took exception to Gassendi's contribution and wished not to have it published. He maintained that Gassendi quite misunderstood him, but that doesn't seem true. It is true that Gassendi pokes fun at Descartes in addressing him first ‘O Soul’ and later, pretending to realize his mistake, ‘O Mind’, but no doubt the trouble was that Gassendi understood rather too well, fastening upon inconsequentialities in the argument and inconsistencies in the thought and finding, against both, formidable arguments. Inconsequentialities and inconsistencies there are, so much so that the work is a set of parts rested together to give the appearance of a construction, not fitted together really to make one. That did not prevent the Meditations having as great an influence on philosophical thought as any work from the day of its publication to our own, or prevent Descartes' ideas from occupying the minds of philosophers ever since. (shrink)

Realist essentialists face a prima facie challenge in accounting for our knowledge of the essences of things, and in particular, in justifying our engaging in thought experiments to gain such knowledge. In contrast, conferralist essentialism has an attractive story to tell about how we gain knowledge of the essences of things, and how thought experiments are a justified method for gaining such knowledge. The conferralist story is told in this essay.

Sosa (2007) claims that a necessary condition on knowledge is manifesting an epistemic competence. To manifest an epistemic competence, a belief must satisfy two conditions: (1) it must derive from the exercise of a reliable belief-forming disposition in appropriate conditions for its exercise and (2) that exercise of the disposition in those conditions would not issue a false belief in a close possible world. Drawing on recent psychological research, I show that memories that are issued by episodic memory retrieval (...) fail to satisfy either of these conditions. This presents Sosa, and other proponents of similar conditions (e.g. some safety theorists and process reliabilists), with a dilemma: (1) deny that episodic memories count as knowledge or (2) give up the conditions as necessary conditions on knowledge. I explore the implications of this dilemma for our understanding of knowledge, memory and the relationship between them. (shrink)