According to the purist war ethic, the killings committed by soldiers fighting in just wars are permissible, but those committed by unjust combatants are nothing but murders. Jeff McMahan asserts that purism is a direct consequence of the justice-based account of self-defence. I argue that this is incorrect: the justice-based conception entails that in many typical cases, killing unjust combatants is morally unjustified. So real purism is much closer to pacifism than its proponents would like it to be. I (...) conclude that the best explanation of the common view that unjust combatants may be defensively killed relies on a rights-based conception of self-defence. (shrink)

Can a soldier be held responsible for fighting in a war that is illegal or unjust? The chapters in the book both challenge and defend many deeply held assumptions: about the liability of soldiers for crimes of aggression, about the nature and justifiability of terrorism, about the relationship between law and morality.

This article examines soldier performance optimisation, enhancement, and augmentation across the three dimensions of physical performance, cognitive performance, and socio-cultural understanding. Optimisation refers to combatants attaining their maximum biological potential. Enhancement refers to combatants achieving a level of performance beyond their biological potential through drugs, surgical procedures, or even gene editing. Augmentation refers to a blending of organic and biomechatronic body parts such as electronic or mechanical implants, prosthetics, and brain–machine interfaces. This article identifies that soldier optimisation is a necessity (...) to protect individual combatants and to give them the ability to make legal and morally justifiable decisions in battle. While enhancement and augmentation of military personnel can lead to accelerated and more destructive warfare, it can also be argued that there is an ethical and moral responsibility to provide combatants the best opportunity for survivability, and that better functioning, less fatigued, and better informed military personnel can make better decisions in battle. There is also a moral responsibility of the state for the combatants themselves, and short-term military success must be balanced against the short- and long-term health and wellbeing of the personnel. This article concludes that it is both the intent and the degree that decide the acceptability. (shrink)

This article explores the personal responsibility of soldiers for fighting in unjust wars. Its reference point is the position developed by Jeff McMahan in his recent Killing in War. I claim that McMahan fails to give sufficient importance to institutional justifications on this matter. I argue for this by developing what I call the argument to democratic duty, which I claim embodies much current thinking about the obligations of soldiers in a democratic culture. The upshot of my (...) argument is that soldiers are placed in a contradictory position, between personal and institutional obligations. This is one sense in which soldiers can be victimized by the institution of war itself. (shrink)

The article critically analyzes one of the central assumptions of Michael Walzer’s version of just war theory, as presented in his main work devoted to war ethics. As requested by the author of Just and Unjust Wars, the controversial nature of the principle of the moral equality of soldiers is revealed by discussing the actual course of events of a historical military conflict – namely, the outbreak of World War II, one of the main issues dealt with in Walzer’s (...) book. The exclusion of individual responsibility of people involved in a military operation which finds no moral justification seems to entail a number of consequences that put a heavy burden on Walzer’s overall model of military ethics. In order to ensure the necessary level of coherence of just war theory one may need to modify Walzer’s principle of the moral equality of soldiers – at least in relation to the participants of total war. (shrink)

Understanding the effect of stress, fatigue, and sleep deprivation on the ability to maintain an alert and attentive state in an ecologically valid setting is of importance as lapsing attention can, in many safety-critical professions, have devastating consequences. Here we studied the effect of close-quarters battle exercise combined with overnight military training with sleep deprivation on cognitive performance, namely sustained attention and response inhibition. In addition, the effect of the CQ battle and overnight training on cardiac activity [heart rate and (...) root mean square of the successive differences ] during the cognitive testing and the relationship between cardiac activity and cognitive performance were examined. Cognitive performance was measured with the psychomotor vigilance task and the sustained attention to response task. Altogether 45 conscripts participated in the study. The conscripts were divided into control and experimental groups. The CON completed the training day after a night of sleep and the EXP after the overnight military training with no sleep. Results showed that the effect of the overnight training on cognitive performance and the between-group difference in heart rate and heart rate variability depended on the cognitive test. Surprisingly, the cognitive performance was not largely affected by the CQ battle. However, as expected, the CQ battle resulted in a significant decrease in RMSSD and an increase in HR measured during the cognitive testing. Similarly, the HR parameters were related to cognitive performance, but the relationship was found only with the PVT. In conclusion, fatigue due to the overnight training impaired the ability to maintain sufficient alertness level. However, this impairment in arousal upregulation was counteracted by the arousing nature of the SART. Hence, the conscripts' cognitive performance was mainly preserved when performing a stimulating task, despite the fatigue from the sleep loss of the preceding night and physical activity. (shrink)

In his recent JME article Daniel Restrepo argues that both legal and ethical rules should protect the so-called Naked Soldiers, combatants engaged in activity unrelated to military operations and unaware of the imminent danger threatening them. I criticize this position from several angles. I deny the existence of any link between vulnerability and innocence, and claim ignorance of deadly threats does not give rise to a morally distinguished type of vulnerability. I argue that actions not contributing to the war (...) effort are nevertheless an inherent part of fighting a war, and that combatants do not signal intention to abandon their commitment to the war effort by undertaking these. I show that by granting hors de combat status to Naked Soldiers, we would unjustly disadvantage their opponents and engender significant and manifold practical difficulties that the proponents of the view fail to solve or even anticipate. Finally, I demonstrate that Restrepo’s general project of “making killing in war difficult to legitimately justify” regardless of why, how and by whom the killing is done is incompatible with just war theory’s basic assumptions. That project is in fact pacifist in nature and as such redundant in light of pacifism’s broader and stronger implications. (shrink)

The work of the French Lithuanian Jewish philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas, describes a perceptive rethinking of the possibility of concrete acts of goodness in the world, a rethinking never more necessary than now, in the wake of the cruel realities of the twentieth century—ten million dead in the First World War, forty million dead in the Second World War, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, the Soviet gulags, the grand slaughter of Mao’s “Great Leap Forward,” the pointless and gory Vietnam War, the Cambodian self-genocide and (...) many an attempted extermination from the face of the earth of entire nations of indigenous peoples. The list of horrors goes on and on—daily holocausts that do not distinguish between the civilian and the soldier, the guilty and the innocent, those deserving of life and those less deserving. (shrink)

Robert Sparrow (among others) claims that if an autonomous weapon were to commit a war crime, it would cause harm for which no one could reasonably be blamed. Since no one would bear responsibility for the soldier’s share of killing in such cases, he argues that they would necessarily violate the requirements of jus in bello, and should be prohibited by international law. I argue this view is mistaken and that our moral understanding of war is sufficient to determine (...) blame for any wrongful killing done by autonomous weapons. Analyzing moral responsibility for autonomous weapons starts by recognizing that although they are capable of causing moral consequences, they are neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy in the moral sense. As such, their military role is that of a tool, albeit a rather sophisticated one, and responsibility for their use is roughly analogous to that of existing “smart” weapons. There will likely be some difficulty in managing these systems as they become more intelligent and more prone to unpredicted behavior, but the moral notion of shared responsibility and the legal notion of command responsibility are sufficient to locate responsibility for their use. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 127.2 (2006) 305-309 [Access article in PDF] J. E. Lendon. Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005. xii + 468 pp. 10 maps. 31 black-and-white figs. Cloth, $35. Necessity, just as a craft, always causes innovations to prevail, and although for a city at peace fixed norms are best, there is need of much contrivance (...) for those compelled by multiple circumstances to proceed. —Thucydides 1.73.3 War, culture, and change from Homer to Vegetius represent the focus of this work, presaged by the author's study of Caesarian battle narrative (ClAnt 18 [1999]: 273–329) and an interpretive review of some recent works (CJ 99 [2004]: 441–49). The reviewer must confess that his own work inspired much of this book's conceptual and factual content (e.g., 318, 401, 403, 411–12, 414, 415, 426, 432, 434–35) and that he provided Delphic responses (per epistulas electronicas) to a diligent inquirer, although he did not see individual chapters before publication and declined to read a final version of the manuscript. The author's own fertile imagination and vivid style animate these pages. Nestor could only advise Achilles.The work has its own historiographical ghosts. A cultural approach to war is now au courant, as a result of the clash of cultures in the so-called "War on Terror" (e.g., V. D. Hanson, Carnage and Culture [2001]) and Shannon French, The Code of the Warrior [2003], both missing from Lendon's bibliography) and as a reaction to the much imitated but seriously flawed "face-of-battle" approach to military history (e.g., John Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture [2003]; cf. E.L. Wheeler, JRA 11 [1998]: 644–51 and Electrum 5 [2001]: 169–84 for the naïve foibles and excesses of "face-of-battle" studies). Lendon follows what is already a common theme of the cultural approach: culture, rather than technological progress and hardware, shapes the conduct of war.Older specters also lurk in the shadows: Jean-Pierre Vernant's structural anthropological school, which discovered that war happens and has ritualized aspects, warrior codes of conduct, and even rules (e.g., Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne, 1968); and Hans Delbrück (whom Lendon finds "perverse," 394), the progenitor of studying war within the total context of its time and society in his Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte (4 vols., 1920). Delbrück's twin principles of Quellenkritik and Sachkritik, basic analytical tools for detailed work, are not exploited in Lendon's sweeping interpretations.Lendon tiptoes carefully among the briars of previous work: war has rules [End Page 305] and culture shapes warrior ethics. A brilliant prologue (1–4), demonstrating from the Vietnam War how rules and culture continue to affect the American conduct of war, raises false hopes, as the rules-culture-conduct nexus is (regrettably) not pursued. But fancy footwork also escapes (for the most part) the face-of-battle morass: unit cohesion and its emphasis on "buddies" are wisely sidestepped in assessing combat behavior; the high road lies with the psychology of the warrior and the stimulus of competition, now a favorite Anglophone emphasis like initiation rites in the 1970s and transhumance in the 1980s. Unique, however, is that for Lendon culture in ancient warfare provides more than a context: culture is an active agent. In an age of limited technological advancement like Antiquity, change meant recreating the past and, as he argues, looking backward made Greek armies better, but eventually ruined Rome.Lendon attempts a very delicate balancing act. A curious (but not unique) editorial decision conceals the "Author's Note and Acknowledgments" at the end of this work. The note is aimed at the proverbial readership in never-never land (so popular with press editors): both ignorant and "adept" readers. A true confession yields that specialists will find nothing new about What or When; originality lies only with the Why of change. A promise of novelty and... (shrink)

Who bears responsibility for the actions of a city or state? Is it the entity that we sometimes call a nation? Or the individual members of the nation? Shakespeare’s Henry V includes a brief interchange the night before the battle at Agincourt that addresses this question. A disguised king and the common soldiers of his army debate who is responsible for the deaths that will occur during the forthcoming battle if the war they are fighting is unjust: the (...) king or his soldiers? Who will be punished on Judgment Day? The interchange opens up reflections on the challenge of deciding who acts when a state acts. Henry V is a play that emphasizes the role of the imagination as central to both stagecraft and the politics of creating a nation. Engaging with the medieval theory of the “king’s two bodies,” the Henry of Shakespeare’s play is caught between the desire to be the embodiment of the imagined nation and yet be his own “natural person” when questions of responsibility for the actions of the nation emerge. Dependent on the imagination to build a unified nation of diverse peoples, Henry desires to escape responsibility for the potentially unjust actions of the nation by focusing on the private actions of his individual subjects. The play thereby brings questions of responsibility for the actions of collective bodies founded by the imagination to the fore and forces us to explore who is responsible when states or nations act. (shrink)

In his widely influential statement of just war theory, Michael Walzer exempts conscripted soldiers from all responsibility for taking part in war, whether just or unjust (the thesis of the moral equality of soldiers). He endows the overwhelming majority of civilians with almost absolute immunity from military attack on the ground that they aren't responsible for the war their country is waging, whether just or unjust. I argue that Walzer is much too lenient on both soldiers (...) and civilians. Soldiers fighting for a just cause and soldiers fighting for an unjust one are not morally equal. A substantial proportion of civilians in a democracy are responsible, to a significant degree, for their country's unjust war. Moreover, under certain (admittedly rare) circumstances, some of them are legitimate targets of military attack. This has bearing on settling moral accounts in the wake of war and the issue of forgiving the wrongs done in its course: possible candidates for such forgiveness are much more numerous than is usually assumed. (shrink)

The modern soldier is faced with a complex moral and psychological landscape. As Nancy Sherman puts it in The Untold War: Inside the Hearts and Minds of our Soldiers, ‘soldiers go to war to fight external enemies… but most fight inner wars as well.’ The modern soldier is no longer simply a warrior: he is at once a peacekeeper, diplomat, leader, sibling and friend. In the face of such challenges, some responsible for the teaching of soldiers have (...) endeavoured to incorporate a character-based training programme, designed to develop virtues that will assist soldiers in fulfilling the multiple roles required of them. However, these training programmes are stymied by the dearth of virtue-based discussion within the most influential guide to the moral conduct of soldiers: just war theory . JWT remains a primarily deontic system in which rights, duties and law are generally perceived as the most important considerations. Aretaic ethics has a great deal to offer both JWT and military education progra.. (shrink)

Child soldiers, who often appear to be both victims and perpetrators, present a vexing moral and legal challenge: how can we protect the rights of children while seeking justice for the victims of war crimes? There has been little stomach, either in domestic or international courts, for prosecuting child soldiers—but neither has this challenge been systematically addressed in international law. Establishing a uniform minimum age of criminal responsibility would be a major step in the right direction; we (...) argue that such a standard ought to be guided by the best evidence from neuropsychology about the development, during childhood and adolescence, of the executive functions that give rise to morally and legally responsible agents. In light of that evidence, which suggests that the brain’s executive functions are still maturing into early adulthood, we recommend a graded structure of culpability for child soldiers. (shrink)

Because wars are fought by human beings and not merely machines, a strong virtue ethic is an essential prerequisite for those engaged in combat. From a philosophical perspective, war has historically been seen as separate and outside of the commonly accepted forms of morality. Yet there remains a general, though not well-thought out, sense that those human beings who fight wars should act ethically. Since warfighters are often called upon to contemplate and complete tasks during war that are not normally (...) required of non-warfighters (civilians), and it is believed these warfighters should act ethically, it becomes necessary to ask: What does soldierly virtue look like? In order to answer this question, I will examine essential elements of moral responsibility and military authority. Once complete, I will propose an Aristotelian-based virtue ethics system, one that is equally valuable to warfighter and civilian. To do this, I will examine the conversation in academia regarding virtue ethics and the foundations of virtue. I will provide both a cursory and deep reading of elements of Aristotle’s conception of virtue, but ultimately I will provide a slightly more rigorous reading and reinterpretation of an Aristotelian-based virtue ethic, with a definitive final recommendation for this interpretation being best for everyone, in war or walking down the street. Upon completing a study of this work, one will walk away with a next-generation interpretation of Aristotelian-based Virtue Ethics that denies eudaimonia as the central principle, relying instead on phronesis as its central theme. Phronesis, when properly developed in the warfighter will lead to moral responsibility, better decision-making, and a seamless re-integration into civilian life once has returned from the horrors of war. (shrink)

The use of child soldiers in armed conflict is an increasing global concern. Although philosophers have examined whether child soldiers can be considered combatants in war, much less attention has been paid to their moral responsibility. While it is tempting to think of them as having diminished or limited responsibility, child soldiers often report feeling guilt for the wrongs they commit. Here I argue that their feelings of guilt are both intelligible and morally appropriate. The (...) feelings of guilt that child soldiers experience are not self-censure; rather their guilt arises from their attempts to come to terms with what they see as their own morally ambiguous motives. Their guilt is appropriate because it reaffirms their commitment to morality and facilitates their self-forgiveness. (shrink)

Traditional just war doctrine holds that political leaders are morally responsible for the decision to initiate war, while individual soldiers should be judged solely by their conduct in war. According to this view, soldiers fighting in an unjust war of aggression and soldiers on the opposing side seeking to defend their country are morally equal as long as each obeys the rules of combat. Revisionist scholars, however, maintain that soldiers who fight for an unjust cause bear (...) at least some responsibility for advancing an immoral end, even if they otherwise fight ethically. This article examines the attitudes of the American public regarding the moral equality of combatants. Utilizing an original survey experiment, we find that the public's moral reasoning is generally more consistent with that of the revisionists than with traditional just war theory. Americans in our study judged soldiers who participate in unjust wars as less ethical than soldiers in just wars, even when their battlefield conduct is identical, and a large proportion supported harsh punishments for soldiers simply for participating in unjust wars. We also find, however, that much of the American public is willing to extend the moral license of just cause significantly further than revisionist scholars advocate: half of the Americans in our survey were willing to allow an unambiguous war crime—a massacre of innocent women and children—to go unpunished when the act was committed by soldiers fighting for a just cause. Our findings suggest that incorporation of revisionist principles into the laws of war would reinforce dangerous moral intuitions encouraging the killing of civilians. (shrink)

Dealing with soldier enhancement can be challenging for military physicians. As research on the ethics of soldier enhancement is mostly theoretical, this study aims to gain insights into the actual moral issues military physicians encounter, or expect to encounter. To that end, we carried out a qualitative study involving six focus groups of Dutch military physicians (n = 28) in operational roles. The participants voiced their concerns about moral issues concerning soldier enhancement. Based on the group discussions, and using inductive (...) thematic analysis, we ascertained three major themes: (1) Doing no harm in soldier enhancement: uncertainty and high stakes; (2) Dependency relationships and conflicting moral responsibilities; and (3) The risk of ethical slippery slopes. Our findings illustrate that dealing with these moral responsibilities requires considerable skill and acuity to weigh up for all the situated complexities and dependency relationships that go beyond abstract rules or moral principles. A care-ethical approach that acknowledges the contextual and relational aspects of moral complexities along with peer consultation and joint reflective dialogue on moral issues can help military physicians deal with soldier enhancement responsibly. (shrink)

In this paper I will analyze several cases from the American Civil War, the two World Wars and the American Vietnam War, and contemporary research in enhancement substance, to determine how drug use can be analyzed and understood in both physical and moral (ethical) terms. This will require a discussion of drug use at different levels. First, I will address the consequences of drug use for the physical and mental sanity of soldiers, during and after wartime, irrespective of the (...) reason for drug use. Second, I will look into the moral questions related to drug use for the enhancement of soldiers, that is, as a method for modern warfare. The moral dimension has at least two different angles: (i) the moral responsibility of superiors administering drugs to their inferiors who are exposed to the rule of full obedience, and (ii) the ethical consequences of enhancement for moral judgment by soldiers in the gray zone between acts of war and war crimes (the difference between the Super soldier and the Killing machine). (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper discusses soldiers’ moral responsibility in today’s complex conflicts. The point of departure is the increased focus on soldiers as moral decision-makers in war, illustrated by the introduction of core values in the Norwegian Armed Forces. Responsibility is one of these core values, but it is not clear exactly how we should understand responsibility. I use a case where a group of Norwegian soldiers in the International Security Assistance Force sought the cooperation of (...) a group of mujahedeen to solve the military mission of establishing security. As confidence between the parties grew, the soldiers became horrified witnesses to a practice of bacha bazi, where a young boy is dressed up for entertainment and sexual abuse. This situation gives reason to question the limits of role responsibility, the status of soldiers’ legitimacy, and the challenges of making morally sound judgments in a multicultural context. The discussion demonstrates that, even if there are restrictions on the... (shrink)

Just war theory has traditionally presupposed what Michael Walzer calls the moral equality of soldiers: that combatants on all sides have an equal right to kill, such that the soldier is not blameworthy for fighting for an unjust cause. The theory of moral equality has come under increasing attack by Jeff McMahan and others who argue that soldiers are responsible for killing for an unjust cause. I agree with McMahan that soldiers cannot be justified in serving injustice, (...) such that there is no full moral equality. Moreover, the common excuses of ignorance and duress cannot exculpate many soldiers. However, I argue that when one considers the force of legal authority and the bonds of patriotism, combined with ignorance and duress, most soldiers are excused. Because of the rarity of exceptions and the consequences of holding soldiers accountable, I conclude that we should presuppose the equal blamelessness of combatants. (shrink)

During the Italian campaigns of the French Revolutionary Wars (1796–1801), several epidemic outbreaks sparked acrimonious aetiological debates: were the fevers spread by soldiers and prisoners of war, or produced by environmental factors? This debate was not only a scientific issue, but also a political one, for causation was linked to accountability. Looking at a series of medical investigations written by French military practitioners, this paper argues that theories of contagion were used by civilians to accuse the army of spreading (...) disease, in what I describe as an “aetiology of blame.” Likewise, military officials attempted to absolve themselves of responsibility for the spread of disease by focusing on unwholesome environments, depicting diseases as unavoidable fatalities. Military doctors thus supported French imperial endeavours by obscuring the army's responsibility for the spread of diseases, putting forward aetiologies of fate and blaming individual behaviour. Even when they did not radically dismiss contagionist perspectives, military practitioners insisted on a wide range of pathogenic causes. Their discourses were in line with medical theories of the time, but they downplayed the responsibility of the army for the spread of diseases, which they depicted as a factor among others. Military doctors were thus not always involved in the direct and deliberate production of ignorance, but they did sustain controversies and uncertainty. (shrink)

Medical rules of eligibility permit severely injured Iraqi and Afghan nationals to receive care in Coalition medical facilities only if bed space is available and their injuries result directly from Coalition fire. The first rule favors Coalition soldiers over host-nation nationals and contradicts the principle of impartial, needs-based medical care. To justify preferential care for compatriots, wartime medicine invokes associative obligations of care that favor friends, family, and comrades-in-arms. Associative obligations have little place in peacetime medical care but significantly (...) affect wartime medicine. The second rule suggests liability for collateral harm that is unsupported by international law and military ethics. Absent liability, there are pragmatic reasons to offer medical care to injured local civilians if it quells resentment and cements support for Coalition forces. In contrast to peacetime medicine, military necessity and associative obligations outweigh distributive principles based on medical need during war. (shrink)

Although the European Union is today largely understood as the guarantor of peace and prosperity on the continent, a continued but neglected aspect of discourses of European integration has been military integration. The idea of a European army appealed in particular to West-German military elites. European military integration, they understood in part as a pragmatic response to technological and geopolitical developments. But they also sought to conceive of a way to safeguard both the West-German state and the Christian Occident from (...) Bolshevik invasion. The solution was a European soldier, who embodied a set of masculine, Christian values. Such an image was a result of experiences gathered on the Eastern Front during the Second World War, which continued to shape the West-German military elite’s thinking about European integration into the late 1960s. (shrink)

We have always been conscious of the wait for life-changing messages, whether it be the time it takes to receive a text message from your love, for a soldier's family to learn news from the front, or for a space probe to deliver data from the far reaches of the solar system. In this book in praise of wait times, award-winning author Jason Farman passionately argues that the delay between call and answer has always been an important part of the (...) message. Traveling backward from our current era of Twitter and texts, Farman shows how societies have worked to eliminate waiting in communication and how they have interpreted those times' meanings. Exploring seven eras and objects of waiting--including pneumatic mail tubes in New York, Elizabethan wax seals, and Aboriginal Australian message sticks--Farman offers a new mindset for waiting. In a rebuttal to the demand for instant communication, Farman makes a powerful case for why good things can come to those who wait. (shrink)

Child soldiers are generally perceived as faultless, passive victims. This ignores that the roles of child soldiers vary, from innocent abductee to wilful perpetrator. This book argues that child soldiers should be judged on their actions and that treating them like a homogenous group prevents them from taking responsibility for their acts.

Military ethics education programmes must prepare soldiers and other military personnel to carry out their duties responsibly, honourably and, above all, ethically. But the practical, moral, and ethical reasoning employed by soldiers in their professional activities—what I call ‘military ethical thinking’—is deeply challenging. The successful interpretation and application of principles and other demands of military ethical thinking presupposes more fundamental commitments that serve as its grounding. But whether soldiers address questions of grounding in their training and education (...) tends to depend upon their rank and role. The ethics education provided to senior officers, junior officers, NCOs, enlisted soldiers, new recruits, or conscripts varies greatly. Nonetheless, to facilitate coordination and cooperation across ranks and roles, there must be an overall unity and coherence to an ethics education programme. This paper asks which ethical approaches are best suited as grounds of military ethical thinking and education. According to a widely held view, the militaries of many democratic states are committed to ‘hybrid approaches’ to military ethical thinking and education. Here I argue that while hybrid decision-making procedures are valuable tools for soldiers facing ethically challenging situations, hybrid approaches cannot play the fundamental grounding role. Instead, I make a case for grounding military ethics education in a non-reductive virtue ethics which is based around the concept of ‘the good soldier’ and which is able to meet objections commonly put to virtue-based approaches. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has posed significant burden across different industrial sectors. Generally, an increase in psychological stress experiences has been reported, while the stress and coping responses of specific, potentially burdened populations have received less attention thus far. Thus, the present study investigated relations between individual and organizational factors, indicators of psychological health, and possible mediating effects of four broad coping dimensions in a specific sample of soldier students who engage in a double-role being military affiliates and students of non-military (...) subjects. To this end, we assessed data of soldier students at two measurement points shortly after the second national lockdown in Germany during the COVID-19 pandemic. Personality traits showed expected associations with indicators of psychological health, i.e., positive relations between neuroticism and social loneliness, between extraversion and COVID-19 stress, and negative relations between neuroticism and life satisfaction. Remarkably, organizational variables showed effects above and beyond personality traits on loneliness and life satisfaction. Neither individual, nor organizational factors could predict change in psychological health over time. We found evidence for mediation effects through active coping, avoidant coping, and the use of social support, but not through positive cognitive restructuring. Findings highlight the relative importance of organizational factors besides personality traits for psychological health in a military student sample, holding important implications for designing efficient support systems in the military. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Response to David Carr, “The Significance of Music for the Promotion of Moral and Spiritual Value”Iris M. YobDavid Carr has addressed a question that has been lurking in philosophical literature for centuries and, I might add, in our collective intuition as well: Just what is the connection between music and the moral and spiritual life? And as we have come to expect from his work, he brings a (...) new perspective to this perennial question in his answer. First he traces a line of thinking since Plato about music and the ordering of the soul, he touches on the role of music and the other arts in exploring the complexities of the moral imperative as it is lived out in human lives, and returns at the end to give a new take on the old Platonic idea of ordering of the soul. Just maybe, he suggests, the detachment, however temporary, "from the trials and tribulations that beset us in the day to day rough and tumble of human practical affairs" "in the interests of some more balanced perspective" on spiritual and moral matters "might be easier to achieve in the contemplation and appreciation of great works of 'music alone.'"This conclusion does not lay claim to more than what is perfectly reasonable. Allowing oneself to be immersed in a great work of music or art or architecture or dance may very well provide that distance from every day life where one might [End Page 209] re-center and refocus, refresh and renew one's outlook on the world. Such an engagement with an artwork can interrupt the patterns of thinking and acting that might have become increasingly thoughtless and ego-centric. It can be a re-creation in the true sense of the word. Paul Tillich, one of the great twentieth century religious philosophers, tells of an experience he had during the First World War where he served as a chaplain in the German army. On a brief leave from the front he visited Kaiser Friedrich Museum in Berlin and stood entranced before Botticelli's "Madonna and Child with Singing Angels." The moment was spiritually transformative, he tells us, lifting his spirits beyond the mud and grime of the battlefield to contemplate life and meaning on a different plane altogether. The experience enabled him to return to duty with renewed inner strength and calm.1 I believe this is a rather powerful and compelling example of what Carr is talking about.In coming to his conclusion, Carr is relying on the particularly difficult case of "music alone," that is, music that does not have words, title, or any other kind of representative function. In other words his argument does not depend on any didactic nature or morally or spiritually directive intent of the music. Rather, it is centered on music that ostensibly is not about anything. This is musical sound composed and performed for the appreciation of what it is in itself. And yet, in providing distance from the every day world, according to Carr, it can give expression to "realms of spiritual experience that lie beyond the sensual and empirical." Here we enter the world of the metaphorical and symbolic, what Rudolf Otto would call the "irrational" or "superrational," or the realm of the Holy. While Carr does not state this explicitly I would go so far as to say that this realm of the wordless and sacred is where the spiritual and the moral are grounded and from where they draw their power.Against this background, I would like to ask how does "music alone," in the sense intended by Carr and Peter Kivy from whom he borrowed the term bring about this effect? We are unable now to ask Tillich what it was that gave the Botticelli its impact for him, but it is curious that what it did for him it most likely did not do for all the other soldiers from the front who happened upon it the way he did. Tillich would most likely explain its effect by resorting to his theory of symbols, because after all this painting does have a literal meaning that might very well have inspired him. But... (shrink)

It is a truism that, due to human weaknesses, human soldiers have yet to have sufficiently ethical warfare. It is arguable that the likelihood of human soldiers to breach the Principle of Non-Combatant Immunity, for example, is higher in contrast tosmart soldierswho are emotionally inept. Hence, this paper examines the possibility that the integration of ethics into smart soldiers will help address moral challenges in modern warfare. The approach is to develop and employ smart soldiers that (...) are enhanced with ethical capabilities. Advocates of this approach think that it is more realistic to make competent entities (i.e., smart soldiers) become morally responsible than to enforce moral responsibility on human soldiers with inherent (moral) limitations. This view somewhat seeks a radical transition from the usual anthropocentric warfare to arobocentricwarfare with the belief that the transition has moral advantages. However, the paper defends the claim that despite human limitations, the capacity ofethically enhanced smart soldiersfor moral sensitivity is artificial and unauthentic. There are significant problems with the three models of programming ethics into smart soldiers. Also, there are further challenges from the absence of emotion as a moral gauge, and the problems of apportioning responsibility in case of mishap from the actions or omissions of smart soldiers. Among other reasons, the paper takes the replacement of human soldiers as an extreme approach towards an ethical warfare. This replacement predicates ethical complications that outweigh the benefits from the exclusive use of smart soldiers. (shrink)

Intuition has increasingly been considered as a legitimate foundation for decision-making, and the concept has started to find its way into military doctrines as a supplement to traditional decision-making procedures, primarily in time-constrained situations. Yet, absent inside the military realm is a critical and level-headed discussion of the ethical implications of intuitive behaviour, understood as an immediate and situational response with no recourse to thoughtful or deliberate activity. In this article the author turns to phenomenological philosophy, and in particular to (...) the works of Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus, to elaborate on the ethical implications and consequences of intuitive behaviour. Dreyfus and Dreyfus understand moral behaviour as a skill, and as such they claim that it is possible to develop this capability through practice. They even claim that intuitive behaviour is the hallmark of the way experts respond to situations. The article seeks to investigate if the prerequisites for development of experience-based intuition are fulfilled inside the frames of military operations. The possible implications and consequences of utilizing such a capability are also emphasized. The article's empirical materials are qualitative and build mainly upon extracted information from interviews and informal conversations with Norwegian soldiers and officers serving in Afghanistan under ISAF's Regional Command North in 2007 and 2008. (shrink)

A question opens up a space between self and other in the very act of expecting a response. As such, it can be a form of world-building. Posing a question might reveal what is or it might push interlocutors to revise what is. Levinas counsels us to question the first attitude toward questioning in order to open ourselves up to the second. Using questions and answers from a trial of a former child soldier at the International Criminal Court, this paper (...) explores the ethical ramifications of the choices we make when we pose and respond to questions. (shrink)

I shall argue that in some wars both sides are (as a collective) justified, that is, they can both satisfy valid jus ad bellum requirements. Moreover, in some wars – but not in all – the individual soldiers on the unjustified side (that is, on the side without jus ad bellum) may nevertheless kill soldiers (and also civilians as a side-effect) on the justified side, even if the enemy soldiers always abide by jus in bello constraints. Traditional (...) just war theory and self-proclaimed “revisionist” just war theory think otherwise since the former focuses on the law enforcement or public authority justification for inflicting harm and the latter on the self-defense justification. These are both intrinsically asymmetrical justifications: there is no justified self-defense (properly understood) against justified self-defense, nor is there justified law-enforcement against justified law-enforcement. However, there can, as I will show, be justified self-defense against force that is justified by a necessity justification, and there can be force justified by a necessity justification being used against force that is also justified by a necessity justification. The necessity justification is not intrinsically asymmetrical, and it is an indispensable justification in the context of war. Moreover, with regard to some forms of inflicting harm on others one may give special weight to one’s own interests and the interests of those to whom one has special responsibilities when assessing the proportionality of those acts. That is, the proportionality calculation may be agent-relative. This is in particular so in the case of foreseeably preventing innocent and non-threatening people from being saved (for instance, by shooting down a tactical bomber who would have saved them by destroying an ammunitions factory) but less so in the case of the intentional or foreseeable direct harming of innocent and non-threatening people (dropping bombs on people standing near an ammunitions factory). In the light of these considerations, I will then answer the question as to when soldiers may justifiably participate in war (and when not). (shrink)

The principle of absolute sovereignty may have been consigned to history, but a strong presumption against foreign intervention seems to have been left in its stead. On the dominant view, only massacre and ethnic cleansing justify armed intervention, these harms must be already occurring or imminent, and the prudential constraints on war must be satisfied. Each of these conditions has recently come under pressure. Those looking to defend the dominant view have typically done so by invoking international peace and stability, (...) or the value of communal self-determination. But the internal aspect of legitimacy has been overlooked in all of this. If a government insists on defending the human rights of foreigners, it must also be sure not to violate the rights of its own citizens in the process. I argue that the current presumption against humanitarian intervention cannot be substantially relaxed for internal reasons, or given the obligations that states owe to their own constituents. (shrink)

Developments in neurotechnology took a leap forward with the demonstration of the first Brain to Brain Interface (BBI). BBIs enable direct communication between two brains via a Brain Computer Interface (BCI) and bypasses the peripheral nervous system. This discovery promises new possibilities for future battlefield technology. As battlefield technology evolves, it is more likely to place greater demands on future soldiers. Future soldiers are more likely to process large amounts of data derived from an extensive networks of humans (...) and machines. This raises several ethical and philosophical concerns. This paper will look at BBI technology in current stages of research, future BBI applications in the military and how the potential use of BBIs in military operations challenges the way we understand the concept of responsibility. In this paper, I propose that an individual connected to a BBI ought not to be held fully responsible for her actions. The justification for this proposition is based on three key points such as an individual connected to a BBI does not have the ability to act freely, has a diminished sense of self-agency and may not be able to demonstrate authenticity of the thoughts and memories generated when connected to the interface. (shrink)

This article furnishes a philosophical background for the current debate about responsibility and culpability for war crimes by referring to ideas from three important just war thinkers: Augustine, Francisco de Vitoria, and Michael Walzer. It combines lessons from these three thinkers with perspectives on current problems in the ethics of war, distinguishes between legal culpability, moral culpability, and moral responsibility, and stresses that even lower-ranking soldiers must in many cases assume moral responsibility for their acts, even (...) though they are part of a military hierarchy and act under orders. The questions addressed in this article are arguably among the hardest and most muddled in military ethics and deserve close philosophical analysis and scrutiny. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Tragic Evolutionary Logic of The IliadBrian BoydThe Rape of Troy: Evolution, Violence, and the World of Homer, by Jonathan Gottschall; xii & 223 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, $32.00 paperback.Jonathan Gottschall has conquered the oldest and craggiest peak of Western literature, The Iliad, by a new face. He stakes out the Darwin route to Homer so directly and clearly that he makes the climb inviting and inspiring (...) even to curious newcomers without high-altitude evolutionary training. And the vista he opens up offers us a chance to look in multiple directions: at Homer, at literary evolutionism and its possibilities, and at Gottschall's role in exploring this new route to discovery.One previous monograph has investigated a single literary work from a Darwinian viewpoint: Brett Cooke's analysis of Evgeny Zamyatin's 1921 science-fiction classic, We.1 Cooke's Human Nature in Utopia, by showing how Zamyatin appeals to the evolved nature of readers, in the face of the denial of human nature in his imagined One State and in early Soviet Communism, deepens our natural response to a modern classic. But where Cooke merely succeeds, Gottschall triumphs. The Rape of Troy not only deepens our response to a classic discussed for almost three millennia but also explains the world of Homer in a way no one could have seen without the multi-million-year perspective evolution allows—and does so with conceptual clarity, tight argument, effortless imagery, and copious verbal energy. [End Page 234]Gottschall emphasizes that his "evolutionary anthropology of conflict in Homeric society" does not attempt a Homeric "theory of everything" (pp. 3, 9). There is much of interest in The Iliad he does not touch on, and much even in possible evolutionary approaches to Homer that he does not consider. He focuses intently on a single two-part question: Why is there so much violence in the Iliad, and what effect does it have on how those in Homeric society see their world?After a brilliant introductory overview, he shows in his first two chapters how over the last century Homerists have increasingly turned to comparative anthropology to augment the meagre direct data. They have clarified that the Iliad was long obscured by later Western assumptions about states and kings, and that the poem probably reflects something like Homer's own world, within (at about 800 BCE) the late Greek Dark Age, a pre-state society in many ways closer to Highland New Guinea than to the worlds of Caesar or Charlemagne.Everyone who knows about the Trojan War knows that the Greeks fight Troy because the Trojan prince Paris took Helen from her husband, the Greek lord Menelaus. But readers of the Iliad want to know why thousands of soldiers on both sides persisted through ten years of brutal battle. Surely war on this scale cannot have been over just a woman? Scholars have proposed many explanations of what was really at stake. Immortal honor for men all too aware, day after bloody day, of their own physical mortality? Power? Status? Material goods? Prestige goods? A chance to neutralize enemies?By drawing on evolutionary biology and anthropology, Gottschall can show that this war, like most human violence against other humans, and even like most intraspecies animal violence, stems ultimately from male competition over females. He introduces the powerful and far-reaching principle of differential parental investment developed by Robert Trivers.2 As Gottschall lucidly elaborates: "males will attempt to mate more promiscuously both because sex is cheaper for them, and because they have the potential to produce many offspring with multiple females. I emphasize the words 'attempt' and 'potential' because if every male adopts a relatively promiscuous strategy, and if some males succeed, then other males will not reproduce at all" (p. 44). The far more divergent rates of reproductive success among males than among females prove to be the key determinant. Gottschall sums up: "males typically face higher risks of total reproductive failure and higher hopes of extraordinary reproductive success. This creates strong incentives to compete for mates. Males who are better able to compete for access to [End Page 235] scarce female reproductive capacity, in whatever form... (shrink)

Revisionist just war theorists maintain that, soldiers, and not merely their leaders or superiors, bear moral responsibility for objectively wrongful harms imposed in pursuit of an unjust war. The conviction that underlies revisionism is that a person's responsibility for her intentional, objectively unjustified, killing is non-transferable. In this essay I aim to elaborate a specific counterexample to this general claim. I will argue that in cases that I characterize as "special authority cases", the moral responsibility for (...) the unintended outcomes that a person brings about because of following the orders of a legitimate authority is transferred to the authority. (shrink)

Roman Catholic teaching holds both that wars must conform to certain criteria in order to be considered morally justifiable, and that individuals are accountable for the moral content of their actions. Are Catholics serving in the armed forces therefore required to refuse to serve in unjust wars? Are they entitled--or obligated--to defer to the judgments of others as to whether a war is just? If so, whose judgment? I suggest that there are exceptional characteristics of military service that may factor (...) in the formation of conscience as it is described in Catholic teaching. Specifically, just as the Church sees the indispensable role of the armed forces in protecting society as reconciling the use of force with the Catholic injunction to seek peace, so too may the indispensable role of obedience and deference to authority in the armed forces--while never supplanting the responsibilities of individual discernment--reconcile fighting in an unjust war with the obligations of conscience. (shrink)

In this article, I contribute to the debate between two philosophical traditions—the Kantian and the Aristotelian—on the requirements of criminal responsibility and the grounds for excuse by taking this debate to a new context: international criminal law. After laying out broadly Kantian and Aristotelian conceptions of criminal responsibility, I defend a quasi-Aristotelian conception, which affords a central role to moral development, and especially to the development of moral perception, for international criminal law. I show than an implication of (...) this view is that persons who are substantially and non-culpably limited in their capacity for ordinary moral perception warrant an excuse for engaging in unlawful conduct. I identify a particular set of conditions that trigger this excuse, and then I systematically examine it as applied to the controversial case of former-child-soldier-turned leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army, Dominic Ongwen, who is currently at trial at the International Criminal Court. (shrink)

Liability, proportionality, and the number of aggressors -- The lesser evil obligation -- Human rights, proportionality, and the lives of soldiers -- Resolving the responsibility dilemma -- Duress and duty -- Can states be corporately liable to attack in war? -- Targeting Al Qaeda: law and morality in the us war on terror -- Adil Ahmad Haque -- Double effect and the laws of war -- Beyond the paradigm of self-defense? on revolutionary violence -- War's endings and the (...) structure of just war theory -- Moral recovery after war: the role of hope. (shrink)

This essay addresses one of the central questions in the ongoing debate about just war theory: are soldiers morally responsible for serving in unjust wars? Francisco de Vitoria addressed this question in the sixteenth century using the concepts of invincible and vincible ignorance. He excused soldiers serving in unjust wars, if they did not know the war was unjust and if they did not have the means to overcome their ignorance; if they had the means, they were morally (...) culpable. In modern just war theory, ignorance is still used both to blame and excuse military service in unjust wars. This essay identifies ten different ways that scholars have used ignorance to argue about the moral responsibilities of soldiers. It then applies the different meanings of ignorance to soldiers serving in Western nations and, using Vitoria’s means tests, evaluates if modern soldiers do indeed have the means to overcome their ignorance. Since many soldiers do have the means, invincible ignorance should no longer be used as an excuse for their service in unjust wars; furthermore, soldiers may, in fact, be morally culpable for serving in them. (shrink)

This chapter argues that military action against an aggressive state may be justified as a form of law enforcement rather than self-defence. The establishment of something like a minimal universal state is needed for such a justification to be effective. It is also argued that the justification of any form of military action requires a moral explanation of why the soldiers against whom one fights are appropriate objects of violence.

Dynamic intra-individual variability (IIV) in cardiac vagal control across multiple situations is believed to contribute to adaptive cognition under stress; however, a dearth of research has empirically tested this notion. To this end, we examined 25 U.S. Army Soldiers (all male, Mean Age= 30.73, SD = 7.71) whose high-frequency heart rate variability (HF-HRV) was measured during a resting baseline and during three conditions of a shooting task (training, low stress, high stress). Response inhibition was measured as the correct rejection (...) of friendly targets during the low and high stress conditions. We tested the association between the standard deviation of HF-HRV across all four task conditions (IIV in vagal control) and changes in response inhibition between low and high stress. Greater differences in vagal control between conditions (larger IIV) were associated with higher tonic vagal control during rest, and stronger stress-related decreases in response inhibition. These results suggest that flexibility in vagal control is supported by tonic vagal control, but this flexibility also uniquely relates to adaptive cognition under stress. Findings are consistent with neurobehavioral and dynamical systems theories of vagal function. (shrink)

This paper considers how the United States does (and can better) ensure that members of the military accept moral responsibility for actions they perform in hostile and non-hostile situations. While the military education system offers soldiers a step-by-step approach to making ethical decisions, it is argued that this teaching is overly simplified as it fails to give enough guidance on how to choose an action that will best serve the nation. In addition to being able to recognize moral (...) dilemmas, the paper contends that understanding the basic principles behind Aristotle’s views on virtue ethics, Kant’s ideology concerning respect for persons, or Mill’s theory of utilitarianism could improve how soldiers go about making ethical decisions. (shrink)