Abstract Schlick quite clearly maintains that the shift from classical physics to the theories of relativity is not necessitated by experience, but motivated by the pragmatic payoff of simplifying space-time ontology. However, there is in his work another, heretofore unrecognized argument for the revolutionary shift from classical to relativistic physics. According to this conceptual line of argument, the principles that define simultaneity and motion in classical physics fail to establish a univocal correspondence to physical quantities, and therefore must be revised, (...) along with the notions of absolute space and time that they underpin. Though these insights appear only intermittently in Schlick’s work, I will seek to elaborate on them in an effort to clarify his views on conventions within physics and the nature of revolutionary science, and to suggest that these views are invulnerable to the criticisms of pragmatic empiricists such as Quine. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-17 DOI 10.1007/s12136-011-0131-3 Authors Steven Bland, Department of Philosophy, Huron University College, 1349 Western Rd, London, Ontario, Canada N6G 1H3 Journal Acta Analytica Online ISSN 1874-6349 Print ISSN 0353-5150. (shrink)

In this paper the basic aim of the so‐called ‘strong programme’ in the sociology of knowledge is examined. The ‘strong programme’ is considered (and rightly so) as an extreme version of the anti‐realist view of science. While the problem of scientific realism has normally been dealt with from the point of view of the ‘context of justification’ of theories, the paper focuses on the issues raised by law‐discovery. In this context Herbert Simon's views about the existence of a ‘logic (...) of scientific discovery’ are discussed and criticized. The main thesis of the paper is that if the structure of both discovery and prediction is properly understood, then the basic anti‐realist claims become untenable. A fortiori, the ‘strong programme’ appears to be unable to explain some basic features of the structure of science. (shrink)

Poincaré is well known for his conventionalism and structuralism. However, the relationship between these two theses and their place in Poincaré׳s epistemology of science remain puzzling. In this paper I show the scope of Poincaré׳s conventionalism and its position in Poincaré׳s hierarchical approach to scientific theories. I argue that for Poincaré scientific knowledge is relational and made possible by synthetic a priori, empirical and conventional elements, which, however, are not chosen arbitrarily. By examining his geometric (...) class='Hi'>conventionalism, his hierarchical account of science and defence of continuity in theory change, I argue that Poincaré defends a complex structuralist position based on synthetic a priori and conventional elements, the mind-dependence of which precludes epistemic access to mind-independent structures. (shrink)

Distinctively mathematical explanations (DMEs) explain natural phenomena primarily by appeal to mathematical facts. One important question is whether there can be an ontic account of DME. An ontic account of DME would treat the explananda and explanantia of DMEs as ontic structures and the explanatory relation between them as an ontic relation (e.g., Pincock 2015, Povich 2021). Here I present a conventionalist account of DME, defend it against objections, and argue that it should be considered ontic. Notably, if indeed it (...) is ontic, the conventionalist account seems to avoid a convincing objection to other ontic accounts (Kuorikoski 2021). (shrink)

Once upon a time, logical conventionalism was the most popular philosophical theory of logic. It was heavily favored by empiricists, logical positivists, and naturalists. According to logical conventionalism, linguistic conventions explain logical truth, validity, and modality. And conventions themselves are merely syntactic rules of language use, including inference rules. Logical conventionalism promised to eliminate mystery from the philosophy of logic by showing that both the metaphysics and epistemology of logic fit into a scientific picture of reality. (...) For naturalists of all stripes, this was paradise. Alas, paradise was lost. By the end of the twentieth century, logical conventionalism had been almost universally abandoned. But more recently, it has been revitalized. This chapter provides an overview of logical conventionalism and its history, clears away misunderstandings, and briefly responds to both the canonical objections to conventionalism (from Quine, Dummett, Boghossian, and many others) as well as new objections (from Field and Golan). From paradise lost, to paradise regained: logical conventionalism is back. (shrink)

This paper examines whether, and in what contexts, Duhem’s and Poincaré’s views can be regarded as conventionalist or structural realist. After analysing the three different contexts in which conventionalism is attributed to them – in the context of the aim of science, the underdetermination problem and the epistemological status of certain principles – I show that neither Duhem’s nor Poincaré’s arguments can be regarded as conventionalist. I argue that Duhem and Poincaré offer different solutions to the problem of theory (...) choice, differ in their stances towards scientific knowledge and the status of scientific principles, making their epistemological claims substantially different. (shrink)

A recurrent theme in philosophy of science since the early twentieth century is the idea that at least some basic tenets within scientific theories ought to be understood as conventions. Various versions of this idea have come to be grouped together under the label ‘conventionalism’. This chapter presents and discusses some important historical stages in the development of conventionalism. Particular attention is paid to the contributions made by Henri Poincaré, Pierre Duhem and Hans Reichenbach.

The subject of this investigation is the role of conventions in the formulation of Thomas Reid’s theory of the geometry of vision, which he calls the ‘geometry of visibles’. In particular, we will examine the work of N. Daniels and R. Angell who have alleged that, respectively, Reid’s ‘geometry of visibles’ and the geometry of the visual field are non-Euclidean. As will be demonstrated, however, the construction of any geometry of vision is subject to a choice of conventions regarding the (...) construction and assignment of its various properties, especially metric properties, and this fact undermines the claim for a unique non-Euclidean status for the geometry of vision. Finally, a suggestion is offered for trying to reconcile Reid’s direct realist theory of perception with his geometry of visibles.While Thomas Reid is well-known as the leading exponent of the Scottish ‘common-sense’ school of philosophy, his role in the history of geometry has only recently been drawing the attention of the scholarly community. In particular, several influential works, by N. Daniels and R. B. Angell, have claimed Reid as the discoverer of non-Euclidean geometry; an achievement, moreover, that pre-dates the geometries of Lobachevsky, Bolyai, and Gauss by over a half century. Reid’s alleged discovery appears within the context of his analysis of the geometry of the visual field, which he dubs the ‘geometry of visibles’. In summarizing the importance of Reid’s philosophy in this area, Daniels is led to conclude that ‘there can remain little doubt that Reid intends the geometry of visibles to be an alternative to Euclidean geometry’;1 while Angell, similarly inspired by Reid, draws a much stronger inference: ‘The geometry which precisely and naturally fits the actual configurations of the visual field is a non-Euclidean, two-dimensional, elliptical geometry. In substance, this thesis was advanced by Thomas Reid in 1764...’, 2 The significance of these findings has not gone unnoticed in mathematical and scientific circles, moreover, for Reid’s name is beginning to appear more frequently in historical surveys of the development of geometry and the theories of space., 3Implicit in the recent work on Reid’s ‘geometry of visibles’, or GOV, one can discern two closely related but distinct arguments: first, that Reid did in fact formulate a non-Euclidean geometry, and second, that the GOV is non-Euclidean. This essay will investigate mainly the latter claim, although a lengthy discussion will be accorded to the first. Overall, in contrast to the optimistic reports of a non-Euclidean GOV, it will be argued that there is a great deal of conceptual freedom in the construction of any geometry pertaining to the visual field. Rather than single out a non-Euclidean structure as the only geometry consistent with visual phenomena, an examination of Reid, Daniels, and Angell will reveal the crucial role of geometric ‘conventions’, especially of the metric sort, in the formulation of the GOV. Consequently, while a non-Euclidean geometry is consistent with Reid’s GOV, it is only one of many different geometrical structures that a GOV can possess. Angell’s theory that the GOV can only be construed as non-Euclidean, is thus incorrect. After an exploration of Reid’s theory and the alleged non-Euclidean nature of the GOV, in 1 and 2 respectively, the focus will turn to the tacit role of conventionalism in Daniels’ reconstruction of Reid’s GOV argument, and in the contemporary treatment of a non-Euclidean visual geometry offered by Angell. Finally, in the conclusion, a suggestion will be offered for a possible reconstruction of Reid’s GOV that does not violate his avowed ‘direct realist’ theory of perception, since this epistemological thesis largely prompted his formulation of the GOV. (shrink)

Against Thomas Mormann's argument that differential topology does not support Carnap's conventionalism in geometry we show their compatibility. However, Mormann's emphasis on the entanglement that characterizes topology and its associated metrics is not misplaced. It poses questions about limits of empirical inquiry. For Carnap, to pose a question is to give a statement with the task of deciding its truth. Mormann's point forces us to introduce more clarity to what it means to specify the task that decides between competing (...) hypotheses and in what way such a task may be both in practice and/or in principle impossible to carry out. (shrink)

Hans Reichenbach's so-called geometrical conventionalism is often taken as an example of a positivistic philosophy of science, based on a verificationist theory of meaning. By contrast, we shall argue that this view rests on a misinterpretation of Reichenbach's major work in this area, the Philosophy of Space and Time (1928). The conception of equivalent descriptions, which lies at the heart of Reichenbach's conventionalism, should be seen as an attempt to refute Poincaré's geometrical relativism. Based upon an examination of (...) the reasons Reichenbach gives for the cognitive equivalence of geometrical descriptions, the paper argues that his conventionalism is a specific form of scientific realism. At the same time we shall argue against those interpretations which lead to a trivialization of Reichenbach's conventionalism or deny it entirely. (shrink)

This paper distinguishes three concepts of "race": bio-genomic cluster/race, biological race, and social race. We map out realism, antirealism, and conventionalism about each of these, in three important historical episodes: Frank Livingstone and Theodosius Dobzhansky in 1962, A.W.F. Edwards' 2003 response to Lewontin (1972), and contemporary discourse. Semantics is especially crucial to the first episode, while normativity is central to the second. Upon inspection, each episode also reveals a variety of commitments to the metaphysics of race. We conclude by (...) interrogating the relevance of these scientific discussions for political positions and a post-racial future. (shrink)

It is necessary to take into account the data of science in the theoretical debates conducted by scientists contributing ontological theories in order to develop new approaches to theological issues in Islamic thought. Even, Kalam scholars with the duty of defending and basing the principles of Islam in the classical sense have established a theological understanding intertwined with science in understanding both existence philosophically and the Script theologically. With its discoveries and theories in the last century, it can be argued (...) that modern science has made a serious progress compared to the past. Maintaining its own methodology and paradigm, every scientific discipline has the opportunity to benefit from the methods and data of other disciplines. Consequently, it is possible to assert that Kalam can enjoy the same opportunity too, as long as staying in its own problem area. According to modern science, the motion system is the unity of structures that enable living things to move. Moreover, Bones and joints, which are the structures of the skeletal system, are passive elements of the movement system. Muscles, on the other hand, are the active elements of the movement system and provide the movement of the body by affecting the bones and joints. Muscle tissue shapes the body by adhering to the bones, besides enabling movement activity to occur. One of the most important systems that provide movement is the nervous system. Because for a person to have movement, the muscles must contract, and the muscles must be stimulated for the contraction of the muscles. The system that enables this contraction to occur is the nervous system. Energy is also required for contraction to occur in the human body. Muscles create energy for movement by first providing their energy from the ATP molecule present in the muscle cells. Considering the movement theories of classical theology scholars, it is seen that they shaped the occurrence of human actions through the concept of potency. While the scholars classify power as spiritual/mental and physical strength in terms of its structure, they have characterized it as accident in terms of its nature. In this context, we can say that the equivalent of the power, which is regarded as necessary for the formation of human acts by the theologians, is the movement system in today's science. The spirit/mental that scholars regard as a structure of power for the occurrence of human action can be regarded as the electrical activity that activates muscles when considered within the framework of the movement system of today's science. It is seen that Kalam scholars emphasize physical competence in their definitions of power as well. At this point, Ash'arians defined the power as the soundness of organs, Mu’tazila expressed it as the presence of organs and their being away from disasters, and the Mâturîdîs stated it as the organs being healthy. With these definitions, Kalam scholars mean that a person should also be physically competent to make a movement. The structures scientifically accepted as biological and physical competence in the movement system are the skeletal system, muscles and nervous system. Therefore, we can say that the strength of the physical fitness/well-being emphasized in the definition of power by theologians corresponds scientifically to the skeletal system, muscles and nervous system. One of the issues that Kalam scholars discuss about power is the issue of the accident of power. The reason why they describe power as an accident is to emphasize its impermanence and to show that it was created by Allah. So, in modern science, electrical activity must occur in the brain in order for human organs to move. The occurrence of this electrical activity is independent of the human being. The fact that electrical activity occurs independently from human beings shows that it conforms to Kalam scholars’ definition of the accident. As a result, we can say that the theory of power created by scholars for human movement has a counterpart in the movement system put forward by today's science. (shrink)

The problem to be discussed here concerns ontology so far as it may not be formed by scientific theory. In brief terms, the problem arises in the following way. On the one hand, the world surely consists of whatever is there, irrespective of whether human beings are around or not, and irrespective especially of whether human beings have constructed any scientific theories depicting the nature of the world; on the other hand, scientific theories are subject to the (...) limitation that we can never verify them or prove them to be true, so that the ontology prescribed by scientific theory is not firmly established but is only what is attributed to the world by a fallible scientific theory at any given time. The problem could also be put in terms of ‘conceptual networks’ or in terms of language-systems. (shrink)

This article develops a constructive criticism of methodological conventionalism. Methodological conventionalism asserts that standards of inductive risk ought to be justified in virtue of their ability to facilitate coordination in a research community. On that view, industry bias occurs when conventional methodological standards are violated to foster industry preferences. The underlying account of scientific conventionality, however, is problematically incomplete. Conventions may be justified in virtue of their coordinative functions, but often qualify for posterior empirical criticism as research (...) advances. Accordingly, industry bias does not only threaten existing conventions but may impede their empirically warranted improvement if they align with industry preferences. My empiricist account of standards of inductive risk avoids such a problem by asserting that conventional justification can be pragmatically warranted but has, in principle, only a provisional status. Methodological conventions, therefore, should not only be defended from preference-based infringements on their coordinative function but ought to be subjected to empirical criticism. (shrink)

In 1929 Moritz Schlick and those scholars he had brought together came to realize that they had given rise to something entirely new, so the text of the Vienna Circle Manifesto has it. What was novel was the conception of the world, henceforth scientific. Or as we may put it otherwise: a discipline had been established, the philosophy of science, that is a reflection on science no longer subordinate to traditional theory of knowledge and metaphysics. The text goes on (...) to explain why such a conception arose geographically where it did: “That Vienna was specially suitable ground for [the development of the spirit of a scientific conception of the world] is historically understandable” 1. The Vienna Circle Manifesto proceeds to enumerate the multifarious intellectual movements that were brought together at the beginning of the 20th century in the city of Vienna. Is it irrelevant or untimely to emphasize this cosmopolitan spirit? I believe, on the contrary, that cosmopolitanism provides both a lesson about philosophical creativity and a key for understanding the vitality of Viennese philosophy: the achievements of the Vienna Circle were the result of an exceptional open-mindedness on the part of its members. (shrink)

The central theme running throughout this outstanding new survey is the nature of the philosophical debate created by modern science's foundation in experimental and mathematical method. More recently, recognition that reasoning in science is probabilistic generated intense debate about whether and how it should be constrained so as to ensure the practical certainty of the conclusions drawn. These debates brought to light issues of a philosophical nature which form the core of many scientific controversies today. _Scientific Method: A Historical (...) and Philosophical Introduction_ presents these debates through clear and comparative discussion of key figures in the history of science. Key chapters critically discuss * Galileo's demonstrative method, Bacon's inductive method, and Newton's rules of reasoning * the rise of probabilistic `Bayesian' methods in the eighteenth century * the method of hypotheses through the work of Herschel, Mill and Whewell * the conventionalist views of Poincaré and Duhem * the inductivism of Peirce, Russell and Keynes * Popper's falsification compared with Reichenbach's enumerative induction * Carnap's scientific method as Bayesian reasoning The debates are brought up to date in the final chapters by considering the ways in which ideas about method in the physical and biological sciences have affected thinking about method in the social sciences. This debate is analyzed through the ideas of key theorists such as Kuhn, Lakatos, and Feyerabend. (shrink)

I reject the widely held view that Duhem's 1906 book La Théorie physique is a statement of instrumentalistic conventionalism, motivated by the scientific crisis at the end of the nineteenth century. By considering Duhem's historical context I show that his epistemological views were already formed before the crisis occured; that he consistently supported general thermodynamics against the new atomism; and that he rejected the epistemological views of the latter's philosophical supporters. In particular I show that Duhem rejected Poincaré's (...) account of scientific language, Le Roy's view that laws are definitions, and the conventionalist's use of simplicity as the criterion of theory choice. Duhem regarded most theory choices as decidable on empirical grounds, but made historical context the main determining factor in scientific change. (shrink)

[Use code AUFLY30 for 30% off on the OUP website.] One central aim of science is to provide explanations of natural phenomena. What role(s) does mathematics play in achieving this aim? How does mathematics contribute to the explanatory power of science? Rules to Infinity defends the thesis, common though perhaps inchoate among many members of the Vienna Circle, that mathematics contributes to the explanatory power of science by expressing conceptual rules, rules which allow the transformation of empirical descriptions. Mathematics should (...) not be thought of as describing, in any substantive sense, an abstract realm of eternal mathematical objects, as traditional platonists have thought. In Rules to Infinity, this view, which I call mathematical normativism, is updated with contemporary philosophical tools, and it is argued that normativism is compatible with mainstream semantic theory. This allows the normativist to accept that there are mathematical truths, while resisting the platonistic idea that there exist abstract mathematical objects that explain such truths. Furthermore, Rules to Infinity defends a particular account of the distinction between scientific explanations that are in some sense distinctively mathematical – those that explain natural phenomena in some uniquely mathematical way – and those that are only standardly mathematical, and it lays out desiderata for any account of this distinction. Normativism is compared with other prominent views in the philosophy of mathematics such as neo-Fregeanism, fictionalism, conventionalism, and structuralism. Rules to Infinity serves as an entry point into debates at the forefront of philosophy of science and mathematics, and it defends novel positions in these debates. (shrink)

The philosopher David Lewis is credited by many social scientists, including mainstream economists, with having founded the modern (game-theoretical) approach to conventions, viewed as solutions to recurrent coordination problems. Yet it is generally ignored that he revised his approach, soon after the publication of his well-known book. I suggest that this revision has deep implications (probably not perceived by Lewis himself) on the analytical links between coordination, uncertainty and rationality. Thinking anew about these issues leads me to map out an (...) alternative social scientific research programme. The traditional ontological equipment of methodological individualism should be reinforced in order to admit the existence of an “intersubjective” world beside the two familiar worlds: the “objective” world of observable things, and the “subjective” world of expectations and individual beliefs. In particular, language becomes necessary to understand coordination via conventions, rather than the other way round. That has led a group of institutionalist economists and pragmatist sociologists to develop an enlarged model of rationality, no longer isolated from questions of coordination and values. This model is the basis for the “Economics of Conventions”. (shrink)

We examine critically the interdependence between science and philosophy which Sklar asserts in Space, Time, and Spacetime. We find that such a view makes it difficult to criticize the ideas of science, like that of absolute space, on their own merits, without importing extraneous philosophical associations. It also impedes appreciation of the importance, and subtlety, of explanation in scientific theory. As a result, particular explanations, such as the one Newton offered of his bucket experiment, are dismissed facilely-- indeed, all (...) geometric explanation appears illegitimate--, and such general attitudes as conventionalism appear to lack rationale. (shrink)

An epistemic notion of verisimilitude (as the 'degree in which a theory seems closer to the full truth to a scientific community') is defined in several ways. Application to the structuralist description of theories is carried out by introducing a notion of 'empirical regularity' in structuralist terms. It is argued that these definitions of verisimilitude can be used to give formal reconstructions of scientific methodologies such as falsificationism, conventionalism and normal science.

The roots of scientific epistemology have generally been recognized in the Greeks, Aristotle and Euclid,—the former representing an empiricist trend whereas the latter representing a rationalist trend. Very little is known about classical Indian scientific epistemologies which are generally considered at least two centuries earlier than Aristotle. Inspired by the Aristotelian and Euclidean models of scientific rationality, various new models have flourished in contemporary Western thought, the prominent ones being the logical-empiricist-inductivist model (Reichenbach), the hypothet-ico-deductivist-falsificationist model (Popper), (...) conventionalist-rationalist model (Pioncaré, Duhem), dialectical-historicist model (Kuhn), and rationalist-historicist model (Lakatos, Feyerabend). While the researches in and debates about these models are still going on, it may be profitable to examine the models of scientific rationality that are presupposed in the most prominent classical Indian sciences such as Yoga, Vyākarana, Jyotisa Siddhānt, and Ayurvijñan. All these sciences have enjoyed an uninterrupted continuity ever since their origin although their evolution has suffered generally after 1200 A.D. (save Yoga) due to cultural-historical vicissitudes. (shrink)

Contemporary sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) is defined by its relativist trend. Its programme often calls for the support of philosophers, such as Duhem, Quine, and Wittgenstein. A critical re-reading of key texts shows that the main principles of relativism are only derivable with difficulty. The thesis of the underdetermination of theory doesn't forbid that Duhem, in many places, validates a correspondence-consistency theory of truth. He never said that social beliefs and interests fill the lack of underdetermination. Quine's idea (...) of a selective revision of hypotheses, as well as the neat incompatibility between holism and conventionalism, openly challenges the principles of relativism. Wittgenstein's work, which is not presented in book-form but rather as a tree, forces us to avoid aphoristic choices that credit any text-excising. This remark allows us to tackle the passages that sociological relativism is based on.Mathematical conventions are not anthropological objects. When Wittgenstein examines the "language-games," he only speaks of the functioning of natural language, not to be confused with scientific formal languages. We then should render the formula "language-game" by "well-defined, explicit and compulsory rules of communication", which is a much less attractive formula for relativism. Consequently, there does not exist a real continuity between the epistemologies of Duhem, Quine and Wittgenstein, and the recent works of the SSK. (shrink)

Using the methods of hermeneutic phenomenology, and against the background of the principle that the real is what is or can be given in a public way in perception as a state of the World, and of the thesis established elsewhere that acts of perception are always epistemic, contextual, and hermeneutical, the writer proposes that objects of scientific observation are perceptual objects, states of the World described by theoretical scientific terms and, therefore, real. This thesis of Hermeneutical Realism (...) is proved by showing how the response of a standard instrument is 'read' as if it were a 'text'. Conclusions are then drawn about a number of topics, including Scientific Realism, Conventionalism, and Cultural Relativism. (shrink)

This dissertation makes two primary contributions. The first three chapters develop an interpretation of Carnap's Meta-Philosophical Program which places stress upon his methodological analysis of the sciences over and above the Principle of Tolerance. Most importantly, I suggest, is that Carnap sees philosophy as contiguous with science—as a part of the scientific enterprise—so utilizing the very same methods and subject to the same limitations. I argue that the methodological reforms he suggests for philosophy amount to philosophy as the explication (...) of the concepts of science through the construction and use of suitably robust meta-logical languages. My primary interpretive claim is that Carnap's understanding of logic and mathematics as a set of formal auxiliaries is premised upon this prior analysis of the character of logico-mathematical knowledge, his understanding of its role in the language of science, and the methods used by practicing mathematicians. Thus the Principle of Tolerance, and so Carnap's logical pluralism, is licensed and justified by these methodological insights. This interpretation of Carnap's program contrasts with the popular Deflationary reading as proposed in Goldfarb & Ricketts. The leading idea they attribute to Carnap is a Logocentrism: That philosophical assertions are always made relative to some particular language, and that our choice of syntactical rules for a language are constitutive of its inferential structure and methods of possible justification. Consequently Tolerance is considered the foundation of Carnap's entire program. My third chapter argues that this reading makes Carnap's program philosophically inert, and I present significant evidence that such a reading is misguided. The final chapter attempts to extend the methodological ideals of Carnap's program to the analysis of the ongoing debate between category- and set-theoretic foundations for mathematics. Recent criticism of category theory as a foundation charges that it is neither autonomous from set theory, nor offers a suitable ontological grounding for mathematics. I argue that an analysis of concepts can be foundationally informative without requiring the construction of those concepts from first principles, and that ontological worries can be seen as methodologically unfruitful. (shrink)

A rational basis can be found for dealing with the epistemology of the various futures' methodologies. According to "Conventionalism"—the modern school of philosophy of science, the main reason for preferring one science over another is its utility, rather than its authenticity. This means that according to "Conventionalism," which perceives the "utility" in the improvement of the psychic state and security of man as the main principle of any scientific thought, futures' methodologies, in their striving to achieve this (...) end, is no less a "science" than any other science. (shrink)

Recent controversy over whether the Vienna Circle can provide a model for today’s political turn in the philosophy of science indicates the need to clarify just what is meant by the term political philosophy of science. This paper finds fourteen different meanings of the term, including both descriptive and normative usages, having to do with the roles of political values in the sciences, the political consequences and significance of the sciences and scientific modes of thought, and political processes within (...) the sciences. These different senses are exemplified by the history of nineteenth century French philosophy of science, including Comte and Renouvier, as well as twentieth century logical positivists such as Neurath and more recent philosophers of science such as Kitcher and Longino. The paper also addresses the issue of how there could be a positivist political philosophy of science, given positivisms’ questioning of values, and considers Renouvier’s social contract approach to a political philosophy of science more promising than either Comte’s naturalism or the logical positivists’ non-cognitivism. (shrink)

In drawing on Poincare’s conventionalism, Cassirer’s neo-Kantianism, Duhem’s methodological conservatism, and Russell’s holist doctrine of scientific knowledge, Worrall (1989) launched in his classical paper a new position in realism debate. The champions of structural realism have managed to combine a sense in which the development of science is cumulative with a picture of theory change that coheres with the argument of the “pessimistic meta-induction”. Twenty two years after the publication of Worrall’s paper, the volume under review presents an (...) exciting recapitulation of the structuralist movement’s main achievements. The recapitulation is most welcome, since from the very outset of its development not only did structural realism oppose the forms of logical reductionism, but it also got its emancipation as a philosophical position through suggesting an alternative to van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism, while at the same time provoking a transformation of the latter into structu .. (shrink)

Some philosophers of science suggest that philosophical assumptions must influence historical scholarship, because history (like science) has no neutral data and because the treatment of any particular historical episode is going to be influenced to some degree by one's prior philosophical conceptions of what is important in science. However, if the history of science must be laden with philosophical assumptions, then how can the history of science be evidence for the philosophy of science? Would not an inductivist history of science (...) confirm an inductivist philosophy of science and a conventionalist history of science confirm a conventionalist philosophy of science? I attempt to resolve this problem; essentially, I deny the claim that the history of science must be influenced by one's conception of what is important in science — one's general philosophy of science. To accomplish the task I look at a specific historical episode, together with its history, and draw some metamethodological conclusions from it. The specific historical episode I examine is Descartes' critique of Galileo's scientific methodology. (shrink)

InScience and Values (1984) and other, more recent, works, e.g. (1987a, 1987b, 1989a, 1989b, 1990), Larry Laudan proposes a theory of scientific debate he dubs the reticulated model of scientific rationality (Laudan, 1984, pp. 50–66). The model stands in sharp contrast to hierarchical approaches to rationality exemplified by Popper (1959), Hempel (1965), and Reichenbach (1938), as well as the conventionalist views of rationality defended by Carnap (1950), Popper (1959), Kuhn (1962), and Lakatos (1978). Ironically, the model commits some (...) of the same errors Laudan finds in hierarchicalist and conventionalists approaches to scientific rationality. This paper will show that the model can be fixed by recognizing that criteria of goal assessment have no privileged status. These rules are best viewed as simply rules of rationality (or rules of scientific method) by another name. (shrink)

We argue that the concepts of `human equality' and `inequality' play an important role in the structure of science and philosophy. When the value of `human inequality' predominates, scientific categories are formed in accordance with the principle of `hierarchical differentiation' and concepts remain closely tied to the objects they are referring to. Following Mirowski we define this as the `anthropometric stage' of human thought and development. Contrary, Mirowski's `syndetic stage' refers to societies where the value of `human equality' prevails. (...) Here concepts appear that are universally applicable. However, because of their conventional nature these concepts cannot be `grasped' any longer by human intuition. Between the `anthropometric' and `syndetic' stages, a `lineamentric stage' appears, a period of transition from `human equality' to `human inequality'. Being both a bridge and gap between the two other stages, the `lineamentric' stage contains many contradictions between an `abstract attitude' and `concrete categories'. In this paper we examine the anthropometric, lineamentric and syndetic stages and discuss several examples taken from philosophy, logic, mathematics and physics. (shrink)

In his account of probable reasoning, Poincaré used the concept, or at least the language, of conventions. In particular, he claimed that the prior probabilities essential for inverse probable reasoning are determined conventionally. This paper investigates, in the light of Poincaré's well known claim about the conventionality of metric geometry, what this could mean, and how it is related to other views about the determination of prior probabilities. Particular attention is paid to the similarities and differences between Poincaré's conventionalism (...) as it applies to probabilities and de Finetti's subjectivism. The aim of the paper is to suggest that in accounts of the development of ideas about probable reasoning, particularly those customarily described as Bayesian, Poincaré's discussion deserves more attention than it has so far received. (shrink)

In his account of probable reasoning, Poincare used the concept, or at least the language, of conventions. In particular, he claimed that the prior probabilities essential for inverse probable reasoning are determined conventionally. This paper investigates, in the light of Poincare's well known claim about the conventionality of metric geometry, what this could mean, and how it is related to other views about the determination of prior probabilities. Particular attention is paid to the similarities and differences between Poincare's conventionalism (...) as it applies to probabilities and de Finetti's subjectivism. The aim of the paper is to suggest that in accounts of the development of ideas about probable reasoning, particularly those customarily described as Bayesian, Poincare's discussion deserves more attention than it has so far received. (shrink)

In Towards an Historiography of Science (1963) and in other related works spanning over his entire career, Agassi presents his wide-ranging and original understanding of the history of science. It emerges from the criticism of two distinctive approaches, each informed by the uncritical acceptance, on the part of historians, of two philosophies of science: inductivism (scientific theories emerge from facts), and conventionalism (scientific theories are mathematical frameworks for classifying facts). Both produce unsatisfactory historical reconstructions, in which errors (...) are either concealed or condemned. Popper’s philosophy, by contrast, allows for a picture in which science grows from the recognition and criticism of our best and wisest errors. (shrink)

Poincaré’s conventionalism has thoroughly transformed both the philosophy of science and the philosophy of mathematics. In the former it gave rise to new insights into the complexities of scientific method, in the latter to a new account of the nature of (so-called) necessary truth. Not only proponents of conventionalism, such as the logical positivists, were influenced by Poincaré, but also outspoken critics of conventionalism, such as Quine, Putnam, and (as I will argue) Wittgenstein, were deeply inspired (...) by conventionalist ideas. Indeed, during the twentieth century, most philosophers of science and mathematics engaged in dialogue with conventionalism. As is often the case with complex ideas, there is no consensus about the meaning of conventionalism in general and Poincaré’s original version of it in particular. Nonetheless, notions such as underdetermination (of theory), empirical equivalence (of incompatible theories), implicit definition, holism, and conceptual relativity, all of which can be linked to Poincaré’s writings, have become central to philosophy. In tracing the flow of Poincaré’s ideas through the philosophical space of the twentieth century, this article emphasizes not only the stimulus provided by his actual views but also the effects of misreading and unjustified appropriation. (shrink)

Several recent commentators argue that Thomas Hobbes’s account of the nature of science is conventionalist. Engaging in scientific practice on a conventionalist account is more a matter of making sure one connects one term to another properly rather than checking one’s claims, e.g., by experiment. In this paper, I argue that the conventionalist interpretation of Hobbesian science accords neither with Hobbes’s theoretical account in De corpore and Leviathan nor with Hobbes’s scientific practice in De homine and elsewhere. Closely (...) tied to the conventionalist interpretation is the deductivist interpretation, on which it is claimed that Hobbes believed sciences such as optics are deduced from geometry. I argue that Hobbesian science places simplest conceptions as the foundation for geometry and the sciences in which we use geometry, which provides strong evidence against both the conventionalist and deductivist interpretations. (shrink)

Up until recently social scientists took it for granted that their task was to account for the social world as objectively as possible: they were realists in practice if not always in their methodological sermons. This situation started to change in the 1960s, when a number of antirealist philosophies made inroads into social studies. -/- This paper examines critically the following kinds of antirealism: subjectivism, conventionalism, fictionism, social constructivism, relativism, and hermeneutics. An attempt is made to show that these (...) philosophies are false and are causing serious damage to social studies. -/- Next the subjective interpretation of probability is analyzed as a case of subjectivism. An approach to the subjective perception of justice is sketched as an example of the objective study of subjective experience. -/- Finally, the three main varieties of realism — naive, critical, and scientific — are outlined. It is argued that the scientific attitude involves scientific realism, which is put in practice even by scholars who, like Weber and Simmel, called themselves antirealists. (shrink)

Austrian economics emphasizes a priori components of social scientific theory. Most emphatically, Ludwig Mises and Murray Rothbard champion praxeology, a methodology often criticized as extremely aprioristic. Among the numerous justifications and interpretations of praxeology to be found in the primary and secondary literature, conventionalism avoids the charge of extreme apriorism by construing the fundamental axiom of praxeology as analytic instead of synthetic. This paper (1) explicates the tentative structure of the fundamental axiom, (2) clarifies some aspects of a (...) conventionalist defense of praxeology, and (3) appraises conventionalist praxeology according to Rothbardian criteria. While Rothbard provides an essentialist justification of praxeology and embraces extreme apriorism, a mildly aprioristic conventionalist defense of praxeology fares better on Rothbard’s own criteria and is much more compatible with other contemporary methodological positions and economic theories. (shrink)

In the late 19th century great changes in theories of light and electricity were in direct conflict with certitude, the view that scientific knowledge is infallible. What is, then, the epistemic status of scientific theory? To resolve this issue Duhem and Poincaré proposed images of fallible knowledge, Instrumentalism and Conventionalism, respectively. Only in 1919–1922, after Einstein's relativity was published, he offered arguments to support Fallibilism, the view that certainty cannot be achieved in science. Though Einstein did not (...) consider Duhem's Instrumentalism, he argued against Poincaré's Conventionalism. Hitherto, Einstein's Fallibilism, as presented at first in a rarely known essay of 1919, was left in the dark. Recently, Howard obscured its meaning. Einstein's essay was never translated into English. In my paper I provide its translation and attempt to shed light on Einstein's view and its context; I also direct attention to Einstein's images of philosophical opportunism in scientific practice. (shrink)

Abstract Artificial language philosophy (also called ‘ideal language philosophy’) is the position that philosophical problems are best solved or dissolved through a reform of language. Its underlying methodology—the development of languages for specific purposes—leads to a conventionalist view of language in general and of concepts in particular. I argue that many philosophical practices can be reinterpreted as applications of artificial language philosophy. In addition, many factually occurring interrelations between the sciences and philosophy of science are justified and clarified by the (...) assumption of an artificial language methodology. (shrink)

Austrian economics emphasizes a priori components of social scientific theory. Most emphatically, Ludwig Mises and Murray Rothbard champion praxeology, a methodology often criticized as extremely aprioristic. Among the numerous justifications and interpretations of praxeology to be found in the primary and secondary literature, conventionalism avoids the charge of extreme apriorism by construing the fundamental axiom of praxeology as analytic instead of synthetic. This paper (1) explicates the tentative structure of the fundamental axiom, (2) clarifies some aspects of a (...) conventionalist defense of praxeology, and (3) appraises conventionalist praxeology according to Rothbardian criteria. While Rothbard provides an essentialist justification of praxeology and embraces extreme apriorism, a mildly aprioristic conventionalist defense of praxeology fares better on Rothbard’s own criteria and is much more compatible with other contemporary methodological positions and economic theories. (shrink)

There is a well-known tension within Sellars' scheme arising from commitments to both an anti-foundationalist epistemology and a Peircean scientific realism. This tension surfaces conspicuously in his treatment of ontological category theory. On the one hand, Sellars applies and extends Carnap's metalinguistic deflation of ontology. On the other hand, however, Sellars is not prepared to 'go conventionalist' but upholds the possibility of a "positive ontology" (Rosenberg). I offer a new reading of Sellars’ Carus Lectures in which I combine two (...) projects. First, I argue that Sellars provides us here with the sketch of a method of ‘category projection’ which can be used, within the setting of Sellars' scheme, to 'transcend from within' the limitations of category theories developed in non-Peircean conceptual structures and to enable us non-Peirceans to make any justifiable descriptive claims about the structure of reality. In the course of doing so I also offer a new reading of Sellars' Carus Lectures, highlighting the systematic advantages that motivated Sellars to view a process ontological interpretation of sensation. (shrink)

This essay explores Kaila's interpretation of the special theory of relativity. Although the relevance of his work to logical empiricism is well-known, not much has been written on what Kaila calls the ‘Einstein-Minkowski invariance theory’. Kaila's interpretation focuses on two salient features. First, he emphasizes the importance of the invariance of the spacetime interval. The general point about spacetime invariance has been known at least since Minkowski, yet Kaila applies his overall tripartite theory of invariances to space, time and spacetime (...) in an original way. Second, Kaila provides a non-conventionalist argument for the isotropic speed of electromagnetic signals. The standard Einstein synchrony is not a mere convention but a part of a larger empirical theory. According to Kaila's holistic principle of testability, which stands in contrast to the theses of translatability and verification, different items in the theory cannot be sharply divided into conventional and empirical. Kaila's invariantism/non-conventionalism about relativity reflects an interesting case in the gradual transition from positivism to realism within the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Most philosophical or scientific theories suppose that colour composition judgments refer to the way colours appear to us. The dominant view is therefore phenomenalist in the sense that colour composition is phenomenally given to perceivers. This paper argues that there is no evidence for a phenomenalist view of colour composition and that a conventionalist approach should be favoured.

Poincaré’s conventionalism has been interpreted in many writings as a philosophical position emerged by reflection on certain scientific problems, such as the applicability of geometry to physical space or the status of certain scientific principles. In this paper I would like to consider conventionalism as a philosophical position that emerged from Poincaré’s scientific practice. But not so much from dealing with scientific problems, as from the use of two specific methodologies proper to modern mathematics (...) and the modern natural sciences: methodological structuralism and the hypothetical-deductive method—thus, as a philosophical position which emerged from a way (or rather, two ways) ofdoingscience. With this approach, I try to deepen the analysis of connections between Poincaré’s scientific practice and his philosophy. (shrink)

Traditionally, accounts of natural kinds have run the gamut from strongly conventionalist to strongly realist views. Recently, however, there has been a significant shift toward more conventionalist-sounding positions, even (perhaps especially) among philosophers interested in scientific classification. The impetus for this is a trend toward making anthropocentric features of categories, namely, capacities to facilitate human epistemic (and other) interests via inductive inference, central to an account of kinds. I argue that taking these features seriously is both defensible and compatible (...) with conventionalism, but not compatible with a traditional realism about kinds specifically. Moreover, hopes of achieving compatibility by revising and extending kind realism—into what I call “hyperrealism”—face an insuperable dilemma. The news for realists is not all bad, however: though kind realism proves untenable, closely associated realisms underlying the objectivity of kind discourse may be viable nonetheless. (shrink)

It is common to defend the Homeostatic Property Cluster ( HPC ) view as a third way between conventionalism and essentialism about natural kinds ( Boyd , 1989, 1991, 1997, 1999; Griffiths , 1997, 1999; Keil , 2003; Kornblith , 1993; Wilson , 1999, 2005; Wilson , Barker , & Brigandt , forthcoming ). According to the HPC view, property clusters are not merely conventionally clustered together; the co-occurrence of properties in the cluster is sustained by a similarity generating (...) ( or homeostatic ) mechanism . I argue that conventional elements are involved partly but ineliminably in deciding which mechanisms define kinds , for deciding when two mechanisms are mechanisms of the same type, and for deciding where one particular mechanism ends and another begins. This intrusion of conventional perspective into the idea of a mechanism raises doubts as to whether the HPC view is sufficiently free of conventional elements to serve as an objective arbiter in scientific disputes about what the kinds of the special sciences should be. (shrink)

The motivating question of this paper is: ‘How are our beliefs in the theorems of mathematics justified?’ This is distinguished from the question ‘How are our mathematical beliefs reliably true?’ We examine an influential answer, outlined by Russell, championed by Gödel, and developed by those searching for new axioms to settle undecidables, that our mathematical beliefs are justified by ‘intuitions’, as our scientific beliefs are justified by observations. On this view, axioms are analogous to laws of nature. They are (...) postulated to best systematize the data to be explained. We argue that there is a decisive difference between the cases. There is agreement on the data to be systematized in the scientific case that has no analog in the mathematical one. There is virtual consensus over observations, but conspicuous dispute over intuitions. In this respect, mathematics more closely resembles stereotypical philosophy. We conclude by distinguishing two ideas that have long been associated -- realism (the idea that there is an independent reality) and objectivity (the idea that in a disagreement, only one of us can be right). We argue that, while realism is true of mathematics and philosophy, these domains fail to be objective. One upshot of the discussion is that even questions of fundamental physics may fail to be objective in roughly the sense that the question, ‘Is the Parallel Postulate is true?’, understood as one of pure mathematics, fails to be. Another is a kind of pragmatism. Factual questions in mathematics, modality, logic, and evaluative areas go proxy for non-factual practical ones. -/- . (shrink)

It is widely believed that the development of the general theory of relativity coincided with a shift in Einstein’s philosophy of science from a kind of Machian positivism to a form of scientific realism. This article criticizes that view, arguing that a kind of realism was present from the start but that Einstein was skeptical all along about some of the bolder metaphysical and epistemological claims made on behalf of what we now would call scientific realism. If we (...) read Einstein’s philosophy of science in its proper late nineteenth-and early twentieth-century philosophical context, we find that a kind of Duhemian under determinationist holism and conventionalism was more important to Einstein than either positivism or realism. And, reading his philosophy of science in its proper scientific. (shrink)