One of the more controversial articles published in the philosophy of criticism during the past twenty-five years is “The Intentional Fallacy” by W. K. Wimsatt, Jr. and Monroe Beardsley. Scholars from a variety of disciplines have expended a lot of energy in attacking and defending the Wimsatt-Beardsley position. Their efforts fall mainly into two classes. Either they have been exploratory with respect to the nature of the concept ‘intention’, but so exploratory as to present no tangible discovery; or they have (...) merely been occasions to air the author’s own views, views which take sides, but views which in the end only serve to define what positions may be taken without really convincing anyone whether one position is clearly better than the other. This dilemma is really rather odd because in a certain sense it is pitifully easy to understand what the intentional fallacy amounts to. There is a kind of minimal meaning to it, and I suspect that introductory students in courses in Aesthetics and Criticism have little difficulty in understanding it. ‘Difficulties’ seem to arise primarily in connection with its implications and general scope within the totality of criticism. However, it would be wrong to conclude that these difficulties have nothing to do with the intentional fallacy. They do. And the reason is this: the way in which one argues for, that is, establishes, the intentional fallacy has much to do with its implications and general scope within the realm of criticism. (shrink)

_The Scope of Morality _ was first published in 1980. Minnesota Archive Editions uses digital technology to make long-unavailable books once again accessible, and are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions. The scope of morality, Peter A. French contends, is much narrower than many traditional and contemporary works in ethical theory suggest. We trivialize morality if we think it has something to say about everything we do; it touches us all, but not at all (...) times. This essay in philosophical ethics focuses upon the origin, purpose, and function of the various concepts to be found in a more or less mature morality. The author draws a distinction between moral concepts that arise from an individual's wish to live a worthwhile life and those directed towards the development of virtue in the moral community. Moral concepts, in his view, are subjective creations of human beings rather than laws with an objective basis in nature. The ethics of sociobiology, of the lifeboat and spaceship models, and of game theory all come under his critical eye in this useful and progressive work. _The Scope of Morality_, says Hector-Neri Castaneda, "represents a serious effort at discussing the nature of morality, taking into account the most important contributions of recent writers.". (shrink)

The author replies to H. Allen Orr's review of "Darwin's Dangrous Idea" (Boston Review, Summer 1996).

Summary By means of examples drawn from everyday experience, the author investigates what conditions must be satisfied in order that behaviour may be called rational or irrational. Does the attribution of irrationality apply to means or to ends? Is it based on consideration of the total cost? Is heroism irrational? Cannot what is irrational for one person be rational for another? Finally, the author uses this approach to come to the problem of induction and to that of moral freedom.RésuméL'auteur examine, (...) à l'aide d'exemples divers tiréds de l'expérience quotidienne, quelles sont les conditions qui doivent ětre remplies pour qu'on puisse qualifier une conduite de rationnelle ou d'irrationnelle. L'imputation d'irrationalité concerne‐t‐elle les moyens ou les buts? Se fonde‐t‐elle sur une estimation globale des coǔts? L'héroïsme est‐il irrationnel? Ce qui est irrationnel pour l'un ne peut‐il pas ětre rationnel pour un autre? Enfin, il aborde par ce biais le problème de l'induction et celui de la liberté morale.ZusammenfassungDer Verfasser untersucht aufgrund verschiedener aus dem Alltag gezogenen Beispiele die Frage, welches die Bedingungen sind, die erfüllt sein müssen, damit man ein Verhalten als rational bezeichnen kann. Bezieht sich das Zuschreiben von Irrationalität auf Mittel oder auf Ziele? Ist es auf der Einschätzung des Aufwandes begründet? Ist Heldentum irrational? Kann das, was dem einen als irrational gilt, einem andern nicht als rational gelten? Schliesslich wird über das Induktionsproblem das Problem der moralischen Freiheit angegangen. (shrink)

The paper defends the so-called political conception of the scope of justice proposed by Thomas Nagel. The argument has three stages: (a) I argue that A. J. Julius’ influential criticism of the political conception can be answered. Pace Julius, actual and (relevant) hypothetical cases of state coercion do in fact involve a claim to the effect that people have a duty to obey, so the problem of justice does arise, according to Nagel’s criterion, in the critical cases scrutinised by (...) Julius. Hence the ‘perverseness’ objection lapses. (b) I argue, against other critics of Nagel’s view, that in central instances of international coercion such as immigration control people are not asked to accept the ongoing coercion. Consequently, the problem of justice does not, on Thomas Nagel’s view, arise internationally. Furthermore, to the extent that political authority is exercised internationally, it does not give rise to justificatory burdens involving principles of distributive justice.(c) I relate the notion of authority to other aspects of the political conception, including responsibility, and argue that together they constitute an attractive alternative to an influential allocative conception of justice. (shrink)

_The Widening Scope of Shame_ is the first collection of papers on shame to appear in a decade and contains contributions from most of the major authors currently writing on this topic. It is not a sourcebook, but a comprehensive introduction to clinical and theoretical perspectives on shame that is intended to be read cover to cover. The panoramic scope of this multidisciplinary volume is evidenced by a variety of clinically and developmentally grounded chapters; by chapters explicating the (...) theories of Silvan Tomkins and Helen Block Lewis; and by chapters examining shame from the viewpoints of philosophy, social theory, and the study of family systems. A final section of brief chapters illuminates shame in relation to specific clinical problems and experiential contexts, including envy, attention deficit disorder, infertility, masochism, the medical setting, and religious experience. This collection will be of special interest to psychoanalytically oriented readers. It begins with a chapter charting the evolution of Freud's thinking on shame, followed by chapters providing contemporary perspectives on the role of shame in development, and the status of shame within the theory of narcissism. Of further psychoanalytic interest are two reprinted classics by Sidney Levin on shame and marital dysfunction. In both depth of clinical coverage and breadth of perspectives, _The Widening Scope of Shame_ is unique in the shame literature. Readable, well organized, and completely up to date, it becomes essential reading for all students of this intriguing and unsettling emotion and of human development more generally. (shrink)

This book offers intriguing philosophical inquiries into biotechnological art and the life sciences, addressing their convergences as well as their epistemic and functional divergences. Rooted on a thorough understanding of the history of philosophy, this work builds on critical and ontological thought to interpret the concept of life that underscores first-hand dealings with matter and experimentation. The book breaks new ground on the issue of animality and delivers fresh posthumanist perspectives on the topics addressed. The authors embark on a deep (...) ontological probe of the concept of medium as communication-bridging and life-bearing. They also take on the concept of performativity as biotechnological art. The book includes concrete, well-documented case studies and shows how certain narratives and practices directly impact ideas surrounding science and technologies. It will interest philosophers in art and technology, aesthetics, ontology, and the life sciences. It will also engage art practitioners in art and science, curators and researchers. (shrink)

One of the more controversial articles published in the philosophy of criticism during the past twenty-five years is “The Intentional Fallacy” by W. K. Wimsatt, Jr. and Monroe Beardsley. Scholars from a variety of disciplines have expended a lot of energy in attacking and defending the Wimsatt-Beardsley position. Their efforts fall mainly into two classes. Either they have been exploratory with respect to the nature of the concept ‘intention’, but so exploratory as to present no tangible discovery; or they have (...) merely been occasions to air the author’s own views, views which take sides, but views which in the end only serve to define what positions may be taken without really convincing anyone whether one position is clearly better than the other. This dilemma is really rather odd because in a certain sense it is pitifully easy to understand what the intentional fallacy amounts to. There is a kind of minimal meaning to it, and I suspect that introductory students in courses in Aesthetics and Criticism have little difficulty in understanding it. ‘Difficulties’ seem to arise primarily in connection with its implications and general scope within the totality of criticism. However, it would be wrong to conclude that these difficulties have nothing to do with the intentional fallacy. They do. And the reason is this: the way in which one argues for, that is, establishes, the intentional fallacy has much to do with its implications and general scope within the realm of criticism. (shrink)

We are in the early stages of a new “intergenerational turn” in political philosophy. This turn is largely motivated by the threat of global climate change, which makes vivid a serious governance gap surrounding concern for future generations. Unfortunately, there is a lack of fit between most proposed remedies and the nature of the underlying problem. Most notably, many seem to believe that only piecemeal, issue-specific, and predominantly national institutions are needed to fill the intergenerational governance gap. By contrast, I (...) argue that we should adopt a genuinely global approach that treats intergenerational questions as foundational, and advocates for new permanent institutions with ongoing responsibilities to act on intergenerational threats. In this essay, I summarize my diagnosis of the underlying problem—that we face a basic standing threat that I call the “tyranny of the contemporary”—and sketch my proposal for a global constitutional convention aiming at institutions with standing authority and a broad remit. I then develop some of these ideas further through responses to fellow advocates for reform who nevertheless consider my proposals to go too far. In particular, I reject a counterproposal made by Anja Karnein, who argues that reforms should address only threats whose negative impacts would cross a high threshold. I argue that this would leave future generations vulnerable to what I call “squandering generations”. Among other things, these intergenerational squanderers violate appropriate relationships between past, present, and future generations. Yet, in my view, a central task of defensible intergenerational institutions is to protect the future against such abuse. (shrink)

Objective Semiotica is published in six annual issues, in two languages (English and French). From time to time, Special Issues, devoted to topics of particular interest, are assembled by Guest Editors. The publishers of Semiotica offer an annual prize, the Mouton d'Or, to the author of the best article each year. The article is selected by an independent international jury. Topics We welcome papers reporting results of research in all branches of semiotic studies. Article formats Research articles, in-depth reviews, guest (...) editorials, reports Mouton D’Or Winner 2022 "Semiotricité et corps en jeu", Parlebas, Pierre, 248, 9-35. The judges commented: "The Committee members made this decision based on many appreciations. First, the article contains a concise theory on semiotics of movement, synthesizing decades of research of the author. It opens an exciting framework for the contribution of many other authors. The theoretical grounds of semiotircity are built on the most classical semiotic approaches and represent a genuine development. Second, the article refreshes semiotics methodology in very original way, by engaging the applied semiotics for furtive and instantaneous activities analysis. Third, the article is pretty clear and well structured, written in very comprehensible French. The theoretical frame it opens is thorough and far reaching. Fourth, the semiotic theory of movement comes in a very special moment when the whole world is football, but it covers also many other areas of applicability which reflect major trends such as the general gamification of life thanks to new media and digital technologies. It is crucial for semiotic theory to open its theoretic scope towards significant cultural trends and become more attractive for young researchers." Les membres du comité ont pris leur décision en fondant leur appréciation sur quatre éléments principaux. Premier élément : l'article, en peu de mots, en prenant appui sur des décennies de recherche de la part de l'auteur, déploie de manière précise les termes d'une sémiotique du mouvement. Les fondements théoriques de la sémiotricité sont construits sur des approches sémiotiques bien établies et représentent un véritable développement dans le domaine. En cela, le texte ouvre un cadre passionnant pour les contributions de nombreux autres chercheurs. Deuxièmement, l'article renouvelle la sémiotique appliquée de manière très originale, l'engageant dans une approche efficace des actions instantanées et furtives; la méthodologie sémiotique en général en tire donc aussi profit. Troisième point, en plus d'être profond, avec un cadre théorique d'ampleur et de grande portée, l'article est particulièrement bien structuré et écrit dans un français très compréhensible, ce qui est un véritable gain pour sa diffusion. Enfin, quatrièmement, s'il est indéniable que le texte pourrait bénéficier d'une visibilité complémentaire due à la ferveur liée au contexte récent de la coupe du monde de football au Qatar, il couvre surtout de nombreux autres domaines d'applicabilité qui reflètent des tendances majeures telles que la gamification générale de la vie, portée par les nouveaux médias et les technologies numériques. L'on y voit une belle opportunité pour la théorie sémiotique d'ouvrir son champ à la faveur de tendances culturelles significatives; ceci est une garantie pour continuer à attirer de nouvelles générations de chercheurs. (shrink)

The principle of procreative beneficence, first suggested by Julian Savulescu, argues that: If couples have decided to have a child, and selection is possible, then they have a significant moral reason to select the child, of the possible children they could have, whose life is expected, in light of the relevant available information, to go best or at least not worse than any of the others. While the validity of this moral principle has been widely contested, in this paper we (...) move away from these issues and grant, for the sake of argument, that PB is a valid moral principle, and that the justification for PB provided by Savulescu and co-authors is sound. We do this in order to explore the implications and consequences of accepting PB and show that even if we put aside questions about the validity and theoretical foundations of this principle, PB has many interesting, astonishing and highly problematic implications that have not been made explicit in the writing of Savulescu and others who support the notion of an obligation to bring to birth the best child possible :204, 2002). We suggest that these implications should be taken into account when considering both the soundness and strength of PB. (shrink)

The article aims to analyze the semantic fields of two Korean terms in the field of a specialized judicial terminology, i.e. court and tribunal, which are usually reflected in English by one hypernym term court. This analysis, although carried out on limited Korean data, is intended to indicate the differences between the use of these two different Korean terms and to indicate the reasons why court is currently the most common English equivalent. At the same time, the author, by pointing (...) to the historical and cultural background, explains the reasons why the term court is not always correct. The methods used in compiling the data are to highlight differences in the semantics of Korean terms covered by an English hypernym court. (shrink)

A unique presentation of philosophy as an integral part of human culture. The whole of philosophy is the scope for this survey which portrays contemporary ideas in philosophy in continuity with the great ideas of the past. The author emphasizes our link with and dependency on the classical cultures of India, China and Japan. Originally published in 1977 by Glencoe Press and Collier, a division of Macmillan.

The nature of causation has been one of the central questions of metaphysics since ancient times. This chapter looks at the arguments for Causal Anti‐Realism. Causation requires necessary connections between separate existences. David Hume argued that the ordinary conception of causation involves the separateness of the cause and effect. Hume had a further, closely related argument against the reality of causation. Authors' idea of causation is merely a confusion of several distinct concepts, namely, the concepts of regular succession and contiguity (...) among events, and the concept of a felt propensity on their own part to infer one thing from another. There are four objections to Universal Causation, one assuming Mereological Universalism, a second employing a pluralized version of Universal Causation, a third involving a chain principle, and a fourth including an argument against infinite causal regresses. (shrink)

By building upon Raz's analysis of the spectrum of voluntary obligations, the author produces a typology of agreements, and then assesses the extent to which these different kinds of agreements underpin the common law of contract. While recognizing that the law of contract purports to deal with a broad range of voluntarily undertaken obligations, the typology of agreements suggests that the present law is primarily suited to dealing only with bargains. This suggests that there are situations in which agreements should (...) be legally recognized, but which should not be dealt with by all of the conceptual tools of contract law, for these agreements and voluntary undertakings serve the interests of those undertaking them in significantly different ways than do bargains. (shrink)

Resultant moral luck occurs whenever aspects of an agent’s moral responsibility are affected by luck pertaining to the outcomes of their actions. Many authors reject the existence of moral luck in this sense, but they do so in different ways. Michael Zimmerman argues that resultant luck affects the scope of moral responsibility, but not its degree. That is, it affects what agents are responsible for, but not how responsible they are. Andrew Khoury takes a more resolute approach, arguing that (...) both the scope and the degree of moral responsibility are free from resultant luck. -/- In this paper, I criticize both accounts and develop an alternative. I argue, first, that Khoury’s approach leads to an implausibly far-reaching error-theory about moral responsibility. Second, Zimmerman’s account cannot account for all the ways in which moral responsibility comes in degrees. Third, these problems can be overcome by introducing a distinction between two concepts of responsibility that both come with scope and degree. The first concept I call internal responsibility, as it applies exclusively to agent-internal factors. The second concept I call external responsibility, as it applies to (partly) agent-external factors such as actions and their outcomes. Given this distinction, we can avoid the problems of Khoury’s as well as Zimmerman’s accounts while preserving the central intuition behind the rejection of resultant moral luck. (shrink)

Seventeenth century philosophers were pre-occupied with the justification for the use of coercion; the nature and scope of the citizen's duty to obey the law was a central concern. The typical philosophical accounts which attempt to articulate the conditions under which a citizen has an obligation to obey the law tend to fall into two camps: those that ground the obligation to obey the law in consent, and those that ground it in benefits received, or possibly a combination of (...) both. More recently, however, some have argued that questions about the obligation to obey the law have been eclipsed by questions about distributive justice. Many leading figures in modern analytic jurisprudence remain concerned with the nature of political obligation. Joseph Raz is a current-day theorist who has recognized the importance of this issue and the need for an answer that is not over-simplistic. Recently Raz has re-examined his account in ?The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception, - making an exploration of his theory particularly timely. Raz argues that all governments claim morally legitimate authority, but not all of them actually possess it. His theory seeks to give us the tools by which to distinguish the legitimate claims from imposters. The complexity and flexibility of Raz's understanding of the nature and scope of the individual's obligation to obey the law accounts for its appeal. Upon closer inspection, however, difficulties emerge. I argue that Raz's theory is plagued by a deep-seated tension between his two central theses: the pre-emption thesis and the normal justification thesis. While I explore both theses in further depth, the gist of the pre-emption thesis is that it requires a pre-commitment to authority in order for the law?s mediating role to be performed. Conversely, the normal justification thesis invites a case by case assessment of the bindingness of norms. I argue that instead of offering us a unified conception of authority, Raz vacillates unstably between two models - a consent-based model and a benefits received model. I demonstrate that this tension is ineradicable because the theses are connected to divergent models of law and incompatible methodologies. (shrink)

This paper provides a defense of two traditional theses: the Autonomy of Philosophy and the Authority of Philosophy. The first step is a defense of the evidential status of intuitions (intellectual seemings). Rival views (such as radical empiricism), which reject the evidential status of intuitions, are shown to be epistemically self-defeating. It is then argued that the only way to explain the evidential status of intuitions is to invoke modal reliabilism. This theory requires that intuitions have a certain qualified (...) modal tie to the truth. This result is then used as the basis of the defense of the Autonomy and Authority theses. The paper closes with a defense of the two theses against a potential threat from scientific essentialism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Martin Heidegger and OntologyEmmanuel Levinas (bio)The prestige of Martin Heidegger 1 and the influence of his thought on German philosophy marks both a new phase and one of the high points of the phenomenological movement. Caught unawares, the traditional establishment is obliged to clarify its position on this new teaching which casts a spell over youth and which, overstepping the bounds of permissibility, is already in vogue. For once, (...) Fame has picked one who deserves it and, for that matter, one who is still living. Anyone who has studied philosophy cannot, when confronted by Heidegger’s work, fail to recognize how the originality and force of his achievements, stemming from genius, are combined with an attentive, painstaking, and close working-out of the argument—with that craftsmanship of the patient artisan in which phenomenologists take such pride. In this study, it is important for us to understand, above all, the true intentions of our author, to illuminate what he thinks really needs to be said, and to surmise what is most critical for him.To get to the heart of Heidegger’s system, it seems fitting to begin with a problem that is generally familiar. We choose the problem of knowledge, a deeper understanding of which takes us to the very threshold of Heidegger’s thought. For this problem, central to modern philosophy, is one of the main obstacles of modern philosophy that Heidegger wishes to surmount. Neo-Kantianism, which takes knowledge as the philosophical problem of the first rank, is the movement against which Heidegger rebels with all his strength. We have, thus, every chance of gaining access to his thought by the main door, so to speak. Once inside the system we will try to trace its outlines, 2 reserving, for a second part of our work, the determination of Heidegger’s place in the history of ideas, especially in the phenomenological movement, as well as of his relations with the philosopher to whom he owes so much—Edmund Husserl. 31In its most general form, the problem of the theory of knowledge has a critical significance. It consists in delineating a domain where knowledge can be certain and in determining the criteria for the legitimate scope of knowledge. But this problem, as normal and as simple as it may appear, has deeper roots. That knowledge should need a criterion at all presupposes that truth is not identical to all that is known and that the course [End Page 11] of things can fail to correspond with the course of thought. “How does knowledge correspond to being?” is a more profound formulation of the problem of knowledge.But we are not going to touch anymore on the primordial phenomenon that generates the problem. The problem of correspondence between thing and thought presupposes a free activity of thought and its isolation in relation to the object. It is precisely this presupposition which renders their harmony and even their contact problematic. “How does the subject take leave of itself to attain the object?” is what the problem of knowledge, in the last analysis, boils down to. Its true source is thus the concept of “subject” as elaborated by modern philosophy. The cogito presided over the subject’s birth. The cogito was the affirmation of the privileged nature of the subject’s immanent sphere, of its unique place in existence; hence, the cogito was the specificity of the subject’s connection to the rest of reality, the sui generis nature which opens up the passage from immanence to transcendence, the passage from ideas contained in the thinking substance to 4 their “formal existence.”The concept of the subject, understood as a substance having a specific position in the entire domain of being, presents us with difficulties of two kinds. First, how do we understand this leave-taking from the self which the thinking substance brings about and which displays an entirely original aspect? Indeed, we could say that thought, in reaching out toward objects, does not actually take leave of itself, since its objects—considered as ideas and contents of thought—are, in a certain sense, already within it. In order to make sense of this paradox, Descartes... (shrink)

According to a widespread view, the Bell theorem establishes the untenability of so-called ‘local realism’. On the basis of this view, recent proposals by Leggett, Zeilinger and others have been developed according to which it can be proved that even some non-local realistic theories have to be ruled out. As a consequence, within this view the Bell theorem allows one to establish that no reasonable form of realism, be it local or non-local, can be made compatible with the (experimentally tested) (...) predictions of quantum mechanics. In the present paper it is argued that the Bell theorem has demonstrably nothing to do with the ‘realism’ as defined by these authors and that, as a consequence, their conclusions about the foundational significance of the Bell theorem are unjustified. (shrink)

The normal justification of authority, as examined in Ch. 3, yields the conclusion that the extent of governmental authority varies from person to person. It cannot justify the authority that governments, in fact, claim for themselves in the case of most people. An analysis of consent is provided in order to explore the prospect that consent might serve to extend the scope of the authority of states. It is argued that consent can ground an extension (...) of political authority only so far as it is non‐instrumentally valuable. Those who, as a mode of expressing identification with their community, consent to the authority of reasonably just governments or respect their laws, are subject to that authority since such modes of consent have non‐instrumental value. (shrink)

In response to three papers about sex and disability published in this journal, I offer a critique of existing arguments and a suggestion about how the debate should be reframed going forward. Jacob M. Appel argues that disabled individuals have a right to sex and should receive a special exemption to the general prohibition of prostitution. Ezio Di Nucci and Frej Klem Thomsen separately argue contra Appel that an appeal to sex rights cannot justify such an exemption. I argue that (...) Appel’s argument fails, but not for the reasons Di Nucci and Thomsen propose, as they have missed the most pressing objection to Appel’s argument: Appel falsely presumes that we never have good reasons to restrict someone’s sexual liberty rights. More importantly, there is a major flaw in the way that all three authors frame their positive accounts. They focus on disability as a proxy for sexual exclusion, when these categories should be pulled apart: some are sexually excluded who are not disabled, while some who are disabled are not sexually excluded. I conclude that it would be less socially harmful and more productive to focus directly on sexual exclusion per se rather than on disability as a proxy for sexual exclusion. (shrink)

A prolonged debate about the nature of norms has been conducted in terms of the scope of a modal operator. Here I argue that the features of what I call Normative Focus are more fundamental than scope. We shall see limitations of scope contrasted with better analysis in terms of Normative Focus. Some authors address such limitations by extending what they mean by scope. I show that scope is still not doing the work: what does (...) it is their elicitation of our tacit knowledge of Normative Focus. Finally, I show that scope cannot capture Normative Focus because scope allows us to make only one distinction where we need to make three. So we should leave scope to the philosophers of language and turn instead to the ontology of Normative Focus. (shrink)

Each year individuals are required to execute millions of authorizations for the release of their health records as a condition of employment, applying for various types of insurance, and submitting claims for benefits. Generally, there are no restrictions on the scope of information released pursuant to these compelled authorizations, and the development of a nationwide system of interoperable electronic health records will increase the amount of health information released. After quantifying the extent of these disclosures, this article discusses why (...) it is important to limit disclosures of health information for nonmedical purposes as well as how it may be possible to do so. (shrink)

Each developed economic system is based on the principle of division of labor and can’t be imagined without the delegation of certain powers to agents. Any economic activity, particularly carried out through legal entity, is not able to function without the party’s right to authorize other persons to negotiate and make contracts on behalf of the principal. Due to the complexity of the economic order it is sometimes difficult to a third party to ascertain whether the agent acts with (...) class='Hi'>authority. Therefore legal regulation expands the scope of authority of the representatives beyond the actually granted powers—often the need to check the credentials of the representatives is rejected, when it is obvious from the facts that they have been granted necessary powers. (shrink)

Healthcare organisations are hierarchical; almost all are organised around the ranking of individuals by authority or status, whether this be based on profession, expertise, gender or ethnicity. Hierarchy is important for several reasons; it shapes the delivery of care, what is prioritised and who receives care. It also has an impact on healthcare workers and how they work and communicate together in organisations. The purpose of this scoping review is to explore the qualitative evidence related to hierarchy in healthcare (...) organisations defined broadly, to address gaps in macro‐level healthcare organisational research, specifically focusing on the (1) impact of hierarchy for healthcare workers and (2) how hierarchy is negotiated, sustained and challenged in healthcare organisations. After a search and screening, 32 papers were included in this review. The findings of this review detail the wide‐reaching impacts that hierarchy has on healthcare delivery and health workers. The majority of studies spoke to hierarchy's impact on speaking up, that is, how it shaped communication between staff with differential status: not only what was said, but how it had an impact on what was acceptable to say, by whom and at what time. Hierarchy was also noted to have substantial personal costs, impacting on the well‐being of those in less powerful positions. These findings also provide insight into the complex ways in which hierarchy was negotiated, challenged and reproduced. Studies not only detailed the way in which hierarchy was navigated day to day but also spoke to the reasons as to why hierarchy is often entrenched and difficult to shift. A number of studies spoke to the impact that hierarchy had in sustaining gender and ethnic inequalities, maintaining historically discriminatory practices. Importantly, hierarchy should not be reduced to differences between or within the professions in localised contexts but should be considered at a broad organisational level. (shrink)

The main purpose of this study was to determine the accumulation of the tradition of political texts (Siyasatnāma) in the context of freedom of expression and to discuss the potential of creating new perspectives accordingly. One of the most important criticisms of modernity towards traditional structures is the claim that people are subjected to many limitations on social, cultural and religious grounds. This criticism, which mainly focuses on limiting the freedom of action, also comes across as preventing the expression of (...) thoughts. While traditional understandings had such an approach, they aimed not only to preserve or strengthen the position of a particular authority, but also to prevent problems that may arise from an individual and social point of view. However, it is not possible to say that these thoughts always remain true to the stated intention. In this context, considering traditional understandings with their historical contexts should not only aim to gain an intellectual knowledge about a certain period or civilization. The main goal should be to evaluate the accumulated knowledge critically and to achieve meaningful results from this field. While determining the framework of the study, it was thought that reading through the political texts would provide such an opportunity. The study focused primarily on the intellectual infrastructure of freedom of expression and, accordingly, included general assessments of the issue in political texts and touched on the concept of authority, which is of great importance for determining the scope of freedom. In particular, it is emphasized on which power the administrators, who are at the head of the administrative power, base their authority on and from which principles the boundaries of this should be determined. It is seen that the political texts related to political life, oriented to ideal principles and taking into account reality, contain important assessments of the source of authority in terms of creating a ground of legitimacy or making sense of the existing situation. When evaluating the issue, it is highly evident that politicians point out that the main purpose of the existence and use of authority is the idea of order. In this context, what kind of precautions have to be taken in case of violation of the determined borders to maintain order is one of the most important issues of the policy books. Among these precautions, the idea of limiting all freedoms, especially freedom of expression, has an important place. The article also points out the possible contributions of the suggestions made in this context to the reactions that may arise in different political and social situations. At the beginning of the mentioned contributions, there are assessments on overcoming an obstacle that causes rulers not to perceive some facts adequately. This creates a serious obstacle to a healthy communication with different layers of society, and can be expressed as a masking effect. One of the main issues that the article focuses on is the suggestions of politicians on how to use the freedom of expression of the broad masses that make up the body of society. These suggestions state that the governed also have responsibilities at the point of determining the framework of the dialectical relationship between the different dimensions of the social structure. The social understandings that developed in the post-modern world have a nature that puts the individual in the foreground much more than traditional approaches. This may have produced positive effects to some extent. However, it seems that a serious erosion in the culture of people’s coexistence occurred on this occasion. The problematic use of freedom in general and freedom of expression in particular may be one reason for this. From the point of view of the states that are the highest social structures, it can also be said that these problems are increasing day by day. Therefore, the medium-term result of the desire to ensure individual freedoms may sometimes appear as chaos, and the long-term result may appear as the emergence of a more authoritarian structure again. In fact, these authoritarianism tendencies can gain strength by being based on reasonable grounds, such as misuse of freedoms of expression. It should be noted that to overcome these problems, political texts can help to prevent major social breakdowns by providing important alternatives to the disinterest which was created by the modern era. In this context, the study also touches on the conditions under which freedom of expression can be restricted according to political statements. (shrink)

The author argues that bioethics ought properly to be regarded "both" as a consulting profession that counsels health practitioners in dealing with the individual problems they face "and" as an academic discipline that defines problem areas on its own and includes attention to the institutional and social aspects of health care. The argument is conducted by means of a brief history of bioethics and comparison of its development with that of history of medicine and sociology of medicine. Several examples of (...) the social issues in bioethics are examined. (shrink)

Kantian constructivists accord a constitutive, justificatory role to the issue of scope: they typically claim that first-order practical thought depends for its authority on being suitably acceptable within the right scope, or by all relevant others, and some Kantian constructivists, notably Onora O'Neill, hold that our views of the nature and criteria of practical reasoning also depend for their authority on being suitably acceptable within the right scope. The paper considers whether O'Neill-type Kantian constructivism can (...) coherently accord this key role to the issue of scope while adhering to the universalist, ‘cosmopolitan’ commitments at its core. The paper argues that this is not so. On the one hand, it shows that O'Neill's attempt to ‘fix’ the scope of practical reasoning supposes, rather than establishes, a view of ethical standing and the scope of practical reasoning. On the other hand, the paper argues that Kantian constructivism should endorse a non-constructivist, perfectionist view of the good to determine that scope. The paper thereby supports the perfectionist conjecture that Kantian constructivism, in order to defend its universalist commitments, should take refuge in non-constructivist, perfectionist considerations, and that Kantian constructivism should therefore construe perfectionism as a partial, though uneasy, ally. (shrink)

I discuss Dante’s understanding that human existence is “ordered by two final goals” and how, for Dante, this understanding defines philosophy’s and revelation’s respective scopes of authority in guiding human conduct. Specifically, I show that, although Dante subordinates our earthly beatitude to spiritual beatitude in a way that seems to suggest the subordination of the authority of philosophy to that of revelation, he in fact limits philosophy’s scope to an arena in which its authority is not (...) only legitimate but also crucial to the cultivation of the higher, spiritual beatitude of human activity. (shrink)

Imāmiyya holds that the theory of imāmate must rely on scriptural evidence and designation and that the Imām, the successor to Muḥammad, is in charge of all political and religious issues. The authority of the Imām includes some religious and social duties such as executing the legal punishments, collecting almsgiving, sustaining social order and declaring holy war. The fulfillment of these duties requires actual leadership of the Imām or his deputy. With the beginning of the great occultation in 329/941, (...) there was an uncertainty among the Imāmiyya followers about who would uphold these responsibilities. In this period, Shīʿī ʿulamā began to undertake the duties of the Imām in order to overcome this uncertainty and to avoid the possible schism. In the beginning, this delegation of authority was limited to the religious sphere; but, later, its scope gradually became wider. This process of delegation of power, which covers a long process, needs to be examined in its various periods. In this study, this subject will be considered with special reference to the scholars of the fifth century of hijra (hijrī). An effort is made in this article to reveal how the issues of the Imām’s powers are discussed in the context of the problem of expanding or narrowing the authority of the scholars who played significant roles in systemization of Uṣūlī (rationalist) thought in the period after Shaykh al-Mufīd.Summary: In the issues of Imām/Caliphate which led to political division among Muslims after the Prophet Muḥammad, Imāmī Shīʿa opines that the Imāmate theory relies on scriptural evidence and designation. According to this theory, apart from scriptural evidence and designation, personal qualities such as immaculacy, knowledge, bravery, and vantage are found in Ali, Ḥasan, Ḥusayn and nine people from the lineage of Ḥusayn. The Imām as a successor to the Prophet Muḥammad is a person who has both religious and political power which includes implementation of punishments, collecting alms, ensuring justice, declaring holy war. For the Imāmī Shīʿa, there is a need for imām or his deputy who has absolute power to fulfill these duties.Imāmī Shīʿa, who held that the disappeared twelfth Imām would return back to restore justice in the world, had to confront various problems in finding solutions to some issues related to the existence of Imām himself, as well as theological issues during the period of great occultation. Particularly, the period of great occultation (329/941), in which the link with the Imām was severed completely, the Shīʿī community were uncertain on how to fulfill the responsibilities of the Imām probably due to the lack of religious sources. Shaykh al-Mufīd draws attention to the issue of khums (a one-fifth share of the spoils of war and of other specified forms of income). In this period of uncertainty, the Shiite scholars came into prominence in order to fill the gap and to prevent the social disorder. Referring to a tawqī‘ (rescript) from the Twelfth Imām, they claimed that they would take responsibility for the Twelfth Imām on his behalf. In the beginning, the delegation of the power was limited to the religious sphere. It was gradually extended to other spheres by the contribution of some scholars. It reached the largest dimension with the implementation of “wilāyat al-faqīh” theory.From that period until our times, the era when Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples lived can be considered as the beginning of this period. In the fifth century when Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples lived the delegation of power was limited to the religious sphere. In this article, how the scholars who played a role in the systematization of Uṣūlī thought dealt with the issue of the limits of the authority of Imām and how they defined the role of the Imāmī jurists (faqīh) will be examined.Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples were sometimes cautious on the issue of the delegation of the power of Imām. They, however, pointed out the role of the faqīh in the occultation period in order to overcome the uncertainty. As a matter of fact, Shaykh al-Ṭūsī and al-Qādī Ibn al-Barrāj made significant contributions to the issues of collection and distribution of khums. However, Sallār al-Daylamī’s contribution to the subject is more crucial. He considered khums as the grace of God and believed that it can be allocated by taking into account the share of the Imām. They put forward the views that explained in details the role of the faqīh in the collection and distribution of alms. Even Ibn al-Barrāj opined that in the absence of Imām and his deputy alms are to be allocated to the Faqihs on the ground that they know better how to distribute it. Therefore, in the absence of Imām and his deputy, by suggesting that faqīh must be in charge of collecting and distributing alms, they proposed a remedy in an early period.On the issue of leading the Friday prayer (ṣalāt al-jum‘a), which is one of the social duties of Imām, Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples considered the presence of the Imām or his deputy as a condition for a valid Friday prayer. In addition to this condition, Al-Ḥalabī, also added that a person who meets the necessary conditions can be also considered in leading Friday prayer. This addition by Ḥalabī was an important contribution to the solution of the problems encountered during the period of great occultation on both Friday prayer and delegation of Imām religious and political authorities to faqīh. On the other hand, Sallār, another disciple of Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, opposed the idea of the faqīh leading the Friday prayer in the absence of the Imām even when the necessary conditions are met. It can be said that this approach of Sallār led to the opinion of some Imāmis which considered Friday prayer unlawful in the absence of Imām. In the occultation period, Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples showed a cautious attitude about the implementation of the punishments. They argued that only Imām could implement the punishments. However, the major step was taken by Shaykh Ṭūsī on the issue of who implements the punishments in the occultation period. He argued that the Imām’s designated the faqihs to implement the punishments. In addition to this subject, Shiite scholars discussed the issue of whether a Shiite officer under the reigning rule in the occultation period implemented the punishments. On this issue, Sharīf al-Murtaḍā compiled a treaty untitled Mas’ala fi’l-‘amal ma‘a’al-sulṭan. For him, the main criteria are whether such person has necessary responsibilities and qualifications. Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples also continued their master’s conciliatory attitude. In the final analysis, the contribution of Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples on the issue of who will undertake the duties and responsibilities of the Imām is crucial in the systematization of the idea of transferal of the power of the Imām to faqīh including political one. In fact, Sharīf al-Murtaḍā’s advice to take part in the existing administrations has been considered a way out for the scholars who want to establish relations with the authorities in the later periods. (shrink)

The call for papers for this conference claims that 'the founders of modern philosophy of science, including Sir Karl Popper… saw it as part of their role to explain the authority of science’. It continues by declaring that 'A key motive for Popper's "demarcation criterion" distinguishing science from "pseudo-science" was to restrict the authority of science to disciplines which used the scientific method.' However, a closer look at Popper’s writing shows that this widespread view is incorrect. In fact, (...) Popper declares in the postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery: [I]t is all guesswork, doxa rather than epistēmē… Science has no authority… It represents… our hope of emancipating ourselves from ignorance and narrow-mindedness, from fear and superstition. And this includes… the superstitious belief in the authority of science itself. After briefly defending my contention, with reference to the work of Bartley and some of Popper's statements elsewhere, I will argue that Popper is better understood as attempting to demarcate inquiry from non-inquiry. I also hope to show that this humbler goal is worthwhile, especially when it comes to resisting calls to teach so-called ‘creation science’ in schools. Unfortunately, Popper has become associated with the relatively simplistic view that falsifiability is a demarcation criterion. But Popper recognized, even in the first edition of Logic of Scientific Discovery, that falsifiability alone does not suffice. He was cognisant of the problem posed by Duhem's thesis, and therefore stated: A system such as classical mechanics may be ‘scientific’ to any degree you like; but those who uphold it dogmatically—believing, perhaps, that it is their business to defend such a successful system against criticism as long as it is not conclusively disproved—are adopting the very reverse of that critical attitude which in my view is the proper one for the scientist. This would appear to be why Popper wrote of 'the non-existence of scientific method' above and beyond 'the one method of all rational discussion, and therefore of the natural sciences as well as of philosophy… stating one's problem clearly and examining its various proposed solutions critically'. In short, the critical approach is a crucial part of the demarcation puzzle. In the remainder of the talk, I will develop this solution to the demarcation problem in response to several possible criticisms. Chief among these is that 'creation scientists' do inquire but only with narrow scope. To address this criticism, I will draw on some of my recent work on the roles of criticism and dogmatism in science ; and in particular, I will consider if looking at matters from the group level can help. (shrink)

We aimed to conduct a scoping review to assess the profile of retracted health sciences articles authored by individuals affiliated with academic institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). We systematically searched seven databases (PubMed, Scopus, Web of Science, Embase, Medline/Ovid, Scielo, and LILACS). We included articles published in peer‐reviewed journals between 2003 and 2022 that had at least one author with an institutional affiliation in LAC. Data were collected on the year of publication, study design, authors' countries of (...) origin, number of authors, subject matter of the manuscript, scientific journals of publication, retraction characteristics, and reasons for retraction. We included 147 articles, the majority being observational studies (41.5%). The LAC countries with the highest number of retractions were Brazil (n = 69), Colombia (n = 16), and Mexico (n = 15). The areas of study with the highest number of retractions were infectology (n = 21) and basic sciences (n = 15). A retraction label was applied to 89.1% of the articles, 70.7% were retracted by journal editors, and 89.1% followed international retraction guidelines. The primary reasons for retraction included errors in procedures or data collection (n = 39), inconsistency in results or conclusions (n = 37), plagiarism (n = 21), and suspected scientific fraud (n = 19). In conclusion, most retractions of scientific publications in health sciences in LAC adhered to international guidelines and were linked to methodological issues in execution and scientific misconduct. Efforts should be directed toward ensuring the integrity of scientific research in the field of health. (shrink)

This article examines the criteria for determining when a local authority owes a duty of care at Common Law, concurrent with statutory obligations, in light of the decisions of the House of Lords in X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council and M (A Minor) v Newham Borough Council. The various policy arguments employed by their Lordships are analysed and located within current debate regarding the purpose and scope of the tort of negligence. It is argued that, in relevant (...) circumstances, English courts should have regard to the European Convention on Human Rights in order to conclude whether it is ‘just and reasonable’ to impose a duty of care. The cases under discussion raised issues under several Articles of the Convention (Article 6 and Article 8, in particular), and their impact upon the decision of the House of Lords, as well as the facts themselves, is assessed. (shrink)

Scientists of many countries in which English is not the primary language routinely use a variety of manuscript preparation, correction or editing services, a practice that is openly endorsed by many journals and scientific institutions. These services vary tremendously in their scope; at one end there is simple proof-reading, and at the other extreme there is in-depth and extensive peer-reviewing, proposal preparation, statistical analyses, re-writing and co-writing. In this paper, the various types of service are reviewed, along with authorship (...) guidelines, and the question is raised of whether the high-end services surpass most guidelines’ criteria for authorship. Three other factors are considered. First, the ease of collaboration possible in the internet era allows multiple iterations between the author(s) and the “editing service”, so essentially, papers can be co-written. Second, “editing services” often offer subject-specific experts who comment not only on the language, but interpret and improve scientific content. Third, the trend towards heavily multi-authored papers implies that the threshold necessary to earn authorship is declining. The inevitable conclusion is that at some point the contributions by “editing services” should be deemed sufficient to warrant authorship. Trying to enforce any guidelines would likely be futile, but nevertheless, it might be time to revisit the ethics of using some of the high-end “editing services”. In an increasingly international job market, awareness of this problem might prove increasingly important in authorship disputes, the allocation of research grants, and hiring decisions. (shrink)

The notion of authority in education has become an increasingly negative concept, regarded by some as championed only by rigid traditionalists and those who cling on to outdated educational theory and philosophy. Authority and the Teacher seeks to overturn the notion that authority is a restrictive force within education, serving only to stifle creativity and drown out the voice of the student. William H. Kitchen argues that any education must have, as one of its cornerstones, a component (...) which encourages the fullest development of knowledge, which serves as the great educational emancipator. In this version of knowledge-driven education, the teacher's authority should be absolute, so as to ensure that the teacher has the scope to liberate their pupils. The pupil, in the avoidance of ignorance, can thus embrace what is rightfully theirs; the inheritance of intellectual riches passed down through time.By invoking the work of three major philosophers - Polanyi, Oakeshott and Wittgenstein - as well as contributions from other key thinkers on authority, this book underpins previous claims for the need for authority in education with the philosophical clout necessary to ensure these arguments permeate modern mainstream educational thinking. (shrink)

People can be autonomous, if they are subject to authority. In particular, they can be autonomous if they are subject to the authority of law. I defend the first claim through a study of Joseph Raz's compelling account of authority; I claim that his work leads to the conclusion that autonomous judgment is needed to determine the jurisdiction of an authority, and to interpret its directives. I defend the second claim by arguing that law does not (...) claim unlimited jurisdiction, and need not claim unlimited scope for its directives. But the requirements of the rule of law create a standing risk that the law will not adequately recognize the autonomy of its subjects, because of its artificial techniques for controlling its own jurisdiction and for controlling the scope of its own directives. (shrink)

This chapter distinguishes between several senses of “normativity”. For example, that we ought to abstain from causing unnecessary suffering is a normative, not descriptive, claim. And so is the claim that we have good reason, and ought to drive on the right, or left, side of the road because the law requires us to do that. Reasons and oughts are normative, by definition. Indeed, it may be that “[t]he normativity of all that is normative consists in the way it is, (...) or provides, or is otherwise related to reasons” (Raz 1999, 67) . That is what the “reasons-first” view holds, but there are also other views, and what is by definition a normative statement, or a normative fact if you like, depends on how we define normativity. -/- It may seem that requirements are also by definition normative. But it seems that there can also be requirements that one has no reason to meet: it is less clear whether such requirements are normative in the same sense that reasons and oughts are normative. This paper will go through various further phenomena, which are candidates for being normative in some other sense than normative reasons and oughts, defending however the view that not all of them are. But arguably four or so different senses of normativity can be distinguished. -/- The paper will accept the view that the normativity of reasons and oughts, which is here called normativity1, is central. It is an open question whether all requirements or expectations or socially constructed norms are normative in that sense. Arguably it depends on the contents and content-independent authority of the legislators, whether we have good reasons, or ought, to meet the requirements, obey the law, or to follow the etiquette, or to conform to others’ interpersonal expectations, requests, demands or prescriptions. Whether and when we do have such reasons is a difficult and important substantive question, which concerns the normativity1 of requirements of law. -/- In another sense, norms (intended to guide behavior) are trivially or by definition normative, and constitute normativity: some forms of behavior are ruled as acceptable (e.g. driving on the right) and others as unacceptable (e.g. driving on the left) in light of the norm. Even in the case of a bad norm (that we have no reason to follow, and which ought to be changed, and ought not prevail) classifies behaviours as acceptable or unacceptable in light of the norm. Surely norms are by definition normative? Call this conformity to social norms and actual expectations normativity2. It is not an open question whether social norms are normative in that sense – they are by definition normative2. But importantly, it is an open question whether one has good reasons, or sufficient reason, or ought, to follow any social norm – that is, whether the norm in question is normative1. -/- The first section of the article characterizes further the difference between these two senses of normativity, and additionally introduces various other candidate senses of “normativity”. These possible senses of “normativity” may be at stake in the debates about normative requirements of rationality , about so called ought-to-be -rules , about normativity of linguistic meaning , about “directions of fit” of beliefs and desires , about subjective authority of intentions and decisions and interpersonal authority or co-authority of concrete others. -/- In later sections these cases are discussed. Do they constitute separate senses of normativity? And are the later phenomena such that they give agents good reasons: do they include normativity1 – the core sense? A “normative power -model” is suggested as a framework for examining whether actual social norms, laws, expectations provide good reasons and oughts or not. Once we understand the relation between the first two senses of normativity, do the later phenomena follow the same pattern – is the “normative powers – model” relevant for them as well? (shrink)

Gottlob Frege has exerted an enormous influence on the evolution of twentieth-century philosophy, yet the real significance of that influence is still very much a matter of debate. This book provides a completely new and systematic account of Frege's philosophy by focusing on its cornerstone: the theory of sense and reference. Two features distinguish this study from other books on Frege. First, sense and reference are placed absolutely at the core of Frege's work; the author shows that no adequate account (...) of the theory can avoid analysing the notion of thought that underpins it, or explaining how it has clarified our concept of judgement. Second, the theory is situated within the development of Frege's thought; the author reveals how the theory caused Frege to alter many of his fundamental views. In doing so the author presents a clearer picture of the problems the theory was intended to solve, and delineates more sharply the characteristic features of Frege's philosophy. (shrink)

With narrow exception, physicians’ treatment of incapacitated patients requires the consent of health surrogates. Although the decision-making authority of surrogates is appropriately broad, their moral authority is not without limits. Discerning these bounds is particularly germane to ethically complex treatments and has important implications for the welfare of patients, for the professional integrity of clinicians, and, in fact, for the welfare of surrogates. Palliative sedation is one such complex treatment; as such, it provides a valuable model for analyzing (...) the scope of surrogates’ moral authority. Guidelines for palliative sedation that present it as a “last-resort” treatment for severe and intractable suffering yet require surrogate consent in order to offer it are ethically untenable, precisely because the moral limits of surrogate authority have not been considered. (shrink)

Ethical research conduct is a cornerstone of research practice particularly when research participants include vulnerable populations. This study mapped the extent of reporting ethical research practices in studies conducted among refugees and war-affected populations in the Arab World, and assessed variations by time, country of study, and study characteristics. An electronic search of eight databases resulted in 5668 unique records published between 2000 and 2013. Scoping review yielded 164 eligible articles for analyses. Ethical research practices, including obtaining institutional approval, access (...) to the community/research site, and informed consent/assent from the research participants, were reported in 48.2, 54.9, and 53.7% of the publications, respectively. Institutional approval was significantly more likely to be reported when the research was biomedical in nature compared to public health and social, when the study employed quantitative compared to qualitative or mixed methodologies, and when the journal required a statement on ethical declarations. Institutional approval was least likely to be reported in papers that were sole-authored, when these did not mention a funding source, or when published in national journals. Similar results were obtained for access to the community site and for seeking informed consent/assent from study participants. The responsibility of inadequacies in adherence to ethical research conduct in crisis settings is born by a multitude of stakeholders including funding agencies, institutional research boards, researchers and international relief organizations involved in research, as well as journal editors, all of whom need to play a more proactive role for enhancing the practice of ethical research conduct in conflict settings. (shrink)

This important new study of theological method comes at the culmination of the author's distinguished career as both a scholar and creative thinker in philosophy and theology. It makes an important, groundbreaking and programmatic contribution to contemporary thinking about theological method. It derives its creativity in no small measure by grounding theological method in the American pragmatic tradition: most notably in the philosophies of Charles Sanders Peirce, the founder and guiding genius of American pragmatic philosophy; John Dewey, the articulate proponent (...) of pragmatic instrumentalism; and George Herbert Mead, the founder of social psychology.Its roots in the pragmatic tradition endow this theory of .. (shrink)

Political theorists have recently sought to replace the liberal, contractual theory of the firm with a political view that models the authority relation of employee to firm, and its appropriate regulation, on that of subject to state. This view is liable to serious difficulties, however, given existing discontinuities between corporate and civil authority as to their coerciveness, entry and exit conditions, scope, legal standing, and efficiency constraints. I here inspect these, and argue that, albeit in some cases (...) significant, such discontinuities fail to undermine the firm/state analogy, either because they are not significant enough to do so or because the particular trait on which they hinge is not decisive for how authority, in the state and in the firm, should be regulated to be legitimate. A pro tanto requirement exists, I thus argue, that corporate authority be held to regulatory norms comparable to those legitimate states abide by, including civil liberties, rule-of-law constraints, and accountability to subjects. (shrink)

The Reason Why by Edo Pivčević is an unconventional philosophy book. The author takes the wind out of the sails of the sceptic’s argument by removing its basis. It is neither epistemology nor ontology; nor does its outcome fall into the usual categories vis à vis the real, including pragmatism. A complete system is developed through a profound examination of explanation, contrasting the conceptual approach with the unbounded naturalistic kind and its dangers, illuminating examples of the latter kind with misunderstandings (...) and abuses in physics, mathematics and computer science; effectively demonstrating the confusions engenderedby varieties of reductionism. The author erects a rational structure of components which are mutually dependent and self-sustaining through the analysis and endorsement of common dualisms, e.g. necessary and contingent truth, self and the world; while distancing causality and determinism. (shrink)

This Article addresses the question of what limits, if any, freedom of speech would place on holding authors liable for the reputational damage they cause with fiction. By “freedom of speech” I am not referring to the First Amendment but rather to one conception of the moral idea underlying it. According to this conception, the limits that freedom of speech places on the scope of authors’ liability for causing false and defamatory beliefs are whatever limits are necessary to adequately (...) protect our interests as potential authors and audiences, and whose costs are acceptable in terms of other interests. To apply this conception, it will be necessary to identify our interests as potential authors of and audiences for fiction about real people, and to assess how these interests would be affected by different limits. Ultimately, I will argue that freedom of speech is consistent with holding authors liable for reputational damage caused by their violations of fiction’s “veracity rules” and for reputational damage caused by mistakes that their target audience would be expected to make. But liability for beliefs that are traceable to mistakes that only an author’s incidental audience would be expected to make is, I will argue, prohibitedby freedom of speech, so long as the costs of that protection remain acceptable. (shrink)

Background The COVID-19 pandemic forced governments, multilateral public health organisations and research institutions to undertake research quickly to inform their responses to the pandemic. Most COVID-19-related studies required swift approval, creating ethical and practical challenges for regulatory authorities and researchers. In this paper, we examine the landscape of ethics review processes in Africa during public health emergencies (PHEs). Methods We searched four electronic databases (Web of Science, PUBMED, MEDLINE Complete, and CINAHL) to identify articles describing ethics review processes during public (...) health emergencies and/or pandemics. We selected and reviewed those articles that were focused on Africa. We charted the data from the retrieved articles including the authors and year of publication, title, country and disease(s) reference, broad areas of (ethical) consideration, paper type, and approach. Results Of an initial 4536 records retrieved, we screened the titles and abstracts of 1491 articles, and identified 72 articles for full review. Nine articles were selected for inclusion. Of these nine articles, five referenced West African countries including Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone, and experiences linked to the Ebola virus disease. Two articles focused on South Africa and Kenya, while the other two articles discussed more general experiences and pitfalls of ethics review during PHEs in Africa more broadly. We found no articles published on ethics review processes in Africa before the 2014 Ebola outbreak, and only a few before the COVID-19 outbreak. Although guidelines on protocol review and approval processes for PHEs were more frequently discussed after the 2014 Ebola outbreak, these did not focus on Africa specifically. Conclusions There is a gap in the literature about ethics review processes and preparedness within Africa during PHEs. This paper underscores the importance of these processes to inform practices that facilitate timely, context-relevant research that adequately recognises and reinforces human dignity within the quest to advance scientific knowledge about diseases. This is important to improve fast responses to PHEs, reduce mortality and morbidity, and enhance the quality of care before, during, and after pandemics. (shrink)