The paper focuses on the notion of disability in the documents of selected international organisations. The social model approach to disability has been implemented since the second half of the 20th century and consequently such terms as ‘invalid’, ‘madman’, ‘dumb’, ‘cripple’, ‘paralytic’, ‘the lame’ or ‘the blind’ were removed from the literature, legal acts, or documents of international organisations. Notions like ‘disability’, ‘disabled person’, or ‘a person with disability’ are considered ‘politically correct’ now. It is (...) worth highlighting however that great emphasis is put to replace the term ‘a disabled person’ with the term ‘a person with a disability or disabilities” as the latter notion does not refer to the person’s characteristics with one adjective only, hence it does not stigmatize him/her either. The trend is reflected in the terminology used in the documents and acts introduced at the international level. Nevertheless, there are still a lot of difficulties with translation into other languages, which is also the Polish case. (shrink)

Complex social and ethical problems are often most effectively solved by engaging them at the messy and uncomfortable intersections of disciplines and practices, a notion that grounds the InVisible Difference project, which seeks to extend thinking and alter practice around the making, status, ownership, and value of work by contemporary dance choreographers by examining choreographic work through the lenses of law, bioethics, dance scholarship, and the practice of dance by differently-abled dancers. This article offers a critical thesis on how (...) bioethics has come to occupy a marginal and marginalizing role in questions about the differently-abled body. In doing so, it has rendered the disabled community largely invisible to and in bioethics. It then defends the claim that bioethics – as a social undertaking pursued collaboratively by individuals from different disciplines – must take much better notice of the body and the embodied individual if it is to better achieve its ends, which include constructing a moral and just society. Finally, this article considers how the arts, and specifically dance, provides us with rich evidence about the body and our ability to respond positively to normally ‘othered’ bodies. It concludes that greater attention to empirical evidence like that being generated in InVisible Difference will help to expand the reach and significance of bioethics, and thereby its relevance to important questions about the status of bodies and bodily differences, which must be considered as central to its ambitions. (shrink)

The Idea of Disability in the Eighteenth Century is a wide-ranging collection of essays that explores philosophy, biography, and texts about and by disabled people living in the eighteenth century. The book, which introduces and affirms the notion that disability studies predates most United States and United Kingdom findings by more than a hundred years, will be of interest to philosophers, historians, sociologists, and literary scholars.

L’anthropologue Roy Wagner a défini l’invention comme une manière de contester l’hypothèse selon laquelle la vie ordinaire est en grande partie déterminée. Dans ce texte, nous explorons la notion de handicap comme notion ordinaire et comme notion conventionnelle, en mettant en évidence le contraste avec la notion de normativité vitale proposée par Georges Canguilhem dans la section II du Normal et du pathologique, qui se rapprocherait de la notion d’invention que Wagner développe. Dans cette seconde (...) approche, le concept de normativité vitale décrit les efforts d’adaptation de l’individu, qu’il soit avec ou sans handicap. Alors que dans la première vision du handicap, collective, la normalisation contribue à l’altérisation du handicap (la normalisation contribue à constituer le handicap comme altérité), l’approche de l’invention de Roy Wagner, si elle était appliquée au handicap, mettrait l’accent sur la créativité individuelle. Nous défendons l’idée que cette vision différenciée du handicap, tout comme le concept de normativité vitale de Canguilhem, ouvre de nouvelles voies pour l’émancipation du handicap/des personnes handicapées au-delà du champ des représentations. (shrink)

The Idea of Disability in the Eighteenth Century is a wide-ranging collection of essays that explores philosophy, biography, and texts about and by disabled people living in the eighteenth century. The book, which introduces and affirms the notion that disability studies predates most United States and United Kingdom findings by more than a hundred years, will be of interest to philosophers, historians, sociologists, and literary scholars.

This paper examines transhuman technologies that seek to eradicate disability - primarily prostheses and implants. While most would agree that disability denies individuals the same quality of life as those deemed “abled,” this eradication ultimately relies upon secular humanist notions of the perfect human. Transhuman technologies hold obvious implications for the human body, however they also hold implications for what it means to be an acceptable body; ultimately these technologies aim to create the perfect human by eradicating the (...) disabled Other. This paper uses these notions to question concepts of “hierarchies of life,” at which disabled individuals are most commonly moved towards the bottom, or at the very least considered nonhuman. This article seeks to provide alternative theory to the eradication of disability, which states that these individuals may not have the same mode of existence, but that their mode/s are just as valid as those lived by “abled” individuals through an examination of Braille. (shrink)

In this paper I review how the notion of gender is understood in psychiatry, specifically in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5). First, I examine the contraposition between sex and gender, and argue that it is still retained by DSM-5, even though with some caveats. Second, I claim that, even if genderqueer people are not pathologized and gender pluralism is the background assumption, some diagnostic criteria still conceal a residue of gender dualism (...) and essentialism. Third, I consider gender dysphoria, which is characterized by an incongruence between one’s experienced or expressed gender and one’s assigned gender; since this condition pertains to distress and disability, not to the incongruence per se, it does not pathologize transgender people. Still, I contend that it should be removed from DSM-5 for theoretical reasons. (shrink)

The practice of terminating a pregnancy following the diagnosis of a fetal abnormality raises questions about notions of bodily normality and the ways these shape ethical decision-making. This is particularly the case with terminations done on the basis of ostensibly minor morphological anomalies, such as cleft lip and isolated malformations of the limbs or digits. In this paper, I examine a recent case of selective termination after a morphology ultrasound scan revealed the fetus to be missing a hand . Using (...) the work of Georges Canguilhem, I show that a person with acheiria could be considered normal. Further, I show that this case reveals a kind of “undecidability” in the significance of fetal sex/gender and disability in termination. From this, I consider the conceptual interaction of disability with sex/gender, to argue that the ethics of disability termination are not as distinct from those of sex/gender selection as is commonly supposed. (shrink)

This paper charts the concepts of grip and the bodily auxiliary in Maurice Merleau-Ponty to consider how they find expression in disability narratives. Arguing against the notion of “maximal grip” that some commentators have used to explicate intentionality in Merleau-Ponty, I argue that grip in his texts functions instead as a compensatory effort to stave off uncertainty, lack of mastery, and ambiguity. Nearly without exception in Phenomenology of Perception, the mobilization of “grip” is a signal of impending loss, (...) and is offered as a strategy for managing failure rather than as an example of sure-footed mastery. I read Merleau-Ponty alongside Mary Felstiner's Out of Joint: A Public and Private Story of Arthritis to explore these other, attenuated dimensions of grip. Finally, the paper turns to Harriet McBryde Johnson's memoir Too Late to Die Young as an example of a way of thinking disabled embodiment otherwise. (shrink)

This essay treats the field of philosophy and the study of disability such that each may be conceived of in terms of the other, perhaps to the extent that they may be thought of as one. First, it examines the bases and methods of various documents in the study of disability, finding that such study may be conceived of as essentially philosophical, even as the philosophical nature of disability studies threatens such studies’ practice. Then philosophy is depicted (...) as that discourse which necessarily interrogates its bases and methods -that is, as discourse that engages its own ability. The two fields are presented as exemplary of the interrogation of ability, particularly of discursive ability. The essay’s primary influence is Emmanuel Levinas, mainly for the emphasis he places on the nature of language in his approach to philosophical critique. Developing the notion of im/possibility -the simultaneous emergence of a discourse’s conditions of possibility with those of its impossibility -the essay focuses on “dis/ability” as the central notion in the convergence of philosophy and disability studies. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Accurate Self-Assessment, Autonomous Ignorance, and the Appreciation of DisabilityJoel Anderson (bio) and Warren Lux (bio)In their thoughtful commentaries on our essay, "Knowing your own strength: Accurate self-assessment as a requirement for personal autonomy," George Agich, Ruth Chadwick, and Dominic Murphy (2004) provide both criticisms and insights that give us a context in which to clarify further our claim that one's autonomy is impaired when one is unable to appreciate (...) whether one has the capacities required for tasks one is undertaking. We focus on two issues: the extent to which our account of autonomy suggests a problematically "externalist" or "objective" approach and the issue of whether our talk of accurate self-assessment entails an overdemanding requirement that one know numerous facts about oneself to count as autonomous.The External Point of ViewFor many, the idea that specific regions of the brain might be relevant to a person's autonomy evokes nightmarish, startlingly reductionist visions of a world in which informed consent is decided on the basis of neuroimaging. In arguing that a capacity for self-assessment is essential for autonomy and also presupposes executive function that is often impaired by prefrontal damage, we do not wish to engage in such reductionism by suggesting that there is any straightforward, one-to-one mapping comparable to that presupposed by the nightmare scenarios. Given what we know about the brain's plasticity, the prospects (although limited at present) for neurorehabilitation, the multiplicity of the instantiation of autonomy-related capacities, and, especially, the constitutively moral/normative dimensions of these capacity concepts, such mappings are clearly problematic. This is true even in the easy cases, which, as Murphy points out, include our case of "John." This is all the more true with regard to the more complicated psychiatric cases, including disorders such as depression where the normative dimensions and the greater interpretive leeway in diagnosis preclude reductionist solutions (See Anderson 2004). For these reasons and for independent philosophical reasons, we are uncomfortable with the label "externalist," [End Page 309] although we acknowledge and confirm our view that externally applied neuroscientific notions—and evidence—can inform these matters. Nonetheless, we do not wish to argue for a fully externalist point of view, especially when paired with the idea that we are advocating a "smooth naturalistic picture of the cognitive basis of autonomy" (Murphy 2004, 303). Murphy puts us in some terrific company with the likes of John Doris, Shaun Nichols, and—we would add—himself, and this is welcome and flattering. But, to avoid any misunderstanding of an issue that we do not actually take up in our essay, we should caution that we do not endorse a program of naturalizing the normativity on which many of central autonomy-related concepts are based. The notion, for example, of what it is to assess competently one's chances of success cannot be replaced with a set of nomological regularities or a self-applying list of necessary and sufficient conditions.Appreciating Disability and Knowing the FactsOne of the central challenges we face in presenting our approach is to distinguish our requirement of "accurate self-assessment" from an implausible requirement that one have no false beliefs about one's capacities. In different ways, all three commentaries make it clear that our argument would benefit from further clarification of this distinction.In her commentary, Chadwick suggests that our approach may commit us to requiring too much self-knowledge, specifically, that it seems to require accurate knowledge of things like our genetic makeup as a requirement for autonomy. To begin with, it is worth underscoring again that the requirement we have introduced is explicitly task specific: we are focused here on whether an agent has an understanding of things that are relevant for undertaking an intended task, and declarative knowledge of facts, genetic or otherwise, about oneself is relevant only insofar as they bear on that understanding.But Chadwick's point clearly goes deeper. In that regard, it is particularly important to underscore that ours is actually a requirement that has less to do with knowing facts—even task-specific ones—about oneself and much more to do with having the ability to incorporate available... (shrink)

In her landmark volume _Freakery: Cultural Spectacles of the Extraordinary Body_, Rosemarie Garland-Thomson argues that the Enlightenment heralded a striking change in the way European and American thinkers conceptualized disability—away from earlier notions of disability as a marvel or wonder, toward a discourse of normalcy and deviance that framed disability as an aberration. Might returning to wonder offer us a path to approach disability differently? This article probes two risks: the way treating disabled people _as_ wondrous (...) can be used to objectify, turning disabled bodies into sites that matter because they spark feeling in others; and the way a call to _experience_ wonder can figure certain feelings or modes of perception as prerequisites for a meaningful life. Considering the way that disabled writers narrate our own experience showcases wonder’s possibilities: new orientations toward beauty, care, interdependence, and a sensuous engagement with the complex present of disabled people’s lives. (shrink)

The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is increasingly seen as driving a paradigm shift in mental health law, particularly in relation to the understanding that it requires a shift from substituted to supported decisions. This article identifies two competing moral commitments implied by this shift, both of which appeal to the notion of autonomy. It is argued that because of these commitments the Convention is in tension with more general calls in the medical ethics literature for (...) preserving patient autonomy through support. The competing commitments within the Convention also present a particular challenge in putting the support it requires into practice. A discursive control account of freedom is used to develop some practical guidelines for navigating this new moral territory. (shrink)

This article questions the notion of a disembodied theology which can provide ultimate answers about an absolute God. It places this questioning within the truly challenging arena of mental health. While issuing challenge to theology the author calls for a pastoral theology that is willing to cross boundaries, those that were perhaps not even previously imagined. This is a daring, moving and embodied challenge to the more constraining and controlling areas of theology and pastoral care.

The notion of being a burden to others is mostly discussed in the context of care‐intensive diseases or end‐of‐life decisions. But the notion is also crucial in decision‐making at the beginning of life, namely regarding prenatal testing. Ever more sophisticated testing methods, especially non‐invasive prenatal testing (NIPT), allow the detection of genetic traits in the unborn child that may cause disabilities. A positive result often influences the decision of the pregnant women towards a termination of the pregnancy. Thus, (...) critics claim that these testing methods send a negative message to people with disabilities. At the core of this is what we call the burden assumption. This assumption claims that children with disabilities are necessarily a burden to others, especially to their parents and other family members. In this paper, we discuss what being a burden to others means in this context and how such an attitude can be avoided without restraining reproductive autonomy. A closer examination shows that the burden assumption is mostly based on misinformation and a false model of disability. Empirical studies as well as narrative evidence from parents who raise a child with disabilities show that the burden assumption is wrong. Raising a child with disabilities does not necessarily mean a decrease in the quality of life. We show how the burden assumption can be challenged through an advanced genetic counselling that combines empirical evidence with narratives from a first‐person perspective. (shrink)

Abstract:How might identity and identity politics inform music teachers' practices and assumptions about disability? In this article, we engage in a critical discussion about how music educators might respond to disability. This article is presented in three parts as a collaborative dialogue between the two authors, using the landscape of identity politics to frame the discussion. In the first part, Warren Churchill discusses Tobin Siebers' theorizing of "the ideology of ability" as it relates to music education's dominant response (...) to disability. Building on his idea of "complex embodiment," Siebers lays out a justification for disabled individuals to actively engage in identity politics for self-advocacy. Churchill connects Siebers' ideology to Joseph Abramo's epistemology of sound. In the second part, Cara Faith Bernard makes a counter-argument against deploying identity politics in the music classroom, drawing upon Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's notion of strategic essentialism to examine its potential risks with regards to music education curricula, in which essentialism may lead to establishing detrimental "best practices" for students. Thereafter, in Part Three, the authors join together to make sense of these seemingly contradictory philosophical outlooks on identity politics, in the hope of furthering conversation about music education's ongoing response to disability. (shrink)

Scholars in language and social interaction have long been concerned with the role of texts in institutional settings, studying, for example, how interview schedules actively shape conversational dynamics between participants. While texts have been acknowledged as active in this way, their generative capacity remains largely overlooked. This article argues that like human subjects, texts in interaction enact agency. One text in particular, a screening form used to diagnose the learning disability attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, is analyzed to claim that this (...) text brings about the very condition it is designed to measure: a learning disability. Drawing from work in discursive psychology, I show how the measurement requires the client to adopt certain speaking positions, which then enables the text to speak for the client. I also demonstrate how the text constructs otherwise normal behavior as pathological through punctuation and nominalization. Finally, I illustrate how the spatial organization of the text constrains clients’ choices for interacting with it. This article claims that texts produce, rather than reflect, cognitive phenomena, and it moreover encourages that the notion of text as agent be taken seriously, especially when it presents the capacity to disable. (shrink)

The visible condition of a person in bodily pain or of a person who has lost autonomy, social status or self–representation, reveals to some degree an invisible reality which is present in every human being. Assuming the validity of this premise, my primary purpose in the following paper is first to reflect upon social and cultural attitudes that consider disability and vulnerability as a boundary and a threat; and secondly, to propose an alternative in transgressing the differences of socio (...) - anthropological boundaries in order to enable dynamic communication with fellow human beings, and ultimately, to bring about the true human flourishing. The structure of my argument is threefold. In a first part my focus is stressed upon concerns of those living with a physical condition of disability and a mainstream socio–cultural attitudes towards it. In the second part, my attention will be on the meaning of vulnerability associated with, but distinct from the notion of disability. Thirdly, I will elucidate my argument with concrete examples from the L´Arche community - where people with and without disabilities are living together in mutual interdependency and cooperation. (shrink)

In this paper I reflect upon my personal experience of chronic progressive multiple sclerosis in order to provide a phenomenological account of the human experience of disability. In particular, I argue that the phenomenological notion of lived body provides important insights into the profound disruptions of space and time that are an integral element of changed physical capacities such as loss of mobility. In addition, phenomenology discloses the emotional dimension of physical disorder. The lived body disruption engendered by (...) loss of mobility includes a change in the character of surrounding space, an alteration in one's taken-for-granted awareness of objects, the disruption of corporeal identity, a disturbance in one's relations with others, and a change in the character of temporal experience. The loss of upright posture is of particular significance since it not only concretely diminishes autonomy but affects the way one is treated by others. Such a change in posture is, therefore, particularly disruptive in the social world of everyday life. An understanding of the lived body disruption engendered by disability has important applications for the clinical context in devising effective therapies, as well as for the social arena in determining how best to resolve the various challenges posed by chronic disabling disorders. (shrink)

Some humanist theologians within the French Reformed Church in the 17th century developed the notion that a disability of the intellect could exist in nature independently of any moral defect, freeing its possessors from any obligations of natural law. Sharpened by disputes with the church leadership, this notion began to suggest a species-type classification that threatened to override the importance of the boundary between elect and reprobate in the doctrine of predestination. This classification seems to look forward (...) to the natural history of mind that emerged later in the century. (shrink)

The Middles Ages are often portrayed as a time in which people with physical disabilities in the Latin West were ostracized, on the grounds that such conditions demonstrated personal sin and/or God’s judgment. This was undoubtedly the dominant response to disability in various times and places during the fifth through fifteenth centuries, but the total range of medieval responses is much broader and more interesting. In particular, the 13th-15th century treatment of three groups (martyrs, mothers, and mystics - whose (...) physical ‘defects’ were often understood as signs of special connection to God in this life, and who were often represented as retaining these signs in the life to come) challenge standard notions of beauty, disfigurement, and bodily perfection, particularly as the notion is applied to eternal life and our ultimate end. (shrink)

This article presents an archaeological inquiry into the early histories of Quality of Life (QoL) measures, and takes this as an occasion to rethink the concept of the ‘medical model of disability’. Focusing on three instruments that set the ground for the emergence of QoL measures, namely, the Karnofsky Performance Scale (KPS, 1948), and the classification of functional capacity as a diagnostic criterion for heart diseases (Bainton, 1928) and as a supplementary aid to therapeutic criteria in rheumatoid arthritis ( (...) Steinbrocker, Traeger, and Batterman, 1949 ) – I discuss how medicine, throughout the emergence of QoL, began to expand its gaze beyond the confines of the body to what that body does in daily life. Building upon Armstrong et al.’s notion of ‘distal symptoms’ (2007) and Wahlberg’s idea of ‘knowledge of living’ (2018), I propose the notion of disabilitization to encapsulate this expansion of the clinical gaze, through which medicine has come to articulate diseases and their treatments in new ways, and in so doing, has inadvertently created disability as a new kind of knowledge category in itself – a category that is defined not through its reduction to mere pathology, but through its dispersal into everyday life. I present this concept not as a periodization, but as a provocative discontinuity with the totalizing history assumed within the medical model of disability, and in so doing, ask what, in fact, holds ‘the medical model’ together, and whether there might be other ways of understanding medicine’s complex relationship to disability than what the concept of the medical model allows us to envisage. (shrink)

The sexual assault of persons with mental disabilities occurs at alarmingly high rates worldwide. These assaults are a form of gender-based violence intersecting with discrimination based on disability. Our research on the treatment of such cases in the Canadian criminal justice system demonstrates the systemic barriers these victims face at the level of both substantive legal doctrine and trial procedure. Relying on feminist legal theory and disability theory, we argue in this paper that abuses of trust and power (...) underlie most sexual assaults of women with mental disabilities. We argue that existing Criminal Code provisions in Canada are inadequate to address this type of exploitation because courts have consistently failed to recognize that such abuses of power and trust are fundamentally inconsistent with any notion of voluntary consent. (shrink)

Disagreement about the properattitude toward disability proliferates. Yetlittle attention has been paid to an importantmeta-question, namely, whether ``disability'' isan essentially contested concept. If so, recentdebates between bioethicists and the disabilitymovement leadership cannot be resolved. Inthis essay I identify some of the presumptionsthat make their encounters so contentious. Much more must happen, I argue, for anydiscussions about disability policy andpolitics to be productive. Progress depends onconstructing a neutral conception ofdisability, one that neither devaluesdisability nor implies that persons withdisabilities (...) are inadequate. So, first, I clearaway the conceptual underbrush that makes usthink our idea of disability must bevalue-laden. Second, I sketch someconstituents of, and constraints upon, aneutral notion of disability. (shrink)

The notion of information puts the human, the animal and the vegetable all on the same plane, and tends to dissolve the previous specificities of these categories. DNA, in this way, is fetishized. Also, the notion of information, and of the gene, has moved from the domain of expert or technical culture to become a part of mass culture: a development that has important social consequences. The human body is seen as a prototype that needs to be tested (...) or rectified (a consequence of the notion of ‘bad’ genes). From prenatal testing to the courtroom, it is implicitly around the notion a ‘life worth living’ (that is to say, of good morphological or genetic quality) that intense debates have arisen concerning the status of the body, of illness and of disability. Genetics is becoming part of the social environment, and it is setting itself up as a form of secular religion, with fundamentalist overtones. This article will analyse the anthropological shifts that have grown up around these new definitions of the human. (shrink)

From the standpoint of disability advocacy, further exploration of the concept of well-being stands to be availing. The notion that “welfarism” about disability, which Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane debuted, qualifies as helpful is encouraged by their claim that welfarism shares important commitments with that advocacy. As becomes clear when they apply their welfarist frame to procreative decisions, endorsing welfarism would, in fact, sharply undermine it. Savulescu and Kahane's Principle of Procreative Beneficence—which reflects transhumanism, or advocacy of (...) radical bioenhancement—morally requires parents to choose the child who will, in all probability, have “the best life.” Assuming the emergence of potent biotechnologies, procreative decision-making would be highly standardized, for prospective parents would be morally obliged to maximize select capacities, including intelligence, self-control, and hedonic set-point, in their children. Welfarism, applied to reproduction, is staunchly objectivist about what course is incumbent on decision-makers, giving no credence to first-personal values, aspirations, and experiences. Though this dismissal of individual perspectives applies to everyone, its implications for disability advocacy are especially severe. With that advocacy in view, greater attention to “well-being” should, therefore, be severed from the welfarism of Savulescu and Kahane. (shrink)

This book uses insights from disability studies to understand in a deeper way the ethical implications that genetic technologies pose for Christian thought. Theologians have been debating genetic engineering for decades, but what has been missing from many theological debates is a deep concern for persons with genetic disabilities. In this ambitious and stimulating book, Devan Stahl argues that engagement with metaphysics and a theology of nature is crucial for Christians to evaluate both genetic science and the moral use (...) of genetic technologies, such as human genetic engineering, gene therapy, genetic screenings, preimplantation genetic diagnosis, and gene editing. Using theological notions of creation ex nihilo and natural law alongside insights from disability studies, the book seeks to recast the debate concerning genetic well-being. Following the work of Stanley Hauerwas, Stahl proposes the church as the locus for reimagining disability in a way that will significantly influence the debates concerning genetic therapies. Stahl's project in "genethics" proceeds with an acute awareness of her own liberal Protestant tradition's early embrace of the eugenics movement in the name of scientific and medical advancement, and it constructively engages the Catholic tradition's metaphysical approach to questions in bioethics to surpass limitations to Protestant thinking on natural law. Christianity has all too frequently been complicit in excluding, degrading, and marginalizing people with disabilities, but the new Christian metaphysics developed here by way of disability perspectives provides normative, theological guidance on the use of genetic technologies today. As Stahl shows in her study, only by heeding the voices of people with disabilities can Christians remain faithful to the call to find Christ in "the least of these" and from there draw close to God. This book will be of interest to scholars in Christian ethics, bioethics, moral theology, and practical theology. (shrink)

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Franklin G Miller recently argued that the wrongness of killing is best explained by the harm that comes to the victim, and that ‘total disability’ best explains the nature of this harm. Hence, killing patients who are already totally disabled is not wrong. I maintain that their notion of total disability is ambiguous and that they beg the question with respect to whether there are abilities left over that remain relevant for the goods of (...) personhood and human worth. If these goods remain, then something more is lost in death than in ‘total disability,’ and their explanation of what makes killing wrong comes up short. But if total disability is equivalent with death, then their argument is an interesting one. (shrink)

In asking scholars to reflect on the structures and practices of academic knowledge that render alternative knowledge traditions irrelevant and invisible, as well as on the ways these must change for the academy to cease functioning as an instrument of westernization rather than as an authentically global and diverse intellectual commons, the editor of this special issue of the Journal of Academic Ethics is envisaging a world much needed and much resisted. A great deal of the conversation about diversity in (...) higher education emphasizes, rightly, the need for an international and ethnically diverse population of scholars and students. Less attention is paid to the value of cognitive diversity—the diversity of cognition generated by cognitive disabilities. As one aspect of intellectual diversity, cognitive diversity promises novel ways of thinking and new understandings of what knowledge is, who makes it, and how it is made. The unique value of cognitive diversity is its insistence on a radical shift in our conception of who can know and who can produce knowledge. Insisting on the inclusion, as scholars, of persons with minds labelled disabled, an epistemology of disability pushes us to reform the much criticized but still dominant notion of the expert and scholar as able-bodied and hyper-rational. (shrink)

This paper is dedicated to the first universities and mendicant schools, where thousands of students began to converge during the thirteenth century. Logic played an unpreceded role in basic and higher education. A “Parisian logical model” of education was shaped at the University of Paris, adopted by mendicant Orders in their schools of logic, diffused in all disciplines, and progressively spread in Southern Europe. Medieval education became heavily based upon logical, and even “logician” practices, with the “syllogization” of exegetical, disputational, (...) and evaluation practices.The notion of logical skill conveniently captures this unique situation for the discipline of logic, as well as the way medieval thinkers conceived of logic as a universal, transdisciplinary method, a natural operation of the mind, a modality of knowledge, the very form of teaching and graduating, a “habitus,” a technique and a science.The divisions of Aristotelian logic, the “artificial logic,” were for the first time naturalized and projected on the very structure of human mind, which was thereby “logicalized” and ascribed a “natural logic.” A strong anthropological dimension was bestowed on logic. The discipline of logic was deemed a necessary instrument in the philosophical “perfection” and the Christian “reparation” of man as an intellectual creature by a group of logically skilled, professional philosophers and theologians, whereas men deprived of logical education were described as “logically disabled,” and stuck into inferior forms of humanity.The world of medieval intellectual elites displayed a variety of social uses of logic, beyond academic circles, especially in the performance of pastoral duties. The possible historical records of the social usefulness of logic are explored: for students, the majority in medieval universities, who left university without a degree, but with a solid logical education, for ordinary mendicant friars, dedicated to preaching and confession, who frequented logical schools, and for members of the parish clergy sent to the faculties of arts. (shrink)

This essay examines dominant notions of reproductive identity in feminist bioethics from a queer-crip perspective by considering the “reproductive situation” in Germany of people who are classified as disabled and people who are classified as queer. I analyze the ways in which such people are excluded from the understandings of reproductive identity that figure prominently in German feminist bioethics, and argue that feminist bioethics in Germany, which has become a well-established part of important bioethical institutions, reflects many, if not most, (...) of the neo-eugenic developments that characterize more recognizably mainstream bioethics. I also show that feminist bioethics constitutes the reproductive subject as nondisabled, intelligibly gendered, and heterosexual. (shrink)

This article critiques the analysis of the comic and the tragic in disability discourse and the text by Ian Stronach and Julie Allan, using the work of Mikhail Bakhtin on the theory of the novel, of language and of speech genres. Taking Bakhtin's notion that to speak or to write is always essentially dialogic, the article introduces particular dimensions of audience, disability, feminism and poststructuralism in an attempt to explore the social organization of disability discourse and (...) to move beyond the artifice of the text's stasis. It argues that unless critical theory is matched with critical response, institutionalized inequality demands that the authority of an individualized `disability' text written by non-disabled authors remains intact - even when it is accompanied by an undermining discussion of itself. The text is commonly decontextualized and remote, and the role of the disable reader, especially their role as audience, is reduced to a `simple' one - a vessel into which the authors' authority is poured. This represents a particular kind of audience experience that maximizes the distance between the reader and the text's performance and, in the case of Stronach and Allan's work, ultimately destabilizes their arguments. (shrink)

The issue of genetic discrimination has attracted growing attention and has been the focus of a recent major Australian inquiry. It is, however, a complex and loaded notion, open to interpretation. This paper explores the concept of genetic discrimination in both its theoretical and practical dimensions. It examines its conceptual underpinnings, how it is understood, and how this understanding fits within the legal framework of disability discrimination. The paper also examines the phenomenon in practice, including the ‘fear factor’ (...) and the resulting implications for the development of regulatory policy. The paper argues that we need to be discerning in our interpretation of this term, and differentiate between discriminatory conduct which is legal and illegal. Further, it is argued that a concerted societal response to the ‘problem’ of genetic discrimination is needed involving targeted legal reforms as well as broader non-legal strategies. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.1 (2003) 91-97 [Access article in PDF] The Ambiguities of "Meaning":A Commentary Hans S. Reinders "Death, Disability, and Dogma" by Jennifer Clegg and Richard Lansdall Welfare (2003) is a rich paper that presents an unexpected but interesting mixture of observations and perspectives on mourning, grief and bereavement in the lives of people with intellectual disabilities.In a number of ways, the notion of meaning (...) is prominent in the paper. The authors observe that recent literature on grief and bereavement because of loss of loved ones does not confirm the "stage theory of loss." Instead there is a "multiplicity of possible responses to bereavement," which is partly explained by the role of cultural diversity. Cultural diversity is particularly involved in the development of "meanings" about loss (2003, 69). However, looking into the literature on grief and bereavement among persons with intellectual disabilities, the authors found that literature "dogmatic" in that it sticks to the traditional theoretical framework of "grief work" (2003, 74). The authors offer an explanation for this "stuck discourse": The approach to grief and bereavement among people with intellectual disabilities is framed within the philosophy of normalization. This leads professionals to downplay limitations to the potential of their clients in ways that encourage the denial of disability. The meaning assigned to intellectual disabilities, this is to say, is primarily positive. This positive outlook promotes the "belief in the apparently limitless potential of the client group to develop skills and autonomy if only they are given the right help" (2003, 71). The authors read this promoting of positive meaning as a counter strategy: our culture in general does not seem to be convinced of a valued meaning of life for persons with intellectual disabilities. Therefore, the professional world of service systems adopts a strategy of "separitism" (2003, 77), which explains why approaches to phenomena like grief and bereavement are "stuck" with ideas that are inadequate. The professional community attending those with intellectual disabilities is too much a world on its own. There should be more interaction between generalists and specialists on the subject of grief and bereavement.So far the general argument of the paper. Because my own area of research is not in the fields of clinical psychology or psychiatry, it cannot be my task to comment on Clegg and Lansdall-Welfare's presentation of the research on grief and bereavement in these fields. Nonetheless, there are a few points in their review of the literature that I will briefly address, but only to prepare the way for the major topic of this commentary, which is the issue of meaning as it relates to intellectual disability.Intuitively, my sympathy would lie with social critics arguing for caution with regard to the [End Page 91] medicalization of mourning and grief (Clegg and Lansdall-Welfare 2003, 67-79). The loss of loved ones will oftentimes be a traumatic experience, but when it is, I tend to see the symptoms of distress following that experience as a sign of mental health, more than anything else. Losing a parent, sibling, or someone else who has been part of one's life, is not only missing the other person, it is missing a part of oneself. That being the case, it is only to be expected that, in some sense, life will never be again what it was. Replacing notions of recovery from a traumatic experience by notions of "adaptation and accommodation" (2003, 68) appears to me the more sensible approach.Therefore, I tend to be suspicious about notions such as "pathological grief." From a philosophical point of view, such a notion seems to betray a modernist conception of the human subject in control of its own action. Following that conception, human beings need to transform that which happens to them by means of their own action so that they have made it part of themselves. Being overcome with grief one is in an emotional state that as such is "pathological"—as Immanuel Kant had it—the main characteristic of which is its heteronomy. A person overcome by grief is controlled by passion instead... (shrink)

This paper examines the ethical issues of the inclusion of workers with disabilities in the workplace with a cross-fertilization approach between organization studies, the ethics of care, and a movement from the field of architecture and design that is called Universal Design (UD). It explores how organizations can use UD to develop more inclusive workplaces, first by applying UD principles to workspaces and second by showing how UD implies an integrative understanding of inclusion from the workspace to the workplace. Moreover, (...) this paper discusses the ethical challenges and complexities that this design practice faces in regard to its applicability to diverse organizations and industries. Finally, this paper demonstrates that inclusion requires abandoning any notion of a perfect, productive body and, therefore, recognizing our shared vulnerability and fundamental interdependence in the workplace. (shrink)

In recent times, phenomena of conversational asymmetry have become a lively object of study for linguists, philosophers of language and moral philosophers—under various labels: illocutionary disablement and silencing, discursive injustice :440–457, 2014; Lance and Kukla in Ethics 123:456–478, 2013), illocutionary distortion. The common idea is that members of underprivileged groups sometimes have trouble performing particular speech acts that they are entitled to perform: in certain contexts, their performative potential is somehow undermined, and their capacity to do things with words is (...) distorted or even annulled. In this paper I will assess this idea, focusing on Rebecca Kukla’s and Rae Langton’s accounts; in particular, I will criticize the role the notion of uptake plays in their accounts, and claim that it may ultimately undermine the very idea of discursive injustice. While, according to Kukla and Langton, members of disadvantaged groups are victims of a kind of uptake failure, leading to illocutionary disablement and even silencing, in the account I present they are victims of a kind of communicative disablement. My overall aim is to develop a notion of discursive injustice that is more plausible and more effective for our broader purposes of criticising the structures of power and oppression. (shrink)

This paper examines the movement for independent living among the Japanese with disabilities from the perspective of multiculturalism and human rights. The IL movement questions the conventional idea, widely held by Japanese without disabilities, that disabled people are in need of special care and cannot live independently in ordinary communities. The IL movement advocates: 1) the reinterpretation of “disability” as mere “difference”, 2) the equal right to autonomy and social participation for the disabled, and 3) the unique right to (...) care and support that enable the disabled to be autonomous. The IL movement thus projects a new “disability culture” that assigns different meanings to disability and calls for radical change in social relationships. The IL movement then is one of many forces that celebrates diversity and advocates pluralism in Japanese society in defiance of the myth of a “homogeneous monocultural” Japan. The IL movement highlights the right to care as a basic human right which is a precondition for the right to autonomy. Consequently, the IL movement reinterprets the notion of autonomy and enriches the concept of “human rights.”. (shrink)

Employing critical discourse analysis (CDA), this paper examines how medicalized concepts of mental illness and paternalistic views are framed and used in the legal case, Thompson and Empowerment Council v. Ontario (2013). The paper argues that the case utilizes a pathologized notion of mental illness to justify and defend the legality of involuntary treatment, specifically, the community treatment orders (CTOs) under Ontario’s Mental Health Act (MHA). This paper shows how the Thompson case relies on medical reductionism and binary notions (...) of capacity versus incapacity while failing to consider intersecting factors and contextual and social determinants of psychosocial disability. Following this, I suggest that a postmodernist relational theory of disability could change the legal discourses about the MHA. Challenging the medicalized view of mental illness through the relational approach to psychosocial disability could have strengthened the plaintiffs’ case and prompted legal reforms for better safeguards under the MHA. In doing so, this paper offers a basis and future direction for legal reforms that can lead to legal mandates for improved social and healthcare services to enhance the autonomy of individuals subjected to CTOs. (shrink)

This chapter seeks to advance two central claims: 1) that the therapy-enhancement distinction is not an absolute one; and 2) that the social model of disability can be applied as at least one possible criterion for evaluating the ethics of enhancement. First, I address the limits of the therapy-enhancement distinction by showing that some accepted forms of therapy are indeed enhancements in their own right. The line between enhancement and therapy in medicine is therefore not clear-cut, but nor is (...) the difference between enhancement and disability straightforward either, as I argue. I discuss how some forms of apparent enhancement may in fact make people disabled from a social point-of-view, for they would not be able to function well in a society “fine-tuned” towards the current average range of abilities. Enhancement is therefore a slippery notion, and one that brings into relief questions of equity and of oppression. If enhancement is meant to be a key stepping stone on the path towards a posthuman condition, as some claim, then the ambiguous nature of enhancement surely throws into the question the coherence of the “post” in “posthuman.”. (shrink)

Disability has remained on the fringes of research in Africa in general and Southern Africa in particular, especially in the field of theology. Its glaring absence constitutes an indictment against both church and society, revealing in the process both the church's and society's penchant for a dependence paradigm which has been the paradigm with respect to issues of disabilities and people with disabilities. Using the participatory method with its proclivity for bringing to the fore the voice of the 'other' (...) and the marginalised, both the dependence and independence paradigms within the context of disability are put under scrutiny. In the process and through the voice of people with disabilities, the practical theological paradigm of interdependence emerges as the most appropriate and friendliest one, as it resonates with both the New Testament notion of koinonia through love and the African notion of botho through interconnection. The practical theology of holding each other in arms resonates with the theology of embrace that has been popularised by Volf within the context of much hatred and alienation. All these different dimensions of the theology of interdependence become the bedrock for inclusive and respectful treatment of each other irrespective of race, gender, religion, ability and social class. (shrink)

The issue of genetic discrimination has attracted growing attention and has been the focus of a recent major Australian inquiry. It is, however, a complex and loaded notion, open to interpretation. This paper explores the concept of genetic discrimination in both its theoretical and practical dimensions. It examines its conceptual underpinnings, how it is understood, and how this understanding fits within the legal framework of disability discrimination. The paper also examines the phenomenon in practice, including the ‘fear factor’ (...) and the resulting implications for the development of regulatory policy. The paper argues that we need to be discerning in our interpretation of this term, and differentiate between discriminatory conduct which is legal and illegal. Further, it is argued that a concerted societal response to the ‘problem’ of genetic discrimination is needed involving targeted legal reforms as well as broader non-legal strategies. (shrink)

This article probes the philosophical and political significance of the relationships between wheelchair activists and their wheelchairs. Analyzing disability memoirs and the work of a professional wheelchair dancer, I argue that wheelers frequently experience complex relationality and queer kinships with their wheels. By bringing the artistry of disabled writers and dancers into conversation with the notions of human–material relations in the work of Donna Haraway, Jane Bennett, Stacy Alaimo, and Mel Chen, I show how alternative animacies shape wheelers’ conceptions (...) of interdependence and movement. The sensuous pleasure they take in their wheels queers conventional conceptions of how humans should relate to things. New materialist philosophy has increasingly drawn attention to the porous boundaries between the human and material world. But where posthumanist philosophers have largely aimed to dethrone the sovereignty of the human, disability activists use alternative animacies to raise up a devalued and discounted portion of humanity: to emphasize the agency and capacity of those whose lives are often cast as pitiable and powerless, to express a queer feminist disability culture and politics, and to claim the transgressive vitality and vibrant artistry of life with disability. (shrink)

The claim that we have a moral obligation, where a choice can be made, to bring to birth the 'best' child possible, has been highly controversial for a number of decades. More recently Savulescu has labelled this claim the Principle of Procreative Beneficence. It has been argued that this Principle is problematic in both its reasoning and its implications, most notably in that it places lower moral value on the disabled. Relentless criticism of this proposed moral obligation, however, has been (...) unable, thus far, to discredit this Principle convincingly and as a result its influence shows no sign of abating. I will argue that while criticisms of the implications and detail of the reasoning behind it are well founded, they are unlikely to produce an argument that will ultimately discredit the obligation that the Principle of Procreative Beneficence represents. I believe that what is needed finally and convincingly to reveal the fallacy of this Principle is a critique of its ultimate theoretical foundation, the notion of impersonal harm. In this paper I argue that while the notion of impersonal harm is intuitively very appealing, its plausibility is based entirely on this intuitive appeal and not on sound moral reasoning. I show that there is another plausible explanation for our intuitive response and I believe that this, in conjunction with the other theoretical criticisms that I and others have levelled at this Principle, shows that the Principle of Procreative Beneficence should be rejected. (shrink)

This chapter argues for a normative distinction between disabilities that are inherently negative with respect to wellbeing and disabilities that are inherently neutral with respect to wellbeing. First, after clarifying terms I discuss recent arguments according to which possession of a disability is inherently neutral with respect to wellbeing. I note that though these arguments are compelling, they are only intended to cover certain disabilities, and in fact there exists a broad class regarding which they do not apply. In (...) section three I discuss two such problem cases: Locked-in Syndrome and the Minimally Conscious State. In section four I explain why these are cases in which possession of the disability makes one worse off overall. I do so by explicating the notion of control over one’s situation. I argue that disabilities that significantly impair control over one’s own situation – e.g., Locked-in Syndrome and the Minimally Conscious State – strongly tend to be inherently negative with respect to wellbeing, while disabilities that do not strongly tend to be inherently neutral. The upshot is that we must draw an important normative distinction between disabilities that undermine this kind of control, and disabilities that do not. (shrink)

This essay draws on two emerging fields—the study of comics or graphic fiction, and disability studies—to demonstrate how graphic fictions articulate the embodied, ethical, and sociopolitical experiences of impairment and disability. Examining David B’s Epileptic and Paul Karasik and Judy Karasik’s The Ride Together, I argue that these graphic novels unsettle conventional notions of normalcy and disability. In so doing, they also challenge our assumed dimensions and possibilities of the comics genre and medium, demonstrating the great potential (...) comics hold for disability studies. (shrink)

Cinema serves as a mirror, reflecting the development or state of society. It plays an important function in entertainment and education and can bring about a shift in our perspectives and attitudes. The article includes a descriptive analysis of Deaf Culture as a prominent subject in the movies Sound of Metal () and CODA () and clarifies the most prevalent misconceptions about disability in both films. In recent years, filmmakers have made an effort to create true and authentic representations (...) of Deaf Culture, moving beyond the notion of a tokenized portrayal of the Deaf. They shifted the emphasis away from unwarranted sympathy towards perceptive analyses of Deaf characters with the aim of dismantling the embarrassing perception of deafness. Filmmakers have provided the Deaf population with a voice by giving real-life Deaf performers a place in mainstream cinema. Even though many efforts have been made, the article also shows that the mainstream media have not generally represented the Deaf Community favourably. Furthermore, the article looks at the psychological conflict that arises when hearing people and hearing-impaired people share the same room. (shrink)

This paper explores the interconnectedness of persons with disabilities, technologies and the environment by problematizing Western notions of the independent, autonomous subject. Drawing from Deleuze and Guattari’s reconfiguration of the static subject as active becoming, prevailing discourses valorizing independence are critiqued as contributing to the marginalization of bodies marked as disabled. Three examples of disability “dependencies”—man-dog, man-machine, and woman-woman connectivities—are used to illustrate that subjectivity is partial and transitory. Disability connectivity thus serves a signpost for an expanded understanding (...) of subjectivity and suggests a radically altered ethics that is no longer premised on individual rights. (shrink)

What is conceptual injustice, and how can it supplement hermeneutical injustice? By bringing feminist epistemology, in particular Miranda Fricker’s notion of hermeneutical injustice, into dialogue with conceptual ethics and conceptual engineering, this article sheds light on what conceptual injustice is and how it can supplement hermeneutical injustice. What needs to be understood is how concepts can be advantageous to some and disadvantageous to others. For this, I propose approaching language in its relationship with ethics: something I call the ethics (...) of attention to language. By combining a Wittgenstein-Murdochian approach to concepts with the ethics of attention, I try to demonstrate how an ethics of attention to language can counter cognitive disabilities or forms of cognitive blockages constituting experiences of oppression and how it can be an antidote to conceptual injustice. I argue that this ethics of attention to language can be especially beneficial to feminism. (shrink)

In his recent Ars Disputandi article, ‘Some Difficulties for Amos Yong’s Disability Theology of the Resurrection,’ Ryan Mullins argues that Yong’s proposals are fundamentally misguided by Stanley Hauerwas’ dictum – which states that to ‘eliminate the disability means to eliminate the subject’ – and that therefore Yong’s disability theology of the resurrection body encounters potentially insuperable difficulties or is not sufficiently justified in the face of more traditional accounts. In response to Mullins’ criticisms, clarifications are offered with (...) regard to both the role of Hauerwas’ notion in Yong’s theology and the theological basis for claims regarding the persistence of the marks of impairment in the resurrection body. (shrink)