This chapter contains sections titled: Spirit, Metaphysics, and the “Unconditioned” Spirit as Positivity Alienation Rational Insight, Utility, and Freedom The Moral Worldview as the Culmination of the Positivity and Negativity of Spirit.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Schopenhauer's Pessimism and the Unconditioned Good MARK MIGOTTI SCHOPENHAUERTOOK PESSIMISMtO be a profound doctrine that had long been accepted by the majority of humanity, albeit usually in the allegorical form given to it by one or another religious creed. Accordingly, he credited himself, not with the discovery of pessimism, but with the provision of a satisfactory philosophical exposition and defense of its claims. It was, he contended, only within (...) the context of his philosophy, animated by the "single thought" that "the world is the self-knowledge of the will,"' that the ultimate significance of pessimism and the arguments demonstrating its inescapability can be brought to light. If, nevertheless, he sometimes appears to protest too much, to defend pessimism as if it were a striking and novel affair, he would have attributed this to the fact that he was, unfortunately, writing in the midst of one of the most naively optimistic cultures known to world history. 2 The philosophical reception of Schopenhauer's pessimism since the publication of The World as Will and Representation in 1818 would, one suspects, have been taken by him as further evidence of modern Western philosophy's optimistic somnambulance. For while other, comparably fundamental aspects of his thought--for example, his theories of action, of the self, and his criticisms of Kant--have received a welcome amount of fruitful, critical attention, his I would like to thank John Atwell, David Schmidtz, Susan Haack, Rudolf Makkreel and, especially,two anonymous referees, for prompting me to make substantial improvements to an earlier draft of this paper. ' Arthur Schopenhauer, Der handschrifllicher Nachlass 1, ed. Arthur Hiibscher (Frankfurt-amMain : Kramer, 1967),462; Manuscript Remains 1, trans. E. F.J. Payne(NewYork: Berg Publishing, 1988), 512. 'See, for example, Arthur Schopenhauer, D/e Welt als Wille und VorsteUung II. In Arthur Schopenhauer. Ziircher Ausgabe, ed. Arthur Hiibscher et. al. (Zurich: DiogenesVerlag, 1977),w 4:721, 732-33; The World as Will and Representation II, trans. E. F. J. Payne(New York: Dover Press, 1969),615, 625-26. Future references to this work willbe made within the text, by the abbreviation WW followed by section number, German edition volume and page number and English translation page number. [643] 644 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER ~995 pessimism has not. Amongst enthusiastic followers it has sometimes been swallowed more or less whole, but from more independent-minded readers it has generally met with disdainful mockery or well-intentioned neglect.3 The aim of this paper is to help rectify' this imbalance. In the first of its four sections, I present an account of Schopenhauerian pessimism that can claim a good measure of textual support, and the essential features of which are found often enough in the secondary literature to warrant calling it the mainstream interpretation.4 In section 2 I show that, as critics have charged, the arguments for pessimism on this interpretation suffer from a pair of fatal ambiguities, and in section 3 I sketch an alternative argument for pessimism, one not so obviously open to the sort of knock-down refutation to which the first argument succumbs. In the paper's final section l explore further the philosophical consequences of this alternative argument for pessimism. 3Gyorg'yLukacs, "Schopenhauer," chapter ~,section 4 of The Destruction of Reason, trans. Peter Palmer (London: Merlin Press, 1979), 19~-243, isthe locusclassicusof an attitude of superior scorn. Bryan Magee, The Philosophy of Schopenhauer (Oxford: "the Clarendon Press, 1983), z3-14, D. W. Hamlyn, Schopentmuer (London: Routledge, z98o), *43, Michael Fox, "Schopenhauer on Death, Suicide, and Renunciation." in Schopenhauer: His Philosophical Achievement, ed. Michael Fox (Totowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble Books, 198o), ]47-7o, and David Cartwrigh*, "Schopenhauer on Suffering, Death, Guilt, and the Consolation of Metaphysics,"in Schopenhauer: New Essays in Hotwr ofHis 2ooth Birthday, ed. Eric yon der Luft (Lewiston,NY: Edwin Mellen Press, t988), 66, all incline to the viewthat it was temperament, not argument, that drove Schopenhauer to pessimism, while Patrick Gardiner, Schopenhatwr (London: Penguin Books, ]963), does not discuss pessimism by name. Not even Nietzsche, the deepest and most astute of Schopenhauer'scritics,can resistbarbs of the following sort: "Schopenhauer, although a pessimist, in ]act played the flute... (shrink)

Towards the unconditioned: Kant, Epicurus and Glückseligkeit -- Arendt and the time of the pardon -- Kant, evil, and the unconditioned -- Judgment after Derrida.

This article tracks Derrida's readings of Kant and Husserl as they explore the relation between, on the one hand, faith and knowledge, and on the other, theory and practice. Kant had to limit the scope of theoretical knowledge in order to make room for a practical faith in the rational ideas of the unconditioned, generated through the unconditionality of the moral law. Husserl deployed the figure of ‘the Idea in the Kantian sense’ at those crucial moments in the exposition of (...) his transcendental phenomenology where the unconditioned comes into play, a problematic strategy that Derrida judges to have revealed the limits of the phenomenological project. While Husserl's call for an unconditional theoretical and practical renewal of faith in reason appears to offer him an out, Husserlian faith is ultimately dependent on an untenable circularity, to which the Kantian variety also succumbs. Only Derrida's unconditional gift of faith can save the honour of reason from its mortal crisis, but in a manner that is itself not wholly a matter of reason. (shrink)

In the Freedom essay, Schelling charges that (1) idealism fails to grasp human freedom’s distinctiveness and that (2) this failure undermines idealism's attempt to refute pantheism, as exemplified by Spinoza. This raises two questions, which I will answer in turn: what, for Schelling, is distinctive of human freedom; and how does the idealists’ failure to grasp it render them unable to refute pantheism? To answer these questions, I will reconstruct Schelling’s argument that freedom has the distinctness of being the unconditioned (...) condition of the world’s intelligibility. My reconstruction will illustrate how Schelling’s notion of freedom as primal will grounds the alleged primacy of practical reason as Kant and Fichte conceive it. I will then consider three objections to Schelling’s argument. Throughout, I will develop the Schellingian idea that freedom is enacted in an unprethinkable decision that cannot be anticipated by any law or principle. (shrink)

This article, inspired by the Derridean thinking of hospitality, attempts to reflect upon the conditions of peace and hospitality, taking a reading of Kant's ‘Toward Perpetual Peace’ as its guiding thread. It endeavours to show that the peace that inhospitable nations maintain between themselves is necessarily illusory, as they continue to amass the restrictive conditions of their hospitality. The hypothesis is proposed that the guiding thread that links the elements of the hyperbolic ethics that Derrida deploys in his ‘questions of (...) responsibility’ seminars indeed concerns this unconditional condition of peace, of which hospitality is the first law. (shrink)

In a series of lectures from 1804–05, Johann Gottlieb Fichte sets out a conception of enlightenment whose basic structure is, I argue, to some extent reproduced in two more famous accounts of enlightenment found in post-Kantian German philosophy: Hegel’s account of the Enlightenment’s struggle with faith in his Phenomenology of Spirit and the conception of enlightenment rationality presented in Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment. The narrative I offer serves to highlight, moreover, the critical role played by the notion of (...) an unconditional good in Fichte’s and Hegel’s critiques of enlightenment. The lack of an explicit appeal to, and account of, this notion in Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique of enlightenment will be shown to raise questions concerning how successful their critique of enlightenment can really be thought to be. (shrink)

The first published writings by Schelling, they were largely written at Tübingen at the conclusion of his seminary education and before his encounters with the new natural science and the new romanticism. Only one of these essays exists in the new critical text of Schelling which began to appear in 1979, and so the text Marti employs is that of Cotta reprinted in the edition of this century.

In his Kant on Laws, Eric Watkins presents an account of reason on which the principles of specification and continuity are regulative instructions to search for different kinds of the unconditioned. I suggest that we correct Watkins’ account in two ways. First, we need to complete Watkins’ claim to the plurality of the unconditioned: reason aims for three kinds of the unconditioned, associated with the lowest, next and highest concepts. Second, we need to look beyond reason’s search for the unconditioned (...) in order to properly understand the nature of the aim of reason. I argue that we construe reason’s aim as the systematic unity of cognition considered as a whole or, in Kant’s teleological terms, as the realization of an ‘idea’, or a ‘purposive unity’. (shrink)

This article provides an annotated English translation and edition of the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of Bhāviveka’s (490/500-570) _Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā_ 3.129cd-136 and of the Tibetan text of the _Tarkajvālā_ thereon, which focus on the discussion of unconditioned entities (_asaṃskṛta_). The study is accompanied by an introduction that outlines the general themes of the third chapter, the specific topics within the examined section and various problematic aspects found in the _Tarkajvālā_ exposition of Buddhist (Vaibhāṣika, Yogācāra) and non-Buddhist (Vaiśeṣika, Jain) doctrines and philosophies. (...) The multitude of inaccuracies detected within the examined _Tarkajvālā_ section cast doubt on its authenticity as a genuine work of Bhāviveka. It is hypothesized that the author of at least this portion of the _Tarkajvālā_ might have been a young student who struggled to recall the fundamental doctrines of the schools he attempts to elucidate. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant Yearbook Jahrgang: 8 Heft: 1 Seiten: 117-142.

The Corpus of English Philosophy Texts (CEPhiT) is part of the Coruña Corpus of English Scientific Writing (CC) following CETA (Corpus of English Texts on Astronomy). In accordance with the rest of the Corpus, CEPhiT has been compiled for the description of philosophical texts written in English in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The sampling method employed requires the collection of extracts of 10,000 words. This method has been followed in CETA and CEPhiT, with samples from 40 different authors in (...) the latter, both from Europe and North America. Text selection is based on some extralinguistic criteria, such as year of publication, sex, geographical provenance and text-types/genres. The corpus contains samples belonging to six different genre categories. This taxonomy, as well as some other extralinguistic information, can be used to search the corpus. CEPhiT, like CETA, is released on CD-Rom with Coruña Corpus Tool (CCT), purpose-designed software by IrLab. (shrink)

Comprising some of the key texts, this collection illustrates not only Kant's influence on British thought in the 19th century, but also gives a greater insight into British intellectual attitudes of that time.

I distinguish between the deep culture and the manifest culture, the relationship between the two constituting a circle, which constitutes the circulation of a radical theology of culture. The deep culture surfaces in the manifest, and the manifest draws upon the depths; neither one without the other. My hypothesis is that religion is an expression of the deep culture and for that reason, religion is not accidentally violent; religion is violent in virtue of something essential to religion. Religion is playing (...) with the fire of the concealed depths, of the unconditional, of the impossible, of the undeconstructible. Religion is the best way to save the world, but it also the best way to burn it down. It is both of these things and in virtue of the same property. This is not to say that religion is structurally violent, always and necessarily violent. It is structurally ambiguous, dangerous, on the verge of violence, whipsawing between radical violence and radical non-violence, between martyrdom and murder. Religious beliefs are not the cause of the violence but often a façade for deeper, visceral nationalism or ethnic hatred, The reaction of Christian right to the contemporary world is naive and simplistic but not superficial; it reflects a visceral fear of the postmodern world. Religion is a matter of being claimed by something unconditional, which means it should have the good sense not to lay claim to it. We should never trust anything that has not passes through that apophasis. Before any claims we make, we are laid claim to in advance by the unconditional, the undeconstructible, which Schelling calls the prius, the “un-pre-thinkable”. The unconditional in the optimal sense is love, which is an expenditure made without the expectation of a return, like loving one’s enemies, which is impossible, the impossible. But love does not get a pass. What would we not do for love? In that question is concentrated all the ambiguity of love, all the courage of the martyr, but no less the violence of the suicide bomber. (shrink)

Forgiveness has been a central issue for humankind since ancient times; it emerged in theology, but in recent decades it has received significant attention from different disciplines, such as philosophy and psychology. More recently, forgiveness has received attention also from organizational and managerial studies, particularly, in studying how individuals respond to interpersonal offenses, or perceived harm and wrongdoing in the workplace. Forgiveness is a complex concept, as it can be understood as a family of related constructs and can be analyzed (...) at different levels. Even if social sciences have widely recognized that the nature of forgiveness can be both conditional and unconditional, the notions of conditionality and unconditionality have not yet received sufficient study, especially in organizational and managerial fields. In these fields, forgiveness has been predominantly studied under a psychological approach, looking for the conditions under which it may occur in the workplace. Unconditional forgiveness has received less attention: with a few exceptions, managerial and organizational literature has limited the conceptualization of forgiveness, weakening its scope and probably not catching a relevant part of forgiving experiences in the workplace. This article proposes to follow a more comprehensive approach to forgiveness in the workplace, according to the social sciences field, which can take into account both conditionality and unconditionality. It focuses on unconditional forgiveness according to Continental philosophy, in particular, to the thought of Jacque Derrida and Paul Ricoeur. Through their contributions, the unconditionality of forgiveness is deepened, and the implications of considering both conditional and unconditional forgiveness are discussed. (shrink)

In his early works, Habermas wants to preserve both, the German idealist notion which gives primacy to self-reflection in the history of the human species, and the Marxist materialist conception that self-reflection is based on the material conditions of existence. ;Such dual preservation cannot be maintained; for the primacy given to self-reflection by German idealism is based on a prior spiritualization of the conditions of reflection. It is precisely with those alienated conditions that Habermas's "neo-Marxism" seeks to limit "materialistically" critical (...) self-reflection. This is a bad overcoming of Hegel, since it preserves the Spirit as alienated otherness. ;However, Habermas's more recent linguistic turn evinces an attempt to ground critical self-reflection by means of a de-historicized anticipation of an ideal speech situation through the formal rules of cogency of speech. ;An atheistic reading of Hegel's conception of life, which regards universal life as "congealed space" or pure positivity, allows for a transition to Marx's practical communism. ;The existential attitudes towards death have as their ontological correlate, the motion of life; that is, historical acts may be regarded as attempts to appropriate objectivity which, as pure positivity, cannot be appropriated in principle, especially after the notion of an all-encompassing transcendental subjectivity, which posits the object as alienated subject, has been rejected. ;In the early Marx, historical and social investigations were limited by the primacy of the subject, the object being subordinated to it. To this extent, he naively remained at the level of ideology, i.e., "lived relations." In this manner, the unconditioned supersensible, in the form of a transcendental subjectivity, clouds the examination of the objective conditions of existence. ;The mature Marx's turn to the object expresses the elimination of the unconditioned, and the concomitant consideration of social reality as the basis of positive and negative ideologies, to the extent that the consciousness of freedom arose from the forced emancipation of consciousness from and by material conditions. (shrink)

This article provides an annotated English translation and edition of the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of Bhāviveka’s (490/500-570) _Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā_ 3.129cd-136 and of the Tibetan text of the _Tarkajvālā_ thereon, which focus on the discussion of unconditioned entities (_asaṃskṛta_). The study is accompanied by an introduction that outlines the general themes of the third chapter, the specific topics within the examined section and various problematic aspects found in the _Tarkajvālā_ exposition of Buddhist (Vaibhāṣika, Yogācāra) and non-Buddhist (Vaiśeṣika, Jain) doctrines and philosophies. (...) The multitude of inaccuracies detected within the examined _Tarkajvālā_ section cast doubt on its authenticity as a genuine work of Bhāviveka. It is hypothesized that the author of at least this portion of the _Tarkajvālā_ might have been a young student who struggled to recall the fundamental doctrines of the schools he attempts to elucidate. (shrink)

Comprising some of the key texts, this collection illustrates not only Kant's influence on British thought in the 19th century, but also gives a greater insight into British intellectual attitudes of that time.

This article reconsiders the reciprocity objection to unconditional basic income based on the idea that reciprocity is not only a duty but a limiting condition on other duties. If the objection wer...

Much philosophy of the last few decades has witnessed a turn toward otherness and a corresponding calling into question of the autonomy of the agent. In my paper I attempt to re-conceive what agency is in light of this emphasis placed on otherness. I undertake this reconsideration through an analysis of the concepts of unconditionality in Kant and of conditioning by the other in Levinas. Through these analyses I arrive at a new concept: the unconditioning of the agent by the (...) other. I then provide some description of this concept by considering the interpretation of the theological concept of creation in Augustine, Kant, and Levinas. (shrink)

Human reason demands ultimate explanation; it demands a Because that admits of no further Because –something unconditioned. Pace dogmatic rationalist metaphysics, Kant concludes that theoretical reason must remain modest; it cannot know or cognize the existence of particular unconditioned entities (e.g. God or Leibnizian monads). The prevailing view goes even further; it maintains that theoretical reason cannot even know that something or other unconditioned exists. Yet I argue that Kant’s critique contains an ambitious conclusion: reason can know that something unconditioned (...) exists among things in themselves, even if it cannot know which particular unconditioned entities exist. I reconstruct Kant’s argument for this ambitious conclusion. On my reconstruction, the argument turns on a key metaphysical assumption about things in themselves: that they are completely determinate. And far from undermining Kant's case for modesty, I suggest, this assumption partly underlies it. (shrink)

A new, four-stage approach to the popular Buddhist practice known as loving-kindness meditation, with the aim of finding unconditional love in our own hearts, in our relationships, and in our perception of the world around us. The unconditional love that we all long for--in our own lives and in the world around us--can be awakened effectively with this unique approach to the Tibetan Buddhist practice of loving-kindness meditation. Tulku Thondup gives detailed guidance for meditation, prayers, and visualization in (...) four simple stages that can be practiced in as little as thirty minutes a session. The four-stage format is a brand-new approach being presented for the first time in English, distilled from the author's lifelong study and practice of authentic, traditional teachings. What if we could experience not only our own body, mind, and heart as a boundless source of loving-kindness, but every particle of the world around us as a beautiful realm filled with the blessing energies of the Buddhas and their celestial abodes? The whole environment would become a miraculous display of unconditional love, wisdom, and power, accompanied by the sweet music of holy prayers and inspirational teachings. This is not just a dream or a fantasy but an effective meditation practice that can bring relief from stress, healing to mind and body, healthier relationships, and a positive new outlook on the world around you. Loving-kindness meditations are a highly effective way to generate positive causation, bring true peace and love into our lives, and release ourselves from habitual suffering. When we train ourselves to desire the happiness and well-being of others, with the unconditional love of a mother who cares wholeheartedly for her little ones, we find our whole world pervaded by the positive qualities of joy, peace, and beauty. The training can be compared to sunbathing. As our body absorbs the sun's heat, it becomes warm and gradually emanates that warmth into our surroundings. In the same way, through devotion and trust in the Buddha of Loving-Kindness, we immerse our mind in his unconditional love, which we then radiate to those around us. The Heart of Unconditional Love presents this meditation in a new, four-stage format distilled from the author's lifelong study and practice of authentic, traditional teachings. The meditation can be practiced in as little as thirty minutes a session: In the Outer Buddha Stage, we open our heart with trust and devotion to the Buddha of Loving-Kindness and enjoy his unconditional love. In the Inner Buddha Stage, we experience the Buddha's unconditional love within and for ourselves. In the Universal Buddha Stage, we learn to see, hear, and feel the world around us as a blessed realm of unconditional love. In the Ultimate Buddha Stage, we rest in the awareness of unconditional love free from conceptual thinking. Designed to be accessible to newcomers as well as experienced meditators, this presentation is a brand-new approach to loving-kindness meditation, being published in English for the first time. (shrink)

The CP-violation problem and unconditional tests of discrete symmetries T and CPT are investigated in the exact quantum theory (QT) beyond the usually used Lee-Oehme-Yang (LOY) theory, which is based on the famous Weisskopf-Wigner (WW) approximation. New unconditional CP-violation effects, independent from those known before, new unconditional tests of the CPT and T invariances, and new results for correlations are derived. Corresponding general results are obtained for\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $$K^0 - (...) \bar K^0,{\mathbf{ }}B^0 - \bar B^0,{\mathbf{ }}D^0 - \bar D^0 $$ \end{document} mesons. On the base of these new theoretical results, some proposals for experiments by CP LEAR and ϕ, B factories are given. The new results are interesting not only for the CP-violation problem itself but also for testing violation of the standard quantum dynamics connected with ideas of quantum gravity. (shrink)

ABSTRACTWhether valence change during evaluative conditioning is mediated by a link between the conditional stimulus and the unconditional stimulus or between the CS and the unconditional response is a matter of continued debate. Changing the valence of the US after conditioning, known as US revaluation, can be used to dissociate these accounts. Changes in CS valence after US revaluation provide evidence for S-S learning but if CS valence does not change, evidence for S-R learning is found. Support for (...) S-S learning has been provided by most past revaluation studies, but typically the CS and US have been from the same stimulus category, the task instructions have suggested that judgements of the CS should be based on the US, and USs have been mildly valenced stimuli. These factors may bias the results in favour of S-S learning. We examined whether S-R learning would be evident when CSs and USs were taken from different categories, the task instructions were removed, a... (shrink)

The article examines one of the many philosophical problems that arise in the discussion on the prospects of unconditional basic income implementation. The author believes that the question of the future of labor should be reviewed in a social-philosophical perspective. The analytical potential of philosophical thinking can be useful in predicting the consequences of implementing the basic income initiative. The article proceeds from the premise that in the 21 st century the idea of basic income application turns from a (...) utopian project into real measures roadmap. The economic well-being provided by the widespread use of technical means makes it possible to seriously plan the transfer of many workers employed in the sector of services and non-material production to basic income. The author points out that first of all it is necessary to assess the consequences of such a measure for the people. Traditionally, capitalist society has been built around a narrative that hard work is well rewarded. The opposition of labor and free time has shaped consumption patterns and life strategies for several generations. In the conclusion, the author suggests to consider whether, by removing such a system-forming element from the social structure, the society itself will be put under threat. It may turn out that an initiative aimed at changing society for the better will actually turn out to become a personal disaster for many people who will not be able to find a use for themselves in the new world, which is already not built around labor. Among other things, the author draws attention that contemporary capitalism, by actualizing the idea of basic income, abolishes the very opportunity of human choice. Virtually all human activity transforms into alienated labor. (shrink)