This chapter contains sections titled: The Will and Modernity Schopenhauer's Architectonic Idealism An Argument against Hegel In Defense of Classicism Structure, Function and Form Architecture and Contemplation Notes References.

This paper presents a blueprint for an ecological cognitive architecture. Ecological psychology, I contend, must be complemented with a story about the role of the CNS in perception, action, and cognition. To arrive at such a story while staying true to the tenets of ecological psychology, it will be necessary to flesh out the central metaphor according to which the animal perceives its environment by ‘resonating’ to information in energy patterns: what is needed is a theory of resonance. (...) I offer here the two main elements of such a theory: a framework and a methodology. (shrink)

헤겔에 의하면 상징적 예술형식이 건축의 근본전형이지만, 건축은 그 내부에서 다시 상징적 건축, 고전적 건축, 낭만적 건축으로 구분된다. 이 점에서 낭만적 건축을 대표하는 고딕 건축이 어떤 예술형식에 속하는지가 문제될 수 있다. 헤겔은 괴테의 건축론을 수용하면서 고딕 건축이 중세에만 한정되지 않고 그 당대의 건축까지 포괄한다고 생각한다. 고딕 건축이 보여주는 특징은 대립하는 요소들의 공존을 공간적으로 구현함으로써, 인간 정신의 내면성을 강화하면서 유한성을 뛰어 넘을 수 있게 한다는 점이다. 더 나아가 고딕 건축은 살아있는 인간의 다양한 일상이 발생하는 장소이기도 한데, 이를 표현하기 위해 헤겔은 ‘노마드’라는 개념을 (...) 사용하기도 한다. 이러한 점들을 고려하면 고딕건축은 낭만적 예술로 간주되어야 적절할 뿐만 아니라 ‘세상의 축소판’으로 해석될 수도 있다. 이처럼 고딕 건축에 관한 헤겔의 논의는 근대 소설이나 후기 네덜란드 장르화에 관한 그의 논의에 버금갈 정도로 근대적 삶에 대한 예술비평으로 간주될 수 있으므로, 헤겔의 건축론은 다른 예술론에 비해 과소 평가되어서는 안 된다. (shrink)

'...deserves serious attention among new theories in architecture, and is recommended for all university architectural collections.'|s CHOICE.

The subject of this research is the theoretical works of Bernard Tschumi. The goal is to determine the place of the problem of corporeal experience in the theory of architecture of developed by the Swiss architect. For achieving the set goal, the author examines the key themes of his works – the question of boundaries and limits of architecture, architecture as the place of occurrence of the event; as well as a number of concepts – “pleasure”, (...) “limits”, “violence”. The texts created by Bernard Tschumi over the period from 1977 to 1981: “The Pleasure of Architecture”, the article “Violence of Architecture”, and a series of essays “Architecture and Limits” served as the sources for this analysis. B. Tschumi did not dedicate works to the problem of corporeal experience alone; however, addresses this problem in the context of interaction between the audience and the building. His attention is focused on the viewer’s sensory experiences emerging in direct contact with the architectural object. On the one hand, this apposes B. Tschumi with the representatives of the phenomenology of architecture – S. Hall and J. Pallasmaa; all of them emphasizes the kinesthetic, nonverbal nature of corporeal experience in the perception of structures, their internal space and materials. On the other hand, B. Tschumi describes the relations between the body and the building as violent. Violence in the relations between man and architecture is ubiquitous: it is the interference of of a person into the architectural space, as well as feeling of discomfort provoked by the architectural space. (shrink)

This paper aims to pay tribute to Figal’s comprehensive and innovative analysis of the artwork and beauty, while challenging both his realist position on the immediacy of meaning and his monist stance that reduces sublimity to beauty. To enquire into the origin of aesthetic feelings and sense, and thus, to break the hermeneutic circle, we first trace the origin of this reduction to the reception of Burke’s concept of the sublime by Mendelssohn and Kant. We then recur to Husserl and (...) Dufrenne to trace the origin of the sense of the feeling of sublimity in the realm of affectivity or sensuousness. This genesis takes place in passive experience, where we identify an excess of sensuous sense over categorial meaning that is constitutive of the affective sense that our bodily sensations give to hyletic material. It is argued that this sensuous excess evokes a sublime experience in the phenomenological sense, involving an affective and disruptive bodily experience and an endless process of sense formation. Affective or sensuous sense is thus an event that irreversibly affects the bodily surface. To elucidate this phenomenon, we draw on the theoretical framework of Breton and Bataille, positing it as a form-transgressive ‘convulsive’ sublime, which we then illustrate in the architectural works of Tschumi and Eisenman. In short, we have retrieved the origin of aesthetic experience and redefined the feeling of the sublime as a phenomenological ‘convulsive’ sublimity. (shrink)

'...deserves serious attention among new theories in architecture, and is recommended for all university architectural collections.'|s CHOICE.

Turing's analysis of computation is a fundamental part of the background of cognitive science. In this paper it is argued that a re‐interpretation of Turing's work is required to underpin theorizing about cognitive architecture. It is claimed that the symbol systems view of the mind, which is the conventional way of understanding how Turing's work impacts on cognitive science, is deeply flawed. There is an alternative interpretation that is more faithful to Turing's original insights, avoids the criticisms made of (...) the symbol systems approach and is compatible with the growing interest in agent‐environment interaction. It is argued that this interpretation should form the basis for theories of cognitive architecture. (shrink)

There are several interconnected themes in Roger Scruton’s The Aesthetics of Architecture, including an account of aesthetic experience, a criticism of reductive theories of architecture, and an account of the self. Through each of these themes Scruton spins a web of argument which supports some manner of conservatism about architecture, and, even more broadly, a conservatism about culture. In this paper I want, from a broadly Scrutonian perspective, to discuss whether it would be appropriate to use (...) class='Hi'>architecture in the same way as some have used the visual arts this century, particularly in 1950s and 60s New York, as a vehicle for criticising certain ingrained habits of seeing. By this I mean art which deliberately frustrates prior expectations of what would be something pleasing to look at. I shall work with an example, which I take to be only a placeholder for any number of candidates, of architecture which pays no regard to symmetry and what I will broadly call ‘laws of proportion’. (shrink)

In the vast literature on architectural theory and practice, the ways in which architectural knowledge is actually taught, debated, and understood are too often ignored. The essays collected in this groundbreaking volume address the current state of architecture as an academic and professional discipline. The issues considered range from the form and content of architectural education to the architect's social and environmental obligations and the emergence of a new generation of architects. Often critical of the current paradigm, these (...) essays offer a provocative challenge to accepted assumptions about the production, dissemination, and reception of architectural knowledge. Contributors: Sherry Ahrentzen, U of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; Stanford Anderson, MIT; Carol Burns, Harvard U; Russell Ellis, UC Berkeley; Thomas Fisher, U of Minnesota; Linda Groat, U of Michigan; Kay Bea Jones, Ohio State U; David Leatherbarrow, U of Pennsylvania; A. G. Krishna Menon, TVB School of Habitat Studies, India; Garth Rockcastle, U of Minnesota; Michael Stanton, American U, Beirut; Sharon E. Sutton, U of Washington; David J. T. Vanderburgh, Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium; and Donald Watson, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. (shrink)

My research is centred upon how architecture is invigorated by cyberspace, the blurred boundary between the virtual and the actual, and how the different parameters of these spaces can be used to inform one another. My early experience in practice was that buildings are limited by the inert materials used to construct them and by the unimaginative ideas of what a building should look like and be. My research draws upon a variety of different disciplines to inform one (...) class='Hi'>architecture. The areas of research are multidisciplinary and include the changing status of the architectural drawing, smart materials, computer-aided architectural drawing, computer-aided manufacture, emergent systems, responsive environments, the architectural design of cyberspace, interactivity, cybernetics and evolving systems and algorithmic design. To create responsive, non-prescriptive designs for architectural intervention was the starting point that led to an interest in the logic of algorithms and open-ended systems. These problem-solving diagrams used by computer programmers are very useful as a way of describing fluctuating conditions in responsive environments. This led to an interest in other computing paradigms such as cellular automata, complexity and emergence. These and other ideas I attempted to bring into the arena of architectural design to help architects cope with the rapid growth of computational technology, which is starting to revolutionize the way buildings are designed, drawn and built. We are at another of the important perturbations in technology and epistemology that seems to affect us so often these days. Cell biology is the new cyber-space and nanotechnology. Once we fully understand the exact nature of how our world makes us and, indeed how it sometimes kills us, we will be able to make true architectures of ecological connectability. This is our profession's future. Small steps have been made, but much more remains to be done. (shrink)

The notion of architectural experience has been explored by Roger Scruton in an essay in which he provides an account of both its structure and content, along with clarifications of certain key concepts in architectural criticism, such as architectural success and architectural beauty. In this article, I introduce Scruton’s theory and argue that, despite its intuitive appeal, some crucial elements for the appreciation of buildings as works of architecture are not adequately addressed there. I then propose various ways (...) of addressing these criticisms. (shrink)

Traditionally it is taken for granted that mental imagery (MI) is a mental representation (MR) of some kind or format. This yields that theory of MR can give an adequate and exhaustive explanation of MI. Such co-relation between the two is usually seen as unproblematic. But is it really so? This article aims at challenging the theoretical claim that the dominant ‘two-world’ account of MR can adequately explain MI. Contrary to the standard theory of MR, there are reasons (...) to believe that: (a) MI has different cognitive architecture, (b) the relations between elements of MI are dynamic, (c) relations between elements of MI are context-dependent. Consequently, it follows that dominant account of MR neglects important characteristics of MI and, thus, fails to give a comprehensive explanation of the latter. Alternatively, I will argue that a sign-theoretic approach, proposed by C. S. Peirce, can suggest a promising explanation of MI and fully account for the divergent empirical data on the matter. (shrink)

This article indicates a new direction for business ethics, which Lon Fuller pioneered with his work on social architecture. “Eunomics”, as Fuller called it, is “the theory or study of good order and workable arrangements”. How should we appraise the effects of the various ways of organizing and running a corporation, for example, with regard to the different structures and basic plans it can espouse? We should reject the “doctrine of the infinite pliability of social arrangements”, as some (...) forms of organization are unsound. They cannot be implemented in a proper fashion given the boundaries and the rules of the market established. A theory of business eunomics explains why each kind of legal process, including managerial direction, is better suited for the pursuit of a limited number of ends, and thus why we should not force a single institution to solve all ethical problems. (shrink)

Although Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) correctly emphasize the importance of conversation in children's social understanding, they neglect several complex issues. Contrary to their assertion, the focus on mental state processing has not been misplaced, and there is a need to recognize that different aspects of social understanding are liable to undergo distinctive developmental changes that vary in relation to social interaction.

Recent work in cognitive neuroscience on the child's Theory of Mind (ToM) has pursued the idea that the ability to metarepresent mental states depends on a domain-specific cognitive subystem implemented in specific neural circuitry: a Theory of Mind Module. We argue that the interaction of several domain-general mechanisms and lower-level domain-specific mechanisms accounts for the flexibility and sophistication of behavior, which has been taken to be evidence for a domain-specific ToM module. This finding is of more general interest (...) since it suggests a parsimonious cognitive architecture can account for apparent domain specificity. We argue for such an architecture in two stages. First, on conceptual grounds, contrasting the case of language with ToM, and second, by showing that recent evidence in the form of fMRI and lesion studies supports the more parsimonious hypothesis. 1. Theory of Mind, Metarepresentation, and Modularity2. Developmental Components of ToM3. The Analogy with Modularity of Language4. Dissociations without Modules5. The Evidence from Neuroscience6. Conclusion. (shrink)

Often, political theories of the subject detach the subject from nature or else reduce the subject to a mere aggregate of natural features. Consequently, many attempts to articulate theories of the subject purport to preserve political theoretical concepts such as freedom, normativity, or responsibility by means of disjoining the subject from its environment. This article proposes a new theory of the ecologically conditioned subject. Developing the concept of companion ecologies, the article employs three examples – architecture, the human (...) microbiome, and indigenous Amazonian ontologies – to show how theorizing the subject at all necessitates theorizing her ecological conditions, as well. Companion ecologies do not refer merely to our environmental conditions, then. The term also functions as a referent. Ultimately, companion ecologies reveal that the individuation and formation of the subject is a process that takes place, paradoxically, only because of the ecological plurality underlying it. From this, I derive a minimalist theory of the subject for which subjects are materially and temporally extended and causally distributed morphogenetic sites, which emerge only in the context of interactive, multiscalar, and overlapping companion ecologies. (shrink)

Ontology of Construction explores theories of construction in modern architecture, with a particular focus on the relationship between nihilism of technology and architecture. Providing an historical context to the concept of making, the essays collected in this volume articulate the implications of technology in works by such architects as Le Corbusier, Frank Lloyd Wright, Adolf Loos, and Mies van der Rohe. Also provided is an interpretation of Gottfried Semper's discourse on the Tectonic and the relationship between architecture (...) and other crafts. Emphasising 'fabrication' as a critical theme for contemporary architectural theory and practice, Ontology of Construction is a provocative contribution to the current debate in these areas. (shrink)

We discuss external and internal graphical and linguistic representational systems. We argue that a cognitive theory of peoples' reasoning performance must account for (a) the logical equivalence of inferences expressed in graphical and linguistic form, and (b) the implementational differences that affect facility of inference. Our theory proposes that graphical representation limit abstraction and thereby aid “processibility”. We discuss the ideas of specificity and abstraction, and their cognitive relevance. Empirical support both comes from tasks which involve the manipulation (...) of external graphics and tasks that do not. For the former, we take Euler's (1772) circles, provide a novel computational reconstruction, show how it captures abstractions, and contrast it with earlier construals and with Johnson‐Laird's (1983) mental models representations. We demonstrate equivalence of the graphical Euler system, and the nongraphical mental models system. For tasks not involving manipulation of external graphics, we discuss text comprehension, and the mental performance of syllogisms. By positing an internal system with the same specificity as Euler's circles, we cover the mental models data, and generate new empirical predictions. Finally, we consider how the architecture of working memory explains why such specific representations are relatively easy to store. (shrink)

Nicolai Hartmann’s theory of ontological categories is presented. After a broad outline of the architecture of the categories, the presentation is focused on two issues, namely the question of paired categories with positional value and the theory of levels of reality and the relations of super-formation and super-position that connect them.

The nature of architecture Building Architecture and Religion The sense of the past Following the example of antiquity.

This paper advocates learned in the religious context of liberation, the "theology," a concept can be reasonably applied to religious traditions other than Christianity. According to that "beyond the world community and how the phenomenon of contact" as a general theological issues, and Consciousness-only school of Buddhism, one of the major literature of the "photo Mahayana theory of" how to respond to this issue. In the "photo Mahayana theory" in this issue of "inaction of the Dharma Realm to (...) save sentient beings in the phenomenal world and promising" in the form of presentation. This stands for "photo Mahayana theory" to this problem, but through three Buddha body of theory. In short, the body of law to the Buddha Dharma and sentient beings as a contact intermediary. On the one hand, body of law as a Buddha in the phenomenal world to attend the results, which do not transcend the phenomenal world; other hand, the body of law were no wisdom to properly recognize the judicial system, and therefore associated with the Dharma Realm. Further, the body of law can not smell, good enough for practical enlightenment through the body of living beings must engage with the changes in the body, while the body of law and the relationship between the other two, is equivalent to no difference between the intellect and wisdom after that relationship. Finally, the "photo Mahayana theory" liberation school structure and Christianity's "Christology" of relief to make a simple comparison study architecture, and as a conclusion. This paper begins with arguing that within the larger context of soteriology, the notion of "theology" can be legitimately applied to other religious traditions than Christianity. Following this, I propose that the issue of how the realm of transcendence could relate to the realm of phenomenon can serve as an example of a general theological issue across religious boundaries. I then investigate how this issue is discussed in the Mahāyānasamgraha as a seminal text in the Buddhist Yogācāra tradition. In the Mahāyānasamgraha, the above issue is formulated as the question of how unconditioned Dharma-realm could save the sentient beings in the conditioned world. I argue that the asnwer provided in the Mahāyānasamgraha hinges on its theory of three bodies of the Buddha. In short, the Dharma-body bridges between the Dharma-realm and sentient beings. On the one hand, the Dharma-body is the result of a bodhisattva's enduring practice in the phenomenal world, and hence does not transcend over the phenomenal world; on the other hand, the Dharma-body correctly knows the Dharma- realm through the non-discriminating cognition , and hence relates to the Dharma-realm. Furthermore, since sentient beings cannot see the Dharma-body, they can be taught only by the Enjoyment-body and the Transformation-body of the Buddha. The relation between the Dharma-body and the other two bodies is identical to the relation between the non-discriminating cognition and the subsequently-acquired cognition . Finally, this paper ends with a brief comparison between the soteriological scheme in the Mahāyānasamgraha and the scheme reflected in the issue of Christology. (shrink)

Inspired by early proposals in philosophy, dominant accounts of language posit a central role for mutual knowledge, either encoded directly in common ground, or approximated through other cognitive mechanisms. Using existing empirical evidence from language and memory, we challenge this tradition, arguing that mutual knowledge captures only a subset of the mental states needed to support communication. In a novel theoretical proposal, we argue for a cognitive architecture that includes separate, distinct representations of the self and other, and a (...) cognitive process that compares these representations continuously during conversation, outputting both similarities and differences in perspective. Our theory accounts for existing data, interfaces with findings from other cognitive domains, and makes novel predictions about the role of perspective in language use. We term this new account the Multiple Perspectives Theory of mental states in communication. (shrink)

Pictorial art and presentness --art and transperceptual space -- In and through space : sculpture, assemblage, and installation art -- Land art : reciprocities of site and formation -- Embodiment and architectural cognition -- The aesthetic space of photography -- Digital objects, aesthetic phenomena.

Some of the required characteristics for a true machine theory of mind (MToM) include the ability to (1) reproduce the full diversity of human thought and behavior, (2) develop a personalized model of an individual with very limited data, and (3) provide an explanation for behavioral predictions grounded in the cognitive processes of the individual. We propose that a certain class of cognitive models provide an approach that is well suited to meeting those requirements. Being grounded in a mechanistic (...) framework like a cognitive architecture such as ACT-R naturally fulfills the third requirement by mapping behavior to cognitive mechanisms. Exploiting a modeling paradigm such as instance-based learning accounts for the first requirement by reflecting variations in individual experience into a diversity of behavior. Mechanisms such as knowledge tracing and model tracing allow a specific run of the cognitive model to be aligned with a given individual behavior trace, fulfilling the second requirement. We illustrate these principles with a cognitive model of decision-making in a search and rescue task in the Minecraft simulation environment. We demonstrate that cognitive models personalized to individual human players can provide the MToM capability to optimize artificial intelligence agents by diagnosing the underlying causes of observed human behavior, projecting the future effects of potential interventions, and managing the adaptive process of shaping human behavior. Examples of the inputs provided by such analytic cognitive agents include predictions of cognitive load, probability of error, estimates of player self-efficacy, and trust calibration. Finally, we discuss implications for future research and applications to collective human–machine intelligence. (shrink)

This piece focuses on the work of Juhani Pallasmaa who introduces phenomenological aspects of kinesthetic and multisensory perception of the human body into architecture theory. He argues that hand-drawing is a vital spatial and haptic exercise in facilitating architectural design. Through this process, architecture can emerge as the very ‘material’ existence of human embodied ‘immaterial’ emotion, feelings and wisdom. Hence, for Pallasmaa, architecture can be seen as an artistic practice, which entails multisensory and embodied thought in (...) order to establish the sense of being in the world. (shrink)

The article analyzes the role of theories of embodied cognition for the development of emotion research. The role and position of emotions changed as philosophy developed. In classical and modern European philosophy, the idea of the “primacy of reason” prevailed over emotions and physicality, emotions and affective life were described as low-ranking phenomena regarding cognitive processes or were completely eliminated as an unknown quantity. In postmodern philosophy, attention focuses on physicality and sensuality, which are rated higher than rational principle, mind (...) and intelligence. Within the framework of this approach, there is a recently emerged theory of embodied cognition, which allows to take a fresh look at the place of emotions in the architecture of mental processes – thinking, perception, memory, imagination, speech. The article describes and analyzes a number of empirical studies showing the impossibility of excluding emotional processes and the significance of their research for understanding the architecture of embodied cognition. However, the features of the architecture of embodied cognition remain unclear, and some of the discoveries of recent years (mirror neurons or neurons of simulation) rather raise new questions and require further research. The rigorously described and clear architecture of the embodied cognition can grow the theoretical basis that will allow to advance the studies of learning processes, language understanding, psychotherapy techniques, social attitudes and stereotypes, highlight the riddle of consciousness and create new theories of consciousness or even create an anthropomorphic artificial intelligence that is close to “strong artificial intelligence.”. (shrink)

With A Theory of General Ethics Warwick Fox both defines the field of General Ethics and offers the first example of a truly general ethics. Specifically, he develops a single, integrated approach to ethics that encompasses the realms of interhuman ethics, the ethics of the natural environment, and the ethics of the built environment. Thus Fox offers what is in effect the first example of an ethical "Theory of Everything."Fox refers to his own approach to General Ethics as (...) the "theory of responsive cohesion." He argues that the best examples in any domain of interest--from psychology to politics, from conversations to theories--exemplify the quality of responsive cohesion, that is, they hold together by virtue of the mutual responsiveness of the elements that constitute them. Fox argues that the relational quality of responsive cohesion represents the most fundamental value there is. He then develops the theory of responsive cohesion, central features of which include the elaboration of a "theory of contexts" as well as a differentiated model of our obligations in respect of all beings. In doing this, he draws on cutting-edge work in cognitive science in order to develop a powerful distinction between beings who use language and beings that do not.Fox tests his theory against eighteen central problems in General Ethics--including challenges raised by abortion, euthanasia, personal obligations, politics, animal welfare, invasive species, ecological management, architecture, and planning--and shows that it offers sensible and defensible answers to the widest possible range of ethical problems. (shrink)

What is love? Why do we idealize those whom we love? How do we choose whom to love? Are some kinds of love better than others? Each age returns to these questions with renewed perplexity. Gerasimos Santas examinees the two greatest theoretical architectures of love, side by side. It provides a thorough critical description and comparison of these theories, allowing a sophisticated dialogue to emerge between the two thinkers. In the first half of the book Professor Santas reconstructs and explains (...) Plato's theories of eros and philia: erotic love, familial love and friendship. He attempt to show that Plato's was a unified theory in which erotic love has a special connecion with creativity and beauty. He then discusses Freud's notion of love as distinct from, though based on, his general theory of sexuality. He discusses in detail Freud's explanations, before and after narcissism, of idealization and choice of beloved. Freud too, it emerges, had a unified theory of love: all love has its origins in the libidinal instincts of infancy and childhood. The book concludes by showing that, despite Freud's claim that his theory of love is 'Platonic', the two theories are instructively different. (shrink)

Adorno wrote prolifically about modernism in culture and the arts, but little has been written about whether or in what form he might have addressed architectural concerns. The project of exploring this potentially fruitful intersection has been helped in the last couple of decades by authors from philosophy and critical theory contrasting his ideas about dwelling with Heidegger’s and by architectural theorists considering the import of his aesthetic theory.1 If these fall shy of the more immediate connections to (...) architecture that some have hoped to uncover, this is because Adorno almost never wrote about specific buildings and their designers. Neither did he publish any texts dedicated exclusively to architecture or dwelling, which is not to say that he never wrote about them or that architectural concerns are absent from his work. Adorno’s writings on dwelling and architecture live here and there, emerging and then moving on to surface later, if not often as direct commentary then as a kind of architectural gaze his thinking sometimes employs. Dwelling and architecture exist like exiles in his writings even though the question of dwelling—of what it means to inhabit social and space-time worlds as embodied beings—lies as much at the core of Adorno’s philosophy as it did in Heidegger’s. (shrink)

Architecture Theory is a comprehensive and groundbreaking one volume overview of, and introduction to, contemporary critical discourse in architecture. In bringing critical theory and Continental philosophy to bear upon architecture, it provides a solid framework for a fully up-to-date theory of architecture, one that reflects the latest developments and concerns. The book is divided into four sections—groundwork; constructing the "individual"; pluralities; instrumentality—each covering a core theme in contemporary architecture theory. In each (...) section an introductory essay by Andrew Ballantyne provides valuable context, exposition, and analysis. This is followed by a selection of writings on architecture and other related cultural concerns from major contemporary thinkers, including Zvizvek, Irigaray, Lefebvre, Lyotard, Kristeva, Nancy, Virilio, Deleuze, and Negri. (shrink)

The well-known game of chess has traditionally been modeled in artificial intelligence studies by search engines with advanced pruning techniques. The models were thus centered on an inference engine manipulating passive symbols in the form of tokens. It is beyond doubt, however, that human players do not carry out such processes. Instead, chess masters instead carry out perceptual processes, carefully categorizing the chunks perceived in a position and gradually building complex dynamic structures to represent the subtle pressures embedded in the (...) positions. In this paper we will consider two hypotheses concerning the underlying subcognitive processes and architecture. In the first hypothesis, a multiple-leveled chess representational structure is presented, which includes distance graphs (with varying levels of quality) between pieces, piece mobilities, and abstract roles. These representational schemes seem to account for numerous characteristics of human player’s psychology. The second hypothesis concerns the extension of the architecture proposed in the Copycat project as central for modeling the emergent intuitive perception of a chess position. We provide a synthesis on how the postulated architecture models chess intuition as an emergent mixture of simultaneous distance estimations, chunk perceptions, abstract role awareness, and intention activations. This is an alternative model to the traditional AI approaches, focusing on the philosophy of active symbols. (shrink)

As a step towards comprehensive computer models of communication, and effective human machine dialogue, some of the relationships between communication and affect are explored. An outline theory is presented of the architecture that makes various kinds of affective states possible, or even inevitable, in intelligent agents, along with some of the implications of this theory for various communicative processes. The model implies that human beings typically have many different, hierarchically organized, dispositions capable of interacting with new information (...) to produce affective states, distract attention, interrupt ongoing actions, and so on. High "insistence" of motives is defined in relation to a tendency to penetrate an attention filter mechanism, which seems to account for the partial loss of control involved in emotions. One conclusion is that emulating human communicative abilities will not be achieved easily. Another is that it will be even more difficult to design and build computing systems that reliably achieve interesting communicative goals. (shrink)

Those who endorse the free energy principle as a theory of cognition are committed to three propositions that are jointly incompatible but which will cohere if one of them is denied. The first of these is that the free energy principle gives us a self-sufficient explanation of what all cognitive systems consist in: a specific computational architecture. The second is that all adaptive behavior is driven by the free energy principle and the process of model-based inference it entails. (...) The third is that cognition is not ubiquitous. These three incompatible propositions together comprise a problem of scope for the free energy principle as a theory of cognition. The prospects for rejecting each of these propositions are considered. To drop either the first or the second would limit the explanatory success of the principle. However, there are plausible ways to bite the bullet on denial of the third proposition. In particular, I argue that it is possible f... (shrink)

This work is an initial step toward developing a cognitive theory of cyber deception. While widely studied, the psychology of deception has largely focused on physical cues of deception. Given that present‐day communication among humans is largely electronic, we focus on the cyber domain where physical cues are unavailable and for which there is less psychological research. To improve cyber defense, researchers have used signaling theory to extended algorithms developed for the optimal allocation of limited defense resources by (...) using deceptive signals to trick the human mind. However, the algorithms are designed to protect against adversaries that make perfectly rational decisions. In behavioral experiments using an abstract cybersecurity game (i.e., Insider Attack Game), we examined human decision‐making when paired against the defense algorithm. We developed an instance‐based learning (IBL) model of an attacker using the Adaptive Control of Thought‐Rational (ACT‐R) cognitive architecture to investigate how humans make decisions under deception in cyber‐attack scenarios. Our results show that the defense algorithm is more effective at reducing the probability of attack and protecting assets when using deceptive signaling, compared to no signaling, but is less effective than predicted against a perfectly rational adversary. Also, the IBL model replicates human attack decisions accurately. The IBL model shows how human decisions arise from experience, and how memory retrieval dynamics can give rise to cognitive biases, such as confirmation bias. The implications of these findings are discussed in the perspective of informing theories of deception and designing more effective signaling schemes that consider human bounded rationality. (shrink)

Summary This paper deals with the development of Husserl’s and Merleau-Pontys analyses of the affective lived experience of body and space. Both the concept of „flesh“ (Merleau-Ponty) and „Hyle“ (Husserl) stand for a sensuous principle that underlies the original givenness and solidarity of body and world and I claim that this interaction and the concomitant intertwining of body and place make up the existential dimension of architecture, i.e. the, being-here-in-a-place’. In this connection, I argue that the fact that bodily (...) affective experience endows the world with sense has led to a double break: On the one hand with representation and on the other with perspectivity and compossibility of the realms of being in Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s respective approaches. Finally, I will exemplify this break and the development of genetic insights – from an anthropocentric, organic and harmonious space conception to a topologic space made up of incompossibilities expressing an ambiguous sense – with paradigmatic works of architecture, so as to make evident the explanatory potential of phenomenology for architecture. (shrink)

This article explores the arguments for architecture having an identifiable essence equivalent to Heidegger's concept of 'dwelling' and place identity, versus those who claim it is no more than a 'hybrid' collection of many different technical, social and cultural practices. The opposing positions in architecture are compared by analogy with the opposing theories of language which underly them, the latter position being associated with the universalist theory of language propagated by Chomsky, while the purpose of architecture (...) in identity formation is compared with Wittgenstein's theory of the interdependence between language and human behaviour as a 'form of life'. As an example, the author points to colonial architecture as a clear case where people retain 'that part of their identity which is their architecture'. The author concludes that, in so far as objects also have meanings, then the physical environment must also be taken into account in the evolution of mind. (shrink)

Some naturalistic philosophers of mind subscribing to the predictive processing theory of mind have adopted a realist attitude towards the results of Bayesian cognitive science. In this paper, we argue that this realist attitude is unwarranted. The Bayesian research program in cognitive science does not possess special epistemic virtues over alternative approaches for explaining mental phenomena involving uncertainty. In particular, the Bayesian approach is not simpler, more unifying, or more rational than alternatives. It is also contentious that the Bayesian (...) approach is overall better supported by the empirical evidence. So, to develop philosophical theories of mind on the basis of a realist interpretation of results from Bayesian cognitive science is unwarranted. Naturalistic philosophers of mind should instead adopt an anti-realist attitude towards these results and remain agnostic as to whether Bayesian models are true. For continuing on with an exclusive focus and praise of Bayes within debates about the predictive processing theory will impede progress in philosophical understanding of scientific practice in computational cognitive science as well as of the architecture of the mind. (shrink)