The two-factor theory (Davies, Coltheart, Langdon & Breen 2001; Coltheart 2007; Coltheart, Menzies & Sutton 2010) is an influential account of delusion formation. According to the theory, there are two distinct factors that are causally responsible for delusion formation. The first factor is supposed to explain the content of the delusion, while the second factor is supposed to explain why the delusion is adopted and maintained. Recently, another remarkable account of delusion formation has been proposed, in which (...) the notion of “prediction error” plays the central role (Fletcher & Frith 2009; Corlett, Krystal, Taylor & Fletcher 2009; Corlett, Taylor, Wang, Fletcher & Krystal 2010). According to this account, the prediction-error theory, delusions are formed in response to aberrant prediction-error signals, those signals that indicate a mismatch between expectation and actual experience. -/- In this chapter, we examine the relationship between the two-factor theory and the prediction-error theory in some detail. Our view is that the prediction-error theory does not have to be understood as a rival to the two-factor theory. We do not deny that there are some important differences between them. However, those differences are not as significant as they have been presented in the literature. Moreover, the core ideas of the prediction-error theory may be incorporated into the two- factor framework. For instance, the aberrant prediction-error signal that is posited by prediction-error theorists can be (or underlie) the first factor contributing to the formation of some delusions, and help explain the content of those delusions. Alternatively, the aberrant prediction-error signal can be (or underlie) the second factor, and help explain why the delusion is adopted and maintained. (shrink)

In this paper we ask whether the two-factor theory of delusions is compatible with two claims, that delusions are pathological and that delusions are adaptive. We concentrate on two recent and influential models of the two-factor theory: the one proposed by Max Coltheart, Peter Menzies and John Sutton (2010) and the one developed by Ryan McKay (2012). The models converge on the nature of Factor 1 but diverge about the nature of Factor 2. The differences between (...) the two models are reflected in different accounts of the pathological and adaptive nature of delusions. We will explore such differences, considering naturalist and normativist accounts of the pathological and focusing on judgements of adaptiveness that are informed by the shear-pin hypothesis (McKay and Dennett 2009). After reaching our conclusions about the two models, we draw more general implications for the status of delusions within two-factor theories. Are there good grounds to claim that delusions are pathological? Are delusions ever adaptive? Can delusions be at the same time pathological and adaptive? (shrink)

The analysis of mental concepts suggests that the distinctionbetween the mental and the nonmental is not ontologically fundamental,and that, whereas mental processes are one and the same things as thebrain processes with which they are correlated, dispositional mentalstates depend causally on and are, thus, ''''distinct existences'''' fromthe states of the brain microstructure with which ''they'' are correlated.It is argued that this difference in the relation between an entity andits composition/underlying structure applies across the board. allstuffs and processes are the same (...) thing as is described by a descriptionof their microstructure. In all cases where the manifestation of adisposition extends beyond the ''''skin'''' of the dispositional propertybearer, dispositions invariably depend causally on the structure,usually the microstructure, of the bearer. (shrink)

In order to explain delusional beliefs, one must first consider what factors should be included in a theory of delusion. Unlike a one-factor theory, a two-factor theory of delusion argues that not only anomalous experience (the first factor) but also an impairment of the belief-evaluation system (the second factor) is required. Recently, two-factor theorists have adopted various Bayesian approaches in order to give a more accurate description of delusion formation. By reviewing the progression from a (...) one-factor theory to a two-factor theory, I argue that in light of the second factor’s requirements, different proposed impairments can be unified within a consistent belief-evaluation system. Under this interpretation of the second factor, I further argue that the role of a mechanism responsible for detecting bizarreness is wrongly neglected. I conclude that the second factor is a compound system which consists of differing functional parts, one of which functions to detect bizarreness in different stages of delusion; moreover, I hold that the impairment can be one or several of these functional parts. (shrink)

Anosognosia is literally ‘unawareness of or failure to acknowledge one’s hemi- plegia or other disability’ (OED). Etymology would suggest the meaning ‘lack of knowledge of disease’ so that anosognosia would include any denial of impairment, such as denial of blindness (Anton’s syndrome). But Babinski, who introduced the term in 1914, applied it only to patients with hemiplegia who fail to acknowledge their paralysis. Most commonly, this is failure to acknowledge paralysis of the left side of the body following damage to (...) the right hemisphere of the brain. In this paper, we shall mainly be concerned with anosognosia for hemiplegia. But we shall also use the term ‘anosognosia’ in an inclusive way to encompass lack of knowledge or acknowledgement of any impairment. Indeed, in the construction ‘anosognosia for X’, X might even be anosognosia for some Y. (shrink)

In the third chapter of his book Psychosemantics , Jerry A. Fodor argues that the truth of meaning holism (the thesis that the content of a psychological state is determined by the totality of that state's epistemic liaisons) would be fatal for intentionalistic psychology. This is because holism suggests that no two people are ever in the same intentional state, and so a psychological theory that generalizes over such states will be composed of generalizations which fail to generalize. Fodor then (...) sets out to show that there is no reason to believe in holism by arguing that its primary foundation (i.e. functional-role semantics), when properly understood (i.e. when construed as a two-factor theory of content), is demonstrably false. In this paper, I argue two claims. First, I try to show that Fodor has seriously misrepresented two-factor theories and that his arguments against his strawman do nothing to indicate the falsity of the genuine article. Second, I argue that if one accepts meaning holism in the form of a two-factor theory, there is no particular reason to think that one is hereby committed to the futility of intentionalistic psychology. In making this point, I make a brief excursion into the psychological literature during which I discuss the belief perseverance phenomenon, the encoding specificity hypothesis, and a problem in human deductive reasoning. My second argument leads to a discussion of how such a psychology could be developed even if no two people are ever in the same intentional state. (shrink)

Corlett (2019) raises two groups of challenges against the two-factor theory of delusions: One focuses on weighing “the evidence for … the two-factor theory”; the other aims to question “the logic of the two-factor theory” (p. 166). McKay (2019) has robustly defended the two-factor theory against the first group. But the second group, which Corlett believes is in many aspects independent of the first group and Darby (2019, p. 180) takes as “[t]he most important challenge to (...) the two-factor theory raised by Dr. Corlett”, has by large remained. Here I offer my two cents in response to the second group. More specifically, I argue that Corlett’s challenges to the logic of the two-factor theory, concerning modularity, double dissociation and cognitive penetration, seem to be based on some misunderstandings of the two-factor theory. (shrink)

In this paper I outline and defend a theory of immediate or foundational justification that I call "phenomenal reliabilism". This theory incorporates elements from Huemer’s theory of phenomenal conservatism and Comesaña’s indexical reliabilism. The basic idea of the theory I propose is that certain mental states contribute in a twofold way to the epistemic justification of beliefs, namely due to the way they determine how things seem to a subject and due to the fact that they are actually reliable indicators (...) of the truth of their contents. The first component allows this theory to accommodate internalist intuitions. The second component allows it to foster the connection between justification and truth without being subject to the counterexamples that plague simple or unqualified reliabilist theories. I also try to show that this theory is superior to rival theories that have been proposed in the literature, like Huemer’s theory itself (2001) or a process-reliabilist treatment of foundational justification as in Goldman (2008a). (shrink)

_In light of Herzberg's two-factor theory, the primary goal of this paper is to investigate the job satisfaction of the faculty members of private and public sector universities in Islamabad with specific reference to hygiene and motivation factors. For the purpose the sample contained 150 staff of private and public universities of Islamabad. The data collection was carried out through Minnesota Questionnaire as a tool of job satisfaction. The sampling techniques of proportional, stratified sampling was selected. The data was (...) analyzed through quantitative method by using the SPSS 21 st edition named as Statistical Package for social science. The results were reflected by using independent samples t-test. According to the study's findings the hygiene factor has significant impact on job satisfaction of participants with reference to Salary, Status, Work Conditions, Interpersonal Relationship with Subordinates and Possibility for Personal Growth besides motivational elements such as recognition and achievement. The data shows that high motivational level is found in public universities faculty member than the private sector universities._. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to critically examine what I call Action-Centric Theories of Representation (ACToRs). I include in this category theories of representation that (1) reject construing representation in terms of a relation that holds between representation itself (the representational vehicle) and what is represented, and instead (2) try to bring the function that representations play for cognitive systems to the center stage. Roughly speaking, according to proponents of ACToRs, what makes a representation (that is, what (...) is constitutive of it being a representation) is its being functionally involved in preselecting or guiding the actions of cognitive systems. I intend to argue that while definitely valuable, ACToRs are underconstrained and thus not entirely satisfying, since there exist structures that would count as representations according to ACToRs, but which do not play functional roles that could be nontrivially or in an explanatorily valuable way classified as representing something for a cognitive system. I outline a remedy for this theoretical situation by postulating that a fully satisfying theory of representation in cognitive science should have two factors; i.e., it should combine the pragmatic, action-oriented aspect present in ACToRs with an element that emphasizes the importance of the relation holding between a representational vehicle and what is represented. (shrink)

In this contribution, I interrogate the historical-intellectual narrative that dominates the history of the Schachter–Singer two-factor theory of emotion. In the first part, I propose that a social influence model became generalized to a cognitive view. I argue that Schachter and Singer presented a cognitive theory of emotions in enacting inside the laboratory Schachter’s preceding “social influence” model of emotions and that Schachter’s adoption of a cognitive model of emotion was driven by and was necessary for his previous research (...) on social influence. In the second part, I argue that the Schachter–Singer theory is remarkable not because it introduced a cognitive turn in emotion, but because it presented sympathetic nervous system activation as an essential constitutive element of every emotion. (shrink)

_In light of Herzberg's two-factor theory, the primary goal of this paper is to investigate the job satisfaction of the faculty members of private and public sector universities in Islamabad with specific reference to hygiene and motivation factors. For the purpose the sample contained 150 staff of private and public universities of Islamabad. The data collection was carried out through Minnesota Questionnaire as a tool of job satisfaction. The sampling techniques of proportional, stratified sampling was selected. The data was (...) analyzed through quantitative method by using the SPSS 21 st edition named as Statistical Package for social science. The results were reflected by using independent samples t-test. According to the study's findings the hygiene factor has significant impact on job satisfaction of participants with reference to Salary, Status, Work Conditions, Interpersonal Relationship with Subordinates and Possibility for Personal Growth besides motivational elements such as recognition and achievement. The data shows that high motivational level is found in public universities faculty member than the private sector universities._. (shrink)

How many factors, i.e. departures from normality, are necessary to explain a delusion? Maher’s classic one-factor theory argues that the only factor is the patient’s anomalous experience, and a delusion arises as a normal explanation of this experience. The more recent two-factor theory, on the other hand, contends that a second factor is also needed, with reasoning abnormality being a potential candidate, and a delusion arises as an abnormal explanation of the anomalous experience. In the past (...) few years, although there has been an increasing number of scholars offering a variety of arguments in defence of Maher’s one-factor theory, these arguments have not been adequately addressed by two-factor theorists. This paper aims to address this gap by critically examining the arguments on three crucial issues: the intelligibility of delusions, the dissociation between anomalous experiences and delusions, and the empirical evidence of a second factor. I will argue that the Maherian notion of anomalous experience is not sufficient for explaining delusions and the two-factor theory is on the right track in its search for the missing factor in the aetiology of delusions. (shrink)

Two-Factor conceptual role theories of mental content are often intended to allow mental representations to satisfy two competing requirements. One is the Fregean requirement that two representations, like public language expressions, can have different meanings even though they have the same reference (as in the case of ‘morning star’ and ‘evening star’). The other is Putnam's Twin-earth requirement that two representations or expressions can have the same conceptual role but differ in meaning due to differing references. But I (...) argue that the hidden agenda behind these theories is to make misrepresentation possible. A simple, one-factor conceptual role theory (like the "crude causal theory" Fodor describes) falls prey to the disjunction problem. If every use or application of a concept is meaning-determining, then there can be no misuse of that concept. Each use will partially determine its meaning, and, use which is covered in the meaning cannot be a misuse, error, or misrepresentation. I argue that the referential factor in two-factor conceptual role theories is what is supposed to make misrepresentation possible. But it fails to do so, because when the two factors do not determine the same meaning, there is no non-question-begging way to have one of them take precedence and force meaning to align with one factor and deviate from the other. (shrink)

In folie à deux, a ‘primary’ patient transmits a delusional belief to one or more ‘secondary’ patients who then adopt and share the belief. This paper applies the two‐factor theory of delusion to retrospectively analyse published cases of folie à deux. Lessons from this retrospective analysis include, firstly, that two‐factor theorists need to shift their focus from endogenous processes to consider the exogenous source of delusional content in most secondaries. Secondly, secondaries who come to share the belief via (...) normal processes of social contagion only qualify as delusional by virtue of the abnormal persistence of their belief, albeit a temporary persistence in those secondaries who abandon their belief soon after separation from the primary. Underpinning this abnormal persistence may be a form of inhibitory failure—a difficulty with inhibiting a belief to allow reasoning for and against it being true. (shrink)

We examine the link between the growing emphasis on corporate social responsibility at the organizational level and beliefs about social responsibility at work (SRW) expressed by individuals. Drawing from theories of professionalism and diffusion of innovations (including practices and beliefs), we advance hypotheses about beliefs of managers and non-managers in 11 countries at two time periods, and use a unique international data set to test our hypotheses. Our general prediction that managers would score higher than non-managers on a measure (...) of SRW was not supported. However, further analysis revealed a more complex relationship moderated by the contextual factors of time frame and country inequality level. We discuss implications and extensions for future research. (shrink)

While the cross-race effect (standardly characterized as the finding that individuals are generally better at recognizing previously observed faces of members of their own race than faces of members of other races), is a well-replicated finding, there is little agreement about the mechanisms underlying it. After outlining existing theories of the cross-race effect, I argue that they all face a similar problem. They at most explain our difficulty in recognizing other-race faces relative to own-race faces. However, a complete explanation (...) of the cross-race effect must account for our difficulty in recognizing other-race faces along with our limited metacognitive awareness of this difficulty. I hypothesize that this limited metacognitive awareness is a product of our tacit yet mistaken assumption that we can recognize individuals of all races equally well. One prediction of this hypothesis, which is borne out, is that subjects judge themselves to be equally likely to recognize individuals regardless of their race. This prediction is not offered by a competing hypothesis which appeals to our general tendency toward overconfidence when task performance is suboptimal. (shrink)

This article reviews existing approaches to defining and distinguishing communication styles and proposes a common frame of reference for future research. The literature review yields two schools of thought: the behavior-centered perspective and the personality-oriented perspective. Although these lines of research differ in their ways of defining communication styles, they show considerable similarities with respect to their classification. Many researchers build their taxonomies on two key dimensions: assertiveness and responsiveness. We propose embedding communication styles into the Five-Factor Theory and (...) defining them as characteristic adaptations of personality. We also suggest the Interpersonal Circumplex as a reference model for distinguishing communication styles as it is able to integrate substantial dimensions and facets of existing taxonomies in a parsimonious way. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to test the two-component theory of news selection. Its components are news factors included in articles and news values of news factors. It is assumed that news factors have different news values for various media outlets. The theory was tested comparing the empirical with the theoretical newsworthiness of news stories. First, news values of five news factors for national quality papers, regional papers, and tabloids were identified. Then, based on theory, the theoretical newsworthiness of (...) news stories was calculated. The independent variables were the news factors included in these articles and the news values of these news factors. In addition, in a laboratory setting, the empirical newsworthiness of the news stories was measured. Finally, measured newsworthiness was compared to the predicted one. Results confirmed the two-component theory and demonstrated that the chances of news stories to get published can be predicted by news factors and their news values. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION: In accounts of the two-factor theory of delusional belief, the second factor in this theory has been referred to only in the most general terms, as a failure in the processes of hypothesis evaluation, with no attempt to characterise those processes in any detail. Coltheart and Davies attempted such a characterisation, proposing a detailed eight-step model of how unexpected observations lead to new beliefs based on the concept of abductive inference as introduced by Charles Sanders Peirce. METHODS: (...) In this paper, we apply that model to the explanation of various forms of delusional belief. RESULTS: We provide evidence that in cases of delusion there is a specific failure of the seventh step in our model: the step at which predictions from hypotheses are considered in the light of relevant evidence. CONCLUSIONS: In the two-factor theory of delusional belief, the second factor consists of a failure to reject hypotheses in the face of disconfirmatory evidence. (shrink)

Empirical studies which examine the theory of newsworthiness and the predictability of news coverage in transnational or developing countries still remain on the agenda of journalism research. Therefore, this study examines the influence of news factors on the foreign news coverage of three Mexican newspapers. Two main questions guide the research. First, is the theory of newsworthiness a valid approach for predicting news selection in a cultural context that is significantly different from western industrialized countries? Secondly, which are the relevant (...) news factors that predict foreign news coverage in the Mexican press and thus shape the image of foreign nations? The results of a quantitative content analysis confirm the hypotheses of selection, additivity, and replication as they were originally postulated by Galtung and Ruge and thus prove the external validity of the theory of newsworthiness beyond western journalism. (shrink)

The novel coronavirus disease that emerged at the end of 2019 began threatening the health and lives of millions of people after a few weeks. However, social and economic problems derived from COVID-19 have changed the development of individuals and the whole country. This study examines the work conditions of Taiwanese versus mainland China employees, and evaluates the relationship between support mechanisms and subjective wellbeing from a social cognitive career theory perspective. In this study, a total of 623 Taiwanese questionnaires (...) and 513 mainland China questionnaires were collected to compare the two sample groups in terms of the development of employees’ subjective wellbeing. The results show that the Taiwanese sample had more significant development paths compared to mainland China employees in terms of prior knowledge, perceived organizational support, self-efficacy, employee employability, subjective wellbeing, and job performance. Finally, based on the conclusions, this study proposes some specific suggestions on theoretical mode for future studies. (shrink)

In his recent book Delusions and Beliefs, Kengo Miyazono offers a thoroughgoing defence of delusions as biologically malfunctioning beliefs, greatly elaborating on his earlier defence of this view. Miyazono has it that delusions have biological doxastic functions, and that delusions involve direct or indirect malfunctions of this kind. In this short piece, I focus on Miyazono’s defence of a two-factor approach to delusion formation as it appears in Chapter Four. Miyazono approaches his discussion of the debate between one- and (...) two-factor theories having already defended the key thesis of the book: that delusions are malfunctioning beliefs. Of course, that thesis might be thought to mesh nicely with the two-factor theorist’s claim that there is a cognitive abnormality present in delusion formation or maintenance. However, I will discuss Miyazono’s defence of the two-factor position in isolation from its role in his overall account of delusion. Miyazono abstracts away from the particulars of Max Coltheart’s two-factor view, and takes himself to be investigating the plausibility of two-factor theories without the specific commitments of Coltheart’s view. Miyazono also captures under the two-factor heading theories which locate the second factor in belief maintenance rather than just in belief formation. He puts forward a new argument for a two-factor approach which goes via inference to the best explanation. I begin by arguing that Miyazono’s starting motivation for a two-factor approach rests on a misrepresentation of the one-factor approach. Then, I turn to the four components of Miyazono’s inference to the best explanation argument, and argue that in each case, we do not have grounds for positing a second factor. (shrink)

The study contributes to building an understanding of the impact of political forces on the information environment of listed firms in a developing economy. Specifically, it investigates the tensions between politico-institutional factors and accounting regulation on the prolonged and incomplete implementation of the International Financial Reporting Standards in Bangladesh from 1998 to 2010. Two phases of interviews were conducted in 2010–2011 and IFRS-related enforcement documents from 1998 to 2010 were evaluated. The study contributes that IFRSs are being diffused to developing (...) countries like Bangladesh, but they invariably interact with local institutions, with variable outcomes. Coercive, normative and mimetic isomorphisms are low in Bangladesh. Notably, political forces have been undermining mimetic isomorphism because of the high level of government intervention and the high level of political lobbying. Political institutional pressures stand in the way of mimetic isomorphism and constitute negative forces that add further tension to accounting regulation in Bangladesh. Regarding the low level of normative isomorphism, there is evidence of a ‘blame culture’, with state institutions and professional accountancy institutions in the country blaming each other for the poor progress in IFRS implementation. Although the study focuses on Bangladesh, its results have implications for international policy makers, as well as the governments and regulators of other developing economies facing similar challenges in implementing IFRS. (shrink)

In contrast to the traditional and ordinary interpretation of Xunzi’s theory of human nature, which considers Xunzi’s theory as claiming that human nature is bad or evil, this article aims at, first, arguing that the interpretation is wrong or at least incomplete and, second, constructing a new interpretation that, according to Xunzi’s text, there are some factors in human nature that are able to promote good behaviors. I shall demonstrate that some major paragraphs in Xunzi’s text were misinterpreted and misarranged, (...) analyze that the word wei in the chapter of “Zhengming” has two different but related senses, one of which designates some of the potential capacities of human nature, and argue that the 23 words in the chapter of “Rongru” should not be deleted as redundant, as was done by the two famous philologists in Qing dynasdy, Wang Niansun and Wang Xianqian. (shrink)

The present paper has two aims. First, we reconstruct the core of molecular genetics (MOLGEN) i.e. the array of theoretical assumptions which underly all or most applications of molecular genetics. Second, we define a reduction relation p reducing character-factor genetics (CFG) to MOLGEN. That p is a reduction relation is proved by establishing that p satisfies the two major conditions which are discussed in the literature as necessary or ‘essential’ for reduction. This substantiates the claim that molecular genetics is (...) ‘better than’ or ‘more progressive-than’ character-factor genetics-which is commonly held true today. The paper continues, and relies heavily on the definitions given in part 1 (Balzer and Dawe [1985]). The enumeration of the definitions and sections in the present paper continues that of part 1. References to definitions with numbers smaller than 8 and to sections number I-4 always refer to part 1. (shrink)

Empirical evidence shows that non-conscious appraisal processes generate bodily responses to the environment. This finding is consistent with William James’s account of emotion, and it suggests that a general theory of emotion should follow James: a general theory should begin with the observation that physiological and behavioral responses precede our emotional experience. But I advance three arguments (empirical and conceptual arguments) showing that James’s further account of emotion as the experience of bodily responses is inadequate. I offer an alternative model, (...) according to which responses (physical states) are perceived and interpreted by a separate cognitive process, one that assigns meaning to those responses. The non-conscious appraisal process and the interpretive process are distinct, hence a two-stage model of emotion. This model is related to Schachter and Singer’s two-factor theory. Their often-discussed experiment showed that interpretation can play a role in producing emotions. But they do not show that interpretation is necessary for producing emotions in general, outside of the experimental conditions that generated unexplained arousal in subjects. My two-stage model supports this stronger claim by situating the interpretive process in a comprehensive model of emotion. (shrink)

Based on the institutional theory, this article attempts to examine two consecutive questions regarding the impact of various factors on corporate decision in environmental information disclosure (EID): (1) whether or not to disclose; and (2) the level of disclosure. The relevance of these factors is empirically tested using data collected from publicly listed manufacturing companies from 2006 to 2008 in China. Some interesting findings appear. We find that firms that are state-owned, those that operate in environmentally sensitive industries, those having (...) more industrial peers engaged in EID, and those with better reputation are more likely to disclose environmental information. When it comes to the content of EID, variables that attempt to capture external institutional pressures exhibit either no or weak explanatory power. Only the variable of organizational image and reputation is demonstrated to have a significant impact on both the act and the content of EID. This study provides a snapshot of the dialogues between constituencies in the organizational field and EID development. (shrink)

Relationalists about episodic memory must endorse a disjunctivist theory of memory-experience according to which cases of genuine memory and cases of total confabulation involve distinct kinds of mental event with different natures. This paper is concerned with a pair of arguments against this view, which are analogues of the ‘causal argument’ and the ‘screening off argument’ that have been pressed in recent literature against relationalist (and hence disjunctivist) theories of perception. The central claim to be advanced is that to (...) deal with these two arguments, memory disjunctivists both can and should draw on resources that are standardly appealed to by rival common factor theories of episodic memory, and, in particular, to the idea that genuine memories and merely apparent ones are to be distinguished, at least in part, in terms of the distinctive ways in which they are caused. On the proposed view, there are substantive causal constraints associated both with cases of genuine memory and with cases of mere confabulation. The resulting theory thus tells us something important about the nature both of genuine memories and of mere confabulations, namely, that such experiences must be caused in certain distinctive ways and cannot occur except as the result of a distinctive sort of causal process. In addition, the theory enables the disjunctivist to offer a unified response to an important pair of arguments against her view. (shrink)

We develop and use an integrated individual-level model to explain the driving forces behind digital piracy practice in two nations. The proposed model combines the Norm Activation model and Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology models. This study also explores the effect of culture on intention to practice DP in two nations: US and India. A survey instrument was used to collect data from 231 US and 331 Indian participants. Use of the integrated model proves to be a (...) powerful and a viable approach to understanding DP across cultures. In each nation, all 10 path coefficients on the research model are statistically significant thereby establishing the fact that personal norm, together with other factors, influences INT to engage in DP, which in turn, may influence the actual practice. The results reveal a support for cross-cultural generalizability and applicability of the proposed model. Culture clearly plays a strong moderating role in two out of the three paths tested. The implications of the findings are discussed. (shrink)

Purpose To examine process factors that either facilitate or inhibit learning medical ethics during case-based learning. Methods A qualitative research approach using microanalysis of transcribed videotaped discussions of three consecutive small-group learning sessions on medical ethics teaching for three groups, each with 10 students. Results This research effort revealed 12 themes of learning strategies, divided into 6 coping and 6 evasive strategies. Cognitive-based strategies were found to relate to Kamin's model of critical thinking in medical education, thereby supporting our distinction (...) between the themes of coping and evasive strategies. The findings also showed that cognitive efforts as well as emotional strategies are involved in discussions of ethical dilemmas. Based on Kamin's model and the constructivist learning theory, an examination of the different themes within the two learning strategies—coping and evasive—revealed that these strategies may be understood as corresponding to process factors either facilitating or inhibiting MET in SGL, respectively. Conclusions Our classification offers a more nuanced observation, specifically geared to pinpointing the desired and less desired process factors in the learning involved in MET in the SGL environment. Two key advantages of this observation are: it brings to the forefront process factors that may inhibit and not merely facilitate MET in SGL and it acknowledges the existence of emotional and not just cognitive process factors. Further enhancement of MET in SGL may thus be achieved based on these observations. (shrink)

The theory of actively open-minded thinking (AOT) implies standards for good thinking. Two broad aspects of these standards characterise individual differences in their acceptance: myside bias, in which thinking favours possible conclusions that are already strong; and uncertainty aversion, a belief that good thinking results in high confidence. Acceptance of AOT standards is often measured with short questionnaire scales. The present paper reports one study focusing on each of these two biases in the evaluation of the trustworthiness of sources, on (...) the basis of short statements differing in signs of myside bias or of unjustified overconfidence. A 10-item scale measuring largely myside bias predicts sensitivity to both sources of difference in the statements. A third study examines the generality of the two standards across topics. The study used four questions about each topic and an 11-item scale with more items about uncertainty aversion. Individual differences are preserved across topic, although some results imply that individual differences are more pronounced when a standard is seen as more relevant to the content. The two standards are best characterised as two unidimensional factors that are correlated with each other. Thus, individual differences in AOT standards are not unidimensional. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to analyze if two emergent models of leadership, servant and spiritual are really different or, on the contrary, are similar, with different labels. Both approaches were analyzed from their backgrounds, depictions, definitions, theoretical models proposed and limitations. It is concluded that both models of leadership are about the same models that share a similar root; both of them are oriented towards transcendental values of employees as a core component of leadership and a main (...) class='Hi'>factor related to the quality of job performance. Further studies should be done in order to provide new empirical evidence to support whether servant and spiritual leadership can be considered as completely independent models. (shrink)

This two-part article examines the competition between the clonal selection theory and the instructive theory of the immune response from 1957–1967. In Part I the concept of a temporally extended theory is introduced, which requires attention to the hitherto largely ignored issue of theory individuation. Factors which influence the acceptability of such an extended theory at different temporal points are also embedded in a Bayesian framework, which is shown to provide a rational account of belief change in science. In Part (...) II these factors, as elaborated in the Bayesian framework, are applied to the case of the success of the clonal selection theory and the failure of the instructive theory. (shrink)