Introduction -- Henri Lefebvre : the production of theory -- Research : from practices of dwelling to the production of space -- Critique : space as concrete abstraction -- Project : urban society and its architecture -- Afterword : toward an architecture of jouissance.

Catholicism is the most restrictive world religion in its position on assisted reproductive technologies. The opposition of the Church, combined with the widespread acceptability of ARTs in the United States, creates a profound moral dilemma for those who adhere to Church doctrine. Drawing on interviews from 33 Catholic women, this study shows that devout women have different understandings of these technologies than women from treatment-based studies. These differences are rooted in devout women’s position of navigating two contradictory cultural schemas—“religious” and (...) “secular”—regarding the meaning of reproductive technologies. Religious schemas provide devout women with different cultural resources that help them to avoid using ARTs while still reckoning with the ideal of biological parenthood. I show how devout women draw on religion to find value and meaning in their suffering, move beyond biological motherhood, and achieve a moral femininity. While religion increases the burden of reproduction for devout women, it also provides the cultural resources to resist the financial, emotional, and physical difficulties experienced by women who use ARTs. (shrink)

This paper defends the Blockian Proviso against its critics, Kinsella in particular, and interprets it as a law of non-contradiction in the theory of just property rights. I demonstrate that one may not lawfully appropriate in such a way as to forestall others from appropriating an unowned land because such appropriation would result in conflict-generating norms, and conflict-generating norms are not rationally justifiable and just norms. The Blockian Proviso, which precludes forestalling, operates therefore at the level of original appropriation and (...) determines, according to the homestead principle of justice in first acquisition, what may and what may not be lawfully appropriated. Hence, the Blockian Proviso is not an add-on to the homestead principle but part and parcel thereof. (shrink)

After a brief look at Drafts on Polish philosophy of the twentieth century you could get the impression that this is a work dedicated to the most recent works of Polish philosophy. However after a moment of consideration, it seems hard to believe that a contemporary philosopher would write a history of twentieth century philosophy which could be considered neither as his history nor his philosophy. The distinction between history and philosophy in this case is not accidental since Wojciech Słomski (...) does not try to present a completely closed view of philosophical thought in the last century but aims at expressing that which he himself considers most valuable in contemporary Polish philosophy. It turns out that despite first impressions, we are not dealing with a systematic lecture, maintaining a cold and impartial approach to the subject but with a text written by an independent philosopher who cannot write differently about philosophy than Wojciech Słomski has done. For this reason too, the philosophy in Drafts is a living philosophy, made up of the most current propositions considered by W. Słomski as more important than the task of executing clear distinctions and pigeonholing of presented views into categories created by philosophers. (shrink)

According to contemporary understanding of the universal tree of life, the traditionally recognized kingdoms of eukaryotic organisms—Protista, Fungi, Animalia and Plantae—are irregularly interspersed in a vast phylogenetic tree. There are numerous groups that in any Linnaean classification advised by phylogenetic relationships would form sister groups to those kingdoms, therefore requiring us to admit them the same rank. In practice, this would lead to the creation of ca. 25-30 new kingdoms that would now be listed among animals and plants as “major (...) types of life”. This poses problems of an aesthetic and educational nature. There are, broadly speaking, two ways to deal with that issue: a) ignore the aesthetic and educational arguments and propose classification systems that are fully consistent with the Hennigian principles of phylogenetic classification, i.e. are only composed of monophyletic taxa; b) ignore Hennigian principles and bunch small, relatively uncharacteristic groups into paraphyletic taxa, creating systems that are more convenient. In the paper, I present the debate and analyze the pros and cons of both options, briefly commenting on the deeper, third resolution, which would be to abandon classification systems entirely. Recent advances in eukaryotic classification and phylogeny are commented in the light of the philosophical question of the purpose and design principles of biological classification systems. (shrink)

Can ownership status influence probability judgements under condition of uncertainty? In three experiments, we presented our participants with a recording of a real horse race. We endowed half of our sample with a wager on a single horse to win the race, and the other half with money to spend to acquire the same wager. Across three large studies, we found the endowment effect – owners demanded significantly more for the wager than buyers were willing to pay to acquire it. (...) However, we also found that probability estimates of each horse winning the race did not differ between owners and non-owners of the betting slip. Our results demonstrate that distorted perception of probability is unlikely to be a mechanism explaining the endowment effect. (shrink)

Anti‐intellectualists about knowledge‐how insist that, when an agent S knows how to φ, it is in virtue of some ability, rather than in virtue of any propositional attitudpaes, S has. Recently, a popular strategy for attacking the anti‐intellectualist position proceeds by appealing to cases where an agent is claimed to possess a reliable ability to φ while nonetheless intuitively lacking knowledge‐how to φ. John Bengson and Marc Moffett and Carlotta Pavese have embraced precisely this strategy and have thus claimed, for (...) different reasons, that anti‐intellectualism is defective on the grounds that possessing the ability to φ is not sufficient for knowing how to φ. We investigate this strategy of argument‐by‐counterexample to the anti‐intellectualist's sufficiency thesis and show that, at the end of the day, anti‐intellectualism remains unscathed. (shrink)

The entry is intended as an advanced introduction to the topic of knowledge-how. It starts with a list of overviews, monographs and collections, followed by selected 20th century discussions. The last two sections contain sources pertaining to Ryle's own work on the topic as well as work by other influential thinkers, and themes that are sometimes associated with knowledge-how. The remaining seven sections survey the contemporary literature on knowledge-how from three perspectives: (i) generic desiderata for accounts of knowledge-how, (ii) specific (...) topics that are already well-entrenched in the tradition of particular subdisciplines and (iii) second-order controversy regarding distinct assumptions and tools employed by the debaters. (shrink)

Presumption of Equality requires that individuals be treated equally in the absence of relevant information that would discriminate between them. Our objective is to make this principle more precise, if viewed as a principle of fairness, and to determine why and under what conditions it should be obeyed. Presumption norms are procedural constraints, but their justification can be sought in the possible or expected outcomes of the procedures they regulate. This is the avenue pursued here. The suggestion is that in (...) the absence of information that would discriminate between the individuals, equal treatment minimizes the expected unfairness of the outcome. A related suggestion is that equal treatment under these circumstances also minimizes the maximal possible unfairness of the outcome. Whether these suggestions are correct or not depends on the properties of the underlying unfairness measure. The required properties are specified. (shrink)

Modern technology offers an increasing number of tools for teaching mathematics, but technology adoption in schools encounters many barriers. The Technology Acceptance Model explains that technology usage is dependent on intentions, which rest on perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness. Less is known about the relationship between intentions and actual behaviour. In the current study we show that the level of cognitive investment on the part of the teachers, captured by the construct of Need for Cognition (NC), is crucial (...) in the use of technology in mathematical instruction, while controlling for a variety of background factors. Furthermore NC moderates the relationship between intentions and technology use, such that high NC weakens the relationship between the perceived usefulness of technology in pedagogy and its actual use. (shrink)

In this commentary, I critically assess Rex Welshon’s position on the neural substrates of ownership unity. First, I comment on Welshon’s definition of ownership unity and underline some of the problems stemming from his phenomenological analysis. Second, I analyze Welshon’s proposal to establish a mechanistic relation between neural substrates and ownership unity. I show that it is insufficient and defend my own position on how neural mechanisms may give rise to whole subjects of experience, which I call the neuro-integrative account (...) of consciousness. Lastly, I comment on Welshon’s philosophical contribution and claim that it leaves the reader theoretically stranded. (shrink)

Assuming, according to Jaspers, that the measure of truth of a philosophical system is the lifestyle of its creator as well as his ability at drawing conclusions resulting from philosophical speculation to the requirements of practical action, the question must be asked, to what extent, if at all Wojciech Słomski's book tries to recognise and name the philosophically characteristic merging of theory and practise. Despite this, it shouldn't be the superior aim of any biography, let alone the biography of a (...) philosopher. However in the case of Professor Antoni Kępiński, the connection between theoretical views and real life holds meaning not only for judging the truth of these views but most of all for a correct understanding of them. (shrink)

According to reductive intellectualists about knowledge-how :147–190, 2008; Philos Phenomenol Res 78:439–467, 2009) knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. To the extent that this is right, then insofar as we might conceive of ways knowledge could be extended with reference to active externalist :7–19, 1998; Clark in Supersizing the mind: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) approaches in the philosophy of mind, we should expect no interesting difference between the two. However, (...) insofar as anti-intellectualist approaches to knowledge-how are a viable option, there is an overlooked issue of how knowledge-how might be extended, via active externalism, in ways very differently from knowledge-that. This paper explores this overlooked space, and in doing so, illustrates how a novel form of extended knowledge-how emerges from a pairing of active externalism in the philosophy of mind with anti-intellectualism in the theory of knowledge. Crucial to our argument will be a new way of thinking about the extended mind thesis, as it pertains to the kinds of state one is in when one knows how to do something, and how this state connects with non-accidentally successful performance. (shrink)

[(What does) a cognitivist in the supermarket] The central area of David Kirsh’s interest is the various ways in which humans use elements of their environment as external components of computation processes or means enabling them to reduce the complexity of cognitive problems they face. in his research he performs field observations as well as laboratory experiments. Kirsh skillfully blends concepts developed in contemporary cognitive science, such as situated cognition or extended mind, with classic concepts including problem solving. A number (...) of his theses seam to derive from “good, old fashioned” computationalism; however, this does not prevent him from demonstrating how cognitive “computations” assume not only reasonings, but also use of cognitive artifacts, bodies or the space itself. In the current issue of AVANT we present two texts authored by Kirsh. (shrink)

The article reviews the book of Jason Stanley, Know How. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Beyond Whitehead brings the reader up to date with the latest developments in process philosophy, concerning the study its basic concepts and their roots, and its potential extensions and revisions.

Recent findings demonstrate sex-related differences in the neurobiological mechanisms by which emotional arousal influences memory, and raise questions about the extent to which memory for emotional events may differ between males and females. Here we examine whether sex-related differences exist in the recall of central information and peripheral detail from an emotional story. Healthy subjects viewed a brief, narrated slide-show containing emotional elements in its middle section. One week later, they received an incidental multiple-choice recognition test for the story. Following (...) the test, each subject completed the BEM Sex-Role Inventory, an assessment of sex-related masculine and feminine traits. The results reveal no differences in recall of either central or peripheral story information when considering the performance of actual men and women, but a significant difference when considering male and females as determined by their BEM test scores. “BEM” males showed significantly enhanced recall of central emotional information. “BEM” females did not. Both groups showed significantly enhanced recall of peripheral emotional information, although this effect appeared larger in BEM females than in BEM males. The influences of “BEM” sex and type of information significantly interacted to influence emotional memory performance. These findings confirm the existence of sex-related influences in the recall of emotional information, and suggest that sex-related traits, rather than actual sex per se, may be a more sensitive indicator of these influences. (shrink)