Debates about the semantics and pragmatics of predicates of personal taste have largely centered on contextualist and relativist proposals. In this paper, I argue in favor of an alternative, absolutist analysis of PPT. Theorists such as Max Kölbel and Peter Lasersohn have argued that we should dismiss absolutism due to its inability to accommodate the possibility of faultless disagreement involving PPT. My aim in the paper is to show how the absolutist can in fact accommodate this possibility by drawing on (...) an account of faultless disagreement that improves upon a recent proposal due to Karl Schafer. In amending Schafer’s proposal, I put forward an empirically informed view of our beliefs regarding matters of personal taste, as well as an account of our assertions concerning such matters. I also argue that absolutists should take disagreement about these matters to be conative, rather than doxastic, in nature. The anticipated result is an independently compelling account of faultless disagreement about matters of personal taste that fits naturally with absolutism. (shrink)

From the mid-nineteenth century to the early twentieth century British Idealism was a leading school of philosophical thought and the Scottish Idealists made important contributions to this philosophical school. In Scotland, there were two types of post-Hegelian idealism: Absolute Idealism and Personal Idealism. This article will show the ways in which these philosophical systems arose by focusing on their leading representatives: Edward Caird and Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison.

Considers and rejects two common explanations of the roots of scepticism. The first, that finds them in a first‐person approach to epistemology that takes as its central question ‘what do I know?’, is rejected on the grounds that first‐personalism results from thinking about certain normally ignored possibilities and gives no explanation of why they are so ignored, and therefore no adequate explanation of scepticism. The second, that scepticism is the offspring of an ‘absolute’ conception of truth, is espoused (...) by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel. Craig argues that since no explanation is given of why it is impossible in principle to attain the absolute conception, the only way adhering to the idea of such a conception can lead to scepticism is if we raise independently the traditional sceptical possibilities. (shrink)

Absolute needs (as against instrumental needs) are independent of the ends, goals and purposes of personal agents. Against the view that the only needs are instrumental needs, David Wiggins and Garrett Thomson have defended absolute needs on the grounds that the verb ‘need’ has instrumental and absolute senses. While remaining neutral about it, this article does not adopt that approach. Instead, it suggests that there are absolute biological needs. The absolute nature of these needs is (...) defended by appeal to: their objectivity (as against mind-dependence); the universality of the phenomenon of needing across the plant and animal kingdoms; the impossibility that biological needs depend wholly upon the exercise of the abilities characteristic of personal agency; the contention that the possession of biological needs is prior to the possession of the abilities characteristic of personal agency. Finally, three philosophical usages of ‘normative’ are distinguished. On two of these, to describe a phenomenon or claim as ‘normative’ is to describe it as value-dependent. A description of a phenomenon or claim as ‘normative’ in the third sense does not entail such value-dependency, though it leaves open the possibility that value depends upon the phenomenon or upon the truth of the claim. It is argued that while survival needs (or claims about them) may well be normative in this third sense, they are normative in neither of the first two. Thus, the idea of absolute need is not inherently normative in either of the first two senses. (shrink)

Drawing on the connection of the I to an absolute ground in the metaphysics of Schelling and the poetry of Hlderlin, this book offers a contemporary model of ...

This book is yet another in the recent growth of studies of Kant’s "investigation and establishment of the supreme principle of morality." Its aim is stated in the subtitle and again in a number of variations throughout the book. The author examines and objects to the intrusion of Kant’s "official metaphysics" in what he believes is intended to be, but does not succeed in being, a guide to action. He deplores Kant’s unawareness that he was, in fact, a utilitarian. He (...) argues that Kant’s and all rationalistic ethics are teleological. Along the way he confuses Kant’s carefully distinguished supreme good and complete good and ignores—in good part by omitting considerations of the third section of the Groundwork—Kant’s identification of pure practical reason and the good will. Nevertheless, there are some virtues to this study: the analysis of the language of major passages of the first two sections of the Groundwork and, more effective, the presentation of the author’s own view, in the final thirty pages, of the notion of man as an end in himself; this is a view which Hutchings thinks Kant should have had but also one which many readers have long since attributed to him. (shrink)

Hans Blumenberg wollte allein durch seine Philosophie sprechen. Seine Person sollte den Blicken der Öffentlichkeit entzogen bleiben. Und doch ist die Lesbarkeit seiner Welt nur durch das Licht seiner Zeit und ihrer Kämpfe möglich. Unter dem Nationalsozialismus wegen seiner jüdischen Mutter verfolgt, geprägt vom katholischen Milieu seines Vaters und einem humanistischen Elitegymnasium in der Hansestadt Lübeck, ist er am Ende ein typischer Vertreter der alten Bundesrepublik. Seit frühester Jugend ein obsessiver Leser, hat er Literatur, Philosophie, Theologie, Naturwissenschaften und Zeitgeschichtliches (...) gleichermassen aufgesaugt und daraus ein herausragendes Werk geschaffen. Im Rückgriff auf bisher unerschlossene Archivquellen legt Rüdiger Zill in seinem reich bebilderten Buch die lebensgeschichtlichen Wurzeln dieses Werks frei und zeigt, dass es keineswegs so monolithisch ist, wie es auf den ersten Blick erscheint. Vielmehr versteht man es nur, indem man seine Wege und Umwege nachvollzieht sowie die Vernetzungen mit den Wissenschaften in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Der absolute Leser gewährt erstmals einen umfassenden Einblick in die Werkstatt eines Autors, der wie kein zweiter die Entwicklung seiner Arbeit akribisch dokumentiert hat. Hans Blumenberg beim jahrzehntelangen Lesen, Entwerfen und Formulieren über die Schulter zu sehen heisst auch, etwas über das faszinierende Handwerk des Denkens selbst zu lernen."--Dust jacket flap. (shrink)

A Husserl-based social ethics is within the noetic-noematic field as disclosed through various reductions. The focus is how at the passive and active levels a bsic sense of will is in play as well as the "telos" of subjectivity in terms of both a "godly" intersubjective ideal "we". This is inseparable form the disclosure of the full sense of person through an "absolute ought" and the "truth of will" wherein the common world and common goods are tied to (...) an ideal community as a person of a higher order. (shrink)

Background Contemporary societies are rife with moral disagreement, resulting in recalcitrant disputes on matters of public policy. In the context of ongoing bioethical controversies, are uncompromising attitudes rooted in beliefs about the nature of moral truth?Methods To answer this question, we conducted both exploratory and confirmatory studies, with both a convenience and a nationally representative sample (total N = 1501), investigating the link between people’s beliefs about moral truth (their metaethics) and their beliefs about moral value (their normative ethics).Results Across (...) various bioethical issues (e.g., medically-assisted death, vaccine hesitancy, surrogacy, mandatory organ conscription, or genetically modified crops), consequentialist attitudes were associated with weaker beliefs in an objective moral truth. This association was not explained by domain-general reflectivity, theism, personality, normative uncertainty, or subjective knowledge.Conclusions We find a robust link between the way people characterize prescriptive disagreements and their sensibility to consequences. In addition, both societal consensus and personal conviction contribute to objectivist beliefs, but these effects appear to be asymmetric, i.e., stronger for opposition than for approval. (shrink)

Der Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, ob eine Behinderung immer als Form von Leid betrachtet werden muss. Mit Hilfe einer Unterscheidung zwischen absoluten und komparativen Einschränkungen des Wohls wird aufgezeigt, dass die bloße Tatsache einer vorliegenden medizinischen Schädigung nicht hinreicht, ein Urteil über das absolute Wohl einer Person zu treffen. Es werden verschiedene Argumente geprüft, warum Behinderung dennoch generell negativ bewertet werden sollte. Diese werden zurückgewiesen. Abschließend wird eine Überlegung eingeführt, wonach gleichwohl bestimmte Formen der Behinderung als (...) objektive Beeinträchtigungen des Wohls zu gelten haben, nämlich dann, wenn basale Fähigkeiten betroffen sind. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDer Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, ob eine Behinderung immer als Form von Leid betrachtet werden muss. Mit Hilfe einer Unterscheidung zwischen absoluten und komparativen Einschränkungen des Wohls wird aufgezeigt, dass die bloße Tatsache einer vorliegenden medizinischen Schädigung nicht hinreicht, ein Urteil über das absolute Wohl einer Person zu treffen. Es werden verschiedene Argumente geprüft, warum Behinderung dennoch generell negativ bewertet werden sollte. Diese werden zurückgewiesen. Abschließend wird eine Überlegung eingeführt, wonach gleichwohl bestimmte Formen der Behinderung als (...) objektive Beeinträchtigungen des Wohls zu gelten haben, nämlich dann, wenn basale Fähigkeiten betroffen sind. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Matter and Organisms Organisms and Persons Is There a Criterion of Personal Identity?

This richly detailed biography captures both the personal life and the scientific career of Isaac Newton, presenting a fully rounded picture of Newton the man, the scientist, the philosopher, the theologian, and the public figure. Professor Westall treats all aspects of Newton's career, but his account centers on a full description of Newton's achievements in science. Thus the core of the work describes the development of the calculus, the experimentation that altered the direction of the science of optics, and especially (...) the investigations in celestial dynamics that led to the law of universal gravitation. (shrink)

The referent of the transcendental and indexical “I” is present non-ascriptively and contrasts with “the personal I” which necessity is presenced as having properties. Each is unique but in different ways. The former is abstract and incomplete until taken as a personal I. The personal I is ontologically incomplete until it self-determines itself morally. The “absolute Ought” is the exemplary moral self-determination and it finds a special disclosure in “the truth of will.” Simmel's situation ethics is useful for making (...) more precise Husserl's ethical position. (shrink)

In order to articulate an account of erotic love that does not attempt to transcend its personal features, Robert Solomon and Martha Nussbaum lean on the speeches by Aristophanes and Alcibiades in Plato’s Symposium. This leads them to downplay the sense in which love is not only for another person, but also for the good. Drawing on a distinction between relative and absolute senses of speaking about the good, I mediate between two features of love that at first (...) may seem irreconcilable. The first is the sense in which love is deeply personal in character. The second is the sense in which we in love come to articulate ethical demands. With the help of the Diotimian ascent of love that Socrates presents in his speech, I submit that these two can come together in the realization that our personally conditioned responses in love are transformed to accommodate demands that carry an unconditional meaning. (shrink)

Marie Stenlund’s careful reading of values-based practice and her demonstration of its links with Martha Nussbaum’s Capabilities Framework are innovative theoretically and have potentially important implications for policy and practice in mental health. As she indicates the two approaches converge in a number of key respects. Notably, both recognise the diversity of individual human values. This diversity crucially underpins contemporary person-centred conceptions of recovery in mental health based on quality of life as defined by reference to the values of (...) (to what is important from the perspective of) the person concerned rather than that of a generic professional ‘needs assessment’.1 2 Where the two theories diverge, too, Stenlund finds practically important consequences. Thus Nussbaum’s Capabilities Framework, as Stenlund indicates, is outcomes-oriented, while values-based practice focuses on process. The two approaches are not however thereby necessarily inconsistent. Drawing on early accounts of values-based practice (from 2006 and 2009), Stenlund suggests a degree of implicit blurring between it and Nussbaum’s capabilities. Here we need to be careful: values-based practice does not (as Stenlund suggests) regard recovery as an outcome; it …. (shrink)

This article argues that there are neither moral considerations that in principle forbid the development or use of recom-binant DNA technology, nor grounds to hold that its application is likely to cause more harm than good. A defensible moral position would enjoin a prudent assessment of consequences, rather than an absolute prohibition. The technology may remain controversial because it presupposes the difference between being a person, an entity who can evaluate and manipulate its own biological structure, and human-ness (...) as a biological structure likely to be the subject of engineering over the long-range future. (shrink)

Argument about the ethical possibility of the therapeutic use of embryonic stem cells depends critically on the evaluation of the moral status of the very early embryo. Some assert that at the blastocyst stage it is only potentially human, not yet possessing the full ethical status of personhood, while others assert that from its formation the embryo possesses all the moral rights of a human person. It is shown that a decision on this issue is closely related to how (...) human nature is to be understood. The idea of a person as a dual combination of body and spirit correlates naturally with the assertion of absolute personhood from conception, while an idea of human psychosomatic unity encourages a development picture in which the embryo only grows gradually into personhood. The latter view is seen to be encouraged by new advances in science which emphasise the importance of the concept of information in the discussion of complex systems. Other ethical issues related to human genetics are also briefly reviewed. (shrink)

Simone Weil writes in one of her notebooks: “When one arrives at the absolute one can only express oneself by identities … – For identity alone expresses the unconditioned” (Cahiers, in Œuvres complètes, t. VI, vol. 4 (Paris: Gallimard, 2006), 113). Thus, it is that “the good is the good”, one and the same, unconditionally. Certainly, an individual is unique, a nation is equally so. Nevertheless, personal identity – or “character” – and the identity of a nation are not (...) absolutes. When we wish to treat them as absolutes, we ignore the fact that the “person,” as well as the “nation”, only exists within relationships that they are subject to exterior circumstances and that their identity is situated in time. Is one correct to suppose that the character of an individual or the identity of the nation are “invariables that one continues to find throughout various manifestations”, (“Notes sur le caractère”, Écrits de Marseille, in Œuvres complètes, Op. cit., t. IV, vol. 1 (2008), 87) observed or probable? We hypothesize here that one can apply to national identity what Simone Weil wrote about the notion of character, in notes composed in Marseille and in her commentary on the Our Father (“À propos du Pater”, ibid., 337‐345). (shrink)

In her seminal article ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ (1958) Elizabeth Anscombe argued that we need a new ethics, one that uses virtue terms to generate absolute prohibitions against certain act-types. Leading contemporary virtue ethicists have not taken up Anscombe's challenge in justifying absolute prohibitions and have generally downplayed the role of rule-following in their normative theories. That they have not done so is primarily because contemporary virtue ethicists have focused on what is sufficient for characterizing the deliberation and action (...) of the fully virtuous person, and rule-following is inadequate for this task. In this article, I take up Anscombe's challenge by showing that rule-following is necessary for virtuous agency, and that virtue ethics can justify absolute prohibitions. First, I offer a possibility proof by showing how virtue ethics can generate absolute prohibitions in three ways: by considering actions that directly manifest vice or that cannot be performed virtuously; actions that are prohibited by one's institutional roles and practical identities; and actions that are prohibited by the prescriptions of the wise. I then seek to show why virtue ethicists should incorporate rule-following and absolute prohibitions into their theories. I emphasize the central role that rules have in the development of virtue, then motivate the stronger view that fully virtuous agents follow moral rules by considering the importance of hope, uncertainty about consequences, and taking responsibility for what eventuates. Finally, I provide an account of what Anscombe called a ‘corrupt mind’, explaining how our understanding of virtue is corrupted if we think that virtue may require us to do vicious actions. (shrink)

This article considers whether any interpretation of the idea of equal claims to the natural world can resolve the Canyon Dilemma (i.e. can justify protecting the Grand Canyon but not a small canyon from mining by a poor generation). It first considers and ultimately rejects the idea of subjecting natural resource rights to an intergenerational equal division. It then demonstrates that a pluralist theory of environmental justice committed to both respect for the separateness of persons and to the collective good (...) can justify a type of intergenerational non-absolute equal division of natural resource rights that can navigate the Canyon Dilemma. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 23 (2003) 101-116 [Access article in PDF] Persons and Awareness Tyson Anderson Saint Leo University The aim of this essay is to relate Christianity and Buddhism through a consideration of two key terms, "persons" and "awareness," the first being central for Christianity and the second being central for Buddhism.The first thing that needs to be noticed is the relatively indefinable character of these words. I of course (...) intend to give as clear an indication as is possible concerning their meaning, but as I considered some of the important concepts that are involved in the topic—language, world, love, understanding—I began to realize that we are surely in the realm of mystery here. By "mystery" I mean something that we can understand somewhat but cannot comprehend, much as Saint Thomas Aquinas thought of God. 1 As is well known, LudwigWittgenstein believed that there is something mysterious even about language itself, that basically what it is can be "shown" but not "said." 2 A certain tentativeness here in regard to propositional adequacy, I might add, is perfectly compatible with strong confidence in one's relation to what Wittgenstein called "the higher." 3 In regard to the truth to be found in the beliefs of others, even a megapandit such as Ken Wilber—not noted for his modesty and circumspection—observes that "the human mind is incapable of producing 100% error." 4 Perhaps some misunderstandings among those engaging in dialogue can be avoided if we remain mindful of the mysterious character of the subject matter and are less confident about the sufficiency of our own articulation of the truth.As to dialogue itself, it is perhaps well to remember when the issues of "fruit salad" and syncretism arise, 5 that thinking itself has typically a dialogical structure, with the result that "fruit salad" is actually the normal condition of persons as they develop in understanding themselves and their world. 6 In conversation with Laurence Freeman, O.S.B., the Dalai Lama appears to disapprove of mixing traditions—"Do not try to put a yak's head on a sheep's body" 7 —but it would be difficult to conceive of a more syncretistic religion than Tibetan Buddhism or Catholicism. Indeed, if we compare the early Jesus movement to the medieval church, the development of Catholicism might well be described by Luther or Calvin, had they thought of it, as an operation that put a yak's head on a sheep's body. The dialogical and finite structure of thinking is in fact one of the reasons why it is possible to conceive of a "universal religion," contrary to what the Dalai Lama thinks. 8 This is so because, since human understanding is never absolute and completed, there is always the possibility that future [End Page 101] understanding will yield a vision that embraces a multiplicity and diversity of religious insights in a way that is impossible for us to foresee at this time. Moreover, part of the point of American culture, I would think, is the benefits of mongrelization, and so perhaps Americans ought to be less suspicious than some at the thought of having "strange bedfellows." Looking for historical examples of conscious syncretism, one thinks of Mani and Jesuit syncretism exemplified in Matteo Ricci (outfitted first as a Buddhist monk and then later as a Confucian scholar) and the evangelization of New Spain, 9 and more recently, Hazrat Inayat Khan and his son, Pir Vilayat Khan. Also, there is Jesaiah Ben-Aharon, a Jewish thinker who interprets the Holocaust in terms of the Christ. 10 I find such efforts to be commendable, and so although doctrinal and cultural immaculacy has its charms, I believe it to be the call of maya. I will proceed, then, in constructing a mysterious and miscegenational fruit salad, my only justification being that this seems to reflect accurately the truth of the matter and that we really have no other peaceable choice. 11 Persons "Person" is often used in the same sense as "human being." By "person" I mean a being who can love and who, as a human being, is the... (shrink)

ABSTRACT There are many points of similarity between the views of pacifists and those of people who argue that sentient non‐human animals have absolute rights. Both positions ultimately rest on the assertion that the consequences of a violent action which is intended to preserve some lives by terminating others are more far‐reaching than we generally suppose. When the total net consequences of such actions are considered, it can be seen that an ethic of complete non‐violence might turn out to (...) be optimific in the long run. Hence, absolutist moral positions of this sort should not be seen as irrational, or self‐serving, and are worthy of respectful consideration even if we finally decide that we ourselves cannot accept them. Until we have firm evidence as to whether non‐violence has positive or negative net consequences, the choice between absolute and situationist ethical positions must remain one which depends very largely on personal character. Absolutist positions do serve a valuable ‘conscience‐pricking’ function for the rest of us. They stand most chance of becoming more widely accepted if they are incorporated within a general ethic of positive helpfulness, rather than being presented as purely negative prohibitions. (shrink)

Determinism from the 1st and 3rd person perspective as well as the universal point of reference aee dealt with. This is to show the absence of free will in the last perspective and the illusion of it when seen from the first two perspectives. ‘Free’ choice is dealt with as well as the absence of free will and the consequences of determinism for law and court judgements are explored. So, what if any, is the place and the role of (...) God in all this? Did s/he create determinism and the potential for or any semblance of choice and free will? Or is the existence of God.. (shrink)

To the question “What are we?”, the common-sense answer is “human beings”; but many philosophers prefer to say we are “persons”. This paper argues that the philosophical use of “person” is problematic. It takes us away from the sound Aristotelian idea that our biological nature is essential to what we are, and towards the suspect Lockean idea that a person could migrate from one body to another. This dualistic Lockean conception is often laid at Descartes’s door, but Descartes (...) himself in many passages underlines our status as human beings. There is a further danger in the idea of personhood as rational agency if it is seen as that which makes someone worthy of moral respect. Respect should be recognized as an inalienable and absolute human entitlement, independent of our circumstances, capacities, group-membership, qualifications or faculties. (shrink)

During the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic in South Africa, one Prophetic Pentecostal Church, Rabboni Centre Ministries, brought about a marked change in their practice and theology of confession and absolution. Before COVID-19, the Prophet would exorcise the evil spirits that caused sinful behaviour in people and in this way restore them as good Christians acceptable to the congregation. During the COVID-19 lockdown, people could not meet in church and therefore the Prophet changed the practice and theology of confession and (...) absolution. People had to personally identify their own sins and write these down in an email that they sent to the church. Their confessions were then read out, and they were given absolution by the Prophet. During COVID-19, sins were understood as the wrong actions and thoughts of believers, who were personally responsible for their sins. Sins were no longer blamed on Satan. No exorcism followed confessions, rather people were absolved by the Prophet just as people are absolved by priests in mainline churches. In this article, I show that through the act of self-reflection and confession, people are able to take control of their lives and determine their future selves. It also enables people to re-connect to the faith community, the Prophet and God. Contribution: Unlike the thesis of Weber and Foucault, this does not lead to heightened individualism but rather to a self-reflective individual who is aware both of their individual agency and their self as a ‘dividual’ being who is connected to other people and spirits. (shrink)

The death of a person is a tragedy while the explosion of a lifeless galaxy is a mere firework. The moral difference is grounded in the nature of humans: humans have intrinsic worth, a worth that makes their fate really matter. This is the worth proposed as the foundation of ethics. Ethics in the usual sense of right and wrong actions, rights and virtues, and how to live a good life, is founded on something more basic that is not (...) itself about actions, namely the worth of persons. Human moral worth arises from certain properties that distinguish humans from the rest of creation (though some animals share a lesser degree of those properties): rationality, consciousness, the ability to act for reasons, emotional structure and love, individuality. This complex package makes humans the "piece of work" of which Hamlet says, “How noble in reason, how infinite in faculty." The Worth of Persons establishes a foundation for ethics in the equal worth of persons, which makes ethics absolutely objective and immune to relativist attacks because it is based on the metaphysical truth about humans. Endless debate about ethical dilemmas, rules, and principles fails to connect with what is really important ethically, that is, what makes humans matter. (shrink)

This paper examines Wittgenstein's conception of absolute safety in the light of two potential problems exposed by Winch. These are that, firstly: even if someone's life has been virtuous so far, the contingency of its remaining so until death vitiates the claim that the virtuous person cannot be harmed; and secondly: when voiced from a first-person standpoint, the claim to be absolutely safe due to one's virtuousness appears hubristic and self-undermining. I argue that Wittgenstein's mystical conception of (...) safety, unlike some others, requires no claim about one's own virtue and hence can be construed as avoiding these problems. (shrink)

To the Editor: Last year I sent a vial of my spit to a prominent direct-to-consumer genetic testing company. The company's Web site promised that, in return, I would get genetic risk information that would allow me to "make life-style choices" and "make more informed decisions" about my health—in other words, personalize my health behaviors and medical care.When the results arrived I found little that was helpful. There was lots of fun and interesting information. It was, after all, information about (...) me—one of my absolute favorite topics. And the data were presented in a sophisticated and engaging manner that made them easy to understand. But was there any information that should or would nudge me toward adopting .. (shrink)

Aquinas does not argue that natural inclinations per se suffice for moral absolutes, but rather that they suffice to make their objects known as self-evidently good for persons. Acting for the contrary of a natural inclination thereby harms persons and is contrary to the Bonum Precept (Good is to be done and pursued; evil is to be avoided). Acting for a self-evident good, however, becomes morally obligatory only when indispensable.

K. C. F. Krause, a disciple of Fichte and Schelling, distinguished himself by elaborating a coherent philosophy of law. In his exhaustive study Dierksmeier first mentions the various authors who influenced Krause, to point out next the latter’s criticism of Fichte, who did not succeed in clarifying the foundation of law. Krause himself sees this foundation in the human person and the rational nature of man. Rather than following Fichte and Schelling, Krause joins Kant: rights and law are an (...) expression of accomplished humanity. In Schelling’s view, on the other hand, right is the organ of freedom. For Kant, law itself must create order to be law. Krause is convinced that the basic structure of man’s intellectual life consists in striving toward wisdom, love, religion, and art. Using Kant’s distinction between analytical and synthetic thought, Krause considers law as being an absolute, irreplaceable category of the practical reason, prior to every juridical order. In complete freedom our reason must reach the Wesenschau, that is, penetrate the essence of things. Laws must agree with man’s essence, which exists in a likeness to God. Therefore, to express what is right, in the full sense of the term, law must be considered a property of God and something divine. (shrink)

Karol Wojtyła—the future pope John Paul II—chose the human being, especially in its personalistic dimension, as the main point of his philosophical research. Inaccordance with the metaphysical rule agere sequitur esse, he investigated the dynamisms proper to a human being: the reactive dynamism of the human body, the emotive dynamism of the human psyche, and the personalistic dynamism associated with free choice of the will. These allowed him to experience and understand the human being as a complex yet integrated entity. (...) The personal structure of the human being is manifest in terms of selfpossession, self-determination, and self-governance. Thanks to self-possession, human beings experience freedom of the will, which expresses itself in each free act. Being endowed with a free will, the human being is able to grow in freedom but can also lose his freedom. Wojtyła’s philosophical investigations are innovative by way of the use that he made of the philosophy of being according to Thomas Aquinas and the philosophy of consciousness articulated by Husserl. He not only pointed out man’s structure but also presented man as an objective entity in an objective world. Each human being is constituted by his or her inner self, which is absolutely exceptional because it is completely irreducible to anything else in the world. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:348 BOOK REVIEWS to God's commandments is "the way and condition of salvation" (VS # 12). Now obedience to the commandments entails, in addition to a good motivation or a willingness to strive, the conformity of an action's object to the specifying content of the commandment. What is the significance of a commandment to honor one's father and mother, if it does not specify actions? The commandments of God (...) specify what kinds of action are, or are not, in conformity with the true good of man. In his analysis of the moral act, the Pope holds that the object of the act is "the primary and decisive element for moral judgment" (VS # 79). Actions which by the nature of their object are unable to be ordered to man's true end can never be "good" actions. Further, he notes that acts, even individual acts, are determinative of the goodness or badness of the person. These points are summarized nicely in the following passage: Activity is morally good when it attests to and expresses the voluntary ordering of the person to his ultimate end and the conformity of a concrete action with the human good as it is acknowledged in its truth by reason. If the object of the concrete action is not in harmony with the true good of the person, the choice of that action makes our will and ourselves morally evil, thus putting us in conflict with our ultimate end, the supreme good, God himself (VS # 72). I believe that Keenan's study commendably highlights the freedom of the will in the order of exercise, and its power to exercise dominion over the intellect in the order of specification. Keenan also insightfully emphasizes the central role of the love of God as the root of our striving to live well. Yet any willing can only be consequent to some knowing. Further, the willingness to strive and be determined, if it is good, is a willingness to be determined, or specified, by the true good known by reason and faith. This willingness, which is a crucial element in moral goodness, must be completed by actions in conformity with the true good. Human goodness is in freely, and lovingly, living out the truth of human nature and its end. The Catholic University of America Washington, D.C. JOHN A. D. CUDDEBACK Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision, and Truth. By JOHN FINNIS. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1991. Pp. 113. $24.95 (cloth), $9.95 (paper). Not long after his conversion to Roman Catholicism, Alasdair MacIntyre told a group of Catholic bishops: " As a matter of autobio- BOOK REVIEWS 349 graphical fact, I came to the conclusion that there were exceptionless and binding [moral] norms prior to and quite independently of any faith in Divine Revelation." Within the Church Macintyre entered, however, there existed, and exists, widespread doubt and confusion about "moral absolutes" or " exceptionless moral norms." Certain eminent Catholic moral theologians today dissent from Pope John Paul's teaching that " there exist acts which per se and in themselves, independently of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason of their object." In the face of this dissent, John Finnis has produced a powerful philosophical and theological defense of the papal teaching. Moral Absolutes presents the 1988 Michael J. McGivney Lectures which Finnis delivered at the John Paul II Institute for Studies on Marriage and the Family. The hook consists of four chapters: "Foundations," "Clarifications," "Christian Witness," and "Challenge and Response." Like Macintyre, Finnis maintains that the authority of scripture and tradition supplement reason's grasp of certain specific types of act as intrinsically wicked and, therefore, never to he performed. Although his goal is to vindicate the proposition that there are moral absolutes, rather than to say which, or even how many, moral norms qualify as " exceptionless " (and therefore as, in the relevant sense of the term, " absolute "), his examples include norms against abortion (and, more generally, the direct killing of innocent human beings), adultery, fornication, contraception, homosexual sex, blasphemy, and disclaimer of the faith. As Finnis observes, the Church's tradition of proclaiming these norms and their absoluteness is "massively solid." Against certain neoscholastic... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:CHRIST, MORAL ABSOLUTES, AND THE GOOD: RECENT MORAL THEOLOGY* SERVAIS PINCKAERS, O.P. University of Fribourg Fribourg, Switzerland I CARLO CAFFARA'S Living in Christ (which appeared in Italian in 1981) was well worth the translating. It presents a fairly complete exposition of Christian moral teaching in a readable style and convenient format and provides principles needed to address the ethical problems most widely discussed today. It is a synthesis of (...) traditional basic ethics which has been revised in the light of profound reflection on values and broa,dened to include the contributions of Christian revelation and tradition. Because of these factors, this book helps us to understand recent stances of the Magisterium towards moral problems by attempting to show the motivations behind these stances. Compared with ethics manuals used in Catholic teaching during recent centuries, this work indicates considerable progress on both philosophical and theological levels and thus responds to the Council's express desire for a renewal of moral theology. The author's reflection focuses on the philosophy of values, *Books considered in this essay: Carlo Caffara, Living in Christ: Funda· mental Principles of Catholic Moral Tea,ching, trans, Christopher Ruff (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987); William E. May, Moral Absolutes, Catholic Tradition, Current Trends and the Truth (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1989) ; Eberhard Schockenhoff, Bonum Hominis: Die anthropologischen und theologischen Grundlagen der Tugendethik des Thomas von Aquin (Mainz: Matthias-Grunewald-Verlag, 1987). 117 118 SERVAIS PINCKAERS, O.P. which he directs to the consideration of the human person. Moral Vialue, the first 'given' of human experience, is specific to the person and can be defined as the development of man qua man aecording to his own nature. Va1ues are reflected in the moral norms which manifest them and receive from them their universality and unchangeable character. They extend into the judgment of conscience, which a:gplies them to a concrete person in the particular circumstances of his action. We thus have a personrulistic view of morality, whose objectivity and truth are rooted in the exigencies of reason in conformity with the dignity of the free and responsible person. The natural law, written in the human heart and inscribed by the God of the Covenant on the two tables of the deoologue, brings out in relief the fundamental commandments. This exposition of momlity is at the same time frankly Christian and reintrodu.ces important dimensions into Catholic moral teaching. The neglect of these dimensions in classic manuals could 1egitimately be deplored; too great a separation was effected between moral and dogmatic theology, spirituality and Scripture. But here all you need do is look at the table of contents to realize the care with which the author has reopened the lines of communication, not only on the ideological level but also on the basis of Christian experience, which undergirds the entire study. This comes through notably at the end of eruch chapter, in lengthy quotations from spiritual authors entitled " Meditation of the Bride." To summarize briefly, the book is divided into three parts: I. The Foundation: the Fundamental Principle of Christian Ethics; II. The Mediation: Living in Christ in History; III. The Response: the Actualization of Life in Christ. Part I shows the Trinitarian dimension of Christian morality : it is a life in Christ, a development of union with His person begun in Baptism, growing under the ruction of the Holy Spirit and his Gifts, reaching to the glory of the Father who called him in creating him. Thus morality is itself explicitly Christian. The author RECENT MORAL THEOLOGY 119 brings things to a climax by showing how in God's historical design the moral life, which proceeds from the dignity of man, finds its fulfillment in man's consent to the creative action which has destined him to share in the divine life, freely offered in Christ. The act whereby God wills us to be persons is the same act by which He orders us to Himself. Our predestination in Christ is, therefore, the ultimate foundation of morality, the definitive guarantee of respect for the person and of the commandment that we should love others as God loves us. Part II treats of the " mediations " of the moral... (shrink)

I clarify Hume's concept of miracle with Kierkegaard's concept of absolute paradox. I argue that absolute paradox is like that miracle which, according to Hume, allows a human being to believe Christianity against the principles of his understanding. I draw such a conclusion on the basis that Kierkegaard does not think Christianity is a doctrine with a truth value and, furthermore, he holds that all historical events are doubtful. Kierkegaard emphasizes the absolute paradox as the condition of (...) faith in such a way that it becomes close to Hume's idea of personal miracle which causes the subversion of the believer's principles of understanding. Hence, the absolute paradox cannot be a possible supporting event for the credibility of Christianity. Absolute paradox more closely approximates Hume's second miracle insofar as it makes persons believe contrary to their custom and experience. (shrink)

In this paper, I respond to questions Sticker and Saunders raise about integrating third-personal interactions within my phenomenological first-personal account of moral obligatedness. Sticker argues that third-personal interactions are more central for grounding moral obligatedness than I admit. Saunders turns things around and suggests we might not even be able to access third-personal interactions with others at the level one would need to in order to secure proper moral interactions with them. I argue in response that both these challenges misunderstand (...) something about my phenomenological first-personal account of the grounding of moral obligation. Sticker assumes that I make absolutely no room for third-personal interactions as important for morality, but that is not the case. And Saunders assumes that first-, second- and third-personal interactions demand phenomenological access to oneself and others as transcendentally free, but I deny that claim. I will consider each of these challenges in turn. (shrink)

The paper considers the freedom of choice, which is a conceptual problem for contemporary philosophical anthropology. It is argued that absoluteness, which is not a “given” (like the gift of life), is “clarified” in the reflection of the decision made, this formalizes human identity. This “sublimation” does not take place by nature, but by the decision of the individual; absoluteness is a certain existential state. It is proved that the “modes of self-affirmation” are conditioned and fragile, absoluteness comes from freedom, (...) transcendent in its foundation. It is stated that the deformation of the ontological and cognitive structures of experience (“personalized” knowledge) changes the meaning of the values of the “alienated” individual, who is not free in society; the Kantian antinomy (of freedom and necessity) receives an interpretation of the “existential drama” in “non-classical” philosophy. It is concluded that individuality is the result of a person’s free choice. (shrink)

This chapter explores Simone de Beauvoir's relation to Hegel's philosophy beyond her adaptation of the master and slave dialectic to the question of woman's historical relation to man. It focuses on her reading of the Hegelian Absolute, which underlies her rejection of the patriarchal representation of the female alterity as absolute, as manifested in the eternal myth of the feminine. Through a survey of Simone de Beauvoir's early intellectual history, it shows that the idea of the Absolute (...) is more important for Simone de Beauvoir than it is generally acknowledged in the philosophical literature on her. She interprets the Absolute as the idea of freedom, which unfolds itself in historical reality, and from which women cannot be excluded as persons. On personalist grounds, she argues that women's acquisition of political and moral status as persons is a necessary implication of the Absolute, if the Absolute has to overcome the unhappy consciousness the consciousness falls into in patriarchal myths. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung: Bis zu welchem Grad ist eine mit dem Lebens- und Gesundheitsschutz begründete Einschränkung von Grundrechten und des gesellschaftlichen Lebens, wie bei der gegenwärtigen Covid-19-Pandemie, aus ethischer und rechtsphilosophischer Sicht legitim? Ethik und Recht und nicht die Medizin sind es, die in diesen Fragen letztlich den normativen Orientierungsrahmen geben müssen – was nicht ausschließt, dass auch medizinische Argumente bei der Deliberation eine wichtige Rolle spielen. Es stellen sich deshalb Fragen nach diesem normativen Orientierungsrahmen und danach, wie die Berufung auf das (...) „Recht auf Leben und körperliche Unversehrtheit“ und eine davon abgeleitete staatliche Aufgabe des Lebensschutzes gegenüber diesem einzuordnen sind. Hierfür ist zunächst auf die Begriffe der „Person“ und der „Menschenwürde“ einzugehen, wobei ich mich insbesondere an Kant orientiere. Es stellen sich hierbei Fragen sowohl nach dem Recht als auch nach dem Verhältnis der menschlichen Person zur Natur bzw. zum Leben. Hier ist dann über Kants Dualismus hinaus zu einer in zweifacher Hinsicht stärker „integrativen“ Perspektive überzugehen, die den Menschen als personal-leibliche Einheit bzw. als personales Naturwesen begreift und auch methodisch eine Vielfalt relevanter Perspektiven einbezieht und von der her sich auch Konsequenzen für das Verhältnis zu Viren und für den Begriff der Gesundheit ergeben. Die hiermit angesprochenen naturphilosophischen und anthropologischen Aspekte sind dennoch zugleich vor dem Hintergrund Kants normativ einzubinden. Als absoluter Selbstzweck können dabei nicht das Leben und die Gesundheit gelten, sondern nur die menschliche Würde. Vor diesem Hintergrund betrachte ich einige zentrale Argumente der gesellschaftlichen und juristischen Debatten, die im Zuge des ersten Lockdowns im Frühjahr 2020 geführt wurden, speziell zum Verhältnis von Würde und Leben und zur Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung in Bezug auf die Einschränkung von Grundrechten. Dass es hierbei eines differen-zierten Umgangs mit verschiedenen Gruppen von Betroffenen bedarf, zeige ich an den Beispielen von Senior:innen in Pflegeheimen sowie Kindern und Jugendlichen. Als Ergebnis halte ich fest: Der Schutz des Lebens ist der Würde des Einzelnen im Zweifel unterzuordnen; es bedarf einer integrativen Perspektive und eines differenzierten Vorgehens, das verschiedene Personengruppen auch hinsichtlich ihrer jeweiligen besonderen Situation entsprechend berücksichtigt. (shrink)