Antipathy is an affective phenomenon which has not received much attention by philosophers and psychologists, unlike its antonym, sympathy. However, antipathy is a phenomenon that contributes to and fuels many of the challenges related to our social behaviours and interpersonal relationships. Antipathy’s exact nature needs to be identified, if only because of the importance it has, for example, in political opposition, in loss of civility, but also in situations that cause poor psychological well-being. It would be then (...) essential to be able to determine whether antipathy is a phenomenon that could be felt on a short term (an episode) or last in the long term (a disposition), since it would allow to study and measure more precisely the nature of the acts it gives rise to, the range of its intensity or/and its social consequences. Like sympathy, antipathy is most often understood as an affective phenomenon that lasts over time. Antipathy is often presented as an instinctive and irrational aversion to something or someone. Yet this common definition is too similar to the definition of other affective phenomena such as disgust or even fear. This article will therefore examine the nature of antipathy by differentiating it from other emotional phenomena that resemble it. But more importantly, the limited existing literature on antipathy mostly characterises it as an affective disposition. In this paper, I will rather argue that antipathy is a conscious emotion, i.e., an emotion that occurs consciously and has a phenomenology. (shrink)

Antipathy is an affective phenomenon which has not received much attention by philosophers and psychologists, unlike its antonym, sympathy. However, antipathy is a phenomenon that contributes to and fuels many of the challenges related to our social behaviours and interpersonal relationships. Antipathy’s exact nature needs to be identified, if only because of the importance it has, for example, in political opposition, in loss of civility, but also in situations that cause poor psychological well-being. It would be then (...) essential to be able to determine whether antipathy is a phenomenon that could be felt on a short term (an episode) or last in the long term (a disposition), since it would allow to study and measure more precisely the nature of the acts it gives rise to, the range of its intensity or/and its social consequences. Like sympathy, antipathy is most often understood as an affective phenomenon that lasts over time. Antipathy is often presented as an instinctive and irrational aversion to something or someone. Yet this common definition is too similar to the definition of other affective phenomena such as disgust or even fear. This article will therefore examine the nature of antipathy by differentiating it from other emotional phenomena that resemble it. But more importantly, the limited existing literature on antipathy mostly characterises it as an affective disposition. In this paper, I will rather argue that antipathy is a conscious emotion, i.e., an emotion that occurs consciously and has a phenomenology. (shrink)

Antipathy towards the possibility that God exists is a common attitude, which has recently been clearly expressed by Thomas Nagel. This attitude is presumably irrelevant to the question whether God does exist. But it raises two other interesting philosophical issues. First, to what extent does this attitude motivate irrational belief? And secondly, how should the attitude be evaluated? This paper investigates that latter issue. Is the hope that God does not exist a morally proper hope? I simplify this question (...) by interpreting the relevant attitude as an aversion towards the Christian picture of the world coupled with a preference for the naturalist atheistic picture. And comparing the content of those two world pictures, I argue that the attitude, though partly explicable, is morally unjustifiable, for clearly recognisable reasons. Regardless, then, of further concerns about the doxastic influence of this attitude, we ought to be ashamed of our antipathy to God, which reflects badly upon us. (shrink)

Schopenhauer regards the ability to experience purely disinterested perception as the mark of aesthetic genius. Experience of the world as representation without interference of the individual will leads genius through imagination to grasp the Platonic Ideas underlying appearance, and then in a willful act of communication to depict the ideal in art. Schopenhauer's thesis that aesthetic genius is incompatible with the charming in still- life paintings of foods and historical paintings of nudes is criticized as inadequately supported by and arguably (...) inconsistent with his aesthetic principles. Nevertheless, Schopenhauer's views about the distractions of appetite and desire for aesthetic experience have a deeper significance in the philosophy of art. (shrink)

Since antiquity, sources report that garlic deprives a magnet of its power of attraction. Although in later centuries some authors disproved or questioned this effect by experience or trial, several, if not the majority of, writers referred to garlic and magnets as “enemies” until well into the seventeenth century. It will be argued that the probable textual origin of the “garlic effect” is a corrupt or ambiguous passage in Pliny’s Natural History, reading “al(l)ium” (garlic) instead of “aliud” (another) in one (...) passage. With a focus on the early-modern period, it will be elucidated why so many authors did not doubt this physical effect, and some even presented causal explanations for it. It shall be emphasized, moreover, that magnetic attraction, and thereby also the garlic effect, was used as an important example or analogy since antiquity. This illustrative or explanatory use of analogies drawn from the garlic–magnet antipathy certainly goes some way towards explaining the longevity of this odd relation between the two substances. (shrink)

What is the source of the antipathy of Catholic intellectuals toward free markets? That is the issue addressed in the present paper. We see the antecedents of this viewpoint of theirs in terms of secular humanism, Marxism and mistaken views of morality and economics. One of the explanations for this phenomenon are the teachings of St Augustine. He greatly distrusted the City of Man, seeing it as anarchic and chaotic. In contrast, his City of God is more orderly, but (...) far removed from the hurly burly of free enterprise. Another source of the rejection of capitalism on the part of Catholic intellectuals is liberation theology, which is Marxism minus the atheism of that doctrine. Both economic and cultural Marxism have played a role in the alienation of such intellectuals from the tenets of laissez faire capitalism. Are there any counter currents? Yes, the School of Salamanca, which has been all but forgotten in this community. (shrink)

One of the interesting aspects of Dewey’s early educational thought is his apparent hostility toward children’s imaginative pursuits, yet the question of why this antipathy exists remains unanswered. As will become clear, Dewey’s hostility towards imaginative activities stemmed from a broad variety of concerns. In some of his earliest work, Dewey adopted a set of anti-Romantic criticisms and used these concerns to attack what one might call “runaway” imaginative and emotional tendencies. Then, in his early educational writings, these earlier (...) concerns were augmented by several other factors, including problematic trends in progressive education, new developments in psychology, and Dewey’s own educational aims. This analysis explores the roots of these criticisms, and explains how they culminate in the stance on the imagination that Dewey eventually outlined in the early educational writings. Notably, these findings have some important implications for certain prominent contemporary critics of progressivism. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Public attitudes toward science in the United States can profoundly affect national well-being, and even national security. We live in a time when these attitudes are considerably more negative than usual. This critical assessment identifies a number of contributors to public antipathy toward science, some of which are intrinsic to the nature of science and as old as science itself, and some of which are external to science, have arisen recently, and may be unique to the present. Historic examples (...) of scientific developments and challenges and two major current examples (the COVID-19 pandemic and anthropogenic climate change) illustrate the interplay of science and public attitudes and actions, and the development and consequences of antipathy toward science. The problem areas that contribute to public antipathy in turn suggest strategies that may mitigate the antipathy, although some social and political factors will impose limits on possible mitigation. The energy required to sustain an acceptable level of civilization needs to be acknowledged, along with the need to minimize anthropogenic climate change. (shrink)

Johannes Jessenius published the treatise on Causes of Sympathy and Antipathy in 1599 which was defended by his student and disciple Daniel Sennert. This disquisition provides interesting material with respect to the concept of natural philosophy and its development in both Jessenius and Sennert. Although Jessenius proclaims that he deals with the question of sympathy and antipathy generally in the Aristotelian manner, he simultaneously indicates the inspiration and main source of his disquisition, these having been lectures held by (...) the Paracelsian Tycho de Brahe. Jessenius, with the help of a distinction between occult and manifest qualities, connected in his disquisition the principles of Aristotelian naturalism with the Paracelsian notion of correspondences between the higher and lower world. Sennert in his later works finds the theory of sympathy, based on analogies or on the doctrine of occult qualities, incompatible with Aristotelian scientific methodology and thereby implicitly demonstrates the inconsistencies in Jessenius's disquisition. (shrink)

Disney’s animated villains have recently changed to show less conventionally villainous traits: They look and express themselves more like sympathetic characters, and they are usually only outed as villains late in the plot. This shift has prompted much academic com­mentary on the psychological and cultural significance of Disney’s new villains. We add to the existing literature on Disney’s new villains in two ways. First, we analyze shifts in the vocalizations of villains between the 1990s and 2010s. Second, we integrate this (...) analysis in a biocultural account of Disney’s shifting overall representations of villains. We argue that while Disney has long employed evolutionarily explicable cues to villainy, such as a foreign accent and an unappealing exterior, the company is now reacting to challenges to norms of social representation that proscribe the linking of such overt traits with immorality. Con­sequently, recent Disney films do not employ socially stigmatizing cues. However, Disney continues to employ nonstigmatizing cues, such as evil laughter and abiding anger, because these cues foster antipathy in audiences at no sociomoral risk. (shrink)

An antipathy to absolutes has been a pervasive feature of twentieth-century philosophy: universality, necessity, objectivity and the like have figured prominently on its index of prohibitions. Ironically, this anti-absolutism itself represents an absolutism of sorts. And it is actually injurious to the interests of philosophizing where adequacy sometimes demands absoluteness. Certain philosophicallysignificant facts root in the non-negotiable necessities of things—the wickedness of inflicting needless pain, for one.

The purpose of this paper is studying the importance of the antithetical pair sympathy-antipathy, as an interpretive instrument of the human phýsis in the Hippocratic medical epistemology. His study aims to be a contribution to the understanding of the methods of inference developed by ancient medicine, in parallel to the demonstrative method.

The antipathy toward group selection expressed in the target article is puzzling because Laland et al.'s ideas dovetail neatly with modern group selection theory.

Plato's antipathy to crowds is a commonplace that reinforces a prevailing portrait of the Socratic method as a practice that centers on individuals, to the exclusion of crowds and the many. This canonical view, however, comes into tension with the tendency of Plato's Socrates to conduct his dialogues in the presence of collective audiences. I argue that Plato's position on crowds is at once more complex and more ambivalent than has been commonly accepted. I distinguish between two distinct lines (...) of critique that Plato develops against crowds: the argument that the incentive structures that move crowds are unconducive to philosophy; and a more ambiguous argument that crowds tend not to be as amenable to control as their portrayal in the Athenian democratic imaginary seems to promise. Plato's depiction of Socratic practice can be understood as an effort to explore an alternative vision of crowd control. (shrink)

Wittgenstein expressed an antipathy to modernism from his earliest work to his latest. He connected modernism with modern science and with what hecalled “the causal point of view.” The causal point of view, which operates like a presupposition or pre-dispositional attitude, blocks a clear vision of the richnessand complexity of the world and human life, and denies access to a religious point of view and the benefits of faith. His analysis of the causal point of view lays bare the (...) uncritically accepted place it holds in our thinking and helps to relieve the anxiety felt over the idea of causal necessity that accompanies it. Wittgenstein’sworld-view and larger philosophical tasks are often easily lost in the details of his analyses and remarks, but not here as he unpacks the reasons for his discomfiture with the assumptions of the modern world. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophy’s antipathy to intuition can come to seem baffling. There is inadequate reason to move away from the intuitively attractive view that we have a faculty of intuition, in many ways akin to our faculties of perception and memory and introspection, that gives us reason for belief, and with it, often enough, gives us knowledge. The purpose here is to consider whether scepticism about intuition is more reasonable than a corresponding scepticism about other epistemic faculties. I am sceptical (...) that it is. (shrink)

Public-private partnerships are established to specifically harness the potential of Big Data in healthcare and can include partners working across the data chain—producing health data, analysing data, using research results or creating value from data. This domain paper will illustrate the challenges that arise when partners from the public and private sector collaborate to share, analyse and use biomedical Big Data. We discuss three specific challenges for PPPs: working within the social licence, public antipathy to the commercialisation of public (...) sector health data, and questions of ownership, both of the data and any resulting intellectual property or products. As a specific example we consider the case of the UK National Health Service providing patient data to Google’s DeepMind AI program to develop a diagnostic app for kidney disease. This article is an application of the framework presented in this issue of ABR. Please refer to that article for more information on how this framework is to be used, including a full explanation of the key values involved and the balancing approach used in the case study at the end. We use four specific values to help analysis these issues: public benefit, stewardship, transparency and engagement. We demonstrate how the Deliberative Framework can support ethical governance of PPPs involving biomedical big data. (shrink)

My purpose in this essay is to suggest, via case study, that if Anglo-American philosophy is to become more inclusive of non-western traditions, the discipline requires far greater efforts at self-scrutiny. I begin with the premise that Confucian ethical treatments of manners afford unique and distinctive arguments from which moral philosophy might profit, then seek to show why receptivity to these arguments will be low. I examine how ordinary good manners have largely fallen out of philosophical moral discourse in the (...) west, looking specifically at three areas: conditions in the 18th and 19th centuries that depressed philosophical attention to manners; discourse conventions in contemporary philosophy that privilege modes of analysis not well fitted to close scrutiny of manners; and a philosophical culture that implicitly encourages indifference or even antipathy toward polite conduct. I argue that these three areas function in effect to render contemporary discourse inhospitable to greater inclusivity where Confucianism is concerned and thus, more broadly, that greater self-scrutiny regarding unexamined, parochial western commitments and practices is necessary for genuine inclusivity. (shrink)

Machiavelli’s antipathy toward institutionalized Christianity has been very well documented, but less attention has been afforded to whether there might be some version of Christianity of which he would have approved. In the present paper, we investigate Machiavelli’s misgivings about Christianity by inquiring into the role that he assigned to prayer, through which Christian “ideology” was operationalized. To our knowledge, nowhere in the large body of Machiavelli literature has anyone investigated systematically one such device for transmitting doctrinal principles into (...) everyday practices. We contend that Machiavelli’s formulation of prayer is consistently transactional and in line with pagan worship, especially as it was practised by Roman religion. We conclude that Machiavelli was not un-Christian, but that his formulation of prayer reveals one element of his criticism of the earthly church that he believed was complicit in twisting Christianity’s potential for promoting commitment to love of country and civic liberty. (shrink)

Our modern-day word for sympathy is derived from the classical Greek word for fellow-feeling. Both in the vernacular as well as in the various specialist literatures within philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, economics, and history, "sympathy" and "empathy" are routinely conflated. In practice, they are also used to refer to a large variety of complex, all-too-familiar social phenomena: for example, simultaneous yawning or the giggles. Moreover, sympathy is invoked to address problems associated with social dislocation and political conflict. It is, then, turned (...) into a vehicle toward generating harmony among otherwise isolated individuals and a way for them to fit into a larger whole, be it society and the universe.This volume offers a historical overview of some of the most significant attempts to come to grips with sympathy in Western thought from Plato to experimental economics. The contributors are leading scholars in philosophy, classics, history, economics, comparative literature, and political science. Sympathy is originally developed in Stoic thought. It was also taken up by Plotinus and Galen. There are original contributed chapters on each of these historical moments. Use for the concept was re-discovered in the Renaissance. And the volume has original chapters not just on medical and philosophical Renaissance interest in sympathy, but also on the role of antipathy in Shakespeare and the significance of sympathy in music theory. Inspired by the influence of Spinoza, sympathy plays a central role in the great moral psychologies of, say, Anne Conway, Leibniz, Hume, Adam Smith, and Sophie De Grouchy during the eighteenth century. The volume should offers an introduction to key background concept that is often overlooked in many of the most important philosophies of the early modern period.About a century ago the idea of Einfühlung was developed in theoretical philosophy, then applied in practical philosophy and the newly emerging scientific disciplines of psychology. Moreover, recent economists have rediscovered sympathy in part experimentally and, in part by careful re-reading of the classics of the field. (shrink)

A critical revaluation of the humanist tradition, _Borrowed Light_ makes the case that the 20th century is the "anticolonial century." The sparks of concerted resistance to colonial oppression were ignited in the gathering of intellectual malcontents from all over the world in interwar Europe. Many of this era's principal figures were formed by the experience of revolution on Europe's semi-developed Eastern periphery, making their ideas especially pertinent to current ideas about autonomy and sovereignty. Moreover, the debates most prominent then—human vs. (...) inhuman, religions of the book vs. oral cultures, the authoritarian state vs. the representative state and, above all, scientific rationality vs. humanist reason—remain central today. Timothy Brennan returns to the scientific Enlightenment of the 17th century and its legacies. In readings of the showdown between Spinoza and Vico, Hegel's critique of liberalism, and Nietzsche's antipathy towards the colonies and social democracy, Brennan identifies the divergent lines of the first anticolonial theory—a literary and philosophical project with strong ties to what we now call Marxism. Along the way, he assesses prospects for a renewal of the study of imperial culture. (shrink)

This chapter defends a pluralistic view of science: the various projects of enquiry that fall under the general rubric of science share neither a methodology nor a subject matter. Ontologically, it is argued that sciences need have nothing in common beyond an antipathy to the supernatural. Epistemically one central virtue is defended, empiricism, meaning just that scientific knowledge must ultimately be answerable to experience. Prima facie science is as diverse as the world it studies; and rejection of this prima (...) facie diversity in favour of a spurious aspiration to unity is grounded in a priori assumption not experience. Disunity, however, does not mean disconnectedness, and the connections between different areas of knowledge are an important theme in the book. (shrink)

From the beginning to the end of his career, the critical theorist and Frankfurt School philosopher Theodor W. Adorno sustained an uneasy but enduring bond with existentialism. His attitude overall was that of unsparing criticism, often verging on polemic. In Kierkegaard he saw an early paragon for the late flowering of bourgeois solipsism; in Heidegger an impresario for a "jargon of authenticity" that cloaked its idealism in an aura of pseudo-concreteness and neo-romantic kitsch; even in the more rationalist tradition of (...) Husserl's phenomenology he detected a vain attempt of the bourgeois spirit to break free from the prison-house of immanent consciousness. Yet his enduring fascination with the philosophical canons of existentialism and phenomenology suggests a connection far more complicated and productive than mere antipathy. From his first published book on Kierkegaard's aesthetic to the mature studies in negative dialectics, Adorno was forever returning to the philosophies of bourgeois interiority, seeking the paradoxical relation between their manifest failure and their hidden promise. Scholars of critical theory often regard these philosophical adventures as unfortunate lapses into reductive sociology or as marginal to Adorno's path of intellectual development. In Adorno and Existence, Peter E. Gordon challenges this assumption, showing how the confrontation with existentialism helps us toward a deeper understanding of Adorno's own intellectual commitments. In lucid prose and with a dialectical sensitivity for the links between philosophy and life, Adorno and Existence casts new and unfamiliar light on this neglected chapter in the history of Continental philosophy.--. (shrink)

The article shows the positions philosophers held to the relationship between a priori judgments and those judgments which are valid necessarily. Enlightenment philosophers of the 18th and 19th century, who, though often in different ways, opposed the concept of metaphysics and scholastic necessity , play the leading role. At the beginning of the 20th century analytic philosophy was born. Its first leaders inherited from their predecessors an antipathy to metaphysics, and so they had no desire to return again to (...) the traditional concept of necessity . Their logic and the new characterization of the a priori paved the way for the linguistic turn. Some of their followers in the second half of the 20th century realized that the concept needed to be returned to its original meaning . This is not a mere repetition of the Aristotelian-scholastic conception, but a new addition that rethinks the relationship between the notions of a priori and necessity. (shrink)

Buddhism and Christianity have been main religions in contemporary Korea. In order to overcome their antipathies and conflicts, some philosophers of religion have suggested possible models for religious harmony and coexistence. This paper will examine John Hick's theory of religious pluralism by analyzing his autobiography and philosophical arguments. Korean scholars of religion have attempted to understand his theory in various ways, including philosophical, phenomenological, and psychological ones. Pointing out that Hick's pluralistic position, which has formed in a particular context, has (...) inherent limitations for Korean situations, I will propose a viable alternative model for religious diversity, based on a phenomenological study of Korean religions, especially Buddhism and Christianity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:diacritics 30.2 (2000) 43-69 [Access article in PDF] Tracing Ricoeur Dudley Andrew François Dosse. Paul Ricoeur: Les Sens D'une Vie. Paris: La Découverte, 1997. [PR] The Time of the Tortoise Gilles Deleuze chose not to see the end of the century that Michel Foucault claimed would be named after him, a century that began just as philosophy registered the aftershocks caused by the work of his closest progenitors, Nietzsche (...) and Bergson. Amplifying the waves they made with tempests of his own, Deleuze tried to capsize the flat-bottom boat of academic philosophy by insisting that it look beyond its own discourse for both the life and the vocabulary to account for life that should be its only mission. Scanning French philosophy for what it might contribute to art, fiction, and cinema, I invoke the stirring character of Deleuze, but I do so to deflect attention to another figure, Paul Ricoeur, whom Deleuze conveniently sets off by contrast.Less than a decade since his death, Deleuze is in danger of having ceded his claim to Ricoeur, the real long-distance runner, who is now pressing his publications into the new century, moving relentlessly beyond his exhausted reviewers. Last year, a fanfare of publicity greeted La mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli, another magisterial tome appearing too late to be included in François Dosse's intellectual biography or in my overview here, which lifts off from that biography. Ricoeur, destined to keep writing--unable to conclude his conversation with philosophy--has outlasted Deleuze, whose notoriety derives from the radical break he makes with the thought of our times, for his abrupt deviations and more abrupt conclusions. Ricoeur's reputation rests seldom on anything conclusive but instead on his persistent interaction with and deployment of so much of that thought. By accident or by savvy design, Ricoeur's trajectory (initiated in the phenomenological atmosphere of the prewar era) has taken him through myth criticism, psychoanalysis, structuralism, language philosophy, analytic philosophy, deconstruction, poetics, historiography, ethics, and epistemology. He carries his learning forward to each new endeavor, not believing in "the radical break" or the prefix post-.François Dosse tracks Ricoeur in a magnificent account that places its subject in relation to each of these movements. But Parisian academic fashion forms only one facet of a life whose brilliance is refracted as well by theology, politics, and a remarkable social network. The thickness of his life evidently provides Ricoeur the necessary ballast to maintain his orientation on the stormy seas of intellectual debate. In fact, across a span of seventy years of uninterrupted reading and writing, he has anticipated, invoked, or debated virtually every important school of French thought, doing so in a way that both establishes their value and serves his own agenda. Ricoeur profits from the productive tension that results, even--indeed, especially--when this brings about a dislocation of his views. These exchanges inevitably leave his own ideas clearer, more defensible, and invulnerable to charges of parochialism. Although Ricoeur concludes his three-volume Time and Narrative with an aggressive chapter explicitly asking, [End Page 43] "Should We Renounce Hegel?," there is something deeply Hegelian about this strategy of taking on, then managing to assimilate, all comers so as to emerge stronger. Ricoeur may not share Hegel's limitless arrogance (literally arrogating everything to himself), but his humility is equally ambitious.There was never any question for Deleuze about renouncing Hegel. His antipathy to this "philosophe de l'État" was immediate, total, and itself completely arrogant. As for Ricoeur, Deleuze apparently avoided the man Dosse dubs "philosophe de la Cité," at least before 1986. Then, he links their names after each had just published a multivolume treatise on temporality and fabulation, Deleuze's cinema books picking up the notion of "bifurcated time" that Ricoeur had just developed in Time and Narrative. Proust was explicitly a key source for both of their studies. But apparently, and outwardly, it gets no closer than this. In concatenating these two French philosophers, I follow the lead of Olivier Mongin, who finds them both to be supreme philosophers of time, yet incompatible on... (shrink)

This is a tribute to Ulrich Beck and a rumination on his legacy in work on cosmopolitanism, translation, anxiety, and memory. Historical transitions and symbolic transmissions open up urgent questions about the connection between the structure of collective memory and the system of cosmopolitical thought. Public memory is embedded in an affective matrix of anxiety which is capable of creating the conciliatory conditions of political virtue and of fueling the terror of political passion. The vicious and sudden turn of cosmopolitan (...) memory from reconciliation to revenge is less surprising if anxiety is seen as the translational moment that mediates relations between remembering and forgetting. Anxiety forces the discourse of cosmopolitan memory to confront its own alterity, negotiating a knife-edge balance between sympathy and antipathy. The ethics of cosmopolitanism is an anxious ethics of the past that refuses to die, confronting a future that will not wait to be born. (shrink)

In the first half of the twentieth century there was a remarkable convergence of art and design in De Stijl, Constructivism and the Bauhaus. But in the second half of the twentieth century fine art relinquished its liaison with design due to the influence of Dada and Surrealism's postromantic antagonism to practical-functionalism. Dada and Surrealism and postmodern fine art are characterized by a critique of the dominant social discourse of functionalism and the demand for a sublime poetics to be brought (...) into everyday life. This article argues that the apparent antipathy between postmodern fine art and design can be ameliorated if we critically analyse interpretations of evolutionary theory by postromantic philosophers such as Nietzsche, Bergson, and Deleuze and Guattari. When Bergson notes that practical-functional reasoning was created by evolution he reveals a flaw in the pursuit of an aesthetics that is totally opposed to commonsense and practical-functionalism. And when we turn to Deleuze and Guattari we find another valuable concept in the form of their notion of the machinic, which assists further in reconciling the postromantic emphasis on the sublime with the practicality of mechanism. Moreover, Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the machinic is informed by chaos theory, which allows further elaboration in terms of complexity theory. Complexity theory can be understood as a process philosophy that has no need to figure the sublime in terms of a mysterious force of nature because the mystery is located within complex interactions among a manifold of components, what one might refer to as a cosmic, machinic, combinatoire that arises out of what Christopher Langton has called the edge of chaos. This makes it possible to replace the emphasis on desire as the fundamental force of nature evident in Nietzsche, Bergson, Deleuze and Guattari with a complexity-theoretical concept of a cosmicmachinic combinatoire. It is then possible to formulate a machinic, evolutionary aesthetics that can reconcile the postromantic demand for sublimity with the demand for practical-functionalism that lies at the heart of the discipline of design. In place of the modernist machine aesthetic that informed De Stijl, Constructivism and the Bauhaus we would have a postmodernist machinic aesthetic. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to PorphyryR. M. DancyGeorge E. Karamanolis. Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. Pp. x + 419. Cloth, $125.00.Coleridge wrote: “Every man is born an Aristotelian or a Platonist. I do not think it possible that anyone born an Aristotelian can become a Platonist; and I am sure that (...) no born Platonist can ever change into an Aristotelian. They are two classes of man, beside which it is next to impossible to conceive a third.”Ancient Platonists could not be counted on to accept this kind of dichotomy, and that is what Karamanolis’s book is about. (It may be usefully compared with Lloyd P. Gerson’s 2005 book, Aristotle and Other Platonists.) It covers Antiochus (second century BC), Plutarch [End Page 634] of Chaeronea, Numenius, Atticus, Ammonius Saccas, Plotinus, and Porphyry (third century AD). And it does so with incredible thoroughness, making it a tough read. The book began as a dissertation; it still has something of the air of one.The longest chapter is devoted to Porphyry, whom Karamanolis claims to be the first Platonist to write commentaries on books of Aristotle, and the first to adopt the view that Aristotle simply was in agreement with Plato—the founder of a tradition in scholarship to the effect that “Plato is named as the authority in metaphysics, and Aristotle in logic” (330). His concluding paragraph is this:It is this understanding of philosophizing which lies behind the formation of the Pla-tonist syllabus I described in the beginning of this book. This remains the situation until the Renaissance. When Renaissance humanists revive ancient philosophy, especially Platonism, as happened in Renaissance Florence, they re-establish this very model. Few other shifts in the history of Western philosophy are of such significance as the one which we, quite rightly, attribute to Porphyry.(330)The “Platonist syllabus” to which Karamanolis here adverts is perhaps summed up when he says that “from the third to the sixth century AD... Aristotle was appropriated by Platonists because they found his philosophy, if properly studied, a prerequisite for, and conducive to, an understanding of Plato’s thought” (4). More precisely, Karamanolis’s book is about Porphyry’s view and the background of its formation.Answering Karamanolis’s title question is not what is at stake; rather, he is concerned with how the Platonists listed above answered it. So we are not getting a history of the reading of Plato and Aristotle as agreeing or disagreeing from the very beginning. The early Academy and the skeptical Academy before Antiochus, for example, do not figure, except incidentally, in Karamanolis’s story (although there is a useful appendix on the early peripatetics). There is enough here to keep us busy without this.Dealing with any of Karamanolis’s Platonists is made more difficult by the nature of the material that remains: except for Plutarch and Plotinus, it is almost entirely fragmentary. So it is a question of interpreting not just the target authors, whose works we do not possess, but the sources we have for them, who have their own hobby-horses to ride, and hence are not always reliable. Karamanolis pays suitable attention to such details. But the back-and-forth discussion required can make it difficult to keep the larger picture in view.Karamanolis’s Platonists do not uniformly go for the agreement of Plato and Aristotle. As Karamanolis has it, Porphyry is the only one to swallow it whole: “... nowhere does Porphyry criticize Aristotle,” he concludes (322). This requires him to explain away what he regards as misunderstandings of the evidence (243–45 records some disagreements, and the Porphyry chapter throughout is dedicated to rebuttal). Karamanolis is at least prima facie convincing. At the opposite end of the spectrum are Atticus and Numenius, whose antipathy toward Aristotle is universal.For the rest, whether we are to say that Plato and Aristotle were in agreement obviously depends on what the agreement is to be about. There is, among Karamanolis’s Platonists, a good deal of interesting variation over that. Most of those who... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 26.1 (2002) 224-238 [Access article in PDF] Bookmarks A Hanging Judge Denis Dutton "CORNERING THE MARKET ON CHUTZPAH," blared the headline on one review, and in tone it wasn't alone. It's not often that a book by a public intellectual has received as much media attention—mostly vilification and scorn—as Richard A. Posner's Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline (Harvard University Press, $29.95). Three reasons for this (...) stand out. First, there's the sheer audacity of including a list of the top hundred public intellectuals, drawn from a larger list of 546 names. This invites endless dispute over how the list was generated, who is on it, who is left off, where each one stands, and why. Second, there is the fact that Posner has managed in the book to offend half of the public intellectuals you'd expect to be called on to review it—almost as though he made a list of potential reviewers and worked in a swipe at each. Finally, he has tapped into the deep antipathy humanist intellectuals have to seeing a beloved topic treated quantitatively, with statistics and applications of social and economic theory, replete with graphs and algebraic formulae. And after all, what topic is more beloved by the intellectuals than they themselves? That Posner would actually treat such important people as a demographic type, sorting them in terms of race, age, field, politics, sex—why, he even asks why so many are Jews. It's outrageous... and delicious.Definitions first. The idea of an intellectual, Posner says, should not be identified merely with having highbrow, cultivated tastes, being especially creative, or having high intelligence. All of these things are possible without being an intellectual, which Posner thinks ought to denote the application of the mind to "political matters in the broadest sense of that word, a sense that includes cultural matters when they are [End Page 224] viewed under the aspect of ideology, ethics, or politics (which may all be the same thing)." There is therefore a vague redundancy in the term "public intellectual," since the placing of ideas in a larger public context, acting as social critic, is what the intellectual most essentially does. In our age of vast communication media, it is also done con-spicuously in public, through op-eds, public radio interviews, and on TV clips with the regulation public-intellectual bookcase as a backdrop. This concern with larger moral issues means that for Posner paradigm individuals would therefore include the likes of John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, Hannah Arendt, Arthur Koestler, Edmund Wilson, Susan Sontag, and most powerfully in Posner's mind, George Orwell: people who write about literature, art, science, and so forth from a broadly political or ideological perspective. For example, when Allan Bloom writes about rock and roll, he is not doing so as a music critic but as a philosopher who sees it as a symptom and source of social degradation. That's echte public intellectual work (and rather bad work in this particular case, Posner believes). That it is done for a broader public is also a crux for Posner, who leaves omits John Rawls from his list, because as influential as Rawls is as a philosopher, he does not address a larger public in the way that Richard Rorty and Martha Nussbaum do.The decline referred to in Posner's title is a decline in the actual worth of public intellectuals' work, not in their media celebrity, which has grown roughly inversely to the value of what they do. This invidious situation has followed, in Posner's view, the proliferation of academics in the ranks of public intellectuals. From the nineteenth century, with such names as Thoreau, J. S. Mill, Herbert Spencer, Matthew Arnold, and Tocqueville, to well into the twentieth, with the likes of Max Eastman, Edmund Wilson, H. G. Wells, and Dwight Macdonald, the great tradition of public intellectuals had its life outside of universities. Although there remain nonacademic public intellectuals today—Susan Sontag, Roger Kimball, Tom Wolfe, Gore Vidal—they are a severely diminished species. Universities, which have expanded... (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 38, Issue 1, pp 5 - 24 Fully aware of an antipathy to comparisons that looks back not only to ancient philosophy and law but to the early modern schoolroom, Erasmus nevertheless puts his full prestige behind the strategy so foundational to the rhetorical theory of Plato, Cicero, Quintilian and Aphthonius. This essay examines the key role of comparison in the form of _similitudo_, _parabola_ or _collatio_, and _imago_ in Erasmus’ educational reform as represented by his (...) _De copia_, _De ratione studii_, and _De conscribendis epistolis_, as well as in his own literary production, especially his _Adages_. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that Ernst Mayr's idea that the emergence of evolutionary biology in Western thought was delayed by the pernicious influence of the false ideologies of Platonism, Christianity, and physicalism is ahistorical and anti-evolutionary, that similar ideas, especially his antipathy to physicalism, prejudice his account of the transformation of natural history and medical science into biology, that his organicist resolution of the perennial conflict between mechanism and vitalism is an unstable compound of semi-holism and semi-mechanism, that (...) his conception of biology as the true bridge between the sciences and the humanities, ethics, and social theory is open to question (especially as to the adequacy of the theory of natural selection to account for every aspect of human nature), and that his depiction of science as the sovereign key to understanding everything known to exist or happen in this universe cannot be justified at the bar of reason. (shrink)

My thesis seeks to reduce what may be a natural human antipathy to ageing and/or the elderly by working with one distinctive and consistently approved feature of some older people. This feature is a bold and cheerful struggle within a self‐chosen project. The argument opens by distinguishing short‐term gratification from lasting, fulfilling happiness, and showing the link between gratification and dependence. Three kinds of struggle (non‐voluntary, part‐voluntary and positive) are then outlined and exemplified. Gerontological and anthropological research suggest that (...) attitudes to struggle are fixed early in life, and while in the past they mitigated for or against successful survival, they now influence happiness and coping in later life. I argue that the negative effects of the first two kinds of struggle ‐ which are often misguided, grudging or ‘no‐win’ struggles ‐ are responsible for the rigidity, narcissism and resentment disliked in some older people. Self‐respect, contrasted with self‐righteousness, is shown to accrue only from the positive (voluntary and congenial) struggle that seems at any age to deflect or compensate for depression, disappointment, loneliness and illness. (shrink)

The conception of contagious disease that Girolamo Fracastoro provides in his work De contagione et contagiosis morbis, marks the origin of modern epidemiology and microbiology. This conception puts into play the Galenic and Aristotelian traditions of research, faced with its own conceptual limitations of the growing mechanistic thought of the time. According to Fracastoro, epidemic diseases spread by invisible living germs called seminaria, begotten by corrupted humours. Fracastoro resorted to the old notions of "sympathy" and "antipathy" to respond to (...) questions about how seminaria is transmitted from one body to another, and what is the specificity that limits its transmission to certain species and organs. Like Galileo and Descartes, Fracastoro tries to establish a dialogue in the field of medicine between the Aristotelian vitalism and the modern mechanistic perspective. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the ideological, theoretical and conceptual assumptions, both philosophical and scientific, assumed by Fracastoro with regard to the problem of contagion. (shrink)

Patriarchy is a feature of Northern Ireland life. This is especially true in the Churches’ sector, which has negotiated itself out of being characterized as a public institution, thus ensuring that the equality legislation, statutory for public bodies since the implementation of the Northern Ireland Act, is not applicable. The legacy of colonialism and a literal approach to biblical interpretation has reinforced patriarchal models of power in the public and private sphere, while arousing suspicion, even antipathy, toward feminism. In (...) a society where a ‘them and us,’ power over, mindset and culture has predominated the violence of sexism, sectarianism, racism and homophobia is very much in evidence. Inter-church women’s groups, engaged in the Irish School of Ecumenics praxis based peacebuilding programme, have been undermining patriarchy’s hold in Church and community. Their alternative voices, and counter-cultural actions, witness to the need for an active non-violent, just and egalitarian society. (shrink)

Aaron Ridley has concluded that “Collingwood’s global Idealism is really only a distraction from the much more important and interesting ideas that constitute his aesthetics.” My paper takes issue with this conclusion. Collingwood’s idealism is an integral part of his aesthetics, and it simply cannot be shucked off, leaving his aesthetics untouched and intact. A careful reading of Collingwood’s oeuvre in aesthetics reveals that it is his long-standing antipathy to realism that grounds both his critique of pseudo-art and his (...) own theory of art, particularly his idealist theory of the imagination. If Collingwood’s aesthetics are interesting and important, so is the idealism that grounds them. (shrink)

The evolusionist and functionalist approaches to religion are generally considered less sympathetic if not antipathy to religious phenomena. This is why, some western scholars propose another approach to study religion called ‘phenomenological’ approach. There have been a number of phenomenological studies of religion, but mostly not of Islam. This article tries to fill in the gap by describing and analyzing the Islamic conception of intention developed by al-Sayuthi and al-Ghazali. As a jurist, al-Sayuthi explores different formal rules on niyyah (...) in Islamic jurisprudence, while al-Ghazali as a Sufi, tries to deepen the meaning of niyyah in relation to one’s sincerity to God. Apart from this difference, both conceptions of niyya indicate that as believers, Muslims always attempt to live in the sacred space and time, and make their speech and deed sacred based on the niyyah. Thus, niyya is the very basis of Muslim religious life. (shrink)

This essay explores the history of the concept of _monstrum_ from Francis Bacon’s _Novum Organum_ to Athanasius Kircher’s _Mundus Subterraneaus_ (1664), as well as its relationship with the origins of science; as in the early modern age, the term _monstra_ is considered as a synonym for _mirabilia naturae_. The introductory part focuses on the difficult definition of “monster”, starting from Aristotle’s famous sentence in _De generatione animalium_: whoever does not looks like his parents, or whatever happens in a different way (...) from the “generality of cases”, is included within the category of the “monstrous”. Monster is a being, whose anomaly represents a warning; therefore, monsters may be considered as signs, susceptible of an allegorical, moral and even political interpretation. In another acceptation of the term, monsters may be considered as the privileged witnesses of the richness and fecundity of nature. In the second part, Bacon’s theory of monsters is exposed: they are classified as _instantiae deviantes_, within that interpretation of nature, through which the Lord Chancellor lays the epistemological foundations of the modern science. In the third, fourth and fifth parts, a taxonomy of monsters is given: at first, by means of the _cabinets des curiosités_, which flourished in sixteenth and seventeenth century Italy, from Naples to Rome, from Bologna to Milan, with famous collectors such as Ferrante Imperato, Ulisse Aldrovandi, Manfredo Settala, Athanasius Kircher; then, through the “books of secrets”, which are at the same time a new, successful literary genre and a way of thinking nature, an aspect of natural history. Among the “professors of secrets”, there are Giovan Battista Della Porta, Ambroise Paré, Leonardo Fioravanti, Jean Fernel, Pierre Borel, Kenelm Digby, and Athanasius Kircher, again, with some disciples of his, such as Kaspar Schott. Secrets of nature and _mirabilia naturae_ are finally compared: the classical list of _mirabilia_, from Pliny the Elder to Kircher, completes the taxonomy of monsters. The sixth and last part of this essay offers an explicative theory of monsters and prodigies: the marvels of nature are magnetic phenomena, which seem to imply a mysterious action at a distance. Such magnetic action can be accounted for on the basis of the Renaissance, Ficinian and Neoplatonic concept of spirit – conceived as the universal vehicle of occult sympathies and antipathies - and then through the seventeenth concepts of corpuscular effluvia, introduced by Pierre Gassendi in his _Physica_ (1658), and _sphaera activitatis_, produced by the effluvia which each body emits, and surrounding it. This sphere is the place when most of marvelous phenomena happen. (shrink)

This article contributes to our understanding of the rise and nature of French anti-slavery thought through a close analysis of ‘Observations sur les Négres esclaves’, an essay written by Jean-Baptiste-Christophe Fusée-Aublet and published in his Histoire des plantes de la Guiane françoise. A botanist, Fusée-Aublet worked in the Isle de France and French Guiana during the 1750s and 1760s in service to the Compagnie des Indes. A close comparison of a surviving draft and the published essay shows how he drew (...) on his observations of colonial slavery, east and west; how he responded to contemporary intellectual currents and publications critical of slavery; and how he modified his draft for publication to satisfy the expectations of a metropolitan audience. Reflecting the influence of Rousseau, both versions combined a withering critique of French empire with a spirited, quasi-ethnographic defence of the moral character and culture of Africans. After detailing his travels and the evolution of his antipathy to slavery, the article details how Fusée-Aublet combined sentimental and economic arguments to craft an essay whose themes engaged with larger debates over luxury and political economy, citizenship and patriotism. (shrink)

The paper offers a twofold intervention in the debates about the paradox of fiction. First, it argues that too much emphasis has been placed on the paradox’ epistemological aspect. This has led to a neglect of its ethical dimension. Specifically, little has been said about the ethical issues of regularly caring for fictional entities while exhibiting comparatively far less concern for real­life fellow men and women. Second, the essay argues that it is often the case that it is real­life structures (...) rather than fictional entities that cause emotions. In the case of horror, for example, we are not afraid of the fictional monster but of an off possibility that something like this might exist in the real world. Importantly, the proposal differs from the counterfactualist approaches because it allows that fictional entities may cause emotions. Specifically, emotions which do not have clearly defined accompanying typical actions, such as sympathy and antipathy. (shrink)

Excerpt from Conditions of National Success Not the centre of the universe, must on moral grounds be made the centre of any investigation into his position in that universe. Indeed, the idea Of society dominating the individual is SO Offensive to some people that the very term social organism arouses in them a strong antipathy. Societies exist because individuals have found them useful. Further more, since societies are thus a mere matter of individual arrangement it is advisable on scientific (...) as well as on moral grounds that our attention should be concentrated upon the individual. Society and the state are supposed to be without meaning except in SO far as they help the individual and increase the fullness of individual life, and study of the individual is under these circumstances much better calculated to throw a light upon the nature of society than the study of society upon the nature of the individual. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

For most of the history of prejudice research, negativity has been treated as its emotional and cognitive signature, a conception that continues to dominate work on the topic. By this definition, prejudice occurs when we dislike or derogate members of other groups. Recent research, however, has highlighted the need for a more nuanced and “inclusive” (Eagly 2004) perspective on the role of intergroup emotions and beliefs in sustaining discrimination. On the one hand, several independent lines of research have shown that (...) unequal intergroup relations are often marked by attitudinal complexity, with positive responses such as affection and admiration mingling with negative responses such as contempt and resentment. Simple antipathy is the exception rather than the rule. On the other hand, there is mounting evidence that nurturing bonds of affection between the advantaged and the disadvantaged sometimes entrenches rather than disrupts wider patterns of discrimination. Notably, prejudice reduction interventions may have ironic effects on the political attitudes of the historically disadvantaged, decreasing their perceptions of injustice and willingness to engage in collective action to transform social inequalities.These developments raise a number of important questions. Has the time come to challenge the assumption that negative evaluations are inevitably the cognitive and affective hallmarks of discrimination? Is the orthodox concept of prejudice in danger of side-tracking, if not obstructing, progress towards social justice in a fuller sense? What are the prospects for reconciling a prejudice reduction model of change, designed to get people to like one another more, with a collective action model of change, designed to ignite struggles to achieve intergroup equality? (shrink)

For familiar reasons, stereotyping is believed to be irresponsible and offensive. Yet the use of stereotypes in humor is widespread. Particularly offensive are thought to be sexual and racial stereotypes, yet it is just these that figure particularly prominently in jokes. In certain circumstances it is unquestionably wrong to make jokes that employ such stereotypes. Some writers have made the much stronger claim that in all circumstances it is wrong to find such jokes funny; in other words that people who (...) laugh at such jokes betray sexist/racist attitudes. This conclusion seems false. There is, as I shall argue, a thin dividing line between being properly sensitive to the rights and feelings of women and of racial groups different from our own, and being excessively sensitive to oversensitivity. Oversensitivity is, in this context, a kind of intolerance, and there is no reason why we should pander to that. One can be opposed to the unchecked dissemination of certain kinds of racist or sexist humor without oneself being a racist or sexist for finding such humor funny. The use of various stereotypes in humor serves the linguistic purpose of facilitating brevity and punch, the cultural purpose of preserving, in a sanitized form traditional rivalries and antipathies, and the psychological purpose of discharging fears. Blanket moral condemnation is inappropriate, though there will, of course, be circumstances under which the promulgation of certain types of humor, or even its enjoyment, ought to be condemned. (shrink)