Based on real-life intergroup animosities originating from a historical conflict, the current study examined how the perceived stance of the outgroup about the conflict affects the dehumanization of the outgroup. In Study 1 (N= 120), Korean undergraduates attributed morehuman natureto the Japanese after reading an article that the Japanese government did (vs. refused to) issue an official apology for a historical wrong. In turn, the more human nature assigned to the Japanese predicted higher expectations about positive mutual relations in (...) the future. Similarly, in Study 2 (N= 209), Japanese undergraduates attributed morehuman uniquenessto Koreans after reading an article that an official apology for a historical wrong from Japan was accepted (vs. rejected) by Koreans. The higher the perceived human uniqueness of Koreans was, the higher were the willingness to help and the expectations of a positive relationship in the future. The findings demonstrate how mutual dehumanization can be reduced as a result of the other side’s reconciliatory stances and can further contribute to improving intergroup relations. (shrink)

Bernard Williams briefly discusses agent regret in his broader account of moral luck. The present paper first outlines one way to develop Williams’s notion with reference to the unintended harm; it then suggests that agent regret can be counteracted by externalizing the action that caused unintended harm, in Harry Frankfurt’s sense of externalization; and then the present paper argues that apology is a mechanism by which a person can externalize an offending action/effect—in that way counteracting agent regret. This function (...) for apology—self-repair—is different from others described in the literature, which address the role of apology in repairing relationships. The present paper describes a nonfictional example, that of a veteran of the U.S. war in Iraq who contacts a family gravely injured by him and his combat unit; the veteran is motivated to contact the family to apologize. The example serves as a prototypical case of agent regret. The example is taken from a recent literature on the clinical psychology of self-inflicted “moral injury”; categorizing this example of moral injury as agent regret also helps broaden our understanding of moral injury as a philosophical category and as a psychological phenomenon. (shrink)

Regardless of leaders’ efforts to do the right thing and meet performance expectations, they make mistakes, with possible ramifications for followers’ and leaders’ well-being. Some leaders will apologize following transgressions, which may have positive implications for their followers’ and their own well-being, contingent upon the nature and severity of the transgressions. We examine these relationships in two separate studies. In Study 1, leader apologies had a positive relationship with followers’ psychological well-being and emotional health, and these relationships were moderated by (...) the severity of the transgression. In Study 2, leader apologies had a positive relationship with their own psychological well-being, positive emotional health and authentic pride. In addition, the nature of transgressions moderated the relationship between leader apologies and leaders’ positive emotions and authentic pride, while the severity of transgressions moderated the relationship between leader apologies and their positive emotions, psychological health, and authentic pride. Implications and future research directions are discussed. (shrink)

This empirical investigation showed that contrary to the popular notion that apologies signify weakness, the victims of mistakes made by leaders consistently perceived leaders who apologized as more transformational than those who did not apologize. In a field experiment (Study 1), male referees who were perceived as having apologized for mistakes made officiating hockey games were rated by male coaches (n = 93) as more transformational than when no apology was made. Studies 2 (n = 50) and 3 (n (...) = 224) replicated this effect in two vignette studies to enhance internal and ecological validity. Contrary to expectations in Study 3, there were no apology×leader gender interactions. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. (shrink)

Apologizing for Socrates places some of the Platonic and Xenophontic writings in the context of contemporary controversies over Socrates, providing a perspective in which many of the philosophic and literary features of the text can be explained. In addition, it sheds light on the apologetic techniques used by Plato and Xenophon.

Apology is a necessary component of moral repair of damage done by wrongs against the person. Analyzing the role of apology in the aftermath of atrocity, with a focus on the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda, 1994, this article emphasizes the role of recognition failures in grave moral wrongs, the importance of speech acts that offer recognition, and building mutuality through recognition as a route to reconciliation. Understanding the US role in the international failure to stop the (...) ’94 genocide raises the question of how any response could mitigate a world-shattering wrong like genocide. With a focus on survivors, this article explains the concepts of recognition harm and spirit murder to illuminate what survivors experience and need. The third section develops a theory of apology as offering recognition to the victim of wrongdoing —through both the act of speaking-to and through its content. The article examines US President Bill Clinton’s 1998 apology to Rwandans, to understand it as an apology, and to see how it began reconciliation between Americans and Rwandans. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the inter-related significance of apology and material reparations. (shrink)

Abstract: This article examines the uses of official apologies for massive human rights abuses in the context of democratic transitions. It sketches a normative model of apologies, highlighting how they serve to provide some moral and practical redress for past wrongs. It discusses a number of contributions apologies can make, including publicly confirming the status of victims as moral agents, fostering public reexamination and deliberation about social norms, and promoting critical understandings of history that undermine apologist historical accounts. The article (...) then presents certain normative criteria that any official apology must satisfy, and concludes with a discussion of several theoretical and practical challenges that apologies face in transitional contexts. It draws on Chilean President Patricio Aylwin's apology for his predecessor's crimes as an illustration of some of the promises and challenges that apologies face. (shrink)

There is a cognitive, an affective, a conative, and an attitudinal component to a genuine apology. In discussing these components, I address the following questions. Might apologies be due for non-culpable actions? Might apologies be due for choices in moral dilemmas? What is the link between sympathy, remorse and making amends? Is it meaningful for resilient akratics to apologize? How much moral renewal is required when one apologizes? Why should apologies be offered in a humble manner? And is there (...) some truth to P. G. Wodehouse's dictum that 'the right sort of people do not want apologies'? (shrink)

This book argues that justice often governs apologies. Drawing on examples from literature, politics, and current events, Cohen presents a theory of apology as corrective offers. Many leading accounts of apology say much about what apologies do and why they are important. They stop short of exploring whether and how justice governs apologies. Cohen argues that corrective justice may require apologies as offers of reparation. Individuals, corporations, and states may then have rights or duties regarding apology. Exercising (...) rights to apology or fulfilling duties to provide them are ways of holding one another mutually accountable. By casting rights and duties of apology as justifiable to free and equal persons, the book advances conversations about how liberalism may respond to historic injustice. Apologies and Moral Repair will be of interest to scholars and advanced students in ethics, political philosophy, and social philosophy. (shrink)

The article examines the role of apology in a process of reconciling with historic injustice. As with so many other facets of the politics of reconciliation, official apologies are controversial, at times strenuously resisted, and their purpose and significance not always well understood. The article, therefore, seeks to articulate the key moral and practical resources that official apologies can bring to bear in a process of national reconciliation and to defend these symbolic acts against some of the more influential (...) criticisms from the skeptics. The analysis is developed in relation to apologies offered in the context of state-indigenous reconciliation processes in the Americas, Australasia, and other regions of the globe. (shrink)

Philosophical discussions of apologies have focused on apologizing for wrong actions. Such a focus overlooks an important dimension of moral failures, namely, failures of character. However, when one attempts to revise the standard account of apology to make room for failures of character, two objections emerge. The first is rooted in the psychology of shame. The second stems from the purported social function of apologies. This paper responds to these objections and, in so doing, sheds further light both on (...) why we apologize (when we are in the wrong) and on why we accept apologies (when others are). (shrink)

In this paper, I explore how theorists might navigate a course between the twin dangers of piety and excess cynicism when thinking critically about state apologies, by focusing on two government apologies to indigenous peoples: namely, those made by the Australian and Canadian Prime Ministers in 2008. Both apologies are notable for several reasons: they were both issued by heads of government, and spoken on record within the space of government: the national parliaments of both countries. Furthermore, in each case, (...) the object of the apology – that which was apologized for – comes closer to disrupting the idea both countries have of themselves, and their image in the global political community, than any previous apologies made by either government. Perhaps as a result, both apologies were surrounded by celebration and controversy alike, and tracing their consequences – even in the short term – is a difficult business. We avoid excessive piety or cynicism, I argue, when we take several things into account. First, apologies have multiple functions: they narrate particular histories of wrongdoing, they express disavowal of that wrongdoing, and they commit to appropriate forms of repair or renewal. Second, the significance and the success of each function must be assessed contextually. Third, when turning to official political apologies, in particular, appropriate assessment of their capacity to disavow or to commit requires that consider apologies both as performance and as political action. While there remain significant questions regarding the practice of political apology – in particular, its relationship to practices of reparation, forgiveness and reconciliation – this approach can provide a framework with which to best consider them. (shrink)

He is the author, among other books, of The Politics of Assimilation: French Jews at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair, Vichy France and the Jews (with Robert Paxton), The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century, The Holocaust in History, Mr. [...] I am grate- ful as well to the Ford Foundation, which supported a series of seminars on the subject of apologies I organized at the Munk Centre for International Studies of the University of Toronto during the academic (...) year 2004-2005, and to the two anonymous reviewers. [...] Official Apologies and the Quest for Historical Justice Thus, despite requests to do so, Soviet and later Russian leaders have never apologized for the massacre of thousands of Polish officers in the forest of Katyn in 1940; the Israelis refused the invitation of Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad in 1968 to apologize for their "aggression" the year before; American historian Eugene Genovese f [...] The apologies considered here are for wrongs that are historic in two 15 respects: first, through the gravity of the wrongdoing in the conscious- ness of the victims and their successors; and second, through the wrongdoing having occurred in the historical past, often the distant past, usually considered out of reach of criminal proceedings or other conventional modes of dispute resolution. [...] Because of the historic nature of the grievances, there is an element of the extraordinary in the acknowledgement of the wrong committed, the acceptance of responsibility, the expression of remorse, and the commitment to set the matter to rest. (shrink)

Under the pretense of defending an obscure treatise by a Catalan theologian, Sebond, Montaigne attacks the philosophers who attempt rational explanations of the universe and argues for a skeptical Christianity based squarely on faith rather than reason. The result is the _Apology for Raymond Sebond_, a classic of Counter-Reformation thought and a masterpiece of Renaissance literature. This new translation by Roger Ariew and Marjorie Grene achieves both accuracy and fluency, conveying at once the nuances of Montaigne’s arguments and his distinctive (...) literary style. (shrink)

As official apologies by political, corporate, and religious leaders becoming increasingly commonplace – offered in response to everything from personal wrongdoing to historical oppression and genocide – providing a plausible account of what such apologies can and cannot accomplish is of paramount importance. Yet reigning theories of apology typically conceive of them primarily as moral and not political phenomena, often modeling official apologies after interpersonal ones. This risks distorting the meaning and function of political apologies, while holding them to (...) an impossible standard. In this paper, I argue that we require a normative theory of official apologies as political practice, and that crucial resources for this theory can be found in Hannah Arendt’s account of meaningful speech and action. In the Human Condition, Arendt privileges what she calls political speech and action as the highest category of human activity, which she identifies according to the following features: i) it can only take place with others; ii) it forces the agent to risk something by disclosing him or herself; iii) it creates a meaningful narrative; and, iv) it engenders some new relationship among those involved. These features, taken together, are a very good description of a successful apology. Furthermore, Arendt’s account of political speech depends upon her account of political forgiveness and political promising, two practices closely linked to the emerging practice of official state apology. In particular, I argue, theorizing apologies as Arendtian speech draws our attention to hitherto overlooked or underemphasized features of apologies and their functions, such the role they play – both powerful and problematic – in establishing authoritative narratives. (shrink)

IntroductionThe possibility of prospective apologies has been ignored and conditional apologies have typically been thought to be insincere, deceptive, or at the very least, not meaningful. In large part this is because authors have attended to a particular suite of psychological features of those who issue an apology, and the presence of this suite of features has been taken to provide evidence that an apology is meaningful, while the absence of said psychological features is taken to provide evidence (...) that the apology is not meaningful. Since there is prima facie good reason to suppose that no agent issuing a conditional or prospective apology could have (all) of these psychological features, it has been largely assumed that such apologies cannot be meaningful. This paper argues that this is a mistake. More careful consideration of prospective and conditional apologies suggests that they can be meaningful. That, in turn, suggests that we should look more closely at the role of these f. (shrink)

Most normative theorists of public apology agree that, while apologies may have multiple purposes, central to most of them is the apology’s narrative power; that is, its ability to tell new stories of wrongdoing, responsibility, and accountability. We judge political apologies by whether they correctly identify the harms in question and the apologizer as the responsible party, whether they acknowledge the effects of this harms on the recipients of apology, and whether they successfully address those recipients as (...) persons deserving respect. The narrative power of official public apologies can also alter legal and political record, as well as media discourse nationally and internationally. Drawing on multiple examples of public apologies to women that were offered (or demanded and not offered), I identify three ways in which attention to gender complicates our understanding of public apology, and the narrative power they hold. These include the difficulties of articulating the nature of gendered harm, given the depoliticization of women’s roles and the stigma surrounding sexual violence, the complexities of traversing the public/private divide by bringing private stories of gendered harm to public attention, and the ways in which attending to gendered and sexual violence reframes our understanding of both political responsibility for wrongdoing, and how apologies express and affirm that responsibility. (shrink)

Apologies are key components of moral repair. They can identify a wrong, express regret, and accept culpability for some transgression. Apologies can vindicate a victim's value as someone who was due different treatment. This paper explores whether acts with vicarious elements may serve as apologies. I offer a functionalist account of apologies: acts are apologies not so much by having correct ingredients but by serving certain apologetic functions. Those functions can be realized in multiple ways. Whether the offenders are individuals (...) or collectives, they can sometimes fulfill such functions through third party agents. Having vicarious elements does not necessarily undermine the reparative reasons offenders hope to provide. (shrink)

Tracer le panorama de l'apologétique à l'âge classique n'est pas chose facile, tant sont multiples les perspectives philosophiques et diverses les formes littéraires. La tentation est alors grande d'aligner les monographies. Le colloque de Metz (16-18 octobre 2008), dont sont issues les contributions du présent ouvrage, a choisi d'appréhender cette diversité foisonnante et mouvante en la soumettant à une unique approche, la question du croire. Tenant de l'imaginaire et du rationnel, la foi manifeste l'ambition de réaliser la synthèse du sentiment (...) et de la raison. La théologie pascalienne de la grâce fournit des éléments de réponse pour faire cohabiter ces deux principes, constituant le matériau dont d'innombrables apologies se nourriront pendant plus d'un siècle. De 1650 à 1802, de Pascal à Chateaubriand, en contexte catholique comme en contexte protestant, la réflexion est inlassablement reprise sur la possibilité de rendre raison de sa foi à autrui, comme le demande saint Pierre (1 P 3, 15), alors que les progrès de l'histoire, de l'exégèse biblique ou des sciences de la nature en renouvellent les conditions. Mais peu à peu le sujet s'affirme comme la preuve première : son expérience de la foi, le témoignage qu'il en rend, l'espace de parole qu'il ouvre à l'autre, pour mettre ses idées en débat et engager un possible dialogue, sont les nouveaux moyens de la persuasion et de la conversion. (shrink)

Plato and Xenophon: Apologies compares two key dialogues on the death of Socrates. Socrates was accused of impiety and corrupting the youth of ancient Athens and was tried, convicted, imprisoned, and executed. Both Plato and Xenophon make clear that the charges were not brought forward in the spirit of true piety, and that Socrates was a man of real virtue and beneficence. To this day, his trial and execution remain a mark upon the democracy that put him to death. These (...) dialogues underscore the limitations of democratic relativism and emphasize the nature of philosophy or the free mind. Plato’s Apology of Socrates is both poetry and an act of reformation, justifying the life of philosophy, challenging the authority of the pagan gods and heroes, and introducing Socrates as a heroic and even divine figure. In contrast, Xenophon’s Socrates is not dialectical and otherworldly, but makes a different appeal for philosophy. From Xenophon emerges the heroic tradition of Plutarch with its reflections on the virtues and vices of great historical men. Focus Philosophical Library translations are close to and are non-interpretative of the original text, with the notes and a glossary intending to provide the reader with some sense of the terms and the concepts as they were understood by Plato and Xenophon’s immediate audience. (shrink)

Recognizing gaps in our present understanding of leader apologies, this investigation examines how followers appraise leader apologies and how these perceptions impact work-related outcomes. Results indicate that followers who viewed their leader as trustworthy or caring before a leader wrongdoing were more likely to perceive their leader’s apology to be sincere, as compared to followers who previously doubted their leader’s trustworthiness and caring. Attributions of apology sincerity affected follower reactions, with followers perceiving sincere apologies reporting greater trust in (...) leadership, satisfaction with supervision, leader–member exchange quality, affective organizational commitment, and forgiveness than those reporting insincere or no apologies. A mediation model was supported, showing that attributions of apology sincerity fostered perceptions of humility, which enhanced perceptions of transformational leadership, and consequently garnered more positive follower reactions. (shrink)

In 2008 I published I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies with Cambridge University Press. I Was Wrong provides a nuanced framework for the ethical meanings of apologies from individuals and collectives, considering along the way the historical and cultural traditions that inform modern acts of contrition. I have discussed I Was Wrong on NPR, CNN, BBC, CBC, Philosophy Talk, and various other national and international programs.I am now working on the follow-up book, tentatively titled Apologies in Law and also (...) under contract with Cambridge University Press. Apologies in Law will apply the framework for the ethical meanings of apologies from I Was Wrong to acts of contrition in civil and criminal law. As a recently tenured J.D./Ph.D. experienced as a litigator in a major Manhattan law firm and as a staff attorney for the U.S. Court of Appeals, I hope to use my upcoming sabbatical to complete a draft of Apologies in Law. I will revise and polish the draft during the summer of 2009. (shrink)

The paper addresses the question of the appropriateness of a Congressional apology for American slavery. After offering an account of what an apology entails, I consider the claim that today's Congress fails to stand in the right relation to the guilt of American slavery to apologize for it. I argue that, while the current Congress and the constituency it represents do not bear a guilt that would permit it to apologize FOR slavery, it has inherited a guilt RELATED (...) TO slavery for which it is appropriate for it to apologize. (shrink)

One of the most profound interactions that can occur between people, apologies have the power to heal humiliations, free the mind from deep-seated guilt, remove the desire for vengeance, and ultimately restore broken relationships. With On Apology, Aaron Lazare offers an eye-opening analysis of this vital interaction, illuminating an often hidden corner of the human heart. He discusses the importance of shame, guilt, and humiliation, the initial reluctance to apologize, the simplicity of the act of apologizing, the spontaneous generosity (...) and forgiveness on the part of the offended, the transfer of power and respect between two parties, and much more. Readers will not only find a wealth of insight that they can apply to their own lives, but also a deeper understanding of national and international conflicts and how we might resolve them. The act of apologizing is quite simply immensely fulfilling. On Apology opens a window onto this common occurrence to reveal the feelings and actions at the heart of this profound interaction. (shrink)

Apology An apology is the act of declaring one’s regret, remorse, or sorrow for having insulted, failed, injured, harmed or wronged another. Some apologies are interpersonal (between individuals, that is, between friends, family members, colleagues, lovers, neighbours, or strangers). Other apologies are collective (by one group to another group or by a group to an […].

Since published acknowledgements of scientific misconduct are a species of image restoration, common strategies for responding publicly to accusations can be expected: from sincere apologies to ritualistic apologies. This study is a rhetorical examination of these strategies as they are reflected in choices in language: it compares the published retractions and letters of apology with the letters that charge misconduct. The letters are examined for any shifts in language between the charge of misconduct and the response to the charge (...) in order to assess whether the apology was sincere or ritualistic. The results indicate that although most authors’ published acknowledgments of scientific misconduct seem to minimize culpability by means of the strategic use of language, their resulting ritualistic apologies often still satisfy in some way the accusers’ (and thus their community’s) concerns. (shrink)

This study adopts the Cross-Cultural Speech Act Realization Patterns (CCSARP) framework to investigate the apology strategies used by L1 speakers of Tashelhit, a variety of Amazigh spoken in central Morocco. To this end, 82 university students either filled an assessment questionnaire or participated in an oral closed role-play. The findings indicated that L1 speakers of Tashelhit employed seven strategies to apologize, namely taking on responsibility, Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices (IFIDs), explanation or account, offer of repair, promise of forbearance, determinism, (...) and self-criticism. While taking on responsibility, IFIDs, and explanation or account were used most frequently in all the role-play situations to realize apologies, the other apology strategies appeared to be situation-dependent. There was also a tendency for L1 speakers of Tashelhit to use certain religious expressions to modify their apologies. These findings yielded a number of recommendations for further research and suggestions for improving the teaching of apologies in Tashelhit. (shrink)

Sincere Apologies: The Importance of the Offender’s Guilt Feelings This paper discusses the meaning and the importance of emotions, in particular the sincere guilt feelings of the offender. It is argued that the emotion of guilt reveals important information about the offender’s values and normative position. In the remainder of the paper, special consideration is awarded to the argument concerning ritual apologies, which might contain value even when insincere. This argument is rejected, on two grounds: 1. if the apology (...) ritual does not aim for sincere guilt feelings, then the use of the symbol of apology is not fitting; and 2. if the apology ritual does aim for sincere guilt, then an insincere apology devalues the sincere expression. (shrink)

Christopher Bennett presents a theory of punishment grounded in the practice of apology, and in particular in reactions such as feeling sorry and making amends. He argues that offenders have a 'right to be punished' - that it is part of taking an offender seriously as a member of a normatively demanding relationship that she is subject to retributive attitudes when she violates the demands of that relationship. However, while he claims that punishment and the retributive attitudes are the (...) necessary expression of moral condemnation, his account of these reactions has more in common with restorative justice than traditional retributivism. He argues that the most appropriate way to react to crime is to require the offender to make proportionate amends. His book is a rich and intriguing contribution to the debate over punishment and restorative justice. (shrink)

The problem of dirty hands is, roughly speaking, concerned with situations in which an agent is faced with a choice between two evils so that, no matter what they do, they will have to violate something of important moral value. Theorists have been primarily concerned with dirty hands choices arising in politics because they are thought to be particularly frequent and pressing in this sphere. Much of the subsequent discussion in the literature has focused on the impact that such choices (...) have on a well-functioning democracy and how, if at all, we can ensure that a politician dirtying their hands does not undermine core democratic values and processes. A particular concern has been whether dirty-handed politicians ought to publicly reveal their actions after the fact and whether they should be held accountable through some form of punishment. The first aim of this paper is to point out that the focus on what is required in the wake of a dirty-handed decision, based on the need to protect the democratic system ought to be balanced with a genuine concern for reparative justice and what is owed to the victims of dirty hands. In the second part of this paper, I then examine the suitability of one common way in which perpetrators partly repair the damage they have done to victims, namely apologizing, in the dirty hands context. (shrink)

The Fall 2000 issue of The Owl of Minerva published the papers presented to a Hegel Society of America session at the 1998 World Congress of Philosophy held in Boston. In the “Special Editor’s Introduction” to this issue, I inadvertently failed to give credit where credit was richly due. The topic for the session in question was proposed to the Executive Committee of the Hegel Society of America by Dr. Riccardo Pozzo of the Catholic University of America, and was selected (...) in competition with others. Dr. Pozzo also authored the public call for papers, assembled the committee for blind review, organized, and chaired this very successful session. The Hegel Society is very grateful for his generous contribution and I wish to apologize for my oversight in failing to mention it. (shrink)

This book inquires into the role and effects of public apologies in international relations. It focuses on two major questions - why and when do states issue apologies for historic crimes and how and under what conditions are these apologies successful in remedying conflictive relationships? In recent years, we have witnessed an unseen popularity of apologies, particularly in the public sphere, with numerous politicians, managers and clergymen being eager to apologise and atone for the wrong-doings of their countries or institutions. (...) The pope, for instance, has apologized for the Inquisition, the United Nations have apologized for their idleness during the Rwandan civil war and US President Bill Clinton has apologized for slavery, to mention just a few examples. Public apologies, thus, are a new and highly interesting, while nevertheless still puzzling phenomenon, the precise role and meaning of which in international politics remains to be explored. This book sets out to do exactly this. Focusing in particular on state apologies, i.e. apologies which are given and/or demanded by states, it assembles twelve detailed empirical case studies which deal with the two questions raised above. In a first part, the case studies reconstruct the processes in which state representatives react to calls for public atonement by either issuing a public apology or refusing to do so. In a second part, the case studies explore the reactions to the apology (in cases where an apology was given) and evaluate signs for its success or failure. All case studies are based on a theoretical framework which is outlined in the introduction to the book and help develop tentative assumptions about the emergence and the effects of state apologies, drawing on different strands of literature, such as political science, philosophy, sociology or psychology. This work will be of great interest to students and scholars of conflict reconciliation, international relations and transitional justice. (shrink)

This essay offers a snapshot of the some of the challenges facing seminary education, specifically teaching the Bible, in the late 19th century that have proved to be fruitful opportunities to recast biblical hermeneutics and, more broadly, theological education in new ways. It examines the way the Bible is handled today in the seminary classroom and charts how we got here theologically and pedagogically as a result of these challenges.

Abstract:There is an inconsistency in the Apology between Socrates' claim to ignorance and his numerous knowledge claims. Scholars have attempted to dispel the inconsistency by weakening the claim to ignorance, the knowledge claims, or both. The author suggests a different tack. He argues that the inconsistency is intentional on Plato's part as a creative means of motivating for the conclusion that the life of inquiry—the examined life—is the best human life. Surprisingly, the claim that said life is best is (...) not a knowledge claim in any ordinary sense. Rather, the claim rests, for Plato, on the awareness of the absence of any worthwhile knowledge. In other words, the claim rests on the claim to ignorance. So too for any subsequent claims which, in turn, rest upon it. Why the claim to ignorance is not a claim like any other is the heart of the article. (shrink)

Socrates, one of the first of the great philosophers, left no written works. What survives of his thought are second-hand descriptions of his teachings and conversations—including, most famously, the accounts of his trial and execution composed by his friend, student, and philosophical successor, Plato. In _Euthyphro_, Socrates examines the concept of piety and displays his propensity for questioning Athenian authorities. Such audacity is not without consequence, and in the _Apology_ we find Socrates defending himself in court against charges of impiety (...) and corruption of the youth. _Crito_ depicts Socrates choosing to accept the resulting death sentence rather than escape Athens and avoid execution. All three dialogues are included here, as is the final scene of _Phaedo_, in which the sentence is carried out. (shrink)

Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito. In this book, the author adds choruses to the Dialogues in order to make the Dialogues suitable for presentation as a three-act drama.

This article is the first exploration of the Chinese notion of apology from a comparative legal perspective. By reviewing the significance of apology in the context of Chinese culture, the article presents a three-dimensional structure of apology that, in contrast to the understanding the research community now has, defines acknowledgement of fault, admission of responsibility, and offer of reparation as three essential elements of an apology. It is the combination of these three elements that enables (...) class='Hi'>apology to serve as a form of reparation. The article further places the three-dimensional apology in the context of the Chinese concept of “the relations of humanity,” arguing that an apology accompanying admission of fault and responsibility may help to restore the harmony of relations and, by so doing, resolve medical disputes positively. (shrink)

Although conceptually distinct, ‘ time ’ and ‘community’ are multiply intertwined within a myriad of key debates in both the social sciences and the humanities. Even so, the role of conceptions of time in social practices of inclusion and exclusion has yet to achieve the prominence of other key analytical categories such as identity and space. This article seeks to contribute to the development of this field by highlighting the importance of thinking time and community together through the lens of (...) political apologies. Often ostensibly offered in order to re-articulate both the constitution of ‘the community’ and its future direction, official apologies are prime examples of deliberate attempts to intervene in shared understandings of political community and its temporality. Offering a detailed case study of one of these apologies, I will focus on Australian debates over the removal of indigenous children from their families, known as the Stolen Generations, and examine the temporal dimensions of the different responses offered by former prime ministers John Howard and Kevin Rudd. (shrink)

Political apologies are commonly imagined as gestures of finality and closure: capstone moments that summate public knowledge. One manifestation of these assumptions is the position that apologies should be timed to come only after appropriate investigation into the wrongdoing has been completed. This article takes a different view, for two reasons. First, even apologies that seem based on robust knowledge can come to seem incomplete or inadequate in the light of subsequent learning and knowledge. Second, because apologies are complexly embedded (...) in longer-term processes of activism and response, they can contribute to their own unravelling by encouraging further consideration and inquiry. We develop these arguments by considering two Canadian cases that illustrate these dynamics: apologies that addressed, respectively, the wartime internment of Japanese Canadians and the policy of forcing Indigenous children to attend residential schools. (shrink)

Two speeches in Plato's Theaetetus, Socrates' well-known description of himself as a midwife and the 'digression' in the middle of the dialogue, wherein Socrates contrasts the philosopher and the public orator, have apologetic dimensions; they are, in part, attempts by Socrates to account for, and hence correct, his and the philosopher's undeserved public reputation. A careful reading of these passages in their dramatic contexts as philosophical apologies reveals interesting parallels to the Apology, insights into some of the major themes (...) of the Theaetetus, and a fuller appreciation of Socratic philosophy as portrayed in Plato's dialogues. (shrink)

In 1979, A. D. Woozley proposed an interpretation of Apology 29c–d which was intended to alleviate the well-known tension between the Apology and Crito on the citizen's obligation to obey the law. According to his interpretation, the court's hypothetical offer – to release Socrates on the condition that he will be put to death if he does not give up philosophy – is not an order, but a warning as to what would happen should he accept their acquittal (...) and yet continue to philosophize. Obviously, if this is the spirit of the words he puts into the court's mouth, Socrates would not be guilty of disobedience should he refuse the offer, or even if he should accept it and then disregard the warning. To support this interpretation, Woozley suggested a novel construal of the words in which Socrates makes his refusal – πεσομαι δ μγγον τ θε ἢ μν. (shrink)

This new, inexpensive translation of Plato's Apology of Socrates is an alternative to the 19th-century Jowett translation that students find online when they're trying to save money on books. Using the 1995 Oxford Classical Text and the commentaries of John Burnet and James Helm, I aimed to produce a 21st-century English translation that is both true to Plato's Greek and understandable to college students in introductory philosophy, political theory, and humanities courses. The book also includes a new translation of (...) the death scene from Plato's Phaedo, a short introduction, a dozen explanatory notes, advice on how to cite Plato in papers, and suggestions for further reading. Search for "Plato Armstrong" in Apple Books (epub ISBN 9781957448022) and Amazon (paperback ISBN 9781957448008, Kindle ISBN 9781957448015). (shrink)

The framework of this paper is a defence of Burnet's construal of Apology 30b 2-4. Socrates does not claim, as he is standardly translated, that virtue makes you rich, but that virtue makes money and everything el se good for you. This view of the relation between virtue and wealth is paralleled in dialogues of every period, and a sophisticated development of it appears in Aristotle. My philological defence of the philosophically preferable translation extends recent scholarly work on eínai (...) in Plato and Aristotle to gígnesthai, which is the main verb in the disputed sentence. When attached to a subject, both verbs make a complete statement on their own, but a statement that is further completable by adding a complement. The important point is that the addition of a complement does not change the meaning of the verb from existence to the copula. Proving this is a lengthy task which takes me into some of the deeper reaches of Platonic and Aristotelian ontology, and into discussion of whether Greek ever acquired a verb that corresponds to modem verbs of existence. I conclude that even when later authors such as Philo Judaeus, Sextus Empiricus and Plotinus debate what we naturally translate as issues of existence, none of the verbs they use (eínai, úpárkhein, úphestekénai) can be said to have existential meaning. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 719 An Apology for Apologetics: A Study in the Logic of lnterreligious Dialogue. By PAUL J. GRIFFITHS. New York: Orbis, 1991. ISBN: 0 88344 761 4. pp. 113. Jesus Christ at the Encounter of World Religions. By J. DUPUIS. New York: Orbis, 1991 (ET: Robert R. Barr, from French, 1989). ISBN: 0 88344 723 1. pp. 301. Griffiths presents a rigorous argument for the possibility of (...) con· tradictory claims between different religious communities. His inspira· tion, as he acknowledges, is William Christian Snr. His basic argu· ment is: " If representative intellectuals belonging to some specific religious community come to judge at a particular time that some or all of their own doctrine-expressing sentences are incompatible with some alien religious claim(s), then they should feel obliged to engage in both positive and negative apologetics vis-a-vis these alien religious claim(s) and their promulgators" (3). He takes negative apologetics to be a critique of arguments made against one's own religious claims, showing that such arguments fail or are inconsistent or incoherent. Positive apologetics shows how a particular religious community's doctrines are cognitively superior, in some respect(s), to another religious community 's doctrines. It is essential for this enterprise that only methods of argumentation and criteria of knowledge acceptable to the adversary are employed. This requires the acceptance of natural theology. Griffiths is well aware of the lion's den he is entering, as his proposals run counter to much scholarship in the area of interreligious dialogue, so he spends three chapters apologetically tackling the lions. The objectors (who mainly remain in notes) include Derrida, Barthes, Winch, Lindbeck, Hick, Huxley, Nasr, Plantinga and others, although Mac· Intyre is curiously missing. This technique has the advantage of isolating and presenting arguments, without falling into problems of cor· rect exegesis of opponents. And this is also its weakness, as objectors will sometimes feel caricatured or misunderstood-as is surely the case with Plantinga and in one instance, Hick. First, he tackles objections that sentences from one tradition are either incomprehensible or incommensurable with those of another, convincingly showing that the strong versions of both claims are self· defeating and unsustainable. Weaker versions still allow for his proj· ect-or so he thinks. This is where Maclntyre's work should have been considered. Then he tackles various theories of religious language (following Lindbeck's typology). He argues against non-cognitive accounts that reduce beliefs to the credibility of causes for holding beliefs, a position incapable of asserting its truth over other views because of its 720 BOOK REVIEWS own presuppositions. He follows Lindbeck in criticizing experiental expressivism, and then turns upon Lindbeck's own form of rule theory (which is ambivalent regarding cognitive claims), arguing convincingly that to suggest that only sentences uttered confessionally and with performative function can possess ontological truth is confused (42). In a brief review it is not possible to rehearse Griffiths's careful argumentation. Griffiths then sets about tackling two types of universalists: Hick and Huxley. Of Hick, he argues that some criteria are required to discern true from false religions (e.g. Jim Jones) and in so doing such a position needs to support and develop such criteria, thereby effectively introducing apologetics. He neglects to deal with Hick's pragmatic criteria of beneficial ' fruits ' evident in adherents, but the logic of his argument can be applied to Hick's proposals. Using Katz and Zaehner, he argues against the esoteric universalism of the philosophia perennis. (The arguments of Robert Forman's recent book, The Problems of Pure Consciousness, are strangely neglected, despite Griffiths's being a contributor to that collection.) Finally, he tackles objections against positive apologetics-first, on the grounds that it has a negative effect on interreligious relations. Logically, this need not be the case, although Griffiths is well aware that the political context of apologetics can obscure its proper goal: deeper critical understanding, learning and problem solving. Then, in sustained dialogue with Plantinga, he argues against the objection that success is impossible. It is impossible only if " knockdown drag-out" (64) argumentative victory is expected. Griffiths suggests the cumulative -case argument and gives instances of such successful apologetics (medieval... (shrink)

Whether Meletus, the accuser of Socrates, is to be identified with Meletus, the accuser of Andocides and participant in the arrest of Leon of Salamis , has recently been discussed, with inconclusive results, by H. Blumenthal. The strongest argument against the identification, it may be thought, is that Socrates mentions the arrest without implicating Meletus. I propose to argue that the Meleti are one, that there is a veiled allusion to Meletus in this passage and that Socrates effects this allusion (...) in two ways. (shrink)