베르그손의 도덕과 종교의 두 원천은 우리에게 주체화에 관한매우 독특한 이론을 제시한다. 이에 따르면, 인간이 자신의 실존을장악하는 주체가 되는 것은 종교를 통해서이다. 지성적 동물인 인간은 인간의 존재가 무의미한 세계 표상을 통해 인간을 허무주의의 고뇌에 빠뜨린다. 주체화는 이러한 지성의 자기 해체적 위험에대한 방어적 반작용에서 시작된다. 그런데 베르그손은 두 종류의주체화, 즉 정태적 종교의 작화 본능에 따른 사회적 주체화와 역동적 종교의 신비주의적 직관에 따른 우주론적 주체화를 제시한다. 이 두 주체화 방식에 대한 검토로부터 우리는 주체와 종교의 관계에 관한 다음의 결론들에 이르게 된다. 1) 종교는 주체화의 (...) 필수적인 요소이다. 2) 하지만 두 가지 주체화 양태에 따라서 두 가지 종류의 종교가 있다. (shrink)

This essay explores the relationship between Kant's and Kierkegaard's treatment of morality and religious faith. In Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone Kant invokes Christian categories in an effort to resolve certain contradictions which arise in consequence of the introduction of the notion of radical evil. I initially argue that Kant's Enlightenment confidence in the autonomy of ethical selfhood ultimately entails the subordination of these categories to the demands of rational ethical subjectivity. I then suggest that Kierkegaard's defence (...) of the independence of Christian faith, against the encroachments of Kantian Enlightenment humanism, largely proceeds on a foundation of shared epistemological principles, such that the Kierkegaardian existential individual's paradoxical Christian faith offers no genuine alternative, but rather a radically subjectivized extension of Kant's demythologized version of orthodox Christian principles. (shrink)

Tibetan Buddhism, the Gelug school specifically, promotes a deep skepticism about the ability to know others’ minds. Its scripture is rife with cautionary tales allegorizing and extolling this skepticism in adherents, while claiming a buddha, by contrast, has eradicated this skepticism with their omniscience. I describe a buddha’s purported privileged epistemic access to others’ minds as “double-hiddenness.” On this skepticism, not just what a buddha knows, but if they know it is hidden, making their authority irreputable. I use critical theory (...) to investigate the ramifications of this double hiddenness, demonstrating that the resultant subjectivization brought about by this extreme skepticism—although the product of power—is not merely a type of subjugation, as suggested by Foucault, but also constitutes a robust agency. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss, in a Heideggerian context, the possibility of de-subjectivizing the notion of the transcendental time-horizon and reinterpreting it as a formally indicated ‘whereto’ of releasement. The structures of the time-horizon depict the way beings unfold in the fullness of time in their alterity, and they orient the subject’s activity of ‘projection.’ What results is a field-oriented (as opposed to self-oriented) transcendental philosophy which would survive Heidegger’s critique of his own transcendental project, and which would avoid mystification. (...) I take three steps. First, I point out that the problematization of ‘transcendental Heidegger’ is based on the subjectivist interpretation of the time-horizon. I problematize a recent account in the subjectivist vein, arguing that it is neither indispensable, nor very plausible, nor the most illuminative of Heidegger’s work. Second, with the help of Dahlstrom, Golob, Engelland, Sheehan, and Vasterling, I gradually dissociate the notion of the horizon from subjectivism, the visual metaphor, and the assumption of an absolute ground. I suggest instead that the horizonality of the horizon be understood temporally, i.e., as an interplay of presencing and absencing where what matter most are the structures, themselves affected by time, which the transcendental field displays when beings unfold themselves within it. Third, I identify three of those structures when performing a de-subjectivizing reading of Heidegger’s interpretation of the threefold synthesis in Kant’s A-Deduction. These structures capture the way every being manifests itself, without themselves being necessarily grounded in the subject’s activity. This gives an example of how transcendental philosophy can clarify what the time-horizon is like while bracketing the question of its provenance. (shrink)

In the pre-history of the concept of recognition Spinoza’s social philosophy deserves a special place. Although we rarely think of Spinoza as a social philosopher, Spinoza understood well the ways in which individual subjectivity is shaped by the social forces. I will argue that Spinoza offers a mechanism to understand the way in which recognition works, in order to untangle the web of affect, desire and ideas, which support the recognitions and misrecognitions at the foundation of social life. Spinoza sets (...) out this mechanism in Book Three of the Ethics, but his extended example of the first Hebrew Kingdom in the Theological-Political Treatise, shows how he applied his theory of social recognition to the great problem of his times – the debate between faith and reason, and the need to unify a commonwealth. Social unity based on shared religion, for Spinoza, could be powerful, though not so powerful as democracy. Only through understanding Spinoza’s views of social subjectivization can we understand why. (shrink)

This is a translation from the Russian of Nikolai Lossky’s review of Henri Bergson, Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion (1932). The review was published in the Parisian émigré journal Новый Град (Cité nouvelle) in 1932. In this review, Lossky criticizes Bergson for leaving some key problems of the philosophy of religion unresolved, namely that of God’s relation to the world (theism vs. pantheism), that of immortality, as well as that of evil. He also (...) criticizes Bergson’s “extreme biologism” in his explanation of morality, which, in his view, subjectivizes the objects of religion. For Lossky, the symbolic images of the Christian religion are not subjective “fabulations,” but real symbols through which God reveals himself to us. Likewise, according to Lossky, true morality cannot be explained in terms of biological adaptation, but must rely on the foundation of an objective, i.e., Platonic, axiological sphere. (Frédéric Tremblay). (shrink)

Qu'est-ce que la littérature? Qu'en avons-nous fait? Que voulons-nous qu'elle soit? La littérature est une forme de partage. Elle institue le commun loin du mythe loin du mythe et de l'anomie douloureuse, pour conjurer toute communion aveugle de la masse et briser l'isolement démuni des exclus. Elle répond et pare à la panique collective. Mais la littérature est parfois elle-même figée dans une loyauté traumatique. C'est le cas, en France, depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale : l'irreprésentable de l'holocauste hante un (...) certain sublime de l'écriture et le formalisme critique qui l'a défendu. Aussi ce livre propose-t-il de remonter le temps, comme un ressort, jusqu'au XVIIe siècle. Un nouveau régime sacral émerge alors, qui rompt avec la sorcellerie et libère une zone de profanation permanente où s'engouffre la littérature. Un horizon de subjectivation sans précédent succède à l'effroi laissé par la peste et les guerres de religion. Le partage transitionnel de la littérature devient alors pensable. Cette monumentale histoire culturelle de ce qui menace la culture n'a guère d'équivalent. La connaissance intime du passé y nourrit une conceptualisation audacieuse des liens affectifs et sociaux que la littérature ouvre et consolide. Et un souci du présent y projette dans l'avenir la question de la transmission d'une exigence démocratique."--Back cover. (shrink)

Ce livre est le fruit d'un travail mené par Jacques Arènes depuis plusieurs années sur les conditions psychiques du fait religieux dans le monde contemporain. La démarche de l'ouvrage réfute l'approche fonctionnaliste du fait religieux - étudié dans le contexte chrétien -, et cherche à mettre en tension mutuelle les discours laïcs, "scientifiques", concernant l'intériorité et ceux, plus anciens, issus du christianisme. L'auteur soutient l'hypothèse que la "laïcisation" du psychisme, induite par les nouvelles théories de l'intériorité, s'est traduite en un (...) travail psychique inédit, sur le plan individuel autant que collectif. L'intuition fondamentale de l'ouvrage est que la religion est aujourd'hui en relation forte avec le processus de subjectivation : dans un cadre historique où les institutions productrices de sens sont devenues incertaines, le sujet contemporain "utilise" ainsi la religion comme lieu de construction personnelle. L'ouvrage aborde les configurations, hautement individuelles, de la spiritualité d'aujourd'hui, et analyse la manière dont la quête de sens s'articule avec des démarches religieuses plus classiques. Le fait spirituel contemporain se saisit ainsi des méthodes et des démarches psychothérapiques pour les intégrer dans une problématique croyante. La confrontation des paradigmes utilisés par les théories religieuses de l'intériorité et par les sciences du psychisme conduit à une discussion approfondie sur les articulations du psychique et du spirituel. Cette tension entre les différents discours sur l'intériorité joue à l'intérieur d'une nouvelle donne anthropologique où le sujet coupable des temps freudiens, hanté par la faute, laisse progressivement la place au sujet blessé, peinant à porter sa destinée. Plus largement qu'une approche de la sphère religieuse, cette étude donne donc des éléments de compréhension sur le sujet contemporain en recherche de sens et en quête de soi. Un ouvrage du même auteur, à paraître prochainement aux Editions du Cerf, explorera plus précisément le positionnement du sujet croyant affronté au "trauma" d'une culture commune remettant en cause les racines de sa foi. (shrink)

In exploring the nature of excess relative to a phenomenology of the limit, Testing the Limit claims that phenomenology itself is an exploration of excess. What does it mean that "the self" is "given"? Should we see it as originary; or rather, in what way is the self engendered from textual practices that transgress—or hover around and therefore within—the threshold of phenomenologial discourse? This is the first book to include Michel Henry in a triangulation with Derrida and Levinas and the (...) first to critique Levinas on the basis of his interpolation of philosophy and religion. Sebbah claims that the textual origins of phenomenology determine, in their temporal rhythms, the nature of the subjectivation on which they focus. He situates these considerations within the broader picture of the state of contemporary French phenomenology (chiefly the legacy of Merleau-Ponty), in order to show that these three thinkers share a certain "family resemblance," the identification of which reveals something about the traces of other phenomenological families. It is by testing the limit within the context of traditional phenomenological concerns about the appearance of subjectivity and ipseity that Derrida, Henry, and Levinas radically reconsider phenomenology and that French phenomenology assumes its present form. (shrink)

In his book Foucault and Religion, Jeremy Carrette presents a compelling argument against Foucault’s genealogical method (what he terms “relations of force”). In brief, Carrette holds that while Foucault’s genealogical method effectively unmasked the origins of “rationality” and “madness,” it was less successful when explaining the materialization of “the spiritual.” Foucault’s analysis of spiritual practices is at best functional and, according to Carrette, fails to explain the psychophysical state of subjects engaged in religious customs. In the following paper, I (...) argue that Carrette is correct; there are limitations to Foucault’s genealogical method, especially when explaining subjectivization processes, such as conversion experiences. However, I demonstrate that we can perform a successful genealogical investigation of the spiritual by adding an additional lens of analysis to “the relations of power” and “the relations of meaning” Foucault employs. I call this lens “the relations of affect.” I use this tool to explain Augustine’s transformative process, as observed in the saint’s Confessions. (shrink)

How relevant is Foucault's social thought to the world we inhabit today? This collection comprises several essays considering the contemporary relevance of the work of Michel Foucault. While Foucault is best remembered for his historical inquiries into the origins of disciplinary society in a period extending from the 16th to the 19th centuries, it seems that today, under the conditions of global modernity, the relevance of his ideas are called into question. With the increasing ubiquity of markets, the break up (...) of centralized states and the dissolution of national boundaries, together with new scientific and political discourses on biological life, the world of today seems far removed from the bounded, disciplinary societies Foucault described in his most famous books. Yet in recent years, it has become apparent that Foucault's thoughts on modern society have not been exhausted, and, indeed, that much remains to be explored. Within this volume, novel interpretations and thematic developments of key Foucauldian concepts are presented in the works of 24 authors. Prominent among them are new forms of neoliberal economic conduct framed by distinct governmentalities; new critical concepts of biological life reflected in Foucault's analysis of biopower, and new theoretical treatments of the effects of subjectivation. Moreover, included among these theoretical departures are empirical studies of contemporary formations of religion and spiritual practice, consumerism, race and racism, the discourse of genetics and the life sciences, surveillance and incarceration, and new social movements. Drawn from a conference held at the University of Massachusetts, Boston bearing the same title, A Foucault for the 21st Century: Governnentality, Biopolitics and Discipline in the New Millennium both expands our understanding of Foucault's central theoretical legacy, and applies his ideas to a range of contemporary empirical phenomena. (shrink)

To the question of the methodology of the study of modern nationalisms Anderson’s radical change in the perspective of the studies of nations allow to consider them beyond traditional subjectivation and objectification as imagined communities, standing on the same level as the worldviews of world religions. The article is devoted to clarifying the conditions of such comparison of nations and religions. Anderson himself explained this correlation with the concepts like “cultural artefacts” and “wide cultural systems”. These concepts, however, are (...) not very clear and are not provided with an appropriate methodology. The article argues that the juxtaposition of religious and national communities is methodologically grounded through the application of the phenomenological concept of symbolic universes to them. The latter are understood as the comprehensive horizons of meanings that legitimize local lifeworlds. The crite- rion for defining of the symbolic universe is the presence of legitimation of death as the man’s most marginalized experience. The application of the concept of symbolic universes to contem- porary communities reveals the ultimate forms of collective identity, the competition between which defines the outlines of actual world politics. (shrink)

In exploring the nature of excess relative to a phenomenology of the limit, _Testing the Limit _ claims that phenomenology itself is an exploration of excess. What does it mean that "the self" is "given"? Should we see it as originary; or rather, in what way is the self engendered from textual practices that transgress—or hover around and therefore within—the threshold of phenomenologial discourse? This is the first book to include Michel Henry in a triangulation with Derrida and Levinas and (...) the first to critique Levinas on the basis of his interpolation of philosophy and religion. Sebbah claims that the textual origins of phenomenology determine, in their temporal rhythms, the nature of the subjectivation on which they focus. He situates these considerations within the broader picture of the state of contemporary French phenomenology, in order to show that these three thinkers share a certain "family resemblance," the identification of which reveals something about the traces of other phenomenological families. It is by testing the limit within the context of traditional phenomenological concerns about the appearance of subjectivity and ipseity that Derrida, Henry, and Levinas radically reconsider phenomenology and that French phenomenology assumes its present form. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hegel and Herder on Art, History, and ReasonKristin GjesdalThe introduction of a historical perspective in aesthetics is usually traced back to Hegel's 1820 lectures on fine art. Given at the University of Berlin, these lectures were amongst Hegel's most successful and best attended.1 By then a recognized intellectual figure, Hegel sets out to salvage art from its subjectivization in Kantian and romantic aesthetics, but ends up declaring that art, (...) considered in its highest vocation, is a thing of the past. This judgment on art—that its greatness is a thing of the past—follows from Hegel's attempt to combine a notion of art's historicity with a conception of its absolute essence. Hegel, however, was not the first to think systematically about the historicity of art. For this aspect of art—and, indeed, of reason too—was explored philosophically a good sixty years before Hegel's Berlin lectures by a young and aspiring student of Kant's, namely Johann Gottfried Herder. In a series of essays and fragments, Herder develops an advanced and elaborate alternative to Hegel's conception, a fundamentally non-essentialist approach to art, history, and reason.Over the past twenty years or so, Hegel's attempt to combine an essentialist and an historicist approach to art has been revitalized, with increasing force and sophistication, by Arthur Danto.2 The attempts to rehabilitate Herder's aesthetics, however, have been few and far between.3 This is the aim of the present essay, which seeks to contrast the young Herder's non-essentialist understanding of the historicity of art with Hegel's essentialist views on the artwork's historicity, pleading for a rehabilitation of the former.4 I approach this task from three different directions. First, I offer a brief account of Herder's and Hegel's views on reason, history, and art. Second, I look closer at their conceptions of classical tragedy and sculpture, which, due to Winckelmann's studies, [End Page 17] were perceived at the time as the gateway to a historically sensitive conception of culture as such. Finally, I round off by looking at some of the hermeneutic implications of Herder's non-essentialist standpoint.IAccording to Hegel, a phenomenologically mature and accountable philosophy is distinguished by its readiness to reflect on its own, historical presuppositions. It must acknowledge the critical commitments of modern thinking, but also take into account how these commitments are the result of spirit's laborious journey through history. Only by combining the perspective of modernity with the resources of tradition may philosophy inhabit a place where systematicity and historicity concur. Reality may now be exhausted in the form of a speculative logic. This, according to Hegel, is the end of history, but as the end of history, it is also the dawn of a new era, that of free and self-determining spirit.Hegel's notion of the end of history testifies to a formidable optimism about the power of critical thought. In modernity, Hegel claims, art and religion no longer emerge as adequate media of self-reflection. It is philosophy that has taken on this task. Considered from the standpoint of modernity, religion and art are no longer appropriate forms of expression; now only the conceptual optics of philosophy adequately reflects our deepest truths and values.5Artistically speaking, this moment may well emerge as a loss. For even though Hegel never claims that art, as such, will no longer be produced,6 he reckons it will not be produced in the same spirit as before. No longer expressive of a shared, ethical and political commitment, art is not brought forth by necessity. Intellectually speaking, however, the end of art triggers a different response. Not only does the end of art represent another step towards the conceptual self-determination of spirit. It also follows that only when a phenomenon such as art has finally fulfilled its historical possibilities can it be brought to philosophical clarity about itself. Only after art can we know conceptually what art is. Aesthetics can only begin at the point when art, considered in its highest vocation, no longer holds a historical future.IIAs a young and... (shrink)

This paper confronts the medieval Church with Foucault´s conceptualization of Christendom in his writing on governmentality. In order to do so, this paper analyzes the formation of an ecclesiastical dual rule –jurisdiccional and pastoral– from the perspective of a genealogy of western political forms. For this purpose, a critical dialogue is stablished with Foucault’s analytics of pastoral power and of the subjectivation technologies involved in it. While the transformations supported by the pontifical power gave rise to the first western (...) juridical system, the ecclesiastical institution implemented services of c ura animarum throughout Christianity. Further, this salvation economy leaned on an unprecedented legal rule that turned pastoral power into a twofold rule, both sovereign and governmental. This paper argues that such an interpretation expounds the problems of the dichotomy government/sovereignity, on which Foucault founds his analytics of pastoral power and his genealogy of governmentality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:702 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER t99 5 appears more as an anomalous figure in the spirit of Kierkegaard than a thinker of the mainstream. For Jaspers, philosophy is a vehicle to provoke a spiritual sense of the wonder of existence rather than an autonomous vocation which strives to recast its questions in increasingly radical ways. Most typically, Jaspers's emphasis on darker aspects of the human (...) predicament--guilt, anxiety, and death as the seminal existential motifs--does not exclude a more positive vision of Existenz as revealed through transcendence. The limits do not provoke a discourse of radical finitude which skirts the edges of presence, but instead indirectly point toward a transcendent mystery, or the "encompassing" (19-2o). If there is an aspect of Jaspers's philosophy that remains inadequately addressed in either volume, it is his preoccupation with the role of tragedy in the post-war era? In light of the premier importance that Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger all grant to tragedy, Jaspers's passionate treatment of this topic in the context of the catastrophe of Western Europe merits far closer attention. Does not the issue of tragedy provide indispensable dues to chart the landscape of twentieth-century thought, and to amplify the differences which prevail in the portrait of politics as displayed by such diverse philosophers as Jaspers and Heidegger, Derrida and Levinas? FRANK SCHALOW DiUard University Norman Malcolm. Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View? Edited with a response by Peter Winch. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, a994. Pp. xi + 14o. Norman Malcolm at the outset of this, his posthumously published last book, focuses on the question: What did Wittgenstein mean when he said to his friend M. O'C. Drury, "I am not a religious man, but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view"? It was the right question. But Malcolm then--again on the first page of his book-proceeded to place restrictions on it, which were quite foreign to the spirit of Wittgenstein 's remark and which virtually crippled it. (1) He took Wittgenstein to be speaking of not social, psychological, or presumably even personal problems, but only of philosophical ones. (2) He chose to say that in Wittgenstein's later philosophy "there is not strictly a religious point of view, but something analogous to a religious point of view" (1, Malcolm's emphases). There is no reason to think that Wittgenstein would have accepted either of these restrictions on his remark. Nor does Peter Winch accept them in his forty-page discussion, which follows Malcolm's text in this book. In the upshot Malcolm finds "four analogies between Wittgenstein's conception of the grammar of language and his view of what is paramount in a religious life" (92). In both, he says, Wittgenstein emphasizes "an end to explanation," a sense of an "illness" pervading the human situation, "an inclination to be amazed at the existence of some ' Karl Jaspers, TragedyIs Not Enough, trans. Harald A. T. Reiche, Harry T. Moore, and Karl W. Deutsch (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952), 31-4O,93- io5_ BOOK REVIEWS 703 thing," and "doing, acting [having.] priority over intellectual understanding and reasoning " (92). But are such "analogies" really the crux of the "religious point of view" in terms of which Wittgenstein said that he could "not help seeing every problem"? When we recall that Wittgenstein's later philosophy was a proibund attack upon what he regarded as the idolatry of science, logic, and mathematics (an idolatry of which he himself, in the Tractatt~,, was partly guilty), and that he was also bent on undermining the accompanying subjectivized and privatized view of the human mind, as well as the scientistic reading of religious beliefs and primitive religions, we may be inclined to see his philosophy as clearing the way for the simple noninstitutionalized Tolstoian faith which he himself accepted. Philosophy and religion were on the same track in his mind (and not merely related by "analogies") when he wrote: "All that philosophy can do is to destroy idols. And that means not creating a new one--for instance, as in the 'absence of an idol' " (MS 213, 89). Peter Winch... (shrink)

Faire fonctionner le thème des contre-conduites repéré par Michel Foucault dans la pratique pastorale de l'Église comme un paradigme de résistance contemporain suppose plusieurs opérations. D'une part, prendre la mesure de l'écart entre les temporalités historiques mobilisées, mais aussi celui des espaces culturels : celui du pastorat chrétien et celui du « Califat après la mort du prophète ». En explorant cet épisode de la chrétienté, il nous est apparu possible de récupérer ces outils rendus disponibles par Foucault pour explorer (...) un champ jusque-là, sinon « vierge », du moins « fermé » et difficilement « accessible » en termes de pratiques politiques, celui de la religion musulmane. Comment peut-on réutiliser cette stratégie pour aborder le statut du sujet dans l'islam? Quel type de processus structure et forme le sujet au sein de l'islam? Comment nous servir de ces concepts foucaldiens de la gouvernementalité, de la subjectivation et de contre-conduite, pour faire ressortir une capacité politique des sujets? Quelle approche peut nous permettre de visionner et de questionner le sujet dans la logique d'une communauté, d'un « nous » collectif dans lequel s'enfouit le sujet en tant que tel? (shrink)

El propósito de este texto es sugerir algunas ideas sobre el tiempo y la impronta. Comenzando con una breve consideración de la expresión francesa maintenant, el texto pasa a examinar la diferencia, propuesta por G. Dumezil, entre impronta y fósil. En un primer momento, la inspiración viene de algunos aspectos de la religión; luego, de las dos dimensiones del tiempo de la historia que propone Peguy: una que solo considera la pura secuencia de los acontecimientos y la otra que retiene (...) lo posible, la impronta del pasado; finalmente, del poema de Baudelaire "Le Cygne", en el cual es posible distinguir una historia que lo arrasa todo y una conservación del pasado como forma de resistencia o protesta del individuo. A partir de aquí el texto presenta la impronta como la dimensión del tiempo en la que la subjetivación le añade profundidad, permanencia de lo que ya pasó, al tiempo de la historia. En un segundo momento, inspirado en la unidimensionalidad de Marcuse y en la sociedad de consumo de Pasolini, el texto trata las ideas de realidad y de progreso para sugerir que la realidad no es solo la actualidad y el progreso no es la moda: la impronta añade conservación. Para el tercer momento, la inspiración viene de Andy Warhol. Ahora la idea es presentar la impronta en su función de puente, de vínculo entre el arte contemporáneo y el antiguo. Finalmente, el texto alude a la noción de difracción, tomada de Fourier, para subrayar la idea de que la impronta implica contestación del puro presente, resistencia, liberación. The purpose of this text is to suggest some ideas about the issue of time and trace. Beginning with a short consideration about the French expression "maintenant", the text goes on examining the difference, pointed out by G. Dumézil, between trace and fossil. In a first moment, the inspiration comes from some aspects of religion. Then, from Peguy's two dimensions of the time of history: one concerned with the pure sequence of events and the other retaining the possible, the trace of the past. Finally from Baudelaire's poem "Le Cygne", where it is possible to distinguish between a history that sweeps everything and a conservation of the past as some sort of resistance or protest of the individual. With this in mind, the text presents trace as this dimension of time where subjectivation adds depth, permanence of what is already gone, to the time of history. In a second moment, inspired by Marcuse's unidimensionality and Pasolini's consumer society, the text examines de idea of reality and progress to say that reality is not just current events and progress is not fashion: trace adds conservation. For the third moment, the inspiration comes from Andy Warhol. Now the idea is to present the trace in its function ofbridge or link between the contemporary and the ancient art. Finally, the text considers the notion of diffraction, taken from Fourier, which helps to underline the idea that trace means challenge to the pure present, resistance, liberation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 703 thing," and "doing, acting [having.] priority over intellectual understanding and reasoning " (92). But are such "analogies" really the crux of the "religious point of view" in terms of which Wittgenstein said that he could "not help seeing every problem"? When we recall that Wittgenstein's later philosophy was a proibund attack upon what he regarded as the idolatry of science, logic, and mathematics (an idolatry of (...) which he himself, in the Tractatt~,, was partly guilty), and that he was also bent on undermining the accompanying subjectivized and privatized view of the human mind, as well as the scientistic reading of religious beliefs and primitive religions, we may be inclined to see his philosophy as clearing the way for the simple noninstitutionalized Tolstoian faith which he himself accepted. Philosophy and religion were on the same track in his mind (and not merely related by "analogies") when he wrote: "All that philosophy can do is to destroy idols. And that means not creating a new one--for instance, as in the 'absence of an idol' " (MS 213, 89). Peter Winch's Responseor Discussion(both words are used as titles) suggests that the pervasiveness of Wittgenstein's "religious point of view" can be seen in his question to Russell: "How can I be a logician before I am a human being?" (which certainly also extends to "How can I be a philosopher before I am a human being?"). With this goes the realization, expressed in the Preface to the PhilosophicalRemarks, that he will not be able to make his book more free of the "impurities" of vanity than he himself is free of them. We sense the religious point of view of Wittgenstein in his utter seriousness (so often compared to Augustine, Pascal, and Kierkegaard) as well as in his conviction that there is a good lying beyond the world which puts every human being, and above all himself, under an obligation to place it ahead of self. When he said that he could not help seeing every problem this way, he meant that he could not help seeing it as having an importance that went beyond facts and theories and circumstances and even beyond the world itself. And the demonstration that this was indeed his point of view he knew would inevitably be, as indeed it was, in every line he wrote. H. L. FINCH Hunter College,CUNY Johnny Washington. A Journey into the Philosophyof Alain Locke. Contributions in AfroAmerican and African Studies. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994. Pp. viii + ~2o. Cloth, $59.95. Alain Locke (1886-1954), a secondary figure in American pragmatism, wrote on problems of value in cultural analysis; he is noted for his vigorous relativism. As this century's most distinguished African American philosopher--a Rhodes Scholar educated at Harvard and Oxford--Locke played twin roles, mentoring artists of the Harlem Renaissance and chairing the philosophy department at Howard University. Josiah Royce's influence on his thought is evident, as is that of social scientists W. E. B. Du Bois and Franz Boas. In Locke's most recognized works, such as "Values 704 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER 1995 and Imperatives" (1935) and "The New Negro" (19~5), as well as his lesser-read "Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy" (1942), he warrants note for two key contributors to the history of ideas. First, he analyzes "race" and "culture" relativistically, showing how nineteenth-century discussions (say, on "racial uplift") may continue without problematic ontological baggage. Second, by appealing to functionalism, he defends the relative equivalence of elements which characterize cultures. He thus undergirds arguments in social philosophy about the sufficiency of values and norms in social practices. Four decades after his death there exist only two book-length studies of Locke's philosophy, both authored byJohnny Washington. Washington deserves a great deal of credit for his part in initiating a fast-growing critical--and distinctively philosophical-literature on Locke. Indeed, no serious student of Locke's philosophy can proceed without contending with Washington's work. While this study merits praise for its thoroughness and care in treating unpublished essays by Locke, it suffers somewhat from its style of exposition. Washington's "narrate-and... (shrink)

This article engages with Michel Foucault’s idea of confession as the central Christian strategy of subjection or subjectivation and the link he proposes between confession and obedience. The article also wishes to show how confession can become counter-conduct. I apply Foucault’s conceptions to early modern Lutheran confessionalism, elucidating how the confessional apparatus of the orthodox Lutheranism of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Sweden strived to mold obedient subjects who are able to conduct themselves. I also examine the transformation and overthrow of (...) these subjectivation techniques in Radical Pietism, analyzing a dissident confession of faith by the Radical Pietist Peter Schaefer, who exemplifies perfect subjection, constituting himself as a perfectly obedient subject, and yet a failure of subjectivation in the sense of submission, insofar as for him, obedience becomes a strategy of empowerment. (shrink)

The recently rising field of Critical Data Studies is still facing fundamental questions. Among these is the enigma of digital subjectivation. Who are the subjects of Big Data? A field where this question is particularly pressing is finance. Since the 1990s traders have been steadily integrated into computerized data assemblages, which calls for an ontology that eliminates the distinction between human sovereign subjects and non-human instrumental objects. The latter subjectivize traders in pre-conscious ways, because human consciousness runs too slow (...) to follow the volatility of the market. In response to this conundrum Social Studies of Finance has drawn on Actor-Network Theory to interpret financial markets as technically constructed networks of human and non-human actors. I argue that in order to develop an explicitly critical data study it might be advantageous to refer to Maurizio Lazzarato’s theory of machinic subjugation instead. Although both accounts describe financial digital subjectivation similarly, Lazzarato has the advantage of coupling his description to a clear critique of and resistance to finance. (shrink)

La clinique des femmes en situation précaire nous confronte aux effets abrupts de la forclusion de l’être sexué femme et à ses conséquences, les difficultés de subjectivation. Cette forclusion repose sur l’impensé d’une réalité : il y a deux sexes. Cela se traduit depuis des lustres par un contrôle de la potentialité créatrice qu’est la maternité au sein du matrimonial, qui mène les femmes vers des impasses quant à leur autonomie psychique en tant que sujets femmes. S’affranchir de cette (...) condition consiste à reconnaître cette part de leur être non symbolisé que représente le matriciel. (shrink)

This article defends the theoretical centrality of Michel Foucault’s account of subjectivation for critical responses to neoliberalism against those Marxist critics who claim that his focus on the subject pushed the Left into the fraught terrain of identity politics. A key contention is that a theoretically sophisticated account of subjectivation is a requisite for any philosophically coherent and politically effective theorization of resistance against neoliberalism. Critical accounts of neoliberal subjectivation must be recognized as indispensable for understanding the (...) conditions of possibility for class struggle and not as an alternative theoretical frame to it. The article also relates Foucault’s and Karl Marx’s thought on the question of power and its relationship to the subject. It presents a reading of Foucault as a post-Marxist who modified, rejuvenated, and extended Marx’s views on power and subjectivation. While Foucault developed his understanding of subjectivation as a critical response to the problems he identified in the French Marxist accounts of his time—particularly in the work of Louis Althusser—his appropriation of Marx should be recognized as decisive for the development of his account of productive power and the concomitant understanding of the subject. (shrink)

Dans cet article l’auteur a souhaité étudier le travail de subjectivation des liens familiaux chez un auteur de violence sexuelle dans le cadre du dispositif pénal qu’est l’injonction de soins. À partir d’une recherche clinique menée sur un mode longitudinal, il propose de montrer comment le génogramme (en test, re-test) peut être un révélateur de la mise en œuvre du processus de subjectivation. Ce procédé permet de relever deux différences notables entre les deux génogrammes : dans le passage (...) d’une place fantasmatique dans les liens (celle d’un « enfant ») à celle d’une position instituée concomitante avec une affiliation intersubjective ; la présence ou l’absence de nom sur les icônes parentales. Des différences favorisées, selon nous, par le dispositif d’injonction de soins. (shrink)

RESUMEN A pesar de la declaración de la muerte del Sujeto en la segunda mitad del siglo XX, tanto Marion como Badiou mantienen esta categoría en el centro de sus filosofías. Sin embargo, para poder hacerlo abandonan sus determinaciones metafísicas de principio y fundamento con el fin de desplazarlo dentro de una posición secundaria de Sujeto de un acontecimiento. Así, el Sujeto, en tanto que substancia, da lugar a un proceso de subjetivación que responde a un acontecimiento que, desde siempre, (...) lo llama. En este texto se muestra que esta estructura apostólica del Sujeto contemporáneo también tiene sus raíces en cierta lectura disidente de Descartes, con la condición de que aceptemos, en una lógica derridiana, escuchar la polifonía de sus textos filosóficos. ABSTRACT Despite the death of the Subject during the second half of the 20th century, both Marion and Badiou maintain this category at the centre of their philosophies. However, in order to do so, they abandon its metaphysical determinations of principle and foundation to displace it within a secondary position of Subject of an event. Thus, the Subject as a substance is replaced by a process of subjectivation that responds to an event that since ever calls it. We show in this text that this apostolic structure of the contemporary Subject has its deep roots in a dissenting reading of Descartes, if we accept to listen, with Derrida, all the polyphonic richness of philosophical texts. (shrink)

La pleine reconnaissance de l’existence du problème de la subjectivation sexuée ou colonisée conduit nécessairement à rendre relatif celui de la subjectivation dite « neutre ». Pourtant, le propre de la conscience dominante est de masquer son propre caractère de domination. Comment forcer la subjectivité dominante à se dévoiler? Nous proposons d’associer la description phénoménologique à une méthode de traduction depuis les expériences des dominé-e-s vers la reconstruction des expériences des dominant-e-s en tant que tel-les. Pour cela, nous (...) partirons, dans une perspective intersectionnelle, des travaux phénoménologiques de Simone de Beauvoir et de Frantz Fanon.The full recognition of the problem of sexual or colonized subjectivation necessarily leads to question the neutrality of “normal subjectivity.” Yet the dominant consciousness tends to mask its own character of domination. How to force dominant subjectivity to reveal itself? We propose to associate the phenomenological description with a method of translation from the experiences of the dominated-ones to the reconstruction of the experiences of the dominants as such. For that, we will rely, in an intersectional perspective, on the phenomenological work of Simone de Beauvoir and Frantz Fanon. (shrink)

Starting from a Foucaultian perspective, the article draws attention to current developments that neutralise democracy through the 'governmentalisation of democracy' and processes of 'governmental subjectivation'. Here, ideas of Rancière are introduced in order to clarify how democracy takes place through the paradoxical process of 'political subjectivation', that is, a disengagement with governmental subjectivation through the verification of one's equality in demonstrating a wrong. We will argue that democracy takes place through the paradoxical process of political subjectivation, (...) and that today's consensus society tends to depoliticize all processes of subjectivation. A final step in the argumentation is to introduce the concept of 'pedagogic subjectivation'—to be understood as the experience of potentiality—that is to be distinguished from governmental subjectivation and also from political subjectivation. The concept 'pedagogic subjectivation' is proposed as a way of thinking of the school as a public place. (shrink)

In this article, I take up one strand – arguably the central one – of the Foucault/Habermas debate: their respective accounts of subjectivation. Against those who hold that Foucault and Habermas occupy such drastically different theoretical perspectives as to preclude the integration of their views into a common framework, I begin to lay the groundwork for an account of subjectivation that draws on the conceptual insights to be found on each side of the debate. While both Foucault and (...) Habermas offer a one-sided analysis of subjectivation – Foucault emphasizes its power-ladenness, and Habermas its communicative, rational, intersubjective aspects – I argue that subjectivation necessarily entails both communicative rationality and power relationships. I then consider the implications of my comparative argument for both Foucault and Habermas’s broader philosophical projects. (shrink)

Une critique de la métaphysique du sujet, prise entre une théorisation substantialiste de l'individu ou au contraire une approche dynamique de la subjectivité. ©Electre 2017.

On the basis of a reconstruction of legal theory in the tradition of Marx - a current that has been more or less silenced since the end of the 1970s - Subjectivation and Cohesion develops a critical counter-pole to the theories of law that predominate in social theory today. To this end, the works of Franz Neumann, Otto Kirchheimer, Evgeny Pashukanis, Oskar Negt, Isaac D. Balbus, the so-called 'State-derivation School', Antonio Gramsci, Nicos Poulantzas and Michel Foucault are first analysed (...) for their strengths and weaknesses, and then combined to form a new construction: a materialist legal theory that is up to date and can avoid the shortcomings of existing theories - above all their disregard for gender relations and the reductive consequences of functionalist, economic or politicist approaches to law. (shrink)

Engaging with the account of pathic subjectivation developed by Félix Guattari, this article explores the ways in which his thinking about the production of subjectivity takes up and transforms the concept of the pathic dimension of experience that emerges from the rich tradition of existential-phenomenological psychiatry and the thematisation of contact it entails. Explicitly foregrounding the link made within that tradition between aesthetics and existence, this article considers the origins of Guattari’s conception of pathic subjectivation in his work (...) on Proust, the experimental understanding of the semiotic transformations of sensory experience it entails and the practical role it plays in catalysing the creative emergence of new modes of existence. (shrink)

This book explores, discusses, and assesses the actual and potential sense of subjectivation in a variety of contexts. In particular, it reflects the genealogies, connections, variations, and practical implications of various theories of subjectivity and subjection while providing an up-to-date and authoritative account of how to engage with the 'subject'. Rather than addressing the 'subject' merely in theoretical terms, this book explores subjectivation as a seminal expression of subjective practices in the plural. To the extent that subjectivity and (...) subjection are key terms in a plurality of discourses and for a number of disciplines, Subjectivation in Political Theory and Contemporary Practices advances a trans-disciplinary reading by taking into account relevant debates that stretch from poststructuralism via postfordism to postdemocracy. In this sense, the book introduces readers to current approaches to subjectivation by displacing conventional understandings and suggesting unexpected reformulations. (shrink)

When posing the political as first, we imply an order. Such civilisational choice distinguishes the political and installs the subject within a sovereignist hierarchy. It forbids the political to those who are constructed as "others" in time, in space or in culture etc. The production of knowledges and (cognitive) inequality are constructed together. Translation is a politics and a technique of resolving that inequality (though it can produce some too). We attribute "ourselves" the political and concede the "pre-political" or the (...) "non-political" to others. Translation, together with some other instruments should allow to target cognitive justice necessary to a future epistemological revolution. It has its politics. The author's idea is, then, to start from intersecting etymologies as well as from the "untranslatables" which, thanks to the context, never make the whole "un-expressible". She gives some examples from "Asian" and "European" philosophies. The difference between the latter is striking when it comes to the fact that "European" philosophies value the subject/agency, while the "Asian" ones do not value it and do not even construct it. (shrink)

Nietzsche est souvent perçu comme un philosophe de la critique du " moi ", qui entreprend d'évacuer le sujet souverain pour en faire un simple effet des rapports entre les volontés de puissance. L'ambition de ce livre est de montrer qu'une telle vision est incomplète. Il y a dans l'œuvre de Nietzsche, et particulièrement dans son dernier livre, Ecce Homo, une forte pensée de l'individu et du rapport à soi qui, loin d'éliminer le problème de la subjectivité, le pose à (...) nouveaux frais. Ce livre procède en deux temps. Tout d'abord, il revient sur l'ensemble du corpus nietzschéen afin de distinguer les différentes critiques que Nietzsche adresse aux notions de " moi ", d'individu, de sujet, et fait apparaître les perspectives ainsi ouvertes. Il s'intéresse ensuite plus particulièrement à Ecce Homo. En convoquant les pensées d'auteurs comme Foucault, Deleuze ou Simondon, il interprète ce dernier ouvrage comme l'effectuation d'un mode de subjectivation inédit : une nouvelle manière de se rapporter à soi et d'en faire le récit. Il tente alors d'analyser ce " moi " spécifiquement nietzschéen, et d'en repérer tant le mode d'apparition que le régime d'action et d'existence. (shrink)

Twentieth century philosophers such as Simondon and Heidegger propose theories of subjectivation that inform our thinking about the definition of personhood and how it arises; including in the potentially wide-ranging context of personhood beyond the human. Simondon’s theory of transindividuation unfolds as a series of decenterings that provides a context for future persons that is a dynamic world of processes without fixity or attachment to any one kind of subject. Subjects participate in but do not cause individuation; and they (...) exist on a spectrum of capacity for action with other living beings including animals; human persons; and possibly a variety of future persons. The role of collectivity in the form of the other has been an important aspect of individuation; however I claim that the function of alterity need not be provided exclusively by a self-similar subject. Philosophical individuation theories serve as a foundation for an approach that opens up greater possibility for individuation in the context of future persons by identifying and alternatively fulfilling the underlying functionality required by individuation. (shrink)

Neither Habermas nor his communitarian and poststructuralist critics sufficiently explore the non-linguistic, playful, and performative dimensions of contemporary public spheres. I argue that the approaches of Castoriadis and Touraine can inform a theoretical understanding of the history and current resonance of this public sphere of performance. Their concepts of the social imaginary, the autonomous society, and subjectivation highlight the role of fantasy, images, individualism, and other non-rational factors in late modern public life.

The work of the Latvian phenomenologist Theodor Celms provides an interesting attempt to reinterpret Husserl’s phenomenological reduction in terms of Natorp’s subjectivation. This paper summarizes in broad outline some salient features of Celms’ theory of subjectivation and discusses some of its similarities and differences with Husserl’s and Natorp’s views. I focus on two more central points. First, Celms proposes to interpret Husserlian reduction as radicalizing or generalizing an operation of thought that is pervasive throughout all forms of cognition. (...) Secondly, he makes a distinction between epistemological and ontological subjectivation that leads him to adopt a critical stance toward both Husserl’s transcendental idealism and Natorp’s general psychology. (shrink)

This article focuses on tracing and extending Michel Foucault’s contributions to the philosophy of technology. At first sight his work on power seems the most relevant. In his later work on subjectivation and ethics technology is absent. However, notably by recombining Foucault’s work on power with his work on subjectivation, does his work contribute to solving pertinent problems in current approaches to the ethics of technology. First, Foucault’s position is compared to critical theory and Heidegger, and associated with (...) the approach of “technical mediation” (Latour, Ihde, Verbeek). Next, a detailed study of Discipline and Punish , results in the identification of two distinct “figures of technical mediation”. Finally, Foucault’s later work on ethics and subjectivation is employed to elaborate an ethics of technology that focuses on care for the quality of the interactions and fusions with technology. Hybridization is central in the approach: it is not to be rejected, neither is it the greatest danger, but it does deserve the greatest care. (shrink)

Starting from a Foucaultian perspective, the article draws attention to current developments that neutralise democracy through the ‘governmentalisation of democracy’ and processes of ‘governmental subjectivation’. Here, ideas of Rancière are introduced in order to clarify how democracy takes place through the paradoxical process of ‘political subjectivation’, that is, a disengagement with governmental subjectivation through the verification of one's equality in demonstrating a wrong. We will argue that democracy takes place through the paradoxical process of political subjectivation, (...) and that today's consensus society tends to depoliticize all processes of subjectivation. A final step in the argumentation is to introduce the concept of ‘pedagogic subjectivation’—to be understood as the experience of potentiality—that is to be distinguished from governmental subjectivation and also from political subjectivation. The concept ‘pedagogic subjectivation’ is proposed as a way of thinking of the school as a public place. (shrink)

With Foucault on subjectivation, seduction, and technology What does Confessions of the Flesh add to Foucault’s approach of subjectivation and its application for the ethics of technology? In his late work Foucault focusses on subjectivation following a fourfold framework, without explaining its development. There are good reasons to believe it relates to Aristotle’s four causes and also refers to Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. Foucault’s analysis of early Christian practices of the conduct of souls and of controlling evil (...) seductions is surprisingly relevant with regard to how today’s digital technologies infringe on thinking and willing. Employing the fourfold scheme to apply insights from Confessions of the Flesh to ethics and technology leads to an approach of ethical subjectivation and technology in which: [1] problematization of seduction and technology [2] prompts good use of technology [3] by technologies of the self [4] realizing a practice of freedom. (shrink)

This article highlights the impasses of anti-racist struggles that understand racism as an opinion or a prejudice and use education as their only means for addressing it. Racism should rather be understood as a socio-historical subjective structure rooted in the process of constitution of the division of labour on a global scale through colonialism, a process that was crucial to the institution of capitalism. This is why we will put forth the importance of rejecting the narrations that camouflage colonization with (...) the idea of civilization, and the necessity to produce decolonial counter-histories. We will thus claim that such an endeavor should start from the struggles of racialized peoples against the different forms of coloniality—that is, from the refusal by racialized peoples of the representations that are imposed on them, and from their repositioning on the basis of their alterity. Only the position of a powerful alterity can in fact make possible a real equality.Cet article met en évidence les impasses des luttes antiracistes qui conçoivent le racisme comme une opinion ou un préjugé et utilisent l’éducation comme le seul moyen d’y remédier. Le racisme devrait plutôt être compris comme une structure socio-historique subjective qui s’enracine dans le procès de constitution de la division mondiale du travail par le colonialisme, un procès qui a été décisif pour l’institution du capitalisme. C’est pourquoi nous mettrons en avant le caractère problématique des récits qui recouvrent la colonisation de l’idée de civilisation et la nécessité de produire des contre-histoires décoloniales. Il s’agira alors de montrer que, pour ce faire, il faut partir des luttes des racisés contre les différentes formes de colonialité—c’est-à-dire du refus par les racisés des représentations qui leur sont adressées et de leur repositionnement à partir de leur altérité. Seule la position d’une altérité puissante peut, en effet, rendre possible une égalité réelle. (shrink)

Critique and subjectivation. Foucault and Butler on the subject In her paper “What is Critique ? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue”, Judith Butler reads Foucault’s “What is Critique ?” According to Foucault, critique is a practice of desubjugation of the subject, which would provide for it a certain form of autonomy. But what kind of autonomy is really possible for the subject, when Foucault rejects the notion of the sovereign subject ? Butler’s reading wants to solve that difficulty in (...) Foucault’s position with the notions of virtue and of speech acts. But Foucault tends more to consider the courage of the truth as a critical mode of philosophical intervention in politics, and he thinks of it as a virtue or as an êthos. Butler’s conception of the subject refuses the whole notion of an originary freedom and she prefers to think an agency which would take place in the context of the subjectivation itself, where being produced as a subject is originally being subjected to different modes of interpellation by the norms. In reading Althusser’s conception of ideology with Foucault’s desubjugation, she considers the critique as the critique of norms of recognition and the subject as vulnerable. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall make the following propositions: in order to conceptually capture and represent the acts of political protest in a state of exception, we will need to reorient and supplement our representational apparatuses and also our theoretical frameworks for thinking about the gendered modes of protest under emergency laws and political abandonment. Through an analysis of the ‘naked protest’ of the Meira Peibis in Manipur, a ‘state of exception’ in democratic India, I shall argue that a series (...) of supplementations to our current thinking on intersectionality, bare life and political subjectivation are required if we are to make sense of political acts of resistance, refusal and disavowal of the law of exception. (shrink)