Le constat est maintenant partout: la puissance du fondamentalisme religieux, la montee des populismes de droite comme de gauche, le discredit de la classe politique, le rejet de la construction europeenne, rendent caducs les schemas anciens. En particulier l'idee que la democratie, a force de bienveillance, peut tolerer toutes les differences, toutes les croyances. Oui! Il y a des croyances insupportables et intolerables. Non! Le populisme n'est pas une illusion qui se dissipera d'elle-meme avec un peu de pedagogie et de (...) bonne volonte. Non! La politique internationale n'obeit pas aux chartes du droit international. Il faut denoncer la tyrannie des bons sentiments, la politique de l'emotion et de la compassion. Non que la bienveillance soit un sentiment indigne, mais nous devons cesser de croire qu'on peut batir sur elle une communaute politique. (shrink)

Les hommes ont toujours agi sur eux-mêmes, et pris en charge leur propre évolution. Avec aujourd'hui deux traits absolument nouveaux. D'une part, les capacités d'action de l'espèce humaine sur elle-même sont incomparablement plus puissantes que par le passé, notamment dans le domaine des technologies de la vie. D'autre part, nous contrôlons si bien notre milieu et l'avons si parfaitement aménagé pour notre survie que nous avons mis en danger notre environnement. Le philosophe Peter Sloterdijk conduit une réflexion peu conventionnelle sur (...) ce double déséquilibre, déséquilibre de la domestication de l'homme par lui-même, déséquilibre de l'environnement par la mobilisation infinie des ressources. En prolongeant ses réflexions, il s'agit ici de réfléchir à cette situation. Faut-il poursuivre et même accélérer sur la voie de la mutation, en inventant le nouvel homme, c'est-à-dire le surhomme? Ou faut-il à nouveau penser la nature humaine dans sa finitude et, contre la mobilisation infinie, en appeler à la dé-mobilisation et à la voie du Tao, mais au risque de l'étouffement dans la mesure, la sagesse et l'ennui? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:360 HUME'S NATURALI Z EP PHILOSOPHY In "Epistemology Naturalized," Quine claimed that the failure of reductive-foundationalist attempts in epistemology, after the model of Carnap' s Aufbau, must lead to a redefinition of epistemology's task. Instead of setting out to reconstruct the whole fabric of our knowledge from absolute data through deductive operations, we should investigate how human subjects derive their knowledge of nature from sensory inputs. Thus epistemology is (...) to be conceived as a branch of natural science, cognate with psychology, not as the study of the foundations of science any more. In the present paper, I will first outline Quine's position and his related interpretation of Hume's philosophical enterprise. Then, I will try to assess the relevance and fairness of Quine's account and consider in what measure it allows us to understand the novelty of Hume's conception of philosophy, since Hume also advocated a nonfoundationalist conception of philosophy which bears some striking analogy to naturalized epistemology. Finally, I will suggest which consequences are to be drawn from this unusual view of Hume, especially as regards the self-reference of philosophy. Quine's position in the matter of epistemology is well known. For him, under its traditional form and program, epistemology used to deal with the foundations of science, be it mathematics or the science of nature. This foundationalist approach had two connected aspects, one which Quine calls conceptual; the other he calls doctrinal. As Quine 361 puts it "the conceptual studies are concerned with clarifying concepts by defining them, some in terms of others" (Quine, p. 69). In the same manner, the doctrinal studies attempt to establish laws "by proving them, some on the basis of others" (Quine, p. 69). Derivative concepts will be defined in terms of the clearer ones and complex laws will be proved from primitive and obvious ones. Thus the traditional or classical conception of epistemology involves simultaneously a theory of concepts or meanings and a theory of truth. These two branches (Quine speaks of a duality of structure or bifurcation) converge so as to provide an analysis of the way our knowledge of nature -- and our knowledge in general — stems from and is built upon our sensory experience which validates it. In so characterizing epistemology, Quine simply restates in his own terms the f oundationalist and reductivist program of positivist epistemology, which itself tied in with the logicist program in mathematics. Then Quine suggests that Hume dealt with both sides of this program, the conceptual and the doctrinal. To begin with, Hume developed what might be called a theory of concepts or meanings in terms of our sensory data. Such is the point of his theory of ideas which consists in tracing them back to the original impressions they are derived from. In spite of its limitations, which hinge on the lack of an approach in terms of statements, Hume's phenomenalism does the job of a theory of meaning and concepts. Hume also attempted to give an answer to the question of the truth of our knowledge. In this case again, his phenomenalist stand allows him to account for the truth of our singular statements concerning our perceptions, even though this result is achieved at the cost of identifying objects and sensory data. 362 However, when Hume comes to general statements and singular statements concerning future events, his attempt fails. This is not surprising. According to Quine, if it were possible to improve on Hume's theory of meaning and concepts, especially through the use of contextual definition techniques, by contrast, all the attempts to logically derive the truth of our knowledge from true premises have failed. In matter of induction, we are not one step further than Hume was. "The most modest of generalizations about observable traits will cover more cases than its utterer can have had occasions actually to observe. The hopelessness of grounding natural science upon immediate experience in a firmly logical way was acknowledged" (Quine, p. 74). Or "the Humean predicament is the human predicament." For Quine, foundationalist attempts of the sort Hume engaged in involve two cardinal principles of empiricism which remain unchallenged. One of these principles is to the effect... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:33 HOW TO BECOME A MODERATE SKEPTIC: HUME'S WAY OUT OF PYRRHONISM The nature and extent of Hume's skepticism have been assessed in various ways. He was viewed as a radical skeptic until the end of the XIXth century. Many contemporary interpretations, which can be traced back to Kemp Smith's book, have claimed since that a reassessment was indispensable if we are to take seriously either the very project (...) of a science of human nature or Hume's naturalist conception of belief. The idea of a science of human nature presupposes that at least some sort of positive knowledge is possible. The naturalist conception of belief claims that some of our beliefs, though lacking rational justification, are nevertheless unavoidable and gain this way a certainty all their own. Both the Treatise of Human Nature in Book I and the Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding -1 conclude with a moderate or mitigated skepticism after making a strong case for radical pyrrhonism. In this paper I wish to carry out two connected tasks: first I want to consider whether Hume's skepticism in the Treatise is the same as that of the Enquiry or not; second, I want to determine which arguments he puts forward for his shift from pyrrhonism to modern skepticism. The most noticeable differences between the Treatise and the Enquiry occur immediately after the analysis of causation. In the Enquiry we find almost nothing concerning the reality of the external world and the nature of the self, but Hume emphasizes heavily the 34 anti-metaphysical and anti-theological outcomes of the science of human nature in his sections on Liberty and Necessity (VIII), on Miracles (X), on Providence and a possible future state (XI). He stresses the devastating agnostic consequences of his principles and his agnosticism culminates in the dreadful censorship of the final lines of the book. On the contrary, the fourth part of the Treatise, Book I, offers an intricate and sophisticated treatment of various subjects. The intricacy shows in the very title of this part: "Of the Sceptical and Other Systems of Philosophy." Hume actually intertwines the exposition of his skeptical system — an expression which sounds odd — with the critical examination of rival systems and an attempt at accounting for the nature of things. These intricate undertakings are the direct upshot of Hume's analysis of causation. He thinks he has established that our causal beliefs are the products of custom alone and that nevertheless they are our only reliable beliefs. Lacking any rational justification, they are simply natural — which means that we cannot hinder ourselves from making inferences and predictions. Accordingly, reason has been immersed in the wider concept of imagination and thus naturalized: it is "nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls" (T 179). Basically, some beliefs are unavoidable. Now, a crucial problem is to know how far we can go into the analysis of such natural beliefs. In the Treatise, Hume sets out to investigate some of them whereas in the Enquiry he is more prudent and merely talks of instincts without considering their mechanism. In the Treatise, the tentative analysis of these natural beliefs has important metaphysical outcomes. Using the concepts and principles of his new-born science of human nature, Hume provides us with 35 a new ontology which states the nature of things from the standpoint of our beliefs concerning it. Thus, we get a Humean version of the nature of the external world and of the nature of the self. Unfortunately, this assessment of what there is on the basis of what we believe there is has unwanted skeptical effects. Hume's "as if" ontology tends to appear definitely fictitious, all the more so because the analysis of our natural beliefs is not successful and even quite defective. So, the skeptical outcome pushes through the positive project itself as the failure to account for our natural beliefs shakes the very belief in their special reliability. Such is, for example, the blatant result of the study of our belief in the external world (T 217). Again, in the Treatise, Hume is eager to emphasize the devastating anti-metaphysical implications of his thought. Under the... (shrink)

Mélissa Thériault,Dominique Sirois-Rouleau | : Bien connu pour ses prises de positions tranchées et polémiques sur le fonctionnement des institutions culturelles et des milieux artistiques, le philosophe français Yves Michaud est aussi un observateur assidu des nouvelles tendances de consommation. L’objectif de cette étude critique est d’ouvrir une discussion critique qui s’impose sur certaines affirmations dont le caractère polémique est aussi manifeste que fertile : la notion de vaporisation de l’art, le statut « orphelin » du design et (...) son rapprochement avec l’art et le luxe et, finalement, la question de l’authenticité. Nous discuterons chacun de ces éléments afin de répondre aux zones grises de l’analyse présentée dans l’essai de Michaud. Nous conclurons par une discussion sur la possibilité même de considérer l’art comme un luxe en montrant dans quelle mesure la conception du luxe telle que défendue par Michaud correspond en fait à un concept bien différent. | : Well known for his controversial positions on the functioning of cultural institutions and artistic communities, French philosopher Yves Michaud is also a fine observer of new consumer trends. The aim of this study is to open a critical discussion on polemic statements made by Michaud in Le nouveau luxe. Expérience, arrogances, authenticité : the notion of vaporization of the art, the “orphan” status of design and the connexion between art and luxury and, finally, authenticity. We discuss each of these elements to clarify the gray areas of the analysis presented by Michaud. We conclude with a discussion on the relevance to consider art as a luxury by showing how design, as understood by Michaud, matches a very different concept. (shrink)

According to the French philosopher Alain, art must regain its existence as a real and solid object to counteract deceitful imagination. In line with this view is Yves Michaud’s description of the “gaseous” state of contemporary art. Paradoxically, the wide circulation of many ‘artistic’ products, destined to be consumed and invoke emotions, does not indicate that we are in presence of an important affirmation of ethical and aesthetical values. As it were, the proliferation of aesthetic objects has destroyed (...) the symbolic value of art. The Italian philosopher Gianni Carchia has underlined how the disappearance of the axiological dimension has led art towards imposture and under the yoke of imagination, which both assist the strategies of the demonic. At this point a question arises: is it possible to eradicate the power of the demonic and evil from our existential condition? According to Jung it’s impossible. In Castelli’s view, the union between art, evil and the demonic has characterized the artistic panorama of the sixteenth century. In the twentieth-century, we owe to Hermann Broch – who brought the raising power of kitsch under philosophical scrutiny − the idea of a complicity between degraded art and evil. Not all scholars agreed that Kitsch represented evil. Many philosophers argued that the growing popularity of Kitsch among the masses posed a problem concerning the demand for art. For this reason, philosophical speculation had better not take a Manichean attitude and reject Kitsch outright, on the contrary, Kitsch should be studied with the aim of transforming the “hunger for art”, of which it is a manifestation, into a desire for ethical and artistic values. (shrink)

This article examines the antecedents and background of the antithesis between art and beauty. It also considers if this confrontation, typical in modern aesthetics, provides necessary conceptual categories to comprehend the situation of art in the communication era, characteristic of a generalised aesthetisation. Departing from the ideas posed by Yves Michaud, Mateu Cabot, Didi-Huberman and Mario Perniola, the author dismantles the false opposition between art and beauty; she proposes a strategy to avoid an antithetical position and exhorts the (...) readers to recover a different experience from beauty. (shrink)

To test the hypothesis of a participation of inner speech in self-referential activity we reviewed 59 studies measuring brain activity during processing of self-information in the following self-domains: agency, self-recognition, emotions, personality traits, autobiographical memory, preference judgments, and REST. The left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) has been shown to sustain inner speech use. We calculated the percentage of studies reporting LIFG activity for each self-dimension. 55.9% of all studies reviewed identified LIFG (and presumably inner speech) activity during self-awareness tasks. Furthermore, (...) the LIFG was more frequently recruited during conceptual tasks (e.g., emotions, traits) than during perceptual tasks (e.g., agency, self-recognition). This supports the view of a relative involvement of inner speech in self-reflective processes. Crown Copyright © 2007 Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

Non-governmental organizations and pressure groups have taken up the mission of counterbalancing the huge power of the multinational corporations. Curiously, while most NGOs have a sincere ethical background and a genuine ethical motivation, the way some activist groups and NGOs themselves act does not always live up to the principles they advocate. Research using a multiple case study methodology is used to provide an illustration of various questionable practices followed by pressure groups revealing a range of tactics. The concerns, the (...) objectives and the legitimacy of NGOs and activist groups will be discussed, along with their strategies and tactics. A framework will be developed as a basis for analysing the ethical aspects of the various NGO actions. The analysis of the cases will reveal some worrisome inconsistencies between the demands and the practices of NGOs and activist groups. Should not the means employed by activists and NGOs be consistent with their own espoused or implied values? As power gives responsibility, NGOs should be seen as having corporate stakeholder responsibility. (shrink)

Michel van de Kerchove : une figure de référence de la pensée pénale Tout au long de sa carrière académique et scientifique, Michel van de KERCHOVE a apporté à la pensé pénale des contributions majeures, essentielles et parfois radicales, n’hésitant pas à en bousculer les standards quand il dénonce le pouvoir mystificateur du langage ou interroge l’effectivité des normes juridiques. À travers ses innombrables travaux, il n’a cessé de rappeler l’importance d’une approche critique et interdisciplinaire du droit. Tel est dès (...) lors l’esprit et le fi l conducteur des deux journées organisées en l’honneur de celui qui fut, notamment, une cheville ouvrière de la revue Déviance et Société. La peine est un thème sur lequel Michel van de KERCHOVE a écrit les plus belles pages, mobilisant tour à tour les ressources du droit pénal et de la sociologie juridique, de la théorie générale et de la philosophie du droit. L’ambition de cet ouvrage est d’être une référence sur cette question. C’était l’occasion pour les auteurs de se mettre au travail sous le regard vigilant de Michel van de KERCHOVE, ce qui est peut-être le plus bel hommage qui pouvait lui être rendu. Le sens, la fonction et les justifications de la peine Dans un premier temps, il s’est agi d’interroger le sens, la fonction et les justifications de la peine à travers la littérature, la philosophie et la politique. La peine et les peines sont, ensuite, examinées au regard de l’exigence des droits fondamentaux garantis aujourd’hui dans les instruments universels et régionaux de protection des droits de l’homme. Les auteurs se dirigent alors vers les scènes européenne et internationale où se situent déjà aujourd’hui, et certainement encore plus à l’avenir, le centre de gravité du droit pénal. Les évolutions de la peine et de son exécution Dans un second temps, les auteurs abordent les évolutions de la peine et de son exécution pour interroger l’inflation pénale, la victimisation et le contexte sécuritaire qui caractérisent le droit pénal contemporain. Enfin, en abordant certains contentieux et dispositifs périphériques à la peine, ils S’interrogent le sens et les contours que prend aujourd’hui, et peut-être demain, le droit pénal. (shrink)

The world of the Na'vi is much more feminine. Na'vi women are equal partners with their men and are just as capable as their male counterparts. And as the tsahìk (spiritual leader) of the Omaticaya clan, Neytiri's mother Mo'at exercises an unrivalled degree of power and influence due to her ability to interpret the will of Eywa, the Na'vi's female deity. Historically, women are the ones who have had the most intimate experience of care, since they have traditionally been the (...) ones tasked with providing it for children, the sick, the disabled, and the elderly. The philosopher Sara Ruddick (1935–2011), one of the pioneers of care ethics, identified three activities at the core of what she calls “maternal work”: preserving the life of the child, fostering the growth of the child, and training the child for social acceptability. (shrink)

At the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, change was fast and furious: the exploration of coastal Africa by the Portuguese, the exploration of the West Indies by the Spanish, the extermination of the island Indians, the importation of black slaves to the Iberian peninsula, then the expansion of the slave trade to the American colonies - in short, the much-heralded inauguration of European colonization overseas, with all of its attendant horrors. All of this is adequately known, it seems; (...) the purpose of the present article is not to rehearse this history, even in summary. But if chronology has any value here, it is in making clear that, while the massacre of the Arawaks and the Caribbean Indians quickly attracted attention, eliciting protests that were to be renewed in the following centuries, the black slave trade and black slavery began somewhat discreetly, as if it took quite some time for the esprits libres in Europe to take notice of it. Over the three centuries leading up to the French revolution, blacks were transferred from their native countries to the American colonies. In Europe, these three centuries saw the development of Enlightenment thought, the revolt against domination by the Church, the call for human rights, and the will to democracy. The parallel is superficial, but troubling nevertheless: four facts appear to be linked together, and not merely chronologically: the massacre or de facto subjugation of the Indians, the trade and enslavement of blacks, and colonization. Is the last of these not the cause of and the key to understanding the other three - as well as a number of other phenomena? (shrink)

The rich text by Roberte Hamayon can be viewed from several angles. I will limit myself to one by noting that this particular case offers a very interesting illustration of the treatment of ethnic questions in Russia following the collapse of the USSR.

Directeur de recherche au CNRS, où il dirige le Centre d’histoire de la philosophie moderne et le Centre Thomas-Hobbes. Il enseigne également la philosophie politique moderne et contemporaine à l’Université de Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne. Il est notamment l’auteur de La décision métaphysique de Hobbes. Conditions de la politique (Vrin, 1987, 2e éd.,..

Les sociétés démocratiques sont confrontées à l'émergence d'enjeux environnementaux décisifs qui concernent tant les modes de production, d'échange et de consommation que l'habitat, les transports, l'agriculture, l'industrie et même nos modes de vie. La prise en charge de ces enjeux ne saurait s'opérer simplement par des mesures ponctuelles ou locales. Elle doit aujourd'hui être repensée la temporalité de l'action politique, confrontée à une urgence qui ne cessera de s'accroître dans les prochaines années.

La constat de ce livre est que l'oeuvre de Hobbes repose sur une position metaphysique et qu'il faut donc reinscrire Hobbes dans l'histoire de la metaphysique pour elucider sa place dans l'histoire de la pensee ethique et politique. Il ne s'agissait pas pour l'auteur de reduire l'importance politico-historique de l'oeuvre, ni d'en minimiser l'inscription dans l'histoire de la guerre civile anglaise, mais au contraire de mettre au jour la structure speculative qui en fondait l'originalite theorique. La pensee de Hobbes engage (...) une reelaboration du concept de verite, c'est-a-dire une redefinition du rapport entre la perception, le discours et le monde qui constitue l'horizon de sa philosophie naturelle et de sa philosophie politique. (shrink)

Humanism is most commonly used as a prefabricated answer, covering the injunction to place man at the centre of our preoccupations, not to succumb to the risk of subordinating him to anything else, when dealing with nature, history, economics or politics, with means and with ends. In this sense humanism is supposed to be the remedy for all evils. But this sort of answer is only possible against a background where the question of humanism is forgotten. To return to the (...) question of humanism is to open a line of questioning about the presuppositions of a thinking which makes man the centre of nature and of history. But if we bring these presuppositions to light, will humanism still be able to remain an acceptable answer? Shouldn't we, on the contrary, call it radically into question? ? as the instrument, or the mask, of a project for domination ? a project of which man has forever sought to be the vector. Levinas showed the invalidity of the conception of humanism which is dominant in the philosophical tradition, not in order to give way to the shortcomings of anti-humanism, but to re-found humanism in a different way. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce qu'un point névralgique en philosophie? C'est une question ou une position particulière, locale, mais autour de laquelle une pensée se joue dans sa totalité. Autrement dit, c'est un lieu de décision philosophique qui n'engage pas seulement sa cohérence, mais aussi et surtout sa spécificité et sa teneur. Un point névralgique est donc un lieu de décision philosophique dont aucune philosophie marquante ne fait l'économie. Dans cet ouvrage sont analysés les principaux points névralgiques de nombres des plus grands philosophes contemporains. (...) Il en va ainsi, par exemple, de la question du sujet chez Foucault, ou de celle du pardon chez Derrida, ou encore de celle de la légitimation postmoderne chez Lyotard, etc. Ces points névralgiques ne sont pas les seuls chez ces penseurs, mais ils ont au moins une importance toute particulière et tous ont joué un rôle majeur dans la construction de la pensée occidentale. (shrink)

The differentiation of T Lymphocytes within the thymus is an important biological phenomenon during wich these cell acquire their functions to further control the immune system. Numerous experiments under various conditions have been devised to understand the different mechanisms involved in this complex process. Nevertheless, interpretation of these experiments lead to still contradictory debatable hypotheses. Modelisation of this process through classical simulation methods cannot be envisaged because they are not adapted to modifications of the model structure, which is the point (...) of interest. For these reasons, we proposed a new approach of automatic search for model. The program consists of four independent connected modules : The generator produces model, based on the rationale of formal grammars. Protocol and experimental data are stored in a set of experiments. The simulator using a protocol and a model provides simulated results. Finally, the supervisor by comparing simulated results and experimental data, adapts the model parameters to increase their fit and either chooses a new experiment to explore, or modifies the model structure. Change of the model structure is performed among still unexplored models according to their promise level, which is iteratively evaluated relatively to previously explored models through a proposed model distance. The generator is written in Prolog and the other modules in C++. The architecture of the program allows us to modify or complete a module without changing anything in the other modules. As a consequence, the proposed modeling approach conceived to study T lymphocyte differentiation within the thymus remains independent of this biological phenomenon and can be applied to other biological problems. (shrink)