In this article I argue that Alston’s recent meta-epistemological approach in terms of epistemic desiderata is not as epistemically plural as he claims it to be. After some preliminary remarks, I briefly recapitulate Alston’s epistemic desiderata approach. Next, I distinguish two ways in which one might consider truth to be an epistemic desideratum. Subsequently, I argue that only one truth-conducive desideratum can count as an epistemic desideratum. After this, I attempt to show that none of the higher-order (...) class='Hi'>desiderata that are thought to be favorable to the discrimination and formation of true beliefs are genuinely epistemic desiderata. A strict interpretation of ‘epistemic desideratum’ leads to a rejection of all deontological desiderata as well. Finally, features of systems of beliefs, such as coherence and understanding, cannot count as epistemic desiderata either. In the end only two candidate-desiderata can count as epistemic, one of which is logically trivial. In the epilogue, I offer some suggestions as to how Alston’s epistemic desiderata approach should be amended in order to make it epistemically plural. (shrink)

According to an increasingly popular view known as non-doxasticism, religious faith need not include belief, but only some cognitively weaker attitude. This view comes with great promises, as it offers a way for the agnostic to partake in religion. My concern is how such a non-doxastic faith might be understood as a rational attitude. I offer three desiderata for any account of rational, non-doxastic faith. These desiderata are based on general considerations regarding epistemic rationality and on major themes (...) from current literature on the closely related notions of trust and hope. The first desideratum states that faith must be able to meet the demands of reason. The second requires, perhaps surprisingly, that faith should not imply trust. The third requires that faith should imply hope while excluding despair. I show how several prominent accounts of non-doxastic faith, by Lara Buchak, Daniel Howard-Snyder and Daniel McKaughan, all fail to meet at least one of these desiderata. I also suggest that the desiderata should make us prefer a reconstructive methodology. (shrink)

This article addresses issues in developing cognitive architectures--generic computational models of cognition. Cognitive architectures are believed to be essential in advancing understanding of the mind, and therefore, developing cognitive architectures is an extremely important enterprise in cognitive science. The article proposes a set of essential desiderata for developing cognitive architectures. It then moves on to discuss in detail some of these desiderata and their associated concepts and ideas relevant to developing better cognitive architectures. It argues for the importance (...) of taking into full consideration these desiderata in developing future architectures that are more cognitively and ecologically realistic. A brief and preliminary evaluation of existing cognitive architectures is attempted on the basis of these ideas. (shrink)

If quantum mechanics is interpreted as an objective, complete, physical theory, applying to macroscopic as well as microscopic systems, then the linearity of quantum dynamics gives rise to the measurement problem and related problems, which cannot be solved without modifying the dynamics. Eight desiderata are proposed for a reasonable modified theory. They favor a stochastic modification rather than a deterministic non-linear one, but the spontaneous localization theories of Ghirardi et al. and Pearle are criticized. The intermittent fluorescence of a (...) trapped atom irradiated by two laser beams suggests a stochastic theory in which the locus of stochasticity is interaction between a material system and the electromagnetic vacuum. (shrink)

In a uniform format with Desiderata and The Desiderata of Love (with all-new illustrations and a fresh new jacket), this is a collection of life-affirming poems by a writer who has inspired and comforted countless readers. Line drawings.

In a recent issue of this journal, Gamble and Saad offer a taxonomy of conscientious objection in health care with the aim of increasing the common ground in the debate over conscientious objection to prevent parties from talking past each other and help facilitate greater progress on this issue. Although we agree that this is an important and worthwhile project, Gamble and Saad's proposal suffers from several serious weaknesses that limit its ability to do the work set out for it. (...) In this paper, we identify some of the major problems with this particular attempt in order to highlight some desiderata for a taxonomy of conscientious objection in health care that can serve as a guide for developing improved taxonomies of this kind in the future. (shrink)

It is only by fixing on agreed meanings of terms in biomedical terminologies that we will be in a position to achieve that accumulation and integration of knowledge that is indispensable to progress at the frontiers of biomedicine. Standardly, the goal of fixing meanings is seen as being realized through the alignment of terms on what are called ‘concepts’. Part I addresses three versions of the concept-based approach – by Cimino, by Wüster, and by Campbell and associates – and surveys (...) some of the problems to which they give rise, all of which have to do with a failure to anchor the terms in terminologies to corresponding referents in reality. Part II outlines a new, realist solution to this anchorage problem, which sees terminology construction as being motivated by the goal of alignment not on concepts but on the universals (kinds, types) in reality and thereby also on the corresponding instances (individuals, tokens). We outline the realist approach, and show how on its basis we can provide a benchmark of correctness for terminologies which will at the same time allow a new type of integration of terminologies and electronic health records. We conclude by outlining ways in which the framework thus defined might be exploited for purposes of diagnostic decision-support. (shrink)

Philip Kitcher has recently worried that the New Atheists, by mounting an attack against religion tout court, risk alienating a large swath of ‘religious’ people whose way of life is, to Kitcher's mind, innocuous. Encouraging a more moderate response, Kitcher thinks certain non-threatening modes of religious existence should be protected. In this article, I argue that while Kitcher's attempt to provide balance to the secularism debate is a great service, he ultimately fails to distinguish innocuous modes of religious belief from (...) more threatening modes, a failing that allows the debate to return to its previous extremes. In drawing attention to the shortcomings of Kitcher's approach, I make the humanist's argumentative burden explicit: the defender of a ‘moderate’ secular humanism must show that people who arrange their lives around belief in a transcendent being are more likely to do ethical harm than those that don't. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that theists are extremely well-situated with respect to developing metaethical accounts that qualify as ‘robust’ versions of moral realism. In the first part of the essay, a number of metaethical desiderata are identified. In the second part, theistic strategies for accommodating those desiderata are explained and defended. The upshot is that, contrary to the received philosophical wisdom, there are good theoretical reasons for theistic philosophers to seek to develop metaethical accounts that ground moral (...) facts in facts about God. (shrink)

International institutions such as UNESCO are deliberating on a new standard setting instrument for neurotechnologies. This will likely lead to the adoption of a soft law document which will be the first global document specifically tailored to neurotechnologies, setting the tone for further international or domestic regulations. While some stakeholders have been consulted, these developments have so far evaded the broader attention of the neuroscience, neurotech, and neuroethics communities. To initiate a broader debate, this target article puts to discussion twenty-five (...) considerations and desiderata for recognition by a future instrument. They are formulated at different levels of abstraction, from the big picture to technical details, seek to widen the perspective of preparatory reports and transcend the narrow debate about “neurorights” which overshadows many richer and more relevant aspects. These desiderata are not an exhaustive enumeration but a starting point for discussions about what deserves and what requires protection by an international instrument. (shrink)

This paper tries to motivate three desiderata for historical epistemologies: (a) that they should be reflective about the pedigree of their conceptual apparatus; (b) that they must face up to the potentially relativistic consequences of their historicism; and (c) that they must not forget the hard-won lessons of microhistory (i.e. historical events must be explained causally; historical events must not be artificially divided into internal/intellectual and external/social “factors” or “levels”; and constructed series of homogenous events must not be treated (...) as quasi-organisms). Ian Hacking’s work on styles of reasoning and Lorraine Daston’s and Peter Galison’s investigation into epistemic virtues are used to identify the costs of neglecting these desiderata. (shrink)

Abstract:Recently, republicans have been increasingly arguing that the ideal of nondomination can ground both a more plausible account of global justice and better insights for global institutional design than liberal egalitarianism does. What kind of global institutions, however, does nondomination require? The essay argues that a global institutional blueprint based on the republican ideal of nondomination is a multifaceted endeavor. Republican institutions should aim to fulfill three different desiderata: 1) avoiding excessive concentration of power; 2) bringing informal asymmetrical power (...) under institutional control; 3) furthering an active, vigilant citizenry. The three desiderata often pull in different directions. At the global level in particular, they do not converge on a verdict over whether we should switch to a cosmopolitan institutional order, stick to a world of states, or opt for something altogether different. As a result, there is no straightforward pathway leading from the vindication of nondomination as the central principle of global justice to a clear vision for a global institutional order. The issue is, instead, a matter of careful balancing. (shrink)

This article offers a characterization of what I call multiple-models juxtaposition, a strategy for managing trade-offs among modeling desiderata. MMJ displays models of distinct phenomena to...

La lectura de este libro me ha permitido corroborar una serie de inquietudes acerca de las formas en que se realiza la historia de la ciencia en Colombia. El libro es un claro ejemplo de las inquietudes que me asaltan desde que entré en contacto con los trabajos que se producen en nuestro país en esta disciplina y que se hicieron aún más visibles en el caso del libro del profesor Carvajal, pues en la contra-carátula se afirma que es el (...) resultado de una tesis doctoral de la universidad que lo publica y que recibió la calificación de Summa cum laude. El interés en reseñarlo está motivado, pues, porque se esperaría del libro una investigación actualizada que permita avanzar en la comprensión de los temas de los que se ocupa. Pero la conclusión que se obtiene después de su lectura es bastante alejada de mi pretensión y expresa un problema general de los trabajos en historia de la ciencia que se realizan en nuestro país: la historia de la ciencia en Colombia, en la mayoría de los casos, ha sido un ejercicio ensimismado, aislado de los problemas de la disciplina, sin conexión –en muchos casos, ni siquiera bibliográfica– con las comunidades de investigación que trabajan en otros países en ella. En consecuencia, se terminan presentando como novedades temas que han sido debatidos ampliamente en la disciplina y se corre el peligro de confundir lo que desconoce el autor con lo que no se ha discutido en la historia de la ciencia. Enmarcaré mi análisis del libro en este contexto, exponiendo en primer lugar algunas dificultades propias de la historia de la ciencia como disciplina específica que se agudizan en el contexto colombiano y que, finalmente, se ven claramente expresadas en el texto del profesor Carvajal. Antes de hablar del libro, presentaré al lector algunos elementos que pueden servirle de contexto para entender mis apreciaciones acerca del mismo. (shrink)

Articulation and defense of Pragmatism against epistemic critiques leveled by historian John Patrick Diggins. -/- Argues that the inferential structure of pragmatist epistemic authority is misunderstood by Diggins and by other critics. -/- Defends both classical and neo-pragmatist naturalism via inferentialism.

Cross-sectorial, dynamic, and innovative partnerships are essential to resolve the challenges of humankind in the 21st century. At the same time, trust in each other’s integrity and good will is a precondition for the solution of any complex problem, and certainly for the success of the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda. Experience shows that a nation’s economic and social success is at its greatest if, and when, there is cooperation and even cocreation involving a fair division of labor and responsibility (...) among the different societal stakeholders. This paper uses Ralf Dahrendorf’s seminal work on obligations, as well as the European Commission’s Science with and for Society unit’s definition of responsible research and innovation (RRI), to motivate industry responsibilities to make the world a healthier place. (shrink)

After the publication of Marcia Colish’s Peter Lombard in 1994, studies on the author of the Book of Sentences have entered a new phase. This article provides an assessment of the state of research in the field and makes suggestions for its further development. In an appreciation and critique of Marcia Colish’s contribution, it argues that Colish’s interpretation, for all its merit, errs on a number of points: the proofs of God’s existence, charity, and the structure of theological ethics are (...) important examples. The second part of the essay considers the potential of research on the tradition of commentaries upon the Sentences. Given the central place that this genre of theological writing occupied in Christian thought between the twelfth and the sixteenth centuries, the Sentences commentaries could serve as a window upon the tradition. It is suggested that study of the literary form of the commentaries will shed much light on changes in the conception of theology which occurred in the period under consideration. (shrink)

Este relato procura expor o desenvolvimento das pesquisas em filosofia medieval em Portugal e no Brasil. O autor oferece uma visão das principais instituições que promovem os estudos em filosofia medieval em ambos os países, bem como das oportunidades e expectativas para o futuro que os estudos do pensamento medieval têm naqueles contextos. Ele nos dá informação, em perspectiva histórica, de alguns dos principais eventos nos últimos anos e dos diferentes grupos em Portugal e no Brasil que investigam aquele período (...) da história da filosofia. (shrink)

The claims that “The brain processes information” or “Cognition is information processing” are accepted as truisms in cognitive science. However, it is unclear how to evaluate such claims absent a specification of “information” as it is used by neurocognitive theories. The aim of this article is, thus, to identify the key features of information that information-based neurocognitive theories posit. A systematic identification of these features can reveal the explanatory role that information plays in specific neurocognitive theories, and can, therefore, be (...) both theoretically and practically important. These features can be used, in turn, as desiderata against which candidate theories of information may be evaluated. After discussing some characteristics of explanation in cognitive science and their implications for “information”, three notions are briefly introduced: natural, sensory, and endogenous information. Subsequently, six desiderata are identified and defended based on cognitive scientific practices. The global workspace theory of consciousness is then used as a specific case study that arguably posits either five or six corresponding features of information. (shrink)

The interest in "social sustainability" has recently increased in the field of urban development. We want societies, cities, and neighborhoods to be economically and environmentally sustainable, but we also want urban areas that are safe, diverse, walkable, and relaxing, just to mention a few examples. Strikingly, however, there is no consensus regarding what definition of "social sustainability" should be employed. Additionally, some people are skeptical about the prospect of finding a useful definition at all and claim it is impossible to (...) satisfactorily define the concept for various reasons, such as its complexity. A potential first step towards navigating this conceptual maze is to provide desiderata for a definition of social sustainability. We defend a list of nine desiderata and thereby create a theoretical framework for analyzing and constructing a definition of "social sustainability". We also examine the skeptical arguments and find that it is premature to conclude that the goal of finding a useful definition is hopeless. With the criteria in place, the future debate can proceed by assessing definitions of "social sustainability" in a more structured and transparent manner. This activity is of upmost importance if we want to create just cities. Keywords: Social Sustainability, Definition, Purposes and Aims, Conditions of Adequacy. (shrink)

Proponents of neuroeconomics often argue that better knowledge of the human neural architecture enables economists to improve standard models of choice. In their view, these improvements provide compelling reasons to use neural findings in constructing and evaluating economic models. In a recent article, I criticized this view by pointing to the trade-offs between the modeling desiderata valued by neuroeconomists and other economists, respectively. The present article complements my earlier critique by focusing on three modeling desiderata that figure prominently (...) in economic and neuroeconomic modeling. For each desideratum, I examine findings that neuroeconomists deem to be especially relevant for economists and argue that neuroeconomists have failed to substantiate their calls to use these findings in constructing and evaluating economic models. In doing so, I identify methodological and evidential constraints that will continue to hinder neuroeconomists’ attempts to improve such models. Moreover, I draw on the literature on scientific modeling to advance the ongoing philosophical discussion regarding the prospects of interdisciplinary models of choice. (shrink)

This article surveys methodological matters that shape, drive, and plague analytic legal philosophy. Section 2 briefly explicates conceptual analysis, analytic definitions, and family resemblance concepts. It also argues that central cases are used in more than one way. Section 3 presents criticisms of those concepts and methods, and suggests that some of these difficulties are due to the lack of a shared paradigm regarding a counterexample’s impact. Section 4 explains “meta- theoretical” desiderata. It contends that, to date, legal philosophical (...) appeals to such norms have not been as helpful as some suggest. Section 5 returns to the issue of concept selection by addressing whether legal theorising is an invariably “normative” enterprise. It argues that certain “normativist” methodologies, such as Dworkin’s constructive interpretation and Finnis’ appeal to the central case of the internal point of view, are unnecessary. (shrink)

Alston argues that there is no such thing as a single concept of epistemic justification. Instead, there is an irreducible plurality of epistemically valuable features of beliefs: ‘epistemic desiderata.’ I argue that this approach is problematic for meta-epistemological reasons. How, for instance, do we characterize epistemic evaluation and do we do we go about it if there’s no theoretical unity to epistemology? Alston’s response is to ground all epistemic desiderata, thereby unifying epistemology, in truth and truth-conduciveness. I argue (...) that this move over-unifies epistemology, in effect, giving us a single criterion for epistemology on par with the epistemology-by-justification approach he rejects. Perhaps surprisingly, we find a similar theoretical worry in Aristotle’s argument about the science of metaphysics. Aristotle’s resolution in this problem by the ‘analogy of being’ provides a parallel framework to resolve the worries with Alston’s approach. In particular, I argue that we can focus epistemic evaluation on the person of epistemic virtue: this category will be focal, unifying the disparate desiderata, without reducing to one thing all epistemic values or relations that desiderate must bear to the central value. A virtue-centric account of epistemic normativity follows: one that can remain genuinely pluralistic and yet unified as well. (shrink)

Some desiderata for scientific confirmation are formulated in the light of a tentative scientific world view. Bayesian confirmation theories generically satisfy most of these desiderata, but one of them, "the strategy of ascent," fits best in a tempered personalist version of Bayesianism. There are both empirical and rational components, dialectically combined, in tempered personalism. The question of explanation vs. prediction is treated in a Bayesian manner, and it is found that both operations are susceptible to characteristic systematic errors. (...) If these are eliminated, however, then explanation and prediction provide equally good evidential support for hypotheses. (shrink)

The paper offers five desiderata on a realist normative theory of politics: that it should avoid moralism, deontologism, transcendentalism, utopianism, and vanguardism. These desiderata argue for a theory that begins from values rooted in a people’s experience; that avoids prescribing a collective deontological constraint; that makes the comparison of imperfect regimes possible; that takes feasibility and sustainability into account; and that makes room for the claims of democracy. The paper argues, in the course of exploring the desiderata, (...) that a neo-republican philosophy of government does pretty well in satisfying them. (shrink)

One of the traditional desiderata for a metaphysical theory of laws of nature is that it be able to explain natural regularities. Some philosophers have postulated governing laws to fill this explanatory role. Recently, however, many have attempted to explain natural regularities without appealing to governing laws. Suppose that some fundamental properties are bare dispositions. In virtue of their dispositional nature, these properties must be (or are likely to be) distributed in regular patterns. Thus it would appear that an (...) ontology including bare dispositions can dispense with governing laws of nature. I believe that there is a problem with this line of reasoning. In this essay, I’ll argue that governing laws are indispensable for the explanation of a special sort of natural regularity: those holding among categorical properties (or, as I’ll call them, categorical regularities). This has the potential to be a serious objection to the denial of governing laws, since there may be good reasons to believe that observed regularities are categorical regularities. (shrink)

I put forward several desiderata that a philosophical theory of causality should satisfy: it should account for the objectivity of causality, it should underpin formalisms for causal reasoning, it should admit a viable epistemology, it should be able to cope with the great variety of causal claims that are made, and it should be ontologically parsimonious. I argue that Nancy Cartwright’s dispositional account of causality goes part way towards meeting these criteria but is lacking in important respects. I go (...) on to argue that my epistemic account, which ties causal relationships to an agent’s knowledge and ignorance, performs well in the light of the desiderata. Such an account, I claim, is all we require from a theory of causality. (shrink)

Invoking three desiderata (empirical adequacy, conceptual precision, and sensitivity to social positioning), this paper argues that poverty is best understood as the deprivation of certain human capabilities. It defends this way of conceiving of poverty against standard alternatives: lack of income, lack of resources, inequality, and social exclusion.

This paper discusses certain desiderata for an acceptable »Simmelian« account of social groups, and explains why my own account of social groups as plural subjects is preferable to the accounts considered. With regard to the »we«-intentionality of plural subjects, this theory of social groups should be taken to demand only that some rough general type of shared action or shared cognition must be understood to be in question of all sides. It is hoped, then, that this theory of plural (...) subjects in general may turn out to be of help in demystifying older accounts of collectivity. (shrink)

This study addresses two desiderata of historical emotion research: reflecting on the interdependence of textual functions and the representation of emotions, and acknowledging the interdependence of studies on the premodern and modern periods in the history of emotion. Contemporary research on the history of emotion is characterised by a proliferation of studies on very different eras, authors, themes, texts, and aspects. The enthusiasm and confidence with which situations, actions, and interactions involving emotions in history are discovered, however, has led (...) to overly direct attempts to access the represented objects (emotions/feelings/affects); as a result, too little attention has been paid to the conditions and functions of their representations. That is why this study engages with the emotion research of historians from an unashamedly philological perspective. Such an approach provides, among other things, insights into the varied, often contradictory, observations that can be made about the history of emotion in modernity and premodernity. (shrink)

Despite the recent backlash against epistemic consequentialism, an explicit systematic alternative has yet to emerge. This paper articulates and defends a novel alternative, Epistemic Kantianism, which rests on a requirement of respect for the truth. §1 tackles some preliminaries concerning the proper formulation of the epistemic consequentialism / non-consequentialism divide, explains where Epistemic Kantianism falls in the dialectical landscape, and shows how it can capture what seems attractive about epistemic consequentialism while yielding predictions that are harder for the latter to (...) secure in a principled way. §2 presents Epistemic Kantianism. §3 argues that it is uniquely poised to satisfy the desiderata set out in §1 on an ideal theory of epistemic justification. §4 gives three further arguments, suggesting that it (i) best explains the objective normative significance of the subject's perspective in epistemology, (ii) follows from the kind of axiology needed to solve the swamping problem together with modest assumptions about the relation between the evaluative and the deontic, and (iii) illuminates certain asymmetries in epistemic value and obligation. §5 takes stock and reassesses the score in the debate. (shrink)