We investigate how social comparison processes in leader treatment quality impact group members’ self-worth, affect, and behavior. Evidences from the field and the laboratory suggest that employees who are treated kinder and more considerate than their fellow group members experience more self-worth and positive affect. Moreover, the greater positive self-implications of preferentially treated group members motivate them more strongly to comply with norms and to engage in tasks that benefit the group. These findings suggest that leaders face an ethical trade-off (...) between satisfying the moral standard of treating everybody equally well and satisfying individual group members’ desire to be treated better than others. (shrink)

Demographic research on fertility has almost exclusively focused on women, however, men’s fertility preferences are equally important to the understanding of the processes and mechanisms that affect fertility. This article analyzes the data from the qualitative study with young (19–34 year old) heterosexual childless Lithuanian men and ex­plores the relationship between fertility desires, visions of fatherhood and perceptions of masculinity. Our results show that independently of whether the study participants have internalized the “male breadwinner” norm, they modelled their fertility (...) desires according to their current financial situation and perceived future income. Their vi­sions of fatherhood were also often framed by the cultural ideal of a man who is strict, tough and is the main family provider. However, the vision of the father who actively participates in childrearing was also common. (shrink)

The question why Bevir's account of intentionality is conceptualized purely in terms of individual beliefs is important as such a conceptualization appears to depart from standard accounts of intentionality within the philosophy of mind, that include reference to individual desires. It is beliefs and desires which are usually considered the rock?bottom components of individual intentional states, yet Bevir defines weak intentions solely in terms of the former while explicitly rejecting attention to the latter. There are (...) a number of difficulties which an account of meaning that excludes reference to desires faces. Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons for historians of ideas to embrace a theory of meaning that includes reference to beliefs but not desires. Through an extension of a different argument put forward by Bevir, it is suggested that such a belief?based definition of the nature of meaning is made defensible through reference to an account of the identity of the history of ideas as a discipline, a distinct area of academic enquiry that can be ? and for good reasons is ? individuated from the history of human action. (shrink)

‘Simple desire-based accounts’ of individual good or well-being identify an individual’s good with the satisfaction of their actual desires. I will defend one version.

There is a trend in modern times towards taking the individual’s desire to be the indicator or basis of what the good life would be for the individual. Desire is believed to be an outer expression of an inner voice. The idea is that the individual’s desire shows what matters and therefore what constitutes the good life for her. An assumption is that the desire is knowable. The task for a fulfilled life is to reason out what (...) the desire is and, as a next step, take corresponding rational actions towards its fulfilment. John Rawls is a paradigm case of this approach. What is missing, I believe, in assuming the knowability of desire, is an awareness of the key characteristic of human desire: that is, it is always in a process of formation and change. In this article, I try to explore the problems of seeing desire as capable of being made fully present, by looking at the ideas of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Jacques Derrida, and Adam Phillips. (shrink)

This chapter analyses how Aristotle explains and justifies his initial statement that all men by nature desire to know. In particular, it aims at clarifying how Aristotle argues that human knowledge differs from the animals' one and develops from sense perception to memory, experience and technê. This development coincides with a development from knowledge of individuals to knowledge of universals, reaching its peak in sophia, defined as epistêmê of first principles and causes, which is the highest form of knowledge desired (...) by men. These Aristotelian arguments are further clarified by a location in their intellectual context and a comparison with views expressed, above all, by Hippocratic physicians, Plato and Isocrates. (shrink)

Leading economist Daniel Cohen provides a whirlwind tour of the history of economic growth, from the early days of civilization to modern times, underscoring what is so unsettling today. The new digital economy is establishing a "zero-cost" production model, inexpensive software is taking over basic tasks, and years of exploiting the natural world have begun to backfire with deadly consequences. Working hard no longer guarantees social inclusion or income. Drawing on economics, anthropology, and psychology, and thinkers ranging from Rousseau to (...) Keynes and Easterlin, Cohen examines how a future less dependent on material gain might be considered and, how, in a culture of competition, individual desires might be better attuned to the greater needs of society."--Publisher's description. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Desire and Monstrosity in the Disaster Film:Alfred Hitchcock's The BirdsDavid Humbert (bio)The theme of the relationship between desire and violence appears regularly in modern film criticism, and studies of this issue range in theoretical orientation from the Lacanian to the feminist.1 Though René Girard's view of this relationship is also regularly mentioned in studies of film violence, it is often with less than full appreciation of the way in (...) which it contradicts central features of structuralist and psychoanalytic approaches to film, approaches that, until recently, have dominated film theory. Furthermore, cinema is mentioned only in passing by Girard himself, sometimes derogatorily, while Girardian studies of films and film makers are relatively few and far between.2 One of the yardsticks by which René Girard demonstrates the validity of his theory of violence is the degree to which it illuminates key aspects of great literature that previously remained unexplained or were passed over in silence. The fundamental concepts of the scapegoat, the double, the rival, and triangular desire can be shown to illuminate similar interpretive lacunae in a wide variety of films of many genres.Alfred Hitchcock's The Birds3 is a case in point. I intend to argue the relevance of the mimetic theory of violence to this film largely as Girard does [End Page 87] himself in relation to works of literature, and hence with no pretense to originality. The theory of the scapegoat and triangular desire persuades because of the particular way it brings to view, and explains, previously unnoticed features of Hitchcock's films, notably The Birds. One must bear in mind, however, that, previous to The Birds, Hitchcock produced a remarkable body of work that is consistently (some would say obsessively) built upon the cluster of themes that Girard identifies with the scapegoat problem. For those who are familiar only with Hitchcock's later, more sensational work, like Psycho4 and The Birds, it may come as a surprise to discover that the director earlier produced films like I Confess5 or The Wrong Man,6 or Vertigo,7 in which the suspense is largely psychological, and in which themes of faith, romantic obsession, or moral conflict take center stage. The Birds is a variation on the works of the 1950s, rather than a completely new point of departure. It is an apocalyptic crystallization of the themes that had always preoccupied Hitchcock.The Birds is perhaps the only film by Hitchcock that envisions total societal breakdown, a disaster of the proportions of a medieval plague. Generally, Hitchcock's films are set in stable, if modern and troubled, societies in which there are at least more or less unquestioned social and economic orders. Flaws in these social orders, however, are evident in the small-scale disasters that happen to individuals in many of Hitchcock's scenarios. The Wrong Man focuses on the story of Manny Balestreros, who is wrongly identified as a criminal and has his life destroyed by a morally blind justice system. In Rope, the practitioners of a nihilistic thrill-kill are shown to be symptomatic of a pervasive moral and intellectual vacuum in contemporary society. Both these films and others by Hitchcock underline the need for morality and social order to withstand the irrational tendencies of human nature. Psycho, in particular, stresses the ambivalence of man in modern civilization. Norman Bates, it seems, is both the product of and yet the immoveable obstacle to the drive for civilization and order.In contrast to these films, The Birds is a film in which civilizational disaster is abrupt, all-consuming, and catastrophic. For no reason, out of the blue, birds collectively mass to attack human beings. The film is nothing more, some would argue, than one more film in the "revenge of nature" genre. But the attack of the birds is not a response called forth by a moral transgression. It is not a reciprocal act of violence, as the "revenge of nature" mode of interpretation would imply. In fact, the very randomness, irrationality, and suddenness of the attack is the key to understanding the film. The preeminent question is, as Slavoj Žižek puts it, "the stupid and... (shrink)

Numerous empirical studies have been conducted to examine first-generation college students, those individuals whose parents have not attended college. Their personality characteristics, cognitive development, academic preparation, and first-year performance have all been topics of research; yet there appears to be little in the literature exploring the motivation of these individuals to seek higher education. There are even fewer studies targeting academic motivation in Hispanic students. The purpose of this study is to conduct a phenomenological examination of the desire to attend (...) college among first generation Hispanic students participating in an academic support program. One-hour taped interviews were conducted with three volunteer participants enrolled in the Student Support Services program at Sul Ross State University. Meaning units and constituents were extracted, and general structures were developed using the Descriptive Phenomenological Method . The phenomenological analysis resulted in two structures that address the effectiveness of academic outreach programming and identify the roles of self-efficacy, successful experiences in high school, a desire for improved socioeconomic status, a need to contribute to the well-being of others, a break with tradition, and the influence of respected role models in facilitating a desire for higher education in first-generation Hispanic college students. (shrink)

Desire satisfaction theories of well-being and deprivationism about the badness of death face similar problems: desire satisfaction theories have trouble locating the time when the satisfaction of a future or past-directed desire benefits a person; deprivationism has trouble locating a time when death is bad for a person. I argue that desire satisfaction theorists and deprivation theorists can address their respective timing problems by accepting fusionism, the view that some events benefit or harm individuals only at fusions of moments in (...) time. Fusionism improves on existing solutions to the timing problem for deprivationism because it locates death’s badness at the same time as both the victim of death and death itself, and it accounts for all of the ways that death is bad for a person. Fusionism improves on existing solutions to the problem of temporally locating the benefit of future and past-directed desires because it respects several attractive principles, including the view that the intrinsic value of a time for someone is determined solely by states of affairs that obtain at that time and the view that intrinsically beneficial events benefit a person when they occur. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming increasingly influential in most people’s lives. This raises many philosophical questions. One is what responsibility we have as individuals to guide the development of AI in a desirable direction. More specifically, how should this responsibility be distributed among individuals and between individuals and other actors? We investigate this question from the perspectives of five principles of distribution that dominate the discussion about responsibility in connection with climate change: effectiveness, equality, desert, need, and ability. Since much (...) is already written about these distributions in that context, we believe much can be gained if we can make use of this discussion also in connection with AI. Our most important findings are: (1) Different principles give different answers depending on how they are interpreted but, in many cases, different interpretations and different principles agree and even strengthen each other. If for instance ‘equality-based distribution’ is interpreted in a consequentialist sense, effectiveness, and through it, ability, will play important roles in the actual distributions, but so will an equal distribution as such, since we foresee that an increased responsibility of underrepresented groups will make the risks and benefits of AI more equally distributed. The corresponding reasoning is true for need-based distribution. (2) If we acknowledge that someone has a certain responsibility, we also have to acknowledge a corresponding degree of influence for that someone over the matter in question. (3) Independently of which distribution principle we prefer, ability cannot be dismissed. Ability is not fixed, however and if one of the other distributions is morally required, we are also morally required to increase the ability of those less able to take on the required responsibility. (shrink)

Nicholas Makins makes a valuable contribution to the literature on medical decision-making, highlighting the role that risk attitudes play in deliberation and subsequently arguing that, in medical choices under uncertainty, if considerations of autonomy and beneficence support deference to patient values and outcome preferences then they also support deference to patients’ attitudes to risk.1 Crucially, however, Makins suggests that it is not simply first-order risk attitudes that are the appropriate target of deference but, rather, patients’ higher-order risk attitudes. In other (...) words, Makins argues that if considerations of autonomy and beneficence support deference in medical decision-making, this deference should include the risk attitudes that individuals desire to have or reflectively endorse. This commentary draws out a morally relevant and overlooked distinction between: (1) deferring to patients’ higher-order attitudes that endorse the first-order risk attitudes they currently hold. and (2) deferring to patients’ higher-order attitudes that endorse risk attitudes that are at odds with the first-order risk attitudes they currently hold (which equates to a higher-order desire to change one’s first-order risk-attitudes). I agree with Makins that if respect for autonomy and beneficence support deference to patient preferences, then these considerations may also support deference to at least some higher-order risk attitudes, namely, those of type (1). But I think that whether they support deference to those of type (2) is less clear. In particular, it does not …. (shrink)

This article is an attempt to rethink the interconnectedness between discourse and subjective agency and to highlight methodological approaches to studies of gendering processes as a central part of it. The notions of desire, subjectification and biography are understood as mediated by narratives and metaphors, as a movement between the individual and her contexts. The transformative methodological project suggests conceptual retoolings as new analytic approaches to empirical analysis of the kind that aims to provide complex understanding of subjectification processes (...) in lived life. The empirical field brought into the article as a means of explication deals with university cultures, and more specifically with a case of an assistant professor caught in conflicts between official academic discourses and more subtle political and gendered discourses. The author takes the concepts of desire trajectories, discursive authority, multifaceted discursive realities and past experiences into an analysis of the enacting forces involved in the processes of exclusion that finally ejects the protagonist in the empirical case from the university field. (shrink)

Being a formal and general as well as the most widely accepted approach to practical rationality, rational decision theory should be crucial for justifying rational morals. In particular, acting morally should also be rational in decision theoretic terms. After defending this thesis, in the critical part of the paper two strategies to develop morals following this insight are criticized: game theoretical ethics of cooperation and ethical intuitionism. The central structural objections to ethics of cooperation are that they too directly aim (...) at the rationality of moral action and that they to do not encompass moral values or a moral desirability function. The constructive half of the paper takes up these criticisms by developing a two-part strategy to bring rationality and morals in line. The first part is to define ‘moral desirability’. This is done, using multi-attribute utility theory, by equating several adequate components of an individual’s comprehensive utility function with the moral desirability function. The second part is to introduce mechanisms, institutions, in particular socially valid moral norms, that provide further motivation for acting in accordance with morals. (shrink)

This article develops the relationship between desire and cultural reproduction, from a conceptual point of view. Desire is emphasized as a process that articulates the subject with culture. Each culture presents ritual and ritualized practices that regulate the desires of individuals to constitute them as reproductive subject of a given culture. The methodological approach focuses on the fact that anthropology as a science requires observing social phenomena from a theoretical framework that includes desire as a social category. This work (...) presents a conceptual proposal made in this regard, exemplified with a specific ethnographic case of Hñähñu migrants to Mexico City. (shrink)

Sequences of numbers representing prior resource size were presented to participants in a common-pool resource dilemma. The numbers were sampled from uniform probability distributions with either a low variance (low resource uncertainty) or a high variance (high resource uncertainty). Presentations were both sequential and simultaneous. Three groups of 16 undergraduates either estimated the size of the resource when it did not represent value to them; requested an amount from the resource, identified with a sum of money, when the outcome of (...) the requests only depended on resource size; or requested from the resource (sum of money) when the outcome of the requests depended on both resource size and how much others in a group requested. In support of an individual outcome-desirability bias due to selective recall of the number sequences, after sequential presentation larger requests were observed when resource uncertainty was high than when it was low. No effects of resource uncertainty or presentation were found on the estimates of resource size. Whether or not the outcome of the requests depended on others' requests made little difference. (shrink)

The note puts forward the idea of revealed desirability, a novel instrument, which like revealed preference is observable from choice and important for individual and social welfare. We provide the axiomatic underlying individual’s choice model, preliminary experimental results that support the idea, and an appealing allocation rule that uses the revealed desirability information along with the revealed-preference information.

Meta-analytic findings have suggested that individual differences are relatively weaker predictors of academic dishonesty than are situational factors. A robust literature on deviance correlates and workplace integrity testing, however, demonstrates that individual difference variables can be relatively strong predictors of a range of counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs). To the extent that academic cheating represents a kind of counterproductive behavior in the work role of "student", employment-type integrity measures should be strong predictors of academic dishonesty. Our results with a (...) college student sample showed that integrity test scores were moderate to strong correlates of self-reported academic cheating and that these relationships persisted even after controlling for a variety of measurement concerns such as item format similarity, concurrent assessment, and socially desirable responding. Implications for institutional honor codes and the broader relations between educational and workplace dishonesty are discussed. (shrink)

The current position on the deceased’s consent and the family’s consent to organ and tissue donation from the dead is a double veto—each has the power to withhold and override the other’s desire to donate. This paper raises, and to some extent answers, questions about the coherence of the double veto. It can be coherently defended in two ways: if it has the best effects and if the deceased has only negative rights of veto. Whether the double veto has better (...) effects than other policies requires empirical investigation, which is not undertaken here. As for rights, the paper shows that it is entirely possible that individuals have a negative right of veto but no positive right to compel acceptance of their offers. Thus if intensivists and transplant teams turn down the deceased’s offer, they do not thereby violate the deceased’s right. This leaves it open whether non-rights based reasons—such as avoiding bad publicity or distress —require intensivists and transplant teams to turn down or accept the deceased’s offer. This, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. The current position may or may not be wrong, but it is at least coherent. (shrink)

This essay discusses how spectacular sports are framed in an national, epic world of fathers, firsts and bests, and put to use in regulating desire by narrating the fundamental fantasies that hold the subject together. Spectacular sports provide allegories of the excessive body, and these embodied narratives are meticulously produced through an individualizing training machine designed to deliver moments of excess. Sports produce phantasms of peak moments and phallic dominance, and symbolize a conquest of youth, women and the working population. (...) We ask if the subject may experience a kind of subjective destitution by the loss of a fundamental fantasy from watching sports and what the effects of such an experience may be. Can televised football induce in the viewer a sense that these images are mistaken as objects of desire, and give rise to the truth effects of "full speech"? (shrink)

The question of individual agency lies at the heart of any political and social theory aiming to analyse the social conditions that shape reality. Drawing mainly on the works of Luce Irigaray, Judith Butler, Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, this book endeavours to provide an account of agency as a mode of life in which social transformation and personal transformation meet and influence one another.<BR> The book describes the shortcomings of associating agency with resisting social norms or institutions, arguing (...) that agency, as a way of life, is a dynamic of self-creation inspired by a horizon of well-being. As part of this new account of agency the book re-evaluates several key concepts, thus far under-theorized in poststructural theory. First, it addresses the question of how we might understand well-being within a post-modern framework. Second, it presents a notion of 'desire to be', designating the motivational force that drives people to act in order to create a different world. And finally, it addresses the question of how a life of transformative political practices might constitute a sense of identity, both individual and collective. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:DESIRED POSSESSIONS: KARL POLANYI, RENÉ GIRARD, AND THE CRITIQUE OF THE MARKET ECONOMY Mark R. Anspach CREA, Paris! f '""phe most radical critique of liberal capitalism ever:" that is how JL Louis Dumont describes 7Ae Great Transformation, Karl Polanyi's classic work on the rise of the market system. But the French anthropologist goes on to observe that, when one confronts this same critique with the ethnography of tribal societies, (...) "one may ask whether Polanyi did not in fact come up short; having criticized the economy as an idea, he thought he could retain it as a thing..." (Dumont xiv, xvi). Is the economy indeed a "thing" that has always existed in some form everywhere, and if so, what manner of thing is it? In a word, what is an economyfor? Is there a particular aim that any economy must serve? A specific motive that it necessarily brings into play? We will begin by looking at Polanyi's answer to this question. "No human motive is per se economic," Polanyi tells us. "There is no such thing as a sui generis economic experience in the sense in which man may have a religious, aesthetic, or sexual experience." It is market society, with its dependence on a disembedded economic system, which fosters the illusion that the "economic" motives of hunger and gain necessarily underlie every economic system (1968, 63-4). In reality, however, "human beings will labor for a large variety of reasons as long as things are arranged accordingly." For example, "Monks traded for religious reasons... The KuIa trade ofthe Trobriand islanders... is mainly an aesthetic pursuit. Feudal economy was run on customary lines. With the Kwakiutl," industry appears to have been "a point of honor," and 1 82Mark R. Anspach so on (1968, 68). The trick, it seems, is to "arrange things accordingly." An economic system can be "run on noneconomic motives," Polanyi explains, without linking the process of production or distribution "to specific economic interests attached to the possession of goods," as long as "every single step in that process is geared to a number of social interests which eventually ensure that the required step be taken" (2001, 48). Now, there is a danger in this presentation. It could lead a reader to conclude that other societies arrange things cunningly so that all these social interests are harnessed to ensure the performance of the steps necessary to economic processes in a kind ofelaborate ruse—a ruse which the out-in-the-open operation ofthe economy in our society gives us the ability to see through. Very well, such a reader might acknowledge, the economy is an "instituted process," and, yes, the act of instituting it "shifts the place ofthe process in society" (Polanyi 1968, 148), but ifyou track it down to its hiding place and strip away the social contrivances in which it has been embedded, what you will find is still the economy as we know it—indeed, the economy which market society alone lays bare. In this reading, or rather misreading, the "real" economic aims that market society achieves directly are elsewhere accomplished only in the most cumbersomely indirect fashion. This kind of erroneous conclusion will likely be difficult to counter as long as one posits an opposition between multiple, variable and diffuse social interests, on the one hand, and the apparently straightforward individual interest in the possession of goods, on the other. Wherever the economy is submerged in social relationships, Polanyi says, a man "does not act so as to safeguard his individual interest in the possession ofmaterial goods; he acts so as to safeguard his social standing, his social claims, his social assets" (2001, 48). The problem with such an opposition between individual and social is that a market-minded theorist can overcome it simply by broadening the individual interest in the possession ofgoods to include the possession ofreified social goods. Once social interests are conceptualized as "social assets," to use Polanyi's own expression—or as "symbolic capital," to cite a more recent formulation—they lend themselves to "economizing" even in the formal sense, and Polanyi's carefully constructed distinction between the substantive and the formal collapses, apparently confirmingthe universality of the market... (shrink)

THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROTESTS OF THE 1950S AND 1960S WERE AS MUCH about challenging normative conceptions of good desire as they were about claiming individual rights. Staged as rituals, these protests dramatized the social borders and sentiments existing in American society, and they performed a transforming vision of the desires and purposes appropriate to democratic citizens and institutions. This analysis of the reason-giving potential of ritual challenges John Rawls's criterion of "reciprocity" as the constraint on public reason and (...) democratic legitimacy. Social activists sometimes have to revise public norms through asymmetrical appeals to religious ideals or moral convictions that other citizens may staunchly oppose. An expanded model of public reasoning teaches the importance and the difficulties of incorporating the arguments of ritual into other rights movements, including the movement for same-sex marriage. (shrink)

Gert Biesta claims that education involves introducing young people to a pathway from what they want to what it is good for them to want, offering the conditions for children to cross from the former to the latter. This shift from a realm of individual desires to the realm of the desirable constitutes a “de-centered existence”. Since there is an undeniable normative dimension in this view, it seemed important to search for the guiding values or principles that frames (...) it. In his ICPIC talk, G. Biesta refers to the Levinasian concept of responsibility, identifying individual desires (children’s desires) with the egological way of existence. In his 2014’s book, The beautiful risk of education, Biesta mentions the concept of educational wisdom (educators’ wisdom), through an Aristotelian standpoint. In either perspective, the author grants normative privileges to adults, claiming that, in an educational environment, adults have the responsibility to be educators and not learners. We follow from here to question Biesta’s statement of education as a risk, since if there are evaluative standards according to which educators can orient their practices, as well as students behaviors (either the responsibility in face of the Other or the ability to make good and wise judgments), how can one still talk about a risk in education? We end up our commentary by looking for deeper meanings for the concept of risk in education. (shrink)

This research is an extension of Walker Information’s (Business Ethics: Ethical Decision Making and Cases, pp. 235–255, 1999) study on employees’ job attitudes that was conducted exclusively in the United States. Walker Information found that the reputation of the organization, fairness at work, care, and concern for employees, trust in employees, and resources available at work were important factors in an employee’s decision to remain with his or her company. Our sample includes 713 students from seven countries: Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, (...) Hong Kong, Ireland, South Africa, and the United States. When analyzing the entire sample, our data indicate that both social desirability response bias and gender were significant; however, this was not the case when the data are analyzed by country. On an individual country basis, our data suggest that the generally accepted premise that women are more ethically conscious than men was only true for the samples from the United States and Canada. The data also indicate that, while social desirability response bias was significant for the four factors suggesting ethical components for the sample from the United States, this finding was not universal. (shrink)

Philosophers have described the human perspective on climate change as a perfect moral storm. I take a new angle on that storm: I argue that our relevant desires feature a particularly problematic case of seemingly consistent but genuinely inconsistent desires. We have, first, non‐indexical desires such as a desire to (make the sacrifices necessary to) stop polluting our environment at some point. We have, second, indexical desires such as a desire not to (make the sacrifices necessary (...) to) stop polluting our environment this year. Our indexical and non‐indexical desires are inconsistent. Such inconsistency is obvious in most short‐term, individual cases such as when we need to make a dentist appointment. But when it comes to climate change, that inconsistency is masked by factors such as longevity and bitter divisions. This is, unfortunately, why humanity may continue putting off the collective action required to address climate change. (shrink)

조선시대 {노자} 주석의 특징은 ‘유학자의 노자 읽기(以儒釋老)’로 대표된다. 그러나 조선사상사 안에서 {노자} 주석사의 흐름을 체계적으로 논의하기 위해서는 좀 더 미시적인 접근이 요구된다. 본 논문에서는 유학과 대립되는 {노자}의 ‘仁을 끊고 義를 버린다(絶仁棄義)’, ‘성인은 어질지 않다(聖人不仁)’ 등의 사유가 5종의 {노자} 주석서에서 어떻게 해석되는가를 살피고, 나아가 시대에 따른 해석의 변화과정에 주목하고자 한다. 조선시대 ‘仁義’는 당대 사회의 윤리적 표지이며, 모두가 따라야 할 공동체의 선이었다. 이이․박세당․홍석주가 {노자} 텍스트 상의 ‘仁義’ 부정에 대해 儒者의 입장에서 비판하거나, ‘仁義’를 적극 변호한다면, 서명응과 이충익에 이르면 ‘仁義’는 ‘공공선’의 위상에서 벗어나, 판단 (...) 주체의 도덕적 자각이 요구되는 도덕률로 언급된다. 또한 율곡과 홍석주가 ‘天理의 公’으로서의 ‘仁義’의 추구가 ‘無私’라고 본다면, 이충익에게서 ‘無私’란 개체의 이익을 위해 仁義를 따르는 것을 반성해야 되는 상태이다. 이 때 반성의 주체는 사회공동체가 아닌 개인이다. 요컨대 조선시대 {老子} 주석사 안에서 ‘도덕률’에 대한 인식변화는, 天理의 당위성이 강조되는 중세시기에서 근대로 넘어가면서, ‘공동체의 善’이 해체되는 과정을 보여 준다. 이 안에서 개인은 도덕률의 순종자에서 도덕률의 판단 주체로 변모하였다. 서명응 이충익의 이러한 새로운 시도에는 18세기 정치 이데올로기화 된 정주학에 대한 반성과 극복의 과정이 투영되어 있다. (shrink)

Feldman (Organization Science 11(6): 611–629, 2000) describes the striving mechanism as a mode of routine change driven by successful organizational routines. Striving describes a process by which organization members gain a better understanding of the ideals undergirding their actions. In turn, this insight drives changes within routines. In this paper, I argue that the rational actor model, especially as articulated in Donald Davidson’s (1963) theory of action, is unable to account for the striving mechanism of endogenous routine change identified by (...) Feldman (Organization Science 11(6): 611–629, 2000). Drawing upon Brewer’s (2011) criticisms of propositional theories of desire, the account of meta-language intentional attitudes developed by List and Pettit (2011), and MacIntyre’s (2007) theory of social practices, I introduce an expanded framework for conceptualizing agency at the individual level, and aggregation at the organization level, that better accounts for the striving mechanism as a process of endogenous routine change. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to determine whether there are cross-cultural differences between Chinese and Canadian business students with respect to their assessment of the ethicality of various business behaviors. Using a sample of 147 business students, the results indicate cultural crossvergence; the Chinese (72 students) and Canadians (75 students) exhibit different ethical attitudes toward questionable business practices at the individual level but not at the corporate level. A social desirability bias (a tendency to deny socially unacceptable actions (...) and to admit to socially desirable ones) is also found to be a cross-cultural phenomenon, with the Canadians demonstrating a greater bias than the Chinese. Finally, this bias causes respondents to increase their assessment of the un-ethicality of questionable business activities. (shrink)

The attempt to recuperate the efficacy of utopia from critics of its blueprint variants has seen the emergence of critical utopias.1 According to critics, the problem with "traditional" blueprint models lay in their production of "a closed, static, authoritarian society that negates temporality and does violence to plurality and individual singularity."2 Critical utopias sought to internalize such critiques in order to rescue utopia, resulting in a heightened attention to the problems of the dialectic of emancipation, plurality, and temporality. Consequently, (...) critical utopias contain a self-reflexive approach that aims to foreclose any authoritarian regression via an internalization of the preliminary and... (shrink)

According to James McCawley (1981) and Richard Larson and Gabriel Segal (1995), the following sentence is three-ways ambiguous: -/- Harry wants to be the mayor of Kenai. -/- According to them also, the three-way ambiguity cannot be accommodated on the Russellian view that definite descriptions are quantified noun phrases. In order to capture the three-way ambiguity of the sentence, these authors propose that definite descriptions must be ambiguous: sometimes they are predicate expressions; sometimes they are Russellian quantified noun phrases. After (...) explaining why the McCawley-Larson-Segal solution contains an obvious flaw, I discuss how an effort to correct the flaw brings to light certain puzzles about the individuation of desires, about quantifying in, and about the disambiguation of desire ascriptions. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that commodity consumption is to the regime of political capitalism at the turn of this century what Michel Foucault claimed for discourses of sexuality in the bio-political state. If I am right, then understanding contemporary subjectivities requires granting greater political credence to practices of commodity consumption than they generally receive and a correlative paradigm shift in our notion of desire - from discourses of sexuality to erotics of appetite. But whatever 'ethical substance' we focus upon (...) when we analyze our contemporary situation I think we must give greater consideration to practices of individual conduct. We must grant due attention to the uses to which our bodies, skills and resources are put, and to our active as well as passive participation in that usage, because our everyday conduct may be the missing link between our professed convictions and our actual political prospects. Key Words: capitalism • commodity consumption • conduct • democracy • ethics • Michel Foucault • freedom • politics • sexuality. (shrink)

The leitmotif of the German contribution to the 12th Architecture Biennial in Venice, “desire“, is at the same time the topic of a survey among architects ; answers are given through drawings. What are you longing for? The response drawings are highly individual, diversity becomes programme: both in picture language and in the presentation in terms of content, reactions are quite different. But there is one thing they all have in common: the burning desire of something concrete. Sometimes it (...) spreads lightning-like on the observer, sometimes time is required for a contemplative involvement with form and content. The architectural sketch, as it may seem, degenerated into a side product of architectural work within the last years, is back! (shrink)

. Personality may play a role in disputes between religion and science. Personality is influenced by sixteen basic desires and core values, which provide the psychological foundation of meaningful experience. How we prioritize these sixteen desires is what makes us individuals. Religious persons may place a low priority on the desire for self‐reliance , whereas nonreligious scientists may place a high priority on self‐reliance. These differences may motivate religious persons to find meaning in images of psychologically supportive deities (...) and may motivate nonreligious intellectuals to find meaning in abstract scientific principles. To bridge the schism between religion and science, we need to appreciate the extent to which spirituality is an individual experience. (shrink)

Autonomy, self-determination, self-affirmation, emancipation: all these words refer to an ideal that orients the way in which our contemporary culture speaks about many moral and political problems. The importance of this ideal for us can be seen in the way we accept as obvious a number of ideas that follow from it. Most of us would certainly tend to accept that no universally valid answer can be given to the question of what kind of human life is truly meaningful or (...) valuable and that, because of this, people should be granted as much freedom as possible to pursue a life that best corresponds with their own personal tastes and preferences. Many would go a step further and claim that people should also be encouraged to live as much as possible according to what they have themselves chosen, and that they should give up traditional forms of life and role patterns.One aspect of this cult of individual freedom or autonomy is the idea that we should develop a critical attitude towards anything established, accepted or traditional: every form of power or authority, prevailing moral norms and educational customs, traditional role patterns, etc. A further feature of this is the tendency to describe any improvement in the fortunes of the weak, the vulnerable and the less well off as an ‘emancipation’. The idea that the poor, the handicapped and the elderly should receive more support, assistance, respect and attention is translated by the assertion that they, too, should be ‘liberated’.The ideals that we associate with words like ‘emancipation’ or ‘self-affirmation’ were at one time innovative and revolutionary, but they gradually became established as accepted ways of thinking and thus became part of a new common sense. Nowadays, anyone wanting to be provocative will attain their goal more easily by scoffing at everything falling under the rubric of emancipation than by speaking out in its defence.This fact is characteristic of an ambiguity in our culture. While the ideals of self-affirmation and emancipation enjoy enormous popularity, in certain intellectual circles they are treated with suspicion. At stake here is the general image of humanity associated with these ideals. Thinkers such as Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Lacan, Derrida or Baudrillard have, each in their own way, attacked the idea of the autonomous subject and stressed that people’s most intimate thoughts and desires are determined by something that transcends them: by the language they speak or the culture to which they belong.Rejecting the idea of the autonomous subject is usually one aspect of a more general critique of ideas inherited from the Enlightenment. The question whether and to what extent this critique is justified occupies a central position in many contemporary philosophical discussions, and much of what goes on in contemporary philosophy can be described in terms of the opposition between those who would defend Enlightenment ideals and those who would reject or cast doubt on those ideals.What I would like to discuss here undoubtedly fits into a framework that could be called ‘antiliberal’ or ‘anti-humanist’. However, it is certainly not my intention to criticize humanism or liberalism directly and systematically. (shrink)

Many economists and social theorists hypothesize that most societies could soon face a ‘post-work’ future, one in which employment and productive labor have a dramatically reduced place in human affairs. Given the centrality of employment to individual identity and its pivotal role as the primary provider of economic and other goods, transitioning to a ‘post-work’ future could prove traumatic and disorienting to many. Policymakers are thus likely to face the difficult choice of the extent to which they ought to (...) satisfy individual citizens’ desires to work in a socioeconomic environment in which work is in permanent decline. Here I argue that policymakers confronting a post-work economy should discount, or at least consider problematic, the desire to work because it is very likely that this desire is an adaptive preference. An adaptive preference is a preference for some state of affairs within a limited set of options formed under unjust conditions. The widespread desire for work has been formed under unjust labor conditions to which individuals are compelled to submit in order to meet material and ethical needs. Furthermore, the prevalence of the ‘work dogma’ in contemporary societies precludes nearly all individuals from seeing alternatives to work as live options. (shrink)

Jonathan Dancy’s Practical Reality makes a significant contribution to clarifying the relationship between desire and reasons for acting, both the normative reasons we seek in deliberation and the motivating reasons we cite in explanation. About the former, Dancy argues that, not only are normative reasons not all grounded in desires, but, more radically, the fact that one desires something is never itself a normative reason. And he argues that desires fail to figure in motivating reasons also, concluding (...) that neither the fact nor the state of desire is ever a motivating reason for acting. I am in significant agreement with Dancy about these matters, but I want to register some reservations nonetheless. Dancy is certainly right to reject the DBR (desire-based reasons) thesis that all normative reasons are grounded in desires.1 Desires, he points out, call for reasons no less than do actions. But I think he insufficiently appreciates a way in which facts about the agent’s desires and related practical psychic states can provide normative reasons. Not that this gives away anything to Dancy’s Humean opponents. What gives an agent’s desires, values, and moral convictions normative weight, I shall suggest, is her dignity and integrity as an individual person. (shrink)

This is a philosophical-moral study on the concept of altruistic happiness, through a hermeneutic analysis of a fundamental episode of the Divine Comedy. The symbol of the White Rose, contemplated by Dante in Paradise XXXI, represents the communion of saints, that is, of those who can experience in their psyche the extinction of desire in full joy. The kingdom of heaven is seen by the pilgrim poet as a beautiful flower with many petals. Its value is in the whole, the (...) flower, but also in its individual parts, the petals. The salvation of the soul is therefore linked to altruism, to denying ourselves for our neighbors, in the name of a collective good. However, the poet shows us that every human individuality is precious, and the paradisiacal abolition of egoism is not the destruction of the uniqueness of the soul but the fulfillment of the self. Inside hell, which is described by Dante like an emblem of selfishness, Beatrice appears as a divine creature, ready to save her beloved poet. This means that Christianity starts the process of human salvation from the lowest material depth of the universe. Consequently, the low is not the opposite of the high: since there is also a high within that low. The individual, if purified from selfishness, becomes in the kingdom of heaven the independent and complementary mirror of a universal joy, a collective joy. Dante, deeply linked to Franciscanism, defends the Mariological concept of ‘Immaculate Conception’ and, in the Divine Comedy, offers us a philosophical-moral message that translates the profound meaning of this same theological idea into secular terms. The solitude of the individual matter that forms the body of every man is only apparent. We are not alone. There is another invisible, silent, very pure reality that has sunk into this matter of ours and into consciousness. This reality can save mankind and bring every person back into joyful wholeness. (shrink)

This essay is about the relationship between the notions of practical reason, the will, and choice in Kant’s practical philosophy. Although Kant explicitly identifies practical reason and the will, many interpreters argue that he cannot really mean it on the grounds that unless they are distinct, irrational and, especially, immoral action is impossible. Other readers affirm his identification but distinguish the will from choice on the same basis. We argue that proper attention to Kant’s conception of practical reason as a (...) capacity reveals that these distinctions are neither textually grounded nor philosophically necessary. His moral psychology concerns a single capacity, practical reason, which is the will, and whose actualities in this or that individual fall under the title of choice. Practical reason is the will and choice because it is the rational faculty of desire: a rational being’s capacity to be, by means of her representations, the cause of the actuality of their objects. This, we argue, is entailed by his conception of rational action: action not just in accordance with, but in and through the representation of, principles. The possibility of irrational action is explained not by a distinction between capacities but by the finitude, and thereby the fallibility, of human reason. (shrink)

Teresa of Avila's desire for suffering cannot be interpreted as the mere passive assumption of a feminine sacrificial role. On the contrary, Teresa was able to transform her suffering into the incarnated performance of her relationship with God: By desiring suffering and by understanding it and her ability to confront it as proof of divine love, she was able to reinforce her self‐confidence and strength. This article discusses Teresa of Avila's experience and interpretation of suffering in the context of the (...) female ascetic‐mystic Christian tradition. It criticizes Teresa's positive conceptualization of suffering but examines in depth the potential of her ability to actively manage and control it. Although Teresa was able to affirm her personality through ascetic practices such as self‐humiliation and mortification, the general applicability of such practices to the management of suffering is fraught since they leave the suffering individual in a vulnerable position. Although Teresa of Avila finds fulfillment and, paradoxically, self‐actualization through self‐denial and the surrender of her will, such practices entail the substantial risk of total self‐annihilation. (shrink)

Publication date: 15 October 2018 Source: Author: Mohsen Hanif, Hamed Badri Theodor Dreiser's Sister Carrie dramatizes the unbridled greed for wealth and craze for status in an extremely commercialized world. It exemplifies the servitude of a society beholden to a consumerist market, where the affluent prey on the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the poor. The novel captures human relations in their seismic change, where family bonds are breaking down and the family is losing its role as a basic social unit. (...) This article will argue that human desire lies at the heart of family breakdowns in Sister Carrie. In doing so, it will provide an insight into the workings of the capitalist system, including its inroads into the shores of human desire – explaining how it robs individuals of their true essence and dehumanizes them. Finally, the article will call for checks and balances vis-à-vis our uncontrollable desires and recommend collective efforts in order to protect the institution of family and bring back commercialized societies from the brink. (shrink)

This paper offers a detailed account of Foucaults ethical and political notion of individuality as presented in his late work, and discusses its relationship to the feminist project of the theory of sexual difference. I argue that Foucaults elaboration of the classical ethos of care for the self opens the way for regarding the I-woman as an ethical, political and aesthetic self-creation. However, it has significant limitations that cannot be ignored. I elaborate on two aspects of Foucaults avoidance of sexual (...) difference as a relevant category for an account of political and ethical individuality, which thus implicitly associates individual agency with men. I argue that Foucault implicitly assumes the existence of an ontological desire to become engaged in political self-creation. However, the ethical position of self-knowledge and desire should be understood as a contingent option that depends on material and historical conditions for its realization. Hence, I argue that a feminist reworking of Foucaults notion of political individuality should add a substantial ethical condition to the imperative of self-knowledge and self-creation – making possible the desiring woman subject. (shrink)

Henry Allison's “Incorporation Thesis” has played an important role in recent discussions of Kantian ethics. By focussing on Kant's claim that “a drive [Triebfeder] can determine the will to an action only so far as the individual has incorporated it into his maxim,” Allison has successfully argued against Kant's critics that desire-based non-moral action can be free action. His work has thus opened the door for a wide range of discussions which integrate feeling into moral action more deeply than (...) had previously been considered “Kantian”. (shrink)

The aim of this book is to lay an ontological foundation for ethics. For this it must at least be assumed that human beings exist and are aware of desires. Desire is defined as “a provoking idea which demands of an individual a state different from the one he is presently experiencing”. Desires occur at three levels, physical, social and cosmological. Cosmological desires, those “which call upon idea-concepts that make ultimate statements about life and reality”, are (...) the most important. A successful cosmological idea is one that satisfies man’s questionings about his life and destiny. A successful idea may, however, in changed circumstances prove no longer adequate. The cosmologies of the Greeks or the physics of the schoolmen have had their day; their radical inadequacy, here called their “furtive factor”, has been called into the open. “The storehouse of history is filled with literally millions of discarded ideas and idea-tools which have been discarded because the furtive factor they contained, so well hidden at the time of their utilization as ‘true’ ideas, has been exposed to view”. (shrink)

This paper presents a unifying diagnosis of a number of important problems facing existing models of rational choice under moral uncertainty and proposes a remedy. I argue that the problems of (i) severely limited scope, (ii) intertheoretic comparisons, and (iii) 'swamping’ all stem from the way in which values are assigned to options in decision rules such as Maximisation of Expected Choiceworthiness. By assigning values to options under a given moral theory by asking something like ‘how much do I desire (...) this option, supposing this theory is true?’ rather than ‘how much value does this theory assign to this option?’ these problems can be avoided, while the appealing features of these accounts can be preserved. This amendment provides a role for the preferences, desires, or goals of rational agents that is curiously absent from the existing discussion of what individuals rationally ought to do when they are uncertain about what they morally ought to do. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Act-based theories of content hold that propositions are identical to acts of predication that we perform in thought and talk. To undergo an occurrent thought with a particular content is just to perform the act of predication that individuates that content. But identifying the content of a thought with the performance of an act of predication makes it difficult to explain the intentionality of bouletic mental activity, like wanting and desiring. In this paper, I argue that this difficulty is (...) insurmountable: the contents of occurrent desires cannot be determined by acts of predication. (shrink)