Unlike many theories of the self found in Western philosophy, Maria Lugones and Mariana Ortega argue that subjectivity is multiplicitous in ways that defy the either/or logic of colonial Western thought. They also center liminal subjects, take embodiment seriously, and position multiplicitous subjects as always already in the borderlands. Their accounts of multiplicity are grounded in their lived experiences. Nevertheless, Lugones and Ortega disagree on the ontological and existential statuses of the multiplicitous self. While Lugones defends (...) ontological pluralism and the discontinuity of experience that dissolves any unified "I," Ortega defends existential pluralism and the continuity of experience, retaining an... (shrink)

La relation est au coeur de l'existence individuelle et les multiplicités, que déterminent les différents rapports pratiques, affectifs, sociaux et politiques, sont coextensives à l'invention continue de l'individualité par elle-même. Le présent essai veut rendre compte de la constitution, à partir de la seule activité des individus, des diverses formes d'existence et d'organisation que peut revêtir un ensemble pratique : rassemblements, dispositifs collectifs, réseaux et systèmes, associations et communautés plus ou moins étendues et diversement intégrées, institutions et Etats, sans oublier (...) les conflits et les luttes, avec leur développement historique. Affectée par des phénomènes de domination, la multiplicité reçoit la structure passive de l'union en altérité, comme si la liberté en venait à réaliser, malgré elle, la transmutation de la puissance singulière en impuissance. Mais une multiplicité active peut aussi se constituer en résistant à la servitude et en rompant avec l'être sériel : elle s'affirme alors dans l'expérience subjective du groupe, avec l'apparition du pouvoir normatif et critique appartenant à une multitude libre, qui crée de nouvelles formes de la vie sociale. (shrink)

In The Expanse, Naomi Nagata, the Roci's XO and engineering marvel, is a person caught between worlds, someone torn in multiple directions by the social situations she finds herself immersed in. Throughout the series, she embodies multiplicitous subjectivity. In Nemesis Games Naomi Nagata experiences the kind of inner conflict of the self that can occur in moving between worlds. Internal conflict illuminates the multiple worlds Naomi inhabits. Just as one can travel between Earth and Mars, “one can ‘travel’ (...) between these [social] ‘worlds.’” Unlike places such as Earth and Mars, with worlds in the social sense, “one can inhabit more than one of these ‘worlds’ at the very same time.” In framing spaces of meaning, the establishment of borders between worlds creates borderlands. (shrink)

This article suggests that looking at the ways in which subjects relate to and internalise gender norms is a fruitful way to explore socially constructed differences between masculinity and femininity in the U.S. Throughout this article, I am in dialogue with Judith Butler’s theory of gender performativity as I focus on practices of subject formation that I denote as ‘logics’ of subject formation. I propose several key ways to distinguish a feminine logic of subject formation from a masculine logic of (...) subjectivity. I suggest that femininity is a multiplicitous, self-proliferating strategy that forecloses truth as a means for achieving selfhood. Alternatively, I postulate that masculinity tends to masquerade as an (oftentimes failed) achievement that is singular and self-consolidating and that generates truth as a means for realising selfhood. In order to contextualise these distinctions between masculinity and femininity, I look to the recent influx of American women into masculine-marked domains such as the workforce, politics and sports without a corresponding entrance of men into feminine-marked domains. Known as the stalled gender revolution, these shifts, I argue, have created the context for the gendered divergences in subjectivity I suggest here. Focusing on examples of women in sports to illustrate these distinctions, I provide a detailed characterisation of femininity as a logic of subject formation. As such, I argue that this approach to gender may provide relevant insights to understanding gender practice, agency and resistance, particularly with respect to Butler’s formulation of gender performativity and subversion. I conclude by providing some preliminary thoughts on how to re-envision agency and subversion in light of the proposed framework. (shrink)

In this manuscript I explore an example of an over-privileged white woman who encounters two young Black men in a parking garage stairwell. Two related axioms are central to the oppressive script that lies before these subjects: the hetero-patriarchal axiom that women are not safe alone at night and the racist axiom that Black men, especially young ones, are dangerous. These axioms are intended to ensure a practical conclusion—white women and Black men are supposed to avoid each other—thereby conferring legitimacy (...) on the white male, hetero-patriarchal order. If this is a performance of oppression, we must ask, what is the performance of freedom? Freedom, I argue, is the practice of allowing and encouraging a subject's multiple selves to interact so that one may devise and pursue courses of action that have been strategically hidden by systems of domination designed to cultivate pliant agency. My project augments accounts of multiplicitous subjectivity wherein our multiple social worlds socially constitute persons as both oppressor and oppressed, empowered and pliant. The practice of freedom conceived here acknowledges multiplicity while positioning us to seek feminist and antiracist futures that are not configured by oppression. (shrink)

This article offers a pragmatist conception of multiplicitous subjectivity that captures the best features of Richard Rorty’s private ironist and John Dewey’s social self while rejecting anti-democratic implications I identify in each. On the one hand, Rorty rightly sees that having a plural self is crucial for self-creation but fails to see the connection between self-creation and social justice. On the other hand, Dewey rightly sees the interrelationship between personal and social growth but fails to appreciate the danger (...) implicit in his emphasis on integration of differences (both within the self and in the community). To see how we can achieve a compelling synthesis of these two views, I turn to Gloria Anzaldúa’s theory of “mestiza consciousness,” which points us toward a model of democratic citizenship that brings together Rorty’s tolerance for multiplicity and ambivalence with Dewey’s relational understanding of personal development and social progress. (shrink)

What are the limits of Left Wittgensteinianism's point- and need-based account of conceptual change? Based upon Wittgenstein's account of certainty and the riverbed analogy for conceptual change in On Certainty, the question is raised whether Queloz and Cueni's redevelopment of Left Wittgensteinianism can account for the multiplicitous forms of change these concepts are subject to. I argue that Left Wittgensteinianism can only partially do so, because it overemphasises the role of criticism-driven conceptual change, due to its focus on the (...) reason-based contingency of the practices of a local ‘we’. In response, it is argued that Left Wittgensteinianism should be fortified with (i) gradual changes to concepts' sociocultural constraints that concept-users are unaware of and (ii) evolutionary and environmental changes to the biological determinants of natural constraints of conceptual cores. In the end, there are conceptual practices like holding for certain that are generally, and fully contingent, but simultaneously inevitable not only for ‘us’ but also for many other delimitations of ‘we’. Subsequently, the compatibility of this Wittgensteinian account of conceptual change with pragmatic genealogy is discussed. It is concluded that thinking about conceptual changes to practices cannot be about the possibility of criticism alone nor succeed without the inclusion thereof. (shrink)

Sur le modèle des représentations et des propositions en soi de Bolzano, Husserl a envisagé les significations comme des unités idéales-objectives qui sont accessibles à plusieurs consciences et qui perdurent au-delà des actes psychiques passagers dans lesquels elles se réalisent. Indépen­dantes des opérations subjectives, les unités sémantiques seraient donc transcendantes, c’est-à-dire extérieures à la conscience. Cependant, en posant la subjectivité transcendantale comme un absolu par rapport auquel tout objet, réel ou idéal, se définit, la phénoménologie transcendantale-constitutive est finalement incapable de (...) rendre compte de cette transcendance dont elle nie le caractère absolu au profit de la conscience : une fois que les unités de sens sont définies comme des formations logiques issues de l’activité catégoriale, leur « transcendance » n’est plus qu’un sens d’être intention­nellement constitué. Dès lors, peut-on expliquer la « transcen­dance » des unités de sens, sans vider ce concept de son contenu essentiel, sans retirer aux significations leur indépendance et leur extériorité vis-à-vis de la conscience ? L’hypothèse la plus simple consisterait à dire qu’avant de traduire la manière dont les objets sont représentés par la conscience, les significations conceptuelles sont liées aux propriétés que la pensée a arra­chées à leurs substrats pour en faire des marques distinctives. Mais cet ancrage ontologique soulève à son tour de multiples difficultés, si bien que Husserl, pour expliquer la transcendance des significations sans contrevenir à ses principes idéalistes, n’a pas d’autre choix que d’invoquer un ancrage linguistique : une fois consignées dans des signes extérieurs, les pensées sortent de la sphère privée, acquièrent une extériorité, une publicité et une solidité en vertu desquelles elles se conservent au-delà des vécus passagers, et sont à tout moment accessibles à toute conscience. Cependant, si le langage commun apparaît, pour les consciences, comme l’ultime condition de possibilité de la transcendance des significations, il n’en demeure pas moins que la transcendance qui leur revient avant qu’elles ne soient exprimées — car pour Husserl les significations, dont l’unité s’oppose à la multiplicité des signes susceptibles de les transcrire, ne sont pas nécessaire­ment exprimées — demeure un postulat métaphysique qui pourrait bien s’effondrer avec l’hypothèse d’une traductibilité translinguistique du sens qui lui sert de corollaire. (shrink)

Aurélien Djian | : L’ambition de cet article est double. Il s’agit d’abord de fixer le contexte philosophique qui sous-tend le débat entre Derrida et Marion en 1999, à l’Université de Villanova, et de réviser la perspective qui y est formulée selon laquelle le destin de la phénoménologie est intimement lié à une décision à prendre à l’égard du concept d’horizon : « il n’y a pas de phénoménologie sans horizon », affirme Derrida à Marion, il faut donc la dépasser (...) ; « la dernière étape en vue d’une véritable phénoménologie serait d’abandonner le concept d’horizon », rétorque Marion à Derrida. Cette révision de perspective nous conduira alors, dans un second temps, à restituer, en se servant de l’histoire du concept d’horizon comme fil directeur heuristique, le sens de ce que nous appellerons l’histoire française de l’herméneutique phénoménologique, dont l’unité, par-delà la multiplicité des étiquettes, réside dans le partage d’une même définition de l’activité philosophique, comme tentative de laisser se montrer soi-même à partir de soi-même le phénomène par excellence, et, avec et contre le second Heidegger, d’une même exigence de dépassement de l’horizon, solidaire de la métaphysique moderne de la subjectivité. Le principe d’une telle reconstruction permettra enfin d’envisager la possibilité d’une histoire différenciée des concepts alternatifs de phénoménologie et d’horizon, qui reste à écrire. | : The task of this article is twofold. First, it is meant to sketch out the philosophical context within which the Derrida/Marion debate that happened in 1999 at the university of Villanova took place, and to overhaul the perspective that it puts forward, that the destiny of phenomenology itself is linked at the abandon of the concept of horizon : “Without horizon there is no phenomenology”, argues Derrida against Marion ; “the last step for a real phenomenology would be to give up the concept of horizon”, answers Marion to Derrida. This overhaul will then leads us to use the history of the concept of horizon as a heuristical guiding thread to flesh out what makes the unity of what we can call the French history of hermeneutical phenomenology, that is to say, firstly, the sharing of the same definition of philosophy, as the attempt to let the distinctive phenomenon be seen as it shows itself by itself. And, secondly, with and against the second Heidegger, of the same requirement of overcoming the horizon, as it is committed to the modern metaphysics of subjectivity. The principle on which such a reconstruction is based will finally allow us to consider the idea of a differentiated history of the alternative concepts of phenomenology and horizon. History which is yet to come. (shrink)

This essay works on the role of trauma and forgetting in the subjective formations of the world-traveler and la nueva mestiza. I investigate how forgetting affects the resistant capacities of these figures. I argue throughout that the memory of the world-traveler is an opaque memory, which is unintelligible for the hegemonic demands of transparency, and which forms the silt upon which the resistant possibilities of the world-traveler rest. The first part elaborates María Lugones's conception of world-traveling in relation to Gloria (...) Anzaldúa's New Mestiza consciousness and Mariana Ortega's multiplicitous self. Here I draw attention to the role of opacity and forgetting in the ways in which one can inhabit a world. The second part develops the notions of trauma and haunting to establish the experiential memory of the world-traveler not as a traumatic rupture, but rather as a haunted memory that accompanies her travels. The last section turns to Édouard Glissant's notion of opacity as a resistant mechanism, which works not through the traumatic rupture of experience but rather through sedimentation of experience. (shrink)

A thorough appreciation of the Whiteheadian subjectivist principle necessitates both a doctrine of panexperientialism as well as a metaphysical perspectivism. Employing a dialectical analysis of these two, this article argues that reality—as understood by the Whiteheadian term “actual world”—is largely misunderstood. Far from representing a singular concrete world, reality is multiplicitous and subject-dependent. As a result of this and the core tenet of process metaphysics—that all existents can be understood as event—it is argued that human language, as its own (...) species of event, interacts with reality in the same way all other events do, and as such must be considered genuinely ontologically creative. (shrink)

This paper argues that one of the most valuable insights that Muslim-Americans ought to bring into the political arena is our affective response to the government of the United States' internal and foreign policies regarding Muslims. I posit the concept of empathy as one such response that ought to inform our foreign policy in a manner inclusive of Muslim-Americans. The scope of our epistemic privilege encompasses the affective response that crosses borders of the nation-state in virtue of our propinquity to (...) the narratives of Muslims globally. Such an affective response is crucial to our selves remaining multiplicitous and whole. Furthermore, I argue that we ought to access and assess those aspects of our identity that make us subject to suspicions of disloyalty, because it is precisely those aspects that can inform our social and political discourse in a more morally adequate and responsive way. (shrink)

The separation of Avicenna between Essence and Existence influenced logic and Arab and Muslim logicians in the Middle Ages among them Ibn al-Nafīs (1208-1288). Under this influence he contributed to the development of logic and especially the theory of the universal term. By means of the consequences of this analysis:-It has become possible to make a distinction between abstract concepts and formal concepts independent of any sensible reality, and hence the questioning of Aristotelian categories, that is to say the ability (...) to conceive for Ibn al-Nafīs like Avicenna, subjects and predicates which are not necessarily words expressing or belonging to one of the Aristotelian categories.-The analysis of the universal proposition as a conditional proposition, which made easier the distinction between absolute proposition which has no existential implication, and the other which differ from the first by an affirmation of explicit existence. (shrink)

In his book “World-Centred Education,” Biesta discusses two themes fundamental for the emergence of subjectivity as a desirable existential humane state of being and for an education that aims to achieve it. The first theme is about freedom and the importance of distancing education and teaching from any act of objectifying students. The second theme concerns the world, its limitations on freedom, and its central role in educational events, which aim to help students fulfill their subjectivity. However, when (...) he analyzes three historical cases to conceptualize and demonstrate his ideas regarding subjectivity and education as subjectification, Biesta seems to focus more on the role of the first theme than the second. This imbalance does not give the world the proper place Biesta’s theory itself inspires to provide, as first and foremost expressed in the book’s title. This article proposes an alternative reading of the book’s theory regarding subjectivity, freedom, the world, and their interrelationships. The suggested reading gives the world a more central role in the emergence of events of subjectivity without harming freedom and thus changes how we can analyze the three cases and how to understand and generate education and teaching aiming at subjectification. (shrink)

Theories of health and disease which oppose evaluative and descriptive claims or opt for one or the other in defining fundamental concepts err, it is argued, due to an oversimplified conception of both the science of medicine and the art of clinical judgment. The work of Georges Canguilhem on the biological dimensions of value and subjectivity is explored. I conclude that he avoids the falsehoods of (a) neutral, pure fact-based medical science, and (b) cultural, arbitrary notions of value.

(2013). Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 291-314. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2011.625117.

The paper links discussions of two topics: biological individuality and the simplest forms of mentality. I discuss several attempts to locate the boundary between metabolic activity and ‘minimal cognition.’ I then look at differences between the kinds of individuality present in unicellular life, multicellular life in general, and animals of several kinds. Nervous systems, which are clearly relevant to cognition and subjectivity, also play an important role in the form of individuality seen in animals. The last part of the (...) paper links these biological transitions to the evolutionary history of subjective experience. (shrink)

This unusually accessible account of recent Anglo-American philosophy focuses on how that philosophy has challenged deeply held notions of subjectivity, mind, and language. The book is designed on a broad canvas in which recent arguments are placed in a historical context (in particular they are related to medieval philosophy and German idealism). The author then explores such topics as mental content, moral realism, realism and antirealism, and the character of subjectivity. Much of the book is devoted to an (...) investigation of Donald Davidson's philosophy, and there is also a sustained critique of the position of Richard Rorty. A final chapter defends the realist position against objections from postmodern thought. As a rigorous and historically sensitive account of recent philosophy, this book should enjoy a wide readership among philosophers of many different persuasions, literary theorists, and social scientists who have been influenced by postmodern thought. (shrink)

Subjectivity is that feature of consciousness whereby there is something it is like for a subject to undergo an experience. One persistent challenge in the study of consciousness is to explain how subjectivity relates to, or arises from, purely physical brain processes. But, in order to address this challenge, it seems we must have a clear explanation of what subjectivity is in the first place. This has proven challenging in its own right. For the nature of (...) class='Hi'>subjectivity itself seems to resist straightforward characterization. In this paper, I won't address how subjectivity relates to the physical. Instead, I'll address subjectivity itself. I'll do this by introducing and defending a model of subjectivity based on self-acquaintance. My model does not purport to reduce, eliminate, or naturalize subjectivity, but it does make subjectivity more tractable, less paradoxical, and perhaps less dubious to those averse to obscurity. (shrink)

This is the first book in English to elucidate the central issues in the work of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, a figure crucial to the movement of philosophy from Kant to German idealism. The book explains Fichte's notion of subjectivity and how his particular view developed out of Kant's accounts of theoretical and practical reason. Fichte argued that the subject has a self-positing structure which distinguishes it from a thing or an object. Thus, the subject must be understood as an (...) activity rather than a thing and is self-constituting in a way that an object is not. In the final chapter, Professor Neuhouser considers how this doctrine of the self-positing subject enables us to understand the possibility of the self's autonomy, or self-determination. (shrink)

_The Horizon of Modernity_ provides a historicized account of New Confucian philosophy in relation to the contemporary revival of Confucianism and explores the nexus between subjectivity and social structure in the works of Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, and Xiong Shili.

This paper draws on the notion of the ‘project,’ as developed in the existential philosophy of Heidegger and Sartre, to articulate an understanding of the existential structure of engagement with virtual worlds. By this philosophical understanding, the individual’s orientation towards a project structures a mechanism of self-determination, meaning that the project is understood essentially as the project to make oneself into a certain kind of being. Drawing on existing research from an existential-philosophical perspective on subjectivity in digital game environments, (...) the notion of a ‘virtual subjectivity’ is proposed to refer to the subjective sense of being-in-the-virtual-world. The paper proposes an understanding of virtual subjectivity as standing in a nested relation to the individual’s subjectivity in the actual world, and argues that it is this relation that allows virtual world experience to gain significance in the light of the individual’s projectual existence. The arguments advanced in this paper pave the way for a comprehensive understanding of the transformative, self-transformative, and therapeutic possibilities and advantages afforded by virtual worlds. (shrink)

Philosophers have spent millennia accumulating knowledge about knowledge. But negative epistemological phenomena, such as ignorance, falsity, and delusion, are persistently overlooked. Markus Gabriel argues that being wrong is part and parcel of subjectivity itself, adding a novel perspective on epistemic failures to debates around New Realism.

The article presents a perspective on the scientific explanation of the subjectivity of conscious experience. It proposes plausible answers for two empirically valid questions: the ‘how’ question concerning the developmental mechanisms of subjectivity, and the ‘why’ question concerning its function. Biological individuation, which is acquired in several different stages, serves as a provisional description of how subjective perspectives may have evolved. To the extent that an individuated informational space seems the most efficient way for a given organism to (...) select biologically valuable information, subjectivity is deemed to constitute an adaptive response to informational overflow. One of the possible consequences of this view is that subjectivity might be (at least functionally) dissociated from consciousness, insofar as the former primarily facilitates selection, the latter action. (shrink)

This book presents an exploration of concepts central to health care practice. In exploring such concepts as Subjectivity, Life, Personhood, and Death in deep philosophical terms, the book aims to draw out the ethical demands that arise when we encounter these phenomena, and also the moral resources of health care workers for meeting those demands. The series Values in Bioethics makes available original philosophical books in all areas of bioethics, including medical and nursing ethics, health care ethics, research ethics, (...) environmental ethics, and global bioethics. (shrink)

Part 1. Husserl: the outlines of the transcendental-phenomenological system -- 1. Husserl's phenomenological discovery of the natural attitude -- 2. Husserl's theory of the phenomenological reduction: between lifeworld and Cartesianism -- 3. Some methodological problems arising in Husserl's late reflections on the phenomenological reduction -- 4. Facticity and historicity as constituents of the lifeworld in Husserl's late philosophy -- 5. Husserl's concept of the "transcendental person": another look at the Husserl-Heidegger relationship -- 6. Dialectics of the absolute: the systematics of (...) the phenomenological system in Husserl's last period -- Part 2. Husserl, Kant, and neo-Kantianism: from subjectivity to lifeworld as a world of culture -- 7. From being to givenness and back: some remarks on the meaning of transcendental idealism in Kant and Husserl -- 8. Reconstruction and reduction: Natorp and Husserl on method and the question of subjectivity -- 9. A hermeneutic phenomenology of subjective and objective spirit: Husserl, Natorp, and Cassirer -- 10. Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms: between reason and relativism: a critical appraisal -- Part 3. Toward a Husserlian hermeneutics -- 11. The subjectivity of effective history and the suppressed husserlian elements in Gadamer's hermeneutics -- 12. Husserl's "hermeneutical phenomenology" as a philosophy of culture. (shrink)

The ethnographic turn in religious studies has responded to important developments, such as the rejection of value neutrality and the need to better address the lived experience of individuals and communities. In this essay, I affirm the value of ethnography as a method in comparative religious ethics, but distinguish between two ways of framing ethnography in relation to ethics. The first way insists on the hard limits of translating values across cultures, and tends to marginalize or dismiss normative inquiry. The (...) second way allows for the interpretation of practices of ethical justification in diverse cultural contexts. I argue that this second category of ethnography is more congenial to the work of comparative religious ethicists, since an integral part of ethical inquiry involves reflecting on, and making arguments about, social norms and practices. (shrink)

'A fabulous journey through thirty years of political and intellectual ferment... will reorient our reading of Foucault's major works' Didier Eribon The Essential Works of Michel Foucault offers the definitive collection of his articles, interviews and seminars from across thirty years of his extraordinary career. This first volume, Ethics, contains the summaries of Foucault's renowned courses at the Collège de France, as well as key writings and candid interviews on ethical matters: from the role of the intellectual and philosopher in (...) society to friendship, sexuality and the care of the self and others. Edited by Paul Rabinow Translated by Robert Hurley and Others. (shrink)

This paper examines ethics in organizations in relation to the subjectivity of managers. Drawing on the work of Michel Foucault we seek to theorize ethics in terms of the meaning of being a manager who is an active ethical subject. Such a manager is so in relation to the organizational structures and norms that govern the conduct of ethics. Our approach locates ethics in the relation between individual morality and organizationally prescribed principles assumed to guide personal action. In this (...) way we see ethics as a practice that is powerfully intertwined in an individual’s freedom to make choices about what to do and who to be, and the organizational context in which those choices are situated, framed and governed. (shrink)

Félix Guattari, a French philosopher and psychotherapist often recognized for his collaboration with Gilles Deleuze, also published important work of his own. The way he conceptualizes subjectivity and schizoanalysis (later developed into institutional analysis) can incite us to interpret our social contexts differently and to help frame an emancipatory path in nursing. At La Borde, a psychiatric clinic, subjectivity was seen as the real power that lies within the institutions; invisible and flowing through all levels of the hierarchal (...) structure—like waves—each of them unique but still part of the same ocean. Even with its elusive character, this concept can be wielded through psychotherapeutic techniques of analysis which aim to reduce hierarchies, encourage collaborations, decentralize levers of power and promote initiatives that arise from the base. These concepts deserve further exploration when it comes to modern institutional issues like the ones present in Quebec's (Canada) healthcare system. Therefore, this article borrows theorizations elaborated through psychotherapy and applies them to the hospital institution which is seen as an organized, stable structure (the molar line), while paying attention to fluid, changing processes and the multiplicity of desires for transformation (the molecular line), to promote nursing movements that escape and abolish these structures, creating new possibilities and new forms of thinking (the line of flight). (shrink)

In what follows I try to show that Spinoza modelled his project of rational psychology, in some of its major respects, upon Descartes's metaphysics of matter. I argue further that, like Descartes, who paid for the rationalization of the science of matter the price of having to leave out of his description non-quantifiable qualities, so Spinoza left out of his psychology the non-rationalizable aspects of emotions, i.e. whatever in them could not be subsumed under common notions. He therefore was left (...) with the cognitive aspects of emotions, keeping outside of his report the inner feeling which accompanies them. Spinoza's psychology, I claim, disregards any non-cognitive aspect of emotions. (shrink)

Departing from Bourdieu's collective habitus, this essay develops a theory of the subjectivity of habitus, meaning the social-psychological processes comprising the agent and fueling deliberation. By incorporating George Ainslie's theory of the will and deliberation as the intertemporal bargaining of a population of interests, I theorize the “saturated agent” composed of an economy of interests, analogous to Bourdieu's “economy of practices” invested and saturated with cultural capital. Here culturally saturated interests negotiate strategically within the agent, with the ending balance (...) constituting the habitus. Additionally, reflexivity becomes amenable to habitus as “desaturation” or suspending the commitment to a set of culturally saturated interests as a result of a crisis, followed by “resaturation”, the restructuring of the economy of interests. (shrink)

This article calls for an examination of the spectral operations of the perceptual architecture of colonization in conjunction with the enactment of a decolonial feminism as proposed by María Lugones. The first section discusses both the notion of ghostly subjectivity from Lugones's early work as well as the echoes of this notion in her recent work on the coloniality of gender that emphasizes the gender/race/sex nexus. Subsequently, through a photographic example, the article presents an analysis of the perceptual operations (...) of specter‐making in practices of colonization in light of Lugones's understanding of the “light” and “dark” sides of the coloniality of gender. This analysis highlights not only the intricate nexus between racialization and gender and sex norms both in the past and in the present context, but it also points to the necessity for of a decolonial feminism attuned to perceptual practices or a decolonial aesthesis. (shrink)

Through an examination of short stories spanning Joseph Conrad's entire writing career, Daphna Erdinast-Vulcan engages with the question of authorial subjectivity and ethics in Modernism. Part One establishes an original theoretical matrix, which turns on the principle of 'heterobiography'. Part Two applies this cultural-historical perspective through close readings of ten of Conrad's short stories.

In this article, we attempt to explore Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity and its relation to the world. Our focus is on the question of whether Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity can be seen as transcendental ‘being-in-the-world,’ in response to critical examinations made by philosophers such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Patočka, and Biemel. While their critiques have complex implications and are subject to debate, they contribute to our understanding of the intricate relationship between transcendental subjectivity and the world. It is important to (...) clarify that this article aims to defend Husserl’s perspective rather than provide an exhaustive analysis of the critiques. We argue that, according to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, transcendental subjectivity is, in fact, integrated within the world’s transcendental structure. This argument is supported by three main points. Firstly, Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity and its internal consciousness are not secluded but remain open and intentionally related to the external world. Secondly, Husserl clarifies the sense of transcendental ‘being-in-the-world,’ with subjective constitution revealing its sense. Lastly, Husserl proposes the notion of transcendental person as an attempt to address how transcendental subjectivity exists concretely in the life-world. This holistic perspective sought to provide a comprehensive understanding of transcendentally grounded subjectivity and its embodied existence in the world with the essential state of ‘being-in-the world.’. (shrink)

Since history concerns change over time, an ontology of history requires a notion of subjectivity. In the modern tradition, beginning with Kant, ontology has come to be understood as epistemology. But as a result of the failure of foundationalism and the turn to a relativistic theory of knowledge, it is necessary to rethink the idea of history in terms of a conception of the historical subject.

This paper analyzes the entanglement of the modern concepts of freedom, autonomy, and the modern notion of the subject and how a passion for and insistence on freedom has undermined the reconstruction of human subjectivity in Heidegger and Foucault, and how such passion has also limited the educational effort at addressing the problems brought to education by the modern notion of the subject. Drawing on Levinas, it suggests that a new understanding of freedom as heteronomy will allow us to (...) envision an open subjectivity that is essential for education. Particularly, it looks at Gert Biesta’s recent campaigns for “subjectification” and “the gift of teaching” to analyze the underlying contradictions caused by the entanglement of freedom and subjectivity. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION There is no doubt that "subjectivity" is one of the central issues of twentieth century philosophy and art. At the beginning of the century ...

This article explores the potential of Bernard Lonergan’s philosophy of subjectivity as objectivity as a grounding for value sensitive design (VSD) and the design turn in applied ethics. The rapid pace of scientific and technological advancement has created a gap between technical abilities and our moral assessments of those abilities, calling for a reflection on the philosophical tools we have for applying ethics. In particular, applied ethics often presents interconnected problems that require a more general framework for ethical reflection. (...) Lonergan’s philosophy, which emphasizes the importance of selfunderstanding and self‐transcendence in achieving objectivity, can provide a valuable perspective on VSD and the design turn in applied ethics. The article examines how Lonergan’s philosophy can be applied to VSD and the design turn, and how scientific knowledge can be integrated into an ethics of science without reducing it to an external reflection. By adopting Lonergan’s perspective, we can address the ethical challenges arising from scientific and technological advancements while promoting a more holistic approach to applied ethics. (shrink)

In his book Das Recht der Freiheit (2011), Axel Honneth develops a theory of social justice that incorporates negative, reflexive and social forms of freedom as well as the institutional conditions necessary for their reproduction. This account enables the identification of social pathologies or systemic normative deficits that frustrate individual efforts to relate their actions reflexively to a normative order and inhibits their ability to recognize the freedom of others as a condition of their own. In this article I utilize (...) Honneth’s theory in the diagnosis of a contemporary social pathology, which impedes social recognition and thereby contributes to social injustice. I argue that this particular social pathology – associated with the Second Amendment right to bear arms – has given rise to a pernicious form of subjectivity, which I call self-defensive. I conclude with some remarks concerning what this application reveals about the strengths and weaknesses of Honneth’s account. (shrink)