The persistent occurrence of a locution that turns out to be far from trivially used, and the translation hurdles related to it are the core elements of this contribution. The term in question is subject-matter, which is used by John Dewey in many of his writings and of which he provides an explicit conceptualization in Art as Experience. Focusing on this term and its hyphenation allows to emphasize and shed new light on important aspects of Dewey’s thought, in that: (...) it is increasingly technicalized in Dewey’s writings; it holds “antecedence” or “primacy”; in its double-barreled employment it keeps together the twofold meaning of “inherent matter” and “addressed matter”; and finally it epitomizes a number of traits shared by the notion of Lebenswelt, hence affording a programmatic and experimental comparison between the two. (shrink)

Although logical settings are typically concerned with tracking alethic considerations, frameworks exist in which topic-theoretic considerations—e.g., tracking subject-matter or topic—are given equal importance. Intuitions about extending topic through a propositional language are generally straightforward for extensional cases. For a number of reasons, arriving at a compelling account of the subject-matter of intensional operators—such as intensional conditionals—is a more difficult task. In particular, the framework of topic-sensitive intentional modals (TSIMs) championed by Francesco Berto and his collaborators leave the topics (...) of intensional formulae undefined, which artificially constricts the expressivity of the theory. This paper proposes an approach to fill in this lacuna, emphasizing an analogous problem in Parry-style containment logics. In this setting, the approach receives a proof-of-concept through the introduction of a natural and general family of subsystems of Parry’s $${\textsf{PAI}}$$ PAI —with sound and complete axiomatizations—that allow a fine degree of control over the topics of intensional conditionals. (shrink)

Logical frameworks that are sensitive to features of sentences’ subject-matter—like Berto’s topic-sensitive intentional modals (TSIMs)—demand a maximally faithful model of the topics of sentences. This is an especially difficult task in the case in which topics are assigned to intensional formulae. In two previous papers, a framework was developed whose model of intensional subject-matter could accommodate a wider range of intuitions about particular intensional conditionals. Although resolving a number of counterintuitive features, the work made an implicit assumption that (...) the subject-matter of an intensional conditional is a function of the subject-matters of its subformulae. This assumption—which I will call a principle of topic sufficiency—runs counter to some natural intuitions concerning topic. In this paper, we will investigate topic sufficiency and offer a semantic account that is state-sensitive, providing an implementation through the introduction of topic-sensitive logics related to William Parry’s prototypical $\mathsf {PAI}$. (shrink)

The notion of objectivity in science has come under critique of feminist writers. The scientific ideal of a detached, neutral observer, who has no race, no gender, no cultural identity, no class, and views the world “from nowhere,” has been challenged, and patterns of domination explored. Feminists argue that objectivity is a tacit generalization from the subjectivity of a small, privileged social group “of educated, usually prosperous, white men.” Hence, it is a result of the denial of the subjectivity of (...) women and other marginalized people. The task which I set before myself is to inquire into the problem of objectivity in science and to explore the relationship between objectivity and subjectivity. I argue that, although the feminists’ critique of objectivity contributes to a greater awareness of the problem of objectivity in science and indeed subjectivity matters, their critique is ill founded. It is an example of one of many stereotypes and simplifications that we can find in today’s feminist thought. The affective engagement with the world, the approach that I propose, leads us to knowledge beyond objectivity. It is a prerequisite of knowing persons as persons and things as they are. (shrink)

In this essay I address the question, “What is the subject matter of phenomenological research?” I argue that in spite of the increasing popularity of phenomenology, the answers to this question have been brief and cursory. As a result, contemporary phenomenologists lack a clear framework within which to articulate the aims and results of their research, and cannot easily engage each other in constructive and critical discourse. Examining the literature on phenomenology’s identity, I show how the question of phenomenology’s (...) subject matter has been systematically neglected. It has been overshadowed by an unending concern with phenomenology’s methodological identity. However, an examination of recent contributions to this literature reveals that a concern with articulating phenomenology’s subject matter has gradually increased, although such articulations remain preliminary. In light of this, I delineate, define, and illustrate three layers of phenomenological research, which I term “existentials,” “modes,” and “prejudices.” While the delineation of these layers is drawn primarily from classical phenomenological texts, they are defined and illustrated through the use of more contemporary literature. Following the articulation of this subject matter, I briefly consider some of the debates—both foundational and applied—that can be facilitated by the adoption of this framework. (shrink)

The notion of subject matter is a key concern of contemporary philosophy of language and logic. A central task for a theory of subject matter is to characterise the notion of sentential subject matter, that is, to assign to each sentence of a given language a subject matter that may count as its subject matter. In this paper, we elaborate upon David Lewis’ account of subject matter. Lewis’ proposal is simple and elegant but lacks (...) a satisfactory characterisation of sentential subject matter. Drawing on linguistic literature on focus and on the question under discussion, we offer a neo-Lewisian account of subject matter, which retains all the virtues of Lewis’ but also includes an attractive characterisation of sentential subject matter. (shrink)

Some public reason liberals identify coercive law as the subject matter of public justification, while others claim that the justification of coercion plays no role in motivating public justification requirements. Both of these views are mistaken. I argue that the subject matter of public justification is not coercion or coercive law but political decision-making about the basic institutional structure. At the same time, part of what makes a public justification principle necessary in the first place is the inherent (...) coerciveness of a legally organized basic institutional structure. While most public reason liberals seem to presuppose that the meaning of “coercion” is sufficiently obvious so as not to warrant further analysis, my defense of the essay’s main thesis explicitly draws on an account of coercion as a powerful agent’s employment of enforceable constraints to determine the will of another agent. (shrink)

The notions of subject matter and aboutness have been objects of considerable attention among philosophers over the last few years. Current theories of subject matter take sentences to be the primary bearers of subject matter: “sentences have aboutness properties if anything has” (Yablo, Aboutness, Princeton University Press, 2014). However, some subsentential expressions can also be thought of as being about something. Moreover, it appears that the subject matters of sentences depend in a systematic way on (...) the aboutness properties of their subsentential components. In this paper, we focus on the question of what predicates are about. We provide an account of predicative subject matter in which subject matters are assigned to predicates in a natural way, and which can be smoothly integrated with some existing accounts of sentential subject matter. We also argue that the notion of predicative subject matter is a worthy object of study, both within the current debate on subject matter and in its own right. (shrink)

In this paper, I raise the problem of dealing with counterpossible conditionals for theories of subject matter. I argue that existing accounts of subject matter need to be revised and extended to be able to a) provide reasonable (potentially non-degenerate) verdicts about what counterpossibles are about, b) explain the intuition that counterpossibles are in some sense about what would happen if the antecedent were true, and c) explain in what sense counterpossibles can be about individuals. I sketch how (...) one could extend atom-based and way-based theories of subject matters to handle the problem. Then, I raise the problem that it might be desirable for a theory of subject matter to prevent the inference that certain counterpossibles are about the kinds of things that they seem to mention. (shrink)

I discuss Yablo’s approach to truthmaker semantics and compare it with my own, with special focus on the idea of a proposition being true of or being restricted to some subject-matter, the idea of propositional containment, and the development of an ‘incremental’ semantics for the conditional. I conclude with some remarks on the relationship between truth-maker approach and the standard possible worlds approach to semantics.

“On the Subject Matter of Phenomenological Psychopathology” provides a framework for the phenomenological study of mental disorders. The framework relies on a distinction between (ontological) existentials and (ontic) modes. Existentials are the categorial structures of human existence, such as intentionality, temporality, selfhood, and affective situatedness. Modes are the particular, concrete phenomena that belong to these categorial structures, with each existential having its own set of modes. In the first section, we articulate this distinction by drawing primarily on the work (...) of Martin Heidegger—especially his study of the ontological structure of affective situatedness (Befindlichkeit) and its particular, ontic modes, which he calls moods (Stimmungen). In the second section, we draw on a study of grief to demonstrate how this framework can be used when conducting phenomenological interviews and analyses. In the concluding section, we explain how this framework can be guide phenomenological studies across a broad range of existential structures. (shrink)

Lithuania’s legislation, establishing criminal liability for illegal disposition of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, uses two different terms while identifying the subject matter for criminal deeds: “narcotic and psychotropic substances” and “plants, incorporated into the lists of controlled substances.” The legislation in article 269 of the Lithuanian criminal code explains that narcotic and psychotropic substances, indicated in the respective chapter of the Lithuanian criminal code, shall be those substances that are included in the lists of narcotic and psychotropic substances (...) as approved by the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Lithuania. Plants having narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances are not introduced into this definition although the exception of the coca bush is enumerated in the lists of controlled substances. This described present position brings in a certain intricacy when deciding when a perpetrator should be punished only for illegal cultivation of plants and when he should be punished also for other illegal acts with narcotic and psychotropic substances. (shrink)

The problem of creeping minimalism concerns how to tell the difference between metaethical expressivism and its rivals given contemporary expressivists’ acceptance of minimalism about truth and related concepts. Explanationism finds the difference in what expressivists use to explain why ethical language and thought has the content it does. I argue that two recent versions of explanationism are unsatisfactory and offer a third version, subject matter explanationism. This view, I argue, captures the advantages of previous views without their disadvantages and (...) gives us a principled and general characterisation of non-representational views about all kinds of language and thought. (shrink)

This paper offers some comments about the subject matter of Skinner's book Verbal Behavior (1957). It first presents an argument against the common misconception that Verbal Behavior is about language. It then discusses the nature of verbal behavior as a subdivision of op?rant .behavior. Following that, the paper identifies three aspects of the concept of verbal behavior that need some clarification. Finally, the paper concludes by pointing out that the significance of Verbal Behavior lies most centrally in its effort (...) to offer a better way of talking about one part of psychology's subject matter. (shrink)

I argue that the physical marks on a canvas resulting from an artist's intentional, stylistic and expressive acts cannot themselves be the artist's expression, but instead they serve to signify or indicate those acts. Thus there is a kind of indicative content associated with a picture that is distinct from its subject matter (or 'representational content'). I also argue that this kind of indicative content is closely associated with the specific artistic medium chosen by the artist as her expressive (...) medium, for which reason I call this kind of content medium content (or medium-related content). (shrink)

Logicians disagree about how validity—the very heart of logic—should be understood. Many different formal systems have been born due to this disagreement. This thesis examines how teachers explain the subject matter of logic to students in introductory logic textbooks, and demonstrates the different explanations teachers use. These differences help explain why logicians have different intuitions about validity.

Naturalistic accounts of culture share the assumption that culture is nothing more than information in people minds/brains and the environment. They do not provide, however, neither a definition nor a theory of information. I address this lacuna adopting a theory of information called “Situation Theory” (Barwise and Perry, 1983). I argue that the notions of constraint and attunement allow to account for cultural information, and, furthermore, that culture is, at a fundamental level, constituted by a set of constraints. Constraints are (...) necessary for information to flow, and attunement to constraints is necessary for an organism to exploit such cultural information. Keywords: Situations, situation theory, naturalistic theories of culture, cultural groups, constraints, conventions. (shrink)

The English word 'curriculum' is derived from the Latin word curriculum meaning 'a course', 'a race' or 'a running'. This suggests a process, the idea of going through something which has a beginning, a development and an end. The secondary meaning of curriculum was 'career'. Both the primary and the secondary meanings of curriculum referred to temporal space and to non-temporal endeavours or intellectual pursuits. The expression 'curriculum vitae', then referred to both intellectual and non-intellectual pursuits. Today curriculum in the (...) educational context refers primarily, if not solely, to intellectual pursuits. Actually curriculum is related to learning in a broad sense, incorporating more than the "cognitive" aspect. This suggests that the concept curriculum is a complex notion. Various meanings have been attached to it. A careful analysis of curriculum shows that the notions of "plan", "content or subject matter", "objectives" and "method" are intimately connected to curriculum which should not be completely identified with any one of these concepts. In this short paper I propose to discuss the following question: Is the notion of subject matter inherent in that of curriculum, or, does the notion curriculum make sense without that of subject matter? Answers to this question are meant to help clarify the relationship between the curriculum and subject matter. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that Habermas' critique of German Idealism is misguided and that his rejection of the philosophy of the subject is unjustified. Critical Theory needs to recognise the importance of subjectivity for all social philosophy if its theoretical aims are to be achieved. In order to demonstrate the relevance of subjectivity to Critical Theory the essay draws on analytic philosophy of mind and on the work of Manfred Frank and Dieter Henrich.

In this article I offer an explicating interpretation of the procedure of content recarving as described by Frege in §64 of the Foundations of Arithmetic. I argue that the procedure of content recarving may be interpreted as an operation that while restricting the subject matter of a sentence, performs a generalization on what the sentence says about its subject matter. The characterization of the recarving operation is given in the setting of Yablo’s theory of subject matter and (...) it is based on the relation of determination between properties. The main advantage of the proposal is its generality, for it is applicable not just to the case of abstraction principles. (shrink)

Subject matter knowledge influences instructional decision-making, particularly for novice teachers. Moreover, teacher candidates’ abilities to create critical pedagogy is influenced by their subject matter knowledge and their opportunity to interact with critical curriculum. Using a researcher-designed task intended to develop teacher candidates’ subject matter knowledge, this qualitative action research study investigated the degree to which the task supported candidates’ critical consciousness and their selection and framing of content for an instructional unit. The findings illustrate inconsistencies in candidates’ (...) abilities to use new subject matter knowledge in ways that conceptualize social studies curriculum in critical ways. These inconsistencies suggest that teacher educators should consider using a critical rationale-based pedagogy as a means to assist teacher candidates to move towards critical pedagogy in ways that subject matter knowledge alone cannot. (shrink)

To help people study Marxist-Leninist philosophy, it is particularly necessary to be careful about the accuracy of philosophical terminology. Vague and ambiguous expressions must be firmly eliminated. Among them, in our view, is the saying, current among us, to the effect that "the world as a whole" is the subject matter of philosophy, Marxist philosophy included. The present article is devoted to criticism of that view.

In formulating the puzzle about cognitive significance in ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, Frege rejects the approach he suggested in the Begriffsschrift on the ground that if the utterance of a sentence of the form a = b is understood as ‘a’ and ‘b’ referring to the same object we lose the subject matter. In this note, we will show how Frege’s concerns can be understood and circumvented.

The problem of creeping minimalism is the problem of drawing a principled distinction between expressivists and non-expressivists. Explanationism is a popular strategy for solving the problem, but two of its forms—ontological explanationism and representational explanationism—have fatal problems. Christine Tiefensee and Matthew Simpson have recently, and independently, endorsed a third form: subject matter explanationism. But this form also fails. At bottom, the problem is that it does not note the existence of non-reductive expressivist views, just as earlier forms of explanationism (...) did not note the existence of error theories, or non-naturalist realists, or realists who wanted to endorse deflationary views of truth and representation. The failure of this latest version of explanationism—one that does indeed avoid problems with earlier versions—strengthens the case that we may not actually want a solution to the problem of creeping minimalism after all. Rather, a form of global expressivism—neopragmatism—might be regarded as yielding a version of non-naturalist normative realism. (shrink)