How does pornography subordinate on the basis of gender? I provide part of an answer in this paper by framing subordination as something that works through everyday classification. Under certain material and social conditions, pornography classifies people through labeling them in ways that connect to structures of oppression. I hope to show two things. First, pornographic content is not the major driving force behind pornography’s subordination of women. Second, pornography, when repurposed in new ways, carries the potential to counter the (...) ill effects of other kinds of pornography, as feminist pornographers have attempted to show through their words and actions. (shrink)

In the People’s Republic of China (PRC), we investigated the relationships between supervisor–subordinate guanxi and trust in supervisor in firms with different types of ownership from both supervisor and subordinate’s sides. Utilising a qualitative approach, the findings of this study showed there was a direct relationship of superior–subordinate guanxi on trust in supervisor. The findings were discussed in the theoretical context of—social exchange theory, social identity theory and the theory of reasoned action as the theoretical foundations on the relationships between (...) superior–subordinate guanxi and trust in supervisor. (shrink)

The article re-examines the Aristotelian backdrop of Arendt’s notion of action. On the one hand, Backman takes up Arendt’s critique of the hierarchy of human activities in Aristotle, according to which Aristotle subordinates action (praxis) to production (poiesis) and contemplation (theoria). Backman argues that this is not the case since Aristotle conceives theoria as the most perfect form of praxis. On the other hand, Backman stresses that Arendt’s notion of action is in fact very different from Aristotle’s praxis, to the (...) extent that Arendt thinks of action as an external to the means-ends scheme, whereas Aristotle ultimately remains caught in this scheme proper to poiesis in thinking of praxis as its own end. According to Backman, Arendt’s concept of action can therefore be understood as a critique, rather than as a rehabilitation, of Aristotelian praxis. (shrink)

Drawing on social exchange theory and benevolent leadership literature, we show how the largesse associated with benevolent leadership can cause subordinates to feel obliged to undertake illegitimate tasks assignments that go beyond their job duties. The hypotheses are tested in a scenario experimental study and a multisource, time-lagged field survey. Both studies indicate that benevolent leadership evokes indebtedness in subordinates (called felt obligation), which is then indirectly related to their willingness to undertake illegitimate tasks. The second study shows that subordinates (...) who try to avoid actions that damage relationships (called disintegration avoidance) and those who feel job insecurity are most willing to perform illegitimate assignments. Practical implications for curbing workplace exploitation are discussed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Casting a Vote for Subordination Using a SlurDuckkyun Lee1. IntroductionIn this paper, I develop an account of slurs focusing on their two underappreciated features. The first underappreciated feature is what I call their "communal nature." Slurs are communal. The meaning of a slur depends on the existence of a significant number of people who are bigoted against the target. When this condition is not satisfied, a slur loses its (...) power to offend. This can be seen when we consider how philosophers choose examples of slurs to avoid offending people. For example, Williamson, in his essay "Reference, Inference and the Semantics of Pejoratives," uses a slur for Germans as his main example. What makes the slur for Germans a safe example to use is the fact that there is no widespread bigotry against Germans in any Anglophone country. Had there been strong enmity between Germans and the people in the Anglophone countries, even if Williamson had chosen an outdated slur, his example would not have been such a safe choice. Slurs are words that bigots use to offend and harm the people they are bigoted against. When there are no bigots, neither are there slurs.The focus on the communal nature of slurs leads to the second underappreciated feature of slurs. A bigot does not use a slur just to express his beliefs or feelings, but to subordinate his target. To subordinate others, a bigot needs to cooperate and coordinate with other bigots. In this paper, I will propose a mechanism for how slurs work as a tool for coordinating subordination. To account for the communal and subordinating nature of slurs, I turn to speech act theory and explain what kind of illocutionary act is performed when one uses a slur.1My proposal is to understand utterances made using a slur, or slurring,2 as an act of casting a vote for ranking the target as socially inferior. On this [End Page 37] view, a slur is a conventional tool used to cast a vote demanding the subordination of its target. The considerations that motivate this view are as follows: First, the uses of a slur are the results of consciously choosing it over its neutral counterpart. By explicitly avoiding a neutral counterpart term, one can show their support for fellow bigots and the willingness to participate in whatever activity they do. Second, the point of using a slur does not seem to be exhausted by its role of expressing the bigot's negative beliefs about the target. We can see this when we consider that the way to fight a slur is to impose strict prohibitions against its use, not by objecting to the content of the slurring utterance. This can be better explained when we understand the slur as a conventional tool for the performance of a certain type of action, rather than a word that has distinctive descriptive content different from the descriptive content of its neutral counterpart. Finally, the point of some speech acts is not just expressing the state of the mind of the speaker. The point of some speech acts is to change what is the case in society. To make an utterance using a slur seems to fall into this latter category of speech acts. What would bigots be up to if they were not engaged in the project of creating a society where their target was inferior to them? This consideration suggests that making an utterance using a slur might fall into the kind of speech act Searle calls declaration (Taxonomy 361–68). As a declaration, slurring is an attempt to change society such that the target is subordinated.Insofar as an election is understood as a process within which people collectively decide on what should be the case in society by indicating their stance for or against a proposal, slurring can be understood as a casting of a vote in the election bigots' proposal to subordinate their target. I argue that this account can better explain why a slur cannot function as a slur without there being a significant number of bigots, and how it is used to coordinate the bigots' effort of subordinating their target.The paper... (shrink)

Abusive supervision, defined as subordinates’ perception of the extent to which supervisors engage in the sustained display of hostile verbal and non-verbal behaviors, excluding physical contact, is associated with various negative outcomes. This has made it easy for researchers to overlook the possibility that some supervisors regret their bad behavior and express remorse for their actions. Hence, we know little about how subordinates react to the perception that their supervisor is remorseful and how this perception affects the outcomes of (...) supervisors’ undesired behavior. Specifically, drawing on the social exchange theory and displace revenge literature, this study explains how abusive supervision leads to victims’ service sabotage behavior. In addition, this study also investigates how perceived supervisors’ remorse mitigates the adverse effects of abusive supervision. Based on time-lagged, dyadic data from Chinese individuals, this study found support for all the proposed relationships, i.e., abusive supervision leads to service sabotage through the mediating effect of revenge desire. The findings also conclude that PSR lessens the detrimental effects of abusive supervision on victims’ behavior with their customers. Finally, this research contributes to service sabotage literature by highlighting the possibility where abusive supervisors cause service sabotage behavior among victims. This study also shows the importance of PSR’s role in decreasing service sabotage behavior exhibited by victims of abusive supervisors in the service sector. (shrink)

In this monograph Pavlos Kontos of the University of Patras in Greece develops a phenomenology of human actions against the background of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. The first part of his study is centered around the question of the autonomy of the moral act, which results from the role Aristotle assigns to the virtue of prudence. Prudence shows us what is morally possible or feasible; an ethics based on prudence does not crush man under the burden of what is far (...) above him as the moral systems of Kant and Christianity tend to do. In Aristotle’s ethics, human actions are not subordinated to a rule which is entirely fixed and determined. Principles in ethics are not the universal propositions of the major premise of a moral syllogism but the conditions under which a prakton exists. They are the manner in which prudence perceives its object as belonging to the moral order. At this point the author refers to the various Abschattungen, appraisals of what has to be done in view of one’s personal momentary situation and of the circumstances. In the deliberations of prudence the quest for happiness enters, which Kontos understands as a successful action. Happiness is not a supplement to actions but is present in good actions all through one’s life. The prakton is the way in which one must organize the world. (shrink)

Counterproductive work behavior is extremely detrimental to an organization and its stakeholders as they impact economic efficiency and damage the atmosphere within the organization. The culture and personality of leaders can affect their behavior, psychology and ability. Leaders are in a position of authority, have resources and decision-making power, and their words and actions are noticed and imitated by employees. From a leadership perspective, an effective way to avoid CWB is to seek ways to reduce in its occurrence and (...) escalation. First, we conducted a grounded theory study on the leadership characteristics which are the antecedent variable of CWB, and the leadership characteristics were divided into three categories: psychological, behavioral, and ability. These characteristics impact subordinates’ CWB. Second, based on the conservation of resource theory, we conducted an ecological validation of the mechanism through which leadership characteristics affect subordinates’ CWB, explored the role of work resources and personal resources in it. The results indicate that all three types of leadership characteristics have a negative effect on subordinates’ CWB, among them, the mediating effect of work resources was established, and the mediating effect of personal resources was established in some cases. Therefore, different characteristics of leaders will affect the cognitive differences of subordinates to resources, and then trigger behavioral responses of subordinates. By an advantage analysis of the three leadership characteristics on subordinates’ CWB, it is found that the three leadership characteristics are of similar importance on interpersonal CWB. However, in the effect of organizational CWB, the characteristics of leadership have obvious advantages. (shrink)

This Article highlights that when procedural rules are legislated and there is substantial coordination between the executive and legislative branches, procedures with potential structural impact are weighted against alternative means of policymaking and implementation. This makes many Continental law countries, parliamentary countries, and countries governed by solid national majorities with substantial control over elected branches, and in general places where power is less fragmented, less likely to encourage American-style class actions. This is manifested in legislative choices of a private (...) enforcement regime for class actions, which, when allowed, is designed to be subordinate to or to piggyback on the enforcement of preexisting bureaucracies. The theory is illustrated with the enactment of class actions in Chile, which is a civil law country that has experimented with class actions since 2004. (shrink)

This chapter explores what Emma and Austen might have to say about human agency and autonomy. Considered and challenged are Christine Korsgaard’s use of Austen’s characters (Emma Woodhouse and Harriet Smith) to exemplify a species of defective autonomous action. Austen's novel persistently addresses and clarifies the nature and sources of defective action. Harriet Smith’s happy subordination to Emma’s will, as Korsgaard maintains, is obviously problematic. But it is most often Emma Woodhouse herself, and not Harriet, whose conduct Austen presents as (...) compromised, and Emma’s behavior is not defective in such a way as to suggest an abdication of will. Moreover, it is evident that considering what another thinks one should do and allowing that to inform one’s conduct is not a course of action that is invariably deplored in Emma. The chapter investigates the light Austen’s novel can shed on defects in action and the inevitability (or not) of their connection with autonomy. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Subordinated Actions Dramatic Images Nietzsche's Objection Timeless Life Further Reading.

In this paper, we study on the ways the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change communicates scientific knowledge on climate change to policymakers in the Summary for Policymakers of the Fifth Assessment Report ; the most recent Assessment Report issued by the IPCC. We investigate implicit argumentation with a special focus on the ways the summary may direct the orientation of the discourse towards the evasion of climate action while appearing to be pro-action on the surface. The results of a systematic (...) analysis of polyphonic constructions in the language of the text indicate that implicit argumentation represents climate action inevitably subordinate to economic goals. In a number of constructions, the discourse reconstructs pro-economic-growth-based frames in contrast to prioritising environmental values when encouraging political action in the context of climate change. Through such language use, the discourses mediated by an institution of such high societal importance and authority as the IPCC arguably have a considerable impact in maintaining conservative climate policies and delaying, even hindering, a transition into a carbon-neutral society. Thus, we conclude that even the most authoritative climate-science-policy institutions should reconsider their use of linguistic representations in terms of implicit argumentation in their communication in order to encourage climate action in a more straightforward manner. As long as the most authoritative actors in science-policy discourse on climate change continue to reinforce cognitive frames evading urgent action to mitigate climate change, it is questionable whether we can expect the policymakers to have the courage to take ambitious action even if the figures in the natural-scientific evidence sections of the reports were demonstrating clear worsening trends. (shrink)

According to Catharine MacKinnon, pornography itself subordinates women by ranking women as inferior to men and legitimating acts of violence and discrimination against us. As such, pornography is directly implicated in women's diminished moral and civil status. It follows that pornography is not a form of speech, but rather an action, and so does not deserve first amendment protection. I argue that MacKinnon does not adequately support her claim that pornography is an action but instead shows that it is harmful (...) speech. While this might be grounds for limiting it, MacKinnon does not adequately support the view that pornography is especially harmful in comparison to other sorts of misogynist and sexist speech. Hence we lack reasons to limit pornography alone. (shrink)

Dialogic leadership as ethics method respects, values, and works toward organizational objectives. However, in those situations where there may be conflicts and/or contradictions between what is ethical and what is in the material interest of individuals and/or the organization, the dialogic leader initiates discussion with others (peers, subordinates, superiors) about what is ethical with at least something of a prior ethics truth intention and not singularly a value neutral, constrained optimization of organizational objectives. Cases are considered where dialogic leadership: (1) (...) helped build ethical organizational culture; (2) was effective; and, (3) as a by-product, produced integrative win-win results. Philosophical foundations for the method as well as differences between dialogic leadership and Theory X forcing leadership, Theory Y win-win integrative leadership, industrial democracy, participative management, action inquiry, and double-loop learning action science are explored. Limitations of the method are also explored. (shrink)

Cette étude qualitative propose une modélisation multimodale des constructions subordonnées en conversation spontanée, à partir de leur action sur les cadres interprétatifs. Les subordonnées ont longtemps été décrites en linguistique comme des éléments dépendants qui complètent des éléments primaires. Cependant, la Grammaire Cognitive a remis en question ce point de vue en montrant que l'emboîtement syntaxique ne reflète souvent que le point de départ choisi par les locuteurs pour véhiculer leur message. Les subordonnées sont des pratiques interactionnelles qui offrent une (...) reconstruction interprétative du discours. Les différents types syntaxiques de subordonnées font référence à différents cadres interprétatifs dans l'expérience du locuteur. La sélection de ces différents cadres est exprimée par le nombre différent d'indices de frontière prosodiques et gestuels produits en co-occurrence avec chaque type syntaxique de subordonnée. (shrink)

This article argues the necessity of overcoming the hierarchical and pyramidal conception of the central nervous system that has subordinated the motor function to the higher brain activities for at least the last 150 years. The evolution of some motor modes of behavior?such as the ability to construct and manipulate instruments?has given rise to an ?embodied logic? underpinning not only the development of models of action and prediction but also the production of gestures and sequences of syllables that are (...) at the basis of human communication. Whether it is a matter of shaking someone's hand, writing a letter, or whatever, each executive function?controlled by a series of nervous structures and mental procedures that process the information?requires behaviors that are oriented to a specific end. (shrink)

In the First Action of the Verrines Cicero highlights the issue of judicial corruption, which appears to be leading to the passage of legislation ending the senatorial monopoly on composition of the juries in the quaestio de repetundis. The work might theoretically, therefore, furnish an important study of how Cicero publicly positioned himself on a key political issue at a crucial point in his career. Historians, however, often dismiss the political impact of the work, arguing that jury reform was essentially (...) a fait accompli before the trial began. Rhetoricians likewise tend to understate its political importance, both because of its status as a substitute for a longer and fully elaborated oration and because of a pronounced tendency in recent scholarship to subordinate political comment in the judicial speeches to the immediate practical goals of legal advocacy. Cicero's prosecution of Verres, however, involved an unprecedented move in the orator's career. Through the trial he injected himself forcefully, and for the first time, into a contemporary political debate and thereby created for himself a new space from which to operate within the political landscape. (shrink)

Although advice is routinely offered in ordinary conversation, commentators and analysts have treated it as a special or delicate type of action, noticing a number of challenges associated with both providing and receiving it. In this article, I first describe the most basic social-sequential context for giving advice and explicate how the formulations speakers use to offer advice are adapted to the distinct epistemic configurations that characterize that context. Drawing on Jefferson and Lee’s observations regarding ‘troubles tellings’, I argue that (...) speakers typically offer advice when a co-participant reports an insoluble trouble or problem to one who possess special knowledge about the domain of trouble. I show how this epistemic configuration constitutes a ‘home environment’ for advice-giving and discuss how speakers vary the design of their advice to adapt to the sequential environments that entail different epistemic configurations. Finally, I consider how alternative, contrasting responses to advice manage the epistemic framework set in motion by advice-giving. (shrink)

As public concern over governmental inaction on climate change grows, it becomes vital to answer the Question of Legitimate Means: what actions can political actors legitimately take to pursue their goals? This paper argues that a particular understanding of the political realm, which I will call the spectator’s view on politics, prevents theorists from confronting this question. Using the philosophy of Noortje Marres, I will demonstrate that the spectator’s view posits a transcendental goal to politics, subordinating any means to (...) the realization of this goal. I will then contrast this view with the political philosophy of John Dewey. Dewey’s approach not only makes it possible to answer the Question of Legitimate Means, but highlights its importance to any democratic project. (shrink)

Unethical acts and reported cases of corruption and commercial crimes in South African business are increasing. Literature studies showed that risk groups (for instance South African managers in affirmative action positions) are functioning in a stressful environment which can give rise to unethical acts. Results pointed out that high stress correlates substantially with: to claim credit for a subordinate's work; to fail to report a co-worker's violation of company policy, to offer potential clients fully paid holidays; and to purchase shares (...) upon hearing privileged company information. In the light of this a number of recommendations were made. (shrink)

In line with Dixon et al.'s argument, I contend that prejudice should be understood in broadly political rather than in narrowly psychological terms. First, what counts as prejudice is a political judgement. Second, studies of collective action demonstrate that it is in struggles, where subordinate groups together oppose dominant groups, that prejudice can be overcome.

This article examines Montesquieu's concept of natural law and treatment of legal customs in conjunction with his theory of moral psychology. It explores his effort to entwine the rational procedural quality of laws with the substantive principles that sustain them. Montesquieu grounds natural law in the desires of the human being as ‘a feeling creature’, thus establishing the normative force of desire and making right action attractive by engaging the passions rather than subordinating them to reason. As a result, natural (...) law generates both political norms and the motivations that drive political actions. It provides a standard for assessing the ostensibly jumbled multiplicity of legal customs in human societies. And it reminds us that there is more to political theory than the rational justifi-cation of norms, that central to any account of liberal constitutionalism must be an effort to show the attractions – and not only the justice or the rationality – of right action. Key Words: law • Montesquieu • moral psychology • motivation • natural • law • norm justification • passions. (shrink)

At the beginning of the study of physical phenomena, the idea of "force" was widely used to explain the non-stationarity of observed phenomena, such as the movement of bodies. However, as mechanics and physical theories developed, the force notions gained own formal definitions and names, without the use of the term "force". So, the concept of kinetic energy arose instead of "vis viva", and "current" instead of "current strength" ets. Additionally, a number of new physical theories have been formulated without (...) the use of force concept. As a result, different types of forces have gradually been replaced by other more important concepts, such as energy and action, which are closely linked to fundamental physical principles. It is interesting to note that the general trend in the development of civilizations has been a shift from unrestricted power (expressed in the thesis "might makes right") to its subordination and incorporation into a legal framework. This is similar to the evolution of physics, which has seen the notion of force become eliminated or subordinated to more general principles and laws. (shrink)

This book argues that the negotiation of agency is central not only to the experience of war but also to its representation in cultural expressions, ranging from a notion of disablement, expressed in victimization, immobilization, traumatization, and death, to enablement, expressed in the perpetration of heroic, courageous, skillful, and powerful actions of assertion and dominance. In order to illustrate this thesis, it provides a comprehensive analysis of literary representations of the American War of Independence from 1775, the beginning of (...) the war, up until roughly 1860, when the Civil War marked a decisive historical turning point. As the first national war, it has an unquestionably exemplary status for the development of American conceptions of war. The in-depth study of exemplary texts from a variety of genres and by authors like Thomas Paine, Benjamin Franklin, James Fenimore Cooper, Catharine Sedgwick, William Gilmore Simms, and Herman Melville, demonstrates that the overall character of Revolutionary War literature presents the war as a forum in which collective and individual agency is expressed, defended, and cultivated. It uses the military environment in order to teach the values of discipline and self-subordination to a communal good, which are perceived as basic principles of a Republican virtue to guide the actions of the autonomous individual in a popular democracy. (shrink)

This article examines the relationship between artificial general intelligence and the image of God. After identifying various models that Christian theologians use to classify or define the imago Dei, particular attention will be given to the ‘created co-creator’ model. Scholars have interpreted this model in different ways, based on the nature of human creative action. This action is seen as either subordinate to divine creation action or the human creative action is truly cooperative with divine creative action. Whether AGI would (...) be made in the image of God in these models is then explored, highlighting the differences between humans as sub-creators versus humans as cooperative co-creators. If human creative action is cooperative, then the question arises as to whether AGI can be made in ‘the image of humanity’. Some elements of this image are explored, and then the discussion turns to whether AGI would be made in ‘the image of humanity’, and if so, could AGI still be made in the image of God?Contribution: The argument concludes by pointing to future work using the various models of imago Dei to help inform the relationship between humans and AGI by briefly mentioning two examples. (shrink)

Evidence from a growing number of studies suggests leader character as a means to advance leadership knowledge and practice. Based on this evidence, we propose a process model depicting how leader character manifests in ethical leadership that has positive psychological and performance outcomes for leaders, along with the moderating effect of leaders’ self-control on the character strength–ethical leadership–outcomes relationships. We tested this model using multisource data from 218 U.S. Air Force officers and their subordinates and superiors. Findings provide initial support (...) for leader character as a mechanism triggering positive outcomes such that only when officers reported a high level of self-control did their honesty/humility, empathy, and moral courage manifest in ethical leadership, associated with higher levels of psychological flourishing and in-role performance. We discuss the implications of these results for future theory development, research, and practice. (shrink)

This response clarifies, qualifies, and develops our critique of the limits of intergroup liking as a means of challenging intergroup inequality. It does not dispute that dominant groups may espouse negative attitudes towards subordinate groups. Nor does it dispute that prejudice reduction can be an effective way of tackling resulting forms of intergroup hostility. What it does dispute is the assumption that getting dominant group members and subordinate group members to like each other more is the best way of improving (...) intergroup relations that are characterized by relatively stable, institutionally embedded, relations of inequality. In other words, the main target of our critique is the model of change that underlies prejudice reduction interventions and the mainstream concept of on which they are based. (shrink)

We outline our central reasons for pursuing the project of equality studies and some of the thinking we have done within an equality studies framework. We try to show that a multi-dimensional conceptual framework, applied to a set of key social contexts and articulating the concerns of subordinate social groups, can be a fruitful way of putting the idea of equality into practice. Finally, we address some central questions about how to bring about egalitarian social change.

Part I distinguishes epistemic and choice democracy, attributing the first to the Rawls of A Theory of Justice but arguing that the second is more justifiable. Part II argues that in comparison with the difference principle, three principles — equal participation in choice democracy, no subordinating purpose, and a just wants guarantee — constitute a more rational choice in the original position; and that they better provide all the benefits claimed for the difference principle in its comparison with either average (...) utilitarianism or restricted average utilitarianism (the mixed conception). Part III, despite noting that my conclusions in Part II can all be reached within the Rawlsian framework, suggests that finding the basis of equality in the presuppositions of communicative action rather than in the existence of the two basic moral powers is more conducive to the affirmative conclusions of Parts I and II. It argues that Rawls' conclusions represented in part his not fully carrying out the break with Kant that he identified himself as making. (shrink)

Virtue ethics now constitutes one of three major approaches to the study of ethics by Anglophone philosophers. Its proponents almost all recognize the source of their approach in Aristotle, but relatively few of them confront the problem that source poses for contemporary ethicists. According to Aristotle, ethikê belongs and is subordinate to politikê. But in the liberal democracies within which most Anglophone ethicists write, political authorities are not supposed to legislate morality; they are supposed merely to establish the conditions necessary (...) for individuals to choose their own life paths. Contemporary ethicists who have addressed this question have proposed three very different answers to the question of how virtue ethics ought to be related to politics in modern nation-states. Martha Nussbaum seeks to provide all human beings with the capacities—intellectual and moral as well as material—they need to choose the best way of life. Arguing that the modern nation-state is incapable of providing its citizens with the education they need to live a good life, Alasdair MacIntyre looks to smaller, tradition-based communities. Because political action is coercive and truly ethical action is voluntary, Douglas den Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen insist, ethics and politics should be strictly separated. This article examines each of these attempts to revive an Aristotelian understanding of ethics, bringing out the advantages and problems involved. (shrink)

Reconstructing some of the experiences of people living with tuberculosis in Argentina in the first half of the twentieth century, as reflected not only in written and oral accounts but also in individual and collective actions, this article explores the ways in which patients came to grips with medical expertise in times of biomedical uncertainty. These negotiations, which inevitably included adaptations as well as confrontations, highlight a much less passive and submissive patient–physician relationship than is often assumed. Though patients (...) were certainly subordinate to medical doctors’ knowledge and practices, that subordination, far from absolute, was limited and often overthrown. The article focuses on patients’ demands to gain access to a vaccine not approved by the medical establishment. By engaging with media organizations, the sick invoked their “right to health” in order to obtain access to experimental treatments when biomedicine was unable to deliver efficient therapies. (shrink)

The morality of human actions consists in their reasonableness. An act is reasonable if doing that sort of thing under the circumstances is a reasonable application, in the particular circumstances, of general principles of action which are intelligible and obvious to virtually everyone. Such applications to particular events are conclusions, usually guided by derivative and subordinate principles of natural law and of human law, and do not, therefore, have the certitude of science; in fact, natural law principles occasionally have (...) exceptions. The sphere of human law, narrower than the sphere of natural law which includes the whole field of morality, is the interpersonal actions of men which bear some relation to the common good. Much of human law is an expression of or an application of the moral law. A human law is just only insofar as it is reasonably related to the achievement of the common good, the law has been enacted by a competent legislator and the burdens it imposes are not unreasonably distributed. The system of laws is effective to regulate conduct within society as a whole, not because of the individual’s fear of punishment, but because the society regards the law as a standard for right action. (shrink)

Permanence has been the dominant cosmological and social model throughout European history. This value model is founded on centralized control of power and truth, and potential success and prosperity for the individual human being is dependent upon acceptance and subordination. New development is strictly controlled and regulated. Successions of civilizations and empires have been based on this construction of being and the world. An almost diametrically opposite understanding of being was always present, however. In Heraclitus’ model of the world as (...) Change, humans are no longer passive and subordinate receivers but active change- and future-makers. Change is no longer seen as dangerous, but rather as the prime mover of the world and therefore, also the fountain of knowledge and insight. Change is the only eternal truth and value, Heraclitus argues. Thus, strategies for meaningful and productive action must also be eternally changing. This article discusses the views of Change propagated by Heraclitus and his most famous follower, Friedrich Nietzsche. It shows how a radical change of perspective and aim, a change from models aiming for Permanence to models with a much greater allowance for and appreciation of Change, can lead to explosions of human creativity and innovation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:156 BOOK REVIEWS ject could never arrive at a viable metaphysics and shows effectively that Marechal's subject was never in isolation from the objects of sensation and thought. On the other side, he presents the PDM as an alternative to the soft theism of thinkers like Hans Kiing and as a promising approach in contemporary epistemological debates involving Thomas Kuhn, Richard Rorty, Joseph Margolis, and many others. The historians (...) of philosophy will have to take up the critique of Matteo and Marechal on the many figures which they survey in PDM and QA. No one writer can cover so much ground without raising the ire of the specialists in particular thinkers or epochs. I shall simply say that the overview is helpful and that Matteo deserves credit for putting Marechal's readings to the test of his own reading of the works at issue. QA presents and evaluates this history with remarkable brevity, a virtue which can have its vicious side. I found the brevity to be a particular problem in the handling of Kant and of Marechal. The Critique of Pure Reason and PDM are elaborate analyses of thought, and Matteo proceeds in such summary fashion towards the big conclusions that he does less than justice to these analyses. Being so summary turns out to be a problem in showing that PDM can escape the accusations of subjectivism and relativism made by its scholastic attackers and that it has a way around those problems in present-day controversies. I myself am a partisan of the epistemology and metaphysics Marechal and Matteo advocate, but I find many of my doubts about the project unresolved by its presentation in QA. My particular concerns here center on conceptual relativism and theistic objectivity, hut anyone who can resolve those doubts definitively will have done a monumental service not just for the reviewer but for humankind. Marechal himself had intended a sixth volume more straight-forwardly along the Aristotelian-Thomist line, something which bad health prevented. We should wish Matteo the good health to develop the ideas of PDM and QA at the greater length required to achieve fully the promise claimed for them in this fine book. MICHAEL J. KERLIN La Salle University Philadelphia, Pennsylvania The Priority of Prudence. By DANIEL MARK NELSON. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992. Pp. ix + 164. $26.95 (cloth). In recent years, we have seen a number of attempts to recapture the natural law doctrines of Thomas Aquinas. This book is another such BOOK REVIEWS 157 attempt, and in it Nelson attempts to do two things. First, he tries to show that prudence is the most important of the virtues and is prior to nature in the process of determining the moral character of actions. Prudence is undoubtedly a highly important virtue because it is the train that carries the agent to the moral good and it must stay on track for the agent to realize fully the aims of morality. But it is not clear that it is prior to other virtues, or to nature itself, as Nelson contends, and a strong case can he made that charity is first among the virtues, and that prudence is determined by charity. Prudence is prior to the other virtues in the sense that they are all weakened by prudential failures, hut prudence wanders aimlessly, not only in the absence of the guidance of the other virtues, hut also without the guidance of nature itself. Cut loose from its secure grounds in nature, prudence and the other virtues collapse, and they need not only the secure standards provided by justice, fortitude, and charity, hut also of nature to he authentic. Second, he is trying to show that Aquinas is not so much a natural law moralist as he is a rationalist and a virtue theorist. To do this, he argues that nature serves merely an explanatory and foundational function for morality, and provides no information about moral judgments (p. 100). He subordinates nature to reason in order to resolve disputes between modern deontologists and consequentialists, hut in doing this he transforms Aquinas from a natural law moralist to a rationalist. He gives priority to reason at the... (shrink)

Racism, sexism, and other forms of injustice are more than just bad attitudes; after all, such injustice involves unfair distributions of goods and resources. But attitudes play a role. How central is that role? Tommie Shelby, among others, argues that racism is an ideology and takes a cognitivist approach suggesting that ideologies consist in false beliefs that arise out of and serve pernicious social conditions. In this paper I argue that racism is better understood as a set of practices, attitudes, (...) social meanings, and material conditions, that systematically reinforce one another. Attitudes play a role, but even the cognitive/affective component of ideologies should include culturally shared habits of mind and action. These habits of mind distort, obscure, and occlude important facts about subordinated groups and result in a failure to recognize their interests. How do we disrupt such practices to achieve greater justice? I argue that this is sometimes, but not always, best achieved by argument or challenging false beliefs, so social movements legitimately seek other means. (shrink)

Roman conflict with Parthia in the mid first century for control of Armenia and Domitius Corbulo's exploits in the East, culminating in the Parthian candidate for the throne, Tiridates, receiving his diadem from the hands of the Emperor Nero in Rome, have frequently been studied for what they reveal about military and diplomatic manoeuvres under the later Julio-Claudians. The historiographical investigation of our main source, Tacitus, particularly through comparison with the fragments of Cassius Dio, is also important for the light (...) this sheds on the Roman senator's methods. The intention of this paper is to draw attention to the complexity of Tacitus’ account by indicating his use of multiple and sometimes contradictory viewpoints in his narration of Caesennius Paetus’ unsuccessful Armenian campaign of a.d. 62–63 and to highlight an unrecognized echoing of his predecessor Livy by the historian. The examination of a text that is as elusive as it is allusive will require a careful study of what must have been a debated incident, but, as I hope to show, will give a broader insight into the historian's methods and, perhaps, wider intentions. I begin with an outline of historical events and the sources available to the historian. Next, I present a narratological examination of the text to show how differing viewpoints are highlighted within a contested storyline. I then show how this confusion may appear to be dispelled by a strong plot-line that borrows heavily from Livy, wherein the actions of an older, experienced general are contrasted with those of his subordinate. However, aspects of this account suggest that the tensions within the narrative are not resolved and that this has wider implications for our understanding of the historian and his work. (shrink)

Cismando com o dualismo cartesiano e seus desdobramentos em práticas e estruturas escolares contemporâneas nas margens do capitalismo Resumo: Esse texto relaciona conceitos que, advindos de áreas do conhecimento diferentes, fundamentam estruturas de subordinação e controle, próprios de muitas práticas e hábitos da vida de diversos povos que habitam as margens do capitalismo moderno e colonialista. Ao articular os desdobramentos trazidos por cada um desses personagens conceituais, nota-se o quanto eles se interseccionam ao fundamentar muito da forma de viver da (...) modernidade, sobretudo em contextos da periferia do capitalismo. Essa articulação se dá por meio de uma investigação bibliográfica sem deixar de refletir sobre as práticas da vida. Para tanto, inicia-se com uma descrição dos fundamentos dualistas cartesianos da ciência e da sociedade ocidental moderna. A seguir, busca-se descrever como esses conceitos se enredam em uma teia que institucionaliza hábitos típicos da estrutura de escola que vigora no país. Por fim, encaminham-se possibilidades de alternativas conceituais que refletem e sustentam práticas educacionais em direção à emancipação e superação das condições impostas pela modernidade/ colonialidade/capitalismo. Encerra-se o artigo com dois apontamentos resultantes do curso da pesquisa: conhecimento é criação, cultivo, cuidado; emancipar-se envolve, necessariamente, a ação de narrar a própria história. Palavras-chave: Educação; Emancipação; Modernidade/colonialidade/capitalismo. Doubting about cartesian dualism and its consequences in contemporary school practices and structures on the margins of capitalism Abstract: This text relates concepts that, coming from different areas of knowledge, underlie structures of subordination and control, typical of many practices and habits of life of different peoples who inhabit the margins of modern and colonialist capitalism. By articulating the developments brought about by each of these conceptual characters, it is possible to notice how much they intersect in grounding much of the way of living of modernity, especially in contexts on the periphery of capitalism. This articulation goes through a bibliographic investigation, without ceasing to reflect on the practices of life. To do so, it begins with a description of the Cartesian dualist foundations of science and modern Western society. Next, we seek to describe how these concepts are entangled in a web that institutionalizes typical habits of the school structure in force in the country. Finally, possibilities of conceptual alternatives that reflect and sustain educational practices towards emancipation and overcoming the conditions imposed by modernity/coloniality/capitalism are presented. The article ends by pointing out two paths resulting from the course of the research so far, that knowledge is creation, cultivation, care, and that emancipating oneself necessarily involves the action of narrating one's own history. Key-words: Education; Emancipation; Modernity/coloniality/capitalism. Dudando del dualismo cartesiano y sus consecuencias en las prácticas y estructuras escolares contemporáneas al margen del capitalismo Resumen: Este texto relaciona conceptos que, provenientes de diferentes áreas del conocimiento, subyacen en estructuras de subordinación y control, propias de muchas prácticas y hábitos de vida de diferentes pueblos que habitan los márgenes del capitalismo moderno y colonialista. Al articular los desarrollos provocados por cada uno de estos personajes conceptuales, es posible notar cuánto se cruzan al fundamentar gran parte de la forma de vida de la modernidad, especialmente en contextos en la periferia del capitalismo. Esta articulación se produce a través de una investigación bibliográfica, sin dejar de reflexionar sobre las prácticas de la vida. Para hacerlo, comienza con una descripción de los fundamentos dualistas cartesianos de la ciencia y la sociedad occidental moderna. A continuación, buscamos describir cómo estos conceptos se enredan en la red que institucionaliza hábitos típicos de la estructura escolar vigente en el país. Finalmente, se presentan posibilidades de alternativas conceptuales que reflejan y sustentan las prácticas educativas hacia la emancipación y la superación de las condiciones impuestas por la modernidad/colonialidade/capitalismo. El artículo finaliza señalando dos caminos resultantes del curso de la investigación hasta el momento, que el conocimiento es creación, cultivo, cuidado, y que emanciparse implica necesariamente la acción de narrar la propia historia. Palabras-clave: Educación; Emancipación; Modernidad/colonialidade/capitalismo. Data de registro: 18/08/2021 Data de aceite: 20/10/2021. (shrink)

In the real world, many people suffer as a function of their subordinate position in social hierarchy. Deliberative, relativist, and essentialist political theorists have sketched philosophies of social criticism that alone are inadequate for criticizing some harmful social values, practices, and norms. Certainly, theirs are critical theories in the sense that they are actionable, coherent, and self-reflective. But they are not adequate theories of social criticism. They do not specify satisfactorily the roles, qualifications, and methodology of social critics worried about (...) the struggles and wishes of real people. I specify all three. Drawing from the practical experience of a wide variety of women activists, I generalize about the roles and qualifications of the social critic. In addition, I formally articulate a method of social criticism that feminists have been developing. Collectively, feminists--particularly Third World women activists-have pioneered a method of social criticism that allows them to criticize existing social values, practices, and norms that perpetuate inequalities. The method of social criticism I propose provides a discipline for ongoing questioning and evaluation of social practices by a society with the help of social critics. In the process of explicating my own philosophy of social criticism, I offer criticisms of the implications for social criticism of three political philosophies--deliberative democratic theory, Michael Walzer's relativism, and Martha Nussbaum's essentialism--and argue that feminist critics have managed to achieve in practice what adherents of those three schools do incompletely in theory. (shrink)

Cornelius Castoriadis understood history as a self-creating order. In turn, he elaborated history in two directions: as the political project of autonomy, and as the ontological modality of the social-historical. On his account, history as self-creation was only possible through the interplay of social (or political) imaginaries and social doing. Although social imaginaries are readily situated within the non-subjective field, non-subjective modes of doing have been less explored. Yet non-subjective contexts are integral to both the “doing” and “imaginary” dimensions of (...) the human condition, and form the preconditions for concrete varieties of social and political action and politics (as la politique), more generally. The present paper begins to clear a path to reflect on social doing in its non-subjective aspects; as such, it is preparatory rather than programmatic. After briefly reviewing the field of “social imaginaries”, it reflects on Castoriadis’s elaboration of “praxis” and “teukhein”. It then considers Johann Arnason’s culturological reconfiguration of Castoriadis’s approach, and Jan Patočka’s asubjective phenomenology of the movement of human existence as different ways of engaging with the problematic of doing, instituting society and political imaginaries. Despite a gradual subordination of “doing” to “signification” in Castoriadis’s philosophical elaborations, “social doing” as a non-subjective modality does not disappear altogether from his thought – especially and explicitly in respect to the phenomenon of instituting society as a political project – and remains a point of recurring intrusion into his more explicit theoretical concerns. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose to understand argumentative decoupling—that is, the structural fact of the argumentative chain self-referring to one of its constituents in subsequent arguments—as part of the way in which cognitive decoupling representation works. In order to support this claim, I make use of part of the discussion developed in cognitive studies and evolutionary theories that describes this phenomenon when explaining intentional communication. By using Toulmin’s model, I exemplify how decoupling representation may be seen as part of a (...) chain of arguments in which a second argumentative move is usually oriented to action. I conclude by reflecting on the relationship between this human cognitive capacity and the problem of recursion to hold that these two concepts are not synonymous but stand in a subordinated and complementary relation to each other. (shrink)

Exploiting the skills of others enables individuals to reduce the risks and costs of resource innovation. Social corvids are known to possess sophisticated social and physical cognitive abilities. However, their capacity for imitative learning and its inter-individual transmission pattern remains mostly unexamined. Here we demonstrate the large-billed crows' ability to learn problem-solving techniques by observation and the dominance-dependent pattern in which this technique is transmitted. Crows were allowed to observe one of two box-opening behaviours performed by a dominant or subordinate (...) demonstrator and then tested regarding action and technique. The observers successfully opened the box on their first attempts by using non-matching actions but matching techniques to those observed, suggesting emulation. In the subsequent test sessions, dominant observers consistently used the learned technique, whereas subordinates learned alternative techniques by explorative trial and error. Our findings demonstrate crows' capacity to learn by observing behaviours and the effect of dominance on transmission patterns of behavioural skills. Keywords: social learning; imitation; emulation; affordance; culture; innovation. (shrink)

Informed Christians have learned in our day that Islâm is not a primitive desert religion spread by the sword, for which faith is reduced to fatalism and women have no souls. Yet Christian historians of religion who avoid such gross errors still tend to present Islâm as at best an imperfect and parochial version of Christian truth, lacking any distinctive genius truly worthy of its independent dignity among the world religions. But until modern times, when the Christianity (and Judaism) of (...) Europeans has been radically transformed along with their secular life, Christianity must long have struck an observer from Mars as, compared to Islâm, the relatively localized faith of largely backward lands. Islâm was the vehicle of a complex and sophisticated sense of social order in a varied and highly creative civilization which was expanding continuously until its field of action encompassed half mankind; it was the only one of the major historical religions which had successfully displaced in large areas other major faiths such as Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism. The Martian observing human history in the later Middle Ages might find it easier to understand why Muslims have looked on Christianity as merely an abortive form of Islâm, as for instance in the approach of those Şûfîs, Muslim mystics, who see the perfection of Islâm in its uniting at once the dispensation of Law, which reflects the Majesty of God, and the dispensation of Grace, which reflects his Beauty, whereas Judaism and Christianity are limited to only the one or the other. This Muslim conception is as inadequate, however, as its Christian counterpart. Probably any widespread religious system will find a place for all major types of religious insight and practice and is in its own way complete. Yet, as each system has matured, it has revealed a characteristic persistent pattern of norms in the interrelation and subordination to one another of all the elements embodied in it. If Christians are to perceive the genius of Islâm, it must perhaps be through the comparison of such persistent patterns. (shrink)

The article takes up the difficult problem of the so-called disobedience of judges against the background of the experiences of the Polish departure from constitutional democracy in 2015–2020. The special role and responsibility of a judge in the state imposes restrictions on her freedom of opinion in the public sphere. Openly manifesting opposition to government policy, which in the case of an ordinary citizen is only the implementation of human rights and freedoms, may be described as controversial and contrary to (...) applicable ethical regulations. The main thesis of this paper is the assertion that although judges who act as impartial arbitrators in disputes should generally refrain from ostentatiously opposing the actions of political authorities, they are not deprived of the possibility of protest. Also in the exercise of office, and not outside the sphere of their duties, judges should take into account overriding moral values that should be implemented by the legal order, and not the values or declarations guiding the government policies. The integrity of the judge, which prescribes restraint in statements and actions in the public sphere, as well as the care for the dignity of the office held, should not be confused with absolute subordination to the legislature or the executive, even if the judge is obliged to apply the law. The traditional attitude of the members of the judiciary, consisting in focusing only on the application of the law in individual cases and the lack of any political involvement, is being reviewed in the face of the spread of majoritarianism and the law abuse as normal techniques of exercising public authority. The disobedience of judges—although difficult to defend at first sight—may seem to be the only possible way to draw public attention to the corruption of the state system. The ‘disobediant’ judges can even be assigned the role of ‘whistleblowers’, which should help to ease their legal liability or their future rehabilitation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Lumps and Bumps”Kathleen Wallace (bio)Reason/Emotion Distinction in PhilosophyI would like to use Radden’s interesting exploration of the historical roots of a split between affect and thought as an occasion for reflecting on the distinction itself and some of the philosophical reasons for its appeal. There is a range of presuppositions in philosophical theories about knowledge, judgment, moral judgment and the like that have disposed us, at least (...) in the West, to accept a split between emotion or affect and reason or thought. At least in the modern tradition (from the seventeenth century on), judgment has been identified with “reason” and conceived of as the making of logical, evidential, “impartial,” or “legislative” inferences or the asserting and applying of universal principles and rules. 1 Feelings might provide content or data for reasoning but do not themselves judge.A brief review of recurrent assumptions about feelings will be indicative of possible rationales for their subordination to “reason.” Some of these assumptions are that feelings (1) are untransformable; (2) are incompatible with autonomy because they are not self-caused but are part of a deterministic causal chain; (3) are noncognitive; (4) are unreliable; (5) are demeaning because associated with the animal, sensual, or “natural” side of human nature; (6) have no moral content; and (7) have only an accidental relation to action and choice. 2In his thought Kant, who had such a strong influence on the development of Kraepelin’s theory, reflects several of these assumptions. Emotions are part of the sensible world and subject to the strict law of causality. The only exception to the deterministic view of emotion is the moral feeling of respect for the moral law. The feeling of respect “is not one received through an outside influence but is, rather, one that is self-produced by means of a rational concept.” 3Most of these accounts presuppose that feeling is a reactive or passive state or that it “expresses” or reveals an inner state over which one has no control. If feeling also tends to be viewed as noncognitive, then it has no value for knowledge. Given these assumptions, actions and judgments that are based on, motivated by, or formed with reference to feeling are viewed as suspect with regard to their objectivity.ImplicationsThe split between reason and emotion has had interesting consequences in the assessment of behaviors that are thought of as gendered. For example, moral deliberation that seems to be based on feeling or emotion is assessed as inferior to that which is allegedly based on reason, and the [End Page 17] former tends to be associated with women. For example, an “epistemic lean” of the moral commitment to care (Bartky 112) involves “a displacement of interest from my own reality to the reality of the other” (Noddings 14). 4 But if the perspective into which a female caregiver enters is one that is structured in terms of a presumed supremacy of the male, then a woman, through caregiving, could participate in her own social (and personal) demotion (Bartky 109). Yet she may thereby be caught in an interesting bind: “Tenderness requires compassion and forgiveness,... virtues under some circumstances and... excellences in a caregiver. But there are situations in which [such] virtues... can lead to moral blindness or outright complicity” (Bartky 112). Bartky cites the example of Teresa Stangl, wife of Fritz Stangl, Kommandant of Treblinka, who, although appalled by what she knew of her husband’s activity, supported him at home and never publicly challenged his moral outlook (Bartky 1990, 113). Thus a woman is caught in a doublebind. If she is “forgiving” and “tender,” she may be identified as “complicitous,” “unprincipled,” or morally “weak-willed,” but if she were to assert her [other] principles she would fail to be “virtuous” as a caregiver, her designated, but subordinate, moral role. 5 Thus, a traditional association of judgment with “reason” may support the inference that the affectively motivated person does not count as a moral agent, or is at best an inferior one.What this suggests is not only that a sharp split between reason and emotion or thought and affect may lead to a distorted understanding... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Brief Introduction to a Philosophy of Music and Music Education as Social Praxis by Thomas A. RegelskiRoger MantieThomas A. Regelski, A Brief Introduction to a Philosophy of Music and Music Education as Social Praxis (New York: Routledge, 2016)ANSWERS WITHOUT QUESTIONSThomas Regelski has earned a place as a major figure in music education, if for no other reason than his role as co-convener of the MayDay Group in (...) 1993. Regelski’s contributions to the profession, however, go much beyond the MayDay Group. His many books and articles provide both practical advice and suggestions for music teachers as well as rigorous discussions of important issues for scholars. He is among the most frequently cited authors in music education today and I count myself among those who have been deeply impacted by his work.1Those familiar with Regelski’s oeuvre and the history of the MayDay Group know that “praxial philosophy” has been his central concern since the early 1990s. The idea of praxialism, a term more or less invented by a small group of music education academics,2 has been driven, at least in part, by a desire to counter what has been considered (by some) to be the music education profession’s misguided adherence to and emphasis on “music education as aesthetic education,” particularly as an outgrowth of its Charles Leonard-Bennett Reimer [End Page 213] lineage.3 Along with contemporaries Philip Alperson, Wayne Bowman, and David Elliott (among others), Regelski has been a major voice in adopting and adapting ancient Greek (especially Aristotelean) thought in order to challenge the presupposition, predominant in twentieth-century academic discourse, that a (or the) philosophy of music education should unquestioningly derive from philosophies of art or aesthetics. Through the deployment of concepts such as theoria, techne, poiesis, phronesis, and especially, praxis, Regelski has, along with a cadre of like-minded thinkers, attempted, in the tradition of Christopher Small, to encourage educators to place greater emphasis on the social aspects of music making rather than on the so-called “aesthetic properties” of the music itself. For almost three decades, Regelski has been consistent, if not relentless in his promotion of all things “praxial.”A Brief Introduction to a Philosophy of Music and Music Education as Social Praxis (hereafter A Brief Introduction) comprises seven short chapters. The first three (Part One: Ideology Critique) provide an historical, if editorialized, overview of the history of aesthetics, from its ancient Greek origins in aisthesis to what Regelski calls today’s “aesthetic rationale” for music education. The last four chapters (Part Two: Theory into Praxis and Praxis Informed by Theory) provide arguments for why a praxial philosophy provides a superior basis for music education, along with illustrations of what music teaching based on praxialism might look like in practice. Readers already acquainted with Regelski’s previous writings are unlikely to find anything new in A Brief Introduction. Many of the book’s themes, such as “automania,” “sacrilization of music,” “legitimation crisis,” “pragmatic difference,” “action learning,” and “breaking 100” will be familiar to those who have read his essays over the years. A Brief Introduction, however, is not intended for those already familiar with his previous writings, but for newcomers, such as upper level undergraduates, for whom A Brief Introduction provides, as the title appropriately suggests, a succinct summary of his ideas distilled into just over a hundred pages. Rather than a stand-alone textbook, Regelski imagines the book as a “complement” to other courses, such as introductory classes in music education, conducting classes, instrumental method courses, and so on. Although not stated explicitly, much of the book’s content is relevant primarily (though perhaps not exclusively) for an American/Canadian readership.Regelski explains from the outset that the ideas in the book “are intended as a corrective to current practices and traditions in music teaching” (xx), ones he considers based upon and reflective of “aesthetic ideology.” As he explains, he wishes to operate in the tradition of Critical Theory, where ideology means the imposition of a dominant group’s values over a subordinate group. Although he never discusses processes of social reproduction, established norms and practices [End Page 214] in institutional... (shrink)

Feminist socially constitutive conceptions of autonomy make the presence of idealized social conditions necessary for autonomy. I argue that such conceptions cannot, when applied under nonideal conditions, play two key feminist theoretical roles for autonomy: the roles of anti-oppressive character ideal and paternalism-limiting concept. Instead, they prescribe action that reinforces oppression. Treated as character ideals, socially constitutive conceptions of autonomy ask agents living under nonideal ones to engage in self-harm or self-subordination. Moreover, conceptions of autonomy that make idealized social conditions (...) a requirement of autonomy yield the conclusion that oppressed agents are appropriate objects of paternalism. (shrink)

Kant is often portrayed as the author of a rigid system of ethics in which adherence to a formal and universal principle of morality - the famous categorical imperative - is an end itself, and any concern for human goals and happiness a strictly secondary and subordinate matter. Such a theory seems to suit perfectly rational beings but not human beings. The twelve essays in this collection by one of the world's preeminent Kant scholars argue for a radically different account (...) of Kant's ethics. They explore an interpretation of the moral philosophy according to which freedom is the fundamental end of human action, but an end that can only be preserved and promoted by adherence to moral law. By radically revising the traditional interpretation of Kant's moral and political philosophy and by showing how Kant's coherent liberalism can guide us in current debates, Paul Guyer will find an audience across moral and political philosophy, intellectual history, and political science. (shrink)

It is known that antiquity understood man as an organic part of the cosmos, which occupies the highest place among natural beings. Instead, the Middle Ages led man beyond the limits of cosmic natural life, proclaiming, on the one hand, an invisible connection with the transcendent God, and, on the other, humiliating the complete dependence caused by his fall upon Divine grace. The Middle Ages are about the discovery of the "inner man", who in the cosmos does not meet anything (...) and know the depths of which can only be obtained by the supernatural light of grace [Haydenko P.P. Evolution of the concept of science.- M., 1980.- C. 409, 425]. Self-knowledge, like the knowledge of God, medieval philosophical thought subordinated the religious task of saving the soul. She transferred the center of gravity of ethics from the sphere of knowledge to the sphere of faith, giving priority to freedom rather than reason - which led to the assertion of man as an active subject of action as opposed to the objectively contemplative attitude of antiquity. Such activity of the subject, despite its purely religious orientation, subsequently played an important role in the formation of the identity of the Renaissance individual. (shrink)

Les normes religieuses des Mongols s’ancraient dans le culte des ancêtres patrilinéaires, qui accordait une valeur supérieure au masculin, et assignaient aux individus des statuts et des rôles sexués, réservant en particulier aux hommes la sphère socio-politique. Elles ont orienté par la suite les pratiques bouddhiques des Mongols. Le régime révolutionnaire instauré en 1924 sur le modèle soviétique leur a substitué jusqu’à 1990 un nouveau modèle normatif neutralisant les différences sexuées entre citoyens, imposant l’égalité des droits politiques, promouvant l’accès des (...) femmes à l’éducation et à une activité sociale et professionnelle extérieure. L’urbanisation et l’industrialisation ont participé à la mutation du cadre socio-économique et des relations de parenté et affaibli l’emprise de la tradition sur les individus. Pourtant la valence différentielle des sexes n’a pas été aussi profondément remise en question qu’il y paraît, en particulier dans l’action politique, comme en témoigne a posteriori la société postcommuniste où la question de la subordination du féminin dans ce domaine reste d’actualité. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s Tractatus contains a curious and inaccessible theory of the will. It is presented in no more than about half a dozen remarks scattered through the latter part of the book. At 5.1362 he writes: “The freedom of the will consists in this, that future actions cannot yet be known. We could know them only if causality were an inner necessity, like that of logical inference.—The connection between knowledge and what is known is that of logical necessity.” Similarly, at (...) 6.373 to 6.375 he writes: “The world is independent of my will. Even if all that we wish for happened, this would still be only a favour of fate, so to speak; for there is no logical connection between will and world, which would guarantee it, and the supposed physical connection is surely not itself something we could will. Just as there is only a logical necessity, there is also only a logical impossibility.” At 6.423 to 6.43 he writes: “The will as the bearer of the ethical cannot be spoken of. And the will as phenomenon is of interest only to psychology. If good or bad willing alters the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts; not that which can be expressed through language. Briefly, the world must become through it an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole. The world of the happy man is a different one from the world of the unhappy man.” Finally, at 5.631 and 5.632 he writes: “There is no thinking, imaging, subject. If I wrote a book called “The world as I found it,” I should have to include a report on my body and say which parts were subordinate to my will and which not, etc.; this is a method of isolating the subject, or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject: for it alone could not be mentioned in that book.—The subject does not belong to the world, but is a limit of the world.”. (shrink)