CHAPTER ONE THE WORLD AS WILL TO POWER /. What there is for Nietzsche Any philosophical system which claims to be at all comprehensive must answer, ...

The existence of neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) is not enough for philosophical purposes. On the other hand, there's more to NCC than meets the sceptic's eye. (I) NCC are useful for a better understanding of conscious experience, for instance: (1) NCC are helpful to explain phenomenological features of consciousness – e.g., dreaming. (2) NCC can account for phenomenological opaque facts – e.g., the temporal structure of consciousness. (3) NCC reveal properties and functions of consciousness which cannot be elucidated either (...) by introspective phenomenology or by psychological experiments alone – e.g., vision. (II) There are crucial problems and shortcomings of NCC: (1) Correlation implies neither causation nor identity. (2) There are limitations of empirical access due to the problem of other minds and the problem of self-deception, and (3) due to the restrictions provided by inter- and intraindividual variations. (4) NCC cannot be catched by neuroscience alone because of the externalistic content of representations. Therefore, NCC are not sufficient for a naturalistic theory of mind, (5) nor are they necessary because of the possibility of multiple realization. (III) Nevertheless, NCC are relevant and important for the mind-body problem: (1) NCC reveal features that are necessary at least for behavioral manifestations of human consciousness. (2) But NCC are compatible with very different proposals for a solution of the mind-body problem. This seems to be both advantageous and detrimental. (3) NCC restrict nomological identity accounts. (4) The investigation of NCC can refute empirical arguments for interactionism as a case study of John Eccles' dualistic proposals will show. (5) The discoveries of NCC cannot establish a naturalistic theory of mind alone, for which, e.g., a principle of supervenience and a further condition – and therefore philosophical arguments – are required. (shrink)

Ethical theories have been largely focused on finding and clarifying certain amoral principles. However fruitful the communication of moral principles for providing orientation in modern society might be, a serious omission has been made in that the problem of implementation is not addressed. Two fundamental question have neither been raised nor answered: Why should self‐interested individuals follow the proposed moral principles in their daily conduct? Are societal institutions of such a design that is in the power of the individuals to (...) follow these moral principles? It is shown in this article that an economic theory of morals does systematically address these two questions and therefore provides a firm basis for discussing the possibilities and boundaries of following the moral principles inherent in the long history of moral philosophy. (shrink)

This chapter addresses the distinction between private and public and the difference between ‘public’ and ‘official’. Drawing on a comparative analysis of Asian cities, it looks at the ways in which the local, the national and the global levels, which serve different, sometimes contrasting, interests, are negotiated and reconciled in the city. The chapter suggests that different forms of reconciliation have brought about an alternative ‘insitutionalisation’ of the public space. Such an institutionalisation is reflected in the access to, and dissemination (...) of, information—e.g., access to the media—and, above all, in the control over the common goods. The public sphere is used to voice discontent, leading to a new definition of the ‘common good’; that is, the inclusion, or non-exclusion, of large sections of the population which, though initially marginal, can become significant in shaping urban politics. (shrink)

Barsalou's theory of perceptual symbol systems is considered from a metacognitive perspective. Two examples are discussed in terms of the proposed perceptual symbol theory. First, recent results in research on feeling-of-knowing judgement are used to argue for a representation of familiarity with input cues. This representation should support implicit memory. Second, the ability of maintaining a theory of other people's beliefs (theory of mind) is considered and it is suggested that a purely simulation-based view is insufficient to explain the available (...) evidence. Both examples characterize areas where Barsalou's theory would benefit from additional detail. (shrink)

The emerging consensus in the philosophy of cognition is that cognition is situated, i.e., dependent upon or co-constituted by the body, the environment, and/or the embodied interaction with it. But what about emotions? If the brain alone cannot do much thinking, can the brain alone do some emoting? If not, what else is needed? Do (some) emotions (sometimes) cross an individual's boundary? If so, what kinds of supra-individual systems can be bearers of affective states, and why? And does that make (...) emotions ?embedded? or ?extended? in the sense cognition is said to be embedded and extended? Section 2 shows why it is important to understand in which sense body, environment, and our embodied interaction with the world contribute to our affective life. Section 3 introduces some key concepts of the debate about situated cognition. Section 4 draws attention to an important disanalogy between cognition and emotion with regard to the role of the body. Section 5 shows under which conditions a contribution by the environment results in non-trivial cases of ?embedded? emotions. Section 6 is concerned with affective phenomena that seem to cross the organismic boundaries of an individual, in particular with the idea that emotions are ?extended? or ?distributed.? (shrink)

The concept of emergence is widely used in both the philosophy of mind and in cognitive science. In the philosophy of mind it serves to refer to seemingly irreducible phenomena, in cognitive science it is often used to refer to phenomena not explicitly programmed. There is no unique concept of emergence available that serves both purposes.

The goal of this paper is to examine moods, mostly in comparison to emotions. Nearly all of the features that allegedly distinguish moods from emotions are disputed though. In a first section I comment on duration, intentionality, and cause in more detail, and develop intentionality as the most promising distinguishing characteristic. In a second section I will consider the huge variety of moods, ranging from shallow environmentally triggered transient moods to deep existential moods that last much longer. I will explore (...) what their sources are, and how they impact one another, other affective processes, and our being in the world. I follow several eminent emotion researchers and try to carve out their insights, many seemingly mutually excluding each other. As it will turn out, most of them are, in fact, not excluding each other, but contribute to a layered picture of moods that fits well in between emotions and personality traits. Eventually, I will shortly discuss what we can do with our moods. (shrink)

Several theories of emergence will be distinguished. In particular, these are synchronic, diachronic, and weak versions of emergence. While the weaker theories are compatible with property reductionism, synchronic emergentism and strong versions of diachronic emergentism are not. Synchronice mergentism is of particular interest for the discussion of downward causation. For such a theory, a system's property is taken to be emergent if it is irreducible, i.e., if it is not reductively explainable. Furthermore, we have to distinguish two different types of (...) irreducibility with quite different consequences: If, on the one hand, a system's property is irreducible because of the irreducibility of the system's parts' behavior on which the property supervenes, we seem to have a case of "downward causation". This kind of downward causation does not violate the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain. If, on the other hand, a systemic property is irreducible because it is not exhaustively analyzable in terms of its causal role, downward causation is not implied. Rather, it is dubitable how unanalyzable properties might play any causal role at all. Thus, epiphenomenalism seems to be implied. The failure to keep apart the two kinds of irreducibility has muddled recent debate about the emergence of properties considerably. (shrink)

This article focuses on existential feelings. To begin with, it depicts how they differ from other affective phenomena and what type of intentionality they manifest. Furthermore, a detailed analysis shows that existential feelings can be subdivided, first, into elementary and nonelementary varieties, and second, into three foci of primary relatedness: oneself, the social environment, and the world as such. Eventually, five strategies of emotion regulation are examined with respect to their applicability to existential feelings. In the case of harmful existential (...) feelings, it turns out that none seems fitting except one, attentional deployment. (shrink)

A central problem for the international governance of heritable germline gene editing is that there are important differences in attitudes and values as well as ethical and health care considerations around the world. These differences are reflected in a complicated and diverse regulatory landscape. Several publications have discussed whether reproductive uses would be legally permissible in individual countries and whether clinical applications could emerge in the context of regulatory gaps and gray areas. Systematic comparative studies that explore issues related to (...) the governance of this technology from different national and international perspectives are needed to address the lack of knowledge in this area. In this research report, we contribute to filling this gap by presenting views of stakeholders in the United Kingdom on challenges to the governance of heritable genome editing. We present findings from a multistakeholder study conducted in the United Kingdom between October 2016 and January 2018 and funded by the Wellcome Trust. This research included interviews, literature analysis, and a workshop. We involved leading U.K. scientists, in vitro fertilization clinicians, and representatives from regulatory bodies, patient organizations, and other civil societal organizations, as well as fertility companies. Part one of this article explores stakeholder perceptions of possible global developments in heritable genome editing and associated risks and governance challenges. Part two presents a range of policy options that were generated during the workshop in relation to the challenges discussed in part one. (shrink)

The concept of self-legislation or autonomy is one of the outstanding innovations of Kant’s ethics. Nevertheless, it should not be ignored that it also builds on previous positions. Even if Kant in the Groundwork classifies all other moral principles as heteronomous, it is important to recognize that Kant incorporates elements of Wolff’s theory of self-legislation and Crusius’ theory of obligation into his theory of autonomy. In this essay, I present the relevant themes in Wolff and Crusius and discuss how they (...) were taken up by Kant in the mid-1780s. (shrink)

Often, the behavior of animals can be better explained and predicted, it seems, if we ascribe the capacity to have beliefs, intentions, and concepts to them. Whether we really can do so, however, is a debated issue. Particularly, Donald Davidson maintains that there is no basis in fact for ascribing propositional attitudes or concepts to animals. I will consider his and rival views, such as Colin Allen's three-part approach, for determining whether animals possess concepts. To avoid pure theoretical debate, however, (...) I will test these criteria using characteristic examples from ethology that depict a broad range of animal behavior. This will allow us to detect a series of gradations in animals' capacities, in the course of which we can think over what would count for or against an attribution of concepts and propositional attitudes to them in each single case. Self-conceit is our natural hereditary disease. Of all creatures man is the most wretched and fragile, and at once the most supercilious. ... It is by this conceit that man arrogates to himself ... divine properties, that he segregates himself from the mass of other creatures and raises himself above them .. (shrink)

Während es im moralisch-politischen Diskurs geradezu unkontrovers ist, dass Toleranz eine eminent wichtige Rolle für ein friedliches Zusammenleben von Menschen in pluralistischen Gesellschaften spielt, ist es alles andere als klar, was Toleranz überhaupt ist. Insbesondere die häufig anzutreffende Auffassung, dass es ‚Paradoxien‘ der Toleranz gäbe, sowie die in der Literatur immer von Neuem auftauchende Vexierfrage, ob Toleranz auch den Feinden der Toleranz gelten kann oder muss, sind deutliche Anzeichen dafür, dass es kein stabiles Verständnis der Natur dieser Einstellung gibt. Das (...) Problem ist nicht zuletzt ein methodologisches. Ich stelle zunächst einige Adäquatheitsbedingungen für eine Theorie der Toleranz auf, und argumentiere dann, dass eine Theorie der Toleranz als eine moralpsychologische Theorie vom normativen Begriff der Tolerierbarkeit frei zu halten ist. Nach der hier vorgeschlagenen Theorie besteht das Herzstück der Toleranz in einer verhaltenswirksamen Kontrolle moralischer Aversionen. Diese Theorie erfüllt die Adäquatheitsbedingungen für Theorien der Toleranz und wird von ihnen sogar erzwungen. Auf der Grundlage der erzielten Ergebnisse, erläutere ich dann Sinn und Rechtfertigung der Toleranzforderung und skizziere ihren Ort innerhalb der Ethik. (shrink)

According to Kant, the moral worth of an action depends on its maxim. As he explains, particularly in the Groundwork, moral worth accrues to an action when the action rests on a maxim selected for its accordance with the moral law. With respect to Religion, however, Kant modifies his understanding of the moral worth of actions. He now expresses the view that an agent acts morally worthy only if he possesses a moral Gesinnung as a character trait. According to this (...) opinion, only such persons can act in a manner that has moral worth who own a good Gesinnung and seek to express it in their actions. But to be in possession of a good Gesinnung depends, according to Kant, on strict conditions that ordinary actors will not realistically be able to fulfil. This accords with Kant's verdict that moral progress has not yet taken place because the conversion in Gesinnung that it would require is still outstanding. (shrink)

Review by: Achim Blumensath The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, Volume 19, Issue 3, Page 394-396, September 2013.

Der Beitrag geht im Anschluss an die Arbeiten Léon Wurmsers der Bedeutung des Schamaffekts in Freuds Schriften nach. Auf der einen Seite versucht er zu entwickeln, dass die Scham unter dem übergreifenden Titel der Peinlichkeit bereits in den frühen Schriften Freuds eine zentrale Rolle spielt: Peinlichkeit benennt vor diesem Hintergrund alle Unlustgefühle, die das eigene Selbst betreffen. Auf der anderen Seite stellt die Konfrontation mit peinlichen Erlebnissen und Erfahrungen für die Psychoanalyse eine Herausforderung dar, die sich auch in Freuds eigenen (...) Schriften niederschlägt. Eine besondere Bedeutung kommt in diesem Zusammenhang der »Traumdeutung« zu, die im Wesentlichen autobiographisch fundiert ist und den Traumdeuter so zu einem für die Scham typischen Spiel von Verdecken und Offenlegen zwingt. Anhand des vieldiskutierten Traum von Irmas Injektion will der Beitrag zeigen, dass Freuds Zentrierung der Deutung der eigenen Träume auf den Themenkomplex der Schuld die Präsenz von Schamkonflikten entgegensteht, die sich insbesondere in Freuds Verhältnis zu den Mitgliedern seiner eigenen Familie, seinen frühen Experimenten mit Kokain sowie seinem Freund Fleischl verbinden. Scham, so wäre zu schließen, kommt in der Geschichte der Genese der Psychoanalyse daher eine Schlüsselstellung zu. (shrink)

Bioethical debates on the use of human embryos and oocytes for stem cell research have often been criticized for the lack of empirical insights into the perceptions and experiences of the women and couples who are asked to donate these tissues in the IVF clinic. Empirical studies that have investigated the attitudes of IVF patients and citizens on the donation of their embryos and oocytes have been scarce and have focused predominantly on the situation in Europe and Australia. This article (...) examines the viewpoints on the donation of embryos for stem cell research among IVF patients and students in China. Research into the perceptions of patients is based on in-depth interviews with IVF patients and IVF clinicians. Research into the attitudes of students is based on a quantitative survey study. The empirical findings in this paper indicate that perceptions of the donation of human embryos for stem cell research in China are far more diverse and complex than has commonly been suggested. Claims that ethical concerns regarding the donation and use of embryos and oocytes for stem cell research are typical for Western societies but absent in China cannot be upheld. The article shows that research into the situated perceptions and cultural specificities of human tissue donation can play a crucial role in the deconstruction of politicized bioethical argumentation and the assumptions about “others” that underlie socio-ethical debates on the moral dilemmas of technology developments in the life sciences. (shrink)

We generalise the concept of clique width to structures of arbitrary signature and cardinality. We present characterisations of clique width in terms of decompositions of a structure and via interpretations in trees. Several model-theoretic properties of clique width are investigated including VC-dimension and preservation of finite clique width under elementary extensions and compactness.

It is a long-debated question in practical philosophy whether normative conclusions can be drawn from non-normative facts. Enoch takes sides in this controversy by denying that there can be normative output without normative input. This paper critically examines his argument from deliberative indispensability that moves from the normative indispensability of deliberation to the view that we are epistemically justified to believe that there are normative facts. I argue that the argument is defensible if some refinements are made. As I show, (...) it further proves successful against the challenge of quasi-realism, i.e., the view that we are only internally, not externally, justified to believe that mind-independent normative facts exist. (shrink)

This paper revisits the often debated question Can machines think? It is argued that the usual identification of machines with the notion of algorithm has been both counter-intuitive and counter-productive. This is based on the fact that the notion of algorithm just requires an algorithm to contain a finite but arbitrary number of rules. It is argued that intuitively people tend to think of an algorithm to have a rather limited number of rules. The paper will further propose a modification (...) of the above mentioned explication of the notion of machines by quantifying the length of an algorithm. Based on that it appears possible to reconcile the opposing views on the topic, which people have been arguing about for more than half a century. (shrink)

We review connections between the metric of spacetime and the quantum fluctuations of fields. We start with the finding that the spacetime metric can be expressed entirely in terms of the 2-point correlator of the fluctuations of quantum fields. We then discuss the open question whether the knowledge of only the spectra of the quantum fluctuations of fields also suffices to determine the spacetime metric. This question is of interest because spectra are geometric invariants and their quantization would, therefore, have (...) the benefit of not requiring the modding out of diffeomorphisms. Further, we discuss the fact that spacetime at the Planck scale need not necessarily be either discrete or continuous. Instead, results from information theory show that spacetime may be simultaneously discrete and continuous in the same way that information can. Finally, we review the recent finding that a covariant natural ultraviolet cutoff at the Planck scale implies a signature in the cosmic microwave background that may become observable. (shrink)

This article examines for the first time the jihadist global hegemonic masculinity of Osama bin Laden. Based on Bin Laden’s public statements translated into English, the authors examine how in the process of constructing a rationale for violent attacks primarily against the United States, he simultaneously and discursively formulates a jihadist global hegemonic masculinity. The research adds to the growing interest in discursive global hegemonic masculinities, as well as jihadist masculinities in the Middle East, by scrutinizing how Bin Laden’s jihadist (...) global hegemonic masculinity is produced in and through his public statements. The authors close their discussion by demonstrating how Bin Laden’s discursive practices are embedded in a clash of competing global hegemonic masculinities on the world stage. (shrink)

The hypothesis that emotions influence our behavior via emotional action tendencies is at the core of many emotion theories. According to a strong version of this hypothesis, these emotional action tendencies are immediate, automatic (unintentional), stimulus-based and directly linked with specific muscle movements. Recent evidence, however, provides little empirical support for this strong version during routine behavior, especially when the task does not require the evaluation of the stimuli. The present study tested the prediction that surprise interrupts routine behavior and (...) triggers a threat avoidance response. In the presence of a threat-related stimulus, avoidance responses are relatively rapid, and approach responses impeded, even when the interrupted routine behavior is guided by a non-evaluative task goal. In contrast, approach and avoidance responses are predicted to be unaffected in the presence of a pleasant surprising stimulus. To test these predictions, in each trial the participants had to execute an approach or withdrawal movement depending on the location of a target stimulus. In the critical trial, either a picture of a pleasant or a threat-related animal was presented as target. Supporting the predictions, the initiation times for these movements were shorter in response to a threat-relevant than a pleasant surprising stimulus. Additionally, in the presence of a threat-related surprising stimulus, withdrawal movements were made faster than approach movements even though the participants performed a non-evaluative task. Implications and limitations of the present study are discussed. (shrink)

: In the analytic tradition of the philosophy of emotions the folk notion of adequacy is understood with regard to – at least four – different questions, viz. a moral question, a prudential question, an epistemic question, and a fittingness question. Usually, the fittingness question is treated as being the central one. I have some doubts concerning this assessment, particularly when it comes to substantial – interpersonal or cultural – controversies about whether a specific emotional response is adequate or whether (...) a specific event deserves the emotional responses it triggers. To approach these matters, I recommend first doing without the established distinctions, for they may prematurely tempt us into assessing the adequacy of emotional responses in terms of one of these categories thereby overlooking other features that deserve attention. Instead, I will start with the folk notion of adequacy and then refine stepwise the conceptual landscape to get closer to what the crucial issues of adequacy are. Keywords: Philosophy of Emotions; Emotional Atmospheres; Existential Feelings; Adequacy of Emotional Responses L’adeguatezza delle emozioni e dei sentimenti esistenziali Riassunto: All’interno della tradizione analitica della filosofia delle emozioni la nozione comune di adeguatezza è presa in considerazione in relazione ad almeno quattro diversi problemi: un primo è di carattere morale ; un secondo riguarda la discrezionalità ; un terzo è di tipo epistemico e un quarto concerne l’ appropriatezza. Di solito, all’appropriatezza viene riservata maggiore importanza. Personalmente nutro diversi dubbi su questa valutazione, in particolare quando si tratta di dirimere questioni sostanziali – interpersonali o culturali –, se una data risposta emotiva è adeguata o se un dato evento merita la risposta emotiva che ha innescato. Per affrontare questi problemi, mi sento in primo luogo di suggerire di fare a meno delle distinzioni maggiormente in uso, poiché possono spiprematuramente a valutare l’adeguatezza delle risposte emotive nei termini una delle categorie già menzionate, trascurando quindi altre proprietà degne di attenzione. Intendo invece partire dalla nozione di adeguatezza propria del senso comune e poi gradualmente raffinare il panorama concettuale, per approssimarmi ai problemi fondamentali dell’adeguatezza. Parole chiave: Filosofia delle emozioni; Atmosfere emotive; Sentimenti esistenziali; Adeguatezza delle risposte emotive. (shrink)

In dieser Arbeit wird gezeigt, daß der Hegelsche Anspruch, allein aus dem Anfang als dem Abstrakten und Unmittelbaren das Konkretere und Reichere zu entwickeln, nicht aufrechtzuhalten ist. Damit wird nicht die Dialektik, und insbesondere nicht die Dialektik des Anfangs, preisgege- ben. Es wird aufgezeigt, wie Hegel bei Entwicklung der Kategorien in der Wissenschat'tder Logik stets Bezug nehmen muß auf ein heteroge- nes Etwas. Er versucht dies zu kaschieren. Der Unterschied der ersten Kategorien Sein und Nichts ist aus der unbestimmten Unmittelbarkeit (...) von Sein und Nichts nicht zu begründen. Für den Unterschied von Sein und Nichts muß ein Etwas zitiert werden. Erst dieses Zitat eines Hetero- genen ermöglicht den Fortgang der systematischen Darstellung. Damit ist die idealistische Dialektik in der Darstellung aufgehoben; sie ist negiert und vernichtet, weil sie als falsche aufgezeigt ist, und sie ist aufbewahrt und bestimmend für die Darstellung, weil die Kritik des Fal- schen konstitutiv für das Weitere ist. Im Folgenden werden die Übergänge zu den Kategorien Sein, Nichts, Werden, Entstehen, Vergehen, Nicht-Werden und Dasein analysiert, und es wird aufgezeigt, an welchen Stellen ein heterogenes Etwas zitiert werden muß, um eine korrekte systematische Entwicklung der Katego- rien zu erhalten. (shrink)