Whose Keeper? is a profound and creative treatise on modernity and its challenge to social science. Alan Wolfe argues that modern liberal democracies, such as the United States and Scandinavia, have broken with traditional sources of mortality and instead have relied upon economic and political frameworks to define their obligations to one another. Wolfe calls for reinvigorating a sense of community and thus a sense of obligation to the larger society.

We argue that though stakeholder theory has much to recommend it, particularly as a heuristic for thinking about business firmsproperly as involving the economic interests of other groups beyond those of the shareholders or other equity owners, the theory is limited by its focus on the interests of human participants in business enterprise. Stakeholder theory runs into intractable philosophicaldifficulty in providing credible ethical principles for business managers in dealing with some topics, such as the natural environment,that do not directly involve (...) human beings within a business firm or who engage in transactions with a firm. Corporate decision-makingmust include an appreciation of these ethical values even though they cannot be captured in stakeholder theory. (shrink)

A central reason that undergirds the significance of evo-devo is the claim that development was left out of the Modern synthesis. This claim turns out to be quite complicated, both in terms of whether development was genuinely excluded and how to understand the different kinds of embryological research that might have contributed. The present paper reevaluates this central claim by focusing on the practice of model organism choice. Through a survey of examples utilized in the literature of the Modern synthesis, (...) I identify a previously overlooked feature: exclusion of research on marine invertebrates. Understanding the import of this pattern requires interpreting it in terms of two epistemic values operating in biological research: theoretical generality and explanatory completeness. In tandem, these values clarify and enhance the significance of this exclusion. The absence of marine invertebrates implied both a lack of generality in the resulting theory and a lack of completeness with respect to particular evolutionary problems, such as evolvability and the origin of novelty. These problems were salient to embryological researchers aware of the variation and diversity of larval forms in marine invertebrates. In closing, I apply this analysis to model organism choice in evo-devo and discuss its relevance for an extended evolutionary synthesis. (shrink)

The rapid development of biobanks internationally reflects the considerable expectations attached to the exploitation of genetics knowledge. However, establishing consent and legitimacy for the new generation of biobanks is not without its challenges because they tend to be prospective in nature, involving the collection of DNA, personal medical and lifestyle data generally held over a very long period of time for unspecified research purposes. Thus far, biobanks have tended to be established ahead of wide-ranging debate about their broad implications. Making (...) specific reference to the 'engagement' processes employed by UK Biobank during its establishment phase, this article focuses on the politics of 'public engagement'. It examines the context of arguments for 'public engagement', drawing attention to how particular approaches to 'engagement' within biobank projects may serve to limit debate on substantive questions arising from their development. Unless biobanks' 'engagements' substantially involve publics in deliberations about their development, it is argued, publics are likely to become distrustful of projects and perhaps resist other similar population-based health initiatives in the future. (shrink)

The paper offers a critical engagement with Cécile Laborde’s book, Liberalism’s Religion. It elaborates several objections to Laborde’s account of religious accommodations, and sketches an alternative approach.

Dada la cantidad de referencias a koinōnía en los diálogos de Platón, llama la atención que la frase “bien común” sea usada solo una vez – en el Cármides 166d. Sócrates pregunta a su interlocutor Critias: “¿No crees que es por el bien común, para casi todos los hombres, el que deba descubrirse cómo son todos los seres?”. La pregunta surge después de que Critias ha afirmado que sōphrosýnē es autoconocimiento, lo cual luego especifica como un “conocimiento de todos los (...) demás conocimientos y de sí mismo”. En este artículo, sostengo que no es casualidad que Sócrates mencione el “bien común” precisamente en este momento en su discusión con Critias. La noción de sōphrosýnē que Critias defiende es incoherente debido a lo que este afirma que es su característica distintiva – su reflexividad. Debido a su total reflexividad, no apunta a ningún fin más allá de sí mismo y, por lo tanto, es incapaz de revelar “los seres” ni de estar conectado a ningún bien fuera de sí mismo. El bien común que Sócrates menciona aquí está, por ende, esencialmente relacionado al reconocimiento de la ignorancia que motiva a asombrarse de un bien más allá del amor de nuestras propias cosas. Por lo tanto, sugiero una explicación para la curiosa adición de “casi” en el comentario de Sócrates aquí: Critias mismo muestra que, a menos que él pueda admitir la ignorancia y experimentar tal asombro, entonces él no está constitucionalmente incluido en este bien común. (shrink)

Currently, entrepreneurs and corporations overwhelmingly do not view the alleviation of global poverty as a strategic priority. Yet business activity can have a negative as well as a positive effect on each distinctive form of poverty. In order to reduce poverty, entrepreneurs have to find ways of limiting the negative aspects. This might be achieved by deliberately augmenting strategies so that they can achieve a synthesis, in partnership with governments and NGO’s.

This study explores the way that belief systems, interactions with social or experimental environments, and skills at the “control” level in decision‐making shape people's behavior as they solve problems. It is argued that problem‐solvers' beliefs (not necessarily consciously held) about what is useful in mathematics may determine the set of “cognitive resources” at their disposal as they do mathematics. Such beliefs may, for example, render inaccessible to them large bodies of information that are stored in long‐term memory and that are (...) easily retrieved in other circumstances. In other cases, individuals' reactions to an experimental setting (fear of failure, or the desire to “look mathematical” while being videotaped) may induce behavior that is almost pathological—and at the same time, so consistent that it can be modeled. In general, such “environmental” factors establish the context within which individuals access and utilize the information potentially at their disposal.Protocols illustrating these points are presented and discussed. A model based on an axiomatization of students' beliefs about plane geometry is outlined, and is shown to correspond closely to their problem‐solving performance. A framework is offered for analyzing problem‐solving performance at three qualitatively different levels: access to cognitive resources stored in LTM, executive or control decision‐making, and belief systems. (shrink)

The structural-systematic philosophy requires a moral theory. This essay seeks to determine whether either of two recent works, Joshua Greene’s Moral Tribes and Michael Tomasello’s A Natural History of Human Morality, should influence that theory. It first argues that Greene’s fails to make its case for utilitarianism over deontology. It then argues that Tomasello’s thesis that early humans developed moralities of sympathy and fairness, particularly when taken in conjunction with aspects of Alan Gewirth’s moral theory, fits well with the (...) moral theory envisaged by extant works on the structural-systematic philosophy. The envisaged theory maintains the objectivity of human rights. (shrink)

Este artículo es un estudio acerca de la elaboración de la teoría de la empatía de Edmund Husserl. Procura reconstruir dos de los hitos principales de las reflexiones sobre la empatía en cuanto que vivencia intencional aprehensora de una subjetividad ajena, a partir de una interpretación de textos póstumos sobre la intersubjetividad editados por Iso Kern en 1973 en los volúmenes XIII, XIV y XV de _Husserliana_. El primer hito es la discusión que a comienzos del 1900 Husserl entabla con, (...) por un lado, la teoría de la inferencia por analogía de Benno Erdmann –formulada originalmente por John Stuart Mill– y, por el otro, la teoría de la empatía como instinto de imitación y expresión de Theodor Lipps. El segundo es la reelaboración del concepto de empatía a partir de la fenomenología genética y el descubrimiento de síntesis pasivas a la base de los actos cogitativos del ego. Sostengo en este trabajo que estos dos jalones del pensamiento husserliano sobre la intersubjetividad no están completamente desvinculados: las nociones de analogía y de operaciones no-yoicias, tan importantes en el segundo período, estaban ya presentes a su manera en la interpretación crítica de las teorías de Erdmann/Mill y Lipps. (shrink)

Incidents are peripheral, rather than central, phenomena. This Collision considers sound and installation artist Inouk Demers, whose recent work explores the incidental in both its geographical and conceptual relationships to the megalopolis of Los Angeles. In Zine-o-file, Conveyance, Wireless Landscape, and Custom Audio Products, Demers offers the incidental as an alternative to straightforward themes and fleshed-out narratives.

(2003). Intellectuals for our times. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: Vol. 6, The Public Role of Intellectuals, pp. 33-50. doi: 10.1080/1369823042000241258.