Should we hold beliefs only insofar as they are rationally supportable? According to Allen W. Wood, we're morally obliged to do so—and yet how does this apply to religious beliefs? _Unsettling Obligations_ examines these and related ethical and philosophical issues, taking and defending stances on many of them. Along with the theme of belief and evidence, other topics include a historical perspective of philosophy based on the Enlightenment rationalist tradition and a study of how our practical commitments help define (...) truth and value. (shrink)

In Better than Human, noted bioethicist Allen Buchanan grapples with the ethical dilemmas of the medical revolution and biomedical enhancements. One problem, he argues, is that the debate over these enhancements has divided into polar extremes--into denunciations of meddling in the natural order, or else a heady optimism that we can cure all that ails humanity. In fact, Buchanan notes, the human genome has always been unstable, and intervention is no offense against nature.

One of the most interesting programs in the foundations of quantum mechanics is the realist quantum logic approach associated with Putnam, Bub, Demopoulos and Friedman (and which is the focus of my own research.) I believe that realist quantum logic is our best hope for making sense of quantum mechanics, but I have come to suspect that the usual version may not be the correct one. In this paper, I would like to say why and to propose an alternative.

Epistemic akrasia arises when one holds a belief even though one judges it to be irrational or unjustified. While there is some debate about whether epistemic akrasia is possible, this paper will assume for the sake of argument that it is in order to consider whether it can be rational. The paper will show that it can. More precisely, cases can arise in which both the belief one judges to be irrational and one’s judgment of it are epistemically rational in (...) the sense that both are supported by sufficient evidence. (shrink)

This volume provides a guide to the discussion among biologists and philosophersabout the role of concepts such as function and design in an evolutionary understanding oflife.

A vast literature has developed probing the law's aversion to statistical/probability evidence in general and its rejection of naked statistical evidence in particular. This literature rests on false premises. At least so far as US law is concerned, there is no general aversion to statistical forms of proof and even naked statistics are admissible and sufficient for a verdict when the evidentiary proffer meets the normal standards of admissibility, the most important of which is reliability. The belief to the contrary (...) rests upon a series of mistakes: most importantly, mismodeling of the structure of legal systems and the nature of common law decision making. Contributing to these mistakes is the common methodology in this literature of relying on weird hypotheticals that mismodel the underlying legal relations and contain impossible epistemological demands. Collectively, these phenomena have distracted attention from issues that actually affect real legal systems. (shrink)

This paper seeks to contribute to the debate around sustainability by proposing the need for an ecocentric stance to sustainability that reflexively embeds humans in—rather than detached from—nature. We argue that this requires a different way of thinking about our relationship with our world, necessitating a engagement with the sociomaterial world in which we live. We develop the notion of ecocentrism by drawing on insights from sociomateriality studies, and show how radical-reflexivity enables us to appreciate our embeddedness and responsibility for (...) sustainability by bringing attention to the interrelationship between values, actions and our social and material world. We examine the implications of an ecocentric radically reflexive approach to sustainability for management education. (shrink)

Carruthers argues that knowledge of our own propositional attitudes is achieved by the same mechanism used to attain knowledge of other people's minds. This seems incompatible with "privileged access"---the idea that we have more reliable beliefs about our own mental states, regardless of the mechanism. At one point Carruthers seems to suggest he may be able to maintain privileged access, because we have additional sensory information in our own case. We raise a number of worries for this suggestion, concluding that (...) Carruthers's new theory cannot clearly preserve the superior reliability of our beliefs about our own attitudes. (shrink)

Positive aesthetics holds that the natural environment, insofar as it is unaffected by man, has only positive aesthetic qualities and value-that virgin nature is essentially beautiful. In spite of the initial implausibility of this position, it is nonetheless suggested by many individuals who have given serious thought to the natural environment and to environmental philosophy. Certain attempts to defend theposition involve claiming either that it is not implausible because our appreciation of nature is not genuinely aesthetic, or that the position (...) is justified in virtue of man’s limited control and understanding of the natural world or in virtue of the natural world’s divine design and origin. Such attempts are inadequate; they neither justify the position nor explain its acceptance. In order to account for positive aesthetics,we must note the intimate connection between nature appreciation and the development of natural science. An understanding of the role of scientific knowledge in the aesthetic appreciation of nature not only sheds light on the acceptance of the positive aesthetics position, but also suggests a means by which to justify it. (shrink)

This book brings together ten influential essays on justice and healthcare, written by a major figure in bioethics and political philosophy. What emerges is a systematic and unified approach to the issues that challenges widely-held dogmas and unsettles the framing assumptions of a number of prominent debates. Unlike most work in bioethics, this book takes the problem of implementing justice seriously, exploring the relationship between institutions, incentives, and moral commitments.

Fichte founded a revolutionary philosophical movement and invented an entirely new kind of philosophy; and he did so knowingly and intentionally. Yet, paradoxically, he did all this merely in the course of attempting to complete the philosophical project of Kant and protect critical philosophy against the possibility of skeptical..

If there is to be any progress in the debate about what sort of positive moral status Kant can give the emotions, we need a taxonomy of the terms Kant uses for these concepts. It used to be thought that Kant had little room for emotions in his ethics. In the past three decades, Marcia Baron, Paul Guyer, Barbara Herman, Nancy Sherman, Allen Wood and others have argued otherwise. Contrary to what a cursory reading of the Groundwork may (...) indicate, Kant thinks the emotions play an important role in the moral life. I want to extend the work of Baron, Guyer, Herman, Sherman and Wood in three ways. First, I will set out in a diagram Kant's taxonomy of feelings and emotions. Agreement on such a taxonomy should make it easier to evaluate debates about Kant and the emotions. Second, I will focus on a certain subclass of emotions – reason-caused affects – that have previously received little attention, even from these Kant scholars. Third, these scholars base much of their defence of Kant on his later works – especially the Metaphysics of Morals and the Anthropology – but Kant's fairly rich taxonomy of the emotions, including reason-caused affects, is clearly in place at least as early as the Critique of Judgment . I believe that the Critique of Judgment is an importantly ignored resource for understanding the moral role of the emotions for Kant. The third Critique makes positive, philosophically interesting claims about the emotions and morality. Kant emphasizes certain roles for emotions in this work that he develops to the same extent nowhere else. Nevertheless, the Critique of Judgment goes all but unmentioned by many who write on these issues. In what follows, I will defend as many of my claims as possible using the third Critique. (shrink)

This innovative book investigates being Jewish not as a sectarian religiosity but as a way of being-in-the-world particularly suited to understanding Heidegger's early phenomenology. At its core is an intimate engagement with sacred texts,which grounds being Jewish in a way of life constituted as a way of reading-a way of reading transmitted to succeeding generations as a passionate teaching. Allen Scult argues that Heidegger was similarly involved in a passionate attempt to introduce his students to philosophical practice through a (...) personal engagement with the words of Aristotle. Scult traces the hermeneutical affinity- even intimacy-between Judaism as a way of life, grounded in an intense interpretive relationship to the Torah; and Heidegger's view of philosophical practice, as a similarly intense interpretive relationship to the founding texts of Western philosophy. In tracing the dynamics of this relationship in Heideggerian and Jewish hermeneutics, Scult not only finds mutually enlightening points of contact between the two, but also uncovers new ways of understanding how Heidegger's fundamental ontology is grounded in the lived experience of religion. Allen Scult is National Endowment for the Humanities Professor of Philosophy and Rhetoric at Drake University. He is co-author of Rhetoric and Biblical Interpretation. Being Jewish/Reading Heidegger ponders what it means to read Heidegger on his own terms, that is, to read him from the place where one is, in Heidegger's language, in and from the facticity of one's own Being... To be Jewish, according to Scult, is to be entexted with Torah. Scult argues that this notion of binding one's being with a textual tradition underlies Heidegger's theory of Dasein. He uses Heidegger's lectures on Aristotle's Rhetoric to illustrate how Heidegger 'reads Aristotle' and, in doing so... teach[es] the Jew how to be-Jewish-in-the-world through an engagement with a textual tradition (Torah)..Shaul Magid, The Jewish Theological Seminary of America a compelling account of how being-Jewish enacts the sort of concrete, revealing relationship to a text and a world that makes meditation on being, as Heidegger - early and late - understands it, possible. Only someone with Allen Scult's trained ear for the subtle interplay of rhetoric and hermeneutics could make us see the remarkable parallels between the Rabbis' reading of the Torah and Heidegger's reading of Aristotle..he makes a trenchant case for 'a reading of Heidegger not as prophet, but as Rabbinic sage'.--Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Boston University Being Jewish/Reading Heidegger ponders what it means to read Heidegger on his own terms to read him from the place where one is...As a Jew seriously engaged with Heidegger as both a philosopher and a thinker... Scult posits that being Jewish is not simply a consequence of birth or biology but... of binding oneTs being with a textual tradition(Torah)...This book is really about a search for b/Being Jewish using Heidegger as a guide --a guide that shows the seeker how text and person read and constructively use one other... Scult succeeds in presenting how one can be a serious disciple of Heidegger and a serious Jew and that the former, in many ways, only enriches the latterShaul Magid, The Jewish Theological Seminary of America A compelling account of how being-Jewish enacts the sort of concrete, revealing relationship to a text and a world that makes meditation on being, as Heidegger-early and late-understands it, possible. Only someone with Allen Scult's trained ear for the subtle interplay of rhetoric and hermeneutics could make us see the remarkable parallels between the Rabbis' reading of the Torah and Heidegger's reading of Aristotle.... He makes a trenchant case for a reading of Heidegger not as prophet, but as Rabbinic sage'.Daniel O. Dahlstrom. (shrink)

Michel de Certeau has described our movement about the city as improvisational—as an interaction with a spatial order that not only activates that order’s ensemble of possibilities but transforms and introduces new possibilities for elements comprising that order. However, architecture’s relation to improvisation is not limited to this provision of a fixed context, an offering of material that is the basis of our daily play. A number of writings about architecture and urbanism by Jane Jacobs, Roger Sherman, and Stan (...) Allen identify improvisation in aspects of the design of the city itself. Along with the Available City, a design proposition that explicitly seeks to organize an improvisational production of a new spatial system within the city of Chicago, those writings reveal possibilities for structure that organize improvisational processes as a way of working on the city. (shrink)

In his conceivability argument, Chalmers assumes that all properties have their causal powers contingently and causal laws are also contingent. We argue that this claim conflicts with how conceivability itself must work for the conceivability argument to be successful. If conceivability is to be an effective mechanism to determine possibility, it must work as a matter of necessity, since contingent conceivability renders conceivability fallible for an ideal reasoner and the fallible conceivability of zombies would not entail their possibility. But necessary (...) conceivability must either be governed by necessitating causal processes or by a necessitating non-causal mechanism. We argue that the latter option is untenable or mysterious; whereas, if Chalmers chooses the former and applies it only to conceivability, his solution is ad hoc, but if he accepts necessary causal powers or processes generally, the conceivability argument fails. We conclude that, as it stands, the Conceivability Argument does not establish that physicalism is false. (shrink)

A collection of essays on the work of Latin American philosopher Enrique Dussel, focusing on his ethics of liberation.

In this article we explore the role of data custodians in establishing and maintaining social licence for the use of personal information in health research. Personal information from population‐level data collections can be used to make significant contributions to health and medical research, but this use is dependent on community acceptance or a social licence. We conducted semi‐structured interviews with data custodians across Australia to better understand data custodians’ views on their roles and responsibilities. This inductive, thematic analysis of the (...) interview data focuses on three factors that contribute to social licence – reciprocity, non‐exploitation and the public good. While the data custodians interviewed did not explicitly frame their role in the context of social licence, their descriptions of their roles and responsibilities clearly indicated that they did have some role to play in building and maintaining social licence. (shrink)

What is the relationship between being coloured and looking coloured? According to Alva Noë, to be coloured is to manifest a pattern of apparent colours as the perceptual conditions vary. I argue that Noë’s ‘phenomenal objectivism’ faces similar objections to attempts by traditional dispositionalist theories of colour to account for being coloured in terms of looking coloured. Instead, I suggest that to be coloured is to look coloured in a ‘non-perspectival’ sense, where non-perspectival looks transcend specific perceptual conditions.

Thanks to Michel Foucault, Jeremy Bentham's panopticon has become the iconic modern prison. But Foucault and most of his readers neglect the fact that a significant proportion of Bentham's panoptical writings were concerned with critically contrasting his ideal prison with the reality of penal transportation to New South Wales. Among his many criticisms, Bentham focussed particular attention on the problem of convict reform, arguing that surveillance was necessary to ensure genuine reformation, and that such surveillance was impossible in the open (...) prison of New South Wales. This connection between reformation and surveillance was a pervasive feature of Bentham's thought, reflected in his ideas for a centralised information state as well as his wider corpus on criminal justice. In this paper, I historicise Bentham's theory of reformative surveillance, and argue that Bentham, writing from London, misunderstood the importance of surveillance to the penal colony. At least in theory, convicts in New South Wales were subject to extensive systems of surveillance, and the failure of these systems in practice point to the limitations of Bentham's own, largely hypothetical, plans. (shrink)

Not the least admirable of the late David Lewis’s attributes was his disdain for technical terminology and jargon. His writings are a model demonstrating that, with skill and care, it is possible to discuss even the most mathematical aspects of logic and semantics in clear English prose, and with only a minimum of symbolism. The main text of Parts of Classes [1, hereafter: PoC], a 120-page essay on the foundations of set theory, follows Aristotle in using letters as variables, and (...) has a few dashes and ellipses where it mentions schemata, but is otherwise free of logical notation. The essential advantages of what Church called “the logistic method” do not depend on its typographical accidents!) It is only natural that writers following him have taken one of his expressive words and turned it into a technical term: he allowed ‘atomless gunk’ as a possible complication in the mereological analysis of things, and ‘gunk’ is now a technical term in mereology. Gunk is stuff every part of which contains further parts, stuff which can be divided endlessly without ever arriving at an indivisible atom. (shrink)

Igli era La Meca de los Almohades. En la cueva de Igli Muhammad Ibn Tûmart proclamó el principio del movimiento almohade en África del norte. A pesar de la importancia de Igli, no se conocía su localización exacta o de la cueva de Ibn Tûmart. Aquí se detalla el descubrimiento de la pequeña aldea de Igli 30 kilómetros al este de Tarûdant. La localización de esta aldea moderna parece corresponder con el Igli almohade. Las fuentes primarias, el testimonio oral y (...) los restos físicos se aducen como evidencia de que el Igli moderno era el lugar de nacimiento de Ibn Tûmart. (shrink)

The probabilistic account of juridical proof meets insurmountable problems. A better explanation of juridical proof is that it is a form of inference to the best explanation that involves the comparative plausibility of the parties’ stories. In addition, discrete evidentiary matters such as relevance and probative value are also best understood as involving inference to the best explanation rather than being probabilistic.

Through exploring multiple contemporary conceptions of justice, this article illustrates that justice matters when considering outcomes in nongovernmental organization assistance. In environmental justice scholarship, the term justice has been underproblematized, assuming a tacit understanding of the concept as fairness or equitable distribution of environmental harms. Using the rebuilding of two heavily damaged poor and minority neighborhoods in post–Katrina New Orleans as case studies, this article makes evident the different conceptualizations of justice embedded within the strategies and techniques of NGOs and (...) community organizations. Examining both practices and outcomes, I argue that the definition of justice that NGOs implicitly or explicitly adopt in their strategies and technologies of assistance can lead to very different results in postdisaster neighborhood revitalization. For science and technology studies, conceptions of justice can help articulate a more critical social science that opens up the descriptive/normative divide. This is important in thinking about equitable social change and allied policy—as it applies not only to NGO assistance but also to other science and technology issues that intersect with marginalized communities as well. (shrink)