More and more organisations formulate a code of conduct in order to stimulate responsible behaviour among their members. Much time and energy is usually spent fixing the content of the code but many organisations get stuck in the challenge of implementing and maintaining the code. The code then turns into nothing else than the notorious "paper in the drawer", without achieving its aims. The challenge of implementation is to utilize the dynamics which have emerged from the formulation of the code. (...) This will support a continuous process of reflection on the central values and standards contained in the code. This paper presents an assessment method, based on the EFQM model, which intends to support this implementation process. (shrink)

Recent research indicates that angry facial expressions are preferentially processed and may facilitate automatic avoidance response, especially in socially anxious individuals. However, few studies have examined whether this bias also expresses itself in more complex cognitive processes and behavior such as decision making. We recently introduced a variation of the Iowa Gambling Task which allowed us to document the influence of task-irrelevant emotional cues on rational decision making. The present study used a modified gambling task to investigate the impact of (...) angry facial expressions on decision making in 38 individuals with a wide range of social anxiety. Participants were to find out which choices were (dis-) advantageous to maximize overall gain. To create a decision conflict between approach of reward and avoidance of fear-relevant angry faces, advantageous choices were associated with angry facial expressions, whereas disadvantageous choices were associated with happy facial expressions. Results indicated that higher social avoidance predicted less advantageous decisions in the beginning of the task, i.e., when contingencies were still uncertain. Interactions with specific skin conductance responses further clarified that this initial avoidance only occurred in combination with elevated responses before choosing an angry facial expressions. In addition, an interaction between high trait anxiety and elevated responses to early losses predicted faster learning of an advantageous strategy. These effects were independent of intelligence, general risky decision-making, self-reported state anxiety, and depression. Thus, socially avoidant individuals who respond emotionally to angry facial expressions are more likely to show avoidance of these faces under uncertainty. This novel laboratory paradigm may be an appropriate analog for central features of social anxiety. (shrink)

Experiences of absence are common in everyday life, but have received little philosophical attention until recently, when two positions regarding the nature of such experiences surfaced in the literature. According to the Perceptual View, experiences of absence are perceptual in nature. This is denied by the Surprise-Based View, according to which experiences of absence belong together with cases of surprise. In this paper, I show that there is a kind of experience of absence—which I call frustrating absences—that has been overlooked (...) by the Perceptual View and by the Surprise Based-View and that cannot be adequately explained by them. I offer an alternative account to deal with frustrating absences, one according to which experiencing frustrating absences is a matter of subjects having desires for something to be present frustrated by the world. Finally, I argue that there may well be different kinds of experiences of absence. (shrink)

Inleiding tot de westerse ideeëngeschiedenis.

It is held by many philosophers that it is a consequence of epistemic contextualism that speakers are typically semantically blind, that is, typically unaware of the propositions semantically expressed by knowledge attributions. In his ?Contextualism, Invariantism and Semantic Blindness? (this journal, 2009), Martin Montminy argues that semantic blindness is widespread in language, and not restricted to knowledge attributions, so it should not be considered problematic. I will argue that Montminy might be right about this, but that contextualists still face a (...) serious and related problem: that it is a consequence of epistemic contextualism that subjects are typically unaware of contents conveyed by knowledge attributions, independently of whether these are semantic or non-semantic contents. Even if semantic blindness is widespread in language, it does not seem that content unawareness of this sort is. (shrink)

We describe a strongly minimal theory S in an effective language such that, in the chain of countable models of S, only the second model has a computable presentation. Thus there is a spectrum of an -categorical theory which is neither upward nor downward closed. We also give an upper bound on the complexity of spectra.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Was Hume An Atheist? Shane Andre Hume's philosophy of religion, as expressed in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, the Natural History of Religion, and sections 10 and 11 ofthe Enquiry ConcerningHuman Understanding,1 invites a number of diverse interpretations. At one extreme are those who see Hume as an "atheist"2 or "anti-theist."3 At the other extreme are those who see Hume as some kind of theist, though not a (...) classical or orthodox one.4 In between are others for whom Hume is an "agnostic* or "ironic skeptic."6 Still a fourth interpretation can be found, according to which Hume "seems to vacillate hopelessly" in his view ofreligion;7 in other words, no coherent philosophy ofreligion can be found in his work and so it is futile to look for one. Ofthe four alternatives, it seems to me that the fourth, being less interesting philosophically and less to Hume's credit as a major philosopher, should be rejected unless by default no coherent case can be made for one of the other three. Since I believe that Hume's views about the nature and existence of God are complex, somewhat unconventional, but still coherent, I will concentrate on the title question. Before tackling that question directly, however, we need to clarify the meaning of the term "atheist" and its cognates. While an atheist is popularly defined as one who does not believe in God, this definition is inadequate for two reasons. First, while the absence of belief is sometimes treated as a synonym for disbelief, it is clear that the two are not the same. An infant does not believe in God, but that does not make him an atheist,8 for, as yet, he does not have the linguistic competence to reflect on the question, Does God exist? Neither is the agnostic an atheist, for, though he has reflected on the question, he has not found reason to answer it affirmatively, Uke the theist, or negatively, like the atheist. For this reason, the atheist must be characterized more strongly, as one who disbelieves that God exists. But even this stronger characterization is insufficient, for, as is well-known but perhaps less widely takeninto account, there are many different conceptions ofGod, ranging from monotheism to polytheism, from beUef in a perfect being to belief in a being who shares some human limitations, from deism to pantheism, and so on. Accordingly, it has become commonplace in philosophy to recognize at least two senses ofthe term "God": a narrow sense, signifying "a supremely good being, creator of but separate from and independent of the world, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal and self-existent";9 and a wide sense, Volume XLX Number 1 141 SHANE ANDRE signifying one or more divine beings, personal or otherwise, manifesting extraordinarybut perhaps not superlative properties. For short, we could call the narrow sense the standard concept ofGod, and beliefin the existence ofsuch a being standard theism.10 And we could call the broad sense, applicable to any concept of the divine, the extended concept of God, and belief in the existence of such a being(s) extendedtheism. On this account, standard theists will alsobe extended theists, but of course someone could be an extended theist without being a standard theist. Let us call such a person (for example, Epicurus, who denied, not that the Gods exist, but that they intervene in human affairs) a limited theist. It is important to note that the limited theist rejects standard theism but is not an atheist simpliciter. How does recognition of these different forms oftheism affect our understanding of atheism? There seem to be two major possibilities. One is to characterize atheism in the narrow sense as disbeUef in standard theism; the other is to characterize it in the broad sense as disbeliefin any form of theism, including limited theism. While either option is open, it seems to me that the latter is preferable. For ifwe say that anyone who rejects standard theism is an atheist, we will end up with the paradoxical result that many distinguished theists will turn out to be atheists. For example, while Charles Hartshorne is not a standard theist, insofar as he rejects the... (shrink)

Orthomodular logic is a weakening of quantum logic in the sense of Birkhoff and von Neumann. Orthomodular logic is shown to be a nonlinear noncommutative logic. Sequents are given a physically motivated semantics that is consistent with exactly one semantics for propositional formulas that use negation, conjunction, and implication. In particular, implication must be interpreted as the Sasaki arrow, which satisfies the deduction theorem in this logic. As an application, this deductive system is extended to two systems of predicate logic: (...) the first is sound for Takeuti’s quantum set theory, and the second is sound for a variant of Weaver’s quantum logic. (shrink)

The article begins by placing Nicholas of Cusa's ideas in the context of Mysticism, whilst, at the same time, establishing the continuing actuality of the topic. After a short review of the concept of art as an imitation of nature through Antiquity and the Middle Ages, the second part of the essay deals with the originality of the Germán Cardinal's development of the concept of "imitatio" and the relation he posits between art and nature. The third part explores some significant (...) examples of the role played by art and its symbolic use in his writing, with particular attention to the icón of the allseeing eye in De visione Dei and to play in De ludo globi. (shrink)

FOREWORD Of Rats and Men 'They corrected his strabismus with glasses, his lisp with a metal loop, his stammer by mechanical exercises, ...

A questão dos letramentos e da inovação demonstram-se fundamentais em períodos históricos como o atual, onde as práticas de ensino-aprendizagem tornam-se cada vez mais complexas, que requerem novas abordagens teóricas para compreendermos possibilidades alternativas de ensino. Tendo estas questões em mente, este artigo visa indicar relações possíveis entre o antifundacionismo, o pensamento de Paul Feyerabend e os letramentos científicos. Em um primeiro momento indicaremos questões relativas ao antifundacionismo, e em seguida verificaremos como tal questão se efetiva no pensamento de Feyerabend. (...) Finalizaremos avaliando como esta abordagem pode fundamentar novas práticas educacionais. (shrink)

Many hold that Hume was an atheist, that he despised the church, and that he was a devastating critic of religion. One cannot deny, however, the references to ‘true religion’ in his work, his sometimes seemingly favorable references to Deity, his call for religion in ‘every civilized community’, and his sense of ‘natural belief’. The following essay describes a speculative Humean ‘true religion’ and discusses its potential use-value for contemporary philosophy of religion. It begins, anecdotally, with a description of Hume's (...) happiness in France, which I attribute to the fact that Hume was not taken to be an atheist by the French reading public. The main argument is that while Hume was critical of ‘vulgar’ and ‘popular’ religion, his philosophical position did not deny our habit to accept a genuine theism that could, if informed by the calm passions, serve to ‘purify our hearts’ and bond us more closely together. Reconceiving Hume's ‘true religion’ in this way allows his insi.. (shrink)

With each proposition P we associate a set of proposition (a hyperproposition) which determines the order in which one may retreat from accepting P, if one cannot fully hold on to P. We first describe the structure of hyperpropositions. Then we describe two operations on propositions, subtraction and merge, which can be modelled in terms of hyperpropositions. Subtraction is an operation that takes away part of the content of a proposition. Merge is an operation that determines the maximal consistent content (...) of two propositions considered jointly. The merge operation gives rise to an inference relation which is, in a certain sense, optimally paraconsistent. (shrink)

La notion de peuple en philosophie, depuis Platon, se veut plus fondamentale qu'elle ne l'est dans les approches empiriques sociologiques ou historiques. Il s'agit de se demander qu'est-ce qui est impliqué dans l'acte originaire, tel qu'il se donne dans les notions d'état de nature et de pacte social -bref, l'acte a priori qui fait qu'un peuple se fait peuple. En ce sens, on peut dire que la notion de peuple implique consciemment ou non celle de la démocratie.Since Plato, the concept (...) of people in philosophy makes much more fundamental sense than the meaning it takes in the empiric approach of sociological or historical research. The question is: what is implied in the originary act, as it is given by the notions of the State of Nature and of what is called since Rousseau the Social Contract - briefly, the a priori act which makes a people a People. In this sense, one can assume that the notion of people consciously or unconsciounsly implies the very notion of democracy. (shrink)

The survival of some masterpieces of literature across the ages is still an unexplained mystery. Deeply rooted in their time, they reflect the preoccupations of a given historical period and have an impact, by means of their testimony, on future generations. They bring into play images, drives and phantoms which have remained unchanged from prehistoric time to our day. The perfection of their form has remained unequaled; their examples incite us to meditation and creativity.

Na passagem da Idade Média para aidade Moderna, o triângulo constituído pelosmotivos conceptuais "homem-natureza-Deus" éum triângulo cuja base, constituída pela relaçãohomem-natureza, tende a assumir, diríamos nósem termos cusanos, uma dimensão infinita nummovimento em que o vértice coincideprogressivamente com essa base transformandotal triângulo numa recta infinita. O lugar detransição que ocupa o pensamento do Cardealalemão é, por isso, paradigmático, encontrado asua expressão plena na forma como transpõe parao Renascimento alguns tópicos recorrentes nopensamento medieval: em primeiro lugar, omotivo do homo, imago Dei, (...) através do qualcomeça por ser pensada a relação do sujeitohumano com o universo, fundamentalmente noâmbito do conhecimento; depois, como segundoponto baseado triângulo, o motivo do livro danatureza, de que o homem se constitui comoprivilegiado intérprete; ligado a estes dois motivose estabelecendo a sua respectiva ligaçãonuma perspectiva estética e criadora, o motivo dooperar humano como imitação da natureza,baseado numa nova leitura do que é a natureza e,também, do que é a arte; em quarto e últimolugar, o motivo do homem como microcosmo,que reassume de urna forma significativa os trêsmotivos anteriores e que, reassumindo-os, éreconfigurado numa perspectiva verdadeiramentedinâmica e criadora. (shrink)

La définition de la loi-rapport par laquelle commence L’Esprit des lois a suscité de nombreux commentaires, ainsi que l’illustration qu’en donne Montesquieu en parlant des lois du monde physique. Cet article précise l’opération à laquelle se livre Montesquieu dans ces passages difficiles en précisant le sens qu’il faut donner à la nécessité et comment il permet d’éclairer les exigences de scientificité requise pour rendre possible une étude des phénomènes humains.

Ruyer démontre qu’une finalité-harmonie œuvre dans la formation des êtres physiques. Cette finalité contredit le mécanisme, et se distingue de la finalité-intention qui est la finalité parlée. Cette dernière est seconde et dépend d’une illusion d’un sujet de l’activité, posé devant celle-ci, illusion inévitable pour la raison pragmatique d’une mise en scène de l’activité. Contre Hume, Ruyer montre que les êtres s’organisent en effet, mais en tant qu’ils sont des subjectivités, des « domaines absolus » constamment actifs, prenant forme selon (...) des types, des essences ou des thèmes, selon un dynamisme harmonique dont l’analogue est donné dans la formation d’une improvisation musicale ou dans la création d’un tableau. (shrink)