Integrative structure modeling is a method for using information from multiple sources to compute structural models of biomolecular systems. It proceeds via four steps: (i) defining the model _representation_, which determines the variables whose values will be computed; (ii) constructing a function for _scoring_ alternative models according to how well they accommodate input information; (iii) _searching_ a space of candidate models for acceptable models; and (iv) _analyzing_ acceptable models to evaluate their fit with input information. These steps are iterated until (...) a model adequate for addressing biological questions is found. In this paper, we draw lessons from integrative modeling about effective integration and about modeling. We describe what it means to integrate information from multiple sources: Integration amounts to distributing information among the four steps of integrative modeling. Theory and data alike can be sources of information; this process thus generates _models of information_, rather than models of theory or models of data. We then propose heuristics for distributing information and designing multiple iterations of modeling. Effective iteration requires prioritizing the most reliable information and minimizing the time required to obtain an adequate model. Rather than being constructed from theory and assessed using data, models are constructed from any available information and assessed in a coherentist manner. (shrink)

Fiora Salis compares the fictional and the artifactual views of models. She argues that both accounts contain several deep insights concerning the nature of scientific models but they also face some difficult challenges. She then puts forward an account of the ontology of models intended to incorporate the benefits of both views avoiding their main difficulties. Her key idea is that models are human-made artifacts that are akin to literary works of fiction. In this view, models are complex objects that (...) are constituted by a model description and the model content generated within a game of make-believe. As per the fiction view, model descriptions are construed as props in a game of make-believe, where props are concrete objects that prescribe certain imaginings. As per the artifactual view, model descriptions are construed as concrete representational tools that enable and constrain a scientist’s cognitive processes and provide intersubjective epistemic access to their imaginings. (shrink)

The paper investigates the epistemological and communicative competences the experts need to use and communicate evidence in the reasoning process leading to diagnosis. The diagnosis and diagnosis communication are presented as intertwined processes that should be jointly addressed in medical consultations, to empower patients’ compliance in illness management. The paper presents defeasible reasoning as specific to the diagnostic praxis, showing how this type of reasoning threatens effective diagnosis communication and entails that we should understand diagnostic evidence as defeasible as well. (...) It argues that metaphors might be effective communicative devices to let the patients understand the relevant defeasors in the diagnostic reasoning process, helping to improve effective diagnosis communication, and also encouraging a change in patients’ beliefs and attitudes on their own experience of illness and illness’ management. (shrink)

Русская культура с самого её начала уже была устремлена к непостигаемым для других народов высотам, и поэтому во все времена звучал в ней голос с неба, говорящий: это скиния Бога с людьми, где Он будет жить с ними; они будут Его народом, а Он будет их Богом. К этой гармонии стремилась она, и хотя теперь многие из русских людей заблудились во тьме невежества и неверия, но стоит лишь заблудшим обратить взоры к новому небу, звёзды русской культуры укажут им верный путь (...) к истине и к праведной жизни, а за ними непременно пойдут и другие народы. (shrink)

How do models represent reality? There are two conditions that scientific models must satisfy to be representations of real systems, the aboutness condition and the epistemic condition. In this article, I critically assess the two main fictionalist theories of models as representations, the indirect fiction view and the direct fiction view, with respect to these conditions. And I develop a novel proposal, what I call ‘the new fiction view of models’. On this view, models are akin to fictional stories; they (...) represent real-world phenomena if they stand in a denotation relation with reality; and they enable knowledge of reality via the generation of theoretical hypotheses, model–world comparisons and direct attributions. (shrink)

The problem of intersubjective identification arises from the difficulties of explaining how our thoughts and discourse about fictional characters can be directed towards the same (or different) characters given the assumption that there are no fictional entities. In this paper I aim to offer a solution in terms of participation in a practice of thinking and talking about the same thing, which is inspired by Sainsbury's name-using practices. I will critically discuss a similar idea that was put forward by Friend (...) in terms of participation in what Perry calls a notion-network. I will then argue in favor of Sainsbury's baptism-based approach against Perry's information-based approach and I will answer some recent objections that Friend put forward against the former. (shrink)

In this entry I present one of the most hotly debated issues in contemporary analytic philosophy regarding the nature of fictional entities and the motivations that might be adduced for and against positing them into our ontology. The entry is divided in two parts. In the first part I offer an overview of the main accounts of the metaphysics of fictional entities according to three standard realist views, fictional Meinongianism, fictional possibilism and fictional creationism. In the second part I describe (...) two main kinds of arguments for or against positing fictional entities into our ontology. The first kind is traditionally inspired by the linguistic data coming from our talk about fictional characters. The second kind is more recent and it builds on genuine ontological considerations. (shrink)

Governance theory in political science and international relations has to adapt to the onset of an increasingly digital society. However, until now, technological advancements and the increasing convergence of technologies outpace regulatory efforts and frustrate any efforts to apply ethical and legal frameworks to these domains. This is due to the convergence of multiple, sometimes incompatible governance frameworks that accompany the integration of technologies on different platforms. This theoretical claim will be illustrated by examples such as the integration of technologies (...) on the “human platform” as it is referred to in the case of enhanced soldiers. Hence, successful governance might require new approaches borrowed from a distant relative, namely cybernetics. Insights gained from cybernetics for governance theories might be able to give guidance for a more efficient and adaptive governance approach that is able to deal with increasing complexity caused by technology and governance convergence. While cybernetics itself might be considered a governance approach, it has had surprisingly little reception in the wider field of governance within the area of social and political sciences. This article will develop cybernetic governance as a set of expandable governance principles that are applicable to an increasingly complex digital and smart society. It thereby tries to further galvanise what could be termed cybernetic governance theory as a subject of worthwhile insights from the combination of otherwise largely the disjoined fields of cybernetics and governance. (shrink)

What are theoretical models and how do they contribute to a scientific understanding of reality? In this chapter, I will argue that models are akin to fictional stories in that they are human-made artifacts created through the imaginative activities of scientists. And I will suggest that the sort of imagination involved in modeling is make-believe and that this is constrained in three main ways which, together, enable knowledge of reality. I will conclude by addressing recent criticisms against the fiction view (...) of models and the relevance of scientific imagination in modeling put forward by Weisberg and Knuuttila. (shrink)

Wilfrid Sellars’ denunciation of the Myth of the Given was meant to clarify, against empiricism, that perceptual episodes alone are insufficient to ground and justify perceptual knowledge. Sellars showed that in order to accomplish such epistemic tasks, more resources and capacities, such as those involved in using concepts, are needed. Perceptual knowledge belongs to the space of reasons and not to an independent realm of experience. Dan Hutto and Eric Myin have recently presented the Hard Problem of Content as an (...) ensemble of reasons against naturalistic accounts of content. In a nutshell, it states that covariance relations—even though they are naturalistically acceptable explanatory resources—do not constitute content. The authors exploit this move in order to promote their preferred radical enactivist and anti-representationalist option, according to which, basic minds—the lower stratum of cognition—do not involve content. Although it is controversial to argue that the Hard Problem of Content effectively dismisses naturalistic theories of representation, a central aspect of it—the idea that information as covariance does not suffice to explain content—finds support among the defenders of classical cognitive representationalism, such as Marcin Miłkowski. This support—together with the acknowledgment this remark about covariance is a point already made by Sellars in his criticism of the Myth of the Given—has a number of interesting implications. Not only is it of interest for the debates about representationalism in cognitive science, where it can be understood as an anticipatory move, but it also offers some clues and insights for reconsidering some issues along Sellarsian lines—a conflation between two concepts of representation that is often assumed in cognitive science, a distinction between two types of relevant normativities, and a reconsideration of the naturalism involved in such explanations. (shrink)

The paper discusses the conceptual and methodological challenges of developing measures of stereotypes and prejudice for use in Slovakia. Developing these measures was the first step in a research project aimed at testing the effectiveness of direct and indirect contact interventions to reduce prejudice against stigmatized minorities, particularly the Roma. The first major problem in this kind of research relates to measuring the impact of interventions, as standardized instruments for measuring prejudice have yet to be developed in Slovak. The second (...) problem concerns the risk that the interventions will fail to reduce anti-Roma prejudice, because of the strong stigmatization of the Roma minority in Slovakia. The paper also reviews existing measures of stereotypes and prejudice in social psychology and discusses their applicability for measuring anti-Roma prejudice in Slovakia. It is argued that measures of stereotypes and prejudice should be designed and used in a sensitive manner and that in the process of measuring various forms of social bias we should avoid reproducing its cognitive, emotional and behavioural manifestations. (shrink)

Сборник эссе о логике и логическом мышлении.

The perspective revolution of Sigmund Freud: An update.

Upholders of fictionalism about scientific models have not yet successfully explained how scientists can learn about the real world by making comparisons between models and the real phenomena they stand for. In this paper I develop an account of model-world comparisons in terms of what I take to be the best antirealist analyses of comparative claims that emerge from the current debate on fiction.

This chapter explores some key themes of Huw Price's global expressivist program and his appropriation of inferentialist views. Some remarks concerning certain internal tensions inside that program follow.

И увидел я новое небо и новую землю, потому что прежнее небо и прежняя земля миновали, и моря уже нет. И я, Иоанн, увидел святой город Иерусалим, новый, снисходящий от Бога с неба, приготовленный как невеста, украшенная для мужа своего. И услышал я громкий голос с неба, говорящий: это скиния Бога с людьми, где Он будет жить с ними; они будут Его народом, а Он будет их Богом. И отрёт Бог всякую слезу с очей их, и смерти уже не будет; (...) ни плача, ни вопля, ни болезни уже не будет, потому что прежнее прошло. А храма я не видел в нём, потому что Господь Бог Всевластный и Агнец — храм его. И город не имеет нужды ни в солнце, ни в луне для освещения своего, потому что слава Божия осветила его, и светильник его — Агнец. Спасённые народы будут ходить во свете его, и цари земные принесут в него славу и честь свою. Ворота его не будут запираться днём, а ночи там не будет. И принесут в него славу и честь народов. И не войдёт в него ничто нечистое и никто преданный мерзости и лжи, а только те, которые написаны у Агнца в книге жизни. (shrink)

How do scientific models represent in a way that enables us to discover new truths about reality and draw inferences about it? Contemporary accounts of scientific discovery answer this question by focusing on the cognitive mechanisms involved in the generation of new ideas and concepts in terms of a special sort of reasoning—or model-based reasoning—involving imagery. Alternatively, I argue that answering this question requires that we recognise the crucial role of the propositional imagination in the construction and development of models (...) for the purpose of generating hypotheses that are plausible candidates for truth. I propose simple fictionalism as a new account of models as Waltonian games of make-believe and suggest that models can lead to genuine scientific discovery when they are used as representations that denote real world phenomena and generate two main kinds of theoretical hypotheses, model-world comparisons and direct attributions. (shrink)

The paper suggests that there is a gap between the research on prejudice in Slovak schools and the pedagogical interventions used to reduce them, particularly in relation to the Roma minority. It highlights the existing curricular requirements for dealing with intergroup relations, stereotypes and prejudice, contrasting them with the organizational, methodological and practical constraints teachers face when trying to meet them. Drawing from experience of piloting alternative tools for measuring attitudes, designing interventions and assessing impact, the article describes one possible (...) way of bridging the gap. (shrink)

The speed of development in Big Data and associated phenomena, such as social media, has surpassed the capacity of the average consumer to understand his or her actions and their knock-on effects. We are moving towards changes in how ethics has to be perceived: away from individual decisions with specific and knowable outcomes, towards actions by many unaware that they may have taken actions with unintended consequences for anyone. Responses will require a rethinking of ethical choices, the lack thereof and (...) how this will guide scientists, governments, and corporate agencies in handling Big Data. This essay elaborates on the ways Big Data impacts on ethical conceptions. (shrink)

English Abstract: The manuscript describes a new scientific discipline called Octology, which should unify morphogenetic linguistics and neurobiology to investigate the development of the words, cognition and behavior. -/- Russian Abstract: В книге даётся описание научной дисциплины Октологии, призванной объединять морфогенетическую лингвистику и нейробиологию для исследования словообразования, понимания и поведения. -/- German Abstract: Der Begriff Oktologie (Engl. octology) wurde von Dr. Andrej Poleev in seinem gleichnamigen Aufsatz, der am 8. März 2010 erschienen ist, im Umlauf gebracht, und bezeichnet eine (...) wissenschaftliche Disziplin, welche die morphogenetische Linguistk und Neurobiologie vereint, um die Zusammenhänge zwischen Wahrnehmung, Verhalten und Wortbildung zu erforschen. Die Sprache ist das Mittel zwischenmenschlicher Verständigung, und der Sprache ist dieses Buch gewidmet. Wie entsteht Sprache? Welche sprachliche Formen gab es, gibt es heute, und wird es noch geben? In welchem Verhältnis steht Kultur zur Sprache? Was sind neurobiologische Grundlagen des Denkens und der Verbalisierung mentaler Inhalte? Mit diesen und anderen Fragen befasst sich neue Wissenschaft, die im Jahr 2010 gegründet wurde, um interdisziplinär die Zusammenhänge zwischen Wahrnehmung, Wortbildung und Verhalten zu erforschen. (shrink)

Stephen Turner’s anti-normativism is based on the idea that the normative can be explained away by social science. Exploiting the idea fostered by the sociology of scientific knowledge that reasons can be understood naturalistically as the causes of the beliefs of scientists and endorsing a non-normative conception of rationality, Turner has argued that normative accounts are better understood as “Good Bad Theories” (GBT). GBT are understood as false accounts that play a role in social coordination like magical or religious rituals (...) in primitive societies (e.g. Tabu and the like). According to Turner, “norms,” “obligations,” “reasons,” and “commitments” are like Tabu and can be explained away as GBT. Hence, Turner expected normative accounts to disappear completely in a fully disenchanted world. Turner focuses on the idea, widespread among philosophers, that the normative does not reduce to the causal: his main claim is that social science succeeds in the reduction of the normative in causal terms, overcoming normative/causal dualism. Furthermore, this success is presented as creating a serious challenge for normativism. By focusing on certain (supposedly normative) features of beliefs like those involved in belief change dynamics, I will point out some interesting implications and problems for Turner’s anti-normativism. (shrink)

Against standard descriptivist and referentialist semantics for fictional reports, I will defend a view according to which fictional names do not refer yet they can be distinguished from one another in virtue of their different name-using practices. The logical structures of sentences containing fictional names inherit these distinctions. Different interpretations follow.

Сошествие небесного Иерусалима на землю не может мыслиться как его материализация, потому что Царство Божие внутри нас, и его явление есть результат соприкосновения и соединения прошлого и будущего, земного и небесного, внутреннего и внешнего, психического и космического, совершающихся в каждом человеке в момент познания истины.

Analgesia and amnesia represent two complimentary pillars of anesthesia directed, respectively, at mitigating the experience of pain and the processes of encoding that experience into memory. These elements are typically combined in modern anesthetic techniques, but some circumstances exist – such as conscious sedation – in which the conditions of amnesia are satisfied while analgesia plays an auxiliary and often incomplete role. These activities reflect a widely held yet underrecognized belief in clinical practice that although pain experiences may be short-lived, (...) their representation in memory and its subsequent effects on thought and emotion can have enduring consequences for patients. In this exploratory article, we delineate phenomenal and abstract ontological categories of pain experience; advance a claim that they are treated by analgesic and amnestic agents, respectively; and describe how each class of experience is uniquely able to bring about individual harm. Beginning with the question of how it can be permissible to allow any preventable experiences or memories of pain, we identify that both phenomenal and abstract pain manifest on a spectrum of severity, each with an enigmatic threshold – unique to circumstance and individual – that determines whether or not pain will translate into harm, and what permissions therefore surround its treatment. Ultimately, we find that there are compelling physiological reasons for the concurrent use of analgesics and amnestics when pain experience exceeds these thresholds, while the treatment of “sub-threshold” experience in either class is a purely ethical imperative to be balanced with considerations of the potential harms posed by the treatments themselves. (shrink)

In recent years, the social world is quickly gaining the focus of attention within the philosophical debates. The work of authors such as John Searle, Barry Smith, Margaret Gilbert, Raimo Tuomela, to name just a few, is becoming increasingly important within the philosophical community. Hence, topics in social ontology dealing with the nature of institutions, collective actions, collective self/personhood, collective intentionality, shared goals and commitments, etc. are increasingly addressed by contemporary philosophical investigations. The discussion on these topics is today sprawling (...) of mainstream ambitious views, contributing to a complete understanding of the proper structures and dynamics of the social world. The present collection of essays aims at exploring side-issues in social ontology, trying somehow to go beyond mainstream topics. Another important aim of this book is connecting the typical discussions of social ontology to the philosophical tradition, and to debates in the social sciences and in anthropology. -/- The collection of essays does not offer a perspective on the social world which is shared among the authors, and it is rather pluralistic in nature: our shared belief is that pluralism and openness, especially in explorative attempts, are methodologically fit to promote dialogue and interaction between different ideas, strategies, and perspectives. According to this spirit, the book comprises a number of articles and critical notes that target different problems, traditions, and methodologies. (shrink)

Discourses on Jaina philosophy; originally written in Jaipuri dialect; translated from the Gujarati edition, with variant readings.

Iranian research on anomie; enjoining good and forbidding evil.

In the first three centuries of Hijri, the first schools of qırā’a emerged in cities such as Medina, Mecca, Kufa, Basra and Damascus. The science of qırā’a concentrated in these cities spread to the newly conquered geographies in parallel with the conquests and the Islamization activities carried out, and under the influence of different factors, some qırā’a’s became dominant in certain regions. Having a special place among the first schools of recitation, Nāfi' b. Abdirrahman al- Madanī’s (d. 169/785) qırā’a gained (...) fame in Medina. This qırā’a, which is of great importance in terms of reflecting the accumulation of recitation of the city of the prophet, has begun to spread in the Maghreb and North Africa regions since the early periods of Islam. In this region, the Medina school of qırā’a was favored by the people and thus became almost the only qırā’a preferred for centuries. As a matter of fact, the mushafs in the region in question have been printed according to this qırā’a from past to the present day. In this study, the phases of the historical progress of Nāfi‘ qırā’a in Ma-ghrib and North Africa are shed light on. In this context, after dwelling on the first qırā’as transferred to the region since the conquest, an evaluation has been made on the entry of Nāfi‘ qırā’a to the region, its pioneers, development and historical process. Then, the reasons and motives behind the spread of Nāfi‘ qırā’a in the region are given, and the reasons for its preference in the region are analysed. Afterwards, information was given about the teaching of Nâfi' qırā’a and its riwāyahs (narrations) and tareqs (ways) in the main sources of recitation. Then, the education of the Nâfi' qırā’a in Maghrib and the ten ways, with al-Ashara al-Nāfe'eyya education program which was distinguished from other Islamic geographies, were tried to be revealed. (shrink)

Wittgenstein betont ständig den kategorialen Unterschied zwischen dem Willen und dem Wunsch. Der Wunsch gehört zur kausalen, empirischen Vorgängern der Handlung, der Wille aber gehört zur Handlung selbst als sein logisch interner Aspekt, der die Handlungen als ein Tun darstellt, das nur im Kontext von Sprachspielen und anderen Handlungen "existiert". In den Tagebüchern und im Tractatus wird der Wille auch als der Träger des Ethischen bestimmt, später wird ethische Aspekt des Willens (bzw. der willentlichen Handlung) weniger betont, obwohl implizit anwesend. (...) Der Willensaspekt der Handlung drückt sich durch verschiedene intentionalen Zustände aus, die sich grammatisch-intern mit den Gründen der Handlungen verbinden, der Wunsch dagegen stellt ein empirisches Phänomen dar. Die Wünsche, die dabei auch auftreten können, können zwar Ursachen oder Gründe der Handlung sein, doch nur in der Verbindung mit den darauffolgenden willkürlichen Handlungen, nicht per se. (shrink)

Science has lost its ethical imperatives as it moved away from a science of ought to a science of is. Subsequently, it might have answers for how we can address global challenges, such as climate change and poverty, but not why we should. This supposedly neutral stance leaves it to politics and religions (in the sense of non-scientific fields of social engagement) to fill in the values. The problem is that through this concession, science implicitly acknowledges that it is not (...) of universal relevance. Objective knowledge, as Karl Popper calls for, might be less easily attainable in the world of ideas and within the confines of scientific idealism. However, if ideas, values and meaning have equal claim to be drivers of change in the sense of causation, aspiring to identify objective knowledge about the world of ideas and of meaning is necessary. If the sciences and disciplines aim to give objectively valid reasons for our actions (and for how to address global challenges), we need to elevate the study of meaning beyond the cultural, disciplinary and ideational delineations. We need to come to a meta understanding of values and meaning equal to objective knowledge about the material world. But differently than in the material world this meta understanding needs to incorporate individual and subjective experiences as cornerstones of objectivity on a meta-level. We need a science of meaning; one that can scientifically answer Kant's third question of 'what may we hope for'."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Deutsche Krankheit: eine Diagnosestellung mit Rückblick und Ausblick auf Krankheitsverlauf.

To make behavioral choices that are in line with our goals and our moral beliefs, we need to gather and consider information about our current situation. Most information present in our environment is not relevant to the choices we need or would want to make and thus could interfere with our ability to behave in ways that reflect our underlying values. Certain sources of information could even lead us to make choices we later regret, and thus it would be beneficial (...) to be able to ignore that information. Our ability to exert successful self-governance depends on our ability to attend to sources of information that we deem important to our decision-making processes. We generally assume that, at any moment, we have the ability to choose what we pay attention to. However, recent research indicates that what we pay attention to is influenced by our prior experiences, including reward history and past successes and failures, even when we are not aware of this history. Even momentary distractions can cause us to miss or discount information that should have a greater influence on our decisions given our values. Such biases in attention thus raise questions about the degree to which the choices that we make may be poorly informed and not truly reflect our ability to otherwise exert self-governance. (shrink)

Was ist Wissen von morgen im Vergleich mit Wissen von heute? Die geschichtliche Erfahrung zeigt diesen Übergang als ein Prozess der Weiterentwicklung der Sprache, weil menschliches Wissen an die Sprache gekoppelt ist, und seine Inhalte zu begreifen nur in sprachlichen Formen möglich ist. Während alte Sprachen vergehen, entstehen neue Sprachen: in diesem Prozess der Erneuerung von sprachlichen Formen wird das Wissen gesammelt, geklärt, und weitergegeben, und das geschieht durch Auswahl der Worte, deren Gebrauchswert ständig geprüft wird.

According to Millianism, the meaning of a name is exhausted by its referent. According to anti-realism about fictional entities, there are no such entities. If there are no fictional entities, how can we explain the apparent meaningfulness of fictional names? Our best theory of fiction, Walton’s theory of make-believe, makes the same assumptions but lacks the theoretical resources to answer the question. In this paper, I propose a pragmatic solution in terms of two main dimensions of meaning, a subjective, psychological (...) dimension and an intersubjective, public dimension. The psychological dimension builds on the notion of mental files; the public dimension builds on Stalnaker’s notion of common ground. The account is coherent with two main theoretical principles, parsimony and uniformity. Furthermore, it satisfies three explanatory conditions posed by the intentionality of our thought and discourse about fiction, object-directedness, counterfictional imagining and intersubjective identification. (shrink)