PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to discuss the UK National DNA Database and some of the controversies surrounding it with reference to legal and ethical issues, focusing particularly on privacy and human rights. Governance of this database involves specific exemptions from the Data Protection Act, and this gives a rise to concerns regarding both the extent of surveillance on the UK population and the possibility for harm to all citizens. This is of wider importance since every current citizen, and (...) everybody who visits the UK, could become a record in the DNA database. Principally, the paper seeks to explore whether these exemptions would also imply exemptions for software developers from codes of practice and ethics of their professional societies as relate to constructing or maintaining such data and the database.Design/methodology/approachThe paper makes a comparison between the principles of the DPA, as would need to be followed by all other organizations handling personal data, professional responsibilities‐based codes of ethics of professional societies, and the current reality as reported in relation to the NDNAD and the exemptions offered through the DPA.FindingsPrimarily, if NDNAD was not exempted from certain provisions in the DPA, the potential for the kinds of data leakages and other mishandlings could largely be avoided without the need for further considerations over so‐called “data minimization”. It can be seen how the lack of afforded protection allows for a wide range of issues as relate at least to privacy.Originality/valueThe paper provides the first evaluation of the combination of law, codes of ethics, and activities in the real world as related to NDNAD, with concomitant considerations for privacy, liberty, and human rights. Originality is demonstrated through consideration of the implications of certain exemptions in the DPA in relation to crime and taxation and national security and in relating the expected protections for personal data to widely reported evidence that such protections may be variously lacking. In addition, the paper provides a broad overview of controversies over certain newer kinds of DNA analysis, and other relatively recent findings, that seem generally absent from the vast majority of debates over this kind of analysis. (shrink)

Deception is a reasonably common part of daily life that society sometimes demonstrates a degree of acceptance of, and occasionally people are very willing to be deceived. But can a computer identify deception and distinguish it from that which is not deceptive? We explore deception in various guises, differentiating it from lies, and highlighting the influence of medium and message in both deception and its detection. Our investigations to date have uncovered disagreements relating to the measurements of such cues, and (...) variations in interpretations, as could be problematic in building a deception detection system. (shrink)

Alethism is the view that successful remembering only requires an accurate representation of a past event. It opposes the truth-and-authenticity view, according to which successful remembering requires both an accurate representation of a past event and an accurate representation of a past experience of that event. Alethism is able to handle problematic cases faced by the truth-and-authenticity view, but it faces an important challenge of its own: If successful remembering only requires accurately representing past events, then how is it possible (...) that our memories are also experienced as originating in past experiences of those events? I call this the puzzle of alethic memory. I argue that alethism can be reconciled with the claim that memories are experienced as originating in past experiences of those events—what I call the experience of first-handedness—if we conceive of the phenomenology of remembering in metacognitive terms. According to the metacognitive approach that I favor, the phenomenology of remembering is partly explained by what memory represents and partly explained by the existence of a metacognitive feeling that accompanies memory representations. I argue that accounting for the feeling of first-handedness in terms of the metacognitive feeling that accompanies memory representations allows us to solve the puzzle of alethic memory. (shrink)

The volume uncovers the most pragmatic and pragmatist aspects of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy, particularly of On Certainty, through a comparison with the pragmatist tradition as expressed by Charles S. Peirce and William James. On Certainty is often described as 'pragmatic' in literature and this pragmatic aspect is said to characterize a new turn in its author’s thought. Yet, what is still missing is a study of what specifically are the features which make these writings 'sound like pragmatism', as Wittgenstein himself (...) put it (OC 422). The book therefore aims to verify if and to what extent it is possible to sustain that there is an objective convergence between his thought and pragmatism. In doing so, the volume also proposes a clarification of the main differences between Peirce’s and James’ vision of some key ideas of classical pragmatism like doubt and certainty, common sense, the pragmatic maxim, action. Among the achievements of the work are: an analysis of Wittgenstein’s first mention of pragmatism; some pieces of evidence in favour of the hypothesis that Wittgenstein did read some works by Peirce; a documented investigation on the relevance of Frank Ramsey for the development of Wittgenstein’s idea of pragmatism. The volume does not sustain the thesis that Wittgenstein was a pragmatist (nor the opposing thesis that he was not), but highlights the objective convergences and the divergences between his perspective and pragmatism through a balanced analysis running both on an exegetical and on a theoretical level. (shrink)

Despite much philosophical attention on forgiveness itself, the phenomenon of un-forgiving is relatively neglected. Some views of forgiveness commit us to denying that we can ever permissibly un-forgive. Some go so far as to say the concept of un-forgiving is incomprehensible—it is the nature of forgiveness to be permanent. Yet many apparent cases of un-forgiving strike us as both real and justified. In what follows, I will address the latter view, that genuine un-forgiving is impossible or incomprehensible as a phenomenon, (...) advanced by a character I will call the “Un-Forgiving Denier.” I address two views which purport to describe candidate un-forgiving cases in alternative ways and deny that any candidate un-forgiving cases are truly cases of un-forgiving: the “epistemic invalidation” and “new forgiveness opportunity” views. In creating problems for those views, I hope to defend the possibility of genuine un-forgiving. Even if it’s possible to respond to the “Un-Forgiving Denier,” a defender of genuine un-forgiving still faces the “Un-Forgiving Critic,” who insists that un-forgiving, while possible, is morally indefensible. Against this view, I argue that un-forgiving enables an ideal of forgiveness wherein victims hold wrongdoers accountable for their moral development and allows certain opportunities for relational repair. I conclude that there is good reason to think un-forgiving is both possible and permissible. Embracing genuine un-forgiving puts constraints on how we should theorize about forgiveness itself and gives us an additional tool for understanding and navigating our relationships. (shrink)

The viability of a naïve realist theory of memory was a lively debate for philosophers of mind in the first half of the twentieth century. More recently, though, naïve realism has been largely abandoned as a non-starter in the memory literature, with representationalism being the standard view held by philosophers of memory. But rather than being carefully argued, the dismissal of naïve realism is an assumption that sits at the back of much recent theorizing in the philosophy of memory. In (...) this paper, we identify three reasons why philosophers of memory have felt compelled to outright reject naïve realism. We argue that none of those reasons are successful. Thus, far from being a non-starter, we argue that naïve realism is a theoretical perspective that needs to be given serious consideration in current philosophy of memory debates. (shrink)

What does friendship require of us cognitively? Recently, some philosophers have argued that friendship places demands on what we believe. Specifically, they argue, friendship demands that we have positive beliefs about our friends even when such beliefs go against the evidence. Call this the doxastic account of the cognitive demands of friendship. Defenders of the doxastic account are committed to making a surprising claim about epistemology: sometimes, our beliefs should be sensitive to things that don’t bear on their truth. I (...) consider both motivations and worries for the doxastic account before developing a new account: the attentional account. According to it, friendship places demands on how we direct our attention. I argue that the attentional account can accommodate the considerations that motivate the doxastic account and weather the worries that trouble it, all while avoiding its surprising epistemological commitments. Along the way, I question the assumption that the cognitive demands of friendship center on positivity, and argue that the attentional account can support a more robust picture of friendship that calls for significant amounts of impartial thinking. (shrink)

With robots increasingly integrated into various areas of life, the question of relationships with them is gaining prominence. Are friendship and partnership with robots possible? While there is already extensive research on relationships with robots, this article critically examines whether the relationship with non-human entities is sufficiently explored on a deeper level, especially in terms of ethical concepts such as autonomy, agency, and responsibility. In robot ethics, ethical concepts and considerations often presuppose properties such as consciousness, sentience, and intelligence, which (...) are exclusively aligned with humans. I will challenge the understanding of these properties by anchoring them in contexts, bodies, and actions. This approach allows to consider the specific ways of being of various human and non-human entities and to identify these properties in non-human entities as well. My “eco-relational” approach posits that it is crucial to consider the relationality with non-human entities such as animals and technology in central ethical concepts from the beginning. This approach reflects the “eco”, the entire house in which we live including animals and robots. To support this, I examine two dominant approaches in robot ethics within the contemporary Western tradition: the “properties approach” and modestly relational approaches. I will develop an eco-relational approach as an alternative. Employing a phenomenological method, I will demonstrate through various examples that our properties and actions are inherently connected with non-human entities. I will show that robots play a central role in our properties and actions, leading to concepts such as hybrid actions and non-human agency. It becomes clear that technology and our relationships with it disrupt traditional ethical concepts. (shrink)

On an evidentialist position, it is epistemically rational for us to believe propositions that are (stably) supported by our total evidence. We are epistemically permitted to believe such propositions, and perhaps even ought to do so. Epistemic rationality is normative. One popular way to explain the normativity appeals to epistemic teleology. The primary aim of this paper is to argue that appeals to epistemic teleology do not support that we ought to believe what is rational to believe, only that we (...) are permitted to do so. In arguing for that, I defend an epistemic teleological position that is radical in nature. It involves no commitment to aiming at the truth. I conclude by dispelling some worries that have been raised about my position. (shrink)

In this study I explore from a phenomenological perspective the relationship between affectivity and narrative self-understanding in depression. Phenomenological accounts often conceive of the disorder as involving disturbances of the narrative self and suggest that these disturbances are related to the alterations of emotions and moods typical of the illness. In this paper I expand these accounts by advancing two sets of claims. In the first place, I suggest that, due to the loss of feeling characteristic of the illness, the (...) narratives with which the patients identified prior to the onset of depression are altered in various ways, thus leading to the weakening or abandonment of the narratives themselves. I then move to show that these autobiographical narratives are replaced by new stories which possess a distinctive structure and I argue that this is dependent upon specific configurations of affective experience, such as existential feelings of guilt, hopelessness, and isolation, and particular forms of temporal and spatial experience. (shrink)

The present reflection draws upon a tradition of energetic, world-facing critical legal scholarship to interrogate the anthropos assumed by the terminology of ‘anthropocentrism’ and of the ‘Anthropocene’. The article concludes that any ethically responsible future engagement with ‘anthropocentrism’ and/or with the ‘Anthropocene’ must explicitly engage with the oppressive hierarchical structure of the anthropos itself—and should directly address its apotheosis in the corporate juridical subject that dominates the entire globalised order of the Anthropocene age.

The extended mind view and the embodied-grounded view of cognition and language are typically considered as rather independent perspectives. In this paper we propose a possible integration of the two views and support it proposing the idea of “Words As social Tools” (WAT). In this respect, we will propose that words, also due to their social and public character, can be conceived as quasi-external devices that extend our cognition. Moreover, words function like tools in that they enlarge the bodily space (...) of action thus modifying our sense of body. To support our proposal, we review the relevant literature on tool-use and on words as tools and report recent evidence indicating that word use leads to an extension of space close to the body. In addition, we outline a model of the neural processes that may underpin bodily space extension via word use and may reflect possible effects on cognition of the use of words as external means. We also discuss how reconciling the two perspectives can help to overcome the limitations they encounter if considered independently. (shrink)

The philosophical debate around moods has mainly focused on whether and how their seeming recalcitrance to representationalist treatment can be overcome by accommodating moods’ apparent undirectedness through a peculiar representational structure. Through these theoretical efforts, though, most theorists have taken a double wrong turn (or so I argue), by maintaining that (i) (if directed,) moods are outwardly directed (i.e., directed toward something external to and independent of the subject’s mind) and (ii) moods are discrete mental states (on a par with (...) emotions, perceptual experiences, thoughts, etc.). By pointing at three as yet overlooked phenomenological features of moods—subjective salience, undetachability, and globality—I suggest that moods are (i) inwardly oriented (i.e., they pertain to the subjective aspect of experience and, if directed at all, they are directed toward one’s experiences) and (ii) structural features of consciousness (rather than discrete mental states). I thus explore a new approach to the nature of mood experience, one that aims to do justice to those phenomenological features: I call this the “ways of inner awareness” view. On this view, moods are ways of being aware of one’s own experiences. Different versions of the view may be developed, depending on various metaphysical commitments. I do not defend or recommend, here, any specific version. The aim of the paper is to motivate the general ways-of-inner-awareness approach to mood and hint at some possible ways it may be elaborated. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the linguistic concept of implicit offensiveness. On the one hand, implicitness will be juxtaposed with indirectness as the two concepts are not conceived of here as synonymous. On the other hand, a typology of offensiveness (vs offensive language and vs offendedness) will be proposed, as well as the overarching term ‘covert meaning’ that will span figurative implicitness and non-figurative implicitness. The gradability of various forms of covert meaning and its (...) overlap with overt meaning (subsuming explicit literal meaning and implicit literal meaning) will also be discussed. In the analysis, two sample implicit concepts will be examined (irony vs sarcasm) based on corpus data (of general English and dedicated offensiveness corpus) and using non-contextual embeddings. Theory-wise, the paper demonstrates that implicitness is a complex term which is fuzzy and gradable; methodology-wise, it shows how computational tools can be used to attest theoretical assumptions related to offensive covert terms. (shrink)

Editorial Board: Karl P. Ameriks, Margaret Atherton, Frederick Beiser, Fabien Capeillères, Faustino Fabbianelli, Daniel Garber, Rudolf A. Makkreel, Steven Nadler, Alan Nelson, Christof Rapp, Ursula Renz, Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, Denis Thouard, Paul Ziche, Günter Zöller The series publishes monographs and essay collections devoted to the history of philosophy as well as studies in the theory of writing the history of philosophy. A special emphasis is placed on the contextualization of philosophical historiography into the areas of the history of science, culture, and (...) the wider scope of intellectual history. (shrink)

Many studies have deduced subterranean dialogues between Hannah Arendt and Carl Schmitt from indirect evidence. This article uses new evidence from marginalia in Arendt’s copy of Nomos of the Earth and finds that she formed, but never published, an incisive critique of Schmitt’s geopolitics. Through an analysis of Arendt’s comments on the topics of soil, conquest, and contract, I show that Arendt deemed Schmitt’s theory to be imperialist and in contradiction with itself. Her reading of Schmitt prompts important new questions (...) regarding the scholarly use of Schmitt’s conception of nomos as a tool of critique against American empire in the post-9/11 era. The marginalia also suggests, against past scholarship, that Arendt thought justice should play a central role in politics. I propose that we look to Arendt’s own conception of nomos, which she developed later, in order to form an alternative geopolitics. Because of her focus on intersubjective world-building, Arendt’s nomos embraces contract and promise-mak... (shrink)

This study examines the presence of ethical climates in skilled nursing facilities and identifies their antecedents (work group, job position, tenure). A cross-sectional survey design was implemented. A total of 359 facilities were selected in the Midwestern United States. Responses were received from nurses representing 100 of those facilities (28%). A total of 656 usable questionnaires were returned of the 3060 distributed (21.4% response rate). Descriptive statistics, confirmatory factor analysis, and multivariate and univariate analyses of variance were used. The results (...) confirmed the presence of five ethical climates. Significant differences between registered and licensed practical nurses with regard to egoistic and independence ethical climates were found. Furthermore, nurses in management and non-management positions differed significantly in their perceptions of caring and egoistic climates. The results suggest incongruence in value perceptions and imply that researchers and practitioners have to direct efforts towards preventing and identifying reasons behind this. (shrink)

Recently, hinge epistemologists have applied Wittgenstein’s metaphor of hinges to religious belief. The most prominent proposal in this context is Pritchard’s “quasi-fideism”. This paper examines some historical precursors of the notion of religious hinges, with the aim of shedding more light on it. After outlining the framework of hinge epistemology and its application to religious belief, I briefly examine the views of Thomas Reid and John Henry Newman as acknowledged forerunners of this framework (or cognate views). Next, I turn to (...) two hitherto unacknowledged forerunners, the pragmatists William James and Charles S. Peirce. I then focus on some insights that the pragmatists offer. On this basis, I conclude that religious beliefs are a special class of hinges. As such, while they can be defended through hinge epistemology, they cannot constitute a model through which we can interpret the nature of hinges in general. (shrink)

Governments are widely viewed by academics and practitioners as the key societal actors who are capable of compelling businesses to practice corporate social responsibility. Arguably, such government involvement could be seen as a technocratic device for encouraging ethical business behaviour. In this paper, we offer a more politicised interpretation of government engagement with CSR where “CSR” is not a desired form of business conduct but an element of discourse that governments can deploy in structuring their relationships with other social actors. (...) We build our argument through a historical analysis of government CSR discourse in the Russian Federation. Laclau and Mouffe's social theory of hegemony underpins our research. We find that “CSR” in the Russian government’s discourse served to legitimise its power over large businesses. Using this case, we contribute to wider academic debates by providing fresh empirical evidence that allows the development of critical evaluation tools in relation to governments’ engagement with “CSR”. We find that governments are capable of hijacking CSR for their own self-interested gain. We close the paper by reflecting on the merit of exploring the case of the Russian Federation. As a “non-core”, non-western exemplar, it provides a useful “mirror” with which to reflect on the more widely used test-bed of Western industrial democracies when scrutinising CSR. Based on our findings, we invite other scholars to adopt a more critical, politicised stance when researching the role of governments in relation to CSR in other parts of the world. (shrink)

Following media-theoretical studies that have characterized digitization as a process of all-encompassing cybernetization, this paper will examine the timely and critical potential of Günther Anders’s oeuvre vis-à-vis the ever-increasing power of cybernetic devices and networks. Anders has witnessed and negotiated the process of cybernetization from its very beginning, having criticized its tendency to automate and expand, as well as its circular logic and ‘integral power’, including disruptive consequences for the constitution of the political and the social. In this vein, Anders’s (...) works, particularly his magnum opus Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen [The Obsolescence of Man], sheds new light on the technologically organized milieus of the contemporary digital regime and also highlights a new form of cybernetic ‘conformism’. The goal of the essay is therefore, not only to emphasize the contemporary nature of Anders’s thought but also to use it to frame a critique of current neo-technocratic and, ultimately, post-political concepts, such as ‘algorithmic regulation’, ‘smart states’, ‘direct technocracy’, and ‘government as platform’. This essay argues that cybernetic capitalism is causing what Anders terms ‘ Unfestgelegtheit’ to disappear; that is, we are losing the originary possibility of technologically (re-)structuring our world in alternative ways, particularly given the determinist character of current technologies. (shrink)

The question of what Wittgenstein meant by "forms of life" has attracted a great deal of attention in the literature, yet it is an expression that Wittgenstein himself employs on only a relatively small number of occasions, and that he does not explicitly define. This Element gives a description of this concept that also explains Wittgenstein's reluctance to say much about it. A short historical introduction examines the origins and uses of the term in Wittgenstein's time. The Element then presents (...) a survey of Wittgenstein's employment of it, and an overview of the literature. Finally, the Element offers a methodological reading of this notion, interpreting it as a conceptual tool in Wittgenstein's wider inquiries into the workings of our language. (shrink)

The book suggests a transition from a relational worldview premised on the socio-political ethos of adaptation towards a transformative worldview premised on the ethos of solidarity and equality. Expansively developing Vygotsky's revolutionary project, the Transformative Activist Stance integrates insights from a vast array of critical and sociocultural theories and pedagogies and moves beyond their impasses to address the crisis of inequality. This captures the dynamics of social transformation and agency in moving beyond theoretical and political canons of the status quo. (...) The focus is on the nexus of people co-creating history and society while being interactively created by their own transformative agency. Revealing development and mind as agentive contributions to the 'world-in-the-making' from an activist stance guided by a sought-after future, this approach culminates in implications for research with transformative agendas and a pedagogy of daring. Along the way, many key theories of mind, development and education are challenged and radically reworked. (shrink)

Digitalisierung und technologischer Fortschritt verändern das menschliche Selbstverständnis. Während sich der Mensch in Abgrenzung zu Tier und Natur als kultiviertes und autonom handelndes Wesen definiert, steht er angesichts der zunehmenden Technologisierung nun vor der Frage: Was bedeutet Menschsein vor dem Hintergrund der neuen Technologien? Wie verändern sich die menschliche Lebenswelt, Verantwortungsstrukturen und Identitätskonzepte? Was können Menschen, was Technologien nicht können? Was macht den Menschen aus und wo wird er in Frage gestellt? Der Band bietet einen umfassenden Blick auf diese Fragestellungen. (...) Im ersten Teil befassen sich Beiträge aus der Philosophie und Anthropologie mit dem Spannungsfeld Mensch-Maschine. Die anschließenden Beiträge eröffnen interdisziplinäre Perspektiven auf die technisierte Lebenswelt des Menschen in den Bereichen Kultur, Kommunikation und Bildung. Im letzten Teil des Bandes wird schließlich als Kontrapunkt das Menschsein in einer technisierten Welt aus der Perspektive von Spiritualität und Pflege in den Blick genommen. (shrink)

A characterization of epistemic rationality, or epistemic justification, is typically taken to require a process of conceptual clarification, and is seen as comprising the core of a theory of (epistemic) rationality. I propose to explicate the concept of rationality. -/- It is essential, I argue, that the normativity of rationality, and the purpose, or goal, for which the particular theory of rationality is being proposed, is taken into account when explicating the concept of rationality. My position thus amounts to an (...) instrumentalist position about theories of epistemic rationality. Since there are different purposes, or goals, for which theories of rationality are proposed, the method of explication leaves room for different characterizations of rationality. I focus on two such (kinds of) purposes: first, the purpose of guiding the formation (or maintenance) of doxastic states and, second, the purpose of assessing (the formation or maintenance of) doxastic states. I conclude by outlining a pluralistic picture concerning rationality. (shrink)

Ob im Fitnessstudio, in der Mode oder bei der Ernährung – heute wird ständig Körperoptimierung betrieben. Durch neue technologische Entwicklungen wie Neuroimplantate und Brain-Computer-Interfaces (neurologisches Enhancement) wird die Körperoptimierung auf eine neue Ebene gehoben. Mittels Pharmazeutika sollen Kognition (kognitives Enhancement) oder moralische Verhaltensweisen (moralisches Enhancement) verbessert werden, Prothesen werden in den Körper integriert und es werden ästhetisch-chirurgische Eingriffe vorgenommen. 2019 wurden insgesamt 983.432 ästhetische Eingriffe in Deutschland unternommen.1 Im Alltag sind Wearables wie Smartwatches mit ihren Fitnessprogrammen und vielfältige Smartphone-Apps zur (...) Körperoptimierung allgegenwärtig. Technologische Körperoptimierung spielt eine wichtige Rolle im menschlichen Leben und bedarf einer ethischen Auseinandersetzung. Der Beitrag behandelt die Frage, wie die gegenwärtigen technologischen Körperoptimierungen ethisch bewertet werden können und stellt dabei die Autonomie ins Zentrum der ethischen Überlegungen. Inwiefern kann die Entscheidung für eine Körperoptimierung autonom getroffen werden? Welche ethischen Aspekte spielen eine Rolle und wie wirken sich die Optimierungen auf das Selbstverständnis des Individuums aus? -/- Die Fülle an Optimierungsmaßnahmen macht es notwendig, in Kap. 1 zunächst in den Begriff, die Formen und Ziele der Körperoptimierung einzuführen und Differenzierungen vorzunehmen. In Kap. 2 wird die Autonomie in den Fokus gerückt und mit Rückgriff auf Foucaults Konzepte der „Bio-Macht“ und „Technologien des Selbst“ untersucht, wie die Optimierungsentscheidungen zwischen individueller Selbstbestimmung und gesellschaftlicher Fremdbestimmung verortet werden können. Daran anknüpfend wird in Kap. 3 nach einer ethischen Bewertung der Optimierungsmaßnahmen gefragt. Der Aufsatz sucht nach einer ethischen Einordnung der Körperoptimierungen und gelangt letztlich zu wichtigen Erkenntnissen über den Zusammenhang von Identität/ Körper, Gesellschaft und Technik. Kap. 4 führt dazu die These aus, dass Technik mithervorbringt, was Körper bedeutet und zeigt auf, wie Technologien auf diese Weise eine Chance sein können, das Menschenund Körperverständnis neu und inklusiv auszuhandeln. Aus den Untersuchungsergebnissen werden letztlich in Kap. 5 Schlüsse für die Theologie abgeleitet und Wege dargestellt, wie die Theologie einen Beitrag zu den Optimierungen leisten kann. Abschließend wird in Kapitel 6 ein Fazit gezogen und ein Ausblick für die zukünftige ethische Forschung eröffnet. (shrink)

Because computers zoom across magnifications, it is easy to conclude that both knowledge and things exist by nature in precision-nested scales. The technical term is “scalable,” the ability to expand without distorting the framework. But it takes hard work to make knowledge and things scalable, and this article shows that ignoring nonscalable effects is a bad idea. People stumbled on scalable projects through the same historical contingencies that such projects set out to deny. They cobbled together ways to make things (...) and data self-contained and static, and thus amenable to expansion. In European New World plantations, the natives were wiped out; coerced and alienated plants and workers came to substitute for them. Profits were made because extermination and slavery could be discounted from the books. Such historically indeterminate encounters formed models for later projects of scalability. This essay explores scalability projects from the perspective of an emergent “nonscalability theory” that pays attention to the mounting pile of ruins that scalability leaves behind. The article concludes that, if the world is still diverse and dynamic, it is because scalability never fulfills its own promises. (shrink)

Following SOX, financial restatements increased dramatically. Prior research suggests that how investors respond to restatements, particularly those involving fraud, may mitigate or exacerbate damage suffered. We extend both accounting and management research by examining the joint effects of pre-restatement managerial reputation and the announcement of managerial corrective actions in response to a restatement on nonprofessional investors’ judgments. We find that pre-restatement managerial reputation and the announcement of managerial corrective actions jointly influence investors’ managerial fraud prevention assessments, which mediate their trust (...) in management. These trust perceptions in turn affect investors’ investment and CEO retention judgments. Our results have implications for firms that are concerned with lessening the negative consequences associated with issuing a restatement. (shrink)

The decision-making environment in intensive care units (ICUs) is influenced by the transformation of intensive care medicine, the staffing situation and the increasing importance of patient autonomy. Normative implications of time in intensive care, which affect all three areas, have so far barely been considered. The study explores patterns of decision making concerning the continuation, withdrawal and withholding of therapies in intensive care. A triangulation of qualitative data collection methods was chosen. Data were collected through non-participant observation on a surgical (...) ICU at an academic medical centre followed by semi-structured interviews with nurses and physicians. The transcribed interviews and observation notes were coded and analysed using qualitative content analysis according to Mayring. Three themes related to time emerged regarding the escalation or de-escalation of therapies: influence of time on prognosis, time as a scarce resource and timing in regards to decision making. The study also reveals the ambivalence of time as a norm for decision making. The challenge of dealing with time-related efforts in ICU care results from the tension between the need to wait to optimise patient care, which must be balanced against the significant time pressure which is characteristic of the ICU setting. (shrink)

Quantitative research has called attention to the burden associated with informal caregiving in home nursing arrangements. Less emphasis has been placed, however, on care recipients’ subjective feelings of being a burden and on caregivers’ willingness to carry the burden in home care. This article uses empirical material from semi‐structured interviews conducted with older people affected by multiple chronic conditions and in need of long‐term home care, and with informal and professional caregivers, as two groups of relevant others. The high burden (...) of home‐care arrangements is unanimously stressed by all three groups involved in the triangle of care. An empirical‐ethical investigation of what can be legitimately expected from family members and informal caregivers, informed by Frith's symbiotic empirical ethics approach, was undertaken. Key tenets from the special goods theory and nursing professionalism are used as analytical tools. The study concludes that the current situation may hinder professional development and can reinforce feelings of being a burden to relevant others. (shrink)

The human imagination manifests in countless different forms. We dream the possible and the impossible. How do we do this so effortlessly? Why did the capacity for imagination evolve and seem to manifest uniquely in our species? This handbook reflects on such questions by collecting perspectives from leading experts. It showcases a rich and detailed analysis on how the imagination is understood across several disciplines of study, including anthropology, archaeology, medicine, neuroscience, psychology, philosophy and the arts. An integrated theoretical-empirical-applied picture (...) of the field is presented, which informs researchers, students and practitioners about the issues of relevance across the board. With each chapter, human imagination is explained - what it entails, how it evolved, and why it singularly defines us as a species. (shrink)

Considerable progress is being made in robotics, with robots being developed for many different areas of life: there are service robots, industrial robots, transport robots, medical robots, household robots, sex robots, exploration robots, military robots, and many more. As robot development advances, an intriguing question arises: should robots also encompass religious functions? Religious robots could be used in religious practices, education, discussions, and ceremonies within religious buildings. This article delves into two pivotal questions, combining perspectives from philosophy and religious studies: (...) can and should robots have religious functions? Section 2 initiates the discourse by introducing and discussing the relationship between robots and religion. The core of the article (developed in Sects. 3 and 4) scrutinizes the fundamental questions: can robots possess religious functions, and should they? After an exhaustive discussion of the arguments, benefits, and potential objections regarding religious robots, Sect. 5 addresses the lingering ethical challenges that demand attention. Section 6 presents a discussion of the findings, outlines the limitations of this study, and ultimately responds to the dual research question. Based on the study’s results, brief criteria for the development and deployment of religious robots are proposed, serving as guidelines for future research. Section 7 concludes by offering insights into the future development of religious robots and potential avenues for further research. (shrink)

Here’s a plausible thought: we should make a promise only if we rationally believe that we will follow through. But if that’s right, and if it’s rational to believe only what our evidence supports, then it seems that we shouldn’t make promises to do things our evidence suggests that there’s a significant chance we don’t do – things that many others, or we ourselves, have set out and failed to do. Think: promises to stay faithful or to be on time (...) or to quit smoking. But surely that can’t be right! After all, these are some of our most important promises. This leaves us with a puzzle: either accept that sometimes it’s ok to promise against the evidence or accept that we shouldn’t be making many of our most important promises. This paper develops a response to this puzzle. Promising against the evidence turns out to be morally problematic across the board. But, upon closer inspection, it seems our evidence often does support the belief that we will do something that many others, or we ourselves, have set out and failed to do. When it does, promising is permissible. When it doesn’t, promising is not the right thing to do. (shrink)

The debate on animal rights has been influenced by changes in science, philosophy, nature, and social life over the last 40 years. These include (1) increased moral sensibility that gradually embraces creatures which are more and more distant from those closest to us; (2) environmental threats and their connection with people’s attitude towards animals; (3) scientific discoveries in the field of ethology and animal emotionality, which indicate evolutionary roots of morality; (4) new philosophical concepts (embodied, embedded, enactive and extended mind, (...) and posthumanism) and revision of the concept of subjectivity; (5) exposing the vagueness of the notion of rights and how it is related to the concepts of duty and need. These changes suggest that the point of departure in discussions of the relations between humans and non-human animals has shifted from the traditional human perspective to a more inclusive approach that relies on the developments in science and the inclusion of environmental concerns. (shrink)

Social consciousness – which amounts to something like ‘being woke’ – is a cognitive sensitivity to social injustices in one’s local environment and broader culture. From here, social consciousness can be accounted for in a variety of ways. Recently, it’s been suggested that we can understand social consciousness through the lens of moral encroachment. To be social consciousness, on this account, is to believe in accordance with the dictates of moral encroachment. After considering this account, I raise a few worries: (...) it involves controversial theoretical commitments, entails unintuitive verdicts in important cases, and appears to be too demanding. In light of these worries, I develop a new account of social consciousness as a morally virtuous cognitive disposition that manifests primarily in certain doxastic states. I argue that we should favor the virtue account because it weathers the worries that trouble the encroachment account, and better captures several important features of social consciousness. (shrink)

This paper develops a theory of perception that reconciles representationalism and relationalism by relying on pragmatist ideas. I call it the pragmatic view of perception. I argue that fully reconciling representationalism and relationalism requires, first, providing a theory in which how we perceive the world involves representations; second, preserving the idea that perception is constitutively shaped by its objects; and third, offering a direct realist account of perception. This constitutes what I call the Hybrid Triad. I discuss how Charles Peirce’s (...) theory of perception can provide a framework for such a view and I devote the rest of the paper to developing my own pragmatic and Peircean theory of perception. In particular, I argue that considering perception as a continuous temporal process, which essentially involves interaction with the environment, allows us to do justice to the Hybrid Triad. I motivate this view by discussing how a pragmatic theory of perception would deal with issues such as the distinction between veridical and non-veridical experiences and the nature of perceptual objects. (shrink)

This paper aims to provide an account of the relationship between self-esteem and moral experience. In particular, drawing on feminist and phenomenological accounts of affectivity and ethics, I argue that self-esteem has a primary role in moral epistemology and moral action. I start by providing a characterization of self-esteem, suggesting in particular that it can be best understood through the phenomenological notion of “existential feeling.” Examining the dynamics characteristic of the so-called “impostor phenomenon” and the experience of women who are (...) involved in abusive relationships, I then claim that self-esteem fundamentally shapes the way in which self and others are conceived, and the ethical demands and obligations to which they are considered to be subjected. More specifically, I argue that low self-esteem—which in the experience of women may be rooted in particular assumptions regarding gender roles and stereotyping—can hinder autonomy, make it difficult to question other people's evaluative perspectives and behaviors, and attribute to others responsibility for their actions. (shrink)

Background: Ethics and dignity in prehospital emergency care are important due to vulnerability and suffering. Patients can lose control of their body and encounter unfamiliar faces in an emergency situation. Objective: To describe what specialist ambulance nurse students experienced as preserved and humiliated dignity in prehospital emergency care. Research design: The study had a qualitative approach. Method: Data were collected by Flanagan’s critical incident technique. The participants were 26 specialist ambulance nurse students who described two critical incidents of preserved and (...) humiliated dignity, from prehospital emergency care. Data consist of 52 critical incidents and were analyzed with interpretive content analysis. Ethical considerations: The study followed the ethical principles in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. Findings: The result showed how human dignity in prehospital emergency care can be preserved by the ambulance nurse being there for the patient. The ambulance nurses meet the patient in the patient’s world and make professional decisions. The ambulance nurse respects the patient’s will and protects the patient’s body from the gaze of others. Humiliated dignity was described through the ambulance nurse abandoning the patient and by healthcare professionals failing, disrespecting, and ignoring the patient. Discussion: It is a unique situation when a nurse meets a patient face to face in a critical life or death moment. The discussion describes courage and the ethical vision to see another human. Conclusion: Dignity was preserved when the ambulance nurse showed respect and protected the patient in prehospital emergency care. The ambulance nurse students’ ethical obligation results in the courage to see when a patient’s dignity is in jeopardy of being humiliated. Humiliated dignity occurs when patients are ignored and left unprotected. This ethical dilemma affects the ambulance nurse students badly due to the fact that the morals and attitudes of ambulance nurses are reflected in their actions toward the patient. (shrink)

In the contemporary phenomenological literature it has been argued that it is possible to distinguish between two forms of selfhood: the “minimal” and “narrative” self. This paper discusses a claim which is central to this account, namely that the minimal and narrative self complement each other but are fundamentally distinct dimensions. In particular, I challenge the idea that while the presence of a minimal self is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a narrative self, the dynamics which characterise (...) narrative selfhood do not have a structuring effect on minimal self-experience. I do so by drawing on both classical and contemporary phenomenological literature to show that at least certain forms of affective experience are complex phenomena in which minimal and narrative forms of selfhood are deeply entwined. More specifically, I claim that, due to their evaluative character, intentional and non-intentional affective states convey a pre-reflective experience of constitutive aspects of the narrative self. This enables me to argue that minimal and narrative selfhood are phenomenologically inextricable. (shrink)

Adults who stutter (AWS) have demonstrated atypical coordination of motor and sensory regions during speech production. Yet little is known of the speech-motor network in AWS in the brief time window preceding audible speech onset. The purpose of the current study was to characterize neural oscillations in the speech-motor network during preparation for and execution of overt speech production in AWS using magnetoencephalography (MEG). Twelve AWS and twelve age-matched controls were presented with 220 words, each word embedded in a carrier (...) phrase. Controls were presented with the same word list as their matched AWS participant. Neural oscillatory activity was localized using minimum-variance beamforming during two time periods of interest: speech preparation (prior to speech onset) and speech execution (following speech onset). Compared to controls, AWS showed stronger beta (15-25Hz) suppression in the speech preparation stage, followed by stronger beta synchronization in the bilateral mouth motor cortex. AWS also recruited the right mouth motor cortex significantly earlier in the speech preparation stage compared to controls. Exaggerated motor preparation is discussed in the context of reduced coordination in the speech-motor network of AWS. It is further proposed that exaggerated beta synchronization may reflect a more strongly inhibited motor system that requires a stronger beta suppression to disengage prior to speech initiation. These novel findings highlight critical differences in the speech-motor network of AWS that occur prior to speech onset and emphasize the need to investigate further the speech-motor assembly in the stuttering population. (shrink)

A co-actor’s intentionality has been suggested to be a key modulating factor for joint action effects like the joint Simon effect (JSE). However, in previous studies intentionality has often been confounded with agency defined as perceiving the initiator of an action as being the causal source of the action. The aim of the present study was to disentangle the role of agency and intentionality as modulating factors of the JSE. In Experiment 1, participants performed a joint go/nogo Simon task next (...) to a co-actor who either intentionally controlled a response button with own finger movements (agency+/intentionality+) or who passively placed the hand on a response button that moved up and down on its own as triggered by computer signals (agency-/intentionality-). In Experiment 2, we included a condition in which participants believed that the co-actor intentionally controlled the response button with a Brain-Computer Interface while placing the response finger clearly besides the response button, so that the causal relationship between agent and action effect was perceptually disrupted (agency-/intentionality+). As a control condition, the response button was computer controlled while the co-actor placed the response finger besides the response button (agency-/intentionality-). We observed a JSE when the co-actor responded intentionally and the causal relationship between co-actor and action effect could be perceived, but not when the co-actor did not respond intentionally and the causal relationship was disrupted (Experiment 1). When the intentionality of the co-actor was maintained but the perception of the causal relationship between co-actor and action effect destroyed, the JSE was absent (Experiment 2). Our findings clearly indicate a vital role of a co-actor’s agency for the JSE and suggest that the ascription of agency is strongly perceptually grounded. (shrink)

Mit den Fortschritten in Generativer Künstlicher Intelligenz, Large Language Models, Brain-Computer Interfaces und genetischen Eingriffen gewinnt auch der Transhumanismus an Relevanz. Der Transhumanismus ist ein beliebtes Thema der Medien und wird in Tages- und Wochenzeitungen sowie im Fernsehen gerne aufgegriffen. Außerdem gibt es inzwischen viele Filme, die den Transhumanismus thematisieren, z. B. die Dokumentation „Endlich unendlich“ (2021, Regie: Stephan Bergmann). Der Transhumanismus wurde in Österreich auch Gegenstand einer Verschwörungserzählung, über die der Bayrische Rundfunk aufgeklärt hat. Auf den Wahlplakaten der „Partei (...) für Gesundheitsforschung“ ist der Transhumanist Aubrey de Grey abgebildet, der ein in Cambridge lebender Brite ist, aber auf Plakaten in Deutschland dargestellt wird. Diese und weitere Entwicklungen machen es notwendig, sich mit dem Transhumanismus aus wissenschaftlicher Perspektive auseinanderzusetzen. Was ist der Transhumanismus? Alle sprechen von Transhumanismus, aber was der Transhumanismus letztlich ist, bleibt häufig unklar. Der Transhumanismus (TH) ist eine philosophisch-technologische Bewegung des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts, die es sich zum Ziel setzt, mittels neuer Technologien den Menschen grundlegend zu transformieren. Wichtig ist dabei, dass sich der TH nicht mit den Optimierungsbestrebungen in der Gesellschaft oder technologischem Fortschritt gleichsetzen lässt. Vielmehr verstehe ich unter TH die Gruppe, die sich um die Organisation Humanity+ in Kalifornien versammelt und die Personen, die sich explizit alsVertreter*innen des TH verstehen. Der TH hat eine ganz eigene Agenda, eigene Institutionen, Organisationen und Publikationsorgane.4 Zu den Themen und Visionen gehören die Lebensverlängerung von mehreren Hundert Jahren bis zur Unsterblichkeit, Kryonik (das Einfrieren des Körpers, der wieder aufgetaut werden soll, wenn nach transhumanistischer Vorstellung Unsterblichkeit ermöglicht werden kann), umfassendes Enhancement und die Verschmelzung von Körper und Technik sowie Beseitigung allen Leids, aller Krankheiten und Aufhebung des Alterns. Der TH strebt danach, mittels Technik neue Sinnesfähigkeiten zu erlangen und neue (virtuelle) Erfahrungswelten zu erschließen. Außerdem wird von vielen Transhumanist*innen auch die hochspekulative Vision des Mind Uploading vertreten, die streng genommen dem Posthumanismus zugeordnet werden muss Gemäß dieser Vision soll durch das maschinelle Lesen des Gehirns der ganze Mensch auf ein externes Medium hochgeladen werden können. Die Vision des Mind Uploadings ist aus naturwissenschaftlicher Perspektive hochumstritten, ist aber ein sehr beliebtes Motiv, das auch außerhalb des TH Wirkung zeigt und in viele Science-Fiction- Filme Eingang gefunden hat (z.B. die Amazon Serie „Upload“, 2020, Regie: Greg Daniels). Das Bestreben des TH, den Menschen grundlegend zu transformieren, wirft zunächst die Frage auf, wie der TH den Menschen überhaupt versteht. Dieser Frage nach dem Menschenverständnis des TH habe ich mich in meinem Buch „Über-Menschen. Philosophische Auseinandersetzung mit der Anthropologie des Transhumanismus“ gewidmet. Philosophische Anthropologie bezeichnet die wissenschaftlichen, philosophischen Reflexionen auf den Menschen. Welches Menschenverständnis vertritt der TH und lässt sich unsere Anthropologie auf dieser Grundlage weiterentwickeln? Das Buch gliedert sich in drei Teile: Teil 1 führt zuerst in die Bewegung des TH ein, worauf Teil II aufbaut, der sich mit dem Menschenverständnis des TH beschäftigt. Teil III betrachtet schließlich heutige Optimierungsbestrebungen in der Gesellschaft sowie neue Ansätze für die Technikanthropologie (z. B. Kritischer Posthumanismus und Neuer Materialismus). Die nachfolgenden Kapitel dieses Aufsatzes sind ein Ausschnitt aus Teil II, der Untersuchung des transhumanistischen Menschenverständnisses. Dieser Aufsatz widmet sich dem „genetisch codierten Menschen“ im TH, also der transhumanistischen Sicht auf den Menschen als jemanden, die*der vollständig von ihren*seinen Genen bestimmt ist. Der genetische Diskurs ist nur einer von fünf im TH dominanten Diskursen, die das transhumanistische Menschenverständnis ausmachen. Zu den anderen Diskursen bzw. transhumanistischen Bestimmungen des Menschen gehören: der Diskurs um die „Natur des Menschen“, der Maschinendiskurs – die Bestimmung des Menschen als Maschine –, der neurowissenschaftliche Diskurs – die Gleichsetzung des Menschen mit dem Gehirn bzw. Neuronalem und zuletzt die metaphysischen Verhältnisbestimmungen von Geist und Körper (PUZIO, Über-Menschen, Kap. 4). Diese transhumanistischen Bestimmungen des Menschen werden am Ende ausgewertet. Ohne die Ergebnisse dieses Kapitels im Detail vorwegnehmen zu wollen, kann für die Gesamtuntersuchung des TH gesagt werden, dass das transhumanistische Menschenverständnis sich als hochproblematisch erweist. Die transhumanistischen Argumentationsstrukturen sind nicht tragfähig und der TH behauptet sich auf die Naturwissenschaften zu berufen, widerspricht allerdings den aktuellen Ergebnissen der Naturwissenschaften. Dies wird in den nachfolgenden Kapiteln gut deutlich werden. Der TH hat ein reduktionistisches Menschenverständnis und reduziert den Menschen beispielsweise auf „Information“. Viele Ausführungen sind diskriminierend z. B. gegenüber Kranken, Alternden und Menschen mit Behinderungen und letztendlich wird sogar jeder Mensch, auch der gesunde junge Mensch, gegenüber der Maschine abgewertet, die aus transhumanistischer Sicht den Menschen weit übertrifft. Im weiteren Verlauf der Arbeit werden sogar „ideologische Elemente“ im TH identifiziert. Daher wird in der Arbeit abgelehnt, den TH als Grundlage für die Weiterentwicklung der Anthropologie zu verwenden und stattdessen werden im letzten Teil der Arbeit alternative Ansätze für die Technikanthropologie präsentiert. Wie bereits erwähnt, richtet sich die Kritik am TH jedoch nicht gegen die heutige Optimierung in der Gesellschaft, die ebenfalls im letzten Teil der Arbeit diskutiert wird. Optimierungsbestrebungen hat es schon immer gegeben und sie werden nun durch neue Technologien weiter verändert, sie sind aber nicht mit der Bewegung des TH gleichzusetzen. Das Kapitel ist eingebettet zwischen dem Maschinendiskurs (Mensch als Maschine) mit seinen Ausführungen zu Information und Kybernetik und dem neurowissenschaftlichen Diskurs („Der Mensch ist ihr*sein Gehirn“). Es wird im Folgenden der genetische Diskurs im TH untersucht, also wie der TH den Menschen vollständig auf Gene zurückführt, und dies schließlich kritisch geprüft. Sind „gute Gene“ alles? Kann der Mensch vollständig über ihre*seine Gene bestimmt werden? Und was hat es mit der trügerischen „genetischen Information“ auf sich? Zunächst wird der genetische Diskurs im TH dargestellt, also die genetischen Ausführungen des TH präsentiert (Kap. 2), danach wird der Blick auf den Gebrauch der genetischen Metaphern im TH gerichtet (Kap. 3) und zuletzt werden die genetischen Vorstellungen des TH kritisiert (Kap. 4). Der Aufsatz schließt in Kap. 5mit einer (vorläufigen) Zusammenführung der Ergebnisse und einem Ausblick. (shrink)

This paper applies the framework of epistemic injustice to the context of the asylum process, arguing that asylum seekers are typically at risk of this kind of injustice, which consists in their not being considered credible and not being listened to due to prejudices toward their social identity. More specifically, I address hermeneutical injustice in the adjudication of LGBTQ asylum claims, as well as the possibility of developing practices of hermeneutical justice in this context. I start with a general analysis (...) of epistemic injustice in the asylum process, examining the different ways in which stereotypes and prejudices hinder the process. Next, I focus on hermeneutical injustice in LGBTQ cases. In section 3, I expand on the possibility of developing hermeneutical justice in this context. Finally, I conclude by hinting at hinge epistemology as a feasible framework for research on hermeneutical injustice and justice, and at broader theoretical themes stimulated by this reflection. (shrink)

The aim of the article is an attempt to analyze the impact of the pandemic crisis on innovations created by economic entities. The ongoing economic downturn has reasons different from previous economic peturbations, and has much more extensive effects across the entire global economy. Hence the need to analyze not individual economies as trends in the emergence of innovations initiated or significantly accelerated by the pandemic crisis. The analysis was made on the basis of reports from institutions such as the (...) World Economic Forum, OECD or ESPAS, as well as preliminary studies conducted in some countries. It should be emphasized that due to the ongoing perturbations and the pandemic not ending, precise research results will be possible to obtain in later years. (shrink)