A partir da hipótese de que a inteligência artificial como tal não representaria o fim da supremacia humana, uma vez que, na essência, a IA somente simularia e aumentaria aspectos da inteligência humana em artefatos não biológicos, o presente artigo questiona sobre o risco real a ser enfrentado. Para além do embate entre tecnofóbicos e tecnofílicos, o que se defende, então, é que as possíveis falhas de funcionamento de uma inteligência artificial – decorrentes de sobrecarga de informação, de (...) uma programação equivocada ou de uma aleatoriedade do sistema – poderiam sinalizar os verdadeiros riscos existenciais, sobretudo quando se considera que o cérebro biológico, na esteira do viés da automação, tende a assumir de maneira acrítica aquilo que é posto por sistemas ancorados em inteligência artificial. Além disso, o argumento aqui defendido é que falhas não detectáveis pela provável limitação de controle humano quanto ao aumento de complexidade do funcionamento de sistemas de IA representam o principal risco existencial real. Palavras-chave: Inteligência artificial, risco existencial, superinteligências, controle humano. (shrink)

The article discusses various conditions of contemporary artificial intelligence, namely deep learning mechanisms, to emphasize its limitations and argues for an antihumanistic view of contemporary technology. It starts from affirming Turing test and argues that machines can in fact be intelligent but that this intelligence must not be related to a capitalistically hyped idea of artificial general intelligence. Then it outlines various conditions on which deep learning depends in its functioning (brute computing power, capitalist datafication, the world of (...) contingency). These conditions show an epistemological schism in the field of artificial intelligence (between symbolic AI and connectionism) that could be overcome by getting rid of the idea of artificial general intelligence and the competitive relation between humans and machines. (shrink)

e understanding of the etiology and pathogenesis of these psyc hiatric disorders such as schizophrenia and depression is still n ot completely clear. At present, there is a lack of objective ne urobiological markers that can be used in clinical routine work such as clinical diagnosis, curative effect evaluation and progn osis evaluation of psychiatric disorders. Therefore, it is of great clinical significance to find biomarkers to improve the diagnos is level and evaluate the curative effect. Electroencephalogram (EEG) is a (...) non-invasive technique to record the potential activi ty of biological brain, through which researchers can analyze th e mechanisms underlying psychiatric disorders. In addition, mac hine learning can be used to further verify the role of these el ectrophysiological indicators in clinical diagnosis and curative e ffect evaluation of psychiatric disorders. The goal of this resear ch topic is to advance research on neurobiomarkers and EEG/ MEG-based diagnostic methods for mental disorders. We hope to conduct in-depth research on the pathogenesis and diagnostic measures of mental diseases such as schizophrenia and depressi ve disorder through EEG/MEG, in order to improve the perfor mance of artificial intelligence for mental diseases diagnosing.Under this research theme, the following is a brief overview of nine published articles, which respectively studied the diagnosis, The work in this special issue may fall into three categories of research: 1) method... (shrink)

J. M. E. McTaggart famously divided time into two time series, which he entitled A-series and B-series. Although he was proponent of neither of them, his division initiated a discussion as to which of the series is prior or real. This paper follows Clifford Williams’s claim that these series are not as distant as their proponents argue they are. It demonstrates their translatability in the case of examples from temporal logic and natural language. It argues that, if there are any (...) deep-rooted differences between these two series, they are only metaphysical. These metaphysical differences could be overcome by focusing on logic or natural language. These two series of time are also used in computer science and in the development of Artificial Intelligence. However, no attempt at unifying them has been suggested in these fields of study. J. M. E. McTaggart rozdělil čas na dvě časové série, A-série a B-série. Třebaže nebyl zastáncem žádné z nich, jeho rozdělení podnítilo diskuzi, která z těchto časových sérií je přednější nebo jediná skutečně reálná. Tento článek navazuje na názor Clifforda Williamse, že tyto časové série nejsou tak rozdílné, jak tvrdí jejich zastánci. V článku je demonstrována jejich přeložitelnost na příkladech z temporální logiky a přirozeného jazyka. Článek dále tvrdí, že jestliže je zde nějaký hluboce zakořeněný rozdíl mezi těmito dvěma sériemi, pak je pouze metafyzický. Tyto metafyzické rozdíly mohou být překonány, zaměříme-li se na logiku a přirozený jazyk. Tyto dvě časové série jsou také použity v informatice a rozvoji umělé inteligence, třebaže v těchto oborech dosud nebyly navrženy žádné pokusy o jejich propojení. (shrink)

This paper delves into AI development’s historical and philosophical dimensions while highlighting the symbiotic relationship between philosophy and AI from a technological perspective: philosophy furnishes foundational concepts, and AI supplies practical tools. The paper posits neurosymbolic AI as a solution to present challenges, sparking discussions encompassing both technical and philosophical considerations. Advocating a multidisciplinary approach calls for merging empirical AI insights with philosophy and cognition science to enrich our comprehension of intelligence and propel AI forward.

More and more people around the world are using computer (video) games. The development of the gaming industry means increasing of its complexity in all aspects. Not only is the content represented in games continuously differentiating, but we also see the increasing diversity among their creators, users, researchers and the public. This article aims to draw attention to the possibility of using the concept of social capital in ludologists’ research as well as in improving the quality of games and of (...) the cooperation between social environments related with games. Social capital is understood here as a potential of interactions embedded in interpersonal ties and social norms, which can bring advantages for individuals, groups and societies. The author takes a closer look on: the main features of this multi-dimensional category; significant differences between human, social and cultural capital; as well as the positive and negative influences of social capital. ** Z gier komputerowych (wideo) korzysta coraz więcej ludzi na całym świecie. Rozwój branży gier oznacza wzrastającą jej złożoność we wszystkich płaszczyznach. Nie tylko stale różnicują się treści przedstawiane w grach, ale też rośnie zróżnicowanie ich twórców, użytkowników, badaczy i opinii publicznej. Celem artykułu jest zwrócenie uwagi na możliwość wykorzystania koncepcji kapitału społecznego w badaniach ludologów oraz w podnoszeniu jakości gier i współpracy między środowiskami związanymi z grami. Kapitał społeczny jest tu rozumiany jako potencjał współdziałania osadzony w powiązaniach międzyludzkich i normach społecznych, który może przynosić korzyści osobom, grupom i społeczeństwom. Przybliżone zostały: główne cechy tej wielowymiarowej kategorii; istotne różnice między kapitałem ludzkim, społecznym i kulturowym; oraz pozytywne i negatywne skutki oddziaływania kapitału społecznego. (shrink)

Resumen Este artículo examina el papel de la ficción como laboratorio mental, que ayuda al filósofo a plantear y discutir los diferentes análisis creados en el campo de la filosofía de la mente. De manera particular se enfoca en algunos de los cuentos que Daniel Dennett ha contado acerca del problema de la conciencia. Es por eso que este artículo también intenta responder preguntas como: ¿Cuál es la relación entre la conciencia y el Centro de Gravedad Narrativo propuesto por Dennett? (...) ¿La mente está hecha de historias? ¿Puede haber un uso semántico en el habla de una inteligencia artificial que no posee experiencia corporal del mundo? Palabras clave: ficción; cuerpo; mente; conciencia; self; creencias; semántica. Fiction, Body and Mind: The Dennett CaseThis paper examines the role of fiction as a mental laboratory that helps the philosopher to pose and discuss the various analyses created in the philosophy of mind. It focuses particularly on some of the tales that Daniel Dennett has told about the problem of consciousness. That is why this paper also attempts to answer questions such as: What is the relation of consciousness to Dennett’s Center of Narrative Gravity? Is the mind made of stories? Can there be a semantic use in speech of an artificial inteligence that does not have a bodily experience of the world? Keywords : Fiction; Body; Mind; Consciousness; Self; Beliefs; Semantics. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to discuss a general tendency in contextualism which is known as "radical contextualism". In the first part I state the well known paradox of semantic holism, as discussed in philosophy of language: if meaning is holistic there is no possibility to share any meaning. In the second part I present the different answers to this paradox, from atomism to different forms of holism. In the third part I give a criticism of the traditional interpretation of Wittgenstein (...) as a supporter of global holism. I stress some similarities between Wittgenstein's thought and Multi Context theories in artificial inteligence. In the last part I give some argument against a rigid interpretation of "local holism": I claim the need to give restrictions to local holim and to develop a study of the connections between "default" properties and high level rules which are studied in Multi−Context theories. (shrink)

W sytuacjach, gdy powinniśmy mieć do czynienia ze wzajemnym oświecaniem, w rzeczywistości często spotykamy się z obopólnym oporem między kognitywistyką a fenomenologią, gdzie ta druga rozumiana jest jako podejście metodologiczne, po raz pierwszy zarysowane przez Husserla. Filozofowie umysłu, z pierwszych szeregów kognitywistów, niejednokrotnie czynią lekceważące gesty w stosunku do fenomenologii, oparte na myleniu fenomenologii z niewykwalifikoną introspekcją psychologiczną (np. Dennett, 1991). Z kolei wielu fenomenologów podlega mylnemu wrażeniu, że kognitywistyce nie udało się wyjść poza tradycyjne modele komputacyjne (DSSI – „dobra (...) staromodna sztuczna inteligencja” (GOFAI - „good old fashioned artificial inteligence”)). Odrzucają oni kognitywistykę, zarzucając jej nadmierny redukcjonizm, uniemożliwiający wyjaśnienie doświadczenia czy świadomości. O ile taki opór nie dziwi w przypadku tych, którzy znają i bronią antynaturalistycznego stanowiska Husserla, o tyle jest niezwykle zaskakujący w przypadku tych, którzy znają dzieła Merleau-Ponty’ego. Badania tego ostatniego łączyły bowiem analizy fenomenologiczne z rozważaniami pochodzącymi z nauk empirycznych, takich jak psychologia i neurologia, i to na długo, zanim kognitywistyka została skonstruowana jako model do uwzględniania tylko tych aspektów psychologii i neurologii, które skupiają się na doświadczeniu poznawczym. Zostawiając przykład Merleau-Ponty’ego, filozofowie po obu stronach stopniowo zdali sobie sprawę, że fenomenologia może być bezpośrednio przydatna do naukowego zrozumienia poznania. Wcześniej niejednokrotnie nawet sami naukowcy empiryczni dochodzili do tego wniosku i to pomimo filozofów. Dobry przykład stanowią tutaj badania Franisco Vareli z neurofenomenologii (Varela, 1996). (shrink)

The problems of transhumanism cannot be considered in isolation from the very rapidly changing advancements of modern technology which has become an immanent part of the modern scientific paradigm and is beginning to affect all people more and more. Focusing the discussion on epistemological and ethical issues alone, while identifying the utopian assumptions of the transhumanism ideology, does not allow to create any useful tools that could restrain the negative phenomena in the world of technoscience. Understanding certain technological concepts developed (...) in environments sensitive to the transhumanist ideas requires appropriate expertise. Many of them touch on the most important aspects of Christian anthropology. In order to understand them properly, it is necessary to investigate the most important results of scientific research carried out in the last few years in the largest scientific laboratories. (shrink)

Book review: Christian, Brian. The Alignment Problem: How Can Artificial Intelligence Learn Human Values? London: Atlantic Books, 2021. 476 stran.

La investigación científica trae consigo múltiples cuestiones, que este libro analiza centrándose en dos grandes corrientes metodológicas: el pragmatismo y el pluralismo. En el primero destacan autores como Nicholas Rescher, que tiene un capítulo en el libro, y en lo segundo hay cada vez más partidarios, muchos de los cuales reconocen el papel de Patrick Suppes en el giro para deslindarse del monismo metodológico, que fue dominante durante un buen número de años. Mediante la reflexión filosófico-metodológica se profundiza en el (...) libro en los procedimientos de investigación, que es la fase inicial para resolver problemas científicos, y en los métodos, que siguen después, dotados mayor grado de rigor que propician la sistematicidad en la indagación de lo real (sea natural, social o artificial). Por un lado, quien investiga ha de seguir los procesos para estudiar adecuadamente su objeto y poder resolver los problemas que plantea ese estudio; y, por otro lado, la realidad a conocer ha de ser inteligible mediante los recursos epistemológicos, de uso de procesos de investigación y de los materiales adecuados, bien sea para la observación o para la investigación. (shrink)

One of the most common contemporary approaches for developing an ethics of artificial intelligence (AI) involves elaborating guiding principles. This essay explores the limitations of this approach, using the history of bioethics as a comparative case. The examples of bioethics and recent AI ethics suggest that principles are difficult to implement in everyday practice, fail to direct individual action, and can frequently result in a pure proceduralism. The essay encourages an additional attention to virtue, which forms the dispositions of (...) actors, directs them to valued ends, and encourages right action in particular situation to complement principles. Practices and professions like medicine or warfighting that already have rich traditions of reflection on virtue ethics will be especially fruitful fields for developing an AI ethics of virtue. (shrink)

This essay introduces this special issue on virtue ethics in relation to military AI. It describes the current situation of military AI ethics as following that of AI ethics in general, caught between consequentialism and deontology. Virtue ethics serves as an alternative that can address some of the weaknesses of these dominant forms of ethics. The essay describes how the articles in the issue exemplify the value of virtue-related approaches for these questions, before ending with thoughts for further research.

Reports of the successful creation of artificial life usually garner considerable interest from philosophers. This paper argues that the worries philosophers have about artificial life do not, for the most part, depend on the artificiality of a given organism. In particular advances in synthetic biology will make the distinction between artificial and natural life a difficult and fluid one. Philosophers should hence refrain from making their arguments depend on a distinction between artificial and natural life.

When is it ethically acceptable to use artificial agents in health care? This article articulates some criteria for good care and then discusses whether machines as artificial agents that take over care tasks meet these criteria. Particular attention is paid to intuitions about the meaning of ‘care’, ‘agency’, and ‘taking over’, but also to the care process as a labour process in a modern organizational and financial-economic context. It is argued that while there is in principle no objection (...) to using machines in medicine and health care, the idea of them functioning and appearing as ‘artificial agents’ is problematic and attends us to problems in human care which were already present before visions of machine care entered the stage. It is recommended that the discussion about care machines be connected to a broader discussion about the impact of technology on human relations in the context of modernity. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) national strategies provide countries with a framework for the development and implementation of AI technologies. Sixty countries worldwide published their AI national strategies. The majority of these countries with more than 70% are developed countries. The approach of AI national strategies differentiates between developed and developing countries in several aspects including scientific research, education, talent development, and ethics. This paper examined AI readiness assessment in a developing country (Palestine) to help develop and identify the main pillars (...) of the AI national strategy. AI readiness assessment was applied across education, entrepreneurship, government, and research and development sectors in Palestine (case of a developing country). In addition, it examined the legal framework and whether it is coping with trending technologies. The results revealed that Palestinians have low awareness of AI. Moreover, AI is barely used across several sectors and the legal framework is not coping with trending technologies. The results helped develop and identify the following five main pillars that Palestine’s AI national strategy should focus on: AI for Government, AI for Development, AI for Capacity Building in the private, public and technical and governmental sectors, AI and Legal Framework, and international Activities. (shrink)

Ectogenesis (artificial wombs) might soon become a reality. This paper will analyse how the development of such technologies will affect Judith Jarvis Thomson’s defence of abortion, and what the potential consequences of this will be for society. Thomson attempts to justify abortion by appealing to the mother’s right to bodily autonomy. We will argue that once these technologies have been developed, the right to abortion can no longer be justified by such appeals. As a result, when justifying abortion, Thomson-style (...) arguments will no longer work, and a very different strategy will have to be adopted by those wishing to justify its permissibility. Anticipating a consequent weaker position of the pro-choice view, we briefly consider some of the practical implications of ectogenesis for society: effects on parental dynamics, governmental expenditure, research, and gender equality. (shrink)

Interview of David Rozen with Jakub Mácha.

In this work I analyze the phenomenon of political polarization on the internet. I argue that the approach centered on the filter bubble and echo chambers has shortcomings. To solve them, I propose the concept of artificial polarization. This concept refers to the process by which the expressive uses of communication, such as flaming or moral grandstanding, provoke fictitious forms of polarization. Recognizing the artificial polarization will allow a better understanding of the polarization processes in the network and (...) their effects on the democratic debate. (shrink)

Artificial intelligency can bring speed and reliability to drug discovery process. It represents an additional intelligence, which in any case can replace the strategic and logic creative insight of the medicinal chemist who remains the architect and molecule master designer. In terms of drug design, artificial intelligency, deep learning machines, and other revolutionary technologies will match with the medicinal chemist’s natural intelligency, but for sure never go beyond. This manuscript tries to assess the impact of the artificial (...) intelligency on drug discovery today. (shrink)

In this paper we will look at the various ways in which infertility can be understood and at how need for reproductive therapies can be construed. We will do this against the background of research with artificial gametes. Having explored these questions we will attempt to establish the degree to which technologies such as AGs could expand the array of choices that people have to reproduce and/or become parents. Finally, we will examine whether and in what ways the most (...) promising developments of such technologies are likely to bring about the “end of infertility”. (shrink)

A major approach to the ethics of artificial intelligence is to use social choice, in which the AI is designed to act according to the aggregate views of society. This is found in the AI ethics of “coherent extrapolated volition” and “bottom–up ethics”. This paper shows that the normative basis of AI social choice ethics is weak due to the fact that there is no one single aggregate ethical view of society. Instead, the design of social choice AI faces (...) three sets of decisions: standing, concerning whose ethics views are included; measurement, concerning how their views are identified; and aggregation, concerning how individual views are combined to a single view that will guide AI behavior. These decisions must be made up front in the initial AI design—designers cannot “let the AI figure it out”. Each set of decisions poses difficult ethical dilemmas with major consequences for AI behavior, with some decision options yielding pathological or even catastrophic results. Furthermore, non-social choice ethics face similar issues, such as whether to count future generations or the AI itself. These issues can be more important than the question of whether or not to use social choice ethics. Attention should focus on these issues, not on social choice. (shrink)

Increasing concerns have been raised regarding artificial intelligence (AI) bias, and in response, efforts have been made to pursue AI fairness. In this paper, we argue that the idea of structural injustice serves as a helpful framework for clarifying the ethical concerns surrounding AI bias—including the nature of its moral problem and the responsibility for addressing it—and reconceptualizing the approach to pursuing AI fairness. Using AI in healthcare as a case study, we argue that AI bias is a form (...) of structural injustice that exists when AI systems interact with other social factors to exacerbate existing social inequalities, making some groups of people more vulnerable to undeserved burdens while conferring unearned benefits to others. The goal of AI fairness, understood this way, is about pursuing a more just social structure with the development and usage of AI systems when appropriate. We further argue that all participating agents in the unjust social structure associated with AI bias bear a shared responsibility to join collective action with the goal of reforming the social structure, and we provide a list of practical recommendations for agents in various social positions to contribute to this collective action. (shrink)

In this book, the author examines the ethical implications of Artificial Intelligence systems as they integrate and replace traditional social structures in new sociocognitive-technological environments. She discusses issues related to the integrity of researchers, technologists, and manufacturers as they design, construct, use, and manage artificially intelligent systems; formalisms for reasoning about moral decisions as part of the behavior of artificial autonomous systems such as agents and robots; and design methodologies for social agents based on societal, moral, and legal (...) values. Throughout the book the author discusses related work, conscious of both classical, philosophical treatments of ethical issues and the implications in modern, algorithmic systems, and she combines regular references and footnotes with suggestions for further reading. This short overview is suitable for undergraduate students, in both technical and non-technical courses, and for interested and concerned researchers, practitioners, and citizens. (shrink)

Whether pattern-parsing mechanisms are specific to language or apply across multiple cognitive domains remains unresolved. Formal language theory provides a mathematical framework for classifying pattern-generating rule sets (or “grammars”) according to complexity. This framework applies to patterns at any level of complexity, stretching from simple sequences, to highly complex tree-like or net-like structures, to any Turing-computable set of strings. Here, we explored human pattern-processing capabilities in the visual domain by generating abstract visual sequences made up of abstract tiles differing in (...) form and color. We constructed different sets of sequences, using artificial “grammars” (rule sets) at three key complexity levels. Because human linguistic syntax is classed as “mildly context-sensitive,” we specifically included a visual grammar at this complexity level. Acquisition of these three grammars was tested in an artificial grammar-learning paradigm: after exposure to a set of well-formed strings, participants were asked to discriminate novel grammatical patterns from non-grammatical patterns. Participants successfully acquired all three grammars after only minutes of exposure, correctly generalizing to novel stimuli and to novel stimulus lengths. A Bayesian analysis excluded multiple alternative hypotheses and shows that the success in rule acquisition applies both at the group level and for most participants analyzed individually. These experimental results demonstrate rapid pattern learning for abstract visual patterns, extending to the mildly context-sensitive level characterizing language. We suggest that a formal equivalence of processing at the mildly context sensitive level in the visual and linguistic domains implies that cognitive mechanisms with the computational power to process linguistic syntax are not specific to the domain of language, but extend to abstract visual patterns with no meaning. (shrink)

Artificial Culture" is an examination of the articulation, construction, and representation of "the artificial" in contemporary popular cultural texts, especially science fiction films and novels. The book argues that today we live in an artificial culture due to the deep and inextricable relationship between people, our bodies, and technology at large. While the artificial is often imagined as outside of the natural order and thus also beyond the realm of humanity, paradoxically, artificial concepts are simultaneously (...) produced and constructed by human ideas and labor. The artificial can thus act as a boundary point against which we as a culture can measure what it means to be human. Science fiction feature films and novels, and other related media, frequently and provocatively deploy ideas of the artificial in ways which the lines between people, our bodies, spaces and culture more broadly blur and, at times, dissolve. Building on the rich foundational work on the figures of the cyborg and posthuman, this book situates the artificial in similar terms, but from a nevertheless distinctly different viewpoint. After examining ideas of the artificial as deployed in film, novels and other digital contexts, this study concludes that we are now part of an artificial culture entailing a matrix which, rather than separating minds and bodies, or humanity and the digital, reinforces the symbiotic connection between identities, bodies, and technologies. "--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

This volume is the direct result of a conference in which a number of leading researchers from the fields of artificial intelligence and biology gathered to ...

This paper aims to show that to think of the artificial means to think at the same time of man, nature, culture and society not as separate entities but as elements of one and the same system; since, in its field of action, the artificial articulates its component dimensions, which altogether are natural, human, cultural and social. Usually we call artificial both the procedure through which we project the realisation of something and the product of our project: (...) the realisation of the artefact. The artefact incorporates, in the physical and inanimate dimensions of nature, those dimensions which are proper to the producer. When the artificial imitates and reproduces certain aspects of nature, its action is directed towards achieving an improvement in man's life. In this perspective, we think that the artificial cannot be viewed as a factor external to man and man's social life. (shrink)

Highly sophisticated capabilities of artificial intelligence (AI) have skyrocketed its popularity across many industry sectors globally. The public sector is one of these. Many cities around the world are trying to position themselves as leaders of urban innovation through the development and deployment of AI systems. Likewise, increasing numbers of local government agencies are attempting to utilise AI technologies in their operations to deliver policy and generate efficiencies in highly uncertain and complex urban environments. While the popularity of AI (...) is on the rise in urban policy circles, there is limited understanding and lack of empirical studies on the city manager perceptions concerning urban AI systems. Bridging this gap is the rationale of this study. The methodological approach adopted in this study is twofold. First, the study collects data through semi-structured interviews with city managers from Australia and the US. Then, the study analyses the data using the summative content analysis technique with two data analysis software. The analysis identifies the following themes and generates insights into local government services: AI adoption areas, cautionary areas, challenges, effects, impacts, knowledge basis, plans, preparedness, roadblocks, technologies, deployment timeframes, and usefulness. The study findings inform city managers in their efforts to deploy AI in their local government operations, and offer directions for prospective research. (shrink)

Background: Artificial intelligence (AI) is the simulation of human intelligence processes by machines, such as learning, reasoning, and problem-solving. AI has the potential to transform the field of public health, which is concerned with promoting and protecting the health of populations and preventing diseases. AI can help public health organizations perform their essential functions more efficiently, effectively, and equitably; AI can transform the public health field, but it also poses some challenges and risks that must be addressed carefully and (...) responsibly. Objectives: This paper reviews the current and potential applications of AI in public health, discusses the opportunities and challenges of AI for public health, and provides recommendations for the ethical and responsible use of AI in public health. Results: AI can improve the speed and accuracy of diagnosis, screening, and treatment of various diseases and support disease surveillance, outbreak response, and health systems management. However, AI poses significant challenges and risks, such as ethical, legal, and social implications, data quality and security, algorithmic bias and fairness, and environmental impact. Conclusion: AI has the potential to revolutionize public health, but it comes with risks that must be addressed. Promoting digital literacy, establishing modern data governance frameworks, and investing in advanced data infrastructure and procedures are essential. Public health organizations must also train their workforce to collaborate with AI. By doing so, they can improve health outcomes, reduce health disparities, and advance public health science and practice. (shrink)

The development of increasingly intelligent and autonomous technologies will eventually lead to these systems having to face morally problematic situations. This gave rise to the development of artificial morality, an emerging field in artificial intelligence which explores whether and how artificial systems can be furnished with moral capacities. This will have a deep impact on our lives. Yet, the methodological foundations of artificial morality are still sketchy and often far off from possible applications. One important area (...) of application of artificial systems with moral capacities is geriatric care. The goal of this article is to afford the methodological foundations for artificial morality, i.e., for implementing moral capacities in artificial systems in general, and to discuss them with respect to an assistive system in geriatric care which is capable of moral learning. (shrink)

Stemming from Uexkull’s fundamental concepts of Umwelt and Innenwelt as developed in the biosemiotic approach of Ferreira 2010, 2011, the present work models mathematically the semiosis of cognition and proposes an artificial cognitive architecture to be deployed in a robotic structure.

The Platonic myth in Book X of The Republic tells us how the choice of “destinies” is carried out by human souls about to be born. The revenant Er, in his particular nekia, returns to life to tell all he has seen and heard: that what life bring us is related to the good or bad choice of our future life trough a draw carried out under the eyes of Necessity and her three daughters: Lachesis, Clotho and Atropo, who weave (...) the destiny of men (The Republic, Book X, 617e): Theintelligible character of this choice has the burden of a determinism ab origine without possibility of rewriting it, making our fate an inalterable journey. Kant could say the same in KrV, although it is true that the doctrine of the “intelligible character” only appears specifically in 1781, in the light of the Third Antinomies, in the“Dialectic” of the Critique of Pure Reason. Anyway, its long shadow appears in other texts (as in Religion Within Limits of Reason Alone of 1793)– that each one of voluntary acts of men: “it is predetermined, well before it occurs, in the empirical character of man” (KrV, A 553 / B 581) would suppose that this intelligiblecharacter would have to be understood together with the problem of freedom and decision. That threshold pointed out by Kant will be trespassed by Schelling, who will form a concept of freedom of a metaphysical character (libertas ex) which will send us to an origin, beyond all times, in which the de-cision, as ex-cision, restructures and sets in order our time. Cut or beginning, it is a wound without stitches which implies the proper opening of being into existence. (shrink)

Presupposing no familiarity with the technical concepts of either philosophy or computing, this clear introduction reviews the progress made in AI since the inception of the field in 1956. Copeland goes on to analyze what those working in AI must achieve before they can claim to have built a thinking machine and appraises their prospects of succeeding. There are clear introductions to connectionism and to the language of thought hypothesis which weave together material from philosophy, artificial intelligence and neuroscience. (...) John Searle's attacks on AI and cognitive science are countered and close attention is given to foundational issues, including the nature of computation, Turing Machines, the Church-Turing Thesis and the difference between classical symbol processing and parallel distributed processing. The book also explores the possibility of machines having free will and consciousness and concludes with a discussion of in what sense the human brain may be a computer. (shrink)