Die Rede von einem Zwischenreich des Dialogs deutet hin auf den intermedHi. ren Charakter des Dialogs, in dem zwischen uns zustande kommt, was keiner fur sich zustande brachte. Stehen wir immer schon im Dialog, so ist fur jeden der Weg zu sich selbst nicht der kurzeste, sondern der langste, er ginge durch die Welt sowohl wie durch die Andern. Dieser Gesichtspunkt ist keines wegs selbstverstandlich, doch selbst dort, wo er sich Geltung ver schafft, wird er vielfach verdunkelt durch die Verwandlung (...) von Verschiedenem in Gegensatzliches, wenn etwa interpersonale Be ziehung und soziale Verhaltnisse, interpersonales Ereignis und anonyme Prozesse und Strukturen, personliche Umkehr und so ziale Veranderungen gegeneinander ausgespielt werden. N eigt die sogenannte Philosophie des Dialogs dazu, reine zwischenmensch liche Beziehungen abzulosen von der mundanen und sozialen Wirklichkeit, so tendiert ein Denken, das von Geschichte und Gesellschaft ausgeht, dahin, einzig den konkreten Entwicklungs gang einer Menschheit in Rechnung zu stellen. Der wechselseitig erhobene Vorwurf, man verliere sich hierin der AuBerlichkeit des Offentlichen und der bloBen Geschichte, man fluchte sich dort in die Innerlichkeit des Privaten und des bloBen Augenblicks, ware dann nur der Ausdruck dafur, daB entweder das Ganze ohne das Urspriingliche oder das Ursprungliche ohne das Ganze gesucht wird. Was hier auseinanderstrebt, nicht nur in der Theorie, sondern auch in der Lebenspraxis, sind zwei Weisen des mitmenschlichen Umgangs. (shrink)

Based on the argument that violence has a parasitic quality rather than an essence of its own, this article seeks to bring to light the conversion processes through which violence crystallises out of, as well as into, various phenomena. Violence is first examined in terms of the relation between perpetrator and victim with, however, an emphasis on the fact that violence cannot be reduced to the intention or the act of the perpetrator. On the contrary, violence is shown to have (...) the character of pathos and to open up a dimension of which the act itself is only a part. Further, the author argues that in being directed towards the other, violence harbours a performative contradiction: by turning the addressee into a thing to be destroyed, the addressing act cancels itself. The paper also sets out to identify the breeding grounds of violence, which, due to its capacity for conversion, can be detected in various phenomena that are not necessarily linked to violence. This means that violence can resort to various mechanisms and can emerge in multiple fields of activity: in bureaucracy, economics, medicine, politics, war, and most importantly, in everyday life, hidden under inconspicuous but sometimes pervasive forms. Finally, the metamorphoses of violence are shown to ultimately rest on the temporal character of violence, which implies that violence has a time of preparation and an aftermath. (shrink)

In this article I shall largely make use of terms like “responding,” “responsive,” and “responsivity.” These terms are not part of traditional philosophy. They became indispensable for my own thinking when I tried to develop a theory of radical Fremdheit, of alienness or otherness. Hence I came to a sort of responsive phenomenology that does not replace current variants of phenomenology, but sets a new tone. This is what I try to show in my article. I shall proceed in four (...) steps. In the first step, dealing with the formation of the theory, I try to show how our experience of radical otherness leads to the key concept of responsivity. In the second step, I shall describe the main features of responsivity and its pathological deviations. In the third step, this perspective will be expanded by referring to co-affection and co-responsivity as elements of proto-sociality. The fourth and last step will offer a practical outlook, raising the question to what extent responsivity can be organised and institutionalised. (shrink)

Few would contest the fact that analytical philosophy has dominated philosophical practice in the English speaking world for about the last century. But dispute continues about both its origins and nature; whilst others question its value. Michael Dummett wholly embraced the analytical approach to philosophy, as he conceived of it. For him analytical philosophy marked itself off from its precursors and its alternatives, embodied in the Continental tradition, by taking the linguistic turn. And Frege was unequivocally the first philosopher to (...) take that auspicious turn, which ushered in a new method in philosophy. Henceforth philosophers were to approach the business of analyzing thought via the enterprise of analyzing language. So Dummett is presenting us with both a history lesson and a recommendation about how we ought to do philosophy. But is his reading of the history accurate? And is his conception of the nature of analytical philosophy viable? In order to reflect on these questions this collection brings together eight scholars who have made a serious business of reading Dummett. (shrink)

Both Brandom and Wittgenstein see meaning and content as emerging from normative social practices. Wittgenstein says little about the constitution of such norms, other than that they are exhibited in practitioners’ judgements of correctness. In addition, they appear already to be content involving, since the moves whose correctness is in question are moves such as asserting that such and such. In contrast, Brandom says a good deal about the constitution of the norms and promises a reductive programme. The norms are (...) essentially inferential and are instituted in the social practice of attributing commitments and entitlements. In particular, we are urged to see the norm-bound move of assertion as capable of being understood in terms of the normative statuses of commitments and entitlements. Jeremy Wanderer calls this Brandom’s bold conjecture. In this paper I use Wittgenstein’s thinking about normativity to reflect on the defensibility of Brandom’s bold conjecture. (shrink)

Since its disc overy by Fitch, the paradox of knowability has been a thorn in the anti-realist's side. Recently both Dummett and Tennant have sought to relieve the anti-realist by restricting the applicability of the knowability principle -- the principle that all truths are knowable -- which has been viewed as both a cardinal doctrine of anti-realism and the assumption for reductio of Fitch's argument. In this paper it is argued that the paradox of knowability is a peculiarly acute manifestation (...) of a syndrome affecting anti-realism, against which Dummett's and Tennant's manoeuvres are not finally efficacious. The anti-realist can only cope with the syndrome by being much clearer about her notion of knowability. In fact, she'll have to offer an account which relativises the notion of knowability both to the world at which knowability is assessed and to the content of the proposition to which it is applied. This is not, however, merely an ad hoc manoeuvre to counter the problematic syndrome; rather it is just what we should expect from the anti-realist's intuitive use of the notion. A preliminary investigation indicates that there is no way of providing a general, systematic explanation of such a notion of knowability and thus an inherent restriction on the principle of knowability -- but one differing from those offered by either Dummett or Tennant -- is developed. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene como objetivo esbozar algunos motivos fundamentales de una teoría de la atención sobre la base de una fenomenología responsiva orientada por el cuerpo. Una fenomenología de la atención no se conforma ni con actos subjetivos ni con mecanismos anónimos. La atención se presenta más bien como un acontecimiento doble: algo nos llama la atención – prestamos atención. Algo nos sobreviene antes de que nos percatemos de ello. Entre ambos momentos se abre una brecha insalvable. La atención (...) vivida excede nuestros propios proyectos, así como las técnicas y prácticas que determinan nuestro comportamiento. Los conflictos de atención apuntan a un ethos que nos confronta con lo inesperado y culmina en una consideración que debemos al otro. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to point out that feelings not only have a place, but also a time. The course of this investigation points out how feelings have been, in many cases, valuated and depreciated. However, a reapropiation of them can be done inside a phenomenological frame thru the analysis..

Gli studi comparati che hanno a oggetto le culture altre mirano a comparare ciò che non è comparabile; e mirano a farlo esclusivamente nei termini di ciò che appare in quanto tale all’interno delle procedure comparative stesse. Si rende uguale ciò che uguale non è. Ogni pratica comparativa è una pratica parziale, poiché il luogo della comparazione è sempre parte di una determinata cultura. Il nostro approccio fenomenologico, per un verso, tiene conto di quel che precede ogni procedura comparativa in (...) termini di intreccio interculturale, e, per altro verso, rispetta ciò che travalica ogni procedura comparativa nei termini di un’eccedenza transculturale. Solo le culture che riusciranno ad essere più che mere culture si proteggeranno dal cadere nel sonno della normalizzazione. (shrink)

Wahrheit und Überlieferung -- Wahrheit und Geschichtlichkeit.