Suppose you’d like to believe that p, whether or not it’s true. What can you do to help? A natural initial thought is that you could engage in Intentionally Biased Inquiry : you could look into whether p, but do so in a way that you expect to predominantly yield evidence in favour of p. This paper hopes to do two things. The first is to argue that this initial thought is mistaken: intentionally biased inquiry is impossible. The second is (...) to show that reflections on intentionally biased inquiry strongly support a controversial ‘access’ principle which states that, for all p, if p is part of our evidence, then that p is part of our evidence is itself part of our evidence. (shrink)

Epistemologists have recently noted a tension between (i) denying access internalism, and (ii) maintaining that rational agents cannot be epistemically akratic, believing claims akin to ‘p, but I shouldn’t believe p’. I bring out the tension, and develop a new way to resolve it. The basic strategy is to say that access internalism is false, but that counterexamples to it are ‘elusive’ in a way that prevents rational agents from suspecting that they themselves are counterexamples to the internalist principles. I (...) argue that this allows us to do justice to the motivations behind both (i) and (ii). And I explain in some detail what a view of evidence that implements this strategy, and makes it independently plausible, might look like. (shrink)

Die Rede von einem Zwischenreich des Dialogs deutet hin auf den intermedHi. ren Charakter des Dialogs, in dem zwischen uns zustande kommt, was keiner fur sich zustande brachte. Stehen wir immer schon im Dialog, so ist fur jeden der Weg zu sich selbst nicht der kurzeste, sondern der langste, er ginge durch die Welt sowohl wie durch die Andern. Dieser Gesichtspunkt ist keines wegs selbstverstandlich, doch selbst dort, wo er sich Geltung ver schafft, wird er vielfach verdunkelt durch die Verwandlung (...) von Verschiedenem in Gegensatzliches, wenn etwa interpersonale Be ziehung und soziale Verhaltnisse, interpersonales Ereignis und anonyme Prozesse und Strukturen, personliche Umkehr und so ziale Veranderungen gegeneinander ausgespielt werden. N eigt die sogenannte Philosophie des Dialogs dazu, reine zwischenmensch liche Beziehungen abzulosen von der mundanen und sozialen Wirklichkeit, so tendiert ein Denken, das von Geschichte und Gesellschaft ausgeht, dahin, einzig den konkreten Entwicklungs gang einer Menschheit in Rechnung zu stellen. Der wechselseitig erhobene Vorwurf, man verliere sich hierin der AuBerlichkeit des Offentlichen und der bloBen Geschichte, man fluchte sich dort in die Innerlichkeit des Privaten und des bloBen Augenblicks, ware dann nur der Ausdruck dafur, daB entweder das Ganze ohne das Urspriingliche oder das Ursprungliche ohne das Ganze gesucht wird. Was hier auseinanderstrebt, nicht nur in der Theorie, sondern auch in der Lebenspraxis, sind zwei Weisen des mitmenschlichen Umgangs. (shrink)

Sometimes changes in an agent's partial values can cast a positive light on an earlier action, which was wrong when it was performed. Based on independent reflections about the role of partiality in determining when blame is appropriate, I argue that in such cases the agent shouldn't feel remorse about her action and that others can't legitimately blame her for it, even though that action was wrong. The action thus receives a certain kind of retrospective justification.

This edited volume offers a new approach to understanding social conventions by way of Martin Heidegger. It connects the philosopher's conceptions of the anyone, everydayness, and authenticity with an analysis and critique of social normativity. Heidegger’s account of the anyone is ambiguous. Some see it as a good description of human sociality, others think of it as an important critique of modern mass society. This volume seeks to understand this ambiguity as reflecting the tension between the constitutive function of conventions (...) for human action and the critical aspects of conformism. It argues that Heidegger’s anyone should neither be reduced to its pejorative nor its constitutive dimension. Rather, the concept could show how power and norms function. This volume would be of interest to scholars and students of philosophy and the social sciences who wish to investigate the social applications of the works of Martin Heidegger. (shrink)

The goal of the following study is to investigate whether first-year students in STEM fields that have a low proportion of females (STEM-L) show vocational interests that fit their vocational aspirations. To place our investigation into a broader context, we compared students in STEM-L with students of STEM subjects with a medium proportion of women (STEM-M) as well as with other subjects with a medium or a high proportion of females. We analyzed their vocational interests, vocational aspirations and their interest (...) congruence. In both the comparison regarding interest profiles and the comparison of vocational aspirations, we focused on the things-orientation and people-orientation, all while taking respective gender differences into account. Following the suggestion from previous studies, in a further step we differentiated between subjects within STEM-L. Using data from the German National Educational Panel Study (NEPS), we analyzed the interest congruence of 5530 male and 7406 female students in STEM majors (with a low or medium proportion of women) and non-STEM majors (with a medium or high proportion of women). Students from different subjects showed different magnitudes regarding their things- and people-orientation. STEM-L students had a high things-orientation and a low people-orientation regarding both their interests and aspired occupations. Students of STEM-L and STEM-M showed a lower interest congruence than students from other subjects. With the exception of education, gender differences regarding the people- and things-orientation also existed within most of the subjects. Gender differences partly remain when distinguishing between the different subjects within STEM-L. And so, the result that not all STEM-L subjects are “created equal” is discussed in the context of their theoretical and methodological aspects. (shrink)

The author calls phenomenological intentionality, into question while taking it, nevertheless, as a starting point. From the analysis of the meaning of phenomena he goes back to a pathic dimension which precedes them. What happens to us or affects us and to what we respond in different ways cannot be reduced to previous horizons. Between pathos and response, there is an irreducible cleft which constitutes a special sort of time-lag. What happens to us comes is always too early; our responses (...) always come too late. Our experience is never completely up to date. In order to explore this pre-semantic and pre-pragmatic depth of experience we need a sort of responsive reduction, which guides all meaning toward something we respond to. In conclusion, the author evokes some areas in which such a revision of phenomenology shows its effects, namely the genesis of life in bioethics, the historical elaboration of memory and the experience of the Other. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene como objetivo esbozar algunos motivos fundamentales de una teoría de la atención sobre la base de una fenomenología responsiva orientada por el cuerpo. Una fenomenología de la atención no se conforma ni con actos subjetivos ni con mecanismos anónimos. La atención se presenta más bien como un acontecimiento doble: algo nos llama la atención – prestamos atención. Algo nos sobreviene antes de que nos percatemos de ello. Entre ambos momentos se abre una brecha insalvable. La atención (...) vivida excede nuestros propios proyectos, así como las técnicas y prácticas que determinan nuestro comportamiento. Los conflictos de atención apuntan a un ethos que nos confronta con lo inesperado y culmina en una consideración que debemos al otro. (shrink)

Gli studi comparati che hanno a oggetto le culture altre mirano a comparare ciò che non è comparabile; e mirano a farlo esclusivamente nei termini di ciò che appare in quanto tale all’interno delle procedure comparative stesse. Si rende uguale ciò che uguale non è. Ogni pratica comparativa è una pratica parziale, poiché il luogo della comparazione è sempre parte di una determinata cultura. Il nostro approccio fenomenologico, per un verso, tiene conto di quel che precede ogni procedura comparativa in (...) termini di intreccio interculturale, e, per altro verso, rispetta ciò che travalica ogni procedura comparativa nei termini di un’eccedenza transculturale. Solo le culture che riusciranno ad essere più che mere culture si proteggeranno dal cadere nel sonno della normalizzazione. (shrink)

Wahrheit und Überlieferung -- Wahrheit und Geschichtlichkeit.