Is materialism right to claim that the world of everyday-life experience – the phenomenal world – is nothing but an illusion produced in physical reality, notably in the brain? Or is Merleau-Ponty right when he defends the fundamental character of the phenomenal world while rejecting physical realism? I address these questions by exploring the nature of the body proper in Merleau-Ponty and Plessner, arguing that physical and phenomenal realism are not mutually exclusive but complementary. The argument includes a (...) close examination of the relationships between scientific and pre-scientific perspectives, between living and non-living things, and between humans and animals. (shrink)

While Merleau-Ponty’sPhenomenology of Perceptionrelies on the descriptive register of the body proper, his Sorbonne lectures on child psychology investigate the genesis of the experience of a body as one’s own. I demonstrate the uniqueness of Merleau-Ponty’s account of the narcissistic affect and sociality involved in this developmental process, distinguishing his account vis-à-vis Wallon’s and Lacan’s studies of the mirror stage. I conclude that in Merleau-Ponty’s account, (1) the experience of the body proper is not singular, (...) but encompasses a range of phenomenological variation; and (2) the genesis of the body proper is not confined to the mirror stage. The production of bodily boundaries is an ongoing process identified not only with its advent in childhood, but also with adult emotional life. The boundaries between inner and outer domains of perception are not merely discovered, but must be negotiated and cultivated in the intercorporeal affective dramas of adult life. (shrink)

Embodied cognitive science has argued that cognition is embodied principally in virtue of grossmorphological and sensorimotor features. This thesis argues that cognition is also internally embodied in affective and fine-grained physiological features whose transformative roles remain mostly unnoticed in contemporary cognitive science. I call this ‘proper embodiment’. I approach this larger subject by examining various emotion theories in philosophy and psychology. These tend to emphasise one of the many gross components of emotional processes, such as ‘feeling’ or ‘judgement’ to (...) the detriment of the others, often leading to an artificial emotion-cognition distinction even within emotion science itself. Attempts to reconcile this by putting the gross components back together, such as JessePrinz’s “embodied appraisal theory”, are, I argue, destined to failure because the vernacular concept of emotion which is used as the explanandum is not a natural kind and is not amenable to scientific explication.I examine Antonio Damasio’s proposal that emotion is involved in paradigmatic ‘cognitive’ processing such as rational decision making and argue (1) that the research he discusses does not warrant the particular hypothesis he favours, and (2) that Damasio’s account, though in many ways a step in the right direction, nonetheless continues to endorse a framework which sees affect and cognition as separate (though now highly interacting) faculties. I further argue that the conflation of ‘affect’ and 'emotion' may be the source of some confusion in emotion theory and that affect needs to be properly distinguished from ‘emotion’. I examine some dissociations in the pain literature which give us further empirical evidence that, as with the emotions, affect is a distinct component along with more cognitive elements of pain. I then argue that affect is distinctive in being grounded in homeostatic regulative activity in the body proper. With the distinction between affect, emotion, and cognition in hand, and the associated grounding of affect in bodily activity, I then survey evidence that bodily affect is also involved in perception and in paradigmatic cognitive processes such as attention and executive function. I argue that this relation is not ‘merely’ casual. Instead, affect (grounded in fine-grained details of internal bodily activity) is partially constitutive of cognition, participating in cognitive processing and contributing to perceptual and cognitive phenomenology. Finally I review some work in evolutionary robotics which reaches a similar conclusion, suggesting that the particular fine details of embodiment, such as molecular signalling between both neural and somatic cells matters to cognition. I conclude that cognition is properly embodied’ in that it is partially constituted by the many fine-grained bodily processes involved in affect (as demonstrated in the thesis) and plausibly by a wide variety of other fine-grained bodily processes that likewise tend to escape the net of contemporary cognitive science. (shrink)

In the late 1940s, a microanatomist from London Ontario, Murray Barr, discovered a mark of sex chromosome status in bodily tissues, what came to be known as the ‘Barr body’. This discovery offered an important diagnostic technology to the burgeoning clinical science community engaged with the medical interpretation and management of sexual anomalies. It seemed to offer a way to identify the true, underlying sex in those whose bodies or lives were sexually anomalous . The hypothesis that allowed the (...) Barr body to stand in for ‘chromosomal’ or ‘genetic’ sex was provisional, but it supported the expectation that genetic information established one’s primary identity, and the conviction that the animal world could be neatly divided into two, and only two, sexes. Ultimately, this provisional hypothesis, and its status as an unambiguous arbiter of true sex, was overturned. But during much of the 1950s, Barr’s thesis about the identity of the Barr body was consistent with a coherent set of theories and evidence explaining sexual development and sexual pathology. Though provisional, the scientific status of the sex chromatin within this system of knowledge was good enough to support a flourishing research enterprise in the clinical sciences. (shrink)

Feminist critics have charged that Aristotle's mistaken and harmful remarks about women and slaves show inconsistency or bias-driven arbitrariness. However, this analysis shows that these remarks function within a consistent and coherent theoretical corpus. Thus, both Aristotle's hierarchical and dualistic first principles and the methodology on which his entire corpus is based must be unreliable. Moreover, consistency and coherence must be insufficient warrants of theoretical insightfulness. Aristotle's mistakes suggest caveats for feminist philosophical reconstruction.

This paper is prompted by the charge that the prevailing Western paradigm of medical knowledge is essentially Cartesian. Hence, illness, disease, disability, etc. are said to be conceived of in Cartesian terms. The paper attempts to make use of the critique of Cartesianism in medicine developed by certain commentators, notably Leder (1992), in order to expose Cartesian commitments in conceptions of disability. The paper also attempts to sketch an alternative conception of disability — one partly inspired by the work of (...) Merleau-Ponty. In particular, three key Cartesian claims are identified and subjected to criticism. These are as follows: (a) The claim that the body is an object, (b) what is termed here ‘the modularity thesis’, and (c) the claim that the body cannot be constitutive of the self (i.e. since the soul/mind/brain is). In opposition to these claims, it is argued that the body is properly viewed as a subject; that there are neither purely mental, nor purely physical disabilities; and that selves are constituted, at least in part, by their bodies. (shrink)

A better appreciation of the material, distributed quality of human agency can illuminate subtle dynamics of domination and oppression and reveal resources for potentially liberatory political action. Materialist accounts of agency nevertheless pose challenges to the notion of personal responsibility that is so crucial to political obligation and democratic citizenship. To guard against this danger, we need to sustain the close connection between agency and a sense of selfhood that is individuated, reflexive, and responsive to norms. Yet we should acknowledge (...) that reflexive selfhood is not the whole of individual agency for the sources of agency extend beyond the individual herself. We also need to recognize the ways that both reflexivity and norm-responsiveness are themselves embodied capacities. When properly conceived, a materialist view of agency can increase awareness of our oftenunwitting contributions to systematic inequalities of power and extend our political responsibilities in emancipatory directions, thus holding great promise for democratic life. (shrink)

Russellian physicalism has the promise of answering all the typical challenges that non-physicalists have issued against standard versions of physicalism, while not giving up physicalism's commitment to the non-existence of fundamental mentality. However, it has been argued that Russellian physicalism must endorse the existence of physically unacceptable protomental properties in order to address these challenges, which would mean giving up on a core physicalist tenet of keeping the fundamental realm untainted by a special relationship to mentality. Against this, I argue (...) that a plausible version of Russellian physicalism can be constructed, which does not posit fundamental properties that are at all protomental in any problematic sense, yet which can explain the existence of subjective experience. This non-protomental Russellian physicalism, which is the only properly-physical version of Russellian physicalism, offers a satisfying solution to the mind-body problem -- including an answer to the conceivability argument -- without sacrificing any of its physicalist credentials. (shrink)

The desire to feel clean and pure might not merely be the absence of contamination and resulting feelings of disgust. Instead, it might have a social function because early in evolution social grooming not only involved improved personal hygiene and cleanliness, but also increased group cohesion. Thus, knowing that one’s body is clean, proper and tidy might have social implications that go beyond morality.

This article further systematizes the existential body, contributing to the ethnographic model of embodied objectivity. It situates embodiment as the foundation of knowledge, demonstrating its underdevelopment in anthropological literature. The paper explores the philosophical relationship between being-in-the-world and Merleau-Ponty’s body-proper, emphasizing the central role of embodied pre-objective signification in representational ethnographic knowing. This aspect is often insufficiently addressed, particularly in light of certain ethnographic applications of the epoché. The paper concludes that, given the oscillatory apprehension of embodiment, (...) the use of terms like “systematizing” and “inter-objectivity” adequately enhances its portrayal as a pre-objective phenomenon rather than an objective one. (shrink)

Human beings pose a problem for Descartes’ metaphysics. They seem to be more than a mere sum of their mental and bodily parts; human beings, Descartes insists, are unions of mind and body. But what does that union amount to? In the first, negative, part of this paper I argue that, by Descartes’ own lights, there is no way for us to answer this question if we are looking for a proper metaphysics of the union. Metaphysics is the (...) job of the intellect; it involves understanding. On Descartes’ considered view, we don’t understand the union; we feel it through the internal senses. In the second, positive, part of the paper I argue that, while Descartes does not give a properly metaphysical account of the union, he does provide a rich phenomenology of it that is of both theoretical and practical interest. Along the way, I suggest a phenomenological reading of a number of important passages that scholars have interpreted as Descartes’ attempt to provide a metaphysics of the union. (shrink)

In this essay, I examine Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche, focusing centrally on his understanding of the Nietzschean “body.” Nietzsche’s status as the culminating figure of Western metaphysics depends on the notion that the body, in Nietzsche’s thought, is the last Western subject. I confirm Heidegger’s sense of the importance of the Nietzschean body, and, in particular, the centrality of the word “incorporation”, to a proper understanding of Nietzsche. I argue, however, through a critique of Heidegger’s own (...) understanding of “incorporation” in Nietzsche’s work, that an investigation of the body in Nietzsche does not reveal him to be an unwilling participant in the metaphysical tradition beyond which Heidegger seeks to move; rather, we should see in the Nietzschean body a human finitude that has more resonances in Heidegger’s own thought than Heidegger would care to admit. Ultimately, I show, an investigation of the actual dynamics of the Nietzschean body, as read through the careful tracing of the word “incorporation” to which Heidegger invites us, yields a fundamentally delimited body that operates according to what we might call a kind of physiological asceticism. (shrink)

Fictional names present unique challenges for semantic theories of proper names, challenges strong enough to warrant an account of names different from the standard treatment. The theory developed in this paper is motivated by a puzzle that depends on four assumptions: our intuitive assessment of the truth values of certain sentences, the most straightforward treatment of their syntactic structure, semantic compositionality, and metaphysical scruples strong enough to rule out fictional entities, at least. It is shown that these four assumptions, (...) taken together, are inconsistent with referentialism, the common view that names are uniformly associated with ordinary individuals as their semantic value. Instead, the view presented here interprets names as context-sensitive expressions, associated in a context of utterance with a particular act of introduction, or dubbing, which is then used to determine their semantic value. Some dubbings are referential, which associate names with ordinary individuals as their semantic values; others are fictional, which associate names, instead, with sets of properties. Since the semantic values of names can be of different sorts, the semantic rule interpreting predication must be complex as well. In the body of the paper, I show how this new treatment of names allows us to solve our original puzzle. I defend the complexity of the semantic predication rule, and address additional worries about ontological commitment. (shrink)

While body modification might generally seem to take the form of denaturalizing a biological given, this article looks at the same practice as normalizing the always already unstable corpus. The dominant discourse of the post-Enlightenment relies on the notion of the centrality of the individual subject within the singular and separate body, where distinctions between self and other are secure. Against this the incidence of monstrosity in general, with its disordered crossing of the boundaries of the proper, (...) offers a gross insult. I look in particular at instances of conjoined twinning to demonstrate that the body can only be regarded as one by a process of material and discursive modification, which nonetheless finally fails to efface the trace of the monstrous other that frustrates the closure of the self-same. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A patient whose case notes had been used, without her permission, during a disciplinary inquiry on the conduct of Wendy Savage (her obstetrician) complained that this was a breach of confidentiality. Her complaint cannot be understood as based on a concern about the possible adverse consequences of this use of the notes: rather, her concern was just with the fact that medical information about her had been made known to others. My concern is with the meaning and status of (...) the right to privacy, to which the Savage patient appealed. Such a right cannot be reduced to a property right, since this cannot capture what concerned the Savage patient. A proper understanding of what lies behind her complaint requires us to recognise the way in which facts about oneself—in this case facts about one's body—are intimately bound up with one's self, with one's identity, and thus with one's autonomy. What kinds of fact, and thus what conception of the self, are involved in such a conception of privacy need not everywhere be the same; the crucial point is that privacy and the self are concepts which, whatever their particular content, are internally related [1]. (shrink)

Aristotle differentiates not just soul from body, but proximate from remote matter. Yet Aristotle can be easily misunderstood as holding that the body of the human being is essentially biological in nature, and that the human differs from the beast only in having an immaterial intellect. On the contrary, I show that for Aristotle even the form of embodiment in humans is different from the form of bestial embodiment, and that human embodiment cannot be adequately understood in the (...) biological way appropriate for understanding bestial bodies. Rather, the form of embodiment proper to humans is habit. (shrink)

Martin Buber has always made it clear that his dialogic principle is not to be treated as an abstract conception but an ontological reality. But admittedly, in I And Thou he could only point to such reality and could not properly present it in discursive prose. However there are instances in the text where he strives to do the latter. One particular instance is where he elaborates the emergence of consciousness of “I”. Through this elaboration, what Buber has tried to (...) point at is the bringing forth of the primary word ‘I-It’ forming part of his dialogic principle, as it ‘emerges round about’ the perceptual consciousness realised in body as some sort of a ‘primitive function of knowledge’. However, this still amounts only to an abstract conception, and not to a description of ontological reality as Buber would have aspired for. Hence the thought: what if there exists an endeavour carried out independently of Buber’s work, nevertheless in the same spirit as Buber but without his notorious mixing up of philosophy and religion? There indeed has been such an Existential-phenomenological take on embodiment and perception by the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, as is laid out in his magnum opus Phenomenology of Perception. In the present paper we will explicate this interesting coincidence, thereby honouring Buber’s aspiration for ontological status to his dialogic principle, at the same time demonstrating how existentially resonating and ontologically converging the thought of these two great thinkers’ have been, though they had totally different intellectual pursuits and concerns. (shrink)

In a paper titled "Dewey between Hegel and Darwin," Richard Rorty argued that while it is appropriate to describe John Dewey as a radical empiricist and panpsychist, it would be better if we allowed those aspects of his thought to atrophy and eventually disappear. This paper challenges that claim, arguing that properly understood, radical empiricism and panpsychism continue to have a role in a world newly fascinated by the way bodies, minds, experience and nature are all interwoven into a complex (...) organic network. (shrink)

“Body positivity” refers to the movement to accept our bodies, regardless of size, shape, skin tone, gender, and physical abilities. The movement is often implicitly understood as the effort to celebrate diversity in bodily aesthetics and to expand our narrow beauty standards beyond their present-day confines. Like other feminists, I question whether the push to broaden beauty norms should occupy as central a role as it does now in the movement’s mainstream incarnations, and I believe that, beyond challenging confining (...) beauty standards, body positivity should teach us that all bodies are worthy—for example, of care and respect. My aim in this paper is to offer a general account of body positivity. I argue that body positivity should be understood as the transition from limiting body shame to proper body pride. I adopt a pluralistic approach to body positivity, incorporating the idea that we should not only expand aesthetic standards, but also celebrate such aspects of embodiment as our capacity for bodily pleasure or our bodily abilities. What is common to these different ways of developing empowering relations to our bodies is the move to resist all forms of body shame that limit our flourishing and to cultivate proper pride in one’s body. I conclude by considering several avenues toward embodying such pride and, thus, embracing body positivity: expanding beauty ideals; promoting equal access to physical activities and celebrating the accomplishments of all athletes, regardless of body size or level of ability; and consciousness-raising. (shrink)

People diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) may engage in what are called self-injurious acts. This paper situates self-injury within a larger cultural context in which body modifications are differently evaluated according to inscribed meanings. To provide a framework for ethical interactions with people diagnosed as BPD who self-injure, I draw on two concepts from theories of meaning: signification and uptake. I suggest possible significations of self-injury, but argue that clinicians have a duty to give uptake to the patient's (...) own interpretations of her behavior. Proper giving of uptake, which involves responding to others' communications such that the communicator's integrity is preserved, is crucial to ethical practices for clinicians, and uptake is never simply neutral or objective. This analysis suggests that sense-making about a client's self-injurious acts involves an understanding not only of the client's own interpretation of her behavior and its meaning, but also of the discursive production and function of such signs in our culture. I offer five maxims to guide the therapeutic process for clinicians working with self-injurious behavior in BPD patients. (shrink)

It is hard to do justice, in a short reply, to Eyal's excellent review. Accordingly, I will focus on what I take to be its central claim – namely that I fail to give proper consideration to the extent to which the forced extraction of body parts undermines individuals' opportunities for self-respect. According to Eyal, ‘body exceptionalism’ can be defended on the following grounds: ‘People usually see trespass into a person and into objects they associate with a (...) person – especially into a person's body – as utterly disrespectful towards that person and her autonomy’ . And later: ‘Whether or not organ confiscation is truly disrespectful . . . its widespread and intractable perception as a humiliating violation counts heavily against it, because it can thwart opportunities for self-respect’. (shrink)

Through a re-reading of Antigone, I offer a critique of Hegel's use of the story to illustrate the unity which emerges from the representation of sexual difference in ethical life. Using Hegel's own account of habits, as the mechanism by which the body becomes a sign of the self, I argue that the pretense of social unity assumes the proper construction and representation of one body only. This critique is brought to bear upon contemporary moves towards a (...) post-Hegelian ethics of difference. (shrink)

This book uses Western philosophical tradition to make a case for a form of thinking properly associated with ancient China.

In this article a neo-Jamesian approach to the self is developed within a naturalistic, bottom-up, and systemic-relational framework. In this approach, consciousness of the body as one’s own body is a necessary precondition of self-consciousness as psychological self-awareness, and hence of a socially and historically situated narrative self. Thus we take on board the criticism of those accounts of the narrative self that pay little attention to embodiment, or go to the extreme of stating that the narrative self (...) is abstract and hence not embodied. But at the same time, we reject the idea that the embodiment of the narrative self is provided by a pre-reflective self-consciousness. By contrast, we view self-consciousness as a construction all the way down, which develops from automatic and pre-reflective processing of representations of objects (object-consciousness), through awareness and then self-awareness of the body, up to introspective self-awareness and then narrative identity. This form of constructivism is a naturalistic reinterpretation of the Hegelian idea that selfhood is socially constructed and self-experience intersubjectively mediated. However, it enables to move away from that blend of narrativism and epiphenomenism that characterizes some strands of the socio-constructivist approach to the narrative self. The storied Me that the selfing process makes is not “empty chatter”, but rather a causally efficacious layer of personality viewed as a self-unifying system. (shrink)

A company called Biojewellery has proposed to take a sample of bone tissue from a couple and to grow this sample into wedding rings. One of the ethical problems that such a proposal faces is that it implies surgery without medical need. To this end, only couples with a prior need for surgery are being considered. This paper examines the question of whether such a stipulation is necessary. It is suggested that, though medical need and the provision of health and (...) wellbeing is overwhelmingly the warrant for surgical intervention, there is no reason in principle why other, non-medical, projects such as jewellery creation might not also warrant surgical intervention. Implicitly, this line of thought forces us to consider the proper place of surgical intervention—that is, to ask what surgeons are for. (shrink)

During the last two decades, many thinkers on Iranian cinema have had many things to say about censorship, especially the issue of the veil imposed on women’s gender by the authorities in Iran. In this paper, I will describe Hamid Dabashi’s narrative as related to the concept of “truth” to show further that the veil issue has reached a new phase in Iran. Although much of what Dabashi defines as the absented body of women in his article “Body (...) less faces: Mutilating modernity and abstracting women in an ‘Islamic cinema’” may still hold, I believe his over-arching narrative doesn’t contribute enough to our understanding of the new relations among the authorities and actresses’ Fashion styles on red carpets. This paper’s method is connected with cultural and visual studies through Roland Barthes’ semiotics. I first focus on Hamid Dabashi’s conception of “truth” and how he believes “truth” is related to Islamic ideology and embodied in Iranian post-revolutionary cinema to further (through analysing photos of Iranian actresses’ clothing who attend festivals) conclude that Iranian women try to adopt new resistances in choosing their costumes compared to the early two decades of post-revolutionary Iran. The presence of Iranian women in festivals especially regarding what they wear has established a new interwoven relationship with authorities which has somewhat not been surveyed properly. By surveying the photos of their fashion and style I conclude that they are in constant negotiation with authorities through what they rebelliously wear. (shrink)

Cognitive systems research has predominantly been guided by the historical distinction between emotion and cognition, and has focused its efforts on modelling the “cognitive” aspects of behaviour. While this initially meant modelling only the control system of cognitive creatures, with the advent of “embodied” cognitive science this expanded to also modelling the interactions between the control system and the external environment. What did not seem to change with this embodiment revolution, however, was the attitude towards affect and emotion in cognitive (...) science. This paper argues that cognitive systems research is now beginning to integrate these aspects of natural cognitive systems into cognitive science proper, not in virtue of traditional “embodied cognitive science”, which focuses predominantly on the body’s gross morphology, but rather in virtue of research into the interoceptive, organismic basis of natural cognitive systems. (shrink)

Numerous scholars have signalled that neo-pagan practitioners use their body and their senses to interact with the divine and elaborate a spiritual experience. However, the learning process followed to achieve and produce a sensing body capable of communicating with summoned entities has not been properly assessed, until very recently. For over a decade, I have conducted ethnographic research on neo-pagan ritual practices held at European megalithic sites to understand how practitioners learn to co-construct their somatic experiences culturally. Collected (...) data allowed me to develop a model I called somatic pedagogy, which is a progressive sensory learning process applied by ritual specialists organizing practices. In this review article, I present a synthesis of published material where I have developed this model extensively. Specifically, I will go through the elements that permit this kind of somatic education to be implemented within analysed practices: the specificities of neo-pagan ontologies about the human body and world, the potential of neo-pagan rituals to function as learning sites, and the main stages of this progressive bodily education. (shrink)

In this essay, I use the theological anthropology of the apostle Paul as a diagnostic lens in order to bring into focus some implicit assumptions about human personhood in the goals and methods of treatment with psychotropic medications. I argue that Paul views the body as a mode of participation in larger relational matrices in both vulnerable and vital ways. He thus sees the self as constituted relationally rather than as fundamentally isolated and self-determining. Such an understanding of personhood (...) yields an account of human agency as co-constituted and freedom as interpersonally mediated and sustained. From this perspective, the proper goal for psychiatric medication is the removal of barriers to life-giving human connections; methods of care for persons in psychological distress may include medication, but they also require embodied personal encounter. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:One Body: An Essay in Christian Sexual Ethics by Alexander R. PrussBenedict M. Guevin O.S.B.One Body: An Essay in Christian Sexual Ethics. By Alexander R. Pruss. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013. Pp. ix + 465. $45.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-0-268-03897-7.As a professor of moral theology in general and of sexual ethics in particular, I found Alexander Pruss’s largely philosophical account of sexual ethics (...) to be refreshing. As much as I try to dissuade my students from using religious legalism to justify the rightness or wrongness of certain sexual practices, I find it almost impossible to break them of the bad habit of using such phrases as “Because the Church teaches...” or “Because the Bible says...”. Even when I counter by saying, “The Church teaches that something is good because it is good and not because the Church says it is good, and such goodness is grounded in the natural law and a sound anthropology,” such legalism still persists. And so, to read Pruss’s extensive analysis of sexual ethics using both personalist and Thomistic principles as well as what we have received from divine revelation is a much-needed tonic not only for students of theology and philosophy but for all those interested in discovering the role of human reason and biology in crafting a sexual ethic.After an introduction, the proper beginning of Pruss’s analysis is found in chapter 2. Here, the author discusses love and its forms with a particular focus on the meaning of agapē in the New Testament. Pruss argues that, philosophically speaking, we should love everyone. But love should not be understood as monolithic. There are various kinds of love: agapē, philia, and erōs. The New Testament understanding of agapē contains the other two, for it is love itself. This kind of love is a love that loves the other as the other is, for the other’s sake, and in a way that is appropriate to that person in the light of objective facts. Moreover, this kind of love is not simply a feeling or an emotion but is concentrated in an action that is an expression of one’s will.In chapter 3, Pruss takes up the issue of desire. He evaluates desire in two ways: (1) desire and libido, and (2) sexual desire, need, and pleasure. He [End Page 485] concludes that sexual desire is not a need in the same way that we desire food, drink, communication, love, and to be loved. Without these latter, human life would be seriously lacking or, in the case of food and drink, quickly cut short. Second, he observes that circumstances may not be appropriate for fulfilling one’s sexual desire. Finally, while human life would be seriously compromised by the lack of food, drink, communication, love, and the need to be loved, abstaining from the fulfillment of sexual desire even over a long period of time would not be detrimental to human well-being in the same way.Pruss does not imply by the preceding that sexuality does not matter. Chapter 4, in fact, deals with the meaningfulness of sexuality. There are two sets of rules regarding sexuality and its expression. Some rules are moral in nature, like the prohibition against rape. Other rules are customs, for example, the exchanging of rings after the exchange of marital vows. With respect to the moral rules regarding sexuality, Pruss highlights casual sex, sexual assault, gay rights, and romantic love. Apart from sexual assault and rape—both of which lack consent—casual sex, homosexual sex, and romantic love have the following in common, namely, that sex is indeed innately important to human beings and that sex aspires to be romantic in nature. While, as in the case of casual sex, romantic love does not necessarily give rise to true love, romantic love is often the prelude to a deep and unique form of love. Why this is so has to do with the meaning of sexual union.Sexual union is the topic of chapter 5, presented under the title “One Flesh, One Body.” Scripture, Pruss affirms, describes the person as... (shrink)

For the past two decades, the issue of the body and essentialism has dominated feminist theory. In general, it is assumed that the body has been devalued and repressed by the Western metaphysical tradition. In this article, I make two claims to the contrary. First, as poststructuralist theory has tirelessly demonstrated, Western thought has continually tried to ground thought in some foundational substance, such as the body. Second, the most provocative, fruitful and radical aspects of recent feminism (...) and poststructuralism concern the event of incorporeality. What makes incorporeality such an urgent issue is its tie with anti-foundationalism. If there is not a direct or proper passage between what is and what is thought, then thinking can be considered as a force or event in its own right. By disrupting the traditional philosophical series that ties thought to some grounding body, thinkers as diverse as Deleuze, Derrida, Irigaray and Foucault have opened the possibility of a theory of the incorporeal. (shrink)

According to the bodily awareness thesis (BAT), awareness of one’s own body is a necessary condition for the acquisition and possession of concepts of primary qualities such as force and shape. I discuss two arguments for this thesis. The acquisition argument for BAT focuses on the role of bodily sensation and action in the acquisition of the concept of force. I suggest that this argument requires us to conceive of the content of sensation as both representational and non–conceptual. The (...) objective reality argument for BAT claims that awareness of one’s own body is an essential component of those experiences which are required for a proper grasp of concepts of primary qualities. I conclude by arguing, in opposition to Sartre and Merleau–Ponty, that there is no incoherence in the idea that one’s body is a thing among other things. (shrink)

In this article, the author examines the work of the Neo-Confucian thinker Zhou Dunyi , particularly his seminal essay, "Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate" , as a key articulation of the anthropocosmic vision that underlies the traditional Chinese practice of taijiquan. Although often associated with Daoism, the art of taiji actually draws on cosmological principles widely shared by followers of all Chinese schools of thought. Through a careful reading of Zhou's essay, it becomes apparent that Zhou is (...) deeply versed in this very ancient pan-Chinese cosmic vision, giving his essay a decidedly mystical air. However, Zhou also takes pains to give his essay a distinctive Confucian flavor by stressing the necessity of human moral action in establishing proper cosmic balance. This marriage of the more mystical and practical/ moral suggests that Zhou himself may have been a practitioner of some form of taijiquan, as that are functions by combining both aspects of Chinese philosophy. Whether this suggestion is true or not, however, Zhou's "Explanation" stands as perhaps the best articulation of the "essence" of taiji found in traditional sources. (shrink)

Patients with the controversial diagnosis of body integrity identity disorder report an emotional discomfort with having a body part that they feel should not be there. This discomfort is so strong that it interferes with routine functioning and, in a majority of cases, BIID patients are motivated to seek amputation of the limb. Although patient requests to receive the best available treatment are generally respected, BIID demands for amputation, at present, are not. However, what little has been said (...) in the ethics literature on the subject tends to favour doing so in cases of BIID. The general argument is that BIID demands should be respected, first, because of the importance that is already placed on respecting autonomy in medical decision-making contexts and second, because of the potential harm of not providing amputation coupled with the fact that no alternative means of relieving suffering exists. The defence of the right to self-demanded amputation is thus typically supported by the use of analogies with other unproblematical cases in order to show that the denial of BIID patient demands is inconsistent with conventional medical norms and practices. This paper criticises the appropriateness of the particular analogies that are thought to shed light on the allegedly unproblematical nature of BIID demands and argues that a proper understanding of the respect for autonomy in the medical decision-making context prohibits agreeing to BIID demands for amputation. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to analyze the significance of the absence of the problem of living body in Heidegger's analytic of Dasein. In order to evaluate the occurrences of the problem of the body in Being and Time, I also refer to the context of some of Heidegger's later work where there is to be found a sketch of an ontological investigation of the living body. I analyze then in detail the scarce occurrences of (...) class='Hi'>body in the fundamental ontology, showing finally that the lack of a proper phenomenological examination of living body generates a series of conceptual difficulties for the problem of Dasein's death, precisely when the issue of dead body is at stake. (shrink)

This article concerns the problem of assessing selected body compo- sition parameters after completion of antitumor therapy and comparing them with the same parameters of healthy children. A high percentage of overweight and obesity, as well as abnormal fat distribution in convalescents with cancer shows a significant adverse effect of therapy on body composition and suggests the need for early intervention in terms of diet and exercise, which would help patients to quickly achieve the proper parameters of (...) body composition. Two main problems will be mentioned during the presented data analysis. Firstly, in each group there was a small number of observations. Because of this, the real differences between examined subgroups may have been omitted. Secondarily, many variables are correlated and are not normally distributed. Therefore, be- side the standard statistical tests to compare two groups, principal component analysis was applied to reduce the dimensions of the attribute space and to attempt to classify two groups of patients. (shrink)

The contribution of the body to cognition and control in natural and artificial agents is increasingly described as “off-loading computation from the brain to the body”, where the body is said to perform “morphological computation”. Our investigation of four characteristic cases of morphological computation in animals and robots shows that the ‘off-loading’ perspective is misleading. Actually, the contribution of body morphology to cognition and control is rarely computational, in any useful sense of the word. We thus (...) distinguish (1) morphology that facilitates control, (2) morphology that facilitates perception and the rare cases of (3) morphological computation proper, such as ‘reservoir computing.’ where the body is actually used for computation. This result contributes to the understanding of the relation between embodiment and computation: The question for robot design and cognitive science is not whether computation is offloaded to the body, but to what extent the body facilitates cognition and control – how it contributes to the overall ‘orchestration’ of intelligent behaviour. (shrink)

This piece brings into critical conversation Christian resurrection hope, virtual versions of transhumanism, and intellectual disability and demonstrates that Christian resurrection provides a more cogent hope for people with severe intellectual disabilities than transhumanism. I argue that transhumanist virtual futures are theologically problematic, as bodily resurrection is neither required nor desirable. It is particularly problematic for people with severe intellectual disabilities given the way they would be excluded from these futures. Disability theology also raises issues with the traditional notions of (...) “healing” in the resurrection and the implications for the value and identity of persons with intellectual disabilities. Starting with these problems, I explore the nature of Christian hope, noting the inadequacies of a virtual transhumanist future with respect to both resurrection faith and intellectual disability, and address how resurrection hope can account for issues raised in disability theology, and so properly include people with intellectual disabilities. (shrink)

In his Confessions, Augustine says that he achieved great intellectual insight from what he cryptically calls the “books of the Platonists.” Prior to reading these books, he was a corporealist and was unable to conceive of incorporeal beings. Because of the insurmountable philosophical problems corporealism caused for the Christian belief he was seeking, Augustine claims that this was the greatest intellectual barrier he faced in converting to Christianity. As such, the specific contents and effects of these Platonist books are of (...) great biographical and philosophical interest. Heretofore, the explanation of the contents and effects of these books has not been forthcoming. This essay aims to supply it. I argue that Augustine learned the mereological distinction between pertensive and entensive presence in the books of the Platonists. This distinction is required for properly conceiving of incorporeal beings. In support of this thesis, I show that Augustine himself says that he learned this very distinction, that the distinction is present in Platonist texts that scholars agree were among “the books of the Platonists,” that the distinction is present in one of Augustine’s earliest works, and that this distinction is uniquely capable of resolving the philosophical difficulties he faced as a corporealist. (shrink)

Fanon's conception of the body schema plays a central role in his philosophy. The body schema is the body's “grasp” or “sense” of itself. Fanon argues that in the encounter between the Black and white person the body schema “crumbles,” so that the Black person experiences herself as object‐like in various ways. Fanon's focus is the Black person's experience because his aim is to provide the Black person with tools for emancipation. Nevertheless, his account raises the (...) question: What happens to white self‐awareness within the colonial system? I argue that a proper understanding of Fanon's notion of the body schema provides an answer. The body schema underpins awareness of other people, not just one's bodily self. It is the self‐other experiential system that crumbles in the colonial system. Thus, we can supplement Fanon's account of Black self‐experience as object‐like with a description of white experience as tending toward solipsism, where this is the other side of the Black self‐awareness that Fanon describes. Both forms of awareness result from degraded reciprocity. Whilst they are not the same, they are nevertheless complementary parts of a defective relation between people. (shrink)

In Sri Lanka’s armed conflict, gender, sexuality, and sex work are intermeshed with militarized nationalism. Militarization entrenches gender performances and heteronormative schemes while enabling women to transgress these—whether as combatants or as sex workers. Familiarly, in this nationalist encounter, women are expected to safeguard culture, notably through proper dress and sexual conduct. Sexualactivity that challenges containment arouses anxiety because loyalty to military groupor communal boundary can be compromised. Drawing on three examples—adress codecall by a Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (...) women’s wing, consequences for a woman alleged to be a sex worker, and the public stripping of an alleged suicide bomber at a military checkpoint—this article explores how gendered behaviors and sexualities marked as culture are constructed and controlled in the interests of militarized, nationalist projects; how women can be both agents and objects of these controls; and the implications for women who refuse to comply. (shrink)

AimTo examine the association of body mass index (BMI) [kg/m2] and its classifications (underweight [BMI < 18.5], normal [18.5 ≤ BMI < 25], overweight [25 ≤ BMI < 30], and obese [BMI ≥ 30]) with brain structure in individuals with a wide range of BMI group.Materials and methodsThe participants included 382 right-handed individuals (mean age: 46.9 ± 14.3 years, 142 men and 240 women). The intelligence quotient was assessed using the Japanese Adult Reading Test. Voxel-based morphometry (VBM) and diffusion (...) tensor imaging (DTI) were performed to analyze the association of BMI and its classifications with gray and white matter structures, respectively.ResultsAccording to VBM, BMI was significantly and negatively correlated with the bilateral cerebellum exterior volumes. In group comparisons, the right cerebellum exterior volume was significantly lower in the overweight or obese group than in the underweight or normal group, while the bilateral cuneus and calcarine cortex, left cuneus, and left precuneus volume was significantly lower in the underweight group than in the non-underweight group. Sex-related stratification analyses for VBM revealed that BMI was significantly and negatively correlated with the bilateral cerebellum exterior volumes only in women. In group comparisons, the left cerebellum exterior volume was significantly lower in obese women than in non-obese women. The left thalamus proper and the right cerebellum exterior volumes were significantly lower in overweight or obese group than in underweight or normal group in men and women, respectively. The bilateral cuneus and calcarine cortex, left cuneus and carcarine cortex, and bilateral cuneus volume was significantly lower in underweight men than in non-underweight men. In contrast, there were no notable findings on DTI.ConclusionOur results suggest association of continuous BMI, being overweight or obese, and being underweight with decreased gray matter volume in individuals with a wide range of BMI group. Furthermore, sex-related differences are seen in the association of BMI and its classifications with regional gray matter volume reductions. Abnormally high or low BMIs may have a negative influence on regional gray matter volumes. (shrink)

Like Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas holds that the rational soul is the substantial form of the human body. In so doing, he takes himself to be rejecting a Platonic version of substance dualism; his criticisms, however, apply equally to a traditional understanding of Cartesian dualism. Aquinas’s own peculiar brand of dualism is receiving increased attention from contemporary philosophers—especially those attracted to positions that fall between Cartesian substance dualism and reductive materialism. What Aquinas’s own view amounts to, however, is subject to (...) debate. Philosophers (such as J. P. Moreland and Scott Rae) have claimed that ‘Thomistic substance dualism’ (TSD) centers around two beliefs: (1) the rational soul is an immaterial substance, and (2) this immaterial substance is the human person. In this paper, I argue that labeling such an account ‘Thomistic’ proves dangerously misleading—not only does Aquinas himself explicitly deny both of these claims, but he denies them for philosophically significant reasons. Furthermore, I argue that Aquinas’s own position provides an account of human nature both more coherent and philosophically attractive. (shrink)

Proper attention to the theme of corporeality is crucial for understanding Derrida’s analysis of Hegel in “The Pit and the Pyramid.” This article argues that Derrida’s essay compels us to face the impossibility of giving a wholly coherent account of embodiment. The _Aufhebung_ supposedly unites the exteriority of the corporeal with interiority in a higher unity that cancels and preserves them both; Hegel’s own text reveals, however, that meaning is primordially absent from the body that was thought to (...) incarnate it. And it is this absence of ideal meaning that is originary: Differance conditions the body as it conditions speech, rendering the body other than itself such that it is not categorizable as flesh that is the self or as an object that is not the self. I am and am not my body because the dichotomy between interiority and exteriority breaks down even at the level of the body. Indeed, I am and am not my self; the embodied self is disrupted from the start, never self-contained. Thus embodiment always already testifies to the other. (shrink)

소수의 유물론자를 제외한다면, 17세기 심신관계 논쟁은 대개 심신합일의 방식을 둘러싸고 이루어진다. 결합되는 신체 범위는 주요 논란거리가 아니었는데, 각자에게 자기 신체는 너무 직접적으로 의식되기 때문이다. 그럼에도 데카르트는 유명한 광기 가설을 통해 내 정신과 결합되는 신체의 정체를 물은 바 있다. 그리고는 이 신체를 “내 것”이라 부를 권리를 이성이 아닌 “자연의 가르침”에 귀속시킨다. 본고는 데카르트가 합리적 증명의 영역 밖으로 밀어낸 심신 합일의 문제를 스피노자가 어떻게 합리성의 권역 안으로 끌어들이는지 검토한다. 먼저 “우리는 어떤 물체가 많은 방식으로 변용됨을 느낀다”라는『윤리학』 2부 서두의 생경한 공리는 우리가 보기에 (...) 데카르트의 도달점이다. 이후 스피노자는 13개의 정리를 거쳐 이 “어떤 물체”가 “인간 신체”임을 증명한다. 그 다음 자연학 소론에서는 물체들이 환경과의 관계에 정체성이 의존하는 가변적이고 상대적인 단위임을 보여준다. 그런데 우리 느낌을 근거로 도출된 우리자신의 신체와, 다른 물체들과 양태적으로만 구별되는 자연학적 물체 사이에는 괴리가 있어 보인다. 아울러 ‘느낌’을 근거로 한 정리 13의 인간 신체 연역은 합리적 증명으로 볼 수 없을 것 같다. 우리는 정리 13의 “인간 신체”가 흔히 생각하듯 고유한 신체로서의 “내 신체”일 수 없음을 논증하고, 스피노자가 말하는 ‘느낌’의 특수성을 통해 위의 두 문제를 해소한다. 곧 ‘느끼다’란 신체 변용에 상응하는 관념이 ‘있다’는 객관적 사태를 가리키기에, 우선 두 번째 문제가 해소된다. 또한 신체 변용의 관념은 사물들을 판명하게 표상하진 않지만 우리가 다른 사물들과 맺는 규정된 관계들을 함축하기에, 첫 번째 문제가 해소된다. (shrink)

Frédérique de Vignemont argues on the basis of several empirical counterexamples that Bain and Klein are wrong about the relationship between pain and bodily care. I argue that the force of the putative counterexamples is weak. Properly understood, the association between pain and care is preserved in a way that is consistent with both de Vignemont's own views and the empirical facts.

Philosophers and doctors from the period immediately after Aristotle down to the second century CE were particularly focussed on the close relationships of soul and body; such relationships are particularly intimate when the soul is understood to be a material entity, as it was by Epicureans and Stoics; but even Aristotelians and Platonists shared the conviction that body and soul interact in ways that affect the well-being of the living human being. These philosophers were interested in the nature (...) of the soul, its structure, and its powers. They were also interested in the place of the soul within a general account of the world. This leads to important questions about the proper methods by which we should investigate the nature of the soul and the appropriate relationships among natural philosophy, medicine, and psychology. This volume, part of the Symposium Hellenisticum series, features ten scholars addressing different aspects of this topic. (shrink)

This paper advocates learned in the religious context of liberation, the "theology," a concept can be reasonably applied to religious traditions other than Christianity. According to that "beyond the world community and how the phenomenon of contact" as a general theological issues, and Consciousness-only school of Buddhism, one of the major literature of the "photo Mahayana theory of" how to respond to this issue. In the "photo Mahayana theory" in this issue of "inaction of the Dharma Realm to save sentient (...) beings in the phenomenal world and promising" in the form of presentation. This stands for "photo Mahayana theory" to this problem, but through three Buddha body of theory. In short, the body of law to the Buddha Dharma and sentient beings as a contact intermediary. On the one hand, body of law as a Buddha in the phenomenal world to attend the results, which do not transcend the phenomenal world; other hand, the body of law were no wisdom to properly recognize the judicial system, and therefore associated with the Dharma Realm. Further, the body of law can not smell, good enough for practical enlightenment through the body of living beings must engage with the changes in the body, while the body of law and the relationship between the other two, is equivalent to no difference between the intellect and wisdom after that relationship. Finally, the "photo Mahayana theory" liberation school structure and Christianity's "Christology" of relief to make a simple comparison study architecture, and as a conclusion. This paper begins with arguing that within the larger context of soteriology, the notion of "theology" can be legitimately applied to other religious traditions than Christianity. Following this, I propose that the issue of how the realm of transcendence could relate to the realm of phenomenon can serve as an example of a general theological issue across religious boundaries. I then investigate how this issue is discussed in the Mahāyānasamgraha as a seminal text in the Buddhist Yogācāra tradition. In the Mahāyānasamgraha, the above issue is formulated as the question of how unconditioned Dharma-realm could save the sentient beings in the conditioned world. I argue that the asnwer provided in the Mahāyānasamgraha hinges on its theory of three bodies of the Buddha. In short, the Dharma-body bridges between the Dharma-realm and sentient beings. On the one hand, the Dharma-body is the result of a bodhisattva's enduring practice in the phenomenal world, and hence does not transcend over the phenomenal world; on the other hand, the Dharma-body correctly knows the Dharma- realm through the non-discriminating cognition , and hence relates to the Dharma-realm. Furthermore, since sentient beings cannot see the Dharma-body, they can be taught only by the Enjoyment-body and the Transformation-body of the Buddha. The relation between the Dharma-body and the other two bodies is identical to the relation between the non-discriminating cognition and the subsequently-acquired cognition . Finally, this paper ends with a brief comparison between the soteriological scheme in the Mahāyānasamgraha and the scheme reflected in the issue of Christology. (shrink)

A common feature of much recent work done in a variety of disciplines is the foregrounding of embodiment. Thinking in terms of a situated body however, brings up a complex problem which has often been overlooked: the re-importation of a kind of metaphysics of the body or a covert idealism, which stubbornly persists in many such discussions. This is seen in treatments ofthe body as a mediation or as a site for inscription of socio-cultural codings. We will (...) briefly show how even such an influential account ofritualization practices, that of Catherine Bell, shows traces of these problems. The corrective strategy to such conceptions is a properly situational ontology as suggested by Merleau-Ponty's later philosophy and Tim Ingolds critical work on environments. (shrink)

Though the two-world interpretation of Plato's metaphysics is no longer uncontested the question of the expendability of the physical world still predominates current discussions. Against this tendency the article suggests that Plato neither intended to dispose of sensory evidence altogether nor to locate the Forms in a separate realm of pure understanding. The Forms should rather be understood as the ideal principles determining the proper function of each entity. Such a 'functional view' of the Forms is discussed explicitly in (...) Book X of the Republic, but it can easily be extended to account for Plato's use of the Forms elsewhere. (shrink)