This study investigated the beliefs that formed teachers’ intentions to integrate STEM content into their social studies instruction. Participants were 60 elementary, middle, and high school in-service teachers who attended a summer history workshop on Abraham Lincoln. Data were collected by qualitative and quantitative instruments. Beliefs about likely outcomes of integrating STEM, and beliefs about persons who would approve, or disapprove, of STEM integration were elicited from teachers, and content analyzed. The resulting outcome and normative beliefs were used as stems (...) for items in the quantitative instrument. Quantitative data were analyzed primarily by correlation and multiple regression. This study found that attitude toward the behavior, integrating STEM, was formed by 15 outcome beliefs, subjective norm was formed by five normative beliefs, and that attitude and norm predicted behavioral intention. The theory we used enabled us to calculate the numerical contribution of each of the beliefs that were important in forming teachers’ intentions. The results have implications for theory, research, and practice in social studies education. In the realm of practice, these implications are for the initial preparation of, and the subsequent professional development of social studies teachers, both at the elementary and secondary levels. (shrink)

In section III of Pryor 2006a, I argued against the view that the mere fact that a thought- type is hyper-reliable directly gives one justification to believe a thought of that type. A close alternative says that our merely appreciating that the thought-type is hyper-reliable directly gives us that justification.

Dogmatism is a claim about a possible epistemic position, not about the metaphysics of what puts us in that position. So, for example, it leaves it open whether the intrinsic nature of a perceiving subject’s state is the same as that of a hallucinating subject’s state.

Consider the skeptic about the external world. Let’s straightaway concede to such a skeptic that perception gives us no conclusive or certain knowledge about our surroundings. Our perceptual justification for beliefs about our surroundings is always defeasible—there are always possible improvements in our epistemic state which would no longer support those beliefs. Let’s also concede to the skeptic that it’s metaphysically possible for us to have all the experiences we’re now having while all those experiences are false. Some philosophers dispute (...) this, but I do not. The skeptic I want to consider goes beyond these familiar points to the much more radical conclusion that our perceptual experiences can’t give us any knowledge or even justification for believing that our surroundings are one way rather than another. (shrink)

What are reasons? For example, if you’re aware that your secretary plans to expose you, and you resign to avoid a scandal, what is your reason for resigning? Is your reason the fact that your secretary plans to expose you? If so, what kinds of facts are eligible to be reasons? Can merely possible facts be reasons (for actual subjects)? Can merely apparent facts? Or are reasons rather attitudes? Are your reasons for resigning your belief that your secretary plans to (...) expose you, and your desire to avoid a scandal? Or are reasons propositions? If so, which propositions? Only propositions that the subject believes and desires? Only propositions that are true? (On some views, those will be facts; on other views, not.). (shrink)

Something about this argument sounds funny. As we’ll see, though, it takes some care to identify exactly what Moore has done wrong. Iwill assume that Moore knows premise (2) to be true. One could inquire into how he knows it, and whether that knowledge can be defeated; but Iwon’t. I’ll focus instead on what epistemic relations Moore has to premise (1) and to his conclusion (3). It may matter which epistemic relations we choose to consider. Some philosophers will diagnose Moore’s (...) argument using Contextualist machinery. They’ll say. (shrink)

Ambidextrous firms are those that can simultaneously manage exploitative and explorative innovation, which is why ambidexterity is key for firms that desire to pursue strategic entrepreneurship. Researchers have explored many of the reasons why some firms are more ambidextrous than others. However, little attention has been devoted to understanding how attributes of top decision makers can influence their firms' ambidexterity. By drawing on upper echelons theory and goal orientations research, we explain how firms' ambidexterity can be affected by top decision (...) makers' motivations in achievement situations. Testing our hypotheses on a sample of 274 top decision makers of firms in the United States, we find that top decision makers' learning goal orientation – their desire to take risks and maximize learning–has an inverted U-shaped relationship with ambidexterity while top decision makers' performance prove goal orientation – their desire to demonstrate competence with existing skills – has a U-shaped relationship with ambidexterity. These effects are weaker for top decision makers who have greater role experience. (shrink)

I want to talk about a certain epistemic quality that I call “justification,” and inquire whether that quality can ever be had “immediately” or “non-inferentially.” Before we get into substantive issues, we need first to agree about what epistemic quality it is we’ll be talking about, and then we need to clarify what it is to have that quality immediately or non-inferentially. When I say I call this epistemic quality “justification,” you’re liable to think, “Oh I know what that is.” (...) You may. But experience has taught me that different philosophers use and understand the term “justification” differently, even before they start spinning substantive theories about what “justification” amounts to. So we should proceed cautiously. You may use the term “justification” to describe the same epistemic quality as I do; or you may use it to describe some different status or quality. You may use some other term, or no term at all, to describe the quality I call “justification.” I say that you have justification to believe P iff you’re in a position where it would be epistemically appropriate for you to believe P, a position where P is epistemically likely for you to be true. I intend this to be a very inclusive epistemic status.1 Some philosophers say you can know P without “having any justification” for your belief. We can assume that whenever a subject knows P, she’ll be in a position where it’d be epistemically appropriate to believe P. So on my usage, whoever knows P has justification to believe P. (Perhaps she has that justification because she knows.) The philosophers who say otherwise are using “having justification” to mean something different, or more specific, than the epistemic status I am using it to mean. The same goes for philosophers who say a belief can be epistemically appropriate, and so play a role in justifying other beliefs, though you do not “have any justification” for it. On my usage. (shrink)

In this book, Frederic L. Pryor uses the concept of structural complexity to show how changes in the population, the labour force, the structure of industry, the financial system, foreign and domestic trade, and the government sector are related to the same general trend in the US economic system. He also investigates the impact of these changes on the functioning of the system, exploring such matters as the long-term rising unemployment rate, the allegedly increasing volatility of the economy, the (...) changing degree of competition, and the evolving economic role of the government. The discussion is aimed at those who wish to view the economy as a whole and who are concerned with problems of understanding an economy that is becoming increasingly complex along many different dimensions. For specialists a number of appendices discuss a variety of technical issues. (shrink)

I argue that beliefs that are true whenever held-like I exist, I am thinking about myself, and (in an object-dependent framework) Jack = Jack-needn't on that account be a priori. It does however seem possible to remove the existential commitment from the last example, to get a belief that is knowable a priori. I discuss some difficulties concerning how to do that.

Reuven Brandt on parental responsibility and gamete donation.

This article surveys work in epistemology since the mid-1980s. It focuses on contextualism about knowledge attributions, modest forms of foundationalism, and the internalism/externalism debate and its connections to the ethics of belief.

Despite scholars’ early emphasis on the role people play in fostering firms’ absorptive capacity, research has not deeply explored the individual-level antecedents of this important capability. We draw on adaptive-innovative theory to explain how top decision makers’ cognitive styles can influence the degree to which their firms develop AC. Top decision makers who have high adaptive cognitive style prefer to adhere to existing norms, follow established procedures, and rely on current knowledge, and we argue that these attributes will strengthen those (...) dimensions of AC based on firms’ existing knowledge and knowledge-assimilation abilities. Top decision makers who have high innovative cognitive style are more likely to reframe information, experiment with new problem-solving approaches, and take risks by violating norms, and we argue that these attributes may strengthen those dimensions of AC based on firms’ acquisition of new knowledge and the assimilation of knowledge throughout the firm. We also argue that gender differences may moderate these effects. Empirical results support our hypotheses. (shrink)

Soames thinks the dependencies show up in the semantics if they are generated by variable binding. That will only partially overlap with Pinillos's ambitions for the notion of de jure codesignation. This chapter contributes towards 'domesticating' the kind of predicates that fans of de jure codesignation are friendly to, that is, making them seem less alien and somewhat less 'magical'. It surveys a novel kind of semantic structure that has been posited by Mark Richard, Kit Fine, Ángel Pinillos, and others. (...) It focuses on anaphora, especially cases that cannot be handled by a 'bound‐variable' analysis, and distinguishes our target view from other treatments of anaphora. The chapter discusses the semantics of attitude reports and discusses two kinds of complex anaphoric dependency. It explains a difference in how functions in a programming language can be sensitive to the identity of their operands. (shrink)

I argue that Frege Problems in thought are best modeled using graph-theoretic machinery; and that these problems can arise even when subjects associate all the same qualitative properties to the object they’re thinking of twice. I compare the proposed treatment to similar ideas by Heck, Ninan, Recanati, Kamp and Asher, Fodor, and others.

Den danske filosof Frithiof Brandts doktorafhandling blev udarbejdet i Paris og færdiggjort i 1921, hvorefter han blev professor i filosofi. Den tager udgangspunkt i den engelske filosof Thomas Hobbes hovedtanke om 'bevægelse' som naturens grundfænomen. Brandt leverer i sin bog en grundig gennemgang af Hobbes' ide. Desuden rummer bogen argumenter for Hobbes' autonomi i forhold til tidligere betydningsfulde tænkere som Galilei og Descartes. Frithiof Brandt (1892-1968) var en dansk filosof og forfatter. Han beskæftigede sig i løbet af sin (...) karriere både med filosofi og psykologi. Han udgav blandt andet bøger om Hobbes og Kirkegaard - filosoffer, der på hver deres måde, havde afgørende indflydelse på hans egen tænkning. (shrink)

O artigo articula um ponto de convergência entre Foucault e Agamben, de forma a sublinhar uma confluência em seus pensamentos, a saber, a possibilidade de um pertencer nãocomplicado ao profano, ou ao tempo perfeito da experiência humana. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Agamben. Experiência humana. Filosofia política. Foucault. Modernidade.

Is flexibility or formality more useful for organizations that are pursuing improved performance? Organizational structure scholars offer opposing answers to this question, and empirical results have been mixed. Our study contributes to this research by describing a mediational model that links organizational flexibility to performance via opportunity exploitation. Specifically, we argue that flexible firms are able to exploit a greater number of opportunities, which, in turn, can improve performance. We also argue that the indirect effect of flexibility on performance via (...) opportunity exploitation is stronger when top executives display higher affective commitment for their firms, meaning that they have a positive emotional attachment to their firms. Top executives with higher affective commitment can mitigate the downsides experienced by the staff of flexible firms, such as uncertainty and negative affect, which improves the outcomes of flexibility. Drawing on a sample of 211 firms and their founders, we find support for our hypotheses. (shrink)

One area in which the moral philosopher might say something useful for the thinking of economists is that of welfare economics – not by improving formalizations or criticizing proofs as to conditions necessary or sufficient for an optimum situation, much less by suggesting what particular state of society would be optimal. Rather, he can do this by pointing out some distinctions, by suggesting how some terms used by economists can profitably be defined, and by questioning some assumptions which seem to (...) lie behind the thinking of some economists. The following discussion is aimed along these lines. The main goal of the argument will be to produce helpful definitions of “increase the welfare of an individual” and “increase social welfare.”. (shrink)

Die Vorlesung zur Anthropologie oder Menschenkunden, die Kant jeweils im Wintersemester 1772/73 bis 1795/96 hielt, sollte den Studenten zur Orientierung in ihren künftigen Welterfahrungen außerhalb der Universität dienen. Sie ist außerhalb seines eigenen philosophischen Systems angesiedelt und nicht als Philosophie geführt worden. Trotzdem gibt es sowohl in den Vorlesungsnachschriften als auch in dem 1798 von Kant herausgegebenen Buch Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht vielfache Beziehungen zur eigenen Philosophie Kants; in dieser wird jedoch nie eindeutig auf die pragmatische Anthropologie Bezug genommen noch (...) kommen in dieser letzteren die Begriffe "Imperativ", "kategorisch", "transzendentalphilosophisch" vor. Der Kommentar sucht das spannungsreiche Verhältnis der erhaltenen Kantischen Handschrift zum gedruckten Buch zu klären; es werden die werkimmanenten Verknüpfungen herausgearbeitet, Verbindungen zu anderen Kantischen Schriften angezeigt und Quellen und thematische Parallelentwicklungen in der europäischen Literatur erörtert. (shrink)

There is a need to explore educational strategies that translate ethics knowledge into ethical behavior. Commonly used pedagogical approaches steeped in traditional normative ethical theory are less powerful than sensemaking in preparing clinicians to respond to ethical problems in practice. This integrative review of 15 articles explores the use of sensemaking as an instructional method for clinical ethics. Whittemore and Knafl’s :546–553, 2005) integrative review method guided a systematic appraisal of data from both qualitative and quantitative research traditions, synthesizing disparate (...) studies in analyzing literature about the use of sensemaking as a pedagogical approach in teaching ethics. Findings supported the use of Weick’s sensemaking theory to develop instructional methods that encourage ethical decision making in students as well as promote ethical response by health care providers. The review reveals important theoretical and training implications for introducing sensemaking as a means to promote ethical action in clinical practice. (shrink)

Richard Brandt is one of the most eminent and influential of contemporary moral philosophers. His work has been concerned with how to justify what is good or right not by reliance on intuitions or theories about what moral words mean but by the explanation of moral psychology and the description of what it is to value something, or to think it immoral. His approach thus stands in marked contrast to the influential theories of John Rawls. The essays reprinted in (...) this collection span a period of almost 30 years and include many classic pieces in metaethical and normative ethical theory. The collection is aimed at both those moral philosophers familiar with Brandt's work and at those philosophers who may be largely unfamiliar with his work. The latter group will be struck by the lucid unpretentious style and the cumulative weight of Brandt's contributions to topics that remain at the forefront of moral philosophy. (shrink)

Rechtsphilosophie der Aufklärung: Symposium Wolfenbüttel 1981.

This article explores the collaborative research of the Nobel laureate Hans Spemann (1869–1941) and the Swiss zoologist Fritz Baltzer (1884–1974) on problems at the intersection of development and heredity and raises more general questions concerning science and politics in Germany in the interwar period. It argues that Spemann and Baltzer’s collaborative work made a significant contribution to the then ongoing debates about the relation between developmental physiology and hereditary studies, although Spemann distanced himself from _Drosophila_ genetics because of his anti-reductionist (...) position. The article analyzes how Spemann framed the issues of heredity in terms of an epigenetic principle in the context of his work on the “organizer,” and it explores the experimental dynamics of research on newt merogones carried out by Baltzer in a methodological development of Spemann’s constriction experiments. Finally, these research attempts are discussed as part of a broader “prehistory” of the mid-twentieth century cell nuclear transplantation experiments, which provided the basis for later animal cloning. (shrink)

“We had a great conference!” was a comment generally shared by the participants at the last Conference of the International Association for the Psychology of Religion (IAPR) which took place in Gdansk, Poland from 31 August through 3 September 2019. This recent event and the publication, in this issue, of several keynote addresses from this conference, afford an excellent occasion to share some thoughts about IAPR conferences, the G’dansk conference in particular, the state of the IAPR in general, and some (...) considerations and challenges for the future of our organization. (shrink)

Scholars of ethics, and of human behavior more generally, will find this book consistently stimulating and rewarding.